
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HAND-BOOK OF THE DEMOCRACY

FOR

1863 & '64.

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No. 1.

Papers from the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

THE

CONSTITUTION.

ADDRESSES

OF

Prof. MORSE, Mr. GEO. TICKNOR CURTIS, and Mr. S. J. TILDEN,

AT THE ORGANIZATION.

"WHEN A PARTY IN POWER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION AND DISREGARDS STATE-RIGHTS, PLAIN MEN READ PAMPHLETS."

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y.,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

On the 6th of February a number of gentlemen met at Delmonico's, to consult on the best means of diffusing correct political knowledge.

On the 13th of February the same gentlemen, with others, reassembled at the same place, to complete the organization of THE SOCIETY FOR THE DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE—the comprehensive objects of which are set forth in the Constitution adopted.

Prof. S. F. B. Morse, who had been chosen President of the Society at a former meeting, took the chair. Upon calling the meeting to order, he spoke briefly as follows:

Speech of Professor Morse.

GENTLEMEN: I can not take the chair this evening, to which you have been pleased in your kindness to call me, without a few words of definition of my position in relation to the movement which we have inaugurated.

Nothing in these days of our country's trial has so saddened the hearts of patriots, and caused such universal misgiving touching the stability and even the existence of our cherished Government, as the constantly recurring evidences of a deep and wide-spread demoralization, pervading the public mind, to which the rostrum, the press, and, I am sorry to add, the pulpit, in a lamentable degree, lend their powerful influence to strengthen and perpetuate. Fanaticism rules the hour. The *fanatic* is on the throne. I use the term fanatic in no loose sense. Fanaticism is a frenzy, a madness. It is not, as it pretends to be, a zeal springing from enlightened reason, founded on the rock of God's word, but a spirit of the pit, clothing itself in our day in the garb of an angel of light, the better to deceive the minds of the unthinking and the simple. Fanaticism has been well defined, "enthusiasm inflamed by hatred," and the truth of the portrait of the foul fiend is exhibited before us every day.

History, ever repeating itself, as time completes its cycles, has not yet closed its sad volume of disastrous hallucinations. It is preparing its pages and reddening its pen to record the story of the foulest tragedy of earth—the most frightful that is yet to deform the annals of the past.

Can patriotic men, persuaded of such an issue, be silent, be idle? There may be those who fold their arms and shut their eyes, and lull their apprehensions with baseless dreams of a future "visionary, impossible Union," a Union begotten of force and fear, not a Union begotten of peace and love; a Union to be created when the South shall be wiped out of existence, and its soil prepared for Northern colonization; when the Southern earth shall be "without form and void," and has become the desolate habitation for the advent of the

new Northern man. But there are others who have awakened to the realities of the times. They can not but read the portentous signs of a coming destruction. If the poisonous seeds sown for long years by a proud, God-defying infidelity in France, have shown their natural fruits in the bloody dramas of the Reign of Terror, how can we believe that the same seeds, exotic though we hope them to be, yet now flowering in an artificial atmosphere and in a hot-bed made congenial to their rank growth by American infidelity in church and state—how can we believe, I say, that we shall pluck grapes from these thorns, or figs from these thistles?

But what can we do to root out these noxious weeds? We must put machinery in motion adapted to that end. The heresies of the Church must be grappled with by the untainted theologians of the land, for there are thousands of these who have not bowed the knee to the abolition Baal. The heresies of the state can be and must be reached in a constitutional way by the intellects of the country. If I have read the provisions of the Constitution aright, this meeting in its object and its mode of reaching that object, is wholly and completely constitutional. We have, however, been assailed by those whose record and antecedents should not make either the act or the manner of the act surprising to us. We are instructed, however, that charity "rejoiceth not in *iniquity*," and the injunction in this case is salutary, for the temptation is certainly strong to rejoice, rather than to feel indignation at the gross indecency our opponents have thought proper to perpetrate. It is not, indeed, the iniquity of which these libelers have been guilty, and which has drawn down upon them one universal cry of shame from all decent men, that tempts our rejoicing; it is their having given to the public such an unmistakable manifestation of that reckless, unprincipled spirit which is so rife in the ranks of fanaticism, and which it is our own purpose, if possible, to exorcise. True, it is a matter of surprise that the simple, unostentatious, unannounced assemblage of a few gentlemen in a parlor to concert a plan for diffusing knowledge should have been the potent spear of Ithuriel, at once to reveal in proper shape and character, the presence in the community of the demon of fanaticism.

> "Him thus intent, Ithuriel with his spear
> Touched lightly; for no falsehood can endure
> Touch of celestial temper, but returns
> Of force to its own likeness. Up he starts,
> . . . . . .
> Abashed, the devil stood."

Now we are told from the best authority that the devil is "the father of lies." If falsehoods, therefore, are evidence of his presence or his agency, surely the spawning of *forty-three*, at one incubation, entitles the prolific reporter to preëminent distinction in the ranks of the prince of evils.

We have been charged with disloyalty. Men use words very loosely in these times of excitement. What is disloyalty? It is unfaithfulness to the sovereign. Where is our sovereign? Will it be said that it resides in the powers that be, and these we are commanded not to resist? If there are any associated with us who propose to resist the powers that be, I have not been acquainted with them. There is one of the powers that be, and that too the very chief of these powers, which seems to be strangely left out of view in our political discussions in these eventful times. There are some, I understand, who believe the sovereign power to exist in the President; others that it rests in the national, executive, legislative, and judicial bodies collectively, and others, in the States; and many, if not most, have very indefinite and confused ideas of these powers that be. Each of these is a power, and there are many others, each of which, in the legitimate exercise in its proper order of its own delegated duties, is not to be resisted without blame. But it seems to be forgotten that there is a power in the State sovereign to each and all these powers, one to which all of them are subject. Can we overlook the great truth that the very foundation of our governmental system is based on the

sovereignty of the people? Do I mistake or exaggerate when I say that presidents, and governors, and all the departments, whether of State or federal machinery, are all subordinate to the people? Justice Story, in his work on the Constitution, in his concluding remarks, says:

"It (the Constitution) is the language of the people. The people have established it, and spoken their will; and their will, thus promulgated, is to be obeyed as the supreme law of the land. Every citizen has a right to contest the validity of its construction before the proper tribunals, and bring it to the test of the Constitution. And if the case is not capable of judicial redress, still the people may, through the acknowledged means of new elections, etc., check any usurpation of authority, and thus relieve themselves from any grievances of a political nature."

The order, then, of classification of these powers is, first the people, then the State Government, and then the Federal Government. The people in their sovereign capacity and right have absolute power over and above all other powers. The Declaration of Independence, in its mixture of truths, qualified truths, and fallacious maxims, has (so far as our Government is concerned) announced one truth which they who make that document their political bible will not gainsay. "It is the right of the people to alter or abolish (any form of government) and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." Can any political power be conceived more absolute than this? It is supreme over all the other powers. To make the case more plain, if it is necessary, reverse the case, and suppose it to read: "It is the right of the President, or the Federal Government, or any of the States to alter or abolish the Government, etc." There is no such power but in the people. And now to whom are we appealing in forming this Society? To the *supreme power*. We have nothing to do with any of the other powers, but to use them, so far as we may in their several subordinate stations, as means of reaching the sovereign; and we intend reaching his throne with our petition only through the well-known constitutional channels of access. We mean to use our rights of free discussion, and look for the answer to our appeal of the ballot-box.

Is this treason? Is this conspiracy? Is this resisting the powers that be? Is it disloyalty to appeal to the *sovereign*, or to exercise that portion of the sovereign power which of right belongs to us as part of the people?

Hon. George T. Curtis, in reporting a draft of a constitution from the committee to which the subject had been referred, spoke as follows:

Speech of Hon. Geo. T. Curtis.

Mr. President and Gentlemen: Since we last met in this place we have been subjected to a gross, wanton, and unprovoked insult. Nevertheless, sir, I presume that we shall go on in the discharge of our rights and duties as free citizens of this free country, and, according to the advice which Hamlet gave to the courtier, that we shall use our assailants not according to their deserts, but according to our own honor and dignity. The committee, sir, who were instructed to prepare and report a constitution for the permanent organization of this Society, have directed me to present the instrument which I hold in my hand. Before reading it, however, I desire to be indulged in a few remarks which it is due to the character of those who were here at the first preliminary meeting, and who are again now here, I should make with all calmness, but at the same time with firmness and frankness. When respectable men, who are to be presumed to be as pure and patriotic as their neighbors, are assailed as traitors and conspirators, it concerns the public good that their objects and purposes should immediately be made known, in order that no excuses may be left for the indulgence of a foolish credulity, stimulated by falsehood and malignity, and therefore, sir, we have requested the attendance here of a per-

son who exercises the honorable employment of a reporter for the public press in an honorable and upright manner, and respects his own calling, and who will doubtless give a faithful and true account of all that may transpire here that it concerns the public to know.

Mr. President, the immediate causes for the formation of this Association are the prevalence of doctrines subversive of the fundamental principles of civil liberty and tending directly to the overthrow of the Constitution of the United States, and a wide-spread popular ignorance of the true nature and character of the institutions under which we live. Under these circumstances, sir, what are good men to do who love their country and value its institutions, and who are not willing that these doctrines should go on to produce their bad work in the entire disorganization of society? For, sir, but one of two things can occur, either these doctrines must be met by discussion and refutation and by the peaceful operations of the ballot-box, or they must go on until they have completed their mischief, and property, government, social order, and all things else sink into confusion, to be followed by such peace and security as an absolute despotism can bring. Sir, I do not propose on this occasion to enter into any argument respecting any of the questions which have come into such alarming significance within the last eighteen or twenty-four months, or into any extended discussion of the theories which prevail respecting the various powers of the different departments of the government. But I do propose very briefly to indicate the nature of some of these questions and the character and tendencies of some of those theories, in order that those who may be induced to reflect on the condition of our country may see whither we are drifting. You all know that there are annexed to the Constitution of the United States certain amendments, which embody, in the form of fundamental laws, superior and paramount to all executive or legislative or judicial power, the fundamental, inalienable, and indestructible rights of the citizen; and you also know that the generation of men who made that Constitution and transmitted it to us were not willing to have it go into operation without annexing to it those limitations on the powers of the government. Now, sir, it is not necessary to repeat, to recite what these limitations are. But you are aware that it is now claimed that in time of war, and because the country is at war, it is legitimately in the power of the President to disregard all those restrictions and limitations, and practically to set aside and annul all these rights of the citizen. That I do not exaggerate or in any degree mistake the nature and extent of this claim, permit me to read a single sentence from a pamphlet, written, published, and largely circulated in the year 1862, by an American lawyer:

"No citizen, whether loyal or rebel, is deprived of any right guaranteed to him in the Constitution by reason of his subjection to *martial law*, because *martial law* when in force is *constitutional law*."

Now, sir, you are aware that the whole of this position, so far as it could affect the American people, is founded on the assumption that there is wrapped up in that phrase which designates the military capacity of the President as that of commander-in-chief of the army and navy, power to declare martial law by proclamation all over the country, when the country is in a state of war and the President has armies in the field. Having seen the form in which this doctrine is promulgated now in our American age and in this country, let me ask you to go back for an instant to the year 1628 in England, and see how the same doctrine was then stated by an English lawyer upholding the side of arbitrary power upon the same description of reasoning, and the coincidence is astonishing. At a conference between the two houses of Parliament concerning the liberty of the subject, holden April 17, 1628, Mr. Sergeant Ashley, a noted lawyer of that day, held the following language in the presence of the two houses:

"The law martial, likewise, though not to be exercised in time of peace,

when recourse can be had to the king's courts, yet in time of invasion, or other times of hostility, when the royal army is in the field, and offenses are committed which require speedy resolution and can not expect the solemnities of legal trials, then such imprisonment, execution, or other justice done by the law martial is warrantable, for it is then the law of the land, and is *jus gentium*."

I will make no comments, but will simply call to your recollection the fact that the phrase or the thing "martial law" is utterly unknown to the Constitution of the United States; that even Congress — the whole legislative power, the Senate, and the House of Representatives — and the President, acting together, can not make any special mode of arrest or trial applicable to any but persons in the army and the navy, and that as to all other men the Constitution absolutely forbids arrests without due process of law or trials otherwise than by a jury of the vicinage. And yet, sir, we are told that the President of the United States may declare martial law by proclamation, and may subject every citizen to seizure and incarceration by provost-marshal.

Then, sir, there is that other kindred heresy by which the same kind of result is arrived at, but by a somewhat different process. We have all heard a great deal about the doctrine of self-defense on the part of the Government. The right of self-defense — as if Government were a natural person, having all the inherent rights of self-defense which a natural person has; and mixed up with this strangely in men's minds is the idea that the members of the executive government may transcend the law of the land in the exercise of this great inherent right of the government to defend itself, and having transcended the law of the land, and committed an injury upon some citizens, may go to Congress and ask for an indemnity, and so the whole wrong is cured by such indemnity by act of Congress. It is the most singular thing in this world that the American people have not hitherto seen that this idea of resorting to the practice of the British Constitution, and borrowing from it what is called the bill of indemnity, to protect the officers of the government from the reclamations and complaints of the citizen, urged in courts of justice, is utterly inapplicable to our Constitution and our institutions, and that the attempt must repeal it—must pull down the Constitution and destroy those institutions. What is the reason, sir, that in England the executive government can in moments of great emergency and in seasons of great public peril, overstep for the moment the positive law of the land, and then, consistently with the principles of that government, receive what is called an indemnity from Parliament — that is, protection and pardon for the act, and thus the remedy of the citizen be cut off? It is solely and simply because it has always been a received principle of that government, that Parliament — the three branches of the Legislature acting together — make and unmake the constitution at their pleasure, and the fundamental reason is that they have no written constitution, but their constitution is an unwritten one. So that when any officer of the government has overstepped the law of the land from right public motives, and in a season of great emergency and peril, it is according to the practice and according to the legitimate theory of their constitution that an indemnity may be granted, for whatever Parliament solemnly enacts in the form of law is constitution. They may set aside the constitution in any particular by act of Parliament—so much so that they may change the descent of the crown, or make the heir apparent a beggar at any moment. But no such thing as that can be done in this country, for the simple reason that we have a written Constitution, which is paramount to all legislative authority and all legislative power — over which Congress has no more control, and in respect to which, where it guarantees rights to the citizen, Congress can no more act to take away the remedy than it can undertake to legislate respecting the condition of things in the provinces of the British empire. If it were not so, it would be in the power of Congress at any time to set aside first one provision of the Consti

tution and then another, and so to go on until they had frittered away or overturned the whole of it.

Then there is that great mischievous heresy with respect to the power of the President to annul the writ of *habeas corpus*. It will always remain a serious discredit to the administration of Mr. Lincoln, that having to establish the first precedent on that subject since the establishment of the Constitution, they should have made that precedent in the wrong way, and thus have introduced a train of mischiefs in this country which are incalculable in extent, and of which no man can see the result. Why, sir, look at it for a moment. When these questions first rose in the path of the administration, nothing could have been more simple for them to do, nothing more necessary than to go to Congress, not only to ask for proper authority to suspend the writ, but to define that suspension and regulate it, to determine just how far the writ should run, just when and where the judge should stay his hand in prosecuting an inquiry, and on what certificate, and on what facts he should close the inquiry. And, sir, it is within my personal knowledge that some of the members of the administration at the extra session of Congress in 1861—at least the highest law-officer of the Government was implored to take that course, and had they taken it there is no amount of assistance from the best legal minds in the country which they could not have had at the asking, to have framed the proper law for that subject. I appeal to you, Mr. Tilden—I believe you are the only one of my brethren I see in the room—I appeal to you to confirm my statement when I say that no judge in the land can now receive judicial information on which he can act, that the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended. What is the present state of things? The writ issues—some body comes into court, some military officer, and instead of making a return and bringing up the petitioner, undertakes to inform the judge that the President says that the writ is suspended. What does suspension mean under those circumstances? What are its limitations? What is its operation? Suppose the petitioner asks to be brought up, saying: "The Constitution guarantees to me, if I am accused of crime, a speedy and impartial trial in the State and district wherein the crime is said to have been committed. I have been incarcerated for eighteen months in a loathsome dungeon, and refused all redress." Is the writ suspended to close that inquiry? And yet that is the necessary consequence of this doctrine of executive suspension of the writ. Those are the reasons, sir, why it is one of the most lamentable, one of the greatest calamities that has ever befallen this country that Mr. Lincoln's administration should have set this precedent in the wrong direction.

Mr. Samuel Tilden said: My friend will excuse me for a moment. I will state that happening to be in Washington just about the period when this question rose, and being spoken with upon the subject by a member of the administration, I advised him that he would have no protection of law in acting upon the assumption that the writ of *habeas corpus* was or could be suspended in this mode, that he had better have just as little to do with it as possible, because when the momentary excitement was over, even if acts of this character were necessary, if arrests and detentions were necessary, he would find it wholly impracticable for him to set up any ground of offense against the several forms of redress that might be sought on the part of the person imprisoned. The suspension if validly made could operate, not to annul the other clauses of the Constitution to which Mr. Curtis has referred, or to suspend them, but simply to enable persons to be arrested and detained—that it did not touch the mode of trial and of punishment. Now, in my own judgment, it was absolutely necessary, as well for the safety of the citizen as for the convenience and fair action of the government, that the whole thing should have been defined by legislative action. It was a mistake of the most extraordinary character, resulting, I presume, from the entire want of acquaintance on the part of the law

officer of the government with the subject of constitutional law, and the fact that the acts had been already committed, and were to be justified when his opinion was asked, and not any future action to be determined.

Mr. Curtis continued: I had no doubt as to what view must be taken by the gentleman, although I never exchanged a word with him on the subject in my life. I have said that this is a very unfortunate occurrence. It has interrupted the chain of that steady, safe, constitutional, and only regular and legitimate line of precedents that had come down to us from our British ancestors for many generations. In five reigns in England, if I remember rightly, the writ of *habeas corpus* has been suspended seven times, always by act of Parliament, always by a statute regulating it, defining it, and determining with the utmost precision what is the duty of the judge under such circumstances.

Then there is that other great heresy which may be called the war measure heresy, as if the Constitution were a thing made of India-rubber, to be stretched in one direction in time of peace and in another direction in time of war, or as if we had one Constitution for a state of peace and another Constitution for a state of war. And so we constantly hear it said, no matter what your complaints are about constitutional provisions—no matter what you may question, or what you may suggest or say, "Oh! that is of no consequence — this is a war measure," and thus it is justified. So one might go on through half of the entire night, respecting these extraordinary ideas which have crept into the minds of educated men, and which they have instilled into the popular mind. There is one especially extraordinary, and, in my judgment, equally dangerous idea—and that is, that the rights of the States will take care of themselves, when the war is over, and things will all fall back to their normal condition. Let us look at that for a moment. Here is the militia — the relations to which of the general government and of the States are defined with the utmost precision by the Constitution—and where there was any room for doubt as to the respective practical duties and rights of either government, all that has been, since the war of 1812, settled by judicial decision of the Supreme Court. Suppose, as is perhaps not unlikely, that the bill shall pass Congress, putting the whole control — constitutional provision or no constitutional provision — of the militia of the several States into the hands of the General Government, or, as I have heard it expressed, putting the sword effectually into the hands of the President. You go on in that state of things throughout this war, you go on to a termination of it, whatever that termination may be. Where is the militia then? What precedent has then been established, and what construction by reason of such a precedent acquiesced in—if it has been acquiesced in by the States and people — has the Constitution received at the hands of all the branches of Government and of the States? Why, a construction which does place and leave the whole "sword" of the whole country in the hands of the President of the United States. "The rights of the States will take care of themselves," we are told, and it is very idle, foolish, and somewhat treasonable talk to think any thing about the rights of the States or say any thing about them. Well, there is actually pending in Congress a bill which proposes to annihilate the jurisdiction of the State courts over personal actions for wrongs and injuries upon the suggestion only by the defendant, when he comes into court, that what he has done and what is complained of was done by order of the President of the United States. Actually, it is proposed that if any man sues another citizen of the same State for a personal wrong or injury in a court of the State—nay, sir, it extends to criminal proceedings also as well as civil — the cause shall instantaneously be transferred into the Federal courts on the suggestion only by the defendant that what he did was done by order of the President. Suppose that takes effect. Suppose that is acquiesced in. What construction have the powers of the General Government *then* received at the hands of all the departments of Govern

ment and at the hands of the people in reference to that? That the entire jurisdiction of the State courts over personal wrongs as between citizen and citizen is stricken out of existence, when it is set up in defense, that the President ordered the act to be done. These theories have exerted and are exerting a most mischievous effect on the power of the Administration to cope with the public enemy; and I need not say how they have divided the public sentiment and the feeling of the North. I need not say how necessary they have made it that these things should undergo discussion, should be brought to the issue of the ballot-box. There is a vulgar error prevalent among a certain class of second-rate statesmen, that violence is strength. It is a lamentable mistake, and in constitutional countries and in countries which are under the control of constitutional principles, it is the falsest suggestion upon which men could possibly act. No government in any constitutional country is strong, powerful, able to discharge its duty to the utmost, able to call forth all the resources of the people for the accomplishment of any great public object, that does not faithfully and strictly pursue the fundamental law of the land. Bear with me, sir, one moment longer, while I endeavor to say why it is that I feel every infraction of the Constitution as if it were a wound inflicted upon my own body or a wrong done to my own soul. It is not, sir, I assure you, because I have endeavored in some humble and imperfect way to explore the foundations of our liberties and to explain them to my countrymen. It is because I feel in every fiber of my existence that this is the last written Constitution we shall ever have. It is because I feel an innate and undying conviction that if you suffer that instrument to be overborne — that if you acquiesce in serious and great infractions of its provisions—you will throw every thing into a state of entire confusion, and there will be an end of this experiment of self-government founded on and residing in the text of a written Constitution, explained, illustrated, and enforced by the peaceful operation of a supreme judiciary. I do not forget, sir, that the Southern Confederacy, so called, have framed for themselves a written Constitution founded on that of the United States as a model, and with some amendments which may be of more or less theoretical or practical value; but, sir, it does seem to me that no one can look at their condition and prospects without seeing that, although in point of form they may, if they succeed in obtaining their independence and can maintain their position, go on ostensibly under a written constitution, that their government must necessarily and will inevitably be a military government and be conducted by force. God forbid, sir, that we should follow that example. Let us take care how we acquiesce in any infractions of the Constitution.

Let us take care how we fail to do our utmost to instruct and enlighten the people, and to cause them to reverence and to cling to it as the great salvation rock. (Applause.)

With these remarks, sir, I beg leave to read the Constitution for this Society, which the Committee have instructed me to report.

Mr. Curtis then read the following draft of a Constitution, which was unanimously adopted as the Constitution of the Society:

CONSTITUTION.

ARTICLE I.

This Society shall be styled *The New-York Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge.*

ARTICLE II.

The objects of the Society shall be to disseminate a knowledge of the principles of American constitutional liberty; to inculcate correct views of the Constitution of the United States, of the powers and rights of the Federal Government, and of the powers and rights reserved to the States and the people; and generally to promote a sound political education of the public mind; to the end that usurpations may be prevented, that arbitrary and unconstitutional measures may be checked, that

the Constitution may be preserved, that the Union may be restored, and that the blessings of free institutions and public order may be kept by ourselves, and be transmitted to our posterity.

ARTICLE III.

The officers of the Society shall consist of a President, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and three Standing Committees, who shall be chosen annually. The Standing Committees shall be a Committee on Publications, to consist of seven members, and a Committee of Finance, to consist of ten members; and these two committees shall constitute the Executive Committee of the Society, of which the President, the Treasurer, and the Secretary shall be members *ex officiis*. Each committee may fill vacancies in its own body.

ARTICLE IV.

The Executive Committee shall have the general direction of the operations and measures of the Society in the promotion of its objects; but no pamphlet, book, or other publication shall be circulated or issued in the name or under the auspices of the Society without being first approved by the Committee on Publications; and no person shall deliver a lecture or other public address in the name or under the auspices of the Society without first receiving a written appointment therefor from the Chairman of the said Committee on Publications.

ARTICLE V.

The Committee on Finance shall collect funds for the use of the Society, and pay them over to the Treasurer, whose duty it shall be to pay therefrom, under the direction of the Executive Committee, all expenses that may be incurred by the Society in the prosecution of its objects.

ARTICLE VI.

Regular meetings of the Society shall be held on the first Saturday in April, October, and January, in each year, and special meetings may be held at any time, under the direction of the President.

ARTICLE VII.

The Secretary shall record all the proceedings of the Society; he shall also act as Secretary of the several committees, and shall notify all meetings of the Society, or its committees.

ARTICLE VIII.

Other citizens of the United States, of full age, and of good moral character, may be admitted as members of this Society, on the nomination of two members, at any regular or special meeting of the Society, by a vote of two thirds of the members present.

ARTICLE IX.

No amendment of this Constitution shall be made without the vote of three fourths of the members present at a regular meeting, and notice thereof shall be given at the preceding regular meeting.

ARTICLE X.

The several committees shall report their doings at each regular meeting, and the Secretary shall record the same in the records of the Society.

SAMUEL F. B. MORSE, President.

MANTON MARBLE, WM. MCMURRAY, } Secretaries.

There being no further business before the Society, an adjournment was effected. The movement thus inaugurated will be a great power in the community and country.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society.

Letter from Mr. Tilden

IN REPLY TO THE EVENING POST.

To the Editors of the Evening Post:

In the *Evening Post* of this afternoon appears a pretended report of remarks made by me at a private meeting of gentlemen held at Delmonico's, last evening, which, I think, your senior editor would not be likely to credit, even though he saw it in a journal that derives its largest claim to public confidence from the authority his name gives to whatever it contains.

I should not deem this publication, however it might misrepresent me, of sufficient importance to require a public notice, except for one single consideration.

It is a studied attempt to give to the meeting the aspect of a revolutionary intrigue, and imputes to me expressions or implications countenancing in some degree, a resort to revolutionary means to effect a change in the policy of the present Federal Administration.

At an ordinary time, I should treat such an imputation with silent contempt. But the time is not ordinary, very far from it. There is a danger yet unrevealed in our future, transcending the calamities we are now experiencing. The premonitions of it are in the wild ideas, which, discarding the maxims and the habits of constitutional government, for the expediency of the moment, grasp at revolutionary power as an instrument of every successive illusion in our national policy.

It illustrates how contagious this bad example is, when set by these who administer the government during a period of public danger, that we daily hear from their partisans, and sometimes from their antagonists, propositions subversive of all constitutional government and of our private rights and personal safety. There are few journals in this city in whose columns, during the present civil war, can not be found invocations to violence against dissentients from their opinions. Among those failing to use their influence to restrain, but often giving countenance to this dangerous tendency, I lament to recall one whose early renown was earned by its advocacy of free discussion, personal rights, and local self-government. We were fast degenerating into a condition in which violence, exercised under the false pretense of lawful authority, or by mobs, was becoming the ordinary weapon of political discussion and partisan warfare, when the elections last fall reminded the party in power that it is not wholly irresponsible, and did something towards restoring that balance between masses representing different opinions, without which popular government is impracticable.

In a generation which finds itself, as ours now does, in a situation wholly novel; which is inexperienced in the larger politics; all of whose leading minds are the growth of a period of peaceful prosperity, and of liberal self-esteem, I fear to see the public mind gradually becoming familiar with the dangerous instruments and methods of revolutionary action. The temptation to use them in aid of the theory, passion, interest, or partisanship of the hour, is immediate and urgent; the evil consequences are remote, contingent, and dimly seen, without the light of experience. That we have hitherto abstained from them is due mainly to the traditions and habits we inherited from our ancestors, wise through much costly experience. I do not think these traditions and habits can be safely broken up. Never once, on any occasion, at any time, in any place, have I failed to lift my voice against any tendency of this kind, from whatever source it proceeded. I may, perhaps, have carried my solicitude upon this subject too far. That is not my opinion. Often, when honest, patriotic men, writhing under a sense of public danger, intensified by a future into which no eye can penetrate, have appealed to me to say what we could do to save the country, I have had occasion to counsel patience with errors which were drifting us as well as their authors to swift destruction, to revive the sense that the men who at present administer the government are our constitutional and legal agents, and that, though they claim from us our full share of the bur-

dens and sacrifices which their policy imposes, without the slightest deference to our convictions in respect to the public interests and public safety, we must still loyally accept disappointment and national disaster, if they should come before the organism of the government can be reclaimed to a better policy in the due course of the elections.

It was some observations of this precise nature, more forbearing than those I now use, made while I was responding to a similar inquiry, that your reporter, by suppression and inversion, has distorted into exactly the opposite import. I had no information of any thing that was intended to be proposed at that meeting, or who was to be present, beyond what was conveyed by the call shown to me a few hours previously. I attended, not because I deemed the occasion of much practical moment — especially as an informal and preliminary meeting — but out of deference to the solicitude of men whose character and motives I unqualifiedly respect. I heard there no suggestion which was not moderate, patriotic, and constitutional. No allusion to peace was made. Some of the gentlemen I know to be of that class called War Democrats; and one, at least, a Republican. In my opinion, the first proposition for a dishonorable peace will come—not from those who foresaw and endeavored to avert civil war, but from that class of the Republicans who were, in a peculiar degree, its authors.

But the ever-recurring question to the minds of those who think the policy of the Administration has been unwise, and generally inadequate and "too late"—and often totally impracticable, yet remains —what can those who think so do? Is there any remedy, or any relief? Can we influence, in any degree, the Administration that represents us in its calamities, if not in its counsels? Will it listen to any suggestion we can offer—will it heed any warning we can give?

Slowly and sorrowfully, after eighteen months of anxious effort, beginning in November, 1860, I yielded to the conviction that we must experience and expiate each calamity, before we can make it visible to our brethren and friends, who at present hold unchecked an the balanced sway over the action of un Federal Government.

The controlling intellects of the Administration accept as the guide of their policy or reflect their own vagaries, through the worst element of their own adherents — blind partisans, visionary theorists, impracticable philanthropists, sensation journalists. The illusion which misled their minds before and at their advent to power is constantly reproduced in new forms and new applications, at every successive stage of their career.

It is the voyage of a ship with a false compass; particular deviations are discovered after they have been committed; but they recur in an indefinite series, because their source remains prolific as at first.

I did not say this at the meeting; but, compelled to restate my opinions, I do not hesitate to be the truth.

The substance of what I did say was, that the dissemination of documents, teaching the fundamental ideas of civil liberty and constitutional government could do no harm, and might be useful, in a time when men's minds are unsettled; that, in my judgment, party action was at present wholly unnecessary, believing, as I did, that future elections would amply take care of themselves; that great caution should be exercised as to the character of all publications authorized or issued, in respect to their practical bearing on the condition of our affairs; that, after all, if we would preserve free institutions among ourselves, or reconstruct the edifice of our Federal Union, it must be chiefly through the lessons of the great teacher, experience; that in a time of war we could not deal with our government, although disapproving its policy, without more reserve than was necessary in debating an administrative question during a period of peace; that the reason was, that if we should paralyze the arm of our own government we yet could not stay the arm of the public enemy striking at us through it; that it was this peculiarity which had sometimes caused minorities

to be suppressed in the presence of public danger; and made such periods perdous to civil liberty; that the generation which embraced Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison and Hamilton, and which framed the glorious fabric of American constitutional federative government, had been educated for their work by a quarter of a century of experience in civil commotions; that their intellects had been employed in studying the fundamental questions of government and society in the lights of history, while they were daily reducing its lessons to practice, until they were able to limit theory by practice, and to enlighten practice by theory; that the next generation, which embraced Jackson, Clay, Webster, Wright and their compeers, had the fresh traditions of their fathers; that within the last ten years that generation had wholly disappeared; that the present generation—not inferior in intelligence, nor, perhaps, in dormant public virtue, had neither experience nor traditions as a practical guide for their conduct; that the statesmen of the present time, had, almost without an exception, been born and educated and attained their political eminence during a period of prosperity and peace, in which the mere mechanical action of the government had surmounted every obstacle it had hitherto met, and in which the political philosophy of our wise ancestors had fallen into desuetude, and a race had grown up formed amid the discussion of the small administrative questions, and amid the competitions of professional politicians, for the petty honors and emoluments of office; that generations like individuals, do not completely understand inherited wisdom until they have reproduced it in their own experience, and, finally, that I supposed we must travel through the whole cycle in order to learn what we ought to have known from the historic past.

The only mention I made of Mr. Lincoln was in illustrating this idea; and what I said was, that a man whose whole knowledge and experience of statesmanship was derived from one term in Congress, a long service in the county conventions at Sangamon, a career at *nisi prius* in the interior of Illinois, and some acquaintance with the lobby at Springfield, had now to deal with the greatest questions and most complicated forces of modern history.

I had met with Mr. Lincoln before he was thought of for the Presidency, and have known much of him from his neighbors and friends. I have never been disposed to treat him so uncharitably as is often done by the factions into which his party is divided under the lead of Mr. Chase and Mr. Seward in his own Cabinet, which have scuffled over his body for power from the very day of his election, to the dissensions of which some of the vacillations of the Administration are to be ascribed; and to the occasional ascendency of the most dangerous of which not only fatal mistakes of civil polity, but most of our military disasters, can be distinctly traced.

I am quite aware how difficult is the conduct of a constitutional opposition, during a period of war; how necessary it is to guard against its degenerating into faction, and to keep its measures directed to attaining the utmost practical good for the country at every varying stage of public affairs. I know, also, that such an opposition is often the only means of preserving civil liberty, or of conducting an existing war to a successful termination. I have hitherto never failed to see the exact line between opposition and faction, or to keep within it, with an impartiality at no moment shaken by interest, passion, prejudice or association. I have not for an instant had out of mind the infinite advantages of using, if possible, those who now sway the government, and must do so, though in a less degree, for two years longer, as the instruments of the national salvation.

It was only when I saw them yielding daily more and more to fatal influences that I looked around for a counterpoise in a constitutional opposition. History affords no example of so liberal and generous—I might say prodigal—a support of an administration by the mass of those who dissent from its policy and disapprove its management. How means more vast than were ever before placed

at the disposal of an administration have been employed, and with what results, I pronounce no judgment. I leave it to the testimonies daily coming to the public from those who were largely instrumental in bringing this Administration into existence. My view of duty on this subject has been purely and exclusively a matter of the judgment. As long ago as 1854, having broken all party ties, by firm resistance to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Mr. Preston King told me that the politicians of the South would never forgive me; and asked me if I thought my name could pass the Senate of the United States? I answered that it was of very little consequence to me whether it could or not; but that it was of great consequence to me that I should do what I thought best for the country. The termination of an intercourse, during which he had persistently sought to engage me with himself in the work of forming the Republican party, was a letter of warning, in which I said, in substance, that every thing that could be usefully or safely done to protect all the interests and rights of the North, could be even better accomplished without the use of such a dangerous agency; and that such an organization would either be a political blunder, or it would be a political crime, in creating a conflict in which the government would probably perish. This conviction, matured by long meditation in retirement and almost political isolation, governed my action ever after by a motive of patriotic duty so overwhelming that there was no room for any other motive.

When unexpected events swept us near to the fatal brink, this conviction was fully stated through the columns of the *Evening Post*, in October, 1860, with the reasons of it, deduced from the nature of men and of parties, in the light of history and of the principles and practices of the great men who founded free government for this continent. I feel my judgment of what was right and wise, and what is now right and wise for us to do, in this most important crisis of our national existence, assured by the accuracy with which, in that prevision, I estimated every element of the question; and, though ready to accept with candor any new lights, I see, as yet, no reason to question my conclusions. If the *Evening Post*, in the issue, from that time to the present, between its opinions and mine, can stand the same test, it may find some excuse for a dogmatic assault I shall not imitate, upon the opinions and motives of others, not less conscientious and patriotic than itself, and, as private citizens, less exposed than it is to the misleading influences of the turbid current of partisanship and journalism.

S. J. Tilden.

New-York, Saturday evening, Feb. 7, 1863.

Daniel Webster.

Mr. Webster's definition of liberty in his Richmond speech, can not be too often repeated. He said:

"Why, gentlemen, there is a good axiom extant, that the quantity of liberty we possess, is precisely equal to the quantity of restraint we put upon the government. And this is true. If the government is restrained from putting its hand in certain particulars upon you, to that extent you are free, and no more. And if individuals are restrained from putting their hands upon you, you have more freedom. *All liberty, therefore, consists in putting such a restraint upon your governments, and upon individuals, that they can not touch your rights or your liberties.*"

Henry Clay.

Letter of Henry Clay to the Ashland Club, on his birthday:

Ashland, Sept. 2, 1843.

My Dear Sir: Allow me to select a subject for one of your tracts, which, treated in your popular and condensed way, I think would be attended with great and good effect. I mean Abolition.

It is manifest that the ultras of that party are extremely mischievous, and are hurrying on the country to fearful consequences. They are not to be con-

ciliated by the Whigs. Engrossed with a single idea, they care for nothing else.

And yet they would see the administration of the Government precipitate the nation into absolute ruin, before they would lend a helping hand to arrest its career. They treat worse, denounce most, those who treat them best, who so far agree with them as to admit slavery to be an evil. Witness their conduct toward Mr. Briggs and Mr. Adams, in Massachusetts, and toward me.

I will give you an outline of the manner in which I would handle it. Show the origin of slavery; trace its introduction to the British government; show how it is disposed of by the Federal Constitution; that it is left exclusively to the States, except in regard to fugitives, direct taxes and representation. Show that the agitation of the question in the free States will first destroy all harmony, and finally lead to disunion—poverty and perpetual war—the extermination of the African race—ultimate military despotism.

But the great aim and object of your tract should be to arouse the laboring classes of the free States against Abolition! Depict the consequences to them of immediate abolition. The slaves being free, would be dispersed throughout the Union; they would enter into competition with the free laborer—with the American, the Irish, the German—reduce his wages, be confounded with him, and affect his moral and social standing. And as the ultras go both for Abolitionism and amalgamation, show that their object is to unite in marriage the laboring white man and black woman, to reduce the white laboring man to the despised and degraded condition of the black man.

I would show their opposition to colonization. Show its humane, religious, and patriotic aim. That they are those whom God has separated. Why do Abolitionists oppose colonization? To keep and amalgamate together two races in violation of God's will, and keep the blacks here, that they may interfere with, degrade, and debase the laboring whites! Show that the British government is co-operating with the Abolitionists for the purpose of dissolving the Union. I am perfectly satisfied that it will do great good. Let me hear from you on this subject. HENRY CLAY.

Five years earlier than this, (1838,) the U. S. Senate adopted the following resolutions, offered by Mr. Clay:

Resolved, That when the District of Columbia was ceded by the States of Virginia and Maryland to the United States, domestic slavery existed in both of those States, including the ceded territory, and that, as it still continues in both of them, it could not be abolished within the District, without a violation of that good faith which was implied in the cession, and in the acceptance of the territory; nor, unless compensation were made to the proprietors of slaves, without a manifest infringement of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor without exciting a degree of just alarm and apprehension in the States recognizing slavery, far transcending in mischievous tendency any possible benefit which could be accomplished by the abolition.

Resolved, therefore, That it is the deliberate judgment of the Senate, that the institution of domestic slavery ought not to be abolished within the District of Columbia; and it earnestly hopes that all sincere friends of the Union, and of harmony, and general tranquillity, will cease to agitate this disturbing question.

What is the Constitution?

ABOLITION AUTHORITY TWO YEARS AGO.

THE Constitution of the United States is a compact of Union adopted by the thirteen original colonies in 1787–8, and '90, and as equal parties to which twenty more States have since been admitted, all to equal rights.

It was in the beginning optional with each State whether it should adopt the Constitution or not, as is shown by the fact that Rhode Island did not ratify and was not one of the United States until the twenty-ninth of May, 1790, which was more than a year after the inauguration of our first President.

This compact derives its auth

from the will of the people of the several States that ratified it, each in its sovereign capacity in Convention assembled.

Its preamble declares that it is ordained "in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure *domestic tranquillity*, provide for the *common* defense, promote the *general welfare*, and secure the blessings of *liberty* to ourselves and to our posterity;" and by a continued and strict observance of it in all its parts, we might still have enjoyed under it all those blessings.

This article is intended to vindicate the inviolability of this Constitution by which alone was formed our *Union*—which is *in itself*, "our government"—the rampart of our freedom, the rubicon of our rights, and the palladium of our liberties, by the authority of which the very men who seek to exceed its powers hold office *under* it, and "without which neither party nor nation, nor liberty can exist." (See *N. Y. Evening Post*, Aug. 22, 1861.)

WASHINGTON'S WARNING AGAINST DESTROYING THE CONSTITUTION.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking, in a free country, should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding, in the exercise of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, AND CONSTITUTING EACH THE GUARDIAN OF THE PUBLIC WEAL, AGAINST INVASION BY THE OTHERS, has been evinced by experiments, ancient and modern · some of them in our own country, and under our own eyes. To PRESERVE them must be as necessary as to INSTITUTE them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be, in any particular, wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment IN THE WAY WHICH THE CONSTITUTION DESIGNATES. But let there be no change by USURPATION; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The PRECEDENT must always greatly overbalance, in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.—*George Washington.*

MADISON'S VIEWS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS.

. . . To hold the union of the States as the basis of their peace and happiness; to support the Constitution, which is the cement of Union, *as well in its limitations as in its authorities; to respect the rights and authorities reserved to the States and to the people, as equally incorporated with, and essential to the success of, the general system; to avoid the slightest interference with the rights of conscience*, or the functions of religion, so *wisely exempted from civil jurisdiction;* to preserve, to their full energy, the other salutary provisions in behalf of *private and personal rights*, and of *the freedom of the press.* As far as sentiments and intentions such as these can aid the fulfillment of my duty, they will be a resource which can not fail me.—*President James Madison.*

THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that, though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; *that the minority possess her equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression.—Thomas Jefferson.*

No. 2.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

SPEECH OF MR. TURPIE,

DELIVERED IN THE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEB. 7, 1863.

"WHEN A PARTY IN POWER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION AND DISREGARDS STATE-RIGHTS, PLAIN MEN WILL READ PAMPHLETS."

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y.,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society, for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

SPEECH OF MR. TURPIE.

MR. PRESIDENT, it would be well at first thought, it would seem, it the whole world could exist under one form of government. It would be a vast economy in the maintenance of foreign relations. It would dispense forever with the armies and navies of the globe, the eternal witnesses of national jealousy. It would settle forever the great question of the balance of power. In the community, however, it has been ordered that the interest of the whole is best promoted by the pursuit of the interest of the individual in his particular sphere. The self-interest of nations and of communities has demanded separation and different nationalities—separation not to be avoided by identity of language, by identity of religion, by geographical contiguity—not to be avoided in any event where the true and real interests of the community may dictate it.

I do not say this, sir, in justification of the crime of secession, but I say it to show how entirely imbecile and weak is the plea for national unity, founded only upon the circumstance of geographical contiguity, and the identity of race, of religion, and of language. Self-interest divides and it separates. The American Union was formed on the principle of different interests of local communities, being protected and more effectually protected by that Union than by any other means. It was formed upon the sole idea that the reserved rights of the States and the people should not be interfered with by the General Government so created.

It is useless to talk about imaginary lines not being sufficient to divide nationalities. Sir, the line which divides your own State from the Canadas is an imaginary line drawn by the compass of the surveyor. Its virtue, its power, its efficiency, are as well known to every negro-larcenous fanatic in this country as it is to that pleasant speaker of parables who darkens the Presidential mansion with his shadow and yet refuses to recognize the efficiency of a line thus drawn. If we would preserve national integrity, if we would extend and keep expanded the national domain, we shall have, above all things, to show that the interests of communities, the interests of States, the interests of Territories, the interests of the future population who are to inhabit this country, will be best subserved and protected by a national Government. The moment you abandon that doctrine, the moment the Federal Government, under any excuse, under any pretense whatever, interferes in such a way as to show that it no longer consults the reserved rights of the States and the people and the self-interest of separate communities composing it, you destroy the only tie which can bind them to our nationality.

The States made the Union; the Union did not make the States. It is a sufficient answer to the dogma that the States have no *status* out of the Union to say that the States existed before the Union, and must have existed out of it. The Union was formed solely upon the idea that certain rights should be reserved. What rights are they? The right of life, of liberty, of the pursuit of happiness; the right of property, its acquisition, its possession, its disposition after the death of the owner; the right of freedom of the press; the toleration of religious opinion; the right of freedom of speech; all the most sacred rights of political, domestic, and social relations are among those reserved to the States and the people, and can not be

interfered with by the General Government in any manner whatever. If there had not been such a reservation the Union never could have existed; and if that reservation be destroyed, the Union will perish with its destruction.

The guardians of these rights—you may call them States, you may call them by whatever name you wish—can be nothing less than sovereign. The idea that any paramount authority may exist as to these rights destroys the reservation of the rights themselves, as it destroys the sovereignty of the community which is bound to protect and assert them. Hence, in the constitution of my State, and yours, of all the States, the crime of treason against the State is defined and punished. Treason can not be committed against less than a sovereignty; and I hold that the States themselves have enacted, and as sovereigns prescribed, the punishment for treason against the rights reserved to them and their people.

I do not wish to wrest this doctrine to my own destruction, or to the justification of any who have taken up arms against the Government. I know that the individuals, the officers of a State, may commit treason against the Federal Government. I believe that the officers of the Federal Government may commit treason against the States. The rights, the duties, and the dangers of the States and the Federal Government are mutual and reciprocal. There should be no trespass either upon the one hand or the other. The crime of treason may be committed against State government as well as against Federal authority.

There are many crimes, however, against the rights of the States and against the rights of the people which are below the grade of treason. There are misdemeanors, offenses less than treason. There are vile frauds, there are most contemptible and cowardly impositions, as fatal to State dignity and State sovereignty as treason itself. The proposition embodied in this bill is one of that character. It is worse than a crime. It is worse than a crime because it lacks the boldness of execution. It is meaner than a crime because you can not fasten it upon the person who seeks to perpetrate it, or upon the power which seeks to commit it. What is this proposition? It is a proposition to interfere with the rights of property in the State of Missouri, and to interfere in the most powerful manner—to interfere by an appeal to the basest passion of humanity, the love of money. The loyalty of Missouri, it seems, has been weighed and measured. It is worth ten millions in cash or twenty millions on credit. I will not pursue the tenor of this thought. It would be doing injustice to the people of a great State to say any thing further about it; nor will I vote the value of a penny to bribe the legislative or popular action of the State of Missouri, upon the subject of their domestic institutions, in any way whatever.

This is a direct bribe offered by the Federal Government, under the authority of the Federal Government, for legislative and popular action against the rights of property in the State of Missouri. If you can buy the property rights of Missouri, you can purchase any others. What reasons are assigned for this most extraordinary conduct? In the first place, it is said that Missouri is willing. Does that change *our* constitutional obligations as Senators and conservators of the Federal compact? Does that give us the right to intervene or interfere? We are told that the fidelity of Missouri to the Union is to depend upon the result of the bill now pending. I heard with regret the Senator from that State [Mr. HENDERSON] say that unless this bill passed, he would not say what the result would be, but he feared it; that he should leave the State and cast his fortunes with the Union; intimating that the State might leave the Union if this bill was not passed.

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. President—

The VICE-PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Indiana give way?

Mr. TURPIE. With all due deference to the Senator, I will not.

Sir, I am sorry that any such appeal should be made to the Senate. I will not under such a threat, as I take it, do so great an injustice to the people of

Missouri, or to those of Indiana, as to vote for a measure of this character. Nor do I believe that the triumph of the Federal cause is to be affected either in Missouri or elsewhere by the defeat or the success of this bill. The American people have undertaken a sublime task, the restoration of our nationality. Does the Senator from Missouri doubt the success of that effort? I do not. I never have. There is a God in heaven for the brave. I believe that no power short of that which arrested Saul on his journey from Jerusalem to Damascus can prevent the accomplishment of that result. I believe that no legislation as suggested by this bill can retard or accelerate the result.

The Administration, to be sure, are laboring under difficulties every day increasing. France, England, Horace Greeley, and the other great powers [laughter] are to be watched and conciliated; McClellan, the patriot without a peer, is to be crushed out and forgotten; Giddings and Garrison, and other domestic enemies of the country's peace, are to be pensioned and provided for; the Porters, by land and sea, are to be punished; the rebels are to be driven out of the State of Missouri; and the draft is yet to be enforced in Massachusetts. These are most arduous labors, and I bespeak for those who have undertaken them not only the coöperation of their friends, but the sympathy of their political opponents, and the neutrality at least of all the world and the balance of mankind. [Laughter.]

But, sir, I do not think that what the Administration has undertaken has any thing to do with the great popular task of the country. Senators are continually saying here, day after day, that unless the country is saved during this Administration, it can not be saved at all. I am of the contrary opinion. I think that, as far as the present Administration is concerned, the Executive has lost the confidence of the people of both sections of this land. He has lost the confidence of the North and the South. He is thoroughly imbued with the fanatical abolition notions of the New-England school. It would be impossible for any man, or any set of men, to operate harmoniously and effectually during the existence of this Administration for the purpose of doing the country any good, or taking any important step towards a final restoration of the political relations formerly existing between these States.

A UNION WORTH HAVING.

I know, sir, that Senators are constantly talking about the Union. I do not wish to be exceeded by any man in my devotion to the American Union. I have spoken for the Union; I have written for the Union; I have fought and acted for the Union when those who now claim to be its ardent friends were willing, under certain contingencies, to let it slide. But I ask you, sir, what do Senators mean by the Union? It is by what they mean, not what they say, that we must judge them. If it is meant by the Union to purchase the negro slaves of Missouri or elsewhere, and pay for them out of the people's money and the public Treasury, I am not for it. If you mean by the Union the support of these fugitive contrabands, these pariahs of the South who escape within our military limits, and the feeding and clothing of these creatures, to the desertion, starvation, and destitution of the soldiers of the Federal Army—if you mean that by the Union, I am not for it. If you mean by the Union the absorption by the Federal Government of the reserved rights of the States and the people I am not for it. But if you mean by the Union the restoration of the national authority upon every foot of the national soil; if you mean by the Union the preservation of the national fame and of the national flag; the flag which waved at Bunker Hill, at Saratoga, at Yorktown, at Palo Alto, at Chepultepec, at Shiloh, and at Donelson—that flag with not a stripe obliterated, and with every star undimmed; the only flag in the world which floats over a limited Government and a free people—if you mean that by the Union, I am for it now and forever.

But, sir, it is said as an additional reason why we should pass this meas-

ure, that it will aid the State of Missouri in emancipation. The object is said to be humane and philanthropic. It may be extremely charitable; but I ask you, sir, why has Congress, why has the General Government exclusively confined its charities to Africans in servitude, and to the wants of the negro race? Are there no other sufferers upon whom this money might be expended? Whole regiments now serving under the flag of your country have gone upaid for months. The wives and children of soldiers, a vast constituency at home, are begging daily for bread. I should sooner vote an appropriation of ten or twenty millions for such a purpose than for any purpose presented in this bill.

THIS MOVEMENT UNNATURAL.

What is our action, and what can be its result? Do you call this strengthening the hands of the President? Do you call it strengthening the Administration? Do you call it filling up the ranks of the Army and encouraging the Union cause? I say that this course of conduct can bring nothing but danger and dishonor upon the country. It will be seen that millions of the national treasury are squandered for abolition purposes in Missouri and elsewhere, and that the soldier in the field remains unpaid, and sometimes unfed, and unclothed. I take it, that Senators would show their devotion to the Union in passing by such measures as the one at present urged, and giving their attention solely and wholly to the condition of the country, and the wants of that large constituency of unpurchased and unpurchasable patriotism which has shown its love of country by bearing arms in the field. Talk about the loyalty of Missouri—the purchased love of the prostitute; one that has to be bought with money, and paid for with money! Would you foster and cherish that feeling, if such exists? I would not dishonor the State by saying that I believe in its existence; but would you foster and cherish that mercenary affection to the destruction of the interests of all those portions of our fellow-citizens who are demanding this money, and demanding, in fact, all the resources and support of the Government which we can possibly give them?

Why should there be an intervention and interference in the case of Missouri? Pennsylvania and New-York were formerly slave States. At the close of the Revolution a large amount of capital was invested in those States in slave property. The institution has disappeared from those States, and how? By virtue of the voluntary legislative action of the people and their representatives. I ask Senators, why should the slaveholders of Missouri be paid for their property out of the national treasury any more than the slaveholders of New-York and Pennsylvania? I ask those, particularly, differing with me in political faith; I ask those Senators who have built up political fortunes upon their pretended hatred of this institution, and their pretended opposition to Southern rights, why they now propose to tax the free people of the loyal North and South; why they propose to tax the national treasury for the special benefit of the slaveholder, the slave-breeder, and the slave-driver, of Missouri?

Sir, the State which I in part represent will yield to no State in the Confederacy in its devotion to the Union. Indiana, the gift of Virginia to the nation, loves the Union for the giver's sake. She hopes yet to see the mother of States and statesmen restored and reconciled to all her children. Although the people of Indiana, at any time before the existence of war by the act of the public enemy, at any time before the Federal flag was fired upon by the traitor-band of South-Carolina at Sumter, would have accepted the Crittenden proposition, the Border State proposition, or any of those propositions, as a settlement of the difficulties between the sections, yet when war came, she waged war; not because she desired it, but because she believed we must have war, or worse; we must either have war or a dissevered nationality; we must have either war or abandon the Government to its enemies. Indiana still follows the flag of the Union. The

bones of her gallant sons, fallen in this great struggle, mingle in the soil of every battle-field from Missouri to the Rappahanock. Indiana now is not for war—she never has been; she is not for peace; she is not for either of these things, except as a means to an end—that end, the restoration of the Union and the unity of the States. If the war is not waged with that purpose, I am for peace to-day. If it is found that that purpose is impracticable or impossible, I am for a cessation of hostilities this moment.

PEACE AND UNION THE END OF THE WAR.

Sir, the people of Indiana have not gone into this contest blindfolded. They surveyed the whole field. They counted the cost. They knew what it would cost to make the effort. They knew it would cost more not to make it. They are not for separation. They are for national integrity at whatever cost, and by whatever means, whether belligerent or pacific, by which that object may be effected. If mediation is to be proposed as a settlement, the people of Indiana will ask why the mediation of New-York, of New-Jersey, of Kentucky, of Illinois; why the mediation of these sovereignties should not be received and accepted, as well as the mediation of France or England, either in regard to the termination of the war or the policy with which it may be conducted. They will ask why was Crittenden rejected as a mediator and any one else preferred? That they will ask, and they will require an answer. As dear as the Union is to Indiana, and as dear as it is to every loyal citizen, it is not of more value than the rights of the States and the people. The same treasure and the same blood that I should be willing to expend in the preservation of the one, I shall spend just as freely in the security and the protection of the other.

THIS MEASURE OUGHT TO ALARM THE STATES.

It is asked, but it is has not been answered, what power under the Constitution we have to make this appropriation. The Chief Magistrate of the country, when he introduced the resolution inaugurating this policy, and since, has declared that there is no power under the Constitution by which it can be carried out and effected. He has admitted that it is extra-constitutional, and beyond the powers specified in that instrument. Have we had any change in the Constitution? How could a change have been effected? We do not distinguish between power and authority. Will it be for a moment claimed that the present Chief Magistrate of the Union has any more authority than the one who preceded him, or the one before that? It can not be. He may have more power. How has he achieved that power? By calling into his hand the military force of the country, by largely increasing the army and navy; but it has given him no shadow of authority more than that which was possessed by his predecessors.

This appropriation is asked for under the war power. It is claimed by Senators to be necessary to crush out the rebellion, to vindicate the national law and the national authority in the State of Missouri. This war power is a most singular article. India-rubber has had some reputation heretofore for being elastic; gold and silver for being malleable and ductile; but sir, they must yield to this war power in all those qualities. Why, sir, it

"Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent."

WAR POWER A COVER FOR REVOLUTION.

The President is the first great reservoir of this war power. He is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. Why is he Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy? Because he is President, and not for any other reason. I take it to be a settled principle of the Government that the military is always subordinate to the civil power. I take it that the powers of the Commander-in-Chief are subordinate to the powers of the President; and that an act of the Commander-in-Chief against the Consti-

tution and beyond the Constitution can not be justified any more than can an act of the President. The war powers of both Congress and the President are subordinate to civil authority. The President is said to be the grand receptacle of these war powers. The heads of departments have, of course, some of them. Some are claimed for Congress. We are now called upon to exercise our share of these extraordinary powers in the passage of this bill. The Governors of the States have claimed some of these powers. They have been distributed down to a multitude, whom no man can number, of provost-marshals, scattered in every village between the two oceans, except Ceredo and Oberlin, which, being inhabited wholly by white and black Africans, needed no such guardians of loyalty.

It is a most remarkable power—this war power of the Constitution—so much so, that I doubt its existence altogether. It is a myth; it is a fiction; it has no existence. The Chief Executive has laid down what this power is. He says it is the power on his part to do any thing which he may consider necessary to crush the rebellion. That is the only limit to it—his own discretion. Can he lengthen his own term of office? Most certainly he can under the war power, if he should think it necessary to crush the rebellion. Can he increase his pay? Most certainly he can, just as easily as he can issue a proclamation affecting the rights of property in any of the States. There is no limit to the power, and there can be none. I take it, sir, that when you thus place the power in the hands of one man to control the army and navy, and the purse of a great nation, without restriction and without limit, you have erected a military despotism. You call him the President. In France he is called the Emperor; in Austria, the Emperor; in Russia, the Czar. The American Czar will find no serfs west of the Alleghanies. It is not proposed to surrender the most sacred rights which were reserved at the time of the formation of the Constitution to the States and to the people; there *can* be no necessity for their destruction.

Why, sir, under this war power you may exercise any authority whatever. It is useless for us to *say* that an act does not conduce to the crushing of the rebellion; if the Executive *thinks* differently, that is the law. I think that the defeat of this Missouri bill will strengthen the Federal Government, not only in Missouri, but elsewhere. I hope it will be defeated; but if Congress, to whom is deputed a part of this remarkable power, thinks differently, away goes your safeguard on the Treasury, and away go all the restrictions and limits which have been thrown around the rights of property in the several States, and the Constitution, instead of being a living ordinance, becomes only a "quiet dogma of the past."

What will be the effect of this continual interference and intervention by the Federal Government with the rights of the States and the people? What has been its effect already? Do we not read it in the signs of the times? As far as one act, treason, is concerned, the officers and people of certain States have taken up arms against the Federal Government. As far as the other act is concerned, it is proposed not to take up arms, but to interfere and intervene by the power of the purse with the domestic institutions of the States. That power, that inference is no more to be justified than the other. Much has been accomplished by indirection since the commencement of the present policy, which no man could have justified or accomplished directly. We find ourselves now in the prosecution of a war where abolition is coincident with military success, simply by this same method of indirection. Forces have been called out, arms have been placed in their hands ostensibly and avowedly for the purpose of protecting the national Government against the treason of certain States, and after they have been so called out, by this same indirection, the whole force is converted from its original intention, and a crusade is undertaken and waged against the very

rights which the General Government is bound to protect; for, as I said before, I believe that the rights of the States and of the General Government are mutual. The General Government guarantees to the States a republican form of Government. It guarantees the safety and protection of the rights of which I have spoken, and it can not interfere with those rights without abandoning its constitutional limitations, and without a breach of the guarantees which it gave the State at the time of her admission.

Hence there are no circumstances which would induce me to vote for the bill under consideration. I regard it as a violation of the reserved rights of the people of Missouri. I regard it as a violation of constitutional obligations upon our part; and let me say that while we are waging a war for the law, we ought to wage it under the law, and we ought not to violate the law. Without the law there is no transgression. Without law there is no rebellion. And if Congress and the General Government insist upon a breach, a serious infraction of the Constitution in regard to the rights of any of the States, we can not tell how far that breach may go, or can tell what effect it may have upon the whole character of the Government.

I say nothing, sir, now, of that new treason which we have heard whispered in high places, that the army of the Union is to be recalled, that there is to be no further effort to save the *Government*, but that the force is all to be exhausted for the purpose of saving the *Administration*. I say nothing about that except this, as far as the State which I represent is concerned, we are not disposed to abandon the Union; we are not yet disposed to accept separation as a necessity; we are not disposed to accept separation as an alternative rather than recognize the right of the Southern States to a peculiar species of property. No, sir; I charge Senators to avoid this crime against nationality. The people of the North-west, the people of the great central States have recently decided upon these very questions. In those States there was no contest as to whether the integrity of the Government should be maintained. The question in the late canvass related to whether there should be a change of its form by our own agency. Upon that question the verdict of Indiana, of Illinois, of New-Jersey, and of other States, was rendered. Determining that, while the Government should be supported, while it should receive money, while it should receive men from the States guaranteeing the vindication of the national sovereignty, there should be no interference whatever by the Federal Government with the rights of the States themselves. Let not Senators mistake this as the verdict or as the action of a *party*. As far as the result of the election in Indiana was concerned, it was distinctly the action of the people, not of any party, against every possible discouragement that could be thrown upon that action. Less attention was paid to party organization, less attention was paid to party drill and party instrumentalities, than in any contest we have ever had in the North-west. It was a pure, plain decision upon the question as to whether, for any purposes, the rights of the people should be violated; as to whether, for any purposes, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of debate and discussion could be trampled under foot by the hand of military power. That was the question raised and decided. Let us heed that warning. Let us retrace our steps. Let us say some fault has been committed. Let us heed the protest which the States have entered. The Federal Government will do well to regard it. The Government is worth more than this Administration; it is worth more than any other. It should work for perpetuity. It should work for all time to the health and safety of the nation, which I pray may exist forever as the fathers formed it.

TRICK OF THE RADICAL PARTY TO DRAW CONSERVATIVES INTO WAR.

At an early stage of the political contest of which I have spoken, great efforts were used to blind the people as to the questions really at issue. The Republican party in my State disbanded its

organization; it claimed to be no party; it claimed to have no issue but a vigorous prosecution of the war; it called itself "Union;" and at a very early stage of the same canvass, a select coterie of negro maniacs, acting under semblance of law, calling themselves a Grand Jury of the United States District Court, affected to present the Democratic party and its organization as disloyal and traitorous to the country. More than that, prominent members and leaders of the party all over the State were arrested, and without cause imprisoned. I myself made a canvass during the last summer under threats, every day, of personal violence, and with my pockets filled with anonymous letters to the same effect. The presses of the party were closed, in some instances; were torn down and destroyed in others. Every effort was made even in that State, always loyal, to suppress a free, clear, plain expression of the people; but the effort failed. The people did speak, and they spoke what I have here said in the Senate.

I know that Senators have disparaged here the discussion of party questions. They have said: "A million men are now in the field, Democrats and Republicans, fighting side by side; with them there is no quarrel; with them there is no difference; why can there not be unanimity and friendship here?" I ask the same question, why? Talk about parties! How do you make parties? How are they created? You can not make them out of conventions and platforms. They are built upon issues. That is the way the present parties are formed and divided. Who are responsible for these issues? The Senators to my right [the Republicans] and their political associates. When the President of the United States issued his proclamation, calling upon the military force of the country to avenge the insult offered to the national flag at Fort Sumter, all men rallied, without distinction of party, to the support of that banner. There was literally no party. And when Congress met here in special session, in the summer immediately succeeding the proclamation, the same unanimity prevailed. Congress then said that this war should not be prosecuted in the spirit of conquest or subjugation, and it should not interfere with the rights, the dignity, or the institutions of the States. Congress adjourned; it went home and found a united constituency. What has divided us? I will tell you, sir. Do you recollect the victory of Fort Donelson? I know you do. You recollect with what rejoicing every loyal heart received the intelligence of the success of the Union arms. Two days after that victory, a special message was submitted to the American Congress. What was it? Congratulating the people on the return of Tennessee to the Union? Inviting again the States of the South to renew their love and allegiance to the General Government? No, sir. It was confined to the sole object of the "abolishment" of African slavery. Why "abolishment?" Why not say "abolition"? Because then the measure would have been christened at once with the approbium and contempt it deserved. An obsolete term, a word almost unheard hitherto in the language, must be selected and placed in this message to discriminate its doctrines from the disgraceful heresies of that school of fanaticism, which has so often met defeat with proclamation, and made victory itself almost contemptible. That was the first thing that presented these issues of which Senators complain. Other measures of a similar character rapidly followed, which have made party in this country a virtue and a necessity.

ABOLITION THE SOLE ANIMUS OF THE RADICAL PARTY.

There was an appropriation here at the last session of $1,000,000 for abolition purposes in the District of Columbia. Who presented it? Who voted for it? Who carried it against the protest of the people? The Senators to my right; those who are complaining about party discussions and party feeling in this hall. When did they do it? When did they propose to squander this vast sum to gratify the fanaticism of a section with which they are connected, and for which they claim all the loyalty? It was when a rebel army

was threatening the possession of the capital itself; when, from the dome of this structure, you might have seen the rebel flag floating—when five hundred thousand men were in arms against this Government. It was at such a time that these men could not forget the flesh-pots of Chicago, but must insist upon party action and party legislation. It is that which has divided a once united people. There is no other cause whatever. If this war had been prosecuted in the spirit in which it was commenced, if it was now prosecuted with an eye single to the purpose of restoring nationality, the people of Indiana, the people of other States would require no draft to certify to a compelled loyalty; they would follow the flag of the Union in myriads more countless than those which followed Peter the Hermit to rescue the sepulcher of Christ from the infidel.

But, sir, it is because you have abandoned the original policy of the war, because you have abandoned the constitutional mode of a reconstruction of the Government, that you have divided the people of the loyal States, and that you have again sowed the seeds of party debate and discussion. I know it is asked at such a time as this will you still continue these wranglings? Let me ask of these Senators, will they postpone these abolltion measures which have already dishonored and ruined the country to so great an extent; will they postpone this thing of buying negroes and paying for them out of the public treasury; will they postpone these other enormities; will they postpone this direct infraction upon the rights of the people of Missouri? If they will postpone these things we will postpone discussion and debate, not otherwise; and I here make the offer, and I know that every person acting politically with me will accede to it, that we bury party; that we forget differences; that we cease discussion and debate, provided they will cease the presentation and urgency of these measures with which they have so often hitherto disgraced the country.

It would, indeed, sir, be a felicitous thing if we of the loyal States could look back upon the history of a once united people and say there was no blot on our escutcheon; that we had never transcended constitutional limits, never stopped to interfere with the constitutional reservation of the rights of any of the States. That brings me to the most important consideration in the passage of the bill—the one I have already alluded to—the effect of this policy of interference and intervention. From the beginning it has been disastrous. If I had the power to blot out the words most hateful to me in the history of my section, I would erase the words "Harper's Ferry." We are never done reading of Federal misfortunes which have clouded Harper's Ferry; and why? At other places we have seen the backs of the rebels; there we have shown them ours. At other places victory has perched upon our eagles; at Harper's Ferry we have had nothing but disaster, defeat, and discomfiture. It is the place where first was raised the hand of Northern fanaticism against the reserved rights and sovereignty of a great State of this Union. It is a spot consecrated to eternal shame and infamy; it is the "damned spot that will never out." Sumter shall equal it in dishonor; but Sumter followed. This may be treason; but it is truth also. If our record of the North was clear, was plain, was unclouded, with what virtue, with what force, with what renewed efficacy we might go before the world and ask its judgment in our favor in regard to the present contest. Do Senators still desire to continue to agitate this most odious doctrine of interference with the sovereignty of the States? Do they still desire to continue to agitate this dangerous and disgraceful element in the political history of the country? If they do, let them vote for the Missouri bill.

But, sir, if Senators desire to return to the constitutional landmarks; if they desire to make this war specially for the Union and for nothing else; if Senators desire to place the merits of this contest wholly and solely upon the question of national integrity, let us defeat this bill

let us say to Missouri: "If slavery is an incubus and an evil, it is one for which the Federal Government is not responsible; it is one for which the people of Indiana, the people of Virginia, the people of Kentucky, the people of no State in this Union are answerable, except the people of Missouri themselves." For good or for evil they chose this institution. They have recognized, cherished, fostered and supported it; and for one, rejoiced as I would be to hear of its disappearance, I am not willing to lift a finger to tax my people or the national Treasury in aid of any such eleemosynary project. We can find other uses for the public treasure more consonant with the national honor, national unity, and national peace.

Extracts from Webster's Reply to Hayne on the Constitution.

Mr. President, the nature of sovereignty or sovereign power has been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as it generally is when the origin of our government is debated. But I confess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustrations drawn from that topic. The sovereignty of government is an idea belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing is known in North America. Our governments are all limited. In Europe, sovereignty is of feudal origin, and imports no more than the state of the sovereign. It comprises his rights, duties, exemptions, prerogatives, and powers. But with us, all power is with the people. They alone are sovereign; and they erect what governments they please, and confer on them such powers as they please. None of these governments is sovereign, in the European sense of the word, all being restrained by written constitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex ourselves when we attempt to explain the relations existing between the general government and the several State governments, according to those ideas of sovereignty which prevail under systems essentially different from our own.

The Constitution of the United States creates direct relations between this government and individuals. This government may punish individuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, when committed against the United States. It has power, also, to tax individuals, in any mode, and to any extent; and it possesses the further power of demanding from individuals military service. Nothing, certainly, can more clearly distinguish a government from a confederation of States than the possession of these powers. No closer relations can exist between individuals and any government.

On the other hand, the government owes high and solemn duties to every citizen of the country. It is bound to protect him in his most important rights and interests. It makes war for his protection, and no other government in the country can make war. It makes peace for his protection, and no other government can make peace. It maintains armies and navies for his defence and security, and no other government is allowed to maintain them. He goes abroad beneath its flag, and carries over all the earth a national character imparted to him by this government, and which no other government can impart. In whatever relates to war, to peace, to commerce, he knows no other government. All these, sir, are connections as dear and as sacred as can bind individuals to any government on earth. It is not, therefore, a compact between States, but a government proper, operating directly upon individuals, yielding to them protection on the one hand, and demanding from them obedience on the other.

The truth is, Mr. President and no ingenuity of argument, no subtility of distinction can evade it, that, as to certain purposes, the people of the United States are one people. They are one in making war, and one in making peace; they are one in regulating commerce, and one in laying duties of imposts. The very end and purpose of the Constitution was, to make them one people in these particulars; and it has effectu-

ally accomplished its object. All this is apparent on the face of the Constitution itself. I have already said, sir, that to obtain a power of direct legislation over the people, especially in regard to imposts, was always prominent as a reason for getting rid of the Confederation, and forming a new Constitution. Among innumerable proofs of this, before the assembling of the Convention, allow me to refer only to the report of the committee of the old Congress, July, 1785.

The people, sir, in every State, live under two governments. They owe obedience to both. These governments, though distinct, are not adverse. Each has its separate sphere, and its peculiar powers and duties. It is not a contest between two sovereigns for the same power, like the wars of the rival houses in England; nor is it a dispute between a government *de facto* and a government *de jure*. It is the case of a division of powers between two governments, made by the people, to whom both are responsible. Neither can dispense with the duty which individuals owe to the other: neither can call itself master of the other: the people are masters of both. The division of power, it is true, is in a great measure unknown in Europe. It is the peculiar system of America; and, although new and singular, it is not incomprehensible. The State constitutions are established by the people of the States. This Constitution is established by the people of all the States.

Habeas Corpus.

In order to show what great principles of human freedom have been assassinated by this bill, we have only to refer to the well-settled maxims of law. First, it strikes down the writ of *habeas corpus:*

CHIEF-JUSTICE BLACKSTONE SAYS.

"Next to personal security," says Mr. Justice Blackstone, "the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclinations may direct, without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.

"By the Petition of Right, 3 Car. 1st, it is enacted that no person shall be imprisoned or detained without cause shown, to which he make answer according to law. By Car. 1st, ch. 10, if any person be restrained of his liberty by order or decree of any illegal court, or by the command of the King's Majesty in person, or by warrant of the council-board, or of any of the privy council, he shall upon demand of his counsel have a writ of *habeas corpus* to bring his body before the Court of King's Bench or Common Pleas, who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and hereupon to do as to justice shall appertain.

"To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown, or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our own Constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the danger of the state is so great as to render this measure expedient; for it is the Parliament only, or legislative power, that, whenever it sees proper, can authorize the Crown, by suspending *habeas corpus* act for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons, without giving any reason for so doing."—*Commentaries on the Laws of England*, vol. i. pp. 135–136.

No. 3.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

SPEECH OF THE HON. JAMES BROOKS,

AT

932 BROADWAY, TUESDAY EVENING, DECEMBER 30, 1862.

"WHEN A PARTY IN POWER VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION AND DISREGARDS STATE-RIGHTS, PLAIN MEN WILL READ PAMPHLETS."

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y.,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

SPEECH OF THE HON. JAMES BROOKS.

THE President of the Union Democratic Association, after some appropriate remarks upon the services rendered by the Association, said, that a speaker would now address them, by whose ability and eloquence, the large audience present would be well rewarded for their attendance on so stormy an evening. He, therefore, introduced the HON. JAMES BROOKS. After the repeated and prolonged cheering that welcomed Mr. Brooks, had subsided, he said:

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN: If any of you expect from me this evening, any exciting, or excited remarks, you will be disappointed. There are times so impressive, crises in public affairs so solemn, that any flourishes of rhetoric, any pompous display of periods, or sesquipedalian words, but detract from the gravity and dignity of the theme. Hence, in the crisis of a civil war like ours, where the blood of kith and kin is poured forth like water, and when the civil war is becoming complicated in fresher, and yet more fearful issues, the simplest language becomes the sublimest expression. (Applause.) The ancient heathen orators in times like these, when they were wont to address their public assemblies invoked their *Dii Immortales*, their Immortal gods. How much more then, should Christians, who assemble now, in the midst of Battle and Blood, invoke *the* immortal God to guide our deliberations. (Applause.)

THE TWO PROCLAMATIONS AND WAR ORDER OF SEPTEMBER, 1862.

When I last had the honor of addressing this Association, late in September last, there were threatening the people two PROCLAMATIONS and one War ORDER: One Proclamation threatening the people of the North, that if they discussed the other, the War Order would, through Courts Martial or Provost Martials, suspend Process, Bail, Jury Trial, Habeas Corpus, and arrest and incarcerate all engaged in such discussion. The Civil Courts were to be suspended, and Military Courts were to be substituted in their places. The very first opportunity after the promulgation of these Edicts, I ventured in this Hall to denounce them, as in violation, not only of *Magna Charta*, the Common Law of England and of the United States, and of the rights of man, but of the Constitution of the United States, and of our State of New-York; and you, in your responses, here in this Hall and elsewhere, so ably, so eloquently supported and cheered me, that the Edicts fell powerless before a brave and determined People. The President, indeed, who fulminated these Edicts, under the influence of our, and other elections, the offspring of what we proclaimed, we *would* have, namely, free discussion, recalled, nullified, abrogated his War Order, and that Proclamation Edict which threatened to subvert all Liberty in the North. The Provost-Marshals shrank back before the majesty of an indignant People, and the Judges and the Courts were reinaugurated, reinstalled by that People. (Cheers.)

THE PROCLAMATION OF JANUARY, 1863.

But, gentlemen, there is left now another proclamation, not annulled—that, for the South and South-West—in force, or if possible, to be put in force January first, 1863 — which I propose this evening more fully to discuss. (Applause.) The President does not claim, nor do the President's friends claim, that for this Proclamation he has any warrant, in, or under the Constitution of the United States — whereby, thus, he subverts, or attempts to subvert, whole States with all the organizations of their society — their statute, their civil, their municipal, as well as their constitutional laws; nor does he claim, that under the laws of nations, he has any such prerogative or power, save what is indefinitely declared to be the laws of war, the war power, or the military necessity of war. I propose, this evening, gentlemen, to discuss all these weighty matters, and you must put up with, as a necessity of

this discussion, the recitation of some of our past history, and with the reading of such documents as proof makes necessary, however heavy such reading may be in a popular assembly. (Cries of "Go on. It is what we want to hear.")

WAR FOR THE CONSTITUTION.

Gentlemen, as I said at the start, we are in the midst of a bloody civil war, the magnitude of which is unlike any thing in the record of human history, except the civil wars of Rome, that drenched the huge Roman Empire in human gore. We, who are not of the Administration, were driven into this war, reluctantly driven in, by the force of unhappy events, and by the then solemn pledge of the Administration, that it was a war, only to maintain the Government and the Constitution of the United States, with the integrity of the Union. (Applause.) We are not now, and we never pretended to be, supporters of the Administration. We drew at first, as we draw now, the constitutional distinction between supporting the Government, and a temporary Administration of that Government. (Applause.) We recognize no loyalty, nor fealty, nor allegiance due to any mere administration of the Government, to no mere man, in no one branch of it — Executive, Legislative, or Judicial — but we do recognize fealty, loyalty, love, devotion, with the whole heart and soul, as due to that great charter of human liberty known as the Constitution of the United States. (Loud and prolonged cheering.) That Constitution in my earlier days, when not as well booked up as I am now I supposed to be some impromptu inspiration of Divine Wisdom, far above all human intelligence, or human instinct — the work of men inspired, as were the Holy Apostles, who handed down to us the Holy Scriptures, and I revered and worshiped that Constitution as the Bible guide on earth to men struggling for Law and Liberty. But upon fuller and maturer reading, I discovered, that our Fathers of the Constitution were not so much inspired men, as condensers or codifiers of centuries of human wisdon, the writers up, and abridgers of human law, the common law of England — of the principles, rights, liberties, our British forefathers, after five or six centuries of struggle, wrested from the Kings and Despots of England, and affixed to great charters of Human Rights, the *Magna Charta* of 1215 won sword in hand by the Barons of England from King John, or the Petition of Rights, 1628, or the *Habeas Corpus*, 1679, or the Bill of Rights, 1689. The Constitution of the United States brought to a *focus* these great Lights of Liberty, Law, Human Progress and Civilization. The eyes of our fathers were then but the lenses of the Past to see their Present, and so to provide for the great Future. (Applause.)

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE AND THE PLEDGE OF THE WAR.

Hence, when in December, now two years gone by, after the Presidential election, there assembled in South-Carolina, a Convention of the States, enacting an ordinance of secession, separating that State from the United States and from the Constitution of the United States, which had not gratified South-Carolina in that election; hence, when in the subsequent February there assembled in Montgomery, Alabama, a convention of a few other States, subverting and annulling the Constitution of the United States, and not only that, but creating a new Constitution, and changing the old Flag — both the reason and the sentiment of the country felt indignant, and uprose to express that indignation. The magazine so well prepared for explosion during twenty-five years of preparation by extreme men, both North and South, was fired at Fort Sumter, and the explosion took place, involving some thirty millions of people in its destruction. The North uprose in mass almost — not to maintain or uphold Abraham Lincoln, or the Cabinet Administration of Abraham Lincoln — but to uphold the Constitution, the three branches of the Government of the United States, its Judiciary as well as its Executive and Legislative authority. (Applause.) "The Constitution *shall* be maintained:" "The Flag *shall* be

respected:" "The Union *must* and *shall* be preserved," were the universal rallying cries of the Northern People. (Applause.) The Rebel Enemy authoritatively, through one of its Cabinet officers, (Mr. Walker,) avowed its intent to march upon, and to seize, Washington;—and hence, when the President called for his 75,000 men, more than a million were earnest to volunteer to protect the Capital, to uphold the Flag, to stand by the Constitution. The war then, was solely and avowedly for the maintenance of the Constitution, and the Flag as the symbol of that Constitution.

THE PLEDGE OF THE INAUGURAL.

The President himself, in his Inaugural, March 4th, 1861, thus pledged himself against the Abolitionists in his own party, and against his Proclamation of Abolitionism:

"I have no purpose, *directly* or *indirectly*, to INTERFERE with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe *I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no intention to do so.*"

THE PLEDGES OF THE HOUSE.

The House of Representatives, by a nearly unanimous vote, in February, 1861, passed the following resolutions:

Resolved, That neither the Federal Government nor the people or government of the non-slaveholding States *have a purpose or a constitutional right to legislate upon or interfere with slavery in any of the States of the Union.*

Resolved, That those persons in the North who do not subscribe to the foregoing proposition *are too insignificant in numbers and influence* to excite the serious attention or alarm of any portion of the people of the Republic, and that the increase of their numbers and influence does not keep pace with the increase of the aggregate population of the Union.

THE CRITTENDEN PLEDGE.

In July, 1861, was introduced into the House, and passed almost unanimously, (only two dissenting,) the well-known Crittenden Pledge or Resolution, namely:

"That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms against the constitutional government, *and in arms around Capitol*; that in this national emergency, Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion and resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, or *for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union* with all the dignity, *equality* and *rights* of the several States unimpaired; and that, as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease."

THE SENATE PLEDGE.

In the Senate, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, had introduced, and the Senate had passed, a like resolution. Thus, three branches of the Legislative Government—the Executive, the Senate, the House—solemnly pledged itself to the country to carry on a war, only for the SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION. The armies were created, and the soldiers were enlisted upon that solemn pledge—and, upon many a battle-field, many a life has been freely offered up to carry out, defend, protect, and promulgate that pledge. This was the war, the North entered into—the war of the Conservative men of the North—the war of the great Democratic Party. We never committed ourselves to any other war, (cheers,) and they who are for breaking these pledges, or for creating another war—or who have committed us to, or enlisted us in this war, under what now seems false pretences or false pledges—they are in honor bound to dismiss us from this war, and to carry it on, themselves. (Loud and prolonged cheering, many of the audience rising and waving their hats.)

THE REVERSE PICTURE—THE PROCLAMATION OF SEPTEMBER 22D.

These being the pledges of Mr. Lincoln, the President, and of the Congress assembled in Washington, now look at the reverse picture, and say, who can, that the whole purpose, the whole *programme* of the war have not been changed? Say, who can, that twenty millions of Northern white men are not now called upon to endure Conscription and Taxation, and to sacrifice themselves in Southern latitudes, mainly to free three or four millions of negroes. (Applause.) The President in his September 22d Proclamation says:

"On the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-

three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, *shall be thenceforward, and then, forever free;* and the *Executive Government* of the United States, including the military and naval AUTHORITY thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, or any of them, in ANY effort, they may make for their actual freedom."

THE PRESIDENT'S EXTRAORDINARY USE OF WORDS.

Let me first call attention here to the extraordinary words of the Proclamation. The President speaks of himself, elected but for four years, two of them now nearly expired, as the EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES? Who created Abraham Lincoln the *Government of the United States?* Who created, who elected him, a man made of no better flesh and blood than the rest of us, to be the GOVERNMENT of thirty millions of people in the United States?

A VOICE — The people. (Cries of "No, no;" "Put him out," "Let him be.")

MR. BROOKS — The people! *Never!* (Exciting cheers.) Never, NEVER did the people give him a majority of their suffrages. (Continued cheers.) He is a minority President, *appointed* by the operations of the Constitution in spite of the people of the United States. (Cheers.) A large majority of the people voted against him, and he was created President in and under that very Constitution he would overthrow by his proclamations. (Great and continued cheers.)

In this Proclamation, the President also speaks of "the Military and Naval AUTHORITY." Authority is a legal power, or a right to command, such as Prince over subject, as Parent over child. The Government has authority; or, the President acting in obedience to Law, and so the Precedents or Decisions of a Court are *authority* or *authorities;* but the AUTHORITY of the Army or Navy is more novel even than this declaration of Mr. Lincoln, that I am the Executive Government of the United States—for there is a precedent for that, in the French *L'etat c'est moi*, (I am the State.) The Army and Navy are the agencies of civil authority—but, under our form of Government, they are no authority of themselves. When the State is the Emperor or the King, the Army or the Navy are only his means of executing his authority—but, under our form of Government, they are no *authority*, only the military Agencies of the Civil Government of the United States. As names often are things, or more than things, I thus dwell in verbal criticisms upon these words. When a President sets himself up as the Executive Government of the United States, and calls the Army and Navy his *authority* for overriding States, and the Laws of States, and the Constitution of the United States, we can not be too watchful of mere words. Naval and military men, then, be it understood, are but Agents, only, of civil authority, to execute Civil and Constitutional Law. (That's so; cheers.) The Army and the Navy are, certainly, not "authority," under any known or recognized "Executive Government of the United States." (Cheers.)

There is another part of the Proclamation which chalks out, or seems to chalk out, a servile war, which contemplates, or seems to contemplate, the exciting of the slaves to the destruction not only of their masters, but of women and children, and to add the horrors of a servile, thus to the civil war. The words are—

"The Executive Government . . . will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons (negro slaves) . . . in any effort they may make for their actual freedom."

I do not know that the President means to excite a servile insurrection I will not impute to him the horrible intent of converting the Southern country into a Hayti or St. Domingo, with the "Authority" of his army and navy to help, but I say, that the language is susceptible of that meaning, and such meaning has been given to it throughout the civilized world. (Applause.) When the "Executive Government" thus addresses negroes or slaves, words ought to be used that negroes or slaves can not pervert into authority to burn, slay, destroy, without regard to condition, age, or sex. (Applause.)

THE HOUSE BREAKING ITS PLEDGES.

But the President alone is not responsible for this violation of the Pledge and Principle, that enlisted the conservative men of the country in this war. The House of Representatives thus, December, 1862, reversed the Crittenden Resolution of July, 1862, the Hon. Sam. C. Fessenden, of Me., offering the following Resolution, which passed, ayes 78; noes 51.

Resolved, That the Proclamation of the President, of the date of Sept. 22d, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution; that the policy of emancipation as indicated therein is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, is well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard to the rights of citizens and the perpetuity of a free government.

ISSUE TAKEN ON PROCLAMATION POWER.

And now, my friends, here we take issue on that Resolution, such as we took in September, here, in this Hall, on the Proclamation, pending that reign of terror, when moral courage was needed to speak, not as now, when we can speak, and dare to speak with freedom, of all the efforts of the administration of the government to subvert the law. When I said to you in the beginning of my remarks, that the Constitution of the United States was the embodiment of the common law of England and of the wisdom of our British ancestors for 500 years, I omitted to say that there was nothing in that Constitution which forbade Executive Proclamations. There are certain things so settled in human life, that it is not necessary to stipulate against them, such as the right to eat, to breathe, to live. When our British forefathers, in their second Revolution, stipulated against almost every form of executive despotic power, they did not deem it necessary expressly to stipulate against Proclamations, or to define the limits of uttering a Proclamation — because the common law of England had long settled, that Kings could not make law by proclamation, or ordain law, or override law. When our Constitution was formed, such a practice had not been set up in England for 200 years. No monarch of England, for that long period of time, had attempted to exercise, by proclamation, such powers and prerogatives as the President of the United States sets up in his Proclamation of September 22, 1862. (Applause.)

Queen Elizabeth as long ago as 1580 began to make Law by Proclamation, then, against the Anabaptists of England, and against Irishmen straying away from home, and against seditious and schismatic books tending to prejudice the then rising Church of England. James the First prohibited by Proclamation country gentlemen from coming to London, and regulated, or attempted to regulate, the habiliments of their women and children. (Laughter.) Charles the First, unfortunately for himself, in prohibiting by Proclamation, emigration to New England, prohibited Cromwell and Hampden from emigrating there. Queen Elizabeth, however, respected her People enough to listen to, and to yield to some of the remonstrances of that People against this power of Proclamation. Charles the First went to the Block, because of the unlawful exercise of this, and similar Prerogatives and Powers. (Applause.) The Tudors and the Stuarts claimed not only the power to proclaim and to ordain Law by Proclamation, but the power to dispense with Law, and to suspend Law. What cost these dynasties their existence is that which calls itself "*the Executive Government*" of the United States, and is now attempting upon us, Americans. (Applause.) Abraham Lincoln *suspends* Law—the *Habeas Corpus—dispenses* not only with Law, but even with the Courts of Law, and, by Proclamation, *ordains* Law. (Cheering.) Our Fathers did not stipulate against these Executive or Royal Prerogatives, in the Constitution — because for 200 years in England, the exercise of such Prerogatives had scarcely been thought of. But what no King of England for two centuries dared to do—what broke down the Tudors and the Stuarts, Abraham Lincoln is doing, and his upholders are claiming that he has a right to do. (Applause.)

A PRONUNCIAMENTO, NOT A PROCLAMATION.

Now, no man doubts the right of the President to utter a Proclamation; at times, it is his duty even—but a *Procla-*

mation is one thing, and a PRONUNCIAMENTO is another. The one is English, on English precedent; the other is Spanish, and comes to us from Spain, or, from the Revolutions of Spanish America. The Kings or Queens of England, utter Proclamations now — and there are numerous precedents for them, from the Administration of Washington, on to this era and age—but the Kings of England, now, and the previous Presidents of the United States, utter Proclamations, not to MAKE Law, or to ORDAIN Law, but to proclaim what the Law *is*, and to forewarn ill-disposed people against the violation of existing Common, Constitutional, or Statute Laws. The Queen of England, Queen born, has forewarned her British subjects not to violate British (neutrality) Law—but our four-years old President suspends Law, dispenses with Law, ordains Law, and overthrows both Constitutional and Statute Law. He *pronounces*, (in the Spanish meaning of the word,) not *proclaims* law. He scorns Common Law, Statute Law, Constitutional Law, Latin *Magna Charta*, and *Habeas Corpus*, and English, as well as American written Constitutions, and introduces here, not from England, the PROCLAMATION, but from Spanish America, the *Pronunciamiento*, that is, REVOLUTION. A Proclamation upholds Law; the Pronunciamiento overthrows Law. The President has fulminated a Spanish Pronunciamiento.

NO SUCH MILITARY POLICY NECESSARY.

But, we are told this *Pronunciamiento* against whole States or upon whole States, is, as a matter of mere military policy, or necessity, a wise exercise of the War Power; and it is insinuated that when the negro is thus "pronounced" free on paper, then Sambo, and Scipio and Cæsar will embrace their Rebel masters, and bring them into the ranks of our army, and surrender them as prisoners of war to the utterer of this Paper Proclamation. (Laughter and applause.) We shall see. We shall see. But I deny that there is any wisdom in this Paper as a war measure. I deny that it is a military policy. Its first effect has been to disunite the North, and to raise up a large majority in that North, certainly in the central States of the North, in opposition to this species of Administration. (Applause.) And the next effect has been, while thus disuniting the North, to unite the whole South as one man against a government carrying on a war on such principles. (A voice — "That's so.") We, who were united, have become a *divided* People, and they who were divided, have become a united people;—and if this be military policy, I must say, I don't see it. Do you? (Laughter.) It is a matter of record, too, that since the utterance of this Paper, while Providence before blessed our arms, when fighting for the Constitution and the Laws; now, Providence in a good degree has ceased to smile upon us. Delaware, Maryland, Western Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri came to us under the Inaugural of the President and the Crittenden Resolutions; New-Orleans was taken; Norfolk surrendered; nearly the whole coast of North-Carolina became ours; a Union party more or less existed every where in the South; while now, vast armies are in the field against us, fighting not alone for Independence, but for life, home, family, fireside, wife, children, every thing dear to man. The military policy of the President has made popular, South, what was there but an odious conscription, and what the people were preparing to resist. A war, becoming unpopular, has there been made popular; while a war here, at the start popular, is becoming unpopular, because of the false pretenses under which men were engaged or enlisted in it. (Applause.) Hence, I deny that there is any military necessity for this Paper, or that there is any military policy in it. (Cheers.) It is costing us already seas of blood, and will cost us, if thus persisted in, the entailment of a debt upon generation after generation, so that labor, for centuries, will be subjected to capital. (Cheers.)

NEGRO PROCLAMATIONS IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION.

And now, as a matter of history, gentlemen, there is no one thing upon which the American people, or the United States Government, are more com-

mitted than against this use of negro-freeing Proclamations, or the use, in any way, of negroes in war, civil or foreign. The British Generals on our own Continent, pending our own Revolution of 1776, uttered Proclamations like this of Abraham Lincoln. Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Howe *proclaimed* in New-York, New-Jersey and Pennsylvania the freedom of our negroes; Lord Dunmore did the like in Virginia, and Lord Cornwallis, further South. Our Statesmen and our Generals made good points of appeal to the civilization of the world against this British employment of Indians and negroes in civil war, and they spoke of the Indian savage and negro barbarism in the same breath. The use of such means and men, by Englishmen to subdue Englishmen, was pronounced to be against the law of nations, the law of nature and the law of God. (Applause.) That great man, Edmund Burke, whom Heaven had so gifted with intellect, that he seemed able to concenter the great lights of the Past, and to spread and to reflect them all over the Future — that great man foresaw what England was driving America into, and often held up the lights of that luminous intellect to forewarn his countrymen to beware. What he, what Lord Chatham, and others, said in the British Parliament, ought now to be read and re-read by every North-American. In an address to the King of England, exhorting that King not to drive the war to extreme measures, said Burke:

"To excite, by a Proclamation issued by your Military Governors, an universal insurrection of negro slaves in any of the Colonies, is a *measure full of complicated horrors, absolutely illegal, suitable neither to the practice of war nor to the time of peace.*"

In an address to the then British Colonies, Mr. Burke said:

"We likewise saw with shame the African slaves, who had been sold to you in public faith, and under the sanction of acts of Parliament, to be your servants and guards, employed to cut the throats of their masters."

The effect of these remonstrances from Burke, from Chatham, and other liberal Englishmen, upon Parliament, against these proclamations for the use or sudden liberation of negro slaves by the British generals, did more than any thing to destroy the popularity of the war in England and to tempt the British government and people to end so wicked a war, by the recognition of their colonies as independent States. (Applause.) Great Britain herself, as a government, confessed the Proclamation respecting the negroes to be so wrong that in the treaty of 1783, 7th article, is this solemn stipulation:

That His Britannic Majesty should, "with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or *carrying away of negroes*, or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the United States, and from every part, and place, and harbor within the same."

When the treaty came to be executed, long controversies arose upon what definition should be given to this "*carrying away of negroes, or other property.*" Whoever will look into the American archives will find long diplomatic papers, and then long diplomatic controversies, — and he will find, too, that not only such Southern men as Jefferson and Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, were committed against the abduction, use, or employment of negroes in war, freed by proclamation or otherwise, but such New-Yorkers as John Jay and Egbert Benson. In the end the British government acquiesced in the justice of these remonstrances, and paid for the deported negroes, thus freed or abducted. (Applause.)

NEGRO PROCLAMATIONS IN THE WAR OF 1812.

A like passage of history was repeated after the war of 1812. Admiral Cochrane, upon the waters of the Chesapeake, issued a Proclamation, which, while it avoided the use of the word slave, in order to seem thus not to violate the understanding, or law of nations, that forbade the use of slaves, or the stirring them up to insurrection, nevertheless invited such persons to enter his Majesty's service, or to emigrate to British possessions in North-America. Admiral Cochrane, in short, was following in the footsteps of Clinton, Howe, Dunmore, and Cornwallis, of the Revolution. When the treaty of Ghent was made, (1815,) in the first

article was inserted a stipulation resembling that in the 7th article of the Treaty of 1783, namely:

"That all places captured by either party should be restored without delay, without carrying away any private property captured in such places, or *any slaves or other private property.*"

OPINION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

John Quincy Adams, to whose name and memory, the Republican party profess to look up with so much respect, it so happens, was Minister at the Court of St. James, charged with the negotiation of this Treaty on the part of the United States. In a letter to the Secretary of State, August 22, 1815, he reports his conversation with Lord Castlereagh upon a subject, in part, as follows:

"Had the British plenipotentiaries asked of us an explanation of our proposal to transpose the words, [of the treaty,] we should certainly have given it; we evidently had an object in making the proposal; and we thought the words themselves fully disclosed it. Our object was the restoration of all property which, by the usages of war among civilized nations, ought not to have been taken. All private property on shore was of that description; it was entitled by the laws of war to exemption from capture — *slaves were private property.*" Further on he continues: "It was true, proclamations inviting slaves to desert from their masters had been issued by British officers; we believe them *deviations from the usages of war;* we believe that the British government itself would, when the hostile passions arising from the state of war should subside, consider them in the same light. . . . . Lord Liverpool manifested no dissatisfaction at these remarks, nor did he attempt to justify the proclamation to which I partially alluded."

In a letter of instructions (July 5th, 1820) to Mr. Middleton, our Minister to St. Petersburgh, where this article of Treaty of Ghent had been referred, upon difficulties arising as to construction similar to those in the Treaty of 1783, Mr. Adams enters into a sustained argument to prove that the emancipation of an enemy's slaves is not authorized by the laws of war. The following extract is sufficient to clearly exhibit his opinion:

"It has been repeatedly alleged on the part of the British Government that it could not be supposed they would have agreed to an article which would oblige them to deliver up to their masters slaves who, during the war, had taken refuge under their protection. The reply to this observation is, that if that had been an objection to their agreeing to the article, it should have been made before the signing of the article, and the engagement not to carry away slaves, at all. They had in fact numbers of slaves by these different modes of capture — one of such as had been seduced to run away from their masters by proclamations from British officers, a second of voluntary fugitives whom they received; and a third of such as had been taken in predatory excursions. You will find in Niles's Register, vol. vi. p. 242, the proclamation of Admiral Cochrane, instigating the desertion of slaves from their masters. . . . . It is not openly addressed to slaves, nor does it avow its real object. From the use of the phraseology which it adopts, the inference is conclusive that the real object was such as the Admiral did not choose to avow, and the only supposable motive for the disguise is the consciousness that it was not conformable to the established usages of war among civilized nations. The wrong was in the proclamation. Admiral Cochrane had no lawful authority to give freedom to the slaves belonging to the citizens of the United States. The recognition of them by Great Britain in the treaty as property is a complete disclaimer of the right to destroy that property by making them free. An engagement contracted with them to that effect was, in relation to the owners of the property wrongful; and, if, in relation to the slaves themselves, it was an engagement which the British Government assumed upon themselves and sanctioned, it could not divest the owners of the slaves of their property, nor release the British government from the obligation to the United States, and to the owners, to evacuate the place without carrying them away."

Mr. Adams wrote to Mr. Rush, at London, as follows:

"The only equity of the British side is that they signed the article without being aware of its full import, and that the stipulation was incompatible with their previous promises to the negroes. This is the real knot of the question between us, and its solution is, that they had no right to make any such promises to the negroes. The principle is, that the emancipation of an enemy's slaves is not among the acts of legitimate war — as relates to the owners; it is a destruction of private property, nowhere warranted by the usages of war. This principle must, I think, be peculiarly familiar to the Emperor of Russia, and may be pressed upon his attention in the case of reference with effect."

On the 18th of October, Mr. Adams again wrote to Mr. Middleton, and expressed his views in the strongest language. He said:

"In the statement of the British ground of argument upon the claim in the submission, they have broadly asserted the right of emancipating slaves — private property — as a legitimate right of war. This is utterly incomprehensible on the part of a nation whose subjects holds slaves by millions, and who, in this very treaty, recognize

them as private property. No such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers who admit any limitation. The right of putting to death all prisoners in cold blood and without special cause might as well be pretended to be a law of war, or the right to use poisoned weapons, or to assassinate. I think the Emperor will not recognize the right of emancipation a legitimate warfare, and am persuaded you will present the argument against it."

Now, gentlemen, no language can be stronger than this, which Mr. Adams here uses against what Mr. Lincoln has done, or is to do. "The Emancipation of an enemy's slaves (he says) is *not* among the acts of legitimate war," almost the language of Edmund Burke. "No such right is acknowledged as a law by writers, who admit of any limitation." Mr. Adams expresses his horror of such war, by classing it "*with putting to death all prisoners* in cold blood," or "*the use of poisoned weapons*," or "*assassination.*" The Emperor of Russia decided on the words of the Treaty, that the slaves must be paid for, and they were paid for, $1,200,000 under this, the Treaty of Ghent, and the Treaty of 1783.

It is now said, that at a late period of life, Mr. Adams retreated from these positions, and excused himself for so doing, that he wrote under instructions from the then administration, and did not express his own opinions. It is true, that after Mr. Adams had been defeated for the Presidency in 1828 — as he deemed, by the South, exasperated, it may be by that defeat, he did argue, that "the War Power" could abolish slavery, but his "War Power" was not laid down to be in a Proclamation from the President of the United States, but in Congress. Congress, he said, (speech of 1842) has power (thus) to carry on the war, and not the President alone. One of the laws of war, he sets down to be:

"When a country *is invaded* and two hostile armies are set in martial array, the Commanders in both armies have power to emancipate slaves *in the invaded territory.*"

But our President in the White House, with no sword buckled on his belt, even, 1000 miles or more from Texas, etc., which our armies have never *invaded*, fulminates from that White House, in a mere Proclamation, a law of war, liberating the slaves in a Territory he has never even seen (Applause.)

It matters not, however, what Mr. Adams said, in the heat of debate in 1842 — for then he was but Mr. Adams — whereas as Minister to England, and as Secretary of State, representing and acting for the Government of the United States, he committed this Government, and the People, in 1815 and in 1820, to principles which no honest, consistent successor in that Government can now retract. Mr. Adams in 1815 and 1820 spoke for the United States: in 1842, he spoke for Mr. Adams alone. *There* is our record, a record made up from 1776, on to 1818, in two Treaties of Peace, in diplomatic correspondence, and in the receipt of moneys thereon, and this record can not be got over, or put under — for it stares us in the face, on every side we turn. (Applause.) The emancipation and the use of negro slaves, as President Lincoln is using and emancipating them, is, then, in violation of every principle and every precedent of our intercourse in such matters, with foreign states. (Great cheers,)

Gentlemen, these historical recollections, I am well aware, in a popular assembly, like this, are somewhat dull — but I feel in addressing you, that through this Association I am addressing no inconsiderable portion of our Northern countrymen, and I trust, directly or indirectly, some of the conservative people of the South. (Applause.) Hence it is not declamation that is useful now, but instruction, the right reading of the right records. We must show both the North and the South, that the war waged was a war for the Constitution and the Laws, not a war to break Constitutions and Laws, and a war to be waged according to the laws of nations, as expounded by such eminent men as John Jay and John Quincy Adams, when they were addressing other nations.

THE WAR POWER.

But we are told, gentlemen — no matter what Constitution, no matter what the laws of nations, this is a war power President Lincoln is using to support the very life of the nation. He

has the right to exert any, and whatsoever power he may deem best fitted to subdue the common enemy. Or, in other words, the President of the United States has but to involve the people in a war, with any body, ostensibly to maintain the Constitution, and he can then pervert that war, to subvert that Constitution, and to extinguish the life of the nation. (Applause.) What proposition more absurd? What better confutation than the mere simple statement of such an absurd proposition. (Applause.) In an abstract struggle, then, for the Republic, we must die in Despotism! To live, we must commit suicide! To restore the Union, we must make the Union not worth a restoration! Now this is not the sort of Government under which we bargained to live, or to die even. (Cries of "no, no.") We have never agreed to subvert the Constitution in order to restore the Union. We have never agreed to surrender Liberty, Property, Free Speech, Free discussion, or Freedom in the concrete or abstract to any Executive Government, or Executive Power. (Cries of Never, never.) And if ever the time comes, when under any "War Power," it may be necessary to subvert the Constitution, and thus to give up our Rights and Liberties, it is a matter of indifference to me, whether a Union thus achieved, be maintained or not; and I say here, and hesitate not to say, that the quicker we be rid of such a Union, under such a Government, the better for all concerned. (Loud, and prolonged, and reiterated applause, the audience rising and giving three cheers for Mr. Brooks.) This War Power is a new name for a very old thing. It is the new name of Despotism, and of Military Despotism, the very worst sort of despotism on earth. When the Roman Republic was changed into the Roman Empire — when the Romans lost their Consuls, their Tribunes, their Senate, all but in the name, and thus lost all their rights and liberties, their IMPERATOR, the Latin name for their Abraham Lincoln, their Commander-in-Chief, was scarcely changed by the War Power into the modern word, EMPEROR. Augustus, or Tiberius Cæsar, but became *Kaiser*, or *Czar*, that is, Cæsar. Hence, let us put down our foot at the start, and declare, we recognize no Presidential War Power, no *Imperator* to be turned into any *Emperor*, no Cæsar to be made into any *Kaiser*, or *Czar*. He who attempts to govern the People, under any other Power than the Powers of the Constitution; he who leaps over the Laws of Civil Liberty, and the Civil Law, into that boundless field of Despotism, claimed as a War Power, establishes principles and precedents, from Emperors and Cæsars, and merits the execrations of every free man. (Applause.) Hence, I say, when a President ordains Law by Proclamation, under the pretense that he has such right, under any unknown, illimitable War Power, his Proclamation is not to be regarded as Law; it is not Law — (cheers) — and the President of the United States has no more right to declare it Law, than you or I, or any other man. (Tremendous and long-continued cheering.)

Gentlemen, your cheers remind me, that this is strong language— but it is such as the crisis demands. Some body must speak, when the great bulwarks of Law are being broken down, and every thing is thus being put in peril, and I may as well speak as other men. Some humble sentinel must stand on the outposts of the Constitution, and the Law, and standing there, must speak, and cry out against Proclamation Law, against Executives dispensing with, or suspending Law. Two months ago, I know it would not have been safe thus to uphold Law, or to declare against the violation of Law— but it is safe now. Then the casernes of Fort Lafayette or Fort Warren would have been my doom. (Cries, not now, never; we've put a stop to all that.) But when a President is unfaithful to his oath to uphold the Constitution and the Law, and subverts that Constitution and the Law— it is my duty, it is your duty, before God and man, to denounce all his arbitrary uses of power. (Great applause, and three cheers for the speaker.)

SUBJUGATION IMPOSSIBLE.

In the beginning of this war—when

it was a war for the Constitution, and for the whole United States, not only were the people of the North a unit, or nearly so—but we had a great and powerful party in some of the Southern States of the Union; and for that Constitution, and under that Flag, which was the symbol of the Constitution, there was a fair prospect, not of subjugating, not of exterminating, not of crushing out the people of the South—but by prudence and wisdom, and a fair adhesion to the principles of the Constitution, and of the Laws of Civilization as well as of Nations, of bringing back the great body of the Southern people to the embrace of the Union, and to the reverence of that ancient and honorable Flag. It was their Flag, as well as our Flag—and the associations connected with it, were as dear to them as to us. (Applause.) But I hesitate not now to say — what hitherto I have refrained from saying, though often felt, that it is vain, utterly vain, to attempt to subjugate, extinguish, or exterminate six or seven millions of Anglo-Saxon people. (Applause.) Their race is our race. The blood that runs in our veins is their blood. The same pulsations that beat in our hearts, beat in theirs. The same current of life that flows in us, flows in them. Now, who of us, standing here on this Northern soil, believes, Southron or Saxon, Celt or Teuton, or Frank, can invade, or conquer, or subjugate us? All Britain, all France, the whole South combined, could never shake us from our propriety, and make us tremble, and yield, under invasion. (Applause.) Subjugation — *subjugo*—is not a word of Anglo-Saxon derivation, or origin. (Cheers.) Anglo-Saxons never were, never are, never will be, brought under the yoke — *subjugated*, conquered, crushed out, exterminated. (Cheers.) Edmund Burke well comprehended all this, and in that masterly speech of his on "Conciliation with America," cited four cases where, for years and years, the British government had attempted to subjugate a neighboring people — the people of Ireland, of Wales, and of the Counties Palatine of Durham and Chester. Ireland was, for a hundred years, he shows, in the process of subjugation, and arms never did conquer her. "It was not English arms, (says Burke,) but the English Constitution that conquered Ireland." The British, at last, threw over her the protecting mantle of British liberty, and Ireland then began to be subjugated. When England piled fifteen acts of penal legislation upon Wales and Welshmen, "no Englishman traveling in that country could go six yards from the high road without being murdered." (Laughter.) "When, after two hundred years of struggle, the day-star of the English Constitution," adds Burke, "had arisen in their hearts, all was harmony, within and without—

> ———Simul alba nautis
> Stella refulsit,
> Defluit saxis agitatus humor, etc. etc.

And the like is said of the Counties Palatine, Durham and Chester. Hence how vain this attempt to subjugate, crush out, or exterminate millions of our own people, of our own flesh and blood—protected as they are by an almost boundless territory stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande— a territory almost without high roads, in large plantations, without visible population, in winter, no inconsiderable portion under water; in summer, the heat so oppressive that the man of the North can hardly endure exposure to the rays of the sun. Such a territory, if there were no defenders upon it, would be almost unconquerable, geographically, or climatically, if I may coin the word. The subjugation, therefore, of such a people, or such a territory, in such a climate, may as well be abandoned first as last. If we wish then to bring them back into the Union, we must bring back to them the Constitution and the Protection of the laws. We must do what Burke said, was done for Ireland and Wales, throw over them the protecting folds of the Constitution, in the spirit in which that Constitution was formed. We must re-lift up from the ground where it was trodden under foot, the Constitution, and only the Constitution. (Applause.) We must do Equity and Justice, and then we can exact Equity and Justice. We must hold out Equal-

ity for the States, and then we can enforce Equality. We must respect our own rights, and the rights of States, and then we can compel respect for these rights upon others. We must rear up here in the North, a Conservative, Constitutional Party, and when that party is reared up, which accepts the Constitution not as this man or that man expounds it—but as the Supreme Court has expounded it, (cheers,) then, and not till then shall we be a reünited States. Then, and not till then, shall we begin to subjugate the South. Force nor Violence can ever win back a People to love. Conquest would but impose the necessity for re-conquest, until here, as in Europe, we should ever be revolving in the ruinous circle of War and Despotism. We hold in the South, now, only what is under the range of our guns. Our conquest is only of the soil on which we are treading. To hold all this, to possess, to occupy a territory so vast, not alone are one million of men indispensable to hold—but a million more, to conquer, to subjugate, as well as to occupy, or to re-fill the ever-thinning ranks of those who do conquer and subjugate. How much better, then, how much wiser is the law of self-Government, or of that home Government, that State Government, which relieves a nation from obligations so vast, and impresses the duty of Government upon every individual. Rely upon it, then, the only army for subjugation is the Constitution of the United States, and the principles of free self-government, interwoven in every part of it. But what we are doing now—organizing and arming negroes, forming negro Battalions, Regiments, and Brigades—is but outraging public sentiment. All Europe is crying out against it. The whole civilized world shrinks from and abhors any prospect of the repetition of the bloody scenes of Hayti and St. Domingo. That European sympathy and civilization which has hither looked up to us as the model Republic, now turns with horror from white men co-operating with African slaves to shed fraternal blood. We have no hope, then, from the world; we can have no hope in ourselves, until we retreat from this disgraceful exhibition of twenty millions of white men calling on four millions of negroes to fight eight millions, at the most, of white fellow-men. Let us, then, hasten back to the principles of Washington, and of the Fathers of the Republic, as soon as possible, and put the Republic back upon the old track of the Constitution. These were principles of compromise and concession, the North to the South, and the South to the North, and under them, from 1776, on to 1860, we carried on a successful and united government. (Applause.) I do not expect an immediate, nor an early, reëstablishment of confidence between the North and the South; the demagogues have been too long successfully at work in parting us—but I do expect, that when we can successfully reëstablish the principles and spirit of the Constitution in the North, we shall be answered by a corresponding party, South. Or, in other words, when we can effectually subvert Abolitionism, North, a corresponding party in the South will successfully subvert Secessionism there. (Applause.)

THE PURPOSES OF THIS GOVERNMENT.

But, I am asked—what is our *programme?*—what we intend to do? Do we intend to lay down our arms, we are tauntingly asked, and to submit to Rebellion, and let Rebellion ride roughshod over us? Do we intend to let the capital of our country be taken—our armies surrender—and our cities, perhaps, be sacked? No; we have no such intent, no such purpose. (Applause.) We now have no such idea, and we never had. We think, and we feel, first—that if we act upon the purpose and upon the principles, which created this Government, the war will soon, of itself, cease. When the Constitution in 1787 was created, it was not altogether the work of Patriotism, or the love of Liberty that inspired our Fathers. The treaty of 1783, with Great Britain, had secured the Liberty of the People, and the Independence of the States. There was not a right then, we have now, that every body had not then. The great principles of British and of American

personal Liberty were as well secured under the old Confederation of States, as under the Constitution of the United States. But there were other things wanting we had not under the Confederation — free trade, free intercourse, a common currency — and, above all, protection and security from European intervention or invasion. Thirteen independent States had thirteen different custom-houses, and thirteen different laws, and regulations of commerce, and of trade. There was one rate of duties in Newport, Rhode Island, and another in New-York, and yet another in Baltimore, or Norfolk. The Fathers of the Republic then felt the great business necessity of creating order out of this chaos — and of adding to a Free People, a system of Free Trade, and of Free intercourse. It was INTEREST, then, SELF-INTEREST, as much as patriotism, that laid the foundations of our Government. There were debts to be discharged, obligations to be met, a navy to be created for the protection of commerce, that could only be achieved by a government of the United States. Under the guidance of these impulses of self-interest, on the 11th of September, 1786, Commissioners from several States assembled in Annapolis, Md., "to consider upon the best means of remedying the defects of the Federal Government." Their very platform was "to take into consideration the TRADE and COMMERCE of the United States, and to consider how far an uniform system, in their commercial intercourse and regulations, might be necessary to their common INTEREST and permanent harmony." The vulgar inspiration of Trade started the Convention held in Philadelphia, afterwards, in 1787. Such men as Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Franklin, Roger Sherman, Rutledge, and Pinckney, did not hesitate to assemble, and to act upon this great inspiration of self-Interest, and of Commerce and Trade. Free-trade, a free intercourse, free rivers, they well reasoned, were indispensably necessary among a free people. The main purpose for which this Government was created, our Constitutional history shows, was to have but one system of customs and of duties, from Georgia to Maine. Or, in other words, more tersely expressed, this is an *exterior*, not an *interior*, Government. The Federal Government was created, not for morals, not for religion, not for slavery or anti-slavery — but to promote the "general welfare," or, in other, more vulgar parlance, to collect duties, to raise revenue thereby, to *coin* money, to have uniform weights and measures, to have one patent-office, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. I repeat, our great Fathers created a Government of, and founded it upon, self-interest, and only upon these principles of self-interest can it be maintained. When we interfere with morals, or religion, or attempt to govern by Theology, or Philosophy, our Government fails. When we attempt to enforce opinions, or to use Government to enforce opinions, the Government fails — for it never can do what it never was created to do. Hence, when an attempt is made to free negroes, or emancipate negroes in the South, the Government fails, just as if it attempted to emancipate them in Brazil or Cuba, or to emancipate the Sepoys of the East-Indies. Hence, when we prosecute war to free four millions of Southern negroes — though there are twenty millions of us, North concerned it — we must fail, under our form of Government; for the Government was created exactly for reverse purposes, — the purposes of *self-interest* — South as well as North — (applause) — and it is not the *interest* of the South to live among free negroes. (Continued applause.) If, then, we wish to end the war, we must resort to the principles of interest that laid the foundations of the Government, and we must make it the interest of the South to live with us — as our fathers did, when they created the Government. We must, then, go back and remember, this is an exterior, not an interior Government, and that slaves and slavery in Georgia or in Carolina do not concern us, as it is our concern to regulate commerce, to collect duties, to have uniform weights and measures, and common patent laws — not to free negroes. We want one system of trade — one uniform commerce upon the sea-coast, and the

free navigation of such great Rivers as the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, the Red River, the Arkansas, etc. The true programme, then, is to go back, and go back as fast as possible, to the reëstablishment of our Custom-Houses, our uniform system of duties. What they are doing in the interior of Virginia, whether they are in rebellion or not in Texas, or Georgia, but little concerns us, if we hold on to Galveston, to Fort Pulaski, to New-Orleans, to Norfok, and collect the Revenue, and attend to the weights and measures. (A laugh.) If in Tennessee, even, they choose to rebel, let them rebel till they are tired of it, provided at New Orleans they will pay the duties, and let us alone in Kentucky, and on the navigation of the Rivers. The beauty of our form of Government is, that we have little or nothing to do with what is going on in Tennessee, or Alabama, or Mississippi. If the people there think it their interest to be in rebellion, let them rebel, as long as they will confine their rebellion in their own limits. I do not propose to surrender New-Orleans, no, never. (Applause.) That Post and that Port are indispensable to the great West — where millions and millions more of people are hereafter to live, and who can not even run the risk, that England or France, or some other Power may take it from the South, as we took it from her, under Farragut. What Gibraltar is to the great Mediterranean, New-Orleans is to the Great West — the Key, the gateway of the commerce of thirty or forty thousand miles of interior River Navigation. (Applause.) I do not propose to surrender Key West. The possession of it is indispensable to our navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. It is our self-interest to hold it, and hold it we must. I do not propose to surrender Norfolk or Fortress Monroe. They are the keys of the Chesapeake, and the gates to the Capital in Washington. The duty of this Government is to collect duties in Mobile, in Charleston, as well as in North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and Louisiana — and I would remove any thing which stands in the way of the execution of this exterior duty.

UNION A NECESSITY.

The God of Nature, I may say more, to the Southern People,—(Oh! that they may heed it to avert eternal wars!)— the God of Nature has written upon our very geography — "One Country, one Constitution, one Destiny." (Applause.) It is written on the long lines of the Missouri and Mississippi, on the Ohio, and all their numerous tributaries, that empty into the Gulf of Mexico. The Father of his Country is not more eloquent in his Farewell Address upon this necessity of Union and Indivisibility, than is the Father of Waters, for four thousand miles — as he gathers up his reasons in the rising rivulets of the icy Rocky Mountains, and rolls them on, into volumes of irresistible logic toward the Gulf of Mexico. (Applause.) These great waters must — it is the law of inexorable necessity — belong to one people, and be in one country. The holding on to what we have got, on the Mississippi, on the Gulf, on the Chesapeake, on the Capes of Virginia, is as indispensable to our safety as it is for the safety of the South to have them too. We are bound together thus, we are linked together, for weal or woe—and no wise man will fight to put asunder what God has thus joined together. (Applause.) If we part by Treaty, we part but soon to meet again in war. Eternal War, or Eternal Union, seems to be our Destiny. (Applause.) Tell me not that the Ohio can divide us as the Rhine divides France and Germany, or, as the Danube parts Nationalities— tell me not all this, unless you tell me, in the same breath, the numbers of the huge standing armies, that garrison the Rhine and the Danube, and secure Peace only by bristling in arms, eternally. (Applause.) England could not live without Scotland and Wales, and France perished in provinces, and Germany has been drenched with human gore — because *there*, there was one people, speaking one language, cut up, divided into Kingdoms, Dukedoms, Landgraves, etc. It is essential, indispensably essential, for the security of our American Liberty, that we be one People. (Applause.) If but a river part us, or a chain of mountains

huge standing armies must stand as sentinels on every such river, or on every such mountain-pass—and there must be cordons of custom-houses, and passports, and restrictions, all utterly destructive of human liberty. Standing armies are the Death of Freedom. Where the sword reigns, the Genius of Liberty runs off in terror and affright—and the People soon yield up to Despotism. (Applause.) Three hundred thousand men on your side, and three hundred thousand on our side, to act as Policemen, will be indispensably necessary to keep apart a People speaking one tongue, and these inflamed by discordant free, and slave institutions. Your negroes would run off, and we should keep them, and you, in revenge, would burn, pillage, and destroy. Eternal war, or huge standing armies, I repeat then, would be our destiny—and where War is, we see now, both North and South, there is no Liberty. In the name of God, then, if we will throw down our arms, throw down yours, and come back to us, or, if God has abandoned men to passion, and blood, in the name of Liberty, that hereditary Liberty, bequeathed to us all, we invoke you, to unite with us, and rescue our country from a destiny that shocks the patriot even in imagination to contemplate. (Great applause.)

UNION OUR SALVATION.

But, gentlemen, Union is not only essential to Liberty, but essential to our salvation. Republics exist on earth only as exceptional governments. Monarchies and despotisms are the common Law, if not the common destiny of nations. All Europe smiles, or seems to smile, upon our divisions, our battles, and the torrents of blood we shed in order to destroy the only great Republic on earth. Monarchy and Despotism both grin their ghastly smile—while Liberty, the earth over, shrieks over the unnatural, the suicidal war.

Gentlemen, "Divide and Conquer" is the principle of monarchies against republics every where. Divide and conquer is the principle which now inspires the British Government, if not the Emperor of France. Divide the North and South, and then if possible conquer both when both are exhausted. Unity and universality of government are therefore a necessity for us both North and South, and the quicker and deeper, and wider, this principle is comprehended universally, the quicker we shall lay down our arms and stop this horrible effusion of human blood. (Applause.)

PRACTICAL RESOLUTIONS.

Gentlemen, I love to speak for practical purposes, and hence I have prepared two or three resolutions to present for your consideration, for your discussion hereafter, not for action at this time and this place, but for submission to this Democratic Association. I see nothing else that is left to us except the principles that are embodied in these resolutions. Revolution is the last thing to be thought of, under a form of government like ours, where grievances can be redressed at the ballot-box. We have to endure this Congress, we have to endure this President; it is wiser to endure them than to overthrow them by revolution. It is possible, barely possible, that at last they may be awakened and may hear and heed the voice of the people. Hence I have selected a State as a medium through which my resolutions may be presented to the people both of the North and the South. A State of the Revolution; one of the Old Thirteen, of high and holy history, which has never been alien, either to the North or to the South, and which has ever been faithful to the Constitution of our common country, and that is, the State, the glorious State, of New-Jersey. (Loud cheers.) I propose, therefore, the following resolutions, to be submitted to the Democratic Association for discussion, for action, and if you approve of them, for presentation to the Government of New-Jersey. And let me remark here that the Government of New Jersey is a homogeneous government, the three branches are all of one faith and one opinion, and hence I name her in preference to the Government of our own New-York.

Mr. Brooks then submitted certain resolutions, the time for action upon which being over, it is not necessary to publish them here.

No. 4.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

THE LETTER OF A REPUBLICAN,

EDWARD N. CROSBY, Esq.,

OF POUGHKEEPSIE,

To Prof. S. F. B. MORSE, Feb. 25, 1863,

AND

Prof. MORSE'S REPLY,

March 2d, 1863.

"Law—her seat is the bosom of God, her voice is the harmony of the world: all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very *least* as feeling her *care*, the *greatest* as not exempted from her *power*."—Richard Hooker.

"What constitutes a State?
Men who their *duties* know,
But know their *rights*, and knowing dare maintain.
And Sovereign Law, *that State's collected will*,
Sits empress, crowning good, repressing ill."
—Sir William Jones.

President, Prof. S. F. B. MORSE,
Secretary, WM. McMURRAY,
Treasurer, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, Cor. Sec'y,
To whom all communications may be addressed

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society, for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

LETTER FROM EDWARD N. CROSBY, Esq.

TROY, Feb. 25th, 1863.

PROF. S. F. B. MORSE:

MY DEAR AND RESPECTED SIR: I have read with deep interest the letter in the N. Y. Evening *Post* of the 19th inst., addressed to you by Mr. D. D. Field. Its general tenor harmonizes with views which I have long coveted the privilege of expressing to you, but which have been repressed by a constitutional feeling of respect for eminence and seniority, and a fear of even seeming officiously to intrude. But, as Mr. Field suggests, your fame has become a national inheritance, and this alike is a motive and an apology for a jealous care on the part of your fellow-citizens as to aught that may impair its lustre. It is the omissions, however, rather than the contents of Mr. Field's sensible and temperate letter that prompt me to speak. While appealing to you on many high grounds, still he fails to reach the highest from which the subject is to be viewed. And I trust it is not assuming too much for one who is not only an admiring fellow-countryman and a near neighbor, but also a Christian friend, to discuss this matter with you from the Christian's stand-point. And what, may I ask, appears to you the sufficient reason for a Christian citizen to ally himself with others, for the extreme and radical purpose of undermining or paralyzing the power of the Government at a crisis when unanimity of support is so plainly essential, not only to the welfare but to the very life of the nation?

There are many, alas! who from ignorance or passion, persistently confound all the immense party, which came into being and into power only on the grand purpose of resisting Southern aggression, with the extremest radicalism and infidelity of the Garrison stamp. They would thus justify themselves in an indiscriminate and reckless hostility to the policy of the Government. I can, of course, find in this fact no explanation of the deliberate action of one of your principles and intelligence. Some may say that "the war on our part is unrighteous and, therefore, unworthy of support." But the rebels began it. To this it may be said: "The provocations offered them were such as greatly to diminish if not remove their criminality in thus beginning it." These assertions, though easily refuted, might require a discussion both long and foreign somewhat to my purpose. But it may be said that "the war though righteous is waged by unrighteous methods, such as confiscation and more particularly emancipation." If, however, it is a legitimate function of our Government to destroy the fabric of the Southern Confederacy, *à fortiori*, is it not justified in removing that which their own highest authorities pronounce to be the *corner-stone* of that fabric? Moreover, though this position is as palpably untenable as the two previously stated, yet supposing it to be a sincere Christian conviction, inasmuch as these methods must be objected to rather as inexpedient than as morally and legally unjustifiable, should not another Christian conviction, that of duty to the "powers that are ordained of God," prevent any disposition to resist or thwart the Government? But I would fain suppose that rather than either of the above, the grounds of your political views and action have been an earnest desire for peace, and an abomination of war, and its attendant horrors, In both of these feelings I claim the fullest sympathy with you, and yet I can not possibly construct upon them a fulcrum for unfriendly action against our Government.

I have seen in the progress of events

much to criticise and regret in the Administration, but I feel assured that as far at least as our President is concerned, the errors have been those of the judgment, and are compatible with a pure integrity and a high-toned patriotism. Horrible too as war is, we are to remember that it may yet be a worthy means to a worthy end. God has certainly in his word more directly and repeatedly given his sanction to it, than he has to slavery. But what is the legitimate, the inevitable tendency of such unfriendly demonstrations as those to which you were persuaded to give countenance at Delmonico's, and which have had a fuller but natural development in Connecticut and elsewhere? We are not left to theories for a reply. Facts show that while the rebel leaders insultingly spurn all pusillanimous overtures of conciliation, they also exult over them as evidences of divided counsels and increasing feebleness at the North. They are thereby emboldened to declare themselves utterly implacable, except by success in their own ruinous plans. What then should be our necessary logic, our irresistible inference? Certainly patriotism and a wise appreciation of the worthy end and the abundant means committed to us would decide at once. Let us by united and courageous effort show the rebels that their success is perfectly hopeless. May I venture to speak a word also as to the "*personnel*" in these matters? Mr. Field says that he knows personally nearly all of those who were associated with you at Delmonico's, and implies very plainly that they borrowed from your presence a respectability for which they could make no becoming return. It was on a previous public occasion, that I saw, with no slight regret, your good name published, as appearing on the same platform with the characterless ——, the infamous ——, and the pitiable ——. Can it be that the purest and most patriotic measures draw to their advocacy such persons, while they fail to attract the innumerable host who dissent, and whose patriotism and probity you can not but heartily commend?

The high estimate I have formed of your Christian character, confirmed and increased by my intercourse with ——, has encouraged me to speak with the more freedom, and with the hope that it will be received in the same kindly spirit which has prompted it.

Yours most sincerely and respectfully,

EDWARD N. CROSBY.

PROF. MORSE'S REPLY.

NEW-YORK, March 2d, 1863.

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 25th of February is received, and I take in good part, what you say, written, however, wholly under misconception of my opinions, my position, and the objects for which the Society for the Diffusion of Political Knowledge has been organized. I know from your estimable character that your intention and motives were of the most benevolent kind in addressing me, and in reply, I shall make a few remarks, I trust in the same kindly spirit, while on the subjects you introduce I use perfect plainness of speech.

Your letter touches on many topics, upon some of which I have, for years, bestowed much study, and it may be that a frank discussion of them at a time when the public mind is alive to such discussions, may be useful in eliciting truth. Fundamental difference of opinion is often more seeming than real, perhaps from the inherent imperfection of language itself, in conveying our real thoughts to another's mind, or through some defect of intellect or education in not using perspicuous language. If due weight were given to a consideration of this kind, there would be less of that asperity of remark upon other's misconceptions, which in this day of excitement deforms the popular style. Mere difference of opinion, honestly entertained, is entitled to that forbearance which is denied to brazen-faced, persistent falsehood.

I can account for your

of the purpose of our Society, as well as of many other topics upon which you have written, only on the presumption that you ground your remarks on the assumed truth of the egregiously false and impudent representations of an unprincipled reporter of the *Evening Post*. If this was the source of your information, you might as well look for truth respecting Bible doctrine, from Voltaire or Thomas Paine. Are you not aware that the pretended report of the incipient meeting at Delmonico's which led to the formation of our Society, is a tissue of falsehoods from beginning to end, exposed and refuted in numerous journals? Of how many falsehoods, persistently repeated, must a journal be convicted before its statement of facts shall be received with suspicion? I need not say to you that the admission into the *Evening Post* of such a grossly abusive report, while entertaining as I have hitherto, for its senior editor, so much personal respect, (however much I may differ from him politically,) is a source of deep mortification to me.

MR. FIELD'S LETTER.

Mr. Field's letter addressed to me was probably indited under the influence of impressions made by that same infamous report, and while I have no complaint of want of courtesy on his part towards me personally, I saw nothing in its general tenor of sufficient importance to require any answer from me. Though addressed to me, it was evidently addressed to the public through me, and I was used only as a convenient mode of addressing the public. So far as any thing he said required notice, that notice was taken of it by several journals. I enclose you clippings from two which happen to be at hand. Whatever personal regard I have for Mr. Field and for his highly respectable family connections, the state of the country compels me to waive all consideration of social relations, in treating of its political condition. His views and mine on the subject of the policy of the Administration are antipodal, and in view of his reported action in the Peace Congress, in connection with some of his radical associates, to which action can be traced the present awful condition of the country, since it was in their power (if I have been rightly advised) to have averted the war, I cannot but look upon his and their political course as laying upon them a weight of responsibility which I would not have upon my conscience for a thousand worlds.

CHRISTIAN STAND-POINT.

You desire "to discuss the subject from the Christian's stand-point." I accede to this the more readily since that is precisely the stand-point from which I have always endeavored to view the whole field of controversy. On Bible truth, therefore, I am ready to plant every position I take.

Did it not lead me into too long a discussion for a letter like this, a discussion starting from a point too far back, even from fundamental theological principles, I should like to establish with you this stand-point impregnably on the Bible. This will have to be done ere the perverted Christian mind of the country can be disabused of the ruinous fallacies which have turned aside the incumbents of so many pulpits from their legitimate duty of allaying the fierce passions of men, through the tranquillizing influences of the gospel of peace, and changed them into impassioned political orators, whose exasperating harangues have added fuel to the already raging fires of a ferocious and desolating fanaticism.* Such a discussion, important as it is, must be in abeyance.

I proceed to answer your question: "What appears to you the sufficient reason for a Christian citizen to ally himself with others for the extreme and radical purpose of undermining or paralyzing the power of the Government at a crisis when unanimity of support is so plainly essential not only to the welfare but to the very life of the nation?"

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.

I will analyze the component parts of your question. You assume, without any warrant, that my purpose is to "undermine and paralyze the power of

* See note A.

the Government." You appear to have fallen into the prevalent error of confounding the *Government* with the *Administration* of the Government. You are too sensible not to see that they are not the same. The word *Government* has indeed two meanings, and in order to rescue the subject from ambiguity allow me to say that the ordinary meaning of Government, in free countries, is, that form of fundamental *rules* and *principles* by which a nation or state is governed, or by which *individual members* of a body politic are to *regulate their action*. Government is in fact a *Constitution* by which the rights and duties both of *citizens* and *public officers* are *prescribed* and *defined*. If the word sometimes has a secondary or more limited meaning synonymous with *Administration* of public affairs, then "*the Government*" is metonymically used for *Administration*, and should not be confounded with the original and true signification of the term *Administration*, which means the *persons collectively* who are intrusted with the execution of the laws, and with the superintendence of public affairs.

Opposition to the *Administration* then, is not opposition to the *Government;* the former may not only be utterly destroyed without affecting the health of the Government, but it may be, and constantly is, thought to be necessary, in the opinion of the supreme power, *the People*, to destroy the Administration in order to preserve the life of the Government. This is in accordance not only with the theory of our institutions, but with the daily practice of the people. Every change of Administration at every election, Federal, State, or municipal, great or small, exemplifies this great truth. The Government remains intact, unscathed, while the Administration is swept out of existence.

In the light of this explication, you must perceive that so far from "allying myself with others for the purpose of undermining and paralyzing the power of the Government," the very purpose of our Society is to uphold and strengthen the Government, by diffusing among the people, such a knowledge of the principles upon which it is founded, that it shall not be in the power of any Administration, whether weak or wicked, to work its injury.

I yield to no man, in hearty *loyalty to the Government*, nor in obedience also to the Administration in all its *constitutional* measures, whatever may be my private opinion of their wisdom. You mistake me if you suppose I have any "radical purpose of undermining or paralyzing" any of its legal measures. If I think them unwise, I shall use my constitutional liberty to say so, and if the Administration transcends the power intrusted to it by the People, I shall endeavor to point out their error, not in a contumacious or unkind spirit, but nevertheless firmly. To the standard of the *Constitution, and the Union* under it, of all the United States I shall cling as the only *political* hope of the country, our only defence against anarchy and despotism.

WHAT MUST WE SUPPORT?

But you say "unanimity of support is essential to the very life of the nation." Support of what? Laws and acts subversive of the Government? Laws and acts in direct and palpable contravention of the Constitution? Laws and acts outside of the Constitution? Where in the fundamental law of the Government, the Constitution, does the President, one of the administrators of the Supreme Law, find his authority for his *emancipation proclamation?* Where for his usurpation of the power to suspend the *habeas corpus?* Where for the confiscation acts? Where for his authority to arrest and incarcerate citizens? These are all acts of the *Administration*, not of the *Government;* they are acts subversive of the Government; acts that are "paralyzing and undermining" the Government; acts that are dividing the people of the North, alarming them for the safety of the Constitution, the Government, and arousing them to call their servants, the Administrators, to account.

It is on such a confounding of terms as this, of *government* and *administration*, that you charge "extreme and radical purposes" upon those who rally in support of the Government.

NECESSITY FOR OUR SOCIETY.

You must excuse me, dear sir, if I say that your letter, to so great an extent based upon the popular fallacies of the day, is itself a proof of the necessity of just such a Society as we have formed; because if minds like yours, intelligent, reflective, ingenuous, and conscientious, are so much at fault on the fundamental principles of our institutions, what must be inferred of the minds of others less intelligent, who imbibe their opinions, and mould their actions, from the prejudiced and befogged intellects controlling the fanatical avenues to public opinion?

CHARACTER OF ABOLITIONISM.

By the manner in which you allude to the "extreme radicalism and infidelity of the Garrison stamp," I am glad to find we have a common stand-point from which to view a portion of the field. Look at that dark conclave of conspirators, freedom-shriekers, Bible-spurners, fierce, implacable, headstrong, denunciatory, Constitution and Union haters, noisy, factious, breathing forth threatenings and slaughter against all who venture a difference of opinion from them, murderous, passionate advocates of imprisonments and hangings, bloodthirsty, and if there is any other epithet of atrocity found in the vocabulary of wickedness, do they not every one fitly designate some phase of radical abolitionism?.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN ABOLITIONISTS AND REPUBLICANS IMPOSSIBLE.

But you would have us make a distinction between these "radicals and infidels of the Garrison stamp," and the "immense party which," as you say, "came into being and into power only on the grand purpose of resisting Southern aggression."

Waiving the question you raise of the existence of any *Southern Aggression*, (previous to the last Presidential Election,) making resistance necessary on the part of the North, I ask you how can any distinction be made, between parties in close alliance, carrying out together and sustaining the same policy? Did not the Republican party, (in whose ranks I recognize many excellent, intelligent, conscientious men,) did not, I say, that party, in the full consciousness of the diabolical character of that "radical and infidel" faction, form a political alliance with it for the purpose of obtaining the power which they now hold? The expectation in forming the coalition was doubtless that you would be able to control the numerically smaller wing of the alliance. You thought this possible; I did not. So soon as it was apparent that such an alliance had been formed, I predicted that the abolition wing would control the whole; and if the party thus formed were successful, the hopes of the country for Peace and Union would be wrecked; for it is the very nature of fanaticism to leaven the whole lump. Was I not right? I ask you now to look at the state of the country. Is it not true that the abolition element has acquired the control of that "immense party" of which you speak? Are you not advocating and supporting the abolition policy of the Administration? Is it not true that these very "radicals and infidels of th Garrison stamp," whom you justly loathe, have framed and passed the most offensive abolition measures that tinge the whole policy of the Administration? So notorious is this fact, that to ask is to answer the question. These then, are the men with whom I find you affiliated. May I not appropriately quote your own question, and ask: "Can it be that the purest and most patriotic measures draw to their advocacy such persons, while they fail to attract the innumerable host who dissent," etc.? But I will not do you the injustice thus to judge you by the standard by which you would judge me, for your standard is defective. Every one of any experience in political movements is aware that on both sides, in party excitements, there is every possible variety of character associating together, not because of other or general affinities, but for the single purpose of carrying a common measure, in which all feel more or less interest. Their several interests in that common measure may be as diverse as possible; some from high principle, some for the triumph of an

mion, some to obtain office, some to obtain money. It is not, therefore, safe to characterize a cause by the character of some few who may be loud and forward in advocating it. Bad men may promote a good cause for bad ends. It is safest to judge of a cause on its own merits.

EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE CORNER-STONE.

I am sorry to find you defending the President's *emancipation proclamation.* It is a measure which I have considered from the moment of its promulgation, unwise, unconstitutional and calamitous, productive of evil and only evil, a measure that, more than any other, has tended to divide the counsels of the North, and unite the South, and render the restoration of the national Union next to hopeless. Your defense of it rests on a fallacy. You say "If it is a legitimate function of our Government to destroy the fabric of the Southern Confederacy, *à fortiori*, is it not justified in removing that which their own highest authorities pronounce to be its *corner-stone?*" To answer your question intelligently, it is necessary to know the nature of that *corner-stone*, before we can pronounce whether the Government would be justified in removing or attempting to remove it. If the stone should happen to be a *providential fixture*, unalterable in its very nature by any thing that man can do, a condition of a *physical character*, not to be affected by any act of man, you will agree with me, that the Government would not be justified in making any such necessarily abortive and quixotic attempt. I presume from your question you have adopted the prevalent misunderstanding of a passage in Mr. Stevens's speech at Savannah, in which he speaks of the *corner-stone* of the Confederate Government. You assume that this corner-stone is *slavery*, and so our Government is justified in its measures to destroy slavery. Although a great multitude both in Europe and America entertain this stereotyped error, and it has within a few days been twice reiterated in the late non-intervention report of the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, yet it is none the less an egregious misapprehension of Mr. Stevens's remark, and a false assumption that the Confederate Government have adopted any such corner-stone. In the first place if Mr. Stevens had made such an announcement in his speech, (which he has not,) that would not constitute law for the Government. We do not look for the authority of the fundamental law of a government in a casual speech of any members of its administration, not even from the President, but in the fundamental law itself, in its written officially accepted Constitution. Now, there is not one word in the Constitution of the Confederacy that gives color to any such idea as slavery being the corner-stone of the Government; on the contrary, Section IX. Article I. clearly repudiates it. For if slavery is the adopted corner-stone of their Government, common-sense suggests, that in their fundamental law they would and should use every effort to strengthen and support it, and yet they forbid in that section and article that very policy which would give strength and permanency to such a corner-stone. Mr. Stevens, however, *has made no such declaration*, yet he is quoted every where as the source whence this widespread erroneous apothegm has proceeded. It may be well to ventilate this matter more thoroughly.

THE CORNER-STONE IS THE INEQUALITY OF THE TWO RACES.

Let us learn what Mr. Stevens actually did say. His language is this: "The foundations of our new Government are laid, its corner-stone rests upon"—what? slavery? no, "upon the *great truth* that *the negro is not equal to the white man*, that slavery "which he then defines to be, "subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition. This our new Government is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth." This language could not be applied to slavery. It would be a strange misapplication of terms to call slavery a physical, philosophical and moral truth. He had just been stating to his hearers that the ideas prevalent at the time our Federal Constitution

was formed "rested upon the assumption of the *equality of the races*." This proposition he declares to be unsound, and that the new Government was founded upon exactly the opposite idea. The error on one side which he combats is *the assumed equality of the races*. The opposite truth which he propounds is the physical, philosophical and moral truth, that *the two races are not equal*, and the inference he draws from this truth is that this physical difference determines the *status* of the inferior race. I confess I can not see how to escape that conclusion, except by denying the *inequality* of the races; by denying that there is this *physical difference* between them, for if there is this difference, then one race of necessity is superior, and the other inferior, and if the two *physically unequal* races are compelled to live together in the same community, the superior must govern the inferior. Can you avoid this conclusion?

THE CORNER-STONE CAN NOT BE REMOVED.

What prospect of success then is there, of any attempt to remove such a corner-stone? Who has constituted the two races physically different? There can be but one answer, it is God. To attempt, therefore, a removal of this corner-stone, which infinite wisdom has laid in the fabric of human society, is of so presumptuous a character, that few should be rash enough to undertake it. The *physical inequality of the races* then is this corner-stone, and not Slavery. Slavery, which is a *Government*, must be, in some form, the necessary resultant of this fact, and if you can remove the corner-stone, to wit, the *physical inequality of the races*, you may thus destroy slavery; but since the "Ethiopian can not change his skin," nor can any earthly power do it for him, so long as the two races exist together in the same community, you may change the master, or the relative position of the races, but one or the other will still be dominant. Slavery in America can only be abolished by *separating the races*. Is it worth while to attempt to remove a corner-stone which God has laid?

The reasoning of Mr. Stevens has an apposite parallel in the reasoning of the elder Adams, on the Theory of Government, as given in his "Life by his grandson, C. F. Adams, the accomplished representative of our Government to the Court of St. James.

"Unlike most speculators on *the theory of Governments*, Mr. Adams begins by assuming *the imperfection of man's nature*, and introducing it at once as an element with which to compose his edifice.

"He finds *the human race impelled by their passions* as often as guided by their reason, sometimes led to good actions by scarcely corresponding motives, and sometimes to bad ones rather from inability to resist temptation than from natural propensity to evil. This is the *Corner-stone* of his system."

Let us put Mr. Adams' theory in the language of Mr. Stevens. "The foundations of Civil Government are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth that *man has an imperfect nature*, that *the human race is impelled by their passions*, that, therefore, *subordination* of the *inferior* to the *superior*, inherent in the very nature of Government, is man's natural and moral condition. Civil Government is based upon this great physical, philosophical and moral truth." Would it be just to accuse Mr. Adams of basing Government on *Slavery*, as the corner-stone, because he admits the necessity of the *subordination* of *the inferior to the superior?* In other words, to make him utter the absurdity, that "*Government is the corner stone of Government*"?

PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND MR. STEVENS PROCLAIM THE SAME CORNER-STONE.

Perhaps you may think I have adopted Southern views on this point, and that the inequality and physical differences of the two races are altogether Southern dogmas. I need not cross the Potomac to find the same great truth proclaimed in a quarter entitled to respect, and by one who politically outranks the Vice-President of the Con-

federacy, to wit, the President of the United States.

You will recollect the interview, on August fourteenth, 1862, between a committee of colored men and President Lincoln, invited by him, to hear what he had to say to them. His object in summoning them before him was to persuade them to *emigrate*, and he bases his argument to them on the very corner-stone declared by Mr. Stevens, to wit, the physical difference or inequality of the two races. President Lincoln's plan was to *separate the races*.

"You and we," said he to them, "are different races. We have between us a *broader difference* than exists between almost any other two races. Whether it is right or wrong, I need not discuss, but this *physical difference* is a great disadvantage to us both, as I think. Your race are suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are far from being placed on an equality with the white race. On this broad continent not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you. I do not propose to discuss this, but to present it as a *fact* with which we have to deal. I can not alter it if I would. It is a *fact* about which we all feel and think alike, I and you."

THEIR DIFFERENT MODES OF DEALING WITH THE CORNER-STONE.

Thus you perceive that both President Lincoln and Mr. Stevens are in perfect accord in accepting and acting upon the same great truth. President Lincoln accepts the *physical inequality* of the two races, as completely as Mr. Stevens, for where there is a *broader difference* than exists between almost any other two races, it would be absurd to say they are *equal*, especially when the President justly adds that this difference is *physical*, that is, grounded in the original constitution of each race. The only difference between the President of the United States and Mr. Stevens is in the use to which they put this physical, philosophical and moral truth, this corner-stone. Mr. Stevens proposes it in his Savannah speech, as the basis of the new government; Mr. Lincoln adopts it as the basis of his plan of separating the races, because of this physical difference. Mr. Stevens takes the stone, as a whole, upon which he would construct a government. Mr. Lincoln would split the stone and drag the parts asunder. Mr. Stevens accepts the fact and adjusts his fabric to it. Mr. Lincoln also accepts the fact, and is perplexed with inextricable difficulties in his attempts to dispose of the two portions of the common corner-stone.

THE PRESIDENT'S PERPLEXITIES IN DEALING WITH THE CORNER-STONE.

It is well to notice these perplexities of the President's mind as they are manifested in his singular interview with this colored delegation. The great truth of the physical difference of the two races is so palpable that he can not controvert it, and he frankly declines to make the attempt, yet, while accepting the fact, he more than doubts the wisdom of the fact itself by raising the singular question of *right and wrong* upon its existence, and thus (no doubt unconsciously) impugns the wisdom of the Creator, for who but God could ordain a *physical* difference in the two races? The raising of the question, therefore, whether a *physical* fact is "right or wrong," as if there were two sides to such a question, directly implicates the wisdom of the Creator. The President, too, while declining to discuss this question of right and wrong, actually decides it to be wrong, by declaring it to be a "disadvantage to both" races, in his opinion. The plain good sense of most of the remarks of the President in this interview, and the collisions of thought in his own breast which he discloses, where truths and doubts come into constant conflict, point to some great radical disturbing error, not in the President's mind alone, but pervading the popular mind on the subject of African slavery every where.

THE GREAT ERROR OF THE WORLD ON SLAVERY.

The great fallacy, so rife

throughout the world, that *slavery is the cause of our national troubles*, rests on the almost universal persistent closing of the eyes to this fact of the physical difference between the two races. Slavery is not the cause of the sectional war, but a blind and mad resistance to a physical condition which God has ordained and which man is, in vain, attempting to subvert.

THE CORNER-STONE DULY ACKNOWLEDGED, SOLVES THE VEXED QUESTION OF SLAVERY.

Take your stand on this great acknowledged fact that the African and white races are physically different, follow out this truth to its logical result, and the question of slavery, or subordination of the inferior to the superior race, is clearly solved in all its phases.

Do you ask how?

First: We must accept as a fixed fact that ordinance of God which he has decreed, that the two races are *physically different*, and not complicate the fact, with any modifications, drawn from the prevalent visionary, infidel notions of an *equality* which has no existence, nor make any vain attempt to fix upon the mere relation of superior and inferior, or of rulers and ruled, moral or religious qualities which God in his word has not fixed to the relation.

Second: We must leave to each and every State in the Union where the two races exist together, whether in larger or smaller proportions, unmolested control over any adjustment of their relations to each other.

Third: In the kindly spirit of the Fathers of 1787, which they brought to the construction of our priceless Constitution, we should refrain from embittering the relations of the two races by an irritating busybodyism, a meddlesome interference with the manner in which the duties belonging to their relation to each other are or are not fulfilled, and taking the Apostle's counsel "to be quiet and mind our own business."

These three directions carried out in a Christian spirit faithfully, would restore the Union on the only basis on which it can ever be restored. Whether enlightened reason can make its voice heard in this din of warring passions and interests, so that its "Peace be still," can calm the storm that is desolating us, is a question I will not pretend to answer. It is to the true, sober, Christian sentiment of the country when disenthralled from its entanglement with the delusive socialistic and infidel theories of the day, that we look with any hope for our national salvation.

I have dwelt at some length on this one point because of its paramount importance. It is a noticeable and gratifying circumstance that our President and the Vice-President of the Southern government are in accord on a fundamental principle. Union of opinion on one point, especially if that point be fundamental, is hopeful, and prophetic of further conciliation, perhaps pacification in the future. The great *physical* fact of the *broad difference* of the African and white races, which the President so justly and openly recognizes, lies at the root of the whole controversy respecting slavery. Let us, then, study the condition of things resulting from this truth in the light of an intelligent Christian philosophy, not viewing it through the distorted medium of Abolition spectacles, but with the clear vision of an eye spiritually enlightened, and a temper of heart which accepts a Providential fact with humility, recognizing the highest wisdom in all God's ordinances, however mysterious to us, endeavoring to adapt our ways to his facts, not his facts to our ways. In that temper of heart, you will clearly discern that this providential arrangement of conditions in human society has for its end a purpose of infinite and eternal good to both races, a purpose clearly discerned in the light of gospel truth, but wholly obscured in the smoke with which a proud but shallow infidel philosophy, a false Christianity, and pretentious humanitarianism have enshrouded the whole subject.

PROBABLE ENGLISH INTRIGUE TO PREVENT RE-UNION.

One word on your remark that the South "spurns all overtures of conciliation." When, where, and by whom have any overtures been made

where, and by whom have they been spurned? If you take the intemperate speeches, the passionate flings in editorial and anonymous articles, in the Southern journals, as the exponents of the real sentiments of the Southern masses, are these the safe bases upon which to found your remarks? If so, by parity of reasoning, the Southern masses should take the "radical and infidel" ravings of the "Garrison stamp" which are their counterpart in the speeches, editorials, and anonymous articles of our newspapers. We have been accustomed to condemn the South for its false judgment of Northern sentiment, because formed from just such radical sources. These are very unsafe sources of information on each side in exciting times like these, on which to found intersectional sentiment. Let me hint at one latent danger from relying on such undiplomatic sources of information. Glance for a moment at the attitude of England towards the United States. We there see two well-defined parties, neither of them friendly to us as a nation, one the cotton interest siding with the South, and the other her abolition coterics siding with the North, and so, England, balancing herself adroitly between these two parties in her own island, safe from any dangerous collision between them, harmful to herself, through her administration can give aid in our deplorable strife to the one section or to the other, or to both, to prevent conciliation, as best may serve the great political purpose of England, *the permanent Division of the United States.* Keeping within the bounds of a quasi-neutrality, England can, on the one hand, furnish the South with munitions of war, and privateers to prey on Northern commerce, and on the other can get up abolition demonstrations at Exeter Hall and elsewhere, to strengthen and encourage the fanatical element of the North, as the vicissitudes of our unnatural war, manifest, in the one or the other section, any abatement of that ferocity of hate which she has for so long a period engendered and sedulously promoted as the sure means of accomplishing her political purpose of *permanent separation.** Is it an unreasonable supposition that English emissaries at the South, supported from the "secret service fund," are the authors of those assumed spurnings of conciliatory overtures which you look upon as coming from the Southern heart? While this supposition, natural in the light of her past history, is not only *possible* but *probable*, I need better evidence than has yet appeared that the Southern masses, the great conservative body of the Southern people are really Disunionists. There is evidence on the contrary, that Union sentiment exists in the South, and would show its existence and activity, were it not stifled by the *unconstitutional* means which Northern, in alliance with English abolitionism, have brought to bear, to kill it.

I stop rather abruptly, possibly to my disadvantage, for I am compelled to leave untouched points perhaps necessary to prevent misapprehension. There is, however, a sentence in your letter, which I can not pass unnoticed, grounded, it appears, upon a remark of Mr. Field, casting an imputation upon the respectability and purity of intention of those associated with me in the effort to diffuse political knowledge. What Mr. Field may have said under the influence of that mendacious report of the *Post*, or what he may think of their characters, becomes of consequence only through your reiteration of his opinion. I notice it, therefore, (since you are in actual ignorance as well of the persons who were present, as of their social and moral position,) to say that neither could their respectability be enhanced, nor my own diminished by my association with them. I can not close without thanking you for your frank letter and expressions of neighborly and friendly interest, which I cordially reciprocate.

Truly, with respect and high personal esteem, your friend and neighbor,

SAMUEL F. B. MORSE.

EDWARD N. CROSBY, Esq

* See note B.

NOTE A.

"*Politics* and the *pulpit* are terms that have little agreement. No sound ought to be heard in the church but the healing voice of Christian charity. The cause of *civil liberty* and *civil Government* gains as little as that of *religion*, by this confusion of duties. Those who quit their proper character to assume what does not belong to them, are, for the greater part, ignorant both of the character they leave and of the character they assume. Wholly unacquainted with the world in which they are so fond of meddling, and inexperienced in all its affairs, on which they pronounce with so much confidence, *they have nothing of politics but the passions they excite.* Surely the church is a place where one day's truce ought to be allowed to the dissensions and animosities of mankind." — BURKE: *Reflections on French Revolution*, vol. i. p. 460.

"I have something also to the *divines*, though brief, to what were needful, not to be *disturbers of the civil affairs;* being in hands better able, and more belonging, to manage them; but to study harder, and to attend the office of good pastors, knowing that he whose flock is least among them has a dreadful charge, not performed by mounting twice into the pulpit with a formal preachment huddled up at the odd hours of a whole lazy week, but by incessant pains and watching, in season and out of season, from house to house, over the souls whom they have to feed. Which, if they well considered, how little leisure would they find to be *the most pragmatical sidesmen of every popular tumult and sedition.*"—MILTON: *Treatise on Tenure of Kings, etc.*

NOTE B.

Let me ask your attentive reflection upon such indications of English designs and desires as the following. In an able article on the American Revolution, in the *Edinburgh Review* of Oct., 1862, the reviewer says: "We therefore say, without hesitation, that we wish the war to cease, and the *independence of the South to be established.*"

Lord Campbell, in the House of Lords on the 4th of August, 1862, said: "It is not too much to say that *no class* or *party* in the country any longer desires to see the reconquest of the South and the *reconstruction of the Union.*" The reviewer says: "At the outset of the struggle the tendency was strong in England to side with the North. On the other hand, *many felt undoubted satisfaction at the breaking up of that great democratic Government, whose institutions had been held up to them by their own reformers as a model of perfection,*" etc. The reviewer puts the question: "Is it the interest of the civilized world, and *especially of our own country*, (England,) that the American Union should be restored?" And he answers it by saying: "It can scarcely be said that the relations of the *American Union* to Europe, *and to England in particular*, have been so satisfactory *as to make us anxious for its continuance.*"

Further on he says: "The feeling in England is not founded on a desire of vengeance or personal retribution on any one, for insults which we have received. It rests on a much more *calm* and *rational* basis—that is to say, on the conviction *that the unity of the Government at Washington alone made the blow tell; it is hoped that when that unity is gone*, all insults of the kind, if not so impolitic as to be avoided altogether, *will at least be harmless*, and of *no consequence to England.*" In another place: "The independence of the South *would open new markets for our manufactures*, without the previous restrictions of *Federal tariffs.*"

These extracts, from the most intelligent exponents of public opinion in England, could be multiplied to any extent. I give one or two only from the *North British Review* of February, 1862: "Most Englishmen, and ourselves among the number, have arrived at the conclusion, not only that the Secessionists *will* succeed in their enterprise, but that *this success will*, eventually, *be of the most signal service to humanity, to civilization, and to the cause of universal and enduring peace.*"

Again: "We entertain, then, no doubt that the *dissolution of the Union* is an *accomplished and irreversible fact*, and one of the very *greatest* facts of our day. We can see *no grounds* on which the *continuance of that Union should be desired by any wise or good man.*"

Again: "That the independence of the South and *the dissolution of the great Republic* are accomplished and irreversible facts, seems to us undeniable. *The nation* founded by Washington *is severed*—the *Union* contrived by his wisdom, and consecrated by his name, is *at an end.* We have now to ask what beauty there was in it that we should have longed for its continuance? What sacred purpose did it serve that we should deplore its end?"

These are specimens only indicating the bias of English sentiment, and showing that the English Government looks with exultation on the success of its plot of dividing our Union. Is this then the time for *persistence in unconstitutional* acts which must inevitably create further rendings and divisions?

No. 5.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

THE TRUE CONDITIONS OF AMERICAN LOYALTY:

A SPEECH DELIVERED BY

GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,

BEFORE THE

DEMOCRATIC UNION ASSOCIATION,

MARCH 28TH, 1868.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society, for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

No. 8.

SPEECH OF GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS.

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN OF THE DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION:

Nothing but a sense of the duty which every man owes to society, according to the measure of his ability to serve it, would have induced me to address you in a time like this. It is a time of strange excitements and strange acts. No man who does not join in a wild, undiscriminating support of the measures and dogmas of a dominant party, can hope to escape detraction and obloquy. The utmost exertions are made to suppress ordinary freedom of speech; every device is employed to misrepresent, and every effort is made to misunderstand, the purposes of those who are in political opposition to the party in power. The vocabulary of political slang is exhausted to find terms of reproach and infamy, with which to stigmatize men whose motives have in their favor all the ordinary presumptions of purity, and whose arguments and opinions are at least entitled to a respectful hearing. This process, which has been going on for many months, with a violence unexampled even among a people whose political discussions are never marked by too much temperance, has culminated from time to time in outrages upon the rights of persons and property, and may do so again. It is no time when one would choose to utter opinions, without being impelled by a strong sense of duty.

But if we are not prepared to suffer for our convictions, they must be very feeble convictions. If we do not love our country and its institutions well enough to encounter all the hazards that may attend an honest effort to save them, our love must be cold indeed. Such, I am sure, is not your case, or my own. Meaning to utter here nothing but words of truth and soberness—the truth as I hold it, in the soberness that becomes me—I accept all the responsibility to public opinion which may justly fall thereon.

I propose to speak to you to-night upon a subject which seems to me to be strangely misapprehended by many good men, and strangely perverted by many who are not good. I mean the subject of "LOYALTY." The word itself, at least in the sense in which it is used in those countries from which we have lately borrowed it, can scarcely be said to have an appropriate place in our political and social system. But it is a word, at present, in great use among us; and we must take it as we find it, and are bound to inquire what are the moral duties which its just and true signification embraces. This inquiry, and the certain consequences of accepting and following out the doctrines which are now forced upon us, will form the topics of my discourse.

The true conditions of American loyalty are not to be found in the passionate exactions of partisan leaders, or in the frantic declamations of the pulpit, the rostrum or the press. People who do not like my political opinions may hurl at me the epithet "disloyal;" but when they have thrown this missile, they have not taken a single step towards defining, to me or others, what the true conditions of loyalty are. It is important that this step should be taken; for whether we are to go on or to cease, in this course of idle and unmeaning abuse, it concerns us all to know what measure of public duty may rightfully be exacted of us. To know the hight and depth of those great virtues which are comprehended in the term "patriotism"—to feel at once that they are seated in our affections and enthroned in our reason—is to "get wis-

dom and to get understanding," in the largest of earthly concerns.

The true conditions of American loyalty are to be found in the law of the land; in the institutions under which we live; in the duties flowing from the Constitution of our country; in the political system which we have inherited from our fathers, with all its manifold relations, through which we may trace the clear dividing-line that separates perfect from imperfect obligations.

The text of our fundamental law is the guide, and the sole guide, in all ethical inquiries into the duties of the citizen. To that source all must come, rulers and people alike; to that fountain all must resort. The vague and shifting standards that are drawn from supposed dangers to what is called "the national life," or which spring from the conflicting judgments of men respecting public necessities, can determine nothing. These things can furnish no *rule*. We must have a *rule*, for loyalty is a moral duty; and it must therefore be capable of definition. A people whose "national life" exists only by virtue of a written constitution, and who can have no necessities that lie out of or beyond that written necessity, can find no rule of loyalty in any of the necessities which their constitution of government does not cover. They may find grounds of expediency, in one or another supposed necessity for destroying their constitution; but it would be extremely absurd to say that this expediency could be made the object of their "loyalty." Let us go then to the fountain head — the source of all our national obligations.

The Constitution of the United States itself prescribes the full measure of our loyalty in these words:

"This Constitution and the laws of the United States *which shall be made in pursuance thereof*, and all treaties made or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND."

Observe how precise as well as comprehensive this great rule of our duty is. It expresses without ambiguity the whole of our obligations towards the Federal Government. It makes a *supreme law*; — a law paramount to all other human laws — an obligation transcending all other political obligations. It leaves no room whatever for the intrusion of another or a rival claimant to our civil obedience. That claimant can neither be a person invested or uninvested with office, nor an idea of public necessity, nor an imaginary national life beyond or apart from the life created under the Constitution. The only possible claimant of our obedience is the LAW; for as that law is made supreme, all other demands or demandants upon our submission are of necessity excluded.

What then does this supreme law embrace? The text on which I am commenting itself furnishes the answer. "This Constitution," it says — what this *Constitution* contains, and the laws that *shall be made in conformity with it*. — *these* shall be the supreme law, rising in authority above all other laws. No public necessities, save as they are embodied in the Constitution; no "national life" save as it exists under the Constitution; no legislation that is not in accordance with the Constitution — is the supreme law; but what the Constitution ordains or authorizes, *that* is the public necessity, *that* is the national life, because it is the supreme civil obligation.

Such is the fundamental character of our political system; and so perfect is it in its consistency with itself and with the rights of all who are subject to it, that it contains a machinery by which the conformity of all acts of the Government with the principles of the Constitution may be peacefully tested, without forcible resistance. If the acts of the Government are complained of as unconstitutional, they may be brought to a judicial test, or the people may themselves pass upon them at the ballot-box, through the instrumentality of frequent elections.

Now when we look into the Constitution of our country to discover the full scope of the obligations which are embraced in the supreme law of the land, we find that it grants certain political powers and rights to the central or national government, and reserves

all other political powers and rights to the States or the people. Hence it is plain that the reserved rights of the States or the people are just as much a part of the supreme law of the land, just as much comprehended within the duty of our allegiance, just as much the rightful objects of our "loyalty," as the powers and rights vested in the national government. If the political existence created by the Constitution is the national life, called into being by the supreme law of the land — and he would be a bold and reckless sophist who should undertake to find that national life any where else — then the rights which the Constitution reserves to the States or the people are equally comprehended in that life, for they are equally declared to be parts of the supreme law of the land. For this reason, all idea of a supremacy of the national rights or powers or interests, when founded on something not embraced in the Constitution, is purely visionary. No duty of "loyalty" can possibly be predicated of any claim that is not founded in the supreme law of the land. When it is once ascertained what are the rights and powers vested in the national authorities by the Constitution, they are parts of the supreme law, and our "loyalty" is due to them. When we know what are the rights and powers reserved to the States or the people—and we know that they are the whole residue of all possible political rights and powers — they are equally the objects of our "loyalty," for the self-same reason, namely, they are parts of the supreme law of the land.

Again: the Constitution not only contains some political powers and rights granted to the Federal Government, and a reservation of all other political powers and rights to the States or the people, but it also embraces rights of person and property guaranteed to every citizen in his individual capacity; and these are equally made, not by implication but expressly, parts of the supreme law of the land, and are therefore equally the objects of our "loyalty." All pretence, therefore, of any paramount authority in the central government to override these personal rights of the citizen, or to claim our "loyalty" in disregard of these coordinate parts of the supreme law, is a perversion of the very idea of American loyalty. As well might the citizen claim, because the Constitution has made his personal rights part of the supreme law, that therefore the loyalty of his neighbor is due to him alone, as the Government can claim that loyalty is due solely, or chiefly, or primarily, or ultimately to the functions which *it* is appointed to perform. The rights of the Government, the rights of the States, and the rights of individuals, all and equally, are comprehended in the supreme law of the land, and our loyalty is due to that law, to the whole and to every part of it, and public officers are in the same sense and for the same reason bound to obey every "jot and tittle" of it.

These positions are very plain and familiar truths; too familiar, perhaps, you will say, to require to be stated. But in these days, nothing that is true is too fundamental or too plain to be inculcated. The extravagant language and ideas that are current in the mouths of even sensible people, on this subject of loyalty, would have exceeded all capacity of belief in any other period than this. If one were to undertake to reduce this language and these ideas to something like a definite moral proposition, it would be found that the doctrine is something like this. In a time of war, when there are great public dangers, the rights of the States and of individuals must give way; and if those who administer the government are satisfied that public necessity requires them to use powers that transcend the limits of the Constitution, he who does not acquiesce in their judgment, or who questions their authority to do particular acts, is a "disloyal" citizen. This statement of the doctrine is the best that I know how to make; for I know not how else to interpret or to apply the denunciations which we find in the proceedings of public meetings, in the columns of party newspapers, and in the common speech and action of very many persons. I need only point to the utter prohibition that is attempted to be placed upon all discussion of any plan for bringing this dreadful civil war to a close, except

ng by the particular method of fighting; or to the manner in which the terms 'traitor" and "secessionist" are hurled at all who question the policy and lawfulness of the methods pursued by the Government in the prosecution of the war. For myself, I do not profess to have a definite opinion, as yet, concerning several of the modes in which a peace might safely be sought. But I know not what right I have, legally or morally, to say that my neighbor shall not discuss such a question, or shall not act upon it at the polls, or shall be denounced as "disloyal," because his opinions on these subjects differ from mine. It is to me very plain, that this whole effort of a dominant party to control opinion, by such means, can, under such institutions as ours, lead to but one of two results—the establishment of a despotism of a very bad kind, or the overthrow of the political power of those who resort to such methods. Either the institutions of the country will perish, or the party which undertakes to repress all freedom of discussion will perish. I hope we shall make up our minds to destroy the party and save the institutions. But of this hereafter.

Let me return to this new doctrine of "loyalty," which requires us to acquiesce in silence in the judgment of public servants as to what the public necessities require, even to the extent of overlooking great infractions of the Constitution. This doctrine entirely ignores the purpose for which the Constitution imposed certain stringent limitations on the powers of the national government. In order to explain this, it will be necessary to descend from general reasoning to particular illustrations.

The Constitution, after conferring certain well-defined political powers upon the Federal Government, declares that all other political powers are reserved to the States or the people; and it further secures to every citizen certain inalienable rights of person and property, which it recognizes as inherent in the citizen forever, beyond all possible control of that government. Now does any one suppose that this was done without a serious purpose? Does any man imagine that it was done for what is vulgarly called *buncombe?* Do you believe that it was done with a mental reservation of the doctrine of public necessity, standing behind the Constitution and ready to strike it down from its supreme control over us and our affairs? Let me suggest to you, my fellow-citizens, that you can not study the Constitution and the purposes of the great generation who made it, without seeing that the very object of all this careful provision for rights that were placed beyond the reach of the central government, was to exclude forever this doctrine of public necessity as a *measure of the powers* that were conferred upon that government. I use this language deliberately. I affirm that when the Constitution repeated the words of Magna Charta, not as a statute but as a fixed provision of fundamental law, and declared that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"—it meant to make a rule for all time and all circumstances, shutting the door forever against any supposed public necessity for violating the rights of the citizen.*

* It is in my opinion, a monstrous fallacy to suppose that the *implied authority* for suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* warrants indefinitely the arrest and detention of *citizens* without judicial process. This implied authority was given in the original Constitution. But after the adoption of that instrument, the people came forward and annexed to it the prohibition of Magna Charta, making that provision part of the supreme law. The two clauses of the Constitution must therefore be so construed and applied as not to render nugatory the one last adopted, and so as to give effect to its stringent declarations. These clauses can be reconciled only by such a course of legislative and executive action, as will preserve the operation of both. If under peculiar circumstances of imminent danger the actual seizure is made without judicial process, the prisoner should immediately be charged with an offense by warrant; and then the suspension of the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* may intervene, to prevent his discharge from the imprisonment for causes which would operate to discharge him if the writ were not suspended. This is the only course of legislation, in my opinion, that can be consistent with all the provisions of the Constitution. I do not see how it is possible to contend that a continual imprisonment, founded on mere executive seizure, can be *authorized* by taking away the privilege of the *habeas corpus*. If Magna Charta had not been interposed there might have been more ground for this pretension; for then there would have been no necessity for process at any time.

In like manner I affirm that when the Constitution reserved to the States or the people all political powers not granted to the Federal Government, it meant to preclude every ground of necessity for the assumption by that government of the powers thus withheld.

In fact, the idea of a written constitution—a fixed and supreme law—is utterly irreconcilable with the theory that the administrators of such a government can resort to their own judgment of public necessity, and act contrary to that supreme law, and that good citizenship requires the people to acquiesce in that judgment. They who set up such a claim for our rulers claim for them an entirely irresponsible power. We are required, for example, to believe that what are called "arbitrary arrests" are necessary, but no one explains to us the grounds of that necessity. No account is rendered. We are to *assume* the existence of causes of justification, but no one tells us what those causes are. They may remain forever locked in the bosoms of those who do the acts of which we complain. Why should American citizens, filling high places of public trust, act upon such a principle as this? Can any thing be more degrading, more injurious to the public conscience of a people, than to form a habit of implicit belief in the existence of necessities which nobody explains, and of which nobody is required to give an account? You may hear a hundred men in a day, speaking of some particular case of this kind, profess its necessity; and not one man in the whole hundred can tell you what the necessity was.

My friends, these false theories of loyalty—for false I must deem them—are infusing into our national character a fatal poison. They are leading those who cherish them to impute factious and interested motives to all pure and manly efforts in defense of the principles of civil liberty. They who indulge in this dangerous work of deriding the defenders of constitutional rights, can have but a very inadequate conception of the convulsions that must precede the final loss of those rights. They take but a very superficial view of the depth of those feelings which lead men in all free countries to resist every form of mere arbitrary power. They make no account of the principles implanted in our breasts, and cherished into dictates of nature by generations of training in the practice of liberty; those principles on which depends the primary office of an opposition in a free government, and by means of which all constitutional rulers are restrained from abuses of power. Impatient of those restraints, such persons rush to methods which can not be employed without undermining the foundations of liberty; and for a supposed temporary advantage barter away the strength and the supports, the vigor and the health of the body politic. This has been in all ages the downward course of nations, who have substituted for free institutions and systems of fundamental law a blind and unquestioning faith in public necessities, and have then welcomed some despotic power. Thus did the Roman Empire succeed the Republic, and thus we may be preparing ourselves for a like destiny. Let us be warned in time.

I have endeavored to state with due precision and fairness one very important part of the conditions of a true loyalty. But I should leave this subject in an imperfect state, if I omitted, on the other hand, to give equal prominence to certain principles of our political system which limit the mode in which States and individuals are to exercise their constitutional rights of opposition to the measures of the Federal Government. I have briefly adverted to this already; but a more extended statement of the principle is necessary.

I will assume then that a measure, having all the forms of law, is believed upon good grounds to be a violation of the constitutional rights of States and individuals. What is the rule of action under such circumstances? There is no difficulty whatever in finding the answer. By the establishment of a judicial system within the Federal Constitution, having ultimate cognizance of all cases arising under that Constitution, *one* mode is provided by which both States and individuals can ascertain whether their reserved rights are invaded by the Federal authorities

This remedy is at all times open; and there is no valid reason why a State should forcibly assert its constitutional rights, any more than that an individual should do the same thing. While a State remains a member of the Union, it is bound to vindicate its constitutional rights and powers in that mode which is consistent with the preservation of that Union; and it can at any time, under any supposed violation of its rights or the rights of its people, make a case for judicial determination. Forcible resistance is open revolution; and nothing but an intolerable oppression, cutting off all judicial remedy, can make revolution a necessity and a duty.

Again:—there is another equally good reason, which shows that no popular tumults, and no forcible resistance, are either legally or morally justifiable, while the ballot-box remains untouched. If the people of a State have reason to believe that measures of the Federal Government are subversive of the Constitution, it is their right and their duty to correct the evil by a change of their rulers. In cases of supposed extensive violations of the Constitution, to which the attention of the whole country is called, the remedy of elections is ordinarily sufficient to reverse, and is in our system held to reverse, erroneous constructions of that instrument, as well as errors of policy. The popular tribunal may not be quite so precise in its action as the judicial; but there can be no mistaking the judgment of the people, when it is pronounced upon an issue clearly made with an Administration which is charged with infringing the Constitution.

These principles no one, I presume, will be inclined to dispute. But there is thrust in, to intercept their application to the present crisis in our affairs, a doctrine which I for one distinctly repudiate. That doctrine is, in substance, that *all* questioning of the measures of the Administration should be postponed while we are in a civil war; that there should be but one party; and that all should rally in an "*unconditional support* of the constituted authorities." This dogma needs examination. If by an unconditional support of the constituted authorities, it is intended to claim that we must all recognize the fact that we are engaged in a civil war, and that we must conduct it, while it lasts, *through* those authorities, and must hold no irregular intercourse with the public enemy, I readily accede to the proposition. But if it is meant that we are not to question the *methods* which the Administration pursue in the prosecution of the war; that we have no rightful control over their *measures;* or that we are to refrain from demanding a change of their *policy*—I reject the doctrine without the slightest hesitation. The very issue which you make with the Administration of itself refutes that doctrine. That issue is, that their course of action subverts the Constitution; makes the war an attack upon the social system of the South; and renders it impossible to succeed in that war, without destroying, for the South and for the North, the whole principle of State sovereignty on which the Union was necessarily founded as *one* of its corner-stones. It is in vain to say that the acts of the Administration, of which you complain, are *military* measures. In every civil war there are political considerations which must qualify the military action, or that action can result only in disaster. A government that undertakes to suppress a great revolt of powerful and organized communities, at the same time furnishing the strongest of moral motives for resistance, is in the same situation as he who fights his enemy with one hand and supplies him through the other with the munitions of war. In the present case we have made the conquest one of infinite difficulty, by first declaring that we waged the war solely for the supremacy of the Constitution, and then turning round and making the overthrow of the Constitution a too probable result of our success.

This result will not be confined to the condition of the revolted States, if the war continues to be prosecuted as it has been for the last six months. You can not acquiesce in the measures of the Administration, involving, as they do, the exercise of many powers that lie wholly outside of the Constitution,

without leaving this country hereafter to be ruled by powers that will rest upon nothing but what the judgment of a party, or a faction, or a clique, shall deem to be public necessities. In this aspect of our affairs I can not avoid a word of earnest appeal to all reflecting men, to consider what fate must attend the securities of property, as well as the rights of person, if we permit the Constitution to be lost.

There are five great securities of property, the continuance of which in this country is dependent on the preservation of the Constitution of the United States. Let me enumerate them. They are:

1. A uniform metallic currency, as the basis and standard of all values.

2. The power to establish a uniform system of bankruptcies, whenever the interests of commerce require it.

3. The inviolability of contracts by State Legislatures.

4. The provision which places property under the protection of the Constitution, as against Federal power, so that no man can be deprived of it without legal process.

5. The prohibition which restrains the Federal power of *eminent domain*, so that private property can not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Now no rational being can suppose that these guaranties can be extorted anew from that centralized despotism which is but too likely to be the only successor that the Constitution of the United States can ever have. I care not what ideas men may form of that "stronger government," which some allow themselves to wish for in the place of our present system. My reason and my instincts both teach me that that government will be an unchecked and uncontrolled despotism; and we need not look far for the signs of its approach. Consciously or unconsciously, there are many agencies at work to promote its advent; one of the most potent of them is the false doctrine of "loyalty," against which I contend, and another is the perilous idea that you can safely trifle with a fixed constitution. We have made such vast strides towards a system entirely unknown to the Federal Constitution, that we can now see the nature of the only power that will ever replace it. When that power has fully come, the present securities of property will have been swept away with the securities of person. Both will disappear with the Federal Constitution; and we shall never extort them as concessions from the new power, or place them beyond reach, if we can extort them. There are no Barons on this our American earth to make a new *Magna Charta;* our race will never see another Runnymede; and *we* shall never see another Washington, another Madison, another Hamilton, another Jay, another Patrick Henry, another Samuel Adams. Even the States, with their separate constitutions, their bills of rights, and their present capacity to protect their people, will fall beneath the new and unchecked power to which the nation will surrender itself, when it cuts aloof from the Federal Constitution; and if they should not, every intelligent man, who has had much to do with accumulation, knows, or should know, that property, deprived of the supports which it derives from the Federal Constitutional system, can maintain but a feeble and precarious existence. We must remember that long, long centuries ago—in a state of society in one sense rude, but when the manly virtues of our ancestors gave them a historic splendor that we can only reflect, it providentially happened that the rights of property and the rights of person were indissolubly blended in one immortal maxim, that was laid, for all time, at the basis of the civilization of our race. Whatever may happen in other civilizations, or in other climes, Liberty and Property for us must flourish or perish TOGETHER.

My friends, it is time that the warfare upon opinion, and thought, and speech, should cease. It is time we had ascertained that our national difficulties can never be cured without the action of the people. It is time we had exploded the fallacy that patriotism and party are incompatible in any conceivable circumstances of our country. You, at any rate, let me hope, reject this dogma as

a delusion; for in all the gloom of the present, in all the dark uncertainties of the future, I put my hopes in the great Democracy of the Union. I see nothing else to which we can look. I see you, it is true, occasionally distracted by the tactics of your opponents, occasionally disturbed by the indiscretion of friends. But I also see you animated by a patriotism which I fully believe will guide you aright, and which, in spite of all that men may say of you, commands my respect and confidence. Permit me then, with such freedom as may be taken by one who neither has nor seeks any special place in your organization, to offer you a word of friendly counsel.

What you need, as it seems to me, is to be fully impressed with a belief in your mission and in your capacity to fulfill it. That mission is to save the Constitution of the United States. By saving it, I mean of course that you are to save it for the whole Union, for the South and the North, for the East and the West, with every right which it protects completely reëstablished. I can see no other mode of saving it; for it is to my mind apparent, that a war prosecuted against the South for the acquisition of powers over their domestic institutions which the Constitution expressly withholds from the Federal Government, can result in nothing but the establishment of a system under which there can be no local rights of self-government left for any section or any State. This it is your mission to prevent. You can not prevent it, by uniting with those who proffer support of the war without the slightest protest against the unconstitutional policy with which it is prosecuted. In all the late popular proceedings looking to the establishment of what are styled "Loyal Leagues," I have not seen one word of indignant remonstrance against the unconstitutional measures of the Administration. You can not expect, and need not look for such remonstrance from assemblies largely composed of those who are the peculiar political supporters of the Administration, and who are more or less responsible for its measures. Public opinion, if it is to make itself *heard* and *felt* against all violations of the Constitution, must make its utterances through the action and the voice of those who have never failed to protest against the policy that has created for us so much peril. If that public opinion fails to recognize this necessary channel of expression — if it yields itself to a fatal apathy, or *will* not see how it can at once save a Government and change an Administration — then all will be lost, and there will remain to us only the consolation that we have individually done our duty.

You are then, permit me to add, to seek by every constitutional and upright method, to obtain the control of all the organisms of government. If in the mean time you can not induce the present Executive of the United States to change his policy, then, remembering his position, possess your souls in patience until you can give him a constitutional successor. Let every thing be prepared with one fixed and unselfish purpose: namely, to make every successive election reverse the doctrines and dogmas and usurpations which you know you should condemn. By this course of action, instead of weakening, you will strengthen your Government; for you will make it apparent to the whole world that the present arbitrary rule is to be succeeded by a period when the Constitution is once more, in all its beneficence and all its power, to be "THE SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND." Fail to do this, and the nation, losing heart and hope, will lose sight of the methods by which a constitutional succession can be preserved to a better day, and will yield itself to the despair which welcomes despotism, or to the rage which welcomes anarchy.

I know the difficulties of your position; but you must not falter, and you must not admit that you can fail. High virtues are demanded of you. You must live down slander, you must despise obloquy, you must watch your own motives, you must chasten your own spirits, you must

> ——"stretch every nerve
> And press with vigor on"

to the salvation of your country. You must win public confidence by your purity; you must challenge public respect

by your intelligence. Above all, and before all, without one instant's hesitation, without pleading one solitary excuse, you must be true to the principles of civil liberty. You must learn that those principles are no chance production of the "piping times of peace," but that they are the rules which in all times of tranquillity and all times of commotion have been evolved out of the wisdom of ages, to save us from the mad thirst for arbitrary power that has again and again seized upon highly civilized nations, and destroyed the hopes of mankind.

Preparing yourselves in this way for the great task that is before you, you will be able to approach the difficult problem of this war with a firm and fearless step. You will see that this problem presents to you the alternatives of consenting to a dismemberment of the country, or of preventing that dismemberment by a reversal of the popular and governmental action which has made it so nearly an accomplished fact. You will soon hear it said, by those who have urged on the war upon this most disastrous policy, that it is too late now; that the breach can never be closed; that the South must be permitted to go in peace. Just here, then, precisely here, before all is given up to the control of the extremists North and South, you must interpose. You have a right to have other measures and other counsels tried. You are numerically a majority in at least four of the largest States in the Union. You may rightfully demand that the Constitution, with all its guarantees, be tendered to the revolted States; and you may rightfully do all that can assure the people of the South of its protection, without calling upon your government to change its *military* attitude. I know well enough the insidious answer that is made to this suggestion; how confidently we are told that the South would reject your offer with scorn. But I tell you that history has never seen a case of war, foreign or civil, in which a nation could absolve itself from the moral responsibility of doing right, by asserting beforehand that it knew its adversary would do wrong. The elements of a moral judgment do not exist in advance of such an offer, either in the controversies of nations or in the controversies of individuals. Whatever others may think, or say, or do, you, I trust, will act upon a principle which I am persuaded rests upon a moral foundation that no sophistry and no casuistry can successfully assail. If, after such an offer, the war must still be carried on, no language can overstate the advantage that would be gained in the vigor of its prosecution.

And here, gentlemen, I close. One path of duty is clearly open before us. I can see no other now. Sufficient unto the day is the evil, sufficient unto the day is the duty thereof. He who does that one duty in a firm and humble faith in the providence of God, prepares himself for a clear perception of the next that may arise in the future.

6*

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting, that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this Union, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed by private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of military operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

No. 6.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

EMANCIPATION AND ITS RESULTS.

"By their Fruits shall ye Know them."

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS,

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society, for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

No. 9.

EMANCIPATION AND ITS RESULTS.

INTRODUCTORY.

GIGANTIC efforts are now being made to convince the people of the North that the overthrow of the present relations of the black and white races in the South, or what is mistakingly called "the Abolition of Slavery," would be a great benefit to all concerned—a benefit to the white race, to the negro race, and a grand step in the progress of civilization and Christianity. Now the simple TRUTH is the exact opposite of this. To overthrow the present relation of the races is to injure both the white man and the negro, and to inflict a deadly blow upon the cause of humanity, civilization, and Christianity. We only need to approach this subject in a spirit of candid inquiry, and to bring it to the touchstone of FACT. It is proposed to show in the following pages—

First. The effects of emancipation in the Northern States in the increase of crime, pauperism, and vice among the freed negroes;

Second. Its results in the West-India Islands, where it has ruined production, destroyed commerce, and where the negro is fast relapsing into his original African savagism;

Third. The effect of Free Negroism upon the commerce, wealth, and business of the world, and especially upon *the white laboring and producing classes*, in producing a scarcity of tropical productions, and a consequent increase of price, thus allowing Negro Idleness to tax WHITE LABOR.

The inherent right or wrong of any measure may be fairly determined by its effect. That which produces crime, pauperism, immorality, poverty, and misery can not in the nature of things be right. Theories vanish before the stern arbiter of FACTS, and to that unerring tribunal we appeal.

PART I.

FREE NEGROISM IN THE NORTH.

SOON after the close of the Revolutionary War, a few individuals, mostly Quakers, commenced efforts for the emancipation of negroes then held as so-called slaves in all the States, except Massachusetts and Pennsylvania It was a purely philanthropic movement, and had no more connection with politics than have the various missionary societies now in existence for diffusing Christianity in Burmah or China. Several States were induced to follow the example of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, namely, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New-Hampshire, Vermont, New-York, and New-Jersey. In New-Jersey and New-York emancipation was gradual, and though provided for in the former State in 1784, and in the latter in 1799, "slavery" did not entirely disappear until 1820, '27. Here emancipation ceased, and did it ever occur to any one to inquire why, all of a sudden, this should be so? If it were a benefit to take from the negro the care and guidance of white men, why did not all the rest of the States follow the example? This question is better answered by the detail of a few facts.

It was not without grave apprehensions as to the result that emancipation had been inaugurated, and it was only nine years after Pennsylvania had set the example in 1780, that Benjamin Franklin issued an Appeal for aid to his society "to form a plan for the promotion of industry, intelligence, and morality among the free blacks." How far Franklin's benevolent scheme had fallen short of his anticipations, may be judged of from the fact that forty-seven years after Pennsylvania had passed her act of emancipation, *one third* of the convicts in her penitentiaries were negroes or mulattoes! Some of the other States were even in a worse condition, *one half* of the convicts in the penitentiary of New-Jersey being freed negroes. But Massachusetts was almost as badly off, as appears from the report of the "Boston Prison Discipline Society."

This benevolent Association included among its members, Rev. Francis Wayland, Rev. Austin Edwards, Rev. Leonard Woods, Rev. William Jenks, Rev. B. B. Wisner, Rev. Edward Beecher, Lewis Tappan, Esq., John Tappan, Esq., Hon. John Bliss, and Hon. Samuel M. Hopkins. In the First Annual Report of the Society, dated June 2d, 1826, they enter into an investigation "of the progress of crime, with the causes of it," from which we make the following extract:

"Degraded Character of the Colored Population. — The first cause, existing in society, of the frequency and increase of crime is *the degraded character of the colored population.* The facts, which are gathered from the Penitentiaries, to show how great a proportion of the convicts are colored, even in those States where the colored population is small, show most strikingly the connection between ignorance and vice."

The Report proceeds to sustain its assertions by statistics, which prove, that, in Massachusetts, where the free colored people constituted *one seventy-fourth* part of the population, they supplied *one sixth* part of the convicts in her Penitentiary; that in New-York, where the free colored people constituted *one thirty-fifth* part of the population, they supplied more than *one fourth* part of the convicts; that in Connecticut and Pennsylvania, where the colored people constituted *one thirty-fourth* part of the population, they supplied more than *one third* part of the convicts; and that in New-Jersey, where the colored people constituted *one thirteenth* part of the population, they supplied more than *one third* part of the convicts.

In the second annual report of the Society, dated June 1st, 1827, the subject is again alluded to, and tables are given, showing more fully the degraded character of the freed negro population. "The returns from the several prisons," says the report, "show that the white convicts are remaining nearly the same, or are diminishing, while the colored convicts *are increasing.* At the same time the white population is increasing in the Northern States much faster than the colored population." The following table is taken from the report:

	Whole number of Convicts.	Colored Convicts.	Proportion.
In Massachusetts,.	313	50	1 to 6
In New-York,..	981	101	1 to 4
In New-Jersey,..	67	33	1 to 2

Were not these facts and statistics powerful arguments for arresting emancipation? The other States, seeing its evil effects, took the alarm. Some of them passed laws prohibiting the freed negroes from coming within them, and it began to be declared that it was much easier and less expensive to manage "slaves" than free blacks. So great was the reäction which the disastrous experiment of emancipation produced, that some of the States passed laws prohibiting emancipation, unless upon condition that the freed negroes be removed from the country. Thus the Colonization Society arose. It was argued that if the negro could not rise to any respectable condition here, it might be owing to the prejudice against his color and the social outlawry visited upon him. To place him, therefore, in a position where none of these influences could affect him, it was pro-

posed to colonize all who were freed, and, for many years, negro "philanthropy" exhausted itself in this direction. The Society was popular at one time, even at the South. It was regarded by some as the agent or means which would gradually do away with "slavery," and by others as simply an organization to get rid of the incubus of freed negroes. In 1826 the Society, by a resolution, declared itself as "not designing to interfere with slavery where it existed, nor yet as endeavoring to perpetuate its existence." This did not suit the more radical members, and Wm. Lloyd Garrison, James G. Birney, Gerrit Smith, and others, who had ranked among its prominent supporters, shortly after withdrew from it. In 1833 the British Parliament passed the act for the West-India emancipation, and the result was a great impulse to the cause of anti-slavery in the United States.

But no more States could be induced to try emancipation. The advocates of emancipation formed societies, and raised the cry of "immediate abolition." They deluged Congress with petitions, and the country with tracts, pamphlets, and newspapers. Thousands and millions of pages of printed matter were sent out, but all in vain. "Moral suasion" accomplished nothing, and "slavery" not only remained as firm as ever, but it had extended and fortified itself in such a manner that the Abolitionists themselves gave up their "immediate abolition" demand in utter despair. They cried, but no one listened. They expostulated, but the public heeded them not. The freed negroes of the North were a standing monument to the folly of Abolitionism. They had not progressed, or shown themselves active, enterprising members of society. They would black boots, whitewash and do other menial offices, and they would hold conventions and pass ridiculous resolutions, but as for clearing up land and settling themselves in independent circumstances, they would not. In 1852 Gerrit Smith, who has done more for freed blacks than any other man, for he gave all who would accept them, free homes on his lands, complained in a letter to Governor Hunt that "the most of them preferred *to rot both physically and morally* in cities, rather than become farmers or mechanics in the country." His own experiment with them resulted in signal failure. Even Horace Greeley, in a moment of apparent forgetfulness, declared in the *Tribune*, September 22d, 1855, that "nine tenths of the free blacks have no idea of setting themselves to work except as the hirelings or servitors of white men; no idea of building a church or other serious enterprise, except through beggary of the whites. *As a class, the blacks are indolent, improvident, servile and licentious.*"

We have shown what the condition of the freed negro population of the North was in 1826–27, according to the statistics of the Boston Prison Discipline Society. We will now give some figures and facts from the United States Census Report of 1850, showing the number of black and white convicts in the penitentiaries of the four States of Massachusetts, New-York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and the proportion of free negro convicts over the whites:

POPULATION IN 1850.

	Mass.	N. Y.	Penn.	Ohio.
Whites,.....	985,450	3,048,325	2,258,160	1,955,050
Free Negroes,.	9,064	49,069	53,626	25,279

NUMBER IN THE PENITENTIARIES AND STATE PRISONS.

	Mass.	N. Y.	Penn.	Ohio.
Whites,.....	389	1,380	328	362
Free Negroes,...	47	257	109	44

It will be seen from the above, that in Massachusetts there was one white convict to every 2533 of white population. In New-York there was one white convict to every 2208 of white population. In Pennsylvania one to every 6884, and in Ohio one to every 5400. But how stands the case as to the free negroes? In Massachusetts, there was one free negro convict to every 192 of the free negro population. In New-York one to every 190. In Pennsylvania one to every 492, and in Ohio one to every 574. It is instructive to note these facts. It appears that crime among the free negroes of

Massachusetts is over *eight* times greater than among the white population. Yet the negroes of Massachusetts have enjoyed the benefits of "impartial freedom" ever since 1780. It would seem, therefore, that the more you try to force white men's rights upon them, the lower and lower they sink in the scale of morality.

The freed negro population of the United States has increased from 59,466 in 1790, to 434,495 in 1850, and 481,823 in 1860. In some States it has become so large as to excite well-grounded alarm, and what is remarkable, some of the very States that have little or none of this population among them, are industriously engaged in trying to force it upon others.. The six Eastern States, as is shown by the census returns of 1850—Maine, New-Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut—have 65,440 square miles; and in 1850 they had 23,021 freed negroes in the six States. By the census taken in 1790 they had 17,042 free and slave. The State of New-York has 46,220 square miles, and had 49,069 free negroes in 1850. She has to-day, under the census of 1860, 49,031—a decrease. The six New-England States, and New-York, have 111,660 square miles, and 72,090 free negroes. *The little State of Maryland, has but* 10,755 *square miles; and in* 1850 *she had* 74,723 *free negroes; according to the census of* 1860, *she has nearly* 84,000! The State of Pennsylvania has 46,215 square miles, lying upon the northern border of the State of Maryland, only divided by an imaginary line, and she had 53,626 free negroes in 1850. Thus we see that the State of Maryland has not one fourth as many square miles as Pennsylvania, and yet Maryland has, by the census of 1860, 27,345 more free blacks than the State of Pennsylvania. The State of Delaware has, by the census of 1860, 19,723 free negroes. The District of Columbia has 11,107 free negroes, and if no slaves had been removed before the abolition of "slavery," this number would have been increased to 14,000—and this, too, in a territory less than ten miles square! Here, then, we see the comparatively small territory comprising the States of Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia, with no less than 115,000 free negroes! Set free all their "slave" negro population, which previous to the emancipation in the District of Columbia must have been about 100,000, and there would be 215,000 free negroes on 13,000 square miles, or one negro to every 2½ white persons! No people can stand such an incubus of black laziness, vice, and crime as this state of affairs would produce, to say nothing of degrading the white population to a level with the negro. It will not be, it can not be a long time before the cry, "Abolition of free negroism," will be raised in Maryland and Delaware, unless the people are deprived of all right of self-government. If allowed to go on, free negroism will yet produce a social convulsion in those States and elsewhere, to which even civil war, with all its horrors, will be but a faint parallel. Robespierre and Brissot, in 1791, tried the "impartial freedom" of Sumner and Greeley, in St. Domingo, and Alison has vividly painted the result. Speaking of the Haytien tragedy, he says: "That negroes *marched with spiked infants on their spears, instead of colors; then sawed asunder the male prisoners, and violated the females on the dead bodies of their husbands.*" The mind of white persons can scarcely conceive of such infernal atrocities, and yet they are common to negroes, when perverted into what is called freedom.

From all that has been presented, then, it is easy to see that the present condition of the freed negroes of the North is of the most degraded character, and after fifty years of freedom, they are worse instead of better off. They are engaged in no *productive* employments; they furnish a large proportion of our criminals; they fill our alms-houses; and hence are a constant tax upon white labor. If their number according to the population were as great as it was when Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were complaining of the burden they cast

upon them, our people would not stand the incubus it would be upon their labor and industry. The free negroes of the North do not now, owing to the immigration and the immense white population, form an appreciable element of society. If they did, our people would demand a remedy, even to a return of these negroes to the care and protection of persons who would guarantee that they should not become public burdens. Society scarcely appreciates the burden of one negro living upon the industry of 100 whites, as in Massachusetts, but when free negroes become as numerous as in Maryland, where there is one to every *five* whites, they become an intolerable weight, and must irretrievably drag down any State that submits to it. The crimes and indolence of these people are not, however, so much to be charged to their account as to the whites, who, with sufficient intelligence to know and comprehend this race, and their duties toward it, shut their eyes from mere *party* spirit, to absolute facts, and keep on neglecting and persecuting it under the name of philanthropy. The effort to make the negro live out the life or manifest the capabilities of the white man, is like trying to force the woman to live the life of a man, or a child to exhibit the capabilities of the adult, or an ox to perform the duties of a horse! Each one of God's creatures has his specific organization and his specific life, and it is just as reasonable to expect a white man to be an angel as it is to expect a negro to be a white man; that is, to act as a white man, to think as a white man, or to work as a white man. Hence it is, as we have shown, that crime, disease, and death mark the career of Free Negroism. It destroys the negro, drags down white men, burdens them with taxes, and must inevitably end, where the number of the two races approximate, in social convulsions and a horrible and revolting war of races.

PART II.

FREE NEGROISM ELSEWHERE.

Having taken a brief glance at free negroism among ourselves, we will now take a general survey of it elsewhere. Freeing the negro in temperate latitudes, where the number was limited, was a matter of no moment in its effect upon the interest of commerce or civilization. White labor, better adapted to those regions, rushed in to supply its place, and if no emancipation had occurred, the result would have been even more healthy, for the negro labor, rendered unprofitable, would have been sent southward, where it would have been productively employed in raising articles to be exchanged for the skilled labor of more northern latitudes. In order, therefore, to see the really disastrous effects of free negroism, we must turn our attention to that vast tropical territory which has been cursed with this miserable delusion. Many people, perhaps, have no idea of the vast territory, which now lies an uncultivated waste, solely from the effects of removing the negro from the control of the superior race. The entire continent of North and South-America, from the Rio Grande on the North to Brazil on the South, is to-day, little more than a desert waste. But this is not all. Those beautiful and fertile islands —the West-Indies—with the exception of Cuba and Porto Rico, are in the same condition. Let us see how much land is thus lying unproductive and neglected.

The number of square miles in the territory to which we have alluded, is as follows:

	Square miles.
Mexico,	829,916
Central America,	155,770
Venezuela,	426,712
New-Granada,	521,948
Ecuador,	287,638
British Guiana,	96,000
Dutch Guiana,	59,765
French Guiana,	22,500
West-India Islands,	150,000
Total,	2,550,249

The United States and Territories comprise an area of 2,946,166 square miles, so that here is an extent of territory nearly equal to the entire length and breadth of our country, which, with here and there an exception, lies

an unproductive waste. If the curse of God had rested upon it, and, like the Cities of the Plain, it had been covered with a bituminous lake, its condition would not be materially different. But, instead of that, the Creator made it originally the most glorious land the sun ever shone upon. Perpetual summer reigns, and the fertility of the soil is as exhaustless as the sea. The variety and extent of its productions are almost unbounded, but, as God said before he made Adam, "Lo! there is no one to till the ground." The negro freed, basks in idleness, and only performs just sufficient labor to keep life in his body. The earth, however, is so rich in spontaneous productions, that the labor which necessity requires, is comparatively none; and hence the negro indulges his constitutional complaint of laziness to its full extent. It would require more space than we have at our disposal to give a review of the decrepitude and decay of the vast extent of territory from the Rio Grande to the Amazon. But a brief extract from Prof. Holton's work on *New-Granada*,* will give an indication of it. Speaking of the Valley of the Cauca, in that country, he says:

"What more could nature do for this people, or what has she withholden from them? What production of any zone would be unattainable by patient industry, *if they knew of such a virtue?* But their valley seems to be enriched with the greatest fertility and the finest climate in the world, only to show the *miraculous power of idleness* and unthrift to keep land poor. Here the family have sometimes *omitted their dinner, just because there was nothing to eat in the house!* Maize, cocoa, and rice, when out of season, can hardly be had for love or money; so this valley, a very Eden by nature, is filled with *hunger and poverty*."

Now there are over 2,000,000 of square miles essentially in the same position—the inhabitants, degraded in morals, lazy in habits, and worthless in every respect. The improvements under the Spaniards are gone to decay and ruin, while the mongrel population do nothing except insult the name of "God and Liberty" by indulging in pronunciamentos and revolutions!

* New-Granada: Twenty Months in the Andes. By Isaac F. Holton, M.A. Harper & Brothers.

THE WEST-INDIA ISLANDS.

From these Islands, where emancipation was inaugurated as an example for us to follow, we propose to draw our principal illustrations of the failure of free negroism. This is the more important, because the abolitionists still endeavor to cling to the delusion that it has been a success. The West-India Islands comprise, it is estimated, in all about 150,000 square miles, or an extent of territory as large as the States of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi. Some of the smaller islands are uninhabited, but those inhabited, and more or less under cultivation, have an area, as stated in Colton's Atlas, of 96,000 square miles. Cuba takes off 42,000 square miles, leaving 54,000 in Hayti and the British and French Islands. When emancipation took place in Jamaica, in 1834, it was loudly heralded that free labor in the West-Indies would soon render "slavery" entirely unprofitable in the United States. Mr. Birney encouraged his followers with this hope, and William Lloyd Garrison even made the confident prediction that the "American slave system must inevitably perish from starvation." George Thompson, the English Abolitionist, who came over to this country about that time to fan the flame of anti-Southern agitation, declared that "soon all slave labor cotton would be repudiated by the English manufacturers." The labor of free negroes was to accomplish all this, for it was presumed that freedom would give an impetus to production, and that the enterprise and industry of the freed black men would soon far outstrip the resources of those countries where "the unprofitable and expensive system of slave labor" was still adhered to. The millennium was thus, in 1833, but just a step ahead of the Abolitionists. They had almost

clutched the El Dorado of negro perfection. But alas! for their confident anticipations and positive predictions. In six years the answer came, and it was as follows: In 1800 the West-Indies exported 17,000,000 lbs. of cotton and the United States 17,789,803 lbs. They were thus at this time about equally productive. In 1840 the West-Indies exported only 866,157 lbs. of cotton, while the United States exported 743,941,061 lbs.! Instead, therefore, of the "American system dying of starvation," as Garrison predicted, or of the British spinners refusing to use "slave" grown cotton, England went right on manufacturing "slave" grown cotton, while her "philanthropists," to keep up the delusion, began to talk about raising cotton in Africa, by free-negro labor there, and they have kept on *talking* about it, and all the while *using* the productions of "slave" labor. But, in order to give the reader a fuller and more complete view of the terrible blow the industrial resources of the world have received by emancipation in the West-India Islands, we propose to take up a few of the more important Islands, and notice their decline with some minuteness. As it was the first to try "impartial freedom," we commence with

HAYTI.

This island is divided into two parts — the western portion being Hayti proper, and the eastern forming the Dominican Republic. It is next in size to Cuba, and is regarded as the most fertile of the Antilles. The entire island is 406 miles in length by a maximum width of 163. The number of square miles is 27,690, of which 10,091 are comprised in the Haytien or negro Republic, and the balance in the Dominican. It is very difficult to arrive at the exact population of Hayti, as no definite statistics exist, but it is variously estimated at from 550,000 to 650,000. The climate, natural productions and fertility of its soil are not surpassed by any other portion of the known world. Gold, silver, platina, mercury, copper, iron, tin, sulphur, rock-salt, jasper, marble, etc., etc., are found among its mineral productions. The gold-mines have long since been abandoned, as has every employment requiring laborious industry. The climate is warm, but on account of the sea-breezes, generally agreeable and pleasant, even during the summer heats. Vegetation is of the richest and most luxuriant kind.

"It is extremely difficult," says a traveler, "to convey to one unacquainted with the richness and variety of the island scenery of the tropics, a correct impression of its gorgeous beauty. Islands rising from a crystal sea, clothed with a vegetation of surpassing luxuriance and splendor, and of every variety, from the tall and graceful palm, the stately and spreading mahogany, to the bright flowers that seem to have stolen their tints from the glowing sun above them. Birds, with colors as varied and gorgeous as the hues of the rainbow, flit amid the dark green foliage of the forests, and flamingoes, with their scarlet plumage, flash along the shore. Fish of the same varied hues glide through waters so clear that for fathoms below the surface they can be distinctly seen. Turn the eye where it will, on sea or land, some bright color flashes before it. Nature is here a queen indeed, and dressed for a gala day.

"In the island of St. Domingo, the rich beauty of the tropics is combined with some of the finest mountain scenery in the world. The broad, fertile lagoons, covered with groves of orange, citron, and coffee, with here and there a delicate column of smoke indicating the locality of some invisible dwelling; groves of mangroves, rising apparently from the midst of the waters, but indicating the presence of dangerous shallows, gradually become visible. No rough promontory, as upon our northern shores, meets the eye; every angle is delicately rounded, every feature of the scenery undulating and graceful."

To this surpassing beauty is added almost all the natural productions that can be conceived. The mountains are covered with forests of pine, mahog-

any, fustic, satin-wood, lignum vitæ, and other cabinet woods. All the usual tropical productions grow spontaneously in great abundance, including plantains, bananas, yams, maize, millet, oranges, pine-apples, melons, grapes, etc. The staples of cultivation are coffee, cocoa, sugar, indigo, cotton, and tobacco. Surely, such a country as this has been peculiarly blessed by the Creator, and it seems nothing less than a crime against nature to allow its exhaustless resources to remain undeveloped. But what is its history?

In 1790 Hayti was in a high state of prosperity. At that time it supplied half of Europe with sugar. It was a French colony, and contained a population which numbered about 500,000, of which 38,360 were whites, and 28,370 free negroes, mostly mulattoes. The remainder were negro "slaves." The period of which we speak was the era of the great French Revolution, when doctrines of "liberty, equality, and fraternity" had full sway in France. The colonists or white people of Hayti entered with great fervor into the support of these doctrines, but they intended them to apply to white men, and *white men only*. But this did not suit the pleasure of the "Mountain Department" of the French Assembly. That demanded "impartial freedom," and "impartial freedom" it was. In 1793 the freedom of the blacks in Hayti was decreed, and the grand experiment of "impartial freedom" commenced. The result of that experiment is now, after seventy years' trial, before the world. If the negro has any capacity for self-government, any of the inherent, natural abilities or energies of the white man, surely he ought to have shown them during this time. With a country whose natural resources and fertility are beyond question, and with a climate exactly suited to the physical peculiarities of the race, surely there should have been no such word as fail. The island had been brought to a high state of cultivation, and to an exalted commercial prosperity by the French planters. It was turned over to its new masters like a garden ready cultivated, and all they had to do was to keep it as it was, and go on in the career of prosperity which had been so successfully inaugurated. But what are the facts? A few statistics will show, more vividly than words, how fearfully the island has retrograded and how fallacious are all the hopes which have been indulged in, as to the industry of negroes, when left to themselves. In 1790 the value of the exports of Hayti were $27,828,000, the principal productions being as follows:

Sugar, lbs.,	163,405,220
Coffee, "	68,151,180
Cotton, "	6,286,126
Indigo, "	930,016

In 1826, about thirty years after emancipation, the figures stood thus:

Sugar, lbs.,	32,864
Coffee, "	32,189,784
Cotton, "	620,972
Indigo, "	none.

Now there is no sugar at all exported, while coffee and logwood have become the principal items of export. The former is gathered wild from the mountains, or from the old abandoned French plantations, while all that is required in order to get the latter is to cut down the tree, which grows spontaneously, and take it to market. It is, therefore, seen that all *cultivation* is abandoned, and only those articles are now exported which require no labor to produce them. In 1849, the latest date of which we have any reliable statistics, and sixty years after emancipation, the exports of the articles we have named were as follows:

Sugar, lbs.,	none.
Coffee, "	30,608,343
Cotton, "	544,516
Indigo, "	none.

It is impossible to state, with accuracy, what the present value of the exports of Hayti amount to. Mr. Sumner, in a recent speech in the Senate, placed them at $2,673,000. This, we apprehend, is just about double the real value. A recent traveler, Mr Underhill, says he could find *no statistics* in Hayti as to her commerce, and Mr. Sumner's figures are, doubtless, mere guess-work. But grant what Mr.

Sumner says, and what a doleful picture of commercial ruin it presents! In 1790, the exports of Hayti amounted to $27,828,000, and now, according even to abolition testimony, they foot up only $2,683,000! Comment is unnecessary.

The statistics we have quoted are taken from the *U. S. Commercial Relations*," Vol. I. pp. 561–2, officially reported to Congress, and published by order of that body. But all these figures are fully corroborated by every candid and impartial traveler. A foreign resident at the capital of Hayti, under a recent date, writes:

"This country has made, since its emancipation, no progress whatever. The population partially live upon the produce of the grown wild coffee plantations, remnants of the French dominion. Properly speaking, plantations after the model of the English in Jamaica or the Spanish in Cuba, do not exist here. Hayti is the most beautiful and the most fertile of the Antilles. It has more mountains than Cuba, and more space than Jamaica. Nowhere the coffee-tree could better thrive than here, as it especially likes a mountainous soil. But the *indolence of the negro has brought the once splendid plantations to decay.* They now gather coffee *only from the grown wild trees.* The cultivation of the sugar-cane has *entirely disappeared*, and the island that once supplied the one half of Europe with sugar now supplies its own wants from Jamaica and the United States."

In order to show the present condition of Hayti more fully, we quote from a work just published in London, entitled *The West-Indies — their Moral and Social Condition.* The author, Mr. E. B. Underhill, was sent out by the Baptist Missionary Society of London, and is an abolitionist of the deepest dye. While finding all the excuses he can for the decay of the island, he is forced to own the truth. He describes his journey to Port au Prince as follows:

"We passed by many or through *many abandoned plantations, the buildings in ruin*, the sugar-mills decayed, *and the iron pans strewing the roadside, cracked and broken.* But for the law that forbids, on pain of confiscation, the export of all metals, they would long ago have been sold to foreign merchants.

"Only once in this long ride did we come upon a mill in use; it was grinding canes, in order to manufacture the syrup from which *tafia* is made, a kind of inferior rum, the intoxicating drink of the country. The mill was worked by a large over-shot or water-wheel the water being brought by an aque duct from a very considerable distance. With the exception of a few banana-gardens, or small patches of maize round the cottages, nowhere did this magnificent and fertile plain show signs of cultivation.

"In the time of the French occupation before the Revolution of 1793, thousands of hogsheads of sugar were produced; *now, not one. All is decay and desolation.* The pastures are deserted, and the prickly pear covers the land once laughing with the bright hues of the sugar-cane.

"The hydraulic works, erected at vast expense for irrigation, *have crumbled to dust. The plow is an unknown implement of culture*, although so eminently adapted to the great plains and deep soil of Hayti.

"A country so capable of producing for export, and therefore for the enrichment of its people—besides sugar, and coffee, cotton, tobacco, the cacao bean, spices, every tropical fruit, and many of the fruits of Europe—*lies uncultivated, unoccupied, and desolate.* Its rich mines are neither explored nor worked; and its beautiful woods rot in the soil where they grow. A little logwood is exported, but ebony, mahogany, and the finest building timber rarely fall before the woodman's ax, and then only for local use. The present inhabitants despise *all servile labor*, and are, for the most part, content with *the spontaneous productions of the soil and forest.*"

The degraded, barbarous condition of the negroes of Hayti is well illustrated in a description given by Mr. Underhill, of what is known as "the

religion of Vaudoux, or serpent-worship." It is a native African superstition, and proves, beyond all question, the rapid return of the Hayti negroes to the original savagism of their African ancestors. Mr. U. gives a full description of the ceremonies of this heathenish rite, as described to him by one of the resident missionaries, which we regret we have not space to give entire. The performances are preceded by the following barbaric chorus!

"Eh! eh! Bomba, hen! hen!
Canga bafia te
Canga mourne de le
Canga de ki li
Canga li."

The object worshiped *is a small green snake*, and the custom is a purely African heathenism. The negro always has a predisposition to it, but it is repressed when he is under white control. Of late years it has been revived extensively in Hayti.

"The Vaudoux," says Mr. Underhill, "meet in a retired spot, designated at a previous meeting. On entering they take off their shoes, and bind about their bodies handkerchiefs, in which a red color predominates. The king is known by the scarlet band around his head, worn like a crown, and a scarf of the same color distinguishes the queen. The object of adoration, the serpent, is placed on a stand. It is then worshiped; after which the box is placed on the ground, the queen mounts upon it, is seized with violent tremblings, and gives utterance to oracles in response to the prayers of the worshipers. A dance closes the ceremony. The king puts his hand on the serpent's box; a tremor seizes him, which is communicated to the circle. A delirious whirl or dance ensues, hightened by the free use of tafia. The weakest fall, as if dead, upon the spot. The bacchanalian revelers, always dancing and turning about, are borne away into a place near at hand, where sometimes, under the triple excitement of *promiscuous intercourse*, drunkenness and darkness, scenes are enacted, enough to make the impassible gods of Africa itself gnash their teeth with horror."

What a disgusting picture of savagism and heathenism does not the present! And yet, there are people who try to palm off upon the world the idea that negroes can remain civilized when left to themselves. This same missionary, Mr. Webley, writing to the London *Missionary Herald*, in 1850, says: "These Vaudoux almost deluge the Haytien part of the Island. They practice witchcraft and mysticism to an almost indefinite extent. They are singular *adepts at poisoning*. A person rarely escapes them when *he has been fixed upon as a victim*." It is thus seen that Obeism is quite as prevalent in Hayti as it is in the interior of Africa. What more need be said to prove the relapse of these negroes into their original barbarism? Such, then, is the condition of Hayti. Production gone, commerce gone, and the negroes themselves returning to their original African heathenism!

JAMAICA.

Jamaica is about 150 miles long by about 50 in width. Its area is about 6400 square miles, or 4,000,000 of acres. It is the largest and most valuable of the British West-India Islands. The last census taken was in 1844, when the population stood as follows: Whites, 15,779; negroes, 293,128; mulattoes, 68,529. By the census of 1861, the only one taken since, the population is stated as follows: whites, 13,816; mulattoes, 81,065; negroes, 346,374. The whole number of persons who can read is set down at 80,724, and 50,726 as able to read and write. It will be seen from this that over 300,000 can neither read nor write. The education is evidently confined to the whites and mulattoes, leaving the negroes in their natural ignorance, where they have neither oral nor any other instruction. Of course "educated" negroes are simply monstrosities, but as some people seem to suppose that "freedom" will develop such "white crows," we have cited these statistics to show that Ja

maica has not yet produced them, after a twenty-five years' trial. The white population, it will also be seen, is gradually decreasing — dying out — through the blood of the negro.

The productions of Jamaica are similar to those of the other West-India Islands. The soil is deep and fertile, and one of the best in the world for the production of sugar, coffee, pimento, and ginger. It is also rich in minerals, cabinet-woods, etc., and the low grounds yield abundantly the plantain, banana, yam, sweet potatoes, pine-apples, oranges, pomegranates, etc., etc. Jamaica has been in possession of England ever since the days of Oliver Cromwell, and at the time of the prohibition of the importation of negroes from Africa in 1807, was in a most flourishing condition. Her history, since then, has been one of gradual but sure decay. The restriction upon her supply of labor produced some decrease in her productions, and the abolition of "slavery" in 1833 hastened the final destruction of the island. The negroes freed in 1833 were to serve five years as apprentices, and on the first of August, 1838, to have their unconditional liberty. For this injury to the negro, and crime toward the white man, the planters were allowed about $30,000,000, the whole sum expended in all the islands, by the British government, being about $100,000,000. And what is the result? Facts speak louder than words, and to them we appeal. The value of the exports of Jamaica, (we quote from the *Cyclopædia of Commerce*, published by Harper and Brothers, of this city,) before and after the emancipation, will illustrate what we say:

BEFORE EMANCIPATION.

Years.	Value of Exports.
1809	£3,033,234
1810	2,303,579

AFTER EMANCIPATION.

1853	£837,276
1854	932,316

The productions of Jamaica show, forcibly, what the above figures exhibit by values. In 1805, two years before the prohibition of African emigration, the productions of Jamaica were as follows:

PRODUCTS OF JAMAICA IN 1805.

Sugar,	150,352 hhds.
Rum,	46,837 punch.
Pimento,	1,041,540 lbs.
Coffee,	17,961,923 lbs.

The production of the island, at that time, was at its highest point. The sugar was the largest crop ever produced in Jamaica. The loss of labor was severely felt, especially in the sugar-culture, so that in 1834, the year emancipation was effected, the production stood as follows:

PRODUCTS OF JAMAICA IN 1834.

Sugar,	84,756 hhds.
Rum,	32,111 punch.
Pimento,	3,605,400 lbs.
Coffee,	17,725,781 lbs.

In the very next year, the first one under free negroism, there was a manifest falling off. The sugar production was only 77,970 hhds., nearly 10,000 hhds. less; coffee was only 10,593,018 lbs., a decrease of over 7,000,000 lbs., and this decrease has steadily continued, until in 1856 the production of Jamaica stood as follows:

PRODUCTS OF JAMAICA IN 1856.

Sugar,	25,920 hhds.
Rum,	14,470 punch.
Pimento,	6,848,622 lbs.
Coffee,	3,328,147 lbs.

The only crop that had increased was that of pimento, or allspice, the increase of which, instead of being an evidence of the industry of the negro, is the reverse. The pimento-tree grows wild in Jamaica, and rapidly spreads over land formerly under cultivation. As the plantations were abandoned, they were overrun with this tree, and the negro women and children picked the berries without the trouble of cultivation. The coffee-tree, to a certain extent, is like the pimento, and grows wild in many places. Hence the production of coffee has not fallen off in the same proportion as that of sugar, which can only be produced by careful cultivation. The coffee crop of Jamaica, however, was in 1813, before the overthrow of "slave" labor, 34,045

585 lbs., but the average crop for the past ten years has not been over 5,000,000 lbs., while the sugar crop had fallen in 1853 as low as 20,000 hhds.! These facts and statistics demonstrate the down-hill progress of Jamaica, and show what may be expected wherever the experiment of free negroism is attempted.

The rapidity with which estates have been abandoned in Jamaica, and the decrease in the taxable property of the island, is also astounding. The movable and immovable property of Jamaica was once estimated at £50,000,000, or nearly $250,000,000. In 1850 the assessed valuation had fallen to £11,500,000. In 1851 it was reduced to £9,500,000, and Mr. Westmoreland, in a speech in the Jamaica House of Assembly, stated it was believed, that the falling off would be £2,000,000 more in 1852. From a report made to the House of Assembly of the number and extent of the plantations abandoned during the years 1848, '49, '50, '51 and '52, we gather the following facts:

Sugar-estates abandoned,.....	128
" " partially abandoned,..	71
Coffee-plantations abandoned,....	96
" " partially abandoned,.	66

The total number of acres thus thrown out of cultivation in five years was 391,187! This is only a sample, for the same process has been going on ever since emancipation. In the five years immediately succeeding emancipation, the abandoned estates stood as follows:

Sugar-estates, 140,.....	168,032 acres.
Coffee-plantations, 465,.	188,400 "

These plantations employed 49,383 laborers, whose industry was, therefore, at once lost to the world, and the articles they had raised were just so much subtracted from consumption. The price of these articles, sugar and coffee, was increased on account of the diminished production, and that increased cost represented the tax which the world paid for the privilege of allowing Sambo to loll in idleness. The *Cyclopædia of Commerce* says, "that *the negro is rapidly receding into a savage state*, and that unless there is a large and immediate supply of immigrants, *all society will come to a speedy end*, and the island become a second Hayti."

Such, then, is the condition of Jamaica, as stated in an impartial work. Let us hear now what the London *Times* candidly owns up to. It says:

"There is *no blinking the truth.* Years of bitter experience, years of hope deferred, of self-devotion unrequited, of prayers unanswered, of sufferings derided, of insults unresented, of contumely patiently endured, have convinced us of the truth. It must be spoken out loudly and energetically, despite the wild mockings of 'howling cant.' *The freed West-India slave will not till the soil for wages;* the free son of the ex-slave is as obstinate as his sire. He will not cultivate lands which he has not bought for his own. Yams, mangoes and plantains—these satisfy his wants; he cares not for yours. Cotton, sugar, coffee and tobacco he cares but little for. And what matters it to him that the Englishman has sunk his thousands and tens of thousands on mills, machinery and plants, which now totter on the languishing estate that for years has only returned him beggary and debt? He eats his yams and sniggers at 'Buckra.' We know not why this should be, but so it is. The negro has been bought with a price—the price of English *taxation* and English *toil.* He has been redeemed from bondage *by the sweat and travail of some millions of hard-working Englishmen.* Twenty millions of pounds sterling—one hundred millions of dollars—have been *distilled from the brains and muscles of the free English laborer*, of every degree, to fashion the West-India negro into a 'free, independent laborer.' 'Free and independent' enough he has become, God knows, but laborer he *is not;* and, so far as we can see, *never will be.* He will sing hymns and quote texts, but honest, steady industry he not only detests but *despises.*"

Such is the testimony of the London *Times*—such the universal evi-

dence of every candid individual. How different is this picture from that predicted by the Abolitionists! The Rev. Dr. Channing, the Dr. Cheever of that day, made the following prophecy in 1833, as the result of emancipation:

"The planters, in general, would suffer little, if at all, from emancipation. This change would make them *richer* rather than poorer. One would think, indeed, from the common language on the subject, that the negroes were to be annihilated by being set free; that the whole labor of the South was to be destroyed by a single blow. But the colored man, when freed, will not vanish from the soil. He will stand there with the same muscles as before, only strung anew by liberty; with the same limbs to toil, and with *stronger motives* to toil than before. He will work from *hope*, not fear; will work for himself, not for others; and unless all the principles of human nature are reversed under a black skin, he will work *better than before*. We believe that agriculture will revive, our worn-out soils will be renewed, and the whole country assume a brighter aspect under *free labor*."

This is the same story the Abolitionists are singing now, not having yet learned that "the principles of human nature are reversed under a black skin"—that is, of *white* human nature, and it was from a total misconception of the negro that Dr. Channing fell into his grand mistake. Mr. Anthony Trollope, an Englishman, and an anti-slavery man, who has written a book on Jamaica, seems to know rather more of the negro race than Dr. Channing did. The London *Times*, drawing its facts from Mr. Trollope, says of it:

"A servile race, peculiarly fitted by nature for the hardest physical work in a burning climate. The negro has no desire for property strong enough to induce him to labor with sustained power. He lives from hand to mouth. In order that he may have his dinner and some small finery, he will work a little, but after that he is content to *lie in the sun*. This in Jamaica he can very easily do, for emancipation and free trade have combined to throw enormous tracts of land out of cultivation, and on these the negro squats, getting all that he wants with very little trouble, and sinking, in the most resolute fashion, to the savage state. Lying under his cotton-tree, he refuses to work after ten o'clock in the morning. 'No, tankee, massa, me tired now; me no want more money.' Or, by the way of variety, he may say: 'No, workee no more; money no nuff; workee no pay.' And so the planter must see his canes foul with weeds, because he can not prevail on Sambo to earn a second shilling by going into the cane-fields. He calls him a lazy nigger, and threatens him with starvation. His answer is: 'No, massa; no starve now; God send plenty yam.' These yams, be it observed, on which Sambo lives, and on the strength of which he declines to work, are grown on the planter's own ground, and probably planted at his own expense.

"There lies the shiny, oily, odorous negro under his mango-tree, eating the luscious fruit in the sun. He sends his black urchin up for a bread-fruit, and, behold, the family table is spread. He pierces a cocoa-nut, and lo! there is his beverage. He lies on the ground, surrounded by oranges, bananas, and pine-apples. Why should he work? Let Sambo himself reply: 'No, massa, me weak in me belly; me no workee to-day: me no like workee just um little moment.'"

This is a graphic description of the negro character, where the climate gives him a chance to show out his real nature. The same author says that "one half of the sugar-estates, and *more than* one half of the coffee-plantations have gone back *into a state of bush*."

The idea of working for pay never entered in black nature. As long ago as Mungo Park traveled in Africa, he discovered that "paid servants, persons of free condition, voluntarily working for pay, *are unknown here*." No traveler in Africa, down to Dr.

Livingstone, has reversed that judgment.

In Lewis's West-Indies, written 17 years before emancipation, it is remarked: "As to free blacks, they are unfortunately lazy and improvident; most of them half-starved, and only anxious to live from hand to mouth. Even those who profess to be tailors, carpenters, or coopers are, for the most part, careless, drunken and dissipated, and never take pains sufficient to attain to any dexterity in their trades! *As for a free negro hiring himself out for plantation labor, no instance of such a thing was ever known in Jamaica.*" Earl Grey said, in the House of Lords, on June 10th, 1852, "that it was established by statistical facts that the negroes were *idle, and falling back in civilization;* that, relieved from the coërcion to which they were formerly subjected, and a couple of days' labor giving them enough food for a fortnight, the climate rendering clothing and fuel not necessary to life, they had no earthly motive to give a greater amount of service than for mere subsistence." Sir H. Light and Gov. Barkley have both shown, also, that the majority of the free negroes of the West-Indies are living in idleness, and the French colonies, according to a work from M. Vacherot, published a few years ago at Paris, demonstrate the same ruinous result under their emancipation act.

Captain Hamilton, on his examination as a witness, before a select committee of Parliament, stated that "*Jamaica, without any exaggeration, had become a desert.*"

In 1850 Mr. John Bigelow, then one of the editors of the New-York *Evening Post*, paid a visit to Jamaica, and wrote a book thereon. As the testimony of an anti-slavery man his statements are given. Mr. Bigelow says that the land of that island is as prolific as any in the world. It can be bought for $5 to $10 per acre, and five acres confer the right of voting and eligibility to public offices. Planters offer $1.50 per day for labor; 16 days' labor will enable a negro to buy land enough to make him a voter and the market of Kingston offers a great demand for vegetables at all times. These facts, said Mr. Bigelow, place independence within the reach of every black. But what are the results? There has been no increase in voters in 20 years. Lands run wild. Kingston gets its vegetables from the United States.

But we will accumulate proof—pile it up, if needed. Mr. Robert Baird, who is an enthusiastic advocate of "the glorious Act of British Emancipation," on visiting the West-Indies for his health, could not fail to be struck with the desolate appearance there.

"That the West-Indians," says Mr. Baird, "are always grumbling, is an observation often heard, and, no doubt, it is very true that they are so. But let any one who thinks that the extent and clamor of the complaint exceeds the magnitude of the distress which has called it forth, go to the West-Indies and judge for himself. Let him see with his own eyes THE NEGLECTED AND ABANDONED ESTATES—THE UNCULTIVATED FIELDS, FAST HURRYING BACK INTO A STATE OF NATURE, WITH ALL THE SPEED OF TROPICAL LUXURIANCE—THE DISMANTLED AND SILENT MACHINERY, THE CRUMBLING WALLS, AND DESERTED MANSIONS, WHICH ARE FAMILIAR SIGHTS IN MOST OF THE BRITISH WEST-INDIAN COLONIES. Let him then transport himself to the Spanish Islands of Porto Rico and Cuba, and witness the life and activity which in these slave colonies prevail. Let him observe for himself the activity of the slaves—the improvements daily making in the cultivation of the fields, and in the processes carried on at the Ingenois or sugar-mills—and *the general, indescribable air of thriving and prosperity which surround the whole*—and then let him come back to England and say, if he honestly can, that the British West-Indian planters and proprietors are grumblers, who complain without adequate cause."

Ex-Governor Wood, of Ohio, who paid a visit to Jamaica in 1853, and who is no friend to "slavery," says:

"Since the blacks have been liberated, they have become indolent, insolent, degraded and dishonest. They are a rude, beastly set of vagabonds, lying naked about the streets, as filthy as the Hottentots, and I believe worse. On getting to the wharf of Kingston, the first thing the blacks of *both sexes, perfectly naked*, come swarming about the boat, and would dive for small pieces of coin that were thrown by the passengers. On entering the city the stranger is annoyed to death by black beggars at every step, and you must often show him your pistol or an uplifted cane to rid yourself of their importunities."

Sewell, in his work on the *Ordeal of Free Labor*, in which he defends emancipation, and pleads for still more extended privileges to the blacks, says of Kingston:

"There is not a house in decent repair; not a wharf in good order; no pavement, no sidewalk, no drainages, and scanty water; no light. There is nothing like work done. Wreck and ruin, destitution and neglect. The inhabitants, taken *en masse*, are steeped to the eyelids in immorality. The population shows unnatural decrease. Illegitimacy exceeds legitimacy. Nothing is replaced that time destroys. If a brick tumbles from a house to the street, it remains there. If a spout is loosened by the wind, it hangs by a thread till it falls; if furniture is accidentally broken, the idea of having it mended is not entertained. A God-forsaken place, without life or energy, old, dilapidated, sickly, filthy, cast away from the anchorage of sound morality, of reason and of common-sense. Yet this wretched hulk is the capital of an island the most fertile in the world. It is blessed with a climate the most glorious; it lies rotting in the shadow of mountains that can be cultivated from summit to base with every product of tropic and temperate region. It is the mistress of a harbor wherein a thousand line-of-battle ships can ride safely at anchor."

We might fill a volume with such quotations, showing the steady decline of the Island. But it is well to note the moral condition of the negro. The *American Missionary Association* is the strongest kind of Abolition testimony in regard to the moral condition of the negroes. The *American Missionary*, a monthly paper, and organ of the Association, for July, 1855, has the following quotation from the letters of one of the missionaries:

"*A man here may be a drunkard, a liar, a Sabbath-breaker, a profane man, a fornicator, an adulterer, and such like—and be known to be such—and go to chapel and hold up his head there, and feel no disgrace from these things*, because they are *so common* as to create a public sentiment in his favor. He may go to the communion-table, and cherish a hope of heaven, and not have his hope disturbed. I might tell of persons, guilty of some, if not all of these things, ministering in holy things."

The Report of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, for 1853, p. 170, says of the negroes:

"Their moral condition is very far from being what it ought to be. It is exceedingly dark and distressing. *Licentiousness prevails to a most alarming extent among the people.* . . . The almost universal prevalence of intemperance is another prolific source of the moral darkness and degradation of the people. The great mass among all classes of the inhabitants, from the governor in his palace to the peasant in his hut — from the bishop in his gown to the beggar in his rags — are *all slaves to their cups.*"

So much for "freedom" elevating the blacks. It is complained that the marriage relation is not always regarded where "slavery" exists, but it would seem, from this statement, that "slavery" had done more for the moral improvement of the negro, in this respect, than he was at all disposed to do for himself.

Mr. Underhill indorses the stories

"of the crowds of bastard children" in the Island, and says it is "too true." "Outside the nonconformist communities," he says, "neglect of marriage *is almost universal.* One clergyman informed me that of seventeen infants brought to his church for baptism, *fifteen*, at least, would be of illegitimate origin." In fact, from all the admissions made, it does not appear that there is any more marriage in Jamaica than in Africa. The churches, Mr. Underhill allows, are less attended than formerly, and there is evidently little of the religious training of the whites left among the people. The negro, however, has all the advantages of "impartial freedom," and "the highest offices of the state are open to colored men. They are found," says Mr. U., "in the Assembly, in the executive, on the bench and at the bar. All colors mix freely. This would be the paradise for Seward, Phillips and Greeley. Mr. Underhill estimates the annual loss of wages to the people, from the decay of estates and plantations, can not be less than £300,000, or nearly $1,500,000! Negroes who work at all can not be prevailed upon to do so, generally, more than four days in the week, and rarely five. Mr. U. also states that it has been officially ascertained that *two thirds* of the persons employed on sugar-estates are *women and children.* Yet, notwithstanding all these facts, the anti-slaveryite still adheres to his favorite hobby. He has excuses and palliatives for his friend, the negro. True, Jamaica is ruined, but still emancipation is a success. The seasons are poor, the estates were mortgaged, the planters have not treated the blacks kindly, and they have bought patches of ground of their own rather than labor for others. Such are some of the excuses of the friends of Sambo. But the facts still stand out in bold relief, despite the assertion of "negro missionaries," who are interested in keeping up the delusion. The *facts* they do admit. They can not deny or controvert them. This is all we ask —we need none of their excuses. In order to relieve themselves of the odium of having ruined the fairest Island of the Antilles, they will naturally look for reasons not chargeable to them. But figures do not lie. The exports of Jamaica have been gradually decreasing ever since "slavery" in the Island was interfered with, until they have dwindled down to insignificance, and, as the London *Times* says, "there is no blinking the truth —the negroes will not work for wages," and hence the tropics are going back to jungle and bush, while white men are taxed double the price they ought to be for all tropical products.

THE OTHER ISLANDS.

The careful survey we have taken of the condition of Jamaica, derived both from official statistics and the evidences of anti-slavery men, render it almost unnecessary to notice the remaining islands, where emancipation has been carried out. The story of Jamaica is the story of all. We will, however, briefly notice the condition of Trinidad and Barbadoes, for these islands are often held up by the discomfited Abolitionists as an evidence of the success of emancipation. Again we will take their own evidence to vanquish them. Trinidad contains 2020 square miles. Her soil is as fertile as any of the islands, and if production has somewhat increased within the past few years, it is owing entirely to the Coolie slave-trade.

As illustrating the terrible ordeal through which Trinidad has passed, we quote from Mr. Underhill. He says:

"Three years after emancipation, in 1841, the condition of the island was most deplorable; the laborers had, for the most part, abandoned the estates, and taken possession of plots of vacant land, especially in the vicinity of the towns, without purchase or lawful right. Vagrancy had become an alarming habit of great numbers; every attempt to take a census of the population was baffled by the frequent migrations which took place. Criminals easily evaded justice by absconding to places where they were unknown, or by hiding themselves in the

dense forests, which in all parts edged so closely on the cleared lands. Drunkenness increased to an enormous degree, assisted by planters who freely supplied rum to the laborers, to induce them to remain as cultivators on their estates. High wages were obtained, only to be squandered in amusement, revelry, and dissipation; at the same time, these high wages induced a diminished cultivation of food, and a corresponding increase in price, and in the import of provisions from the neighboring islands and continent. The laborers steadily refused to enter into any contracts which should oblige them to remain in the service of a master; this would too much have resembled the state of slavery from which they had but just emerged. It was with reference to this state of things that Lord Harris wrote in 1848: 'Liberty has been given to a heterogeneous mass of individuals, who can only comprehend license; a partition in the rights and privileges and duties of civilized society has been granted to them; they are only capable of enjoying its vices.'"

With the help of Vagrant Acts and other legislative enactments, somewhat like order was established; and the introduction of Coolie labor has enabled Trinidad to recover from the state of poverty into which it has been plunged. The island, however, has been compelled to burden itself with a debt of $725,000 on account of the expenses of the Coolie slave-trade, which is disguised under the name of apprenticeship.

According to Lord Harris, one fourth of the entire negro population of Trinidad, in 1850, were living in idleness. Estates were wholly abandoned, and poverty stalked abroad. The Coolie labor arrested this downward tendency. Between 1847 and 1856, 47,739 Coolies were introduced into the West-India possessions of Great Britain, the greater portion going to Trinidad and Guiana. These 47,739 protests against the idleness of the negro have about doubled the production of sugar in Trinidad—raising it from 20,000 to 40,000 hogsheads. But no thanks to the negro for this. It is none of his doings. Mr. Underhill declares that NOT ONE FOURTH of the persons employed on the estates are negroes. Hence this increase in the sugar production of Trinidad is no evidence of the benefit of emancipation, but just the reverse.

The case of Barbadoes is still more emphatic, though the Abolitionists are never tired of referring to that island as the proof positive of the success of "free negro labor." Now, what is Barbadoes? Well, it is a small island, about large enough for a good-sized water-melon patch. It is about 21 miles long by 14 wide, and contains 100,000 acres of land, all told. It has 150,000 inhabitants, and is more thickly settled than China. There is not an acre of wild or unimproved land; not room, as Trollope says, "for a picnic." This land is monopolized by the whites; and, under a rigid system of vagrant laws, the black is compelled to work. If an idle negro is seen, he is set to work, at wages, or else compelled to DRAG A BALL AND CHAIN on the highways. Mr. Trollope says: "When emancipation came, there was no squatting ground for the poor Barbadian. He had still to work and make sugar—work quite as hard as he had done while yet a slave. He had to do that or to starve. Consequently, labor has been abundant in this island only." Now, how this "capsizes" all the stuff the anti-slaveryites tell us about Barbadoes! Not long since there appeared in the *Independent*, of this city, an article glorifying emancipation as it had affected Barbadoes. Gov. Hinks, of that island, published a letter in proof of it, and in it occurs this remarkable admission:

"In Barbadoes, I have explained already that wages have ranged from 10*d.* to 1*s.* per task, and that rate prevails generally. In addition to these wages, a small allotment of land is usually given, but on a most uncertain tenure. The laborer may be EJECTED AT ANY TIME ON A FEW DAYS' NOTICE, and he is subjected to PENALTIES FOR NOT WORKING ON THE ESTATE."

There is the alternative to the negro,

"work or starve." Does any one suppose that the negroes of Barbadoes would work any better than the negroes of Jamaica, if there were plenty of unoccupied land in that island, as there is in Jamaica, on which they could squat? If the negroes of Barbadoes are as enterprising as the Abolitionists would have us believe, why do they not emigrate to Jamaica, where labor is in such demand, much higher than in Barbadoes, and where land is plenty? The truth is easily told. The negro never emigrates voluntarily any where. He works when compelled to, and riots in idleness wherever he has a chance to show out his nature. It is doubtful, however, whether the production of sugar in Barbadoes is any larger now than it was nearly 200 years ago. It was one of the first islands in which the Spaniards cultivated sugar, and in 1676 the sugar-trade of Barbadoes required 400 vessels, of 150 tons each.* The production of sugar in 1852 was 48,000 hogsheads. In 1836, the tonnage of its shipping was 62,000, about the same as in 1676. It is, therefore, quite evident that there has not been a material change in Barbadoes for many years. The negroes have simply exchanged masters, and are probably now in a worse condition than under the old system.

We have thus traced, with some minuteness, the present condition of four of the principal West-India Islands. Hayti, where the negro has been left mainly to himself, we have seen, has gone back to its original, uncultivated wilderness, and the inhabitants are sunk into the SAVAGISM OF THEIR AFRICAN ANCESTORS. They are rapidly losing even all conceptions of civilization, and, as soon as the mulattoes die out, the process will be complete. Abolitionism will have reared an African heathenism on this continent as the culmination of their bastard philanthropy. Civilization, and all the wants of civilization, are utterly ignored by the negroes of Hayti. The cotton, sugar, coffee, indigo, etc., which they ought to supply to the world, are left uncultivated.

Jamaica, the principal British West India island, though the white population there has struggled against it, presents essentially the same features. Every where are desolation and ruin. These beautiful and fertile islands, perfect "gems of the sea," are turned over to savagism, and ruined upon the false and visionary idea that negroes are white men!

To present at a glance the effects of Free Negroism in the West-India Islands, and to sum up the whole subject in a brief space, it is only necessary to examine the following table, showing the deficit in production under "free negro labor:"

CONTRAST OF "SLAVE" NEGRO LABOR AND "FREE" NEGRO LABOR EXPORTS FROM THE WEST-INDIES.

	"SLAVE" NEGRO LABOR.			
	Years.	*lbs. Sugar.*	*lbs. Coffee.*	*lbs. Cotton.*
British West-Indies,	1807	636,025,643	31,610,764	17,000,000*
Hayti,	1790	163,318,810	76,835,219	7,286,126
Total,		809,344,453	108,245,983	24,286,126
	"FREE" NEGRO LABOR.			
	Years.	*lbs. Sugar.*	*lbs. Coffee.*	*lbs. Cotton.*
British West-Indies,	1848	313,306,112	6,770,792	427,529†
Hayti,	1848	very little	34,114,717‡	1,591,454‡
Total,		313,306,112	40,885,509	2,018,983
"Free" Negro Labor Deficit,		496,038,341	67,360,474	22,267,143

If it were necessary to add to the proof we have given, that it is the overthrow of the supremacy of the white race, and that alone, that has produced this deplorable result, it is only required to cite the case of Cuba. Let Mr. Underhill, the British Abolitionist, from whom we have quoted, describe the difference between Cuba,

* Sugar: Its Culture and Consumption. By P. L. Simmonds, of London.

* 1800. † 1840. ‡ 1847.

where "slavery" exists, and where it does not. Of Havana he says:

"It is the BUSIEST AND MOST PROSPEROUS OF ALL THE CITIES OF the Antilles. Its harbor is one of the finest n the world, and IS CROWDED WITH HIPPING. Its wharves and warehouses are piled with merchandise, and the general aspect is one of GREAT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY. Its exports nearly reach the annual value of NINE MILLIONS STERLING, ($45,000,000,) and the customs furnish an annual tribute to the mother country over and above the cost of government and military occupation. EIGHT THOUSAND ships annually resort to the harbor of Cuba."

Evidently Mr. Underhill had got into a new world. He saw it, and was struck with the contrast it presented to the dilapidated region he had just left. In order to show the contrast between the PROGRESS of Cuba, and the DECLINE of Jamaica, it is only necessary to give a few statistics. The value of the exports of Jamaica, in 1809, were greater than those of Cuba in 1826, and a comparison of the two islands gives the following:

Jamaica, in 1809,	$15,166,000
Cuba, in 1826,	13,809,388
Jamaica, in 1854,	4,480,661
Cuba, in 1854,	31,683,731

What a picture is this of free negroism! What can the Abolitionist, who prates of free negroes laboring, say to these facts and figures? Cuba has been just as steadily advancing as Jamaica has been retrograding.

The productiveness of Cuba is most astonishing. Her exports are *more per head than those of any other country on the face of the globe.* Her export and import trade for 1859 was as follows:*

Exports for 1859,	$57,455,185
Imports for 1859,	43,465,185
Showing an excess of exports over imports of	$13,989,506

Now, the population of Cuba is only about one million and a half, all told, black and white. Upon analyzing the above figures, then, it will be seen that the exports of Cuba amount to about $40 per head for each man, woman and child on the island! At the same time it should be noted that this great production is not all exchanged for articles imported, but there is a net income or surplus of exports over imports of $13,989,506.

This net surplus of wealth amounts to $9.32 cents for each man, woman and child in Cuba. No other country in the world can present such a picture of prosperity, and yet Cuba is by no means as productive as she might be. Through a mistaken policy, or supposed kindness to the negro, manumissions are easily procured, and freed negroes are multiplying so rapidly that her welfare will, ere long, be very seriously impaired, unless the evil be checked.

But it will be instructive to take a glance at our own exports and imports, so that we may be able to see how much we are dependent upon negro labor for our prosperity. The exports of the fiscal year ending June 30th, 1860, embracing specie and American produce, amounted to $373,167,461; in addition to which we also reexported about $27,000,000 of foreign produce, the result standing as follows:

Exports for 1859–60,	$400,167,465
Imports for 1859–60,	361,727,209
Excess of exports over imports	$38,370,252

This gives a net surplus of only $1.26 cents per capita, while in Cuba, an exclusively negro labor country, it is $9.32 per head. Taking our *aggregate* domestic exports, and making a similar comparison, we find, calling our population in round numbers thirty millions, that our exports per head are $12.43, against $40 per capita in Cuba.

Having shown now that the exports of the United States, North, South and West amount, we will call it, to $12½ per head, it will be interesting to *analyze* these exports and see where they come from. To whom is the country mainly indebted for this surplus wealth, which enables us to buy and pay for nearly four hundred mil-

* Balanza General Del Commercio de la Isla de Cuba en 1859. Habana: 1861.

lions of foreign goods per year? It is very certain that we can have no imports, unless we have something to pay for them. Nor can we have any commerce unless we have something to sell which other nations want. It has been shown that the specie and American produce exported were, as above stated, $373,167,461; of this amount the specie was $56,946,851. The amount of American produce consequently exported was $316,220,610.

We propose to classify the amount furnished exclusively by the free States, the amount furnished by both the free and "slave" States, (which it is impossible to separate and designate the respective amount furnished by each,) and the amount furnished exclusively by the "slave" States.

FREE STATES EXCLUSIVELY.

Fisheries,	$4,156,480
Coal,	731,817
Ice,	183,134
Total free States,	$5,071,431

FREE AND SLAVE STATES.

Products of the forest,	$11,756,060
Products of agriculture,	20,206,265
Vegetable food,	25,656,494
Manufactures,	35,154,644
Manufactured articles,	2,397,031
Raw produce,	1,355,805
Total free and slave States,	$96,826,299

SLAVE STATES EXCLUSIVELY.

Cotton,	$191,806,555
Tobacco,	15,906,547
Rosin and turpentine,	3,734,527
Rice,	2,566,390
Tar and pitch,	151,095
Brown sugar,	103,244
Molasses,	44,562
Hemp,	8,951
Total slave States,	$214,322,880

RECAPITULATION.

Free States exclusively,	$5,071,431
Free and slave States,	96,826,299
Slave States exclusively,	214,322,880
Total,	$316,220,610

If any one will analyze the articles embraced in the amount, $96,826,299, belonging alike to the North and the South, he can not fail to come to the conclusion that at least one third is justly the product of negro labor. The result, then, stands as follows:

Exports of Southern States,	$246,898,313
Exports of Northern "	69,322,297
Total,	$316,220,610

Calling the population of the North, in round numbers, twenty millions, and the population of the South ten millions, we have the significant fact that while the exports of the North amount to only $3.45 per head, those of the South amount to $24.65!* It is not intended by this statement to deny that the North has vast industry, but white men, in a temperate or cold latitude, *consume* nearly all the products of their own labor, and hence it is, that in all ages, every nation which has acquired wealth and power, obtained them from tropical regions where the inferior races, in their normal relation to the superior race, produced them. It is thus self-evident that nearly all the wealth of our country is derived from negro servitude, for wealth is the surplus of production over consumption. The North has but little over — the South a great deal. It is the tropical regions which must be relied upon for this surplus wealth. When Spain held all her tropical possessions on this Continent, it is estimated that her net income from them was not less than $50,000,000 annually, and she was the mistress of the world. When she lost them, her greatness and wealth declined, and she soon sunk to a third or fourth-rate power. Of late years she has been improving, and if she do not commit the folly of overthrowing the natural relation of the races, she will rapidly advance in power, wealth, and prosperity.

There is one other view of this question, which is very important,

* To this statement it may be objected that the North sends a vast quantity of produce and manufactured articles to the South, but it should be remembered that the South also sends a vast quantity of *her* produce North. Our consumption of cotton is about $55,000,000; of sugar, $25,000,000; besides naval stores, rice, tobacco, etc., which do not enter into our calculation of Southern exports, any more than the Northern articles sent South enter into the exports of the North. Our calculation is based upon the *foreign* exports, as these only represent the *surplus* wealth of the country.

and is worthy the careful attention of every person who desires to be well informed upon the *causes* of the greatness, grandeur and prosperity of his country. It is frequently asserted, by thoughtless people, who have never investigated this subject, that the North has supported the South, paid the expenses of the government, etc. Now, all *imports* are based upon *exports*, and hence it is the *exports* which, in fact, furnish the revenue of a country, and *not* the imports, for the latter are but the representative of the former, without which they could not exist. Taking the history of our government for forty years, this view of the case presents some most astounding results, which are condensed with much labor in the following table:

RETURNS FROM THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AT WASHINGTON, SHOWING THE VALUE OF THE EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FOR FORTY YEARS, FROM 1821 TO 1861, WITH THE CUSTOMS PAID DURING THE SAME TIME TO THE UNITED STATES.

Gross value of exports, from 1821 to 1861,	$5,556,401,272
" " imports, " "	5,501,238,157
Customs duties on imports, paid in the U. S. Treasury,	1,191,874,443

TOTAL UNITED STATES EXPORTS FOR FORTY YEARS.

Cotton,	$2,574,834,991	
Tobacco,	424,118,067	
Rice,	87,854,511	
Naval stores,	110,981,296	
	$3,198,850,965	*Amount of Duty* $689,141,805
Food,	1,006,951,335	216,682,773
Gold,	458,588,615	95,349,955
Crude articles, manufactures, etc,	892,010,457	190,699,910
	$5,556,401,272	$1,191,874,443

EXPORTS FROM THE SOUTH EXCLUSIVELY, FOR FORTY YEARS.

Cotton,	$2,574,834,091	
Tobacco,	425,118,067	*Amount of Duty, paid by the South.*
Rice,	87,854,511	
Naval stores,	110,981,296	$689,141,805
One third of food,	335,650,411	72,227,591
40 per cent. gold, *	183,588,615	38,139,982
	$3,718,026,991	$799,508,378
Amount of duty from the North,		392,365,065
Difference,		$407,244,313

It will thus be seen that Southern products have contributed to the support of the government nearly $800,000,000, while Northern products have contributed less than half that sum! Can there be any doubt, therefore, in the mind of any candid and sensible person, that this country owes its unparalleled prosperity to negro labor? We do not mean to say that this difference arises from any inferiority of Northern or superiority of Southern men, but solely from that *universal law of nature, that the cultivation of the tropics, carried on by the enforced labor of the inferior races, produces a large surplus over consumption, while white men in temperate latitudes consume nearly all they produce. Destroy this cultivation, and you destroy Northern commerce, labor, mechanics, manufactures, etc., etc., and reduce white men to poverty and privation.*

The comparative value of free negro labor and "slave" negro labor is

* Some people, without reflecting, may suppose that this estimate, giving the South one third of the gold production for forty years, is too high; but they should recollect that the estimate is made for forty years, and we have had gold from California for only ten or twelve years. Previous to that time we depended entirely upon the mines of Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, and Maryland for our gold. These mines have been very productive, the Dorn mine in South-Carolina bringing to the U. S. Mint, at Charlotte, $220,000 to $225,000 annually.

also forcibly illustrated in the *progress* of our own country, when compared with those places where the negro has been deprived of the guidance of the white man. It is often the habit of Abolition writers to compare the value of "free" and "slave" labor, in order to show the vast superiority of the former over the latter. But they are always very careful to have the comparison to occur between WHITE labor and negro labor. They never DARE to make a comparison between negro "FREE" labor and negro "SLAVE" labor. As white men are superior to negroes, their labor ought to be superior to theirs, and in all latitudes where white labor is available, it is more valuable, because more intelligent. There is no sense, therefore, in comparing Ohio with Alabama, simply because there are no grounds for a comparison. The white man could not do the work of the negro in Alabama, nor could the negro do the work of the intelligent farmer in Ohio. The real question is, are the Southern States in a better condition than the free negro countries? This is the correct test as to the success of free negroism. It is only necessary, in order to answer this question, to show the constant and steady increase of the great staple of cotton—a product that has done more for the comfort and happiness of the great toiling masses than any and all other productions of modern times:

Years.	Total Bales.	Export Value.
1800.....	35,000	$5,726,000
1824	509,158	21,947,401
1830.....	870,415	29,674,883
1835.....	1,254,328	64,961,302
1840.....	2,177,532	63,870,303
1845.....	2,394,503	51,739,643
1850.....	2,796,700	71,984,616
1851.....	2,355,257	112,315,817
1852.....	3,015,029	87,965,732
1853.....	3,262,882	109,456,404
1854.....	2,930,027	93,596,220
1855.....	2,847,339	88,143,844
1856.....	3,527,841	128,382,351
1857.....	2,939,519	131,575,859
1858.....	3,113,962	131,386,661
1859.....	3,851,481	161,434,923
1860.....	4,300,000	184,400,000

What a grand and noble picture does not this present! Yet in 1817, the production of cotton in the West-Indies and the United States was just about the same! and Wm. Lloyd Garrison, Geo. Thompson and Dr. Channing, at the time of the West-India emancipation, predicted that free negro labor would soon drive all "slave" grown cotton out of the market! These architects of ruin, however, shut their eyes to the desolation they have achieved, and now, with the malignity of demons, desire to bring the calamities upon our own hitherto prosperous and happy country, which have marked the progress of the free-negro delusion in other places.

The territory cursed by free negroism in the West-Indies, however, is but a small portion of the space now blighted in the same manner. We have given no statistics of the condition of all that vast territory, comprising the fairest and most beautiful portion of our continent, extending from the Rio Grande almost to the Amazon. When it was under its Spanish conquerors, this territory, almost as large as the whole United States, was largely productive. Its capabilities, however, were never developed to any thing like their full extent, yet such cultivation as was commenced has been almost wholly abandoned. The country may be truly described as a desert, with only here and there an oasis, where a rude kind of cultivation produces just enough to let the world know that it is not an entire waste. Brazil, on the south, is the first spot where commerce and trade exist to any great extent, and there the negro has NOT BEEN FREED. We are thus able to count up, with perfect ease, the only places where tropical production is now carried on on this Continent—Cuba, Porto Rico, our own Gulf States and Brazil! Just four comparatively small green spots amid the wild and uncultivated yet fertile and glorious tropical regions of the western hemisphere!

PART III.

THE EFFECT OF EMANCIPATION UPON TRADE, COMMERCE, AGRICULTURE, AND WHITE LABOR.

No nation or people, from the days of imperial Babylon, has ever been great in wealth or power which did not possess the trade of the tropical regions of a continent. The wealth of the East-Indies made England what she is. With the riches which poured into her coffers, from 1750, after she expelled the Dutch from India, she was enabled to crush Napoleon, and raise herself to that power in the world which was formerly swayed by Rome. The rise and fall of imperial greatness in Asia and Europe has been determined by the possession of the trade of the East-Indies, where the enforced labor of two hundred millions of natives has formed an ever-flowing stream of wealth.

The Creator has intended our own tropical regions to be productive. They were not made "to waste their sweetness on the desert air." How are they to be made productive? That is the practical question of the hour. The negro has been brought here from Africa, where he had been a wild, untutored savage for centuries, just what he must and will be forever, (so far as we are able to judge by all the facts before us,) when he is separated from the white man. This negro has been made available for just the work to be done. The white men of this continent need and MUST HAVE cotton, sugar, coffee, indigo, and spices. Without these, civilization is put back five hundred years. True, we MIGHT again drag along as our ancestors did, the rich only being able to afford good clothing. The poor might manufacture their own by spinning, and carding, and weaving. Sugar, coffee, etc., might be again unknown luxuries. The farmer might have little or no market for his grains; but this would not satisfy us. These articles must be had, and they can not be had without the enforced labor of the negro.

Already white men have been, and are to-day, seriously taxed on account of emancipation of this negro. Take the two items of sugar and coffee alone. If we estimate the decline in the production of sugar and coffee by the reduction that has taken place in Jamaica and other places, it is fair to calculate that, were all the negroes, now lolling in the sun, eating yams and laughing at white men, set to work, we should have at least THREE TIMES the amount of both articles now produced. Such a production would decrease the price at least ONE HALF, thus furnishing the white men of this country with their groceries at fifty per cent less than present prices.

Let us look at this subject a little more closely. The "grocery bill" of the people of the United States is computed* annually at $86,928,000. Our imports of coffee, sugar, tobacco, and molasses, for 1853, amounted in value to $38,479,000, of which the negro "slaves" of Cuba and Brazil supplied $34,451,000. The balance of these four articles that we need, $48,449,000, is the product of our own "slave" States. The "grocery bill" of the people of the United States, therefore, stands indebted as follows:

To Negro "Slave" labor.....	$82,900,000
To all other sources.....	4,028,000

A great many well-meaning people no doubt sincerely believe that it would be good policy to emancipate the negroes engaged in producing this $82,000,000 worth of groceries for the North. If it were done, the result is apparent. All kinds of groceries would rise in price to such an extent that no one but perhaps the wealthy classes could afford to use them. The negro, if freed in the tropical regions, ceases to produce; and all know that the less of an article produced, the higher the price, and of course the greater the tax upon the consumer. Every negro, therefore, lazily squatting in the West-Indies, and, as the London *Times* says, "sniggering at

* Professor David Christy, in *Cotton is King.*

Buckra," takes something from the pocket of every consumer of sugar, coffee, and molasses. The cost of tropical productions is now fifty per cent above what it ought to be. Coffee ought to be had for about the tax now upon it, and sugar in proportion. We are paying nearly NINETY MILLIONS of dollars annually for our groceries—FORTY MILLIONS of it at least ought to be saved, and would be, if every negro were fulfilling the Heaven-decreed ordinance of labor.

But the tax of emancipation upon the North is not fully seen in the increased price of coffee, sugar, tobacco, etc. Every negro freed in the tropics becomes at once a non-consumer of Northern products. When at work on the plantation, he eats bacon and bread, and is furnished with plenty of good, coarse clothing, shoes, hats, etc. When freed, as we have shown, he eats yams and plantains mainly, and consumes little or nothing of Northern productions. The farmer and mechanic, therefore, are taxed by his idleness in two ways—First, by an increase in the price of coffee, sugar, etc.; and secondly, by a decrease in the DEMAND for their own productions. It was not until the extension of "slavery" occurred in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana, that the Western farmer began to get any thing like remunerative prices for his grain. And it is a singular fact that, the column of black labor on the Gulf, and of white labor above the 36th parallel of latitude, have kept right along *pari passu*. The one is the handmaid of the other. Carry out emancipation on the Gulf, and you destroy the farmer in Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa. It would be of little use to remove the blockade of the Mississippi if the negro is to be freed. Sectional agitators have educated the Northern mind to believe that there is an antagonism between what they call "free and slave labor," that is, between white labor and negro labor. Now, the real truth is that there never was a more perfect harmony in the world than that existing between white labor and negro labor, and when we say negro labor, we mean so-called "slave" labor, for we must disabuse ourselves of the fallacy, that there is any such a thing as *productive free negro labor*. The negro, as we have shown, on a plantation, becomes a consumer of the agricultural productions of the Northern farmer, and the skilled labor of the Northern mechanic. His labor therefore sets in motion cotton factories and machine-shops. THE MUSCLES OF THE NEGRO AND THE INTELLECT OF THE WHITE MAN THUS BECOME THE GREAT AGENCIES OF MODERN CIVILIZATION. The exchange of the products of the one for the other constitutes OUR COMMERCE, gives employment to shipping, erects our banks, lines our streets with marble palaces, and makes a rocky island like New-York, the seat of untold wealth. Destroy this tropical production, that is, emancipate the negroes, and the commerce that flows from it would be annihilated, and New-York would be in the position of the city of Alexandria when the Portuguese discovered the route for the East-India commerce by the way of the Cape of Good Hope.

But people often say, is not the North great and powerful by herself? We answer, as history attests, that no nation has ever been great in commerce and wealth that did not have the trade of the tropical regions of a continent. What are all the productions of agriculture unless there is a market for them? The matter can be illustrated thus: Suppose all the negroes of Brazil, Cuba, and the Southern States, from which we now derive all our groceries, were set to raising grain, etc., for their own subsistence. Of course there would be no exchange of commodities and no commerce. The world is constituted with different climates and productions for the purposes of exchange and commerce. Each hemisphere has its temperate and tropical regions, and those regions require different labor. To overthrow that form of labor, by which only the tropics

can be cultivated, is as criminal as it would be to overthrow the system of labor necessary for the temperate latitudes. The tropics can not be cultivated by "freed" negroes any more than the temperate latitudes could be by putting white men in slavery. Looking to Europe as a market for our agricultural productions is a mistake. Each hemisphere of the world is mainly independent of the other. For centuries they existed without the knowledge of each other. The foreign call for our agricultural productions occurs perhaps in one year out of five, but our real and permanent markets are the tropics of our own continent, and to these our farmers should direct their attention. If every negro in Mexico, Central America, New-Granada, and the West-Indies, were this day industriously at work, we judge each white laborer in the North would have his wages increased nearly one half, while the cost of articles for his family would be decreased in about the same ratio. The Western farmer, now getting only eight or ten cents per bushel for his corn, ought to and would then get twenty-five cents. Each man, therefore, can compute the expense of emancipation as it effects himself personally. The laboring classes, then, instead of living in close, ill-ventilated apartments, where the light of day is scarcely permitted to enter, might afford neat and agreeable cottages. The demoralization of huddling human beings together would be mainly obviated, and the education, intelligence, and morality of the white population vastly increased. While emancipation has conferred no benefit on the negro, yet its most serious results have fallen on *white men*. It enslaves them, it binds burdens upon them, and if in contact with this free negro, he becomes their legal equal, and among the debased and vicious leads to amalgamation. Philanthropists have dreamed of social reforms, of the elevation of the white laboring classes, and predicted a future wherein want should be comparatively unknown, and labor meet an adequate reward; but they have been looking for it through social reforms, perhaps convulsions. The great want is remunerative labor. Where can it be had? is the universal cry. The farmer wants better prices for his grain, the mechanic for his labor. Why do they not get them? The answer is summed up: *Thirty degrees of latitude on our continent are almost a desert waste. The finest countries the sun of heaven ever shone upon are a wilderness simply because no one will "till the ground." Hence there is not sufficient market for the farmer, for the mechanic, for the laborer of the temperate latitude. He has no one who stands ready to consume what he is anxious to produce, and there is no one ready to produce what he stands ready to purchase.* Shall we, therefore, go on in this career of folly? Shall we shut our eyes to facts, and in sheer party madness rush on to national suicide? All around us are scattered the ruins of emancipation. Torn and distracted Mexico, desolate and wild Central America, silent and deserted New-Granada, ruined and savage Hayti, dilapidated and broken-down Jamaica, all testify in thunder tones to beware of the breakers of emancipation. On the contrary, Brazil, Cuba, and Porto Rico are the marts of commerce and trade. Wherever the negro occupies the relation of servitude to the white man, all is happiness and prosperity. Where he does not, all is social chaos and blight.

CONCLUSION.

1. The foregoing pages show that these naturally fertile regions have been nearly withdrawn from the commerce of the world. The little that remains springs from a lingering force of former improvements, or from articles requiring little culture to prepare them for a market.

2. It appears that a gradual Africanization is passing over the people, which points back to their fatherland for its permanent type—a type which has been the same ever since the

Portuguese attempted to civilize by Christianizing the west coast of Africa, nearly four hundred years ago.

Had these and other fields of emancipation around the Gulf kept their former position in the market of the world, or had they obviously lost that position by misfortune, they would have furnished an argument in favor of further emancipations. Their American friends predicted and hoped for this result. Their English friends (except the planters in Jamaica) cared little about it; for they were still nauseous over our revolution, and cherished a rival interest in Asia, Australia, and the Eastern Islands.

Our reformers are slow to admit the whole truth of these results. They denied for a long time, then tried to excuse the thriftless course of these people, and now, under political pressure, they allege that the separation of master and servant must be effected without regard to consequences of this sort.

The price paid by England to separate the master and servant in Jamaica *was* the boast of the whole English press, as a vast sacrifice to the cause of African civilization. Not so *now*. There has been a larger generalization; new elements have come into the argument; the discussian has ranged over the relations of an *unlimited* population to a *limited* surface of a food-growing earth; and the *London Times* has more than intimated that Exeter Hall had led the British Parliament into a social blunder in regard to Jamaica. But the English press is now nearly unanimous in the conclusion that the only good done to the Africans in Jamaica and St. Domingo has been to deliver them from labor, and consequently from appearing in the commerce of the world. And, to turn the sharp edge of this conclusion, some of the English social philosophers ask: "What business is it of the whites, that the blacks in America shall do one thing or another, or nothing?"

If mere exemption from moderate labor is the sum of all the good to the emancipated, in return for the Africanization of the tropical regions of America—and this concession is claimed from the whites in cold climates of the United States—then we must look deeper into the relation of the two races north of the Gulf of Mexico, and our reformers must not be surprised if we ultimately, in behalf of a common humanity, put a stop to the Africanization on the south side of the Gulf.

The two races had wants which could be better supplied in America than in Europe or Africa. The whites foresaw their future; but the blacks could not, because they know no past; and therefore the whites constrained the blacks to come.

The whites took the cold climate, and placed the blacks in the warm, just as they had been at home.

The whites left feudal masters, in a small country, and gained large freeholds in a great country.

The blacks left little and gained much. The blacks gained a full supply of the wants of themselves and their families, with freedom from care about an employer, a sick-day, a sick family, a birth or a funeral. Never before had they fancied such a condition of life.

The blacks left the same cannibal tribes, the same fetishes and witches, and the same wars, which Du Challu found in Africa five years ago, where the chief of the last tribe he reached, in the interior, sent him, as a complimentary breakfast, a little boy to be roasted. America is the Paradise of the blacks. Would they leave it? The Colonization Society asked them, Mr. Lincoln asked them. Did they go? Political emancipation may constrain a few; military necessity may drive more; but the millions will be buried where they were born, in the sunny South. The blacks never have regretted that their race was *brought* to America.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED.

But the blacks were placed in America as coöperating partners of the whites. They grow large, and

strong, and healthful, and long-lived on the food and clothing produced for them. Their coöperation is the essence of our prosperity: they must not spoil it. We are as essential to each other as boys on the opposite ends of an up-and-down plank. They have the warm end of the plank, and we the cold. The cold constrains us to work hard to provide for a long winter; and nothing but *changing work* with them makes our winter tolerable, and bring us through.

On an east and west line, in the same climate, coöperative labor may be useful, if the one country is more advanced in its manufactures, or if it is rich in mines, but, even then, the utility requires that she shall have free access to tropical products. If the coal and iron and consequent manufactures of England induce her to take our corn and pork, it is because she gets from Asia and Brazil the price of her goods to pay us; and the time may come when we shall make similar goods for those markets. If England should sink in the ocean, it would not permanently check the prosperity of American civilization. Our coal and iron fields would work us out. But let our tropical lands (which are made small by the Gulf of Mexico) be sunk from our commerce, by Africanization, and we shall go down together. Labor-saving machines can not save us. The steam-engines down-town could not build palaces up-town and colleges at Princeton, by the *cheap manufacture* of sugar, if like engines did not *first produce cheap* sugar in the *tropics*. Machinery only makes the relations of the two races more essential to the North. For the machines open the way for a four-fold population in the North *only* on condition that the South increases its products for our use. Our great civilization rose on the abundance and cheapness of tropical products. Tropical cotton and wool in New-England enriched the boys and girls who peopled the West, and the West nursed her millions, because of the interchanges above and below Cairo.

HOW THE MODERATE LABOR OF THE BLACKS GIVES SOME LEISURE AND LUXURY TO THE WHITES.

Climate is the chief agent in this operation. The effects of climate on men and things teach laws, on this subject, which must be observed by those who would go with us in the further examination of this matter.

By the mere difference of climate, one cotton or cane field, under the same labor, is worth four corn-fields, and the support of the laborer costs less. The three fourths saved by climate are claimed by capital, commerce, and cold, and accumulate in the North.

But the products are such as we can not dispense with. The loss of them would send us back to the age of the Crusades. What sort of a toilet would a lady make of mere wool and flax? What sort of a table could a matron set forth with Indian corn, insipid pumpkins, sour apples, hard cider, and fox-grapes, without the sweets, spices, and coffee of the South?

The first smile that relaxed the grim face of the Pilgrims was raised by the sight of a West-India trader. And, perhaps, an abundant and cheap supply of tropical products induced a Boston minister to say at thanksgiving, that while he was very proud of his descent from the Puritans, he was equally thankful that the Puritans had not descended to us. The genial power of these products is akin to that of sun-rays. It can melt the iron heart of a disappointed reformer, and almost soften into modesty the temper of an escaped martyr!

Before the use of cotton-machinery, the English ships used to go, once in each year, to the Deccan, carrying food to the poor serfs, who made India shirting for our use, at one dollar a yard. They had made their cloths as usual, had delivered his share to the landlord, and waited for the ships to fetch them food; but the machines had made better cloths in England, at half the price. No ship came; and one hundred thousand of the tenants died of starvation.

To us, the failure of the blacks to coöperate will entail just as sure a diminution of the people, but it will come more gradually, and be less obvious, because the market of the world will be open, to give us temporary relief, until the prices of a diminished supply of cotton, groceries, etc., lift them out of our reach; and we turn from one cheap article to another, until insufficient food, and clothing, and fuel do their work of grinding a large and vigorous population into a small and weak peasantry.

We have shown that had all the blacks, whose labor has been withdrawn by emancipation, continued in the field, they would have been better provided for than they are now, and we might have had sugar at four cents a pound, and cotton and coffee at eight.

But this would not have met the requirement of the "reformers" in England and France. The same spirit has spread over our "reformers." No adjustment, no amendment, no melioration of the tie that binds the blacks to coöperation can be accepted. It is vain to show them, by the sad examples in these pages, that the blacks, being once fairly off the plank, are not likely to return. They talk of the unrequited labor of the blacks. We answer them, by comparing their requital with that of the laboring class in the North. They talk of hardships in the South, and we prove to them that there is more laughing and dancing on one plantation than in a dozen Northern factories. They talk of religious privileges, and we show them that there is as much singing, and praying, and preaching, and as large communions among the blacks as among the whites in the North..

But the blacks are not free. The whole history in these pages shows that, in the vocabulary of the blacks, liberty is a license not to work. And the whole matter comes to this: a necessity is laid on the "reformers!" They have a mission from human nature. A moral necessity is upon them. They are sent to preach the gospel of laziness to the blacks! They have put some of their spirit upon the President. He catches the idea of the mission, that it is the gospel of laziness. Being a military chieftain, he feels a military necessity to cut the cord which binds the blacks to the whites, and then, to rid his country of the laziness, he beseeches the blacks to go away—somewhere: and beseeches us to pay somebody a thousand millions of dollars for the privilege of abstaining from cotton, coffee, and sugar.

The "reformers" have had help. The war brought on by their movement has precipitated the practical results of a success which is not yet quite sure. Practically the link is broken—the blacks are pushed off the plank, and we of the North, who are not in office, are rolling in the dirt. The sugar and the coffee are gone out of the laborer's dinner-pail; his ragged cotton-shirt can not be replaced; the Sunday-clothes of his children are unsightly; (the son who used to work at his side is drafted:) but yield not to despair! Carry these symbols of a poverty not induced by your fault to the assembly of these apostles of laziness, and hold them up to their eyes, and say *you did it.* And when the day of deliverance comes, march with your comrades to the ballot-box and say to these "reformers," Now, *we* will do it.

HOW EMANCIPATION WORKS TO-DAY.

As pertinent to this subject, illustrating the effects of the emancipation theory as it is operating under our own eyes, this very year, we append the following from Gen. Banks's department, New-Orleans and its vicinity. Recalling to mind the anti-slavery proclivities and the antecedents of General Banks, and the character of the New-Orleans *Picayune*, under the dominant influence of those there in power, we may give more than ordinary weight to the testimony here adduced to show the essential character of the negro, and the effects of emancipation upon him and society. In this as in every other attempt to carry out their emancipation ideas, under the influence of their visionary anti-slavery hostility, these theorists are compelled, in spite of themselves, to return to the system of enforced labor which is slavery.

From the New-Orleans Picayune, Feb. 1863.

THE NEGRO QUESTION IN THIS DEPARTMENT.

Gen. Banks has responded to the general desire to know what course he would pursue upon the negro question in this department, through his "General Orders, No. 12," published in our columns yesterday morning. The subject is now fairly before our planters and others for their consideration. It is an exceedingly practical matter, and one of no small importance. The time is now at hand when, if at all, work must commence upon plantations in order to make a crop. What therefore shall be done? Shall there be any crops made? or shall the plantations be allowed to go to ruin? These questions must be promptly answered or they will gradually answer themselves. It is certainly true that "wise men will do what they can when they can not do what they would." It is clearly the part of wisdom to make the most of the condition in which we find ourselves placed, to do the best we can when we can not do what we would. Nobody will counsel idleness on the part of gangs of negroes throughout the entire season. This would subject them to all the evils of hunger and crime, and entail a curse upon the inhabitants which is already onerous, and would become every day more so.

Gen. Banks declares that "under no circumstances whatever can they be maintained in idleness, or allowed to wander through the parishes and cities of the State without employment. Vagrancy and crime will be suppressed by an enforced and constant occupation and employment." The negro idea of freedom generally is to have plenty to eat, and to lie all day in the sun and sleep! Doubtless hundreds left comfortable homes with the expectation of realizing this rather peculiar elysium. When the hordes of runaways learn, as they soon will now, that they can not be maintained in idleness, they will probably be willing to return to their homes, to industry, and to plenty. Some have done this already, after having had a little experience under the altered state of things, and learned what this much talked of mode of living without work really amounts to. Some of them have had glimpses of the ele-

phant, and do not desire a second sight of him. It is probable, under these circumstances, we think, that planters will not find it difficult to effect an arrangement with their servants, by which the accustomed labors upon the plantation may be again resumed. Such an arrangement once made, the Commanding General says, it "shall be enforced on the part of the negroes by the officers of the government," and that this shall include all the conditions of continuous and faithful service, respectful deportment, correct discipline, and perfect subordination," and "under such regulations as will tend to keep families together, and to impart self-supporting habits to the negroes."

Great numbers of these people have already died, and multitudes more will unless they are promptly sent back to work upon the plantations where they can receive the food to which they have been accustomed, and resume again the habits of their lives. It is a great mistake to suppose that the negro can stand any thing and every thing better than the white laboring man. He can stand the heat better, that is, a hot climate is more congenial to his nature; but change his food, and his habits, and he sinks more rapidly than the white man. His body and mind are alike feeble, and both require the paternal care and superior wisdom of the master. To place these now idle hordes back upon the plantations is, therefore, a work of genuine humanity, while it will be a relief to the community and will promote its interests. If we can not do what we would, let us do what we can, and make the most of our circumstances.

Common-sense, duty, and patriotism alike demand it.

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4th July,] No. 7. [1863.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

OVATION AT THE ACADEMY OF MUSIC.

SPEAKERS.

Governor H. SEYMOUR, | Hon. G. H. PENDLETON, Ohio,
Ex-Governor T. H. SEYMOUR, | RICHARD O'GORMAN, Esq.
Governor PARKER, N. J.

Henry Laurens was President of the Continental Congress in 1779. In 1780 he was sent as Minister to Holland. On his way he was captured, and imprisoned in the Tower of London for fourteen months. When Lord Shelburne became Premier. Laurens was brought up, on Habeas Corpus, and released. After his release, he was treated with great kindness and respect by the British authorities. He dined with Lord Shelburne. After dinner, the conversation turned on the separation of the two countries. Lord Shelburne remarked:

"I AM SORRY FOR YOUR PEOPLE." "WHY SO?" ASKED LAURENS. "THEY WILL LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS," WAS THE REPLY. "LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS!" SAID LAURENS. "YES," SAID LORD SHELBURNE. "WE PURCHASED IT WITH CENTURIES OF WRANGLING, MANY YEARS OF FIGHTING, AND HAD IT CONFIRMED BY AT LEAST FIFTY ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. ALL THIS TAUGHT THE NATION ITS VALUE; AND IT IS SO INGRAINED INTO THEIR CREED, AS THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THEIR LIBERTY, THAT NO MAN OR PARTY WILL EVER DARE TRAMPLE ON IT. YOUR PEOPLE WILL PICK IT UP, AND ATTEMPT TO USE IT; BUT, HAVING COST THEM NOTHING, THEY WILL NOT KNOW HOW TO APPRECIATE IT. AT THE FIRST GREAT INTERNAL FEUD THAT YOU HAVE, THE MAJORITY WILL TRAMPLE UPON IT, AND THE PEOPLE WILL PERMIT IT TO BE DONE, AND SO WILL GO YOUR LIBERTY!"

Published Journal of Henry Laurens

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS.

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

THE OVATION AT THE ACADEMY OF MUSIC

TO

GOVERNOR SEYMOUR,

AND THE OTHER ORATORS OF THE DAY.

It was in good taste that the Society which called Ex-Governor Seymour to open the campaign at the Cooper, and John Van Buren to open all eyes and lips by reading the letter of General Scott, should welcome Governor Seymour at his coming to set in order the defenses of our City and State. This Society contents itself with spreading political knowledge. Under the liberal patronage of a few princely seniors, *The Young Men's Democratic Association* has done a good year's service, and is fairly entitled to be placed on record at its first anniversary.

The celebration at the Academy of Music was conceived and arranged by the Nestor of the Society, Philip W. Engs, aided by the generosity of Mr. Loring Andrews, and others; and the details were gracefully executed by the President, the Hon. Luke F. Cozans, and other regular officials of the Society.

The audience was invited by tickets, and the invited came from every State. The house was filled to its entire capacity, and the music ruled the hour from one to two o'clock — the scene being graced by the presence of near one thousand ladies.

At two o'clock the Committee escorted the speakers to the front of the stage. The President named Mr. Engs as chairman of the meeting, and conducted him to his seat. There was no time for reading the letters of the absent, not even such as that of Mr. George S. Hillard.

The Chairman called on C. Godfrey Gunther, Esq., to read the Declaration of Independence. The indictment against the king moved the audience intensely by suggestive analogies.

Mr. Eli P. Norton, Chairman of the Committee on Correspondence, was then called on to read the Ten Commandments of the Constitution, which he prefaced as follows:

Fellow-Citizens: It has been thought appropriate to the times in which we live, and to the day which we celebrate, that there should be read on this occasion those guarantees of the Constitution by which our fathers intended to secure for themselves and for us certain rights believed to be essential to the existence of free communities. These guarantees do not derive their sanctity alone from the fact that they are a portion of our written Constitution; they came to us hallowed by ages. Our Revolutionary ancestors and the people from whom we derive so many of our laws, maintained them with arms in their hands. The people of England, although under a monarchy, from the earliest period, have contended for that priceless privilege of being tried alone by a jury of their peers, and by the laws of the land. Magna Charta, the great charter, extorted from King John by the people of England six hundred and forty-eight years ago, provided, among other things, "that no subject should be exiled, or in any shape whatever molested, either in his person or effects, otherwise than by judgment of his peers, and according to the law of the land." In 1627, Charles I. of England violated this sacred provi-

ion of Magna Charta by repeated acts of arbitrary power. The people remonstrated with him; but he still persisted and declared, in a letter to Parliament that, "without the overthrow of sovereignty, he could not suffer the power of general commitment to be questioned." At once, those great lawyers Coke and Selden prepared that celebrated statute called the Petition of Right. The Petition of Right declared that the King had no right to make arbitrary arrests, and punish by military commissions. Although the King gave his written assent to that statute, he continued to violate it. The result of these violations, and the continuance of arbitrary arrests and trials by military commissions, was civil war, and the loss, by the King of England, of his head upon the scaffold. Sixty years after the adoption of the Petition of Right, Parliament, for the purpose of placing the liberties of the people of England upon a basis that could never be questioned, enacted the Bill of Rights. The material provisions of that Bill of Rights were ingrafted into the Constitutions of the American colonies and American States, and are now in the Constitution of the United States. Our Constitution, my fellow-citizens, is not like the written Constitutions of the French, Mexican, and South-American Republics, which can be repeatedly changed without any shock to the habits and moral sense of the peoples they were intended to govern. The written Constitution of the United States constituted, in the proper sense, the essential institutions of the Republic. Its guarantees, indeed, are necessary to the life of American liberty. If they are permitted to be destroyed or suspended at the will of the Executive, American manhood will be lost, and the once proud and lofty American citizen will sink into the cringing subject of arbitrary power.

Those portions of the Constitution peculiarly appropriate to the present t nes were applauded to the echo.

When the "Hail Columbia" of the band subsided, Governor Seymour was introduced amidst cheers so loud and long continued, that nothing closed them but the clear and familiar tones of the speaker.

ADDRESS OF GOVERNOR SEYMOUR.

Fellow-Citizens: When I accepted the invitation to speak, with others, at this meeting, we were promised the downfall of Vicksburgh, the opening of the Mississippi, the probable capture of the confederate capital and the exhaustion of the rebellion. By common consent, all parties had fixed upon this day when the results of the campaign should be known, to mark out that line of policy which they felt that our country should pursue. But in the moment of expected victory there came the midnight cry for help from Pennsylvania to save its despoiled fields from the invading foe; and almost within sight of this great commercial metropolis, the ships of your merchants were burned to the water's edge. Since that time to this, I have occupied every hour of my time, to the point of physical exhaustion, to rally our troops to the rescue of an adjoining sis-

State, (tremendous applause;) to organize the militia of our own State for defense, and to place New-York in that condition of dignity and power which a great State should ever hold that respects its own rights. (Great applause.) I have concerned myself with those measures that I thought best calculated to protect the commerce of this great city. I stand before you, then, upon this occasion, not as one animated by expected victories, but feeling as all feel who are now within the sound of my voice, the dread uncertainties of the conflicts which rage around us, not alone in Pennsylvania, but along the long line of the Mississippi—contests that are carrying down to bloody graves so many of our fellow-countrymen, so many of our friends—that are spreading renewed mourning throughout this great broad land. Under circumstances like these, I shall allow to go unnoticed many topics upon which I meant to speak at this

time. They might seem to jar with the solemnity of the occasion. They might not be in keeping with the feelings which now oppress us. But there is one subject to which even now I feel it my duty to call your attention. There is one appeal that I would now make to this whole community, irrespective of party, and I pray that you may hear that appeal.

A few years ago we stood before this community to warn them of the dangers of sectional strife, but our fears were laughed at. At a later day, when the clouds of war overhung our country, we implored those in authority to compromise that difficulty, for we had been told by the great orator and statesman, Burke, that there never yet was a revolution that might not have been prevented by a compromise opportunely and graciously made. (Great applause.) Our prayers were unheeded. Again, when the contest was opened, we invoked those who had the conduct of affairs not to underrate the power of the adversary—not to underrate the courage and resources and endurance of our own sister States. This warning was treated as sympathy with treason. You have the results of these unheeded warnings and unheeded prayers; they have stained our soil with blood; they have carried mourning into thousands of homes; and to-day they have brought our country to the very verge of destruction. Once more I come before you, to offer again an earnest prayer, and beg you to listen to a warning. Our country is not only at this time torn by one of the bloodiest wars that has ever ravaged the face of the earth; but, if we turn our faces to our own loyal States, how is it there? You find the community divided into political parties, strongly arrayed, and using with regard to each other terms of reproach and defiance. It is said by those who support more particularly the Administration, that we who differ honestly, patriotically, sincerely, from them with regard to the line of duty, are men of treasonable purposes and enemies to our country. ("Hear, hear.") On the other hand, the Democratic organization look upon this Administration as hostile to their rights and liberties; they look upon their opponents as men who would do them wrong in regard to their most sacred franchises. I need not call your attention to the tone of the press or to the tone of public feeling, to show you how at this moment, parties are thus exasperated, and stand in defiant attitudes to each other. A few years ago we were told that sectional strife, waged in words like these, would do no harm to our country; but you have seen the sad and bloody results. Let us be admonished now in time and take care that this irritation, this feeling which is growing up in our midst, shall not also ripen into civil troubles that shall carry the evils of war into our own homes. Upon one point all are agreed, and that is this: Until we have a united North we can have no successful war. Until we have a united, harmonious North we can have no beneficent peace. How shall we gain harmony? How shall the unity of all be obtained? Is it to be coërced? I appeal to you, my Republican friends, when you say to us that the nation's life and existence hangs upon harmony and concord here, if you yourselves, in your serious moments, believe that this is to be produced by seizing our persons, by infringing upon our rights, by insulting our homes, and by depriving us of those cherished principles for which our fathers fought, and to which we have always sworn allegiance? (Great applause.) I do appeal to you, my Republican friends, and beg that you will receive this appeal in the earnest, and patriotic spirit which prompts me to make it. I appeal to you if you are not doing yourselves and your country a great wrong, when you declare that harmony and unity of purpose are essential to save the nation's life, essential to the highest interests of our land, and yet stigmatize men, as true and honest as yourselves, and whom experience has proved to have been wiser, as men who do not love their country, and who are untrue to her interests? How, then, are we to get this indispensable harmony—this needed unity? It is not to be obtained by trampling upon rights; it is not to be obtained by threats; it is not to be ob-

tained by coërcion; it is not to be obtained by attempting to close our lips when we would utter the honest purposes of our hearts and the firm convictions of our judgment.

But, my Republican friends, there is a mode by which it can be reached; there is a mode by which the nation's life can be saved; there is a mode by which, in the end, we will restore this Union of ours, and bring back those glorious privileges which were so wantonly thrown away. We come to you in no spirit of arrogance. We do not ask you to make any concession of advantage to us. On the contrary, we only say to you, holding in your hands and in your control almost all the political power of your country, to exercise it according to your chartered rights. (Tremendous applause.) We only ask that you shall give to us that which you claim for yourselves, and that which every freeman and every man who respects himself will have—freedom of speech, the right to exercise all the franchises conferred by the Constitution upon American citizens. (Great applause.) Can you safely deny us these? Will you not trample upon your own rights if you refuse to listen? Do you not create revolution when you say that our persons may be rightfully seized, our property confiscated, our homes entered? Are you not exposing yourselves, your own interests, to as great a peril as that with which you threaten us? Remember this, that the bloody, and treasonable, and revolutionary doctrine of public necessity can be proclaimed by a mob as well as by a government. (Applause.) Remember all the teachings of history; and we implore you, with regard to your own interests, to stop and inquire if you are not doing yourselves and your own families, and all that you hold dear to you, an infinite wrong when you sustain propositions that tear away from them, as well as from us, all the protections which the Constitution of your country has thrown around public liberty. (Great applause.) Can you tell when ambition, love of plunder, or thirst for power, will induce bad and dangerous men to proclaim this very principle of public necessity as a reason why they should trample beneath their feet all the laws of our land? I ask you again to think if measures like these give power, dignity, or strength to our Government? I ask you, on the other hand, if those governments have not lived out the longest periods which, in times of public danger, instead of shrinking back from the principles of liberty and the barriers of order, have raised aloft these great principles, and battled under them, and thus given strength to the hearts of the people and gained the respect of the world. (Applause.) I ask you if it is not an evidence of weakness, defeat, and discomfiture, when, in the presence of armed rebellion, the Administration is compelled to assert that the very charter by which it holds its power has ceased to have a virtue that can protect a citizen in his rights? Suppose we accept this doctrine, what will be the consequences? To-day the great masses of conservatives who still battle for time-honored principles of government, amid denunciation, contumely, and abuse, are the only barriers that stand between this government and its own destruction. If we should acquiesce in the doctrine that in times of war constitutions are suspended and laws have lost their force, then we should accept a doctrine that the very right by which this Government administers its power has lost its virtue, and we would be brought down to the level of rebellion itself, having an existence only by virtue of material power. When men accept despotism they may have a choice as to who the despot shall be. The struggle then will not be, shall we have constitutional liberty? But having accepted the doctrine that the Constitution has lost its force, every instinct of personal ambition, every instinct of personal security, will lead men to put themselves under the protection of that power which they suppose most competent to guard their persons. And then this Administration would find that, in putting military rulers over us they had made military masters for themselves; for this war teaches us that the general who will be-

tray the liberties of the people for the purpose of gaining the favor of power, will, when opportunity occurs, seize power itself. (Applause.) I came here to-day to appeal to you who may be politically opposed to us. Do not do yourselves a wrong. Do not do your own Administration a wrong, and push us from that position which we are trying to hold. Do not use abuse and contumely against our persons, and threats against our property, because we stand up to say that you, and we, and all shall have our rights; that your houses shall be sacred; and, in English parlance, that every man's home shall be his castle, within which he is safe from intrusion. (Applause.) Why, what is the glory of a people and the glory of a nation? It is not the magnitude of its power; it is not the extent of its dominions. It is the fact that the humblest home is safe under its protection. The proudest boast ever uttered by Britain's proudest statesmen was—not of martial achievements—not of the triumphs upon the field—not of that wonderful dominion upon which the sun never sets—no, it was this; that Britain's monarch could not enter unbidden the meanest home in the land, although its shattered walls might give its humble inmate but a scanty protection from the storms that howled around. (Great applause.) For what are governments constituted? Not for dominion, not for grandeur, but in order that every man should enjoy the rights of person and security of home, and freedom of conscience and the enjoyment of his property, subject to the laws. These are the great objects of government; and any system that comes short of this, fails in its objects; and any declaration that assails or endangers them is treason against human rights. (Applause.) But it is said that there is a law of necessity that, in times like these, suspends our Constitution—that war is unfavorable to liberty. It is not true. Liberty was born in war, it does not die in war. (Great applause.) Liberty was wrought out in the battle-field. That wonderful people who founded this great State—the Hollanders, who for eighty years battled against the martial laws and martial power of Spain, made it a principle which sustained them during that long contest, and enabled them to render their history glorious in the annals of mankind. Were personal rights and personal liberties suspended by our own forefathers during our Revolutionary contest? You heard the words of that Declaration of Independence which said that men had a right to trial by jury; that the military authority should never be exalted above the civil jurisdiction; that men should not be transported abroad for trial, (tremendous applause;) that they should have all the privileges know to English jurisprudence and English law; and yet to-day we are told that the men who put forth that declaration amid the roar of battle, when our nation was struggling into existence in all its weakness, who declared that these rights were to be held sacred in war, that these men made a Constitution that dies and shrinks away in war—that men trained in the perils of revolution had formed a government, that was not equal to the very highest purposes for which governments are constituted. I tell you it is a libel upon our fathers. (Great applause.) So far from it being true that those who formed this Constitution contemplated that these powers should be suspended, you find in all these provisions particular care for all the exigencies of war; you find numerous provisions that are meant to guard against the very dangers that menace us. Your attention has been called to the fact by the gentleman who preceded me. Why was it that they so carefully protected all your rights amid public commotion, if they meant that the mere existence of disorder should suspend the Constitution and the laws? This doctrine of the suspension of the Constitution and of the laws, is unconstitutional, is unsound, is unjust, is treasonable! (Tremendous applause, and waving of hats and handkerchiefs. A voice: "That's just the word!")

I am full of hope for the future. Not that I underrate the dangers which threaten us, not that I do not deplore the terrible ravages of this war. But why does war rage in our land? It is

because this generation has lost the virtues patriotism, and wisdom of their fathers. It is because we have become indifferent to those great truths which we have now laid before us as if they were curiosities in legal literature, instead of being principles that should be impressed upon the heart and mind of every American. Examine yourselves, and I ask you how many men there are within the sound of my voice who knew twelve months ago what the Constitution of this country was? I do not say that you did not understand it intellectually; that it was not imprinted upon your memory; that it had not received your assent; but it was not until we were made to feel, as our fathers felt, the value of this declaration, that they had put forth, that any of us could ever see the significance of the Constitution of our country and the Declaration of Independence. (Applause.) We have accepted it, as I said, mentally and intellectually; but why was it, when these familiar words sounded upon your ears on this occasion, as you have heard them often before on the anniversary of our country's liberty, that they stirred your very hearts within you, made your blood tingle in your veins? My friends, we have not now a mere intellectual knowledge of the Constitution; we do not give it now a mental support; we accept it with a vital, living piety that makes us better men and better patriots; and wherever you go, all over this land, you find these sentiments now exist in the minds of more than a majority of the American people. They are now fervent in their faith, fixed in their purpose—fanatics if you please—for the great principles of liberty, and in their determination to see that those rights and liberties are established. (Great applause.) We have seen in our land two small parties, each an inconsiderable minority in the section of country where they existed, but men of purpose, men of zeal, men of fanaticism.

We have seen them wage a war upon the Constitution of our country with a persistence and power that has at last shaken it to its very foundation, and brought us to-day to the very brink of national ruin. We have seen what zeal and purpose could do when it was opposed only by a dull mental acquiescence in great truths. What may we not hope that we may do when the great majority of the American people propose to maintain it at every cost and at every hazard? (Great applause.) Do you wish for peace? Do you wish for victory? Do you wish for the restoration of our national privileges? Here lies the pathway. Let the American people once learn the full value of their liberties, and the battle is fought and won. Without this, my friends, war can bring you no success, peace can give you no quiet. Until that takes place, war or peace are the mere incidents of the great underlying causes of convulsion which have affected our land, and shaken our institutions to the very centre. Your particular views may lead you to attribute it to one special cause or another; but there is one great underlying general cause of this war which must be removed before the country can be restored, and that cause is indifference to our rights, indifference to our liberties, and want of an elevated wisdom that could understand the duties of American citizenship. When you have gained this, peace will be restored; institutions that made us but three short years ago the most glorious nation on the face of the earth will be reinvigorated, and the respect of the world regained. When we have again restored that virtue and that intelligence, our country will again be restored to its former greatness, and to its former glory. (Great applause.) But, my friends, any thing short of this will disappoint your hopes. No victory can restore greatness, and glory, and power to a people who are unworthy of liberty. No peace will bring back prosperity to a land which can not understand the great principles upon which governments should be conducted, and the great objects for which they are instituted. But, my friends, I must close. ("Go on! Go on!") Let us now, upon this sad and solemn, as well as glorious occasion, rededicate ourselves to the service of our country in pure and fervent pa-

triotism, putting aside all partisan passions and prejudices, and preparing ourselves to assert and maintain the great principles stated in the Declaration of Independence, and secured to us by the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Let us resolve from this time on to do our duty, and demand our rights. (Immense applause.) So far as they are acting in the sphere of their constitutional power, let us be obedient to rulers, let us submit cheerfully, patiently, and willingly to those commands which they have a right to issue, whether we like them or not. When we have done this, let us claim our rights in all their fullness, and in all their perfection.

He who does not do his duty without regard to the misconduct of others is untrue to his country. He who does not claim his rights is false to liberty and to humanity. (Applause.) Our pathways are clear before us if we will but accept the wise teachings of our fathers. From this time let us resolve that we will uphold all the just powers of the general government, the rights of the States (applause) and of persons, and, above all, as their best and surest shield, the independence and purity of the judiciary. (Applause.) We stand to-day amid new-made graves; in a land filled with mourning, upon a soil saturated with the blood of the fiercest conflict of which history gives us an account. We can, if we will, avert all these calamities, and evoke a blessing. If we will do what? Hold that Constitution, and liberties, and laws are suspended—shrink back from the assertion of right? Will that restore them? Or shall we do as our fathers did under circumstances of like trial, when they combated against the powers of a crown? They did not say that liberty was suspended; that men might be deprived of the right of trial by jury; that they might be torn from their homes by midnight intruders! (Tremendous and continued applause.) If you would save your country and your liberties, begin right; begin at the hearthstones, which are ever meant to be the foundations of American institutions; begin in your family circle; declare that your privileges shall be held sacred; and having once proclaimed your own rights, take care that you do not invade those of your neighbor. (Applause.) Claim for your own States that jurisdiction and that government which you, better than all others, can exercise for yourselves, for you best know your own interests, and that which will do the most to advance the happiness and prosperity of your country. All the lessons of political wisdom are very few and very simple; they are, for men to respect their own rights and those of others. (Great applause.) They are to declare that the great principles of government were not holiday affairs, meant merely for a period of calm; but that they are great truths that can battle a storm as well. When we have determined this, as I said before, we can hope that our country will be restored to its former greatness and former glory. Once more, then, you, my Republican friends—once more, this whole community, I invoke you to ask yourselves whether, in giving way to your passions and prejudices, you will not endanger your own safety and your own homes? Once more I ask those who are politically opposed to me, if I am honored with the attendance of one such, that they will inquire if, in attempting to strike down my liberties, they have not struck a blow at their own also? (Great applause.) I ask all such if they can hope to stop the mighty ball of revolution precisely at that point which may suit their passions, their prejudices, and their purposes, and if they declare that laws and constitutions have lost their virtue to defend us, have they not equally lost their virtue to def them?

The eloquent speech of Ex-Governor SEYMOUR, of Conn., we are obliged to omit, not being able to procure the manuscript in time.

Governor PARKER was called away by telegram during the first speech.

HON. GEORGE H. PENDLETON'S ADDRESS.

MR. PRESIDENT — FELLOW-CITIZENS: It is related of the Italian peasant who visited Rome in the days of its imperial splendor, that he fled to his country home, dismayed at his dwarfed proportions in comparison with the magnificence and magnitude of all about him. I can participate in his feelings to-day. I would shrink from addressing you in view of the comparison which will naturally arise between myself and the eminent gentlemen who speak with me, if I did not know that you intend to give to-day a practical demonstration of the equal rights of all citizens, and under the protecting wing of the sovereignty of your noble State, and in the presence of your Governor, to vindicate, even in behalf of the humblest, the right of free speech, and to declare in tones which will penetrate executive mansions, that, as Congress can not legally, so any other power shall not illegally abridge that right. (Cheers.) It has been said that the character of a people might be known by its ballads. I think, in this prosaic age, a surer test is to be found in their national fête-days. France celebrates the days which her great Napoleon has stamped on history because they minister to her quenchless thirst for military glory. England recalls to the memory of her sons the days illustrious in her ecclesiastical reforms, because she prefers beyond all the glories of Cressy, and Agincourt, and Waterloo, to be called the leader of Protestantism in Europe. We have but this one national day. I have been told that in New England homes they garner up the memories of past pleasures on Thanksgiving-days. We, in the West, do homage to the birth of Washington, and to the achievements of that grand old patriot, Andrew Jackson. This day alone, in all our history, commands general celebration, because we have been hitherto content to be known as the people who were willing to incur the perils of revolution to test the truth of a preamble, and its falsity being settled, to limit the aspirations and movements of our Federal Government to the written permissions of a written Constitution. (Applause.) It is indeed Independence Day, but custom has consecrated its festivities also in honor of the Constitution and the Union. We celebrate it, indeed, because it was the first step in our separate existence; but much more, I think, because succeeding years have vindicated the wisdom of that revolution, whose consummation was had in the establishment of our confederated government. You remember, gentlemen, full well the history of those times. We might learn from them lessons of wisdom for present use. The war waged against the Colonies by Great Britain produced the cohesion of the Colonies. When the war ceased, the cohesion relaxed, and was in danger of being entirely destroyed. The States met in convention as sovereign communities to adopt a form of confederation which should accomplish its purpose without interfering with their great duty of protection of the life, liberty and property of their citizens. Their wisdom evolved our federal Union; but their prudence induced them to reäffirm the great principles of personal liberty which had been incorporated in the organism of their State governments. They proclaimed aloud—and the declaration secured the adoption of the Constitution—that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; that Congress shall make no law to abridge the freedom of speech or the press, or the right to bear arms, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble. (Applause.) These principles were the spirit of immortal life. The Union was the body in which and by which they were to be applied to the uses of men. Your Committee has well understood this. They have made it part of their celebration to read the guarantees of the Constitution—guarantees of personal liberty, of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of ballot; safety for life, liberty, and property. These, gentlemen, are essential to free government. There can be no free government without them. There can be no free government without free elections—there can be no free elections

without deliberation—there can be no free deliberation without free speech; there can be no free speech if prison-bars and banishment are the rewards of its exercise. (Applause.) And yet we are told that it is necessary to violate these rights in order to preserve the national life. They constitute the national life; they mark its identity. Without them that life ceases to be. You might as well talk of saving a man's life by taking away his upright form, his living soul, and reducing him to a brute. You might as well talk of preserving the wise and bold and hopeful and vigorous man, when you reduce him to a raving maniac or a gibbering idiot. I speak warmly upon this subject. I have seen the operation of this doctrine. I have seen a citizen of my own State torn from his home at the dead hour of night—his house broken into—his family terrified; himself carried to Cincinnati to a military prison, and after a sham trial, before an illegal tribunal, sentenced to a punishment unknown to our law. His only offense was that he loved his country well, and was brave enough to stand even against the Administration, in hope of maintaining the Constitution as it is, and restoring the Union as it was. (Cheers.) He is to-day in exile, but he will have his reward. If to deserve success will secure it, we will place him in honor and power, alongside of your worthy Governor here, and of him who ought to have been Governor of Connecticut. (Immense cheering.) As your chairman has already told you, I am one of the representatives of the democracy of Ohio, accredited to Abraham Lincoln, and commanded to deliver this message: Obey the Constitution; respect the guarantees of personal liberty; restore our citizen to his home. If you have aught against him, try him by jury, on an indictment, and if he is convicted, punish him. And now, returning from that mission, I have this to say to you, that if the doctrines which are obstinately asserted by men in high place, who have their hand on the hilt of the drawn sword, are to prevail, the first question for you will be, not whether you will have peace or war, but whether you have a free government, whether you are free men; whether you have a right to an opinion, and to express it, by means of that free but silent ballot which "executes the freeman's will as lightnings do the will of God."

They tell us that the suppression of free speech and personal rights is necessary to a vigorous prosecution of the war. Is this true? The history of the war of 1812 and of the Mexican war disprove it. It would be a libel on the names of our fathers to assert that this Constitution, the child of revolution, the offspring of men who had just tried the perils of seven years of war, was intended to be for times of peace only, and not for times of war. But if it be true, and the suppression of personal liberty is necessary for the successful prosecution of the war, then I say, that the war ought to be instantly stopped. [Immense, long-continued applause.] Its most successful prosecution, the utmost benefits which its friends in their highest flights of fancy have ever claimed, can not compensate to any of us for the loss of personal liberty. And here I can not refrain from calling your attention to the fact that the men who assert this opinion now most warmly belong to one of two classes—those who two years and more ago said there would be no war; that we Union-savers were timid; that, to use the classic language of His Excellency, President Lincoln, "nobody is hurt," or those who agreed with the bloody and brutal doctrine of a Western Senator, that without a "little blood-letting the Union would not be worth a curse." The Union not worth a curse!!! What is the Union? Not a government antecedent to the existence of the States, as Mr. Lincoln asserted, but a confederation made by sovereign independent States, each one of which was endowed with all the powers of sovereignty, and charged with the duty of the care of its own citizens. The Union is only the representative in the family of nations of all these States. They retain their original powers, except as they have consented for a time to part with them. This Union has its counterpart in the vegetable world. There seems to be one perfect indivisible plant. Break the upper rind and

there are many parts, each perfect in itself, having separate roots, which, though closely intertwined, may be easily separated, and thus present a perfect plant, ready in good time to produce another as sound, symmetrical, and compact as the former. So with the States. They delegated certain powers to secure a representation in the world of nations, but they retained all their other powers. They are held compactly together by the band of those delegated powers; but if it shall be broken, you will find the separated States perfect in their machinery of government, able to preserve order and secure the rights of their citizens, and abundantly able to renew the forms of the old Union, or to reconstruct it on the ancient foundation, or to build up a new confederation, as nearly like the old as possible, and able to rival its surpassing glories. [Cheers] And why may we not have now the benefit of this united wisdom and power applied to this great question of reconstruction? Why not now call a sovereign Convention to settle this question? I speak not for those whom my voice can not reach, who have erected just now between us and them a wall of glistening bayonets: I ask those who are in power here at home—our rulers in the Federal Government, and their adherents in the North—why not have now a sovereign Convention? Because they would not compromise with Rebels with arms in their hands. Not compromise! Compromise is the first law of combination—I had almost said of nature. It is the law of all society, all government, all united action. Partners in business compromise; the members of church societies compromise; members of political, religious, charitable, useful societies compromise. Kings compromise with each other; they compromise with their subjects or lose them. Wars end by compromise—the family circle is a compromise. Husbands compromise with their wives; fathers compromise with their disobedient children; and if our holy religion is true, God Almighty compromised with man when he accepted in his behalf the atonement of his Son; and shall we refuse to do what nature, reason, religion, and history all command, because our bad passions are aroused, and we are told it would be cowardly to treat with avowed traitors? [Cheers.] Our Government was all a compromise. Three times the Convention at Philadelphia was ready to give up in despair, and three times the pleading, warning voices of Washington, Franklin, and Madison urged them to compromise their differences. They did so. They formed the Constitution, which created the Union. This was the great compromise. Let us stand by it firmly, my friends, and to the end. I participate in the hope so beautifully expressed by Governor Seymour of Connecticut, that all will yet be well. It can only be by adhering to the great compromise: stand by it, adhere to it, faithfully perform it in all parts; you, this audience—every man in his sphere—do your duty by it, urge your neighbors, your city, your State—the Northern States—to do theirs. Do not look after the South until you have eradicated the doctrine that the Administration and the North will violate it in order to have power to compel the South to observe it; that the Administration will destroy our Constitutional rights that it may vigorously prosecute a war to enforce its unconstitutional policy. [Cheers.] But stand by it in all integrity. It is the ark of our safety now. Let us revere it as the Jews did the Ark of the Covenant of God. Let us trust to it now while we are in the shadow of the dark valley, as well as when we were in the full daylight of prosperity. And then I confidently hope, that in God's good time, when peace shall have prevailed and mourning shall have ceased, and widows' weeds shall have been laid aside, and orphans' tears shall be dried, and new-made graves shall have grown green, there shall arise from this whole land, without the loss of a single State, from all its people North and South in fraternal union, an anthem of joy the like of which has not been heard since on Judean plains, on the natal morn, angels announced the coming of the Great Messiah: "Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, good-will to men."

ADDRESS OF RICHARD O'GORMAN, Esq.

It has been thought desirable, fellow-citizens, that, after the more important business of the day was done—after you had heard what counsel should be given you by the distinguished gentlemen who have visited you from other parts of this State, and from other States—some one, a resident of your own city, should say to you a few words at parting. Why I have been chosen for this duty it is hard to say; unless it be because I am, like yourselves, a mere simple citizen—wearing no party honors—wearing no party fetters—accustomed to speak my own mind—and whose sayings, if, by chance, wise, may do good to others; but if not wise, can do little hurt to any one but myself. (Applause.)

You have heard to-day, first of all, the proud voice from the brave days of old, the voice of your heroic fathers telling you what were the liberties for which they fought, and what were the liberties they bequeathed to you. You have heard the voice of the Governor of the State of New York, calm, prudent, bold, as becomes the first officer of a sovereign State of four millions of people, and a territory as large as Great Britain. (Cheers.) Next you heard the voice of the gentleman who is not, but ought to be Governor of Connecticut. (Loud cheers.) Gov. Parker, of New-Jersey, did not speak to you, but was present; and in the persons of these three gentlemen, these three States have taken hands, and here to-day vowed that there should be for them and their people one policy—to secure the Union as long as it is possible to secure the Union, but our liberties at all events and at all hazards. (Great applause.) Before the Union was, these liberties were inherent and inalienable. They were not given to us by the Union, not granted to us by any parchment, but God gave them to every brave and honest man upon the earth, and of these principles the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were simply declaratory. (Applause.) You heard that the citizens of the State of Ohio had awakened to a sense of the deep injury and wrong done to each of them, in the person of Mr. Vallandigham, and the voice of Mr. Pendleton, their representative before you, reëchoing from here, will awaken among them a new sense of conviction that in the defense of the Constitution and the law, and the liberties they guarantee, New-York will be ready with her assistance. (Applause.) True, we are in great danger; the greater, therefore, should be our courage. We have not been awake to our danger. With what horror would it fill us to see a boat about being swept over the falls of Niagara, while the crew, blind to their danger, waste time in wrangling and quarreling and carouse; but to see a nation, great though young, bearing on its head the crown of unexampled prosperity, inheriting all European civilization, Law, Liberty, and Religion, to see that nation with its own insane hands tearing its own breast and glorying in the wounds it inflicts, is a sight to make the angels weep. There are very few really disloyal men in the nation, and the disloyal men are not always to be found in the places where we are mostly told to look for them. (Applause.) That man who, in an hour of peril like this, prefers the interests of himself or his party to the interests of the country, whether he be in the cabinet, the counting-house, or the field, is disloyal, (applause;) and the man who strives honestly, and to the extent of his intelligence, to do his duty as a citizen toward his country, and in the discharge of that duty tells publicly what he believes to be the truth, that man, though he be found in Fort Lafayette, is a loyal man. (Great applause.) Now, fellow-citizens, words ought to be used in their proper meanings. Do not suppose that you are dealing with an insurrection or rebellion—the movement at the South is no disorderly emeute of disaffected citizens. It has grown

beyond that. It is the uprising of a whole people, and confronts us now in all the stature of civil war. Once it was a mere insurrection—there was very little Union in the South, but we made them united, and more shame for us. (Applause.)

We here at the North adopted the disgraceful policy of bringing home war to the doors of unarmed and defenseless citizens. There were many at the South who looked upon the old Union with love and reverence, and hoped again to see the old flag wave over them, but we have made that flag to them an emblem of pillage, havoc, and ruin, and implanted in their hearts a heritage of bitter and imperishable hatred. Though I should stand alone, I will, for the honor of this nation among nations, raise my voice in protest against this disgraceful and uncivilized warfare. (Great applause.) It is no apology to say that the Southern soldiers have done wrong in burning our fishing ships; let them be reproved for their wrong; but let us not lay the flattering unction to our souls that by denouncing them, our own sins can be kept hidden from the eyes of watchful nations—from my heart do I wish that they could be. The South is united, and their armies are marching upon us; who knows but their cannon are now hurling death among those dear to us on the soil of Pennsylvania! In what condition are we? disunited, discordant. The people not trusting the Government, and the Government not trusting the people, no two men agreeing as to what is or what ought to be the object for which we are fighting. If this continues there is nothing for us but disgraceful defeat. How are the people of the North to become united. The Government has its own plan, and it is exceedingly simple, if it could be carried into effect. It is simply this. That all the people in the North are to concur with the opinion of the Republican party, or retire to the Dry Tortugas. This plan of securing unanimity is expressed exceedingly well in the phrase of unconditional loyalty. It means that you must discuss no public question unless you discuss it in a tone favorable to the Government and the Republican party. When there is a discussion you must not remain silent, as the President says you must declare in favor of the Government and its actions, whether you like them or not. You must read just what papers the Government likes; you must get what telegrams from the war that the Government concocts; you must get so much and so little information about what is most dear to you, the success of your armies, and the fate of your own brethren, precisely as the Government chooses to give. The Government will be a father to you and you will be as little children—open your mouth and shut your eyes, and see if heaven won't send you a prize. (Great laughter.)

Now that little nursery plan was from time to time tried in Europe. There was a monarch who made that experiment in France some time ago, and he could not get his people to agree with him in every thing—they had one will, and he had another; and the plan that he adopted to secure unanimity was to send as many as he thought proper to a place called the Bastile. Now, possibly you remember that he continued that, until the people, long apathetic, were at last stung into resistance, and they walked up with their unarmed breasts to the Bastile, and tore it down, stone by stone, and swept the foul thing from the face of the earth. (Great cheering.) And that reminds me of a little story. (Laughter.) The key of the Bastile was sent by General Lafayette to General Washington, who accepted it as a token of the victory of freedom over despotism, and he hung it up in Mount Vernon. I have heard that that key is missing, (laughter,) and I am credibly informed that an experiment has been made in the depth of the midnight, and that it exactly fits the lock of Fort Lafayette. (Laughter and cheers.)

The experiment was once made also in England. There was once upon a time a king there who had a will of his own, and a minister who was disposed to help him. The king was Charles the First — the minister was Thomas Wentworth, Lord

Strafford. They inaugurated a system of unconditional loyalty that they called "Thorough." The king willed one thing and the people another, and there was no compromise between them; and the result was that the king lost the people, and the people lost the king, because they beheaded him. I can not help thinking that Mr. Seward had that transaction before his mind in the remarkable conversation he is reported to have had with Lord Lyons on the fourteenth of September, 1861. "My lord," he is reported to have said, "I can touch a bell on my right hand and order the arrest of a citizen of Ohio." He did it. (Laughter.) "I can touch the bell again and order the arrest of a citizen of New-York." He can not do it. (Tremendous and continued applause. A voice: "Three cheers for Governor Seymour; he can not do it," given enthusiastically.) "Can the Queen of England in her dominions do as much?" She can not do it. The English people love the royal lady that now occupies the throne of England, and they are a loyal people; but in spite of their loyalty she dare not attempt it, and they would not let her. Ah! that little bell! I think I hear it tinkling still, and the sound becoming louder and louder, until it begins to boom along and grows into a tocsin, at the sound of which the citizens of America shall awake and secure their liberties forever. (Tremendous applause.) It is useless for the Government to attempt to stifle discussion. Discussion must be had either in public or in secret, and secret discussion is dangerous, and leads to conspiracy. Open discussion makes patriots and heroes—it is secret whispering, dark plotting that makes traitors and cowards. Let our discussions of national questions be open and public, and kindly, too. Let all fair allowances be made for the difficulties of the Government. But let discussion be fearless. The sacred right to grumble should be defended at all hazards. Secrecy is unmanly. If any thing disgraces the American people, if any thing will unman them in the face of the enemy, it is their craven fear of Fort Lafayette. (Applause.) But what are we to discuss? Are we to question one another whether we are or are not for the "vigorous prosecution of the war, for the preservation of the Union"? I denounce that phrase as a delusion, a snare, a trap. I deny that there is any war for the preservation of the Union. Union does not come from war, but only subjugation, submission. We may subdue the South to the condition of Poland, but if we do, we must make of ourselves a Russia. Our talk of Union and liberty will be as hollow as the dispatch, "Order reigns in Warsaw," uttered when freedom lay in its death-agonies, bleeding, mangled, crushed, and hopeless. It is not possible, under the free form of our Government, to hold one half of it in subjection to another. If we mean that, we must get rid of the Constitution—if the South is to be subdued by our arms—it is the destruction of the republican government of this country. (Applause.) I do not like that talk about the vigorous prosecution of the war. I am not sure I know what it means. I heard a person the other day say he was in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, of hanging Northern "Copperheads," o carrying the war to the homes of the rebels—in fact, as he concluded with a climax of martial feeling, he would rather fight than eat. I ventured to suggest that the general preference of humanity was in favor of eating, (laughter,) whereupon he gave me an indignant scowl, and deigning no reply, he strode away. I asked a bystander to what regiment the gallant captain belonged. "Oh!" said he, "he is not a captain, he is not an officer in the army at all, he is a contractor." (Great laughter and applause.) In his case "vigorous prosecution of the war" means vigorous filling of his own pockets. So it is generally; you will find that those who are most eager for the prosecution of the war, are those who are making money by it, and those who talk most about fighting do the least of it. Some of you, perhaps, know that so far as I am concerned, I condemn this war, that I deplore it, that I consider it a reckless waste of heroic blood. (Loud applause.) I have lifted up my voice

for peace when I thought peace possible, and I believe, that from time to time, during the last two years of war, an honorable peace, an honorable compromise, would have been possible; but now that the war is in its agony, that we are in the grip and struggle of the fight · now that the enemy is upon the soil of a neighboring State, it is no use to speak of peace. When this struggle is over, then will my voice again be heard for peace, for compromise; but to-day all I can say is: "God defend the right." (Continued applause.)

The Government of the United States has been to a great extent unfortunately a government of party, and the present Administration is particularly open to that objection. I have remarked in the policy of the Republican party a tendency, I believe, inconsistent with a republican form of government. This policy is centralization — taking away rights from municipalities, States, and individuals, and gathering them adroitly to one centre. Now, the principle on which the American Union is founded is precisely the reverse of that. The principle of the Union is diversity, State Sovereignty, State rights. (Great applause.) Centralization is Imperialism. Centralization is despotism: State rights is freedom. (Cheers.) And when I am asked to increase the power of the Government, and the party that governs it, by placing armies in their hands, over which they have complete and supreme control, I confess I fear much that under the pretext of restoring the Union, we are strengthening the hands of those whose policy tends to destroy our liberties. Do you ask what then is to be done? I say the first thing to be done is to arm the State of New-York. (Great applause.) Arm it, and arm it at once. The course is safe, and can harm nobody. The Governor will do his duty, and if he wants money, let him get it by free and voluntary subscription. Let the State be armed and the soldiers drilled and disciplined, (a voice: "And commanded by State rights men,") commanded by their constitutional and lawful Commander-in-Chief, the Governor of the State. (Loud applause.) Then we will be ready for our own protection. Then we will be ready to fulfill all our legal obligations to the Federal Government. The State of New-York has never proved recreant to its duty to the Federal Government, and it will not do so now. A few days ago the Governor of the State of Pennsylvania called for help to resist an invasion, and the Governor of New-York sent men to help them almost before the Pennsylvanians had awakened to a sense of their imminent danger. (Applause.) Let our soldiers be drilled, then, not merely for parades in the streets, but in camps of instruction, and let them be prepared as men to defend the rights of our State. When that is done we will need no longer provost-marshals in New-York; it will be no longer necessary for gallant officers to be fretting their glorious souls in contentions with old women, and testing the authenticity of cripples, (laughter,) while they might be winning fame with their swords in the field. It is a shame for the State of New-York to put the Federal Government to the expense and trouble of a conscription here. Let the State, as a State, raise such troops as the Federal Government has the right to ask of her. (Cheers.) There is no blinking the fact that the union of these States may possibly be destroyed. I do not believe it will be destroyed. I hope that God, who guided its discovery and settlement, and has thus far prospered us, will not desert us in the hour of our trial. But although the Union may fall, liberty may be preserved, and the State may be sovereign yet. (Cheers.) Have we not four millions of people, a great territory, bounded on one side by the vast ocean, and on another by the lakes, with harbors, railroads, and canals; and can we not lift this State high enough above the troubled waters to be a freehold for humanity forever? (Applause.) Do not suppose that a vast territory is necessary for freedom. Attica was scarce larger than this little island on which we stand, yet think how great and glorious, how rich and strong, was its life, and what it has done for the world. In the midst of des-

potic nations, rich in territories and in population, it was free, and has outlived them all. Where now are Nineveh, Carthage, and Tyre? They are gone; their language is forgotten, and almost their place upon the earth. Go to Athens, and there you will still see the old Acropolis lifting up to the sun its diadem of pillars, bidding mankind come there and learn how immortal are the fruits of liberty. I hear many men nowadays speak in favor of a "strong government." What do men mean by a strong government? a dictatorship, an oligarchy? These are the weakest forms of government; a dictatorship is sure to result in repeated revolution. This American people will not submit to the irresponsible government of one man. An oligarchy leads to socialism, to anarchy, and disorder. You have no ground-work here, on which to build an aristocracy, no prestige of antiquity supports it. It would be here an aristocracy of mere wealth, and such an aristocracy is in contradiction to all the traditions and habits of thought of the American People. It is folly to call these "strong governments." There is but one form of government, that is strong, that is permanent and secure. It is that which rests on the will of its citizens. (Great cheering.) As Athens was of old, let New-York be still. Let us protect to the last the inalienable rights of citizens; let us stand by ourselves, and God will stand by us. I think we have an official at the head of our State that is fit to lead our State and guide it aright; I, for one, have confidence in Horatio Seymour. (Applause.) Let us do our duty by him; let us remember that each State in its inherent sovereignty is independent in itself. Then we are for the Union as long as it can be supported, but we are for our liberties at all events, and in defense of those liberties, in defense of the Constitution, of Law and Order, "we pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor." (Great applause.)

No. 8.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

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READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

BIBLE VIEW OF SLAVERY.

THE word "slave" occurs but twice in our English Bible, but the term "servant," commonly employed by our translators, has the meaning of slave in the Hebrew and the Greek originals, as a general rule, where it stands alone. We read, however, in many places, of "hired servants," and of "bondmen and bondmaids." The first were not slaves, but the others were; the distinction being precisely the same which exists in our own day. Slavery, therefore, may be defined as *servitude for life, descending to the offspring.* And this kind of bondage appears to have existed as an established institution in all the ages of our world, by the universal evidence of history, whether sacred or profane.

This understood, I shall not oppose the prevalent idea that slavery is an evil in itself. A *physical* evil it may be, but this does not satisfy the judgment of its more zealous adversaries, since they contend that it is a *moral* evil—a positive *sin* to hold a human being in bondage, under any circumstances whatever, unless as a punishment inflicted on crimes, for the safety of the community.

Here, therefore, lies the true aspect of the controversy. And it is evident that it can only be settled by the Bible. For every Christian is bound to assent to the rule of the inspired Apostle, that "sin is the transgression of the law," namely, the law laid down in the Scriptures by the authority of God—the supreme "Lawgiver, who is able to save and to destroy." From his Word there can be no appeal. No rebellion can be so atrocious in his sight as that which dares to rise against his

government. No blasphemy can be more unpardonable than that which imputes sin or moral evil to the decrees of the eternal Judge, who is alone perfect in wisdom, in knowledge, and in love.

With entire correctness, therefore, your letter refers the question to the only infallible criterion—the Word of God. If it were a matter to be determined by my personal sympathies, tastes, or feelings, I should be as ready as any man to condemn the institution of slavery, for all my prejudices of education, habit, and social position stand entirely opposed to it. But as a Christian, I am solemnly warned not to be "wise in my own conceit," and not to "lean to my own understanding." As a Christian, I am compelled to submit my weak and erring intellect to the authority of the Almighty. For then only can I be safe in my conclusions, when I know that they are in accordance with the will of Him, before whose tribunal I must render a strict account in the last great day.

I proceed, accordingly, to the evidence of the sacred Scriptures, which, long ago, produced complete conviction in my own mind, and must, as I regard it, be equally conclusive to every candid and sincere inquirer. When the array of positive proof is exhibited, I shall consider the objections, and examine their validity with all the fairness in my power.

The first appearance of slavery in the Bible is the wonderful prediction of the patriarch Noah: "Cursed be Canaan, a *servant of servants* shall he be to his brethren. Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and Canaan *shall be his servant.* God shall enlarge Japhet, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan *shall be his servant.* (Gen. 9 : 25.)

The heartless irreverence which Ham, the father of Canaan, displayed toward his eminent parent, whose piety had just saved him from the deluge, presented the immediate *occasion* for this remarkable prophecy; but the actual *fulfillment* was reserved for his posterity, after they had lost the knowledge of God, and become utterly polluted by the abominations of heathen idolatry. The Almighty, foreseeing this total degradation of the race, ordained them to servitude or slavery under the descendants of Shem and Japhet, doubtless because *he judged it to be their fittest condition.* And all history proves how accurately the prediction has been accomplished, even to the present day.

We come next to the proof that slavery was sanctioned by the Deity in the case of Abraham, whose three hundred and eighteen bond servants, born in his own house, (Gen. 14 : 14,) are mentioned along with those who were *bought with his money*, as proper subjects for circumcision. (Gen. 17 : 12.) His wife Sarah had also an Egyptian slave, named Hagar, who fled from her severity. And "the angel of the Lord" commanded the fugitive to *return to her mistress and submit herself.* (Gen. 16 : 9.) If the philanthropists of our age, who profess to believe the Bible, had been willing to take the counsel of that angel for their guide, it would have preserved the peace and welfare of the Union.

The third proof that slavery was authorized by the Almighty occurs in the last of the Ten Commandments, delivered from Mount Sinai, and universally acknowledged by Jews and Christians as THE MORAL LAW: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his *man-servant, nor his maid-servant*, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor's." (Exod. 20 : 17.) Here it is evident that the principle of *property*—"any thing that is thy neighbor's"—runs through the whole. I am quite aware, indeed, of the prejudice which many good people entertain against the idea of *property* in a human being, and shall consider it, in due time, amongst the objections. I am equally aware that the wives of our day may take umbrage at the law which places them in the same sentence with the slave, and even with the house and the cattle. But the truth is none the less certain. The husband has a real *property* in the wife, because she is bound, for life, to serve and to obey him. The wife has a real *property* in her husband, because he is bound for life to cherish and maintain her. The *character* of property is doubtless modified by its design. But whatever, whether person or thing, the law *appropriates* to an individual, becomes of necessity his *property.*

The fourth proof, however, is yet more express, as it is derived from the direct rule established by the wisdom of God for his chosen people, Israel, on the very point in question, namely:

"If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve, and in the seventh year he shall go out free for nothing.

if he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself. If he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. if his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, *the wife and the children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself.*" (Exod. 21 : 2–4.) Here we see that the separation of husband and wife is positively directed by the divine command, in order to secure the property of the master in his bond-maid and her offspring. But the husband had an alternative, if he preferred slavery to separation. For thus the law of God proceeds: "If the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free; then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall also bring him to the door or unto the door-post; and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and *he shall serve him forever.*" (Exod. 21 : 5, 6.) With this law before his eyes, what Christian can believe that the Almighty attached immorality or sin to the condition of slavery?

The treatment of slaves, especially as it regarded the degree of correction which the master might administer, occurs in the same chapter, as follows: "If a man smite his servant or his maid with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall be surely punished. Notwithstanding if he continue a day or two, *he shall not be punished; for he is his money.*" (Exod. 21 : 20, 21.) And again, If a man smite the eye of his servant or the eye of his maid, that it perish, he shall let him go free for his eye's sake. And if he smite out his man-servant's tooth, or his maid-servant's tooth, he shall let him go free for his tooth's sake." (Exod. 21 : 26, 27.) Here we see that the master was authorized to use corporal correction toward his slaves, within certain limits. When immediate death ensued, he was to be punished as the judges might determine. But for all that came short of this, the loss of his property was held to be a sufficient penalty.

The next evidence furnished by the divine law appears in the peculiar and admirable appointment of the Jubilee. "Ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land to all the inhabitants thereof: it shall be a Jubilee unto you, and *ye shall return every man unto his possession, and ye shall return every man to his family.*" (Lev. 25 : 10.) This enactment, however did not affect the slaves, because it only extended to the Israelites who had "a possession and a family," according to the original distribution of the land among the tribes. The distinction is plainly set forth in the same chapter, namely:

"If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond servant, but as a hired servant and as a sojourner he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto the year of Jubilee, and then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he return. For they are my servants which I brought forth out of the land of Egypt, they shall not be sold as bondmen. *Both thy bondmen and bondmaids, which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bondmen and bondmaids.* Moreover, of the children of the *strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land,* and they shall be your possession. And ye shall take them as an *inheritance for your children after you,* to inherit them for a possession; THEY SHALL BE YOUR BONDMEN FOR EVER; but over your brethren, the children of Israel, ye shall not rule one over another with rigor. For unto me the children of Israel are servants; they are my servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God." (Lev. 25 : 40–46, with v. 55.)

The distinction here made between the temporary servitude of the Israelite and the perpetual bondage of the heathen race, is too plain for controversy. And this express and positive law furnishes the true meaning of another passage which the ultra abolitionist is very fond of repeating: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that place which he shall choose, in one of thy gates where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him." (Deut. 23 : 15, 16.) This evidently must be referred to the case of a slave who had escaped from a *foreign heathen master,* and can not, with any sound reason, be applied to the slaves of the Israelites themselves. For it is manifest that if it were so applied, it would nullify the other enactments of the

divine Lawgiver, and it would have been an absurdity to tell the people that they should "buy bondmen and bondmaids of the heathen and the stranger, to be their possession and the inheritance of their children for ever," while, nevertheless, the slaves should be at liberty to run away and become freemen when they pleased. It is the well-known maxim, in the interpretation of all laws, that each sentence shall be so construed as to give a consistent meaning to the whole. And assuredly, if we are bound to follow this rule in the legislation of earth, we can not be less bound to follow it in the legislation of the Almighty. The meaning that I have adopted is the only one which agrees with the established principle of legal construction, and it has invariably been sanctioned by the doctors of the Jewish law, and every respectable Christian commentator.

Such, then, is the institution of slavery, laid down by the Lord God of Israel for his chosen people, and continued for fifteen centuries, until the new dispensation of the Gospel. What change did this produce? I grant, of course, that we, as Christians, are bound by the precepts and example of the Saviour and his apostles. Let us now, therefore, proceed to the all-important inquiry, whether we are authorized by these to presume that the Mosaic system was done away.

First, then, we ask what the divine Redeemer said in reference to slavery. And the answer is perfectly undeniable: HE DID NOT ALLUDE TO IT AT ALL. Not one word upon the subject is recorded by any of the four Evangelists who gave His life and doctrines to the world. Yet slavery was in full existence at the time, throughout Judea; and the Roman empire, according to the historian Gibbon, contained sixty millions of slaves, on the lowest probable computation! How prosperous and united would our glorious republic be at this hour, if the eloquent and pertinacious declaimers against slavery had been willing to follow their Saviour's example!

But did not our Lord substantially repeal the old law, by the mere fact that he established a new dispensation? Certainly not, unless they were incompatible. And that he did not consider them incompatible is clearly proved by his own express declaration. "Think not," saith he, "that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfill." (Matt. 5: 17.) On that point, therefore, this single passage is perfectly conclusive.

It is said by some, however, that the great principle of the Gospel, love to God and love to man, necessarily involved the condemnation of slavery. Yet how should it have any such result, when we remember that this was no new principle, but, on the contrary, was laid down by the Deity to his own chosen people, and was quoted from the Old Testament by the Saviour himself? And why should slavery be thought inconsistent with it? In the relation of master and slave, we are assured by our Southern brethren that there is incomparably more mutual love than can ever be found between the employer and the hireling. And I can readily believe it, for the very reason that it is a relation for life, and the parties, when rightly disposed, must therefore feel a far stronger and deeper interest in each other.

The next evidence which proves that the Mosaic law was not held to be inconsistent with the Gospel occurs in the statement of the apostles to St. Paul, made some twenty years, at least, after the establishment of the first Christian church in Jerusalem. "Thou seest, brother," said they, "how many thousands of Jews there are who believe, *and they are all zealous of the law.*" (Acts 21: 20.) How could this have been possible, if the law was supposed to be abolished by the new dispensation?

But the precepts and the conduct of St. Paul himself, the great apostle of the Gentiles, are all sufficient, because he meets the very point, and settles the whole question. Thus he saith to the Ephesians: "Servants, (in the original Greek, *bond servants* or slaves) "be obedient to them that are your masters, according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your hearts, as unto Christ. Not with eye service, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not unto men, knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening, knowing that your Master also is in heaven, neither is there any respect of persons with him." (Eph. 6: 5–9.)

Again, to the Colossians, St. Paul

repeats the same commandments. "Servants," (that is, *bond servants* or slaves) "obey in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye service, as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God." (Col. 3 : 22.) "Masters, give unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a Master in heaven." (Col. 4 : 1.)

Again, the same inspired teacher lays down the law in very strong terms, to Timothy, the first Bishop of Ephesus : "Let as many servants as are under the yoke," (that is, the yoke of bondage,) "count their own masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. And they that have believing masters, let them not despise them because they are brethren, but rather do them service because they are faithful and beloved, partakers of the benefit. These things teach and exhort. *If any man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness.* From such withdraw thyself. But godliness with contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out. And having food and raiment, let us be therewith content." (1 Tim. 6 : 1–8.)

Lastly, St. Paul, in his Epistle to Philemon, informs him that he had sent back his fugitive slave, whom the apostle had converted to the Christian faith during his imprisonment, asking the master to forgive and receive his penitent disciple. "I beseech thee for my son Onesimus," saith he, "whom I have begotten in my bonds, which in time past was to thee unprofitable, but now profitable to thee and to me, whom I have sent again : thou therefore receive him that is mine own bowels, whom I would have retained with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered unto me in the bonds of the gospel. But without thy mind would I do nothing, that thy benefit should not be as it were of necessity, but willingly. For perhaps he therefore departed for a season, that thou shouldst receive him forever, not now as a servant, but above a servant, a brother beloved, specially to me, but how much more to thee, both in the flesh and in the Lord. If thou countest me therefore a partner, receive him as myself. If he hath wronged thee or oweth thee aught, put that on mine account. I Paul have written it with mine own hand. I will repay it ; albeit I do not say to thee how thou owest unto me thine own soul besides." (Ep. to Philemon 5 : 10, 19.)

The evidence of the New Testament is thus complete, plainly proving that the institution of slavery was not abolished by the Gospel. Compare now the course of the ultra abolitionist with that of Christ and his inspired apostle. The divine Redeemer openly rebukes the sanctimonious Pharisees, "who made void the law of God by their traditions." He spares not the wealthy, infidel Sadducees. He denounces the hypocritical Scribes, who "loved the uppermost rooms at feasts and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi." He calls the royal Herod "that fox," entirely regardless of the king's displeasure. He censures severely the Jewish practice of divorcing their wives for the slightest cause, and vindicates the original sanctity of marriage. He tells the deluded crowd of his enemies that they are "the children of the devil, and that the lusts of their fathers they would do." He makes a scourge of small cords, and drives the buyers and sellers out of the temple. And while he thus rebukes the sins of all around him, and speaks with divine authority, he proclaims himself the special friend and patron of the poor — preaches to them his blessed doctrine, on the mountain, by the seaside, or in the public streets, under the open canopy of heaven — heals their diseases, partakes of their humble fare, and, passing by the rich and the great, chooses his apostles from the ranks of the publicans and the fishermen of Galilee. Yet he lived in the midst of slavery, maintained over the old heathen races, in accordance with the Mosaic law, and uttered not one word against it! What proof can be stronger than this, that he did not regard it as a sin or a moral evil? And what contrast can be more manifest than this example of Christ on the one hand, and the loud and bitter denunciations of our anti-slavery preachers and politicians, *calling themselves Christians*, on the other? For they not only set themselves against the Word of God in this matter, condemning slavery as the "monster

sin," the "sum of all villainies," but—strange to say—they do it in the very name of that Saviour whose whole line of conduct was the very opposite of their own!

Look next at the contrast afforded by the inspired Apostle of the Gentiles. He preaches to the slave, and tells him to be obedient to his master for Christ's sake, faithful and submissive, as a main branch of religious duty. He preaches to the master and tells him to be just and equal to his slave, knowing that HIS Master is in heaven. He finds a fugitive slave, and converts him to the Gospel, and then sends him back again to his old home, with a letter of kind recommendation. Why does St. Paul act thus? Why does he not counsel the fugitive to claim his right to freedom, and defend that right, if necessary, by the strong hand of violence, even unto death? Why does he not write to his disciple, Philemon, and rebuke him for the awful sin of holding a fellow-man in bondage, and charge it upon him, as a solemn duty, to emancipate his slaves, at the peril of his soul.

The answer is very plain. *St. Paul was inspired, and knew the will of the Lord Jesus Christ, and was only intent on obeying it.* And who are we, that in our modern wisdom presume to set aside the Word of God, and scorn the example of the divine Redeemer, and spurn the preaching and the conduct of the apostles, and invent for ourselves a "higher law" than those holy Scriptures which are given to us as "a light to our feet and a lamp to our paths," in the darkness of a sinful and polluted world? Who are we, that virtually blot out the language of the sacred record, and dictate to the Majesty of heaven what he shall regard as sin, and reward as duty? Whoare we, that are ready to trample on the doctrine of the Bible, and tear to shreds the Constitution of our country, and even plunge the land into the untold horrors of civil war, and yet boldly pray to the God of Israel to bless our very acts of rebellion against his own sovereign authority? Woe to our Union when the blind become the leaders of the blind! Woe to the man who dares to "strive against his Maker!"

Yet I do not mean to charge the numerous and respectable friends of this popular delusion with a willful or conscious opposition to the truth. They are seduced, doubtless, in the great majority of cases, by the feelings of a false philanthropy, which palliates, if it can not excuse, their dangerous error Living far away from the Southern States, with no practical experience of the institution, and accustomed, from their childhood, to attach an inordinate value to their personal liberty, they are naturally disposed to compassionate the negro race, and to believe that the slave must be supremely wretched in his bondage. They are under no special inducement to "search the Scriptures" on this particular subject, nor are they in general, I am sorry to say, accustomed to study the Bible half as much as they read the newspapers, the novel and the magazine. There they find many revolting pictures of slavery, and they do not pause to ask the question whether they are just and faithful. Perhaps a fugitive comes along, who has fled from his master, and who, in justification of himself, will usually give a very distorted statement of the facts, even if he does not invent them altogether. And these good and kind-hearted people believe it all implicitly, without ever remembering the rule about *hearing both sides* before we form our opinion. Of course, they sympathize warmly with the poor, oppressed African, and are generously excited to hate the system of slavery with all their heart. Then the eloquent preacher chooses it for the favorite topic of his oratory. The theme is well adapted to rouse the feelings, and it is usually by no means difficult to interest and gratify the audience when the supposed sins of others, which they are under no temptation to commit, are made the object of censure. In due time, when the public mind is sufficiently heated, the politician lays hold of the subject, and makes the anti-slavery movement the watchword of party. And finally the Press follows in the wake of the leaders, and the fire is industriously fanned until it becomes a perfect blaze; while the admiring throng surround it with exultation, and fancy its lurid light to be from heaven, until the flames begin to threaten their own security.

Such has been the perilous course of our Northern sentiment on the subject of slavery. The great majority, in every community, are the creatures of habit, of association and of impulse, and every allowance should be made for those errors which are committed in ignorance, under a generous sympathy for what they suppose to be the rights of man. I can not, however, make the same apology for those who

are professionally pledged to understand and inculcate the doctrines of the Bible. On that class of our public instructors, the present perilous crisis of the nation casts a fearful responsibility. Solemnly bound by their sacred office to preach the Word of God, and to follow Christ and his apostles, as the heralds of "peace and goodwill to men," they seem to me strangely regardless, on this important subject, of their highest obligations. But it is not for me to judge them. To their own Master, let them stand or fall.

I have promised, however, to notice the various objections which have been raised in the popular mind to the institution of Southern slavery, and to these I shall now proceed.

First on this list stand the propositions of the far famed Declaration of Independence, "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." These statements are here called "self-evident truths." But with due respect to the celebrated names which are appended to this document, I have never been able to comprehend that they are "truths" at all. In what respect are men "created equal," when every thoughtful person must be sensible that they are brought into the world with all imaginable difference in body, in mind, and in every characteristic of their social position? Notwithstanding mankind have all descended from one common parent, yet we see them divided into distinct races, so strongly marked, that infidel philosophers insist on the impossibility of their having the same ancestry. Where is the equality in *body* between the child born with the hereditary taint of scrofula or consumption, and the infant filled with health and vigor? Where is the equality *in mind* between one who is endowed with talent and genius, and another whose intellect borders on idiocy? Where is the equality in *social position* between the son of the Esquimaux or Hottentot, and the heir of the American statesman or British peer?

Neither am I able to admit that all men are endowed with the *unalienable* right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, because it is manifest that since "sin entered into the world and death by sin," they are all *alienated*, forfeited and lost, through the consequences of transgression. Life is *alienated* not only by the sentence of the law, but by innumerable forms of violence and accident. Liberty is *alienated* not only by imprisonment, but by the irresistible restraints of social bondage to the will, the temper, the prejudices, the customs, or the interests of others; so that there is hardly an individual to be found, even in the most favored community, who has really the liberty of word and action so confidently asserted as the *unalienable* right of all men. And as regards the "pursuit of happiness," alas! what multitudes *alienate* their right to it, beyond recovery, not only in the cells of the penitentiary, but in the reckless indulgence of their appetites and passions, in the disgust arising from ill-chosen conjugal relations, in their associations with the profligate and the vile, in the pain and suffering of sickness and poverty as the results of vice, in the ruin of the gambler, the delirium of the drunkard, the despair of the suicide, and in every other form of moral contamination!

If it be said, however, that the equality and unalienable rights of all men, so strongly asserted by this famous Declaration, are only to be taken in a *political* sense, I am willing to concede that this may be the proper interpretation of its intended meaning, but I can not see how it removes the difficulty. The statement is that "all men are *created equal*," and that "the CREATOR has endowed them with these *unalienable* rights." Certainly if the authors of this celebrated document designed to speak only of *political* rights and *political* equality, they should not have thus referred them to the act of creation, because it is perfectly obvious that, since the beginning of human government, men have been created with all imaginable inequality, under slavery, under despotism, under aristocracy, under limited monarchy, under every imaginable form of political strife and political oppression. In no respect whatever, that I can discover, has the Almighty sent our race into the world with these imaginary rights, and this fanciful equality. In his sight the whole world is sinful, rebellious, and lying under the just condemnation of his violated laws. Our original rights, whatever they might have been, are all forfeited and gone. And since the fall, mankind have no *rights* to claim at the hand of the Creator. Our whole dependence is on his *mercy and compassion*. And

he dispenses these according to his sovereign will and pleasure, on no system of equality that any human eye can discover, and yet, as every Christian must believe, on the eternal principles of perfect benevolence, in union with impartial justice, and boundless knowledge, and wisdom that can not err.

Where, then, I ask, did the authors of the Declaration of Independence find their warrant for such a statement? It was probably judicious enough to call their propositions "self-evident truths," because it seems manifest that no man can prove them. To estimate aright the vast diversity among the races of mankind, we may begin with our own, the highly privileged Anglo-Saxon, which now stands at the head, although our ancestors were heathen barbarians only two thousand years ago. From this we may go down the descending scale through the Turks, the Chinese, the Tartars, the Japanese, the Egyptians, the Hindoos, the Indian tribes, the Laplanders, the Abyssinians, the Africans, and how is it possible to imagine that God has made them all *equal!* As truly might it be said that all the trees of the forest are equal—that all the mountains, and seas, and rivers are equal—that all the beasts of the fields are equal—that all the birds of the air are equal. The facts rather establish the very contrary. The Deity seems to take pleasure in exhibiting a marvelous wealth of power through the rich variety of all his works, so that no two individuals of any species can be found in all respects alike. And hence we behold a grand system of order and GRADATION, from the thrones, dominions, principalities and powers in heavenly places, rank below rank, to man. And then we see the same system throughout our earth displayed in the variety of races, some higher, some lower in the scale—in the variety of governments, from pure despotism to pure democracy—in the variety of privilege and power among the subjects of each government, some being born to commanding authority and influence, while others are destined to submit and obey. Again, we behold the system continued in the animal creation, from the lordly lion down to the timid mole, from the eagle to the humming bird, from the monsters of the deep to the sea-star in its shell. The same plan meets us in the insect tribes. Some swift and powerful, others slow and weak, some marshaled into a regular government—monarchy in the bee-hive, aristocracy in the ant-hill, while others, like the flies, have no government at all. And in perfect harmony with this divine arrangement, the inanimate creation presents us with the same vast variety. The canopy of heaven is studded with orbs of light, all differing in magnitude, all differing in radiance, and all yielding to the sovereign splendor of the sun. The earth is clothed with the most profuse diversity of vegetation, from the lofty palm down to the humble moss. The mineral kingdom shines with gold, silver, iron, copper, and precious stones, in all conceivable forms and colors. From the mammoth cave down to the minutest crystal—from mountains of granite down to the sand upon the shore, all is varied, multiform, unequal, yet each element has its specific use and beauty, and the grand aggregate unites in the sublime hymn of praise to the wisdom, the goodness, and the stupendous resources of that ineffable Power which produced the whole.

This brief and most inadequate sketch of the order of creation may serve at least to show that the manifest inequality in the condition of mankind is no exception to the rule, but is sustained by all analogy. It is the will of God that it should be so, and no human sagacity or effort can prevent it. And the same principle exists in our political relations. We may talk as we please of our equality in political rights and privileges, but in point of fact, there is no such thing. Amongst the other civilized nations it is not even pretended. None of the great galaxy of European governments can have a better title to it than England, yet who would be so absurd as to claim political equality in a land of monarchy, of hereditary nobles, of time-honored aristocracy? The best approach to political equality is confessedly here, and here only. Yet even here, amidst the glories of our universal suffrage, where is it to be found? Political equality, if it means any thing, must mean that every man enjoys the same right to political office and honor; because the *polity* of any government consists in its *system of administration*, and hence it results, of necessity, that those who can not possibly be admitted to share in this administration, have no *political equality* with those who can. We do, indeed, say that the *people are*

sovereign. But every one knows, full well, that the comparative few who are qualified to take the lead, by talent, by education, by natural tact, and by a conjunction of favoring circumstances, are practically *sovereigns over the people.* The man who carries a hod gives his vote for the candidate. The candidate himself can do no more, so far as it concerns the mere form of election. Are they therefore politically equal? Who formed the party to which the candidate belongs? Who ruled the convention by which his name was put upon the list? Who arranged the orators for the occasion? Who subsidized the Press? Had the poor hodman any share in the operation, any influence, any voice whatever? No more than the hod which he carries. Can any human power ever manufacture a candidate out of *him?* The notion would be preposterous. Where then is his political equality? Even here, in our happy land of universal suffrage, how does it appear that "*all men are born equal*"? The proposition is a sheer absurdity. All men are born *unequal,* in body, in mind, and social privileges. Their intellectual faculties are unequal. Their education is unequal. Their associations are unequal. Their opportunities are unequal. And their freedom is as unreal as their equality. The poor are compelled to serve the rich, and the rich are compelled to serve the poor by paying for their services. The political party is compelled to serve the leaders, and the leaders are compelled to scheme and toil, in order to serve the party. The multitude are dependent on the few who are endowed with talents to govern. And the few are dependent on the multitude for the power, without which all government is impossible. From the top to the bottom of the social fabric, the whole is thus seen to be *inequality* and *mutual dependence.* And hence, although they are free from that special kind of slavery which the Southern States maintain over the posterity of Ham, yet they are all, from the highest to the lowest, in bondage quite as real, from which they can not escape—the *slavery of circumstances,* called, in the ordinary language of the world, NECESSITY.

I have been, I fear, unreasonably tedious in thus endeavoring to show why I utterly discard these famous propositions of the Declaration of Independence. It is because I am aware of the strong hold which they have gained over the ordinary mind of the nation. They are assumed by thousands upon thousands, as if they were the very doctrines of divine truth. And they are made the basis of the hostile feeling against the slavery of the South, notwithstanding their total want of rationality. Yet I do not wonder that such maxims should be popular. They are admirably calculated to gratify the pride and ambition so natural to the human heart, and are therefore powerful incentives in the work of political revolution. It was for this purpose, I presume, that they were introduced in that famous document, which publicly cast off the allegiance of the colonies to the British crown. And the same doctrines were proclaimed a few years later, in a similar service, by the French Directory, in the midst of a far more terrible revolution. *Liberty, equality, and fraternity*—THE RIGHTS OF MAN, were then the watchwords of the excited populace, while their insane leaders published the decree of Atheism, and a notorious courtesan was enthroned as the goddess of reason, and the guillotine daily massacred the victims of democratic fury, till the streets of Paris ran with blood.

I do not state this fact because I desire to place the revolutions in the Colonies and in France on the same foundation, with respect to the *spirit* or the *mode* in which they were conducted. God forbid that I should forget the marked features of contrast between them! On the one side, there was religious reverence, strong piety, and pure disinterested patriotism. On the other, there was the madness of atheism, the brutality of ruffianism, and the "reign of terror" to all that was good and true. In no one mark or character, indeed, could I deem tha there was any comparison between them, save in this: that the same false assumption of human equality and human rights was adopted in both. Yet how widely different was their result on the question of negro slavery! The American revolution produced no effect whatever on that institution; while the French revolution roused the slaves of their colony in St. Domingo to a general insurrection, and a scene of barbarous and cruel butchery succeeded, to which the history of the world contains no parallel.

This brings me to the last remarks

which I have to present on this famous Declaration. And I respectfully ask my readers to consider them maturely.

First, then, it seems manifest, that when the signers of this document assumed that "*all men* were born equal," they did not take the negro race into account at all. It is unquestionable that the author, Mr. Jefferson, was a slaveholder at the time, and continued so to his life's end. It is certain that the great majority of the other signers of the Declaration were slaveholders likewise. No one can be ignorant of the fact that slavery had been introduced into all the colonies long before, and continued to exist long after, in every State save one. Surely then, it can not be presumed that these able and sagacious men intended to stultify themselves by declaring that the negro race had rights, which nevertheless they were not ready to give them. And yet it is evident, that we must either impute this crying injustice to our revolutionary patriots, or suppose that the case of the slaves was not contemplated.

Nor is this a solitary example, for we have a complete parallel to it in the preamble to the Constitution, where the important phrase, "We, the people of the United States," must be understood with the very same limitation. Who were the people? Undoubtedly the free citizens who voted for the Constitution. Were the slaves counted as a part of that people? By no means. The negro race had no voice, no vote, no influence whatever in the matter. Thus, therefore, it seems perfectly plain that both these instruments must be understood according to the same rule of interpretation. The slaves were not included in the Declaration of Independence, for the same reason precisely that they were not included amongst the "people" who adopted the Constitution of the United States.

Now it is the established maxim of the law, that every written document must be understood according to the *true intent* of the parties when it was executed. The language employed may be such that it admits of a different sense; but there can be only one *just* interpretation, and that is fixed unalterably by the apparent meaning of its authors at the time. On this ground alone, therefore, I respectfully contend that the Declaration of Independence has no claim whatever to be considered in the controversy of our day. I have stated, at some length, my reasons for rejecting its famous propositions, as being totally fallacious and untenable. But even if they were ever so "self-evident," or capable of the most rigid demonstration, the rule of law utterly forbids us to appeal to them in a sense which they were not designed to bear.

In the second place, however, it should be remembered that the Declaration of Independence, whether true or false, whether it be interpreted legally or illegally, *forms no part of our present system.* As a great historical document, it stands, and must ever stand, prominent before the nations of the world. But it was put forth more than seven years anterior to the Constitution. Its language was not adopted in that Constitution, and it has no place whatever in the obligatory law of the United States. When our orators, our preachers, and our politicians, therefore, take its propositions about human rights and human equality, and set them up as the supreme law, overruling the Constitution and the acts of Congress, which are the *real law* of the land, I can not wonder enough at the absurdity of the proceeding. And I doubt whether the annals of civilized mankind can furnish a stronger instance of unmitigated perversity.

Thirdly, and lastly, I am utterly opposed to those popular propositions, not only because I hold them to be altogether fallacious and untrue, for the reasons already given, but further, because their *tendency* is in direct contrariety to the precepts of the Gospel, and the highest interests of the individual man. For what is the unavoidable effect of this doctrine of human equality? Is it not to nourish the spirit of pride, envy, and contention? To set the servant against the master, the poor against the rich, the weak against the strong, the ignorant against the educated? To loosen all the bonds and relations of society, and reduce the whole duty of subordination to the selfish cupidity of pecuniary interest, without an atom of respect for age, for office, for law, for government, for Providence, or for the word of God?

I do not deny, indeed, that this doctrine of equality is a doctrine of immense power to urge men forward in a constant struggle for advancement. Its natural operation is to force the vast majority into a ceaseless contest

with their circumstances, each discontented with his lot, so long as he sees any one else above him, and toiling with unceasing effort to rise upon the social scale of wealth and importance, as fast and as far as he can. There is no principle of stronger impulse to stimulate ambition in every department. And hence arises its manifold influence on the business, the enterprise, the commerce, the manufactures, the agriculture, the amusements, the fashions and the political strifes of our Northern people, making them all restless, all aspiring, and all determined, if possible, to pass their rivals in the race of selfish emulation.

But how does it operate on the order, the stability, and the ultimate prosperity of the nation? How does it work on the steadfast administration of justice, the honor and purity of our public officers, the quiet subordination of the various classes in the community, the fidelity and submission of domestics, the obedience of children, and the relations of family and home? Above all, how does it harmonize with the great doctrines of the Bible, that the Almighty Ruler appoints to every man his lot on earth, and commands him to be satisfied and thankful for his portion — that we must submit ourselves to those who have the rule over us — that we should obey the laws and honor the magistrates — that the powers that be are ordained of God, and he that resisteth the power shall receive condemnation — that we may not covet the property of others — that having food and raiment, we should be therewith content — that we must avoid strife, contention and railing accusations, and follow peace, charity, and good will, remembering that the service of Christ is the only perfect freedom, and that our true happiness depends not on the measure of our earthly wealth, on social equality, on honor, or on our relative position in the community, but on the fulfillment of our personal duty according to our lot, in reliance on His blessing?

I have no more to add, with respect to this most popular dogma of human equality, and shall therefore dismiss it, as fallacious in itself, and only mischievous in its tendency. As it is the stronghold of the ultra-abolitionist, I have devoted a large space to its examination, and trust that the conclusion is sufficiently plain. Happily it forms no part of our Constitution or our laws. It never was intended to apply to the question of negro slavery. And it never can be so applied without a total perversion of its historical meaning, and an absolute contrariety to all the facts of humanity, and the clear instruction of the Word of God.

The next objection to the Slavery of the Southern States, is its presumed *cruelty*, because the refractory slave is punished with corporal correction. But our Northern law allows the same in the case of children and apprentices. Such was the established system in the army and the navy, until very lately. The whipping-post was a fixed institution in England and Massachusetts, and its discipline was administered even to free citizens during the last century. Stripes, not exceeding forty, were appointed to offenders in Israel by divine authority. The Saviour himself used a scourge of small cords when he drove the money-changers from the temple. Are our modern philanthropists more merciful than Christ, and wiser than the Almighty?

But it is said that the poor slaves are treated with *barbarity*, and doubtless it may sometimes be true, just as soldiers and sailors, and even wives and children, are shamefully abused amongst ourselves, in many instances. It is evident, however, that the system of slavery can not be specially liable to reproach on this score, because every motive of interest as well as moral duty must be opposed to it. The owner of the horse and the ox rarely treats his brutes with severity. Why should he? The animals are his property, and he knows that they must be kindly and carefully used, if he would derive advantage from their labor. Much more must the master of the slave be expected to treat him with all fairness and affection, because here there are human feelings to be influenced, and if the servant be not contented and attached, not only will he work unwillingly, but he may be converted into an enemy and an avenger. When the master is a Christian, the principles of the Gospel, as laid down by St. Paul, will operate, of course, in favor of the slave. But even when these are wanting, the motives of interest and prudence remain. And hence I can not doubt that the examples of barbarity must be exceedingly few, and ought to be regarded, not as the general rule, but as the rare exceptions. On the whole, indeed, I see no reason to deny the statement of our Southern friends, that their slaves

are the happiest laborers in the world. Their wants are all provided for by their master. Their families are sure of a home and maintenance for life. In sickness they are kindly nursed. In old age they are affectionately supported. They are relieved from all anxiety for the future. Their religious privileges are generously accorded to them. Their work is light. Their holidays are numerous. And hence the strong affection which they usually manifest toward their master, and the earnest longing which many, who were persuaded to become fugitives, have been known to express, that they might be able to return.

The third objection is, that slavery must be a *sin*, because it leads to *immorality*. But where is the evidence of this? I dispute not against the probability and even the certainty that there are instances of licentiousness enough among slaveholders, just as there are amongst those who vilify them. It would be a difficult, if not an impossible task, however, to prove that there is more immorality amongst the slaves themselves, than exists amongst the lower class of freemen. In Sabbath-breaking, profane cursing and swearing, gambling, drunkenness and quarreling — in brutal abuse of wives and children, in rowdyism and obscenity, in the vilest excesses of shameless prostitution — to say nothing of organized bands of counterfeiters, thieves and burglars — I doubt whether there are not more offenses against Christian morality committed in the single city of New-York than can be found amongst the slave population of all the fifteen States together. The fact would rather seem to be that the wholesome restraints of slavery, as a general rule, must be, to a great extent, an effectual check upon the worst kinds of immorality. And therefore this charge, so often brought against it, stands entirely unsupported either by positive proof or by rational probability.

The fourth objection is advanced by a multitude of excellent people, who are shocked at the institution of slavery, because it involves the principle of *property in man*. Yet I have never been able to understand what it is that so disgusts them. No slaveholder pretends that this property extends any farther than the *right to the labor of the slave*. It is obvious to the slightest reflection that slavery can not bind the intellect or the soul. These, which properly constitute the MAN, are free, in their own nature, from all human restraint. But to have a *property in human labor*, under some form, is an essential element in all the work of civilized society. The toil of one is pledged for the service of another in every rank of life; and to the extent thus pledged, both parties have a *property* in each other. The parent especially has an established *property* in the labor of his child to the age of twenty-one, and has the further power of transferring this property to another, by articles of apprenticeship. But this, it may be said, ends when the child is of age. True; because the law presumes him to be then fitted for freedom. Suppose, however, that he belonged to an inferior race which the *law did not presume to be fitted for freedom at any age*, what good reason could be assigned against the continuance of the property? Such, under the rule of the Scriptures and the Constitution of the United States, is the case of the negro. God, in his wisdom and providence, caused the patriarch Noah to predict that he should be the *servant of servants* to the posterity of Japhet. And the same almighty Ruler, who alone possesses the power, has wonderfully adapted the race to their condition. For every candid observer agrees that the negro is happier and better as a slave than as a free man, and no individual belonging to the Anglo-Saxon stock would acknowledge that the intellect of the negro is equal to his own.

There have been philosophers and physiologists who contended that the African race were not strictly entitled to be called *men* at all, but were a sort of intermediate link between the baboon and the human being. And this notion is still maintained by some at the present day. For myself, however, I can only say that I repudiate the doctrine with my whole heart. The Scriptures show me that the negro, like all other races, descends from Noah, and I hold him to be a MAN AND A BROTHER. But though he be my *brother*, it does not follow that he is my *equal*. Equality can not be found on earth between the brothers even in one little family. In the same house, one brother usually obtains a mastery over the rest, and sometimes rules them with a perfect despotism. In England, the elder brother inherits the estate, and the younger brothers take a lower rank, by the *slavery of circumstances*. The

eldest son of the royal family is in due time the king, and his brothers forthwith become his subjects. Why should not the same principle obtain in the races of mankind, if the Almighty has so willed it? The Anglo-Saxon race is king, why should not the African race be subject, and subject in that way for which it is best adapted, and in which it may be more safe, more useful, and more happy than in any other which has yet been opened to it, in the annals of the world?

I know that there may be exceptions, now and then, to this intellectual inferiority of the negro race, though I believe it would be very difficult to find one, unless the intermixture of superior blood has operated to change the mental constitution of the individual. For all such cases the master may provide by voluntary emancipation, and it is notorious that this emancipation has been cheerfully given in thousands upon thousands of instances, in the majority of which the gift of liberty has failed to benefit the negro, and has, on the contrary, sunk him far lower, in his social position. But no reflecting man can believe that the great mass of the slaves, amounting to nearly four millions, are qualified for freedom. And therefore it is incomparably better for them to remain under the government of their masters, who are likely to provide for them so much more beneficially than they could provide for themselves.

The difference then, between the power of the Northern parent and the Southern slaveholder, is reduced to this, namely, that the master has a *property in the labor of his slave for life*, instead of having it only to the age of twenty-one, because the law regards the negro as being always a child in understanding, requiring a superior mind to govern and direct him. But, on the other hand, the slave has just as really a *property for life in his master's support and protection*, and this property is secured to him by the same law, in sickness and in health, in the helplessness of old age, as well as in the days of youthful vigor, including, besides, a comfortable maintenance for his wife and family. Can any rational judgment devise a fairer equivalent?

The fifth objection, which often meets the Northern ear, proceeds from the overweening value attached, in our age and country, to the name of liberty, since it is common to call it the dearest right of man, and to esteem its loss as the greatest possible calamity. Hence we frequently find persons who imagine that the whole argument is triumphantly settled by the question: "*How would you like to be a slave?*"

In answer to this very puerile interrogatory, I should say that whether any condition in life is to be regarded as a loss or an advantage, depends entirely on circumstances. Suppose, for example, that the Mayor of New-York should ask one of its merchant princes: "How would you like to be a policeman?" I doubt whether the question might not be taken for an insult, and some words of indignation would probably be uttered in reply. But suppose that the same question were addressed to an Irish laborer, with what feelings would he receive it? Assuredly with those of gratitude and pleasure. The reason of the difference is obvious, because the employment which would be a degradation to the one, offers promotion and dignity to the other. In like manner, slavery, to an individual of the Anglo-Saxon race, which occupies so high a rank in human estimation, would be a debasement not to be thought of with patience for a moment. And yet, to the Guinea negro, sunk in heathen barbarism, it would be a happy change to place him in the hands of a Southern master. Even now, although the slaves have no idea of the pagan abominations from which their forefathers were taken, it is notorious that they usually value their privileges as being far superior to the condition of the free negroes around them, and prefer the certainty of protection and support for life to the hazards of the liberty on which the abolitionist advises them to venture. How much more would they prize their present lot, if they understood that, were it not for this very institution of slavery, they would be existing in the darkest idolatry and licentiousness among the savages of Africa, under the despotic King of Dahomey, destitute of every security for earthly comfort, and deprived of all religious hope for the world to come!

If men would reflect maturely on the subject, they would soon be convinced that liberty is a blessing to those, and only those, who are *able to use it wisely*. There are thousands in our land, free according to law, but so enslaved to vice and the misery consequent on vice, that it would be a mercy to place them, supposing it were possible, under the rule of some other will, stronger and better than their

own. As it is, they are in bondage to Satan, notwithstanding their imaginary freedom; and they do his bidding, not merely in the work of the body, but in the far worse slavery of the soul. Strictly speaking, however, the freest man on earth has no *absolute liberty*, for this belongs alone to God, and is not given to any creature. And hence it is the glory of the Christian to be the *bond servant* of the divine Redeemer who "bought us to himself with his own precious blood." The *service of* CHRIST, as saith the Apostle, is "the only *perfect freedom*." All who refuse that service, are slaves of necessity to other masters; slaves to Mammon; slaves to ambition; slaves to lust; slaves to intemperance; slaves to a thousand forms of anxious care and perplexity; slaves at best to pride and worldly decorum, and slaves to circumstances over which they have no control. And they are compelled to labor without ceasing under some or all of these despotic rulers, at the secret will of that spiritual task-master, whose bondage does not end at death, but continues to eternity.

The sixth objection arises from the fact that slavery separates the husband from the wife and the parents from the children. Undoubtedly it sometimes does so, from necessity. Before we adopt this fact, however, as an argument against slavery, it is only fair to inquire whether the same separation do not take place, perhaps quite as frequently, amongst those who call themselves free. The laboring man who has a large family is always obliged to separate from his children, because it is impossible to support them in his humble home. They are sent to service, therefore, one to this master and another to that, or bound as apprentices, as the case may be, and thus the domestic relations are superseded by strangers, for the most part beyond recovery. So among the lower orders, the husbands are separated from their wives by the same necessity. How many, even of the better classes, have left their homes to seek their fortune in the gold regions! How many in Europe have abandoned their families for Australia, or the United States, or the Canadas! How many desert them from pure wickedness — a crime which can hardly happen under the Southern system! But above all, how constantly does this separation take place amongst our soldiers and sailors, so that neither war nor foreign commerce could be carried on at all without it! All these are borne by *freemen*, under the *slavery of circumstances*. Is it wise to declaim against this necessity in one form, when we are forced to submit to it in so many other kinds of the same infliction?

There is only one other argument which occurs to me, requiring notice, and that is based upon the erroneous notion that the laws of God, under the Mosaic dispensation, allowed polygamy as well as slavery; and, therefore, it is inferred that the legislation of the Old Testament is of no authority upon the subject, but as the Gospel did away the first, so also it should do away the other.

The facts here are misunderstood, and the inference is without any real foundation. Let us look at the matter as it is explained by the Saviour himself. "The Pharisees came to him, tempting him, and saying unto him: Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause? And he answered and said unto them: Have ye not read that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female; and said, for this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife, and they twain shall be one flesh? Wherefore they are more twain, but one flesh. What therefore, God hath joined together let no man put asunder. They say unto him: Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and put her away? He saith unto them: Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, suffered you to put away your wives, but from the beginning it was not so. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery, and whoso marrieth her that is put away, doth commit adultery." (Matt. 19: 3–9.)

Now, here our Lord plainly lays down the original law of marriage, referring expressly to Adam and Eve, one man and one woman, declared to be *one flesh*, and adding the command, *What God hath joined together let no man put asunder*. But it is evident that polygamy must, of necessity, interfere with this divine union. The *twain* can no longer be *one flesh*, when another wife is brought between them, because the new wife must deprive the former one of her exclusive rights and privileges, and the husband destroys the very unity which God designed in joining them together. The doctrine

of our Saviour, therefore, restores the law of marriage to its original sanctity, and the apostles, accordingly, always speak of the wife in the singular number, in no instance appearing to contemplate the possibility of the Christian having more wives than one, while, in the case of a bishop, St. Paul specifies it as an essential condition that he shall be "the husband of one wife." (1 Tim. 3 : 2.)

But how had the chosen people been allowed for so many centuries to practice polygamy, and divorce their wives for the slightest cause? Our Lord explains it by saying that *Moses* suffered them to put away their wives "because of the hardness of their hearts." The special questions addressed to him by the Pharisees, did not, indeed, refer to polygamy, but only to the liberty of divorce, for at that time it should seem that the practice of polygamy had well nigh ceased in *Judea*, and it is certainly not countenanced by the Jewish laws at this day. The principle, however, is precisely the same in the two cases. Dissatisfaction with the present wife and desire for another, were the cause of action in both; and when the husband did not wish to be burdened by the murmurs or the support of his old companion, he would naturally prefer to send her away, in order to make room for her successor. We see, then, how readily this facility of divorce became the mode in which the Jews of that day sought for the gratification of their capricious attachments, instead of the more expensive and troublesome system of polygamy. And hence our Lord applied the remedy, where it was specially required, by forbidding divorces unless for the weightiest cause, such as adultery. Yet this was no change in the divine arrangement, which had been the same from the beginning. He expressly declares, on the contrary, that the latitude assumed by the Israelites was an *indulgence granted by Moses*, on account of "the hardness of their hearts." And this is a very different thing from an authoritative decree of the Almighty.

It is surely therefore manifest, from this language of our Saviour, that God had never given any direct sanction to polygamy. Doubtless, as we must infer from many parts of the Old Testament, it had become common among the Israelites, who, supposing themselves justified by the case of Jacob, had probably adopted it in so many instances that Moses did not think it safe or prudent to put it down, lest worse evils might follow, unless he was constrained to do so by the positive command of the Almighty. All that can be truly stated, therefore, is, that *no such positive command* was given, and the Deity left the human law-giver to use his own discretion in the matter.

Such is the aspect of this question, according to the statement of our Lord, which must be conclusive to every Christian. And hence we may perceive, at once, that the case is in no respect parallel to that of slavery. For here the Almighty caused his favored servant Noah to predict that the posterity of Ham should be the servants of servants, under the descendants of Shem and Japhet. He recognized the bondman and the bondmaid in the ten commandments. He laid down the positive law to Israel that they should buy the children of the heathen that were round about them, and of the strangers who dwelt in their land, to serve them and their families forever. The Saviour, when he appeared, made no allusion to the subject, but plainly declared that he had not come to destroy the law. The first church of believers in Jerusalem were all "zealous" for the law. And St. Paul preached obedience to the slaves among the Gentile churches, and sent a converted slave back to his Christian master.

Where, then, is the resemblance between these cases? In the matter of divorce and polygamy, the Deity is silent, leaving them to the discretion of Moses, until the Messiah should come. But in regard to the slavery of Ham's posterity, he issues his commands distinctly. And the Saviour disclaims the intention to repeal the laws of his heavenly Father, while he asserts the original design of marriage, and his inspired Apostle gives express sanction to slavery, and speaks of the one husband and the one wife, in direct accordance with the word of his divine Master. Here, therefore, it is plain that the cases are altogether unlike, and present a contrast, rather than a comparison.

We know that the doctrine of the primitive church was in harmony with this, for polygamy was never permitted, nor divorces for trifling causes, while slavery was allowed, as being perfectly lawful, so long as the slave was treated with justice and kindness. The ancient canons sometimes advert to the mode in which slaves might be corrected. Bishops and clergy held

slaves. In later times, bondmen and bondmaids were in the service of convents and monasteries. And no scruple was entertained upon the subject until the close of the last century, when the new light burst forth which now dazzles the eyes of so many worthy people, and blinds them not only to the plain statements of Scriptures, but to the interests of national unity and peace.

Thus, then, I have examined the various topics embraced in your inquiry, and the conclusion which I have been compelled to adopt must be sufficiently manifest. The slavery of the negro race, as maintained in the Southern States, appears to me fully authorized both in the Old and the New Testament, which, as the written Word of God, afford the only infallible standard of moral rights and obligations. That very slavery, in my humble judgment, has raised the negro incomparably higher in the scale of humanity, and seems, in fact, to be the only instrumentality through which the heathen posterity of Ham have been raised at all. Out of that slavery has arisen the interesting colony of Liberia, planted by slaveholders, to be a place of refuge for their emancipated bondmen, and destined, as I hope, to be a rich benefit, in its future growth and influence, to Africa and to the world. I do not forget, and I trust that I do not undervalue, the missionary work of England and our own land, in that benighted continent. But I believe that the number of negroes Christianized and civilized at the South, through the system of slavery, exceeds the product of those missionary labors, in a proportion of thousands to one. And thus the wisdom and goodness of God are vindicated in the sanction which his word has given, and the sentence originally pronounced on Canaan as a curse has been converted into a blessing.

I have now gone over the whole ground covered by your kind application, and would only here repeat that on the question of slavery, which lies at the root of all our present difficulties, I have obeyed the rule of conscience and of duty, in opposition to my habits, my prejudices, and my sympathies, all of which would tend strongly to the other side. I need hardly say that I am no politician. More than forty years have elapsed since I ceased even to attend the polls. But as a Christian, I am bound to accept the doctrine of the apostles for my guide. And as a citizen, I am bound to sustain the Constitution of the United States, and defend those principles of law, and order, and friendly comity, which every State should faithfully regard in its relations to the rest. Nor is this the first time that I have expressed my opinions. In a lecture at Buffalo, published in 1850, and again in a volume entitled *The American Citizen*, printed by Pudney & Russell, in 1857, I set forth the same views on the subject of slavery; adding, however, a plan for its gradual abolition, whenever the South should consent, and the whole strength of the Government could aid in its accomplishment. Sooner or later, I believe that some measure of that character must be adopted. But it belongs to the slave States themselves to take the lead in such a movement. And meanwhile, their legal rights and their natural feelings must be respected, if we would hope for unity and peace.

In conclusion, I would only say, that I am perfectly aware how distasteful my sentiments must be, on this very serious question, to the great majority of my respected fellow-citizens, in the region where divine Providence has cast my lot. It would assuredly be far more agreeable if I could conscientiously conform to the opinions of my friends, to whose ability, sincerity, and zeal I am ready to give all just commendation. But it would be mere moral cowardice in me to suppress what I believe to be the truth, for the sake of popularity. It can not be long before I shall stand at the tribunal of that Almighty and unerring Judge, who has given us the inspired Scriptures to be our supreme directory in every moral and religious duty. My gray hairs admonish me that I may soon be called to give an account of my stewardship. And I have no fear of the sentence which He will pronounce upon an honest though humble effort to sustain the authority of His Word, in just alliance with the Constitution, the peace, and the public welfare of my country.

With the fervent prayer that the Spirit of Wisdom, unity, and fraternal kindness may guide our National Congress, the Legislatures of the several States, and the sovereign will of our whole people, to a happy accommodation of every existing difficulty,

I remain, with great regard,

Your faithful servant in Christ,

JOHN H. HOPKINS,

Bishop of the Diocese of Vermont.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

SPEECH OF MR. PUGH

TO 50,000 VOTERS,

WHO NOMINATED VALLANDIGHAM,

AND RESOLVED TO ELECT HIM

GOVERNOR OF OHIO.

Henry Laurens was President of the Continental Congress in 1779. In 1780 he was sent as Minister to Holland. On his way he was captured, and imprisoned in the Tower of London for fourteen months. When Lord Shelburne became Premier, Laurens was brought up, on Habeas Corpus, and released. After his release, he was treated with great kindness and respect by the British authorities. He dined with Lord Shelburne. After dinner, the conversation turned on the separation of the two countries. Lord Shelburne remarked:

"I AM SORRY FOR YOUR PEOPLE." "WHY SO?" ASKED LAURENS. "THEY WILL LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS," WAS THE REPLY. "LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS!" SAID LAURENS. "YES," SAID LORD SHELBURNE. "WE PURCHASED IT WITH CENTURIES OF WRANGLING, MANY YEARS OF FIGHTING, AND HAD IT CONFIRMED BY AT LEAST FIFTY ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. ALL THIS TAUGHT THE NATION ITS VALUE; AND IT IS SO INGRAINED INTO THEIR CREED, AS THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THEIR LIBERTY, THAT NO MAN OR PARTY WILL EVER DARE TRAMPLE ON IT. YOUR PEOPLE WILL PICK IT UP, AND ATTEMPT TO USE IT; BUT, HAVING COST THEM NOTHING, THEY WILL NOT KNOW HOW TO APPRECIATE IT. AT THE FIRST GREAT INTERNAL FEUD THAT YOU HAVE, THE MAJORITY WILL TRAMPLE UPON IT, AND THE PEOPLE WILL PERMIT IT TO BE DONE, AND SO WILL GO YOUR LIBERTY!"

Published Journal of Henry Laurens.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS.

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

SPEECH OF MR. PUGH.

Fellow-Citizens: For some weeks, and until the execution of his sentence of banishment, I discharged the duty of counsel to the gentleman you have just nominated for Governor of Ohio. I did not agree with him, and do not now agree, as to some questions of policy or expediency connected with the civil war in which we are engaged; I have not thought it possible to conclude terms of peace by which our difference with the people of the Southern States could be reconciled or satisfactorily adjusted; but I regard the alternative of war or peace as the highest problem of statesmanship—a problem which can not be solved wisely, or even understandingly, without absolute freedom in its discussion. Not only as partisans, therefore, but as citizens, we need and must insist upon liberty of speech. That liberty has been denied to Clement L. Vallandigham; for attempting to exercise what was, in the circumstances, my right as well as his own, he has been ruthlessly seized, imprisoned, and, at length, forced into exile. His right, I say, was your right and mine; his injury is our injury; the outrage committed on him was and is an outrage committed on every one of us. I implore you thus to regard it. ("We do!" "we do!")

I exhort you to make his cause—the cause of a brave, honest, persecuted, heroic man—your cause also. ("We will!" "We will!") In the many hours during which it was my duty to be with him, and to consult of the probabilities of his fate, I never saw his cheek blanch nor his eye quail; I never knew him to swerve for one instant from a resolution to maintain, so far as it depended on him, that essential doctrine of all free governments, the right of every citizen to express his opinion respecting public affairs, without hindrance or fear of military dictation. (Cheers.)

The question of prosecuting this war, or concluding peace, can not be decided intelligently until the people have heard both sides. I am not prepared, for one, to say whether war or peace. ("Peace!" "Peace!") You may be wiser than I am; but I never will undertake to decide a question of that magnitude without hearing it fully discussed. And as to any idea of public discussion, or of exercising any right as freemen, while under the dominion of martial law—while General Burnside's Order No. 38 can be enforced upon us—that is utterly ridiculous. I know not the character of the resolutions to be brought before the Convention; but if my advice should be taken, they will be very short, and simple, and to this effect: That we can decide no question of war or peace until we have regained our liberty. The right of the people to debate the affairs of their government, is paramount in importance to all other questions. If Mr. Vallandigham can satisfy me that tendering an armistice to the Confederate States will result in terms of honorable peace—in terms by which the union of the North and the South may be restored—I am ready to join him with heart and with hand; but how can I pronounce any opinion until I have heard his argument and his presentation of facts and circumstances? Therefore, when the President or any military officer, general or corporal, declares that Mr. Vallandigham shall not speak—shall not tell me what he knows, or what he thinks best for the interest of the repub

dic—I say, at once, it is farcical to pretend that we live under a free government.

The Democratic party of the North is not responsible for this unhappy division and this most disastrous war. Our adversaries of the Republican party, now in office, are responsible. I know that slaves and suppliants, pretending once to have been with us, give themselves to the task of asserting that the South would not accept any reasonable terms of compromise; but I know, upon the other hand, that war might have been avoided—that all difficulties might have been adjusted—that the Union might have been maintained in its original integrity—had not Abraham Lincoln and the leaders of the Republican party refused—constantly, persistently, stubbornly refused—any terms whatsoever. It is no matter of opinion with me; for I was a member of Congress at that time, and familiar with the transactions of which I speak. Mr. Lincoln and his supporters were entreated, earnestly entreated, as well as warned, not to launch this country into the vortex of civil war; but they scorned all entreaties and laughed at all advice, distinctly declaring that they could and would maintain the Union by virtue of the sword alone. They challenged that responsibility—not with doubt or even hesitation, but with supreme complacency, and with the utmost confidence in themselves. For one, therefore, I hold them to the responsibility so challenged and assumed; and I will not do, as I have not done, any act, nor utter any word, to release them from it. They have had their own way, and without opposition. No man at the North has resisted them, or thwarted them, or staid them in any manner. They have had money and men, whenever, and as largely as they demanded; they have controlled the State government as well as the Federal government; and here, in the midst of a third campaign, after infinite sorrow, and misery, and shame—while carnage fills the air, and rivers roll with blood—when mourning dwells in every homestead, and desolation stalks on every highway—they call for new hundreds of thousands of men, and for incalculable millions of treasure. These, also, they must have, and will have; I could not prevent them if I would, and inasmuch as war exists—whether properly or improperly commenced—I would not if I could. But when they fail at last, as fail they will, let them not approach us with any excuse for their failure, or any plea with which to put off responsibility and punishment. I say that they will fail: whatever the Democratic party might have done, in similar circumstances, it is now obvious that the leaders of the Republican party can succeed in nothing but mischief and ruin. They are incapable of conducting war; they are equally incapable of concluding an honorable peace. (Applause.) Nevertheless, the Republican party is now in administration; it is entitled to exercise the authority of the Federal government; and, whilst I hold its leaders responsible for what they have done, and may do, I will submit, as patiently as possible, to every exaction which they have a constitutional right to impose.

But I will not submit to the exercise of arbitrary, absolute, and unlimited power. They have no right to that; and their exercise of it ought to be opposed, and, if need be, resisted. The Northern Democracy have submitted, and submitted tamely; they have experienced, in the past two years, more flagrant tyranny than the people of any nation in Europe would have tolerated. But there is a limit of all human endurance. If our political opponents continue to declare and maintain martial law, as they call it, in the States where no rebellion has existed—if we, in Ohio, are henceforth to hold our property, our lives, and the security of our families at the whim of General Burnside, or of any other officer—it is high time for us to attend another convention than this—a convention which never will adjourn until our liberties are achieved and our constitutional rights thoroughly vindicated. (Tremendous applause.) I say this in full view of General Burnside's Order No. 38. Man dies but once; and life is a debt which all must repay at some time. It matters not whether in

the agony of battle, or by reason of the mock-trial and sentence of a military commission; the debt is gloriously paid by death whenever and wherever that death is in the cause of liberty. I scorn your Order No. 38. (Cheers.) I execrate, I trample under foot, the decree of any military officer extending the crime of treason, or proscribing freedom of speech. (Renewed applause.) Come what may—come death, or exile, or imprisonment; or hard labor, or even stripes—I defy General Order No. 38. (Immense applause.) We are not—we can not be — so abject as to yield our liberty, without a struggle, at the dictation of any man, President, General, corporal, or civilian. (Cheers.)

If you submit you deserve to be slaves. ("Yes!" "Yes!" "We will never submit!" Great excitement, which did not subside for several minutes.)

I may not agree with Mr. Vallandigham in all his opinions respecting the prosecution or the conclusion of this war, so unhappily and needlessly begun; but I will maintain his right to express those opinions, whether I agree or not—maintain it as my own right. I exhort you, fellow-citizens, to postpone every other question, and to think of nothing else, until you have secured liberty of speech. I will utter my sentiments respecting public affairs—utter them, if that be necessary, at the cost or the hazard of my life. God grant me the courage, at least, with Cato, as not to live a slave, to die a freeman!

I implore you, my Democratic friends, to put aside all other engagements, and devote yourselves to this great question.

Let this be your business, and all your business, until the second Tuesday in October next! Don't hallo to-day and repent to-morrow. Say it, and mean it! Let each man take counsel in his own heart, and then come to the resolution that arbitrary arrests and imprisonments shall be stopped—peaceably if possible, but stopped at all events! (Applause.) The best security to a people for their liberty, is the conviction that they will defend it. That induces a general to think; yes, *think* before he undertakes to trifle with it. Some man must make the issue for us, in Ohio, upon this subject of arbitrary arrests. It may be your lot, Mr. President, or it may be mine. If mine, God help me! I will abide the consequences. ("We'll stand by you.) If we had an honest man in the Governor's office, to-day, our rights would be intact; but, instead of such a man, we have one who glories in licking the very dust at the feet of Presidential domination. We have no Governor in truth; we have only a being. (Groans for Tod.) And yet this renegade had the audacity to say, in Cincinnati, that he would return to the Democratic party, at the end of the war, and would, in our State Convention, put such men as Vallandigham and Olds to the wall. I tell him, or I tell you, that if he ever appears in any Democratic convention in which I happen to be a delegate, I will move to suspend all business until he has been expelled. (Prolonged cheers, and cries of "We'll kick him out!") I can pardon a man who has erred in judgment, or been misled by the clamor of these unwonted times, but never the man who sold his birthright in the Democratic party, and then proffered to become its worst and shameless oppressor. Tod has gained an office, but he has gained infamy also. (Prolonged groans for Tod.) If I am arrested, as I may be to-morrow, or before sundown, and dragged into the presence of a military commission, as Vallandigham was, will you act? ("We will!" "We will!") I have considered the possibility that you will not. ("But we will!" "We will!") I say that I have considered the possibility of your not acting. ("We will," "we will," repeated by the whole assembly several times, and with great enthusiasm.)

I see that our liberty is safe. (Cheers and laughter.) But, whether you act or not, I am resolved to maintain my constitutional rights; and if it be at the cost of life, I shall thank God that he has counted me worthy to suffer in the cause of human freedom. (Applause.) When I heard that my fellow-citizen and friend, Mr. Vallandigham, for expressing his opinion with regard to public

affairs, had been violently seized in his own house, in the presence of his family, and thence hurried to Cincinnati, and imprisoned in the Bastile on Columbia street, my indignation at the conduct of the military officers knew no bounds; but afterward, when a judge of the United States, knowing his duty, and sworn to discharge that duty without fear or favor of any man—whether from the instigation of cowardice, or a desire of transient popularity—violated his duty and his oath, trampling to death the Constitution of which he was an especial guardian, and betraying the liberty of all his fellow-citizens, I almost forgave the soldier in my detestation of the faithless civilian. It has now become a question of the impeachment of Humphrey H. Leavitt, and, if he should act in like manner, of Noah H. Swayne. We need an example of that sort for the benefit of posterity in all coming time.

Fellow-citizens: Nothing less than a sense of imminent danger to my own liberty and the liberty of my children, would have brought me to this Convention as a delegate. I am not a politician in the ordinary use of that word. I served the people of Ohio in various offices, and as well as I could, for ten years: the contract between them and me has expired; and, although grateful for the confidence reposed in me while it continued, I have not the slightest disposition to renew it. I desire only, for the rest of my days, the rank and office of a private citizen. I have duties toward my wife and children, duties which I would fain be spared to perform; but I can perform no duty except as a free man. Life is an intolerable burthen under such despotism as we have endured for the last two years. I would sooner face a platoon of soldiers, at once, than to be in constant terror of the iniquities threatened by General Order No. 38. The question for you to decide, this day, is whether you will suffer such despotism any longer. ("No!" "No!" "Never!" "Never!") If we should fail at the election, in October next, a majority of the people of Ohio will have sanctioned a tyranny as monstrous as ever prevailed; and I counsel you, in that event, to sell your property as soon as possible, your goods and chattels, your lands and tenaments, and emigrate with your families to some other country—no matter how distant—in which you can enjoy, as citizens, the liberty which you will no longer be able to enjoy here. (Immense applause.) If our enemies do not give us a fair opportunity of declaring our wishes, at the ballot-box, in that election; if, as in Indiana, they train artillery to bear upon our unarmed assemblies; or, as in Kentucky, disperse them at the point of the bayonet, then, looking right into your eyes, and speaking directly to your hearts, I ask you, once more, *will you act?* ("We will!" "We will!") Then let us have that Convention which will not adjourn without securing our liberty, and securing it too, by the aid of whatever weapons we can command. And I say with Patrick Henry, "*If* THIS *be treason, make the most of it!*" (Tremendous cheers.)

Now, Governor Medill, you may announce the nomination of Mr. Vallandigham; for, if he was rightly convicted, I have violated General Order No. 38 long enough. (Cheers and laughter.)

I have a message, and had almost forgotten it. As soon as I heard that President Lincoln had altered the sentence of the military commission, from imprisonment in Fort Warren to banishment, I sought an interview with Mr. Vallandigham; it was on board the gunboat by which he was taken to Louisville, and in the presence of several gentlemen, I asked him, distinctly, whether Mr. Lincoln had offered him a choice between going to Fort Warren or going to the confederate States. Mr. Vallandigham said that he had not been allowed any choice. I asked: "Which do you prefer, and which alternative, in case you should have a choice, will you accept?" He answered: "I would go to Fort Warren, a thousand times, before I would go to the Southern Confederacy." I then said: "As soon as you have gone, the Abolition liars in charge of the telegraph will report that you had a choice, and that you exercised it." He replied: "I authorize you and request you to tell my friends, and espe-

cially at Columbus, that I am not allowed any choice, and that I would go to Fort Warren, if I could, rather than to the confederate States." I have expressed my opinion, fellow-citizens, in regard to the subject of arbitrary arrests and imprisonment. If you have the spirit of freemen, you will not only adopt it, but render it effectual. If you have not that spirit, it matters little what you say or do, for you could not long remain free, in ever such favorable circumstances.

I call upon you, as representing one hundred and eighty thousand Democratic electors in Ohio, not to separate until you have demanded of Abraham Lincoln the person of your nominee for Governor. (Great applause.) Do not talk or even think of prosecuting the war, or of concluding peace, or of any other question, until our standard-bearer has been restored to us.

In view of the circumstances that have brought us together, we hereby resolve:

1. That the will of the people is the foundation of all free government. That to give effect to this will, free thought, free speech, and a free press are absolutely indispensable. Without free discussion, there is no certainty of sound judgment, without sound judgment there can be no wise government.

2. That it is an inherent and constitutional right of the people to discuss all measures of their government, and to approve or disapprove as to their best judgment seems right. That they have a like right to propose and advocate that policy which in their judgment is best, and to argue and vote against whatever policy seems to them to violate the Constitution, to impair their liberties, or to be detrimental to their welfare.

3. That these and all other rights, guaranteed to them by their Constitutions, are their rights in time of war as well as in times of peace, and of far more value and necessity in war than in peace. For, in peace, liberty, security, and property are seldom endangered; in war, they are ever in peril.

4. That we now say to all whom it may concern, not by way of threat, but calmly and firmly, that we will not surrender these rights, nor submit to their forcible violation. We will obey the law ourselves, and all others must obey them.

5. That there is a manifest difference between the administration of the Government and the Government itself. The Government consists of the civil and political institutions created by the Constitution, and to it the people owe allegiance. The Administration are but the agents of the people, subject to their approval or condemnation, according to the merit or demerit of their acts.

6. That in the exercise of the right to differ with the Federal Executive, we enter our solemn protest against the proclamation of the President of the United States, dated the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, by which he assumes to emancipate slaves in certain States, holding the same to be unwise, unconstitutional, and void.

7. That we declare our determined opposition to a system of emancipation by the States upon compensation to be made out of the treasury of the United States, as burdensome upon the people, unjust in its very nature, and wholly without warrant of the Constitution.

8. That we declare that the power which has recently been assumed by the President of the United States whereby, under the guise of military necessity, he has proclaimed and extended—or asserts the right to proclaim or extend—martial law over States where war does not exist, and has suspended the writ of *habeas corpus*, is unwarranted by the Constitution, and its tendency is to subordinate civil to military authority, and to subvert our system of free government.

9. That we deem it proper further to declare that we, together with the truly loyal people of the State, would hail with pleasure and delight any manifestation of a desire on the part of the seceded States to return to their allegiance to the Government of the Union, and in such event we would cordially and earnestly coöperate with them in the restoration of peace and the procurement of such proper guarantees as

would give security to all their interests and rights.

10. That the soldiers composing our armies merit the warmest thanks of the nation. Their country called, and nobly did they respond. Living, they shall know a nation's gratitude; wounded, a nation's care; and dying, they shall live in our memories, and monuments shall be raised to teach posterity to honor the patriots and heroes who offered their lives at their country's altar. Their widows and orphans shall be adopted by the nation, to be watched over and cared for as objects truly worthy a nation's guardianship.

11. That Ohio will adhere to the Constitution and the Union as the best, it may be the last hope of popular freedom; and for all wrongs which may have been committed, or evils which may exist, will seek redress, under the Constitution and within the Union, by the peaceful but powerful agency of the suffrages of a free people.

12. That we hail with pleasure and hope the manifestations of conservative sentiment among the people of the Northern States in their elections, and regard the same as the earnest of a good purpose upon their part to coöperate with all other loyal citizens in giving security to the rights of every section and maintaining the Union and the Constitution as they were ordained by the founders of the Republic.

13. That whenever it becomes practicable to obtain a convention of all or of three fourths of the States, such body should be convened for the purpose of proposing such amendments to the Federal Constitution as experience has proved to be necessary to maintain that instrument in the spirit and meaning intended by its founders, and to provide against future convulsions and wars.

14. That we will earnestly support every constitutional measure tending to preserve the Union of the States. No men have a greater interest in its preservation than we have—none desire it more; there are none who will make greater sacrifices, or endure more, than we will to accomplish that end. We are, as we ever have been, the devoted friends of the Constitution and the Union, and we have no sympathy with the enemies of either.

15. That the arrest, imprisonment, pretended trial, and actual banishment of Clement L. Vallandigham, a citizen of the State of Ohio, not belonging to the land or naval forces of the United States, nor to the militia in actual service, by alleged military authority, for no other pretended crime than that of uttering words of legitimate criticism upon the conduct of the Administration in power, and of appealing to the ballot-box for a change of policy — (said arrest and military trial taking place where the courts of law are open and unobstructed, and for no act done within the sphere of active military operations in carrying on the war) — we regard as a palpable violation of the following provisions of the Constitution of the United States:

1. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

2. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

3. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger."

4. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."

And we furthermore denounce said arrest, trial, and banishment, as a direct insult offered to the sovereignty of the

people of Ohio, by whose organic law it is declared that "no person shall be transported out of the State for any offense committed within the same."

16. That Clement L. Vallandigham was, at the time of his arrest, a prominent candidate for nomination by the Democratic party of Ohio to the office of Governor of the State; that the Democratic party was fully competent to decide whether he was a fit man for that nomination; and that the attempt to deprive them of that right, by his arrest and banishment, was an unmerited imputation upon their intelligence and loyalty, as well as a violation of the Constitution.

17. That we respectfully but most earnestly call upon the President of the United States to restore C. L. Vallandigham to his home in Ohio; and that a committee of one from each Congressional district of the State, to be selected by the presiding officer of this Convention, is hereby appointed to present this application to the President.

18. That the thanks of this Convention are hereby tendered to Horatio Seymour, Governor of the State of New-York, for his noble letter in relation to the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham; and the President of the Convention is hereby directed to communicate a copy of this resolution to Governor Seymour.

19. That the establishment of a military government over loyal States, where war does not exist, to supersede the civil authorities, and suppress the freedom of speech and of the press, and to interfere with the elective franchise, is not only subversive of the Constitution and the sovereignty of the States, but the actual inauguration of revolution.

20. That it is the sworn duty of the Governor of the State to protect her citizens in the enjoyment and exercise of all their constitutional rights; and we have beheld with deep humiliation and regret not only the failure of David Tod, Governor of Ohio, to perform that duty, but—what is still worse—his *active* participation in the violation of those rights.

21. That we denounce, as traitors to the country, the Abolition Jacobins who are seeking to bring about civil war in the loyal States, with the view of turning, if possible, the bayonets of the army against the breasts of the fathers, brothers, and friends of the soldiers, and subjecting those States to a military surveillance and dominion.

22. That we denounce, as libelers of the Democratic party, and enemies of their country, the men who are engaged in representing the Democratic party as wanting in sympathy with our soldiers in the field. It is a base slander upon human nature to assert that Democrats, who have hundreds of thousands of brothers and sons in the army, do not sympathize with them—and it is an outrage upon the Democratic party, that has always stood by the country, to assert that it is not the friend of its gallant defenders.

23. That the conduct of Brigadier-General Mason, the military commandant at Columbus, and of the officer commanding the provost-guard, in preventing all appearance of military restraint upon the proceedings of this Convention, shows that they have a just appreciation of the Constitution of their country and the rights of the people—and that they are wise and patriotic officers; and that their conduct on this occasion is in striking contrast with the contrary conduct of the military authorities upon the occasion of the late Democratic meeting at Indianapolis. And we take pleasure in expressing our confidence in General Mason, and the officers and soldiers under his command.

No. 10.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

REPLY

TO

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S LETTER

OF 12TH JUNE, 1863.

Henry Laurens was President of the Continental Congress in 1779. In 1780 he was sent as Minister to Holland. On his way he was captured, and imprisoned in the Tower of London for fourteen months. When Lord Shelburne became Premier, Laurens was brought up, on Habeas Corpus, and released. After his release, he was treated with great kindness and respect by the British authorities. He dined with Lord Shelburne. After dinner, the conversation turned on the separation of the two countries. Lord Shelburne remarked:

"I AM SORRY FOR YOUR PEOPLE." "WHY SO?" ASKED LAURENS. "THEY WILL LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS," WAS THE REPLY. "LOSE THE HABEAS CORPUS!" SAID LAURENS. "YES," SAID LORD SHELBURNE. "WE PURCHASED IT WITH CENTURIES OF WRANGLING, MANY YEARS OF FIGHTING, AND HAD IT CONFIRMED BY AT LEAST FIFTY ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. ALL THIS TAUGHT THE NATION ITS VALUE; AND IT IS SO INGRAINED INTO THEIR CREED, AS THE VERY FOUNDATION OF THEIR LIBERTY, THAT NO MAN OR PARTY WILL EVER DARE TRAMPLE ON IT. YOUR PEOPLE WILL PICK IT UP, AND ATTEMPT TO USE IT; BUT, HAVING COST THEM NOTHING, THEY WILL NOT KNOW HOW TO APPRECIATE IT. AT THE FIRST GREAT INTERNAL FEUD THAT YOU HAVE, THE MAJORITY WILL TRAMPLE UPON IT, AND THE PEOPLE WILL PERMIT IT TO BE DONE, AND SO WILL GO YOUR LIBERTY!"

Published Journal of Henry Laurens.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS.

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

REPLY TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S LETTER.

To His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States:

SIR: Your answer, which has appeared in the public prints, to the resolutions adopted at a recent meeting in the city of Albany, affirming the personal rights and liberties of the citizens of this country, has been referred to the undersigned—the Committee who prepared and reported those resolutions. The subject will now receive from us some further attention, which your answer seems to justify, if not to invite. We hope not to appear wanting in the respect due to your high position, if we reply with a freedom and earnestness suggested by the infinite gravity and importance of the questions upon which you have thought proper to take issue at the bar of public opinion.

You seem to be aware that the Constitution of the United States, which you have sworn to protect and defend, contains the following guarantees to which we again ask your attention: (1) Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. (2) The right of the people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath. (3) No person except soldiers and mariners in the service of the Government shall be held to answer for a capital or infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor shall any person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (4) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right of a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State or District in which the crime shall have been committed, and to be confronted with the witnesses against him.

You are also, no doubt, aware that on the adoption of the Constitution, these invaluable provisions were proposed by the jealous caution of the States, and were inserted as amendments for a perpetual assurance of liberty against the encroachments of power. From your earliest reading of history, you also know that the great principles of liberty and law which underlie these provisions were derived to us from the British Constitution. In that country they were secured by *Magna Charta* more than six hundred years ago, and they have been confirmed by many and repeated statutes of the realm. A single palpable violation of them in England would not only arouse the public indignation, but would endanger the throne itself. For a persistent disregard of them, Charles the First was dethroned and beheaded by his rebellious subjects.

The fact has already passed into history, that the sacred rights and immunities which were designed to be protected by these constitutional guarantees, have not been preserved to the people during your administration. In violation of the first of them, the freedom of the press has been denied. In repeated instances newspapers have been suppressed in the loyal States, because they criticised, as constitutionally they might, those fatal errors of policy which have characterized the conduct of public affairs since your advent to power. In violation of the second of them, hundreds and, we believe, thousands of men, have been seized and immured in prisons and bastiles, not only without warrant upon probable cause, but without any warrant, and for no other cause than a constitutional exercise of freedom of speech. In violation of all these guarantees, a distinguished citizen of a peaceful and loyal State has been torn from his home at midnight by a band of soldiers, acting under the order of one of your generals, tried before a military commission, without judge or jury, convicted and sentenced without even the suggestion of any offense known to the Constitution or laws of this country. For all these acts you avow yourself ultimately responsible. In the special case of Mr. Vallandigham, the injustice commenced by your subordinate was consummated by a sentence of exile from his home, pronounced by you. That great wrong, more than any other which preceded it, asserts the principles of a supreme despotism.

These repeated and continued inva-

sions of constitutional liberty and private right, have occasioned profound anxiety in the public mind. The apprehension and alarm which they are calculated to produce have been greatly enhanced by your attempt to justify them, because in that attempt you assume to yourself a rightful authority possessed by no constitutional monarch on earth. We accept the declaration that you prefer to exercise this authority with a moderation not hitherto exhibited. But believing as we do, that your forbearance is not the tenure by which liberty is enjoyed in this country, we propose to challenge the grounds on which your claim of supreme power is based. While yielding to you as a constitutional magistrate the deference to which you are entitled, we can not accord to you the despotic power you claim, however indulgent and gracious you may promise to be in wielding it.

We have carefully considered the grounds on which your pretensions to more than regal authority are claimed to rest; and if we do not misinterpret the misty and clouded forms of expression in which those pretensions are set forth, your meaning is, that while the rights of the citizen are protected by the Constitution in time of peace, they are suspended or lost in time of war, when invasion or rebellion exist. You do not, like many others in whose minds reason and the love of regulated liberty seem to be overthrown by the excitements of the hour, attempt to base this conclusion upon a supposed military necessity existing outside of and transcending the Constitution, a military necessity behind which the Constitution itself disappears in a total eclipse. We do not find this gigantic and monstrous heresy put forth in your plea for absolute power, but we do find another equally subversive of liberty and law, and quite as certainly tending to the establishment of despotism. You claim to have found not outside, but within the Constitution, a principle or germ of arbitrary power, which in time of war expands at once into an absolute sovereignty, wielded by one man; so that liberty perishes, or is dependent on his will, his discretion, or his caprice. This extraordinary doctrine you claim to derive wholly from that clause of the Constitution which, in case of invasion or rebellion, permits the writ of *habeas corpus* to be suspended. Upon this ground your whole argument is based.

You must permit us to say to you, with all due respect, with the earnestness demanded by the occasion, that the American people will never acquiesce in this doctrine. In their opinion the guarantees of the Constitution which secure to them freedom of speech and of the press, immunity from arrest for offenses unknown to the laws of the land, and the right of trial by jury before the tribunals provided by those laws, instead of military commissions and drum-head courts-martial, are living and vital principles IN PEACE AND IN WAR, at all times and under all circumstances. No sophistry or argument can shake this conviction, nor will the people require its confirmation by logical sequences and deductions. It is a conviction deeply interwoven with the instincts, the habits, and the education of our countrymen. The right to form opinions upon public measures and men, and to declare those opinions by speech or writing, with the utmost latitude of expression; the right of personal liberty, unless forfeited according to established laws, and for offenses previously defined by law; the right, when accused of crime, to be tried where law is administered, and punishment is pronounced only when the crime is legally ascertained—all these are rights instantly perceived without argument or proof. No refinement of logic can unsettle them in the minds of freemen; no power can annihilate them, and no force at the command of any chief magistrate can compel their surrender.

So far as it is possible for us to understand, from your language, the mental process which has led you to the alarming conclusions indicated by your communication, it is this: the *habeas corpus* is a remedial writ, issued by courts and magistrates, to inquire into the cause of any imprisonment or restraint of liberty; on the return of which and upon due examination, the person imprisoned is discharged, if the restraint is unlawful, or admitted to bail if he appears to have been lawfully arrested, and is held to answer a criminal accusation. Inas-

much as this process may be suspended in time of war, you seem to think that every remedy for a false and unlawful imprisonment is abrogated; and from this postulate you reach, at a single bound, the conclusion that there is no liberty under the Constitution which does not depend on the gracious indulgence of the Executive only. This great heresy once established, and by this mode of induction, there springs at once into existence a brood of crimes or offenses undefined by any rule, and hitherto unknown to the laws of this country; and this is followed by indiscriminate arrests, midnight seizures, military commissions, unheard-of modes of trial and punishment, and all the machinery of terror and despotism. Your language does not permit us to doubt as to your essential meaning, for you tell us, that "arrests are made not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done." And, again: "The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his government is discussed, can not be misunderstood. If not hindered, (of course by arrest,) he is sure to help the enemy, and much more if he talks ambiguously, talks for his country with 'buts' and 'ifs' and 'ands.'" You also tell us that the arrests complained of have not been made "for the treason defined in the Constitution," nor "for any capital or otherwise infamous crimes, nor were the proceedings following, in any constitutional or legal sense, criminal prosecutions." The very ground, then, of your justification is, that the victims of arbitrary arrest were obedient to every law, were guiltless of any known and defined offense, and therefore were without the protection of the Constitution. The suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, instead of being intended to prevent the enlargement of arrested criminals until a legal trial and conviction can be had, is designed according to your doctrine, to subject innocent men to your supreme will and pleasure. Silence itself is punishable according to this extraordinary theory, and still more so the expression of opinions, however loyal, if attended with criticism upon the policy of the Government. We must respectfully refuse our assent to this theory of constitutional law. We think that men may be rightfully silent if they so choose, while clamorous and needy patriots proclaim the praises of those who wield power; and as to the "buts," the "ifs," and the "ands," these are Saxon words, and belong to the vocabulary of freemen.

We have already said that the intuition of a free people instantly rejects these dangerous and unheard-of doctrines. It is not our purpose to enter upon an elaborate and extended refutation of them. We submit to you, however, one or two considerations, in the hope that you will review the subject with the earnest attention which its supreme importance demands. We say, then, we are not aware that the writ of *habeas corpus* is now suspended in any of the peaceful and loyal States of the Union. An act of Congress, approved by you on the third of March, 1863, authorized the President to suspend it during the present rebellion. That the suspension is a legislative, and not an executive act, has been held in every judicial decision ever made in this country, and we think it can not be delegated to any other branch of the Government. But passing over that consideration, you have not exercised the power which Congress attempted to confer upon you, and the writ is not suspended in any part of the country where the civil laws are in force. Now, inasmuch as your doctrine of the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of innocent men, in admitted violation of express constitutional guarantees, is wholly derived from a suspension of the *habeas corpus*, the first step to be taken, in the ascent to absolute power, ought to be to make it known to the people that the writ is in fact suspended, to the end that they may know what is their condition. You have not yet exercised this power, and therefore, according to your own constitutional thesis, your conclusion falls to the ground. It is one of the provisions of the Constitution, and of the very highest value, that no *ex post facto* law shall be passed the meaning of which is, that no act which is not against the law when committed, can be made criminal by subsequent legislation. But your claim is, that when the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended, you may lawfully imprison and punish for the

crimes of silence, of speech, and opinion. But as these are not offenses against the known and established law of the land, the constitutional principle to which we now refer plainly requires that you should, before taking cognizance of such offenses, make known the rule of action, in order that the people may be advised in due season, so as not to become liable to its penalties. Let us turn your attention to the most glaring and indefensible of all the assaults upon constitutional liberty, which have marked the history of your administration. No one has ever pretended that the writ of *habeas corpus* was suspended in the State of Ohio, where the arrest of a citizen at midnight, already referred to, was made, and he placed before a military court-martial for trial and sentence, upon charges and specifications which admitted his innocence according to the existing laws of this country. Upon your own doctrine, then, can you hesitate to redress that monstrous wrong?

But, sir, we can not acquiesce in your dogmas that arrests and imprisonment, without warrant or criminal accusation, in their nature lawless and arbitrary, opposed to the very letter of constitutional guarantees, can become in any sense rightful, by reason of a suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. We deny that the suspension of a single and peculiar remedy for such wrongs brings into existence new and unknown classes of offenses, or new causes for depriving men of their liberty. It is one of the most material purposes of that writ, to enlarge upon bail persons who, upon probable cause, are duly and legally charged with some known crime; and a suspension of the writ was never asked for in England or in this country, except to prevent such enlargement when the supposed offense was against the safety of the government. In the year 1807, at the time of Burr's alleged conspiracy, a bill was passed in the Senate of the United States, suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* for a limited time *in all cases where persons were charged on oath with treason or other high crime or misdemeanor*, endangering the peace or safety of the government. But your doctrine undisguisedly is, that a suspension of this writ justifies arrests without warrant, without oath, and even without suspicion of treason or other crime. Your doctrine denies the freedom of speech and of the press; it invades the sacred domain of opinion and discussion; it denounces the "ifs" and the "buts" of the English language, and even the refuge of silence is insecure.

We repeat, a suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* merely dispenses with a single and peculiar remedy against an unlawful imprisonment; but if that remedy had never existed, the right to liberty would be the same, and every invasion of that right would be condemned not only by the Constitution, but by principles of far greater antiquity than the writ itself. Our common law is not at all indebted to this writ for its action of false imprisonment, and the action would remain to the citizen if the writ were abolished forever. Again, every man when his life or liberty is threatened, without the warrant of law, may lawfully resist, and if necessary, in self-defense, may take the life of the aggressor. Moreover, the people of this country may demand the impeachment of the President himself for the exercise of arbitrary power. And when all these remedies shall prove inadequate for the protection of free institutions, there remains, in the last resort, the supreme right of revolution. You once announced this right with a latitude of expression which may well be considered dangerous in the present crisis of our national history. You said: "Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, and form a new one that suits them better. Nor is this right confined to cases where the people of an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that can may revolutionize and make their own of so much of the territory as they inhabit. More than this, a majority of any portion of such people may revolutionize, putting down a minority intermingled with or near about them, who may oppose their movements." (Vol. XIX., *Congressional Globe*, p. 94.) Such were your opinions, and you had a constitutional right to declare them. If a citizen now should

utter sentiments far less dangerous in their tendency, your nearest military commander would consign him to a dungeon, or to the tender mercies of a court-martial, and you would approve the proceeding.

In our deliberate judgment, the Constitution is not open to the new interpretation suggested by your communication now before us. We think every part of that instrument is harmonious and consistent. The possible suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* is consistent with freedom of speech and of the press. The suspension of that remedial process may prevent the enlargement of the accused traitor or conspirator, until he shall be legally tried and convicted or acquitted, but in this we find no justification for arrest and imprisonment without warrant, without cause, without the accusation or suspicion of crime. It seems to us, moreover, too plain for argument that the sacred right of trial by jury, and in courts where the law of the land is the rule of decision, is a right which is never dormant, never suspended, in peaceful and loyal communities and States. Will you, Mr. President, maintain, that because the writ of *habeas corpus* may be in suspense, you can substitute soldiers and bayonets for the peaceful operation of the laws, military commissions and inquisitorial modes of trial for the courts and juries prescribed by the Constitution itself? And if you can not maintain this, then let us ask, where is the justification for the monstrous proceeding in the case of a citizen of Ohio, to which we have called your attention? We know that a recreant judge, whose name has already descended to merited contempt, found the apology on the *outside* of the supreme and fundamental law of the Constitution. But this is not the foundation on which your superstructure of power is built.

We have mentioned the act of the last Congress professing to authorize a suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*. This act now demands your special attention, because, if we are not greatly in error, its terms and plain intention are directly opposed to all the arguments and conclusions of your communication. That act, besides providing that the *habeas corpus* may be suspended, expressly commands that the names of all persons theretofore or thereafter arrested by authority of the President, or his cabinet ministers, *being citizens of states in which the administration of the laws has continued unimpaired*, shall be returned to the courts of the United States for the districts in which such persons reside, or in which their supposed offenses were committed; and such return being made, if the next grand jury attending the courts does not indict the alleged offenders, then the judges are commanded to issue an order for their immediate discharge from imprisonment. Now, we can not help asking whether you have overlooked this law, which most assuredly you are bound to observe, or whether it be your intention to disregard it? Its meaning certainly can not be mistaken. By it the national Legislature has said that the President may suspend the accustomed writ of *habeas corpus*, but at the same time it has commanded that all arrests under his authority shall be promptly made known to the courts of justice, and that the accused parties shall be liberated, unless presented by a grand jury according to the Constitution, and tried by a jury in the ancient and accustomed mode. The President may possibly, so far as Congress can give the right, arrest without legal cause or warrant. We certainly deny that Congress can confer this right, because it is forbidden by the higher law of the Constitution. But, waiving that consideration, this statute, by its very terms, promptly removes the proceeding in every case into the courts where the safeguards of liberty are observed, and where the persons detained are to be discharged, unless indicted for *criminal offenses* against the established and ascertained laws of the country.

Upon what foundation, then, permit us to ask, do you rest the pretension that men who are not accused of crime may be seized and imprisoned or banished at the will and pleasure of the President or any of his subordinates in civil and military positions? Where is the warrant for invading the freedom of speech and of the press? Where the

justification for placing the citizen on trial without the presentment of a grand jury and before military commissions? THERE IS NO POWER IN THIS COUNTRY WHICH CAN DISPENSE WITH ITS LAWS. The President is as much bound by them as the humblest individual. We pray you to bear in mind, in order that you may duly estimate the feeling of the people on this subject, that for the crime of dispensing with the laws and statutes of Great Britain, our ancestors brought one monarch to the scaffold, and expelled another from his throne.

This power which you have erected in theory is of vast and illimitable proportions. If we may trust you to exercise it mercifully and leniently, your successor, whether immediate or more remote, may wield it with the energy of a Cæsar or Napoleon, and with the will of a despot and a tyrant. It is a power without boundary or limit, because it proceeds upon a total suspension of all the constitutional and legal safeguards which protect the rights of the citizen. It is a power not inaptly described in the language of one of your Secretaries. Said Mr. Seward to the British Minister in Washington: "I can touch a bell on my right hand, and order the arrest of a citizen of Ohio. I can touch the bell again, and order the imprisonment of a citizen of New-York, and no power on earth but that of the President can release them. Can the Queen of England, in her dominions, do as much?" This is the very language of a perfect despotism, and we learn from you, with profound emotion, that this is no idle boast. It is a despotism unlimited in principle, because the same arbitrary and unrestrained will or discretion which can place men under illegal restraint or banish them, can apply the rack or the thumb-screw, can put to torture or to death. Not thus have the people of this country hitherto understood their Constitution. No argument can commend to their judgment such interpretations of the Great Charter of their liberties. Quick as the lightning's flash, the intuitive sense of freemen perceives the sophistry and rejects the conclusion.

Some other matters which your Excellency has presented demand our notice.

In justification of your course as to Mr. Vallandigham, you have referred to the arrest of Judge Hall, at New-Orleans, by order of General Jackson; but that case differs widely from the case of Mr. Vallandigham. New-Orleans was then, as you truly state, under "martial or military law." This was not so in Ohio, where Mr. Vallandigham was arrested. The administration of the civil law had not been disturbed in that Commonwealth. The courts were open, and justice was dispensed with its accustomed promptitude. In the case of Judge Hall, General Jackson in a few days sent him outside of the line of his encampments and set him at liberty; but you have undertaken to banish Mr. Vallandigham from his home. You seem also to have forgotten that General Jackson submitted implicitly to the judgment of the court which imposed the fine upon him; that he promptly paid it; that he enjoined his friends to assent, "as he most freely did, to the decision which had just been pronounced against him."

More than this, you overlook the fact that the then administration (in the language of a well-known author) "mildly but decidedly rebuked the proceedings of General Jackson," and that the President viewed the subject with "surprise and solicitude." Unlike President Madison, you, in a case much more unwarranted, approve the proceedings of your subordinate officer, and in addition, justify your course by a carefully considered argument in its support.

It is true that after some thirty years, Congress, in consideration of the devoted and patriotic services of General Jackson, refunded the amount of the fine he had paid! But the long delay in doing this proved how reluctant the American people were to do any thing which could be considered as in any way approving the disregard shown to the majesty of the law, even by one who so eminently enjoyed their confidence and regard.

One subject more, and we shall conclude. You express your regret that our meeting spoke "as Democrats," and you say that "in this time of national peril you would have preferred to meet us upon a level, one step higher than any party platform." You thus compel us to allude to matters which we should

have preferred to pass by. But we can not omit to notice your criticism, as it casts at least an implied reproach upon our motives and our proceedings. We beg to remind you that when the hour of our country's peril had come; when it was evident that a most gigantic effort was to be made to subvert our institutions and to overthrow the Government; when it was vitally important that party feelings should be laid aside, and that all should be called upon to unite most cordially and vigorously to maintain the Union; at the time you were sworn into office as President of the United States, when you should have urged your fellow-citizens in the most emphatic manner to overlook all past differences, and to rally in defense of their country and its institutions; when you should have enjoined respect for the laws and the Constitution, so clearly disregarded by the South—you chose, for the first time under the like circumstances in the history of our country, to set up a party platform, called "the Chicago platform" as your creed, to advance it beyond the Constitution, and to speak disparagingly of that great conservative tribunal of our country, so highly respected by all thinking men who have inquired into our institutions —THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Your administration has been true to the principles you then laid down. Notwithstanding the fact that several hundred thousand Democrats in the loyal States cheerfully responded to the call of their country, filled the ranks of its armies, and by "their strong hands and willing arms" aided to maintain your Excellency and the officers of Government in the possession of our national capital—notwithstanding the fact that the great body of the Democrats of the country have, in the most patriotic spirit, given their best efforts, their treasure, their brothers and their sons to sustain the Government and to put down the rebellion, you, choosing to overlook all this, have made your appointments to civil office from your cabinet officers and foreign ministers, down to the persons of lowest official grade among the tens of thousands engaged in collecting the revenues of the country, exclusively from your political associates.

Under such circumstances, virtually proscribed by your administration, and while most of the leading journals which supported it approved the sentence pronounced against Mr. Vallandigham, it was our true course, our honest course, to meet as "Democrats," that neither your Excellency nor the country might mistake our antecedents or our position.

In closing this communication, we desire to reäffirm our determination, and, we doubt not, that of every one who attended the meeting which adopted the resolutions we have discussed, expressed in one of those resolutions, to devote "all our energies to sustain the cause of the Union."

Permit us, then, in this spirit, to ask your Excellency to reëxamine the grave subjects we have considered, to the end that, on your retirement from the high position you occupy, you may leave behind you no doctrines and no further precedents of despotic power to prevent you and your posterity from enjoying that constitutional liberty which is the inheritance of us all, and to the end, also, that history may speak of your administration with indulgence, if it can not with approval.

We are, sir, with great respect, yours very truly, JOHN V. L. PRUYN,
Chairman of Committee.
JAMES KIDD,
GILBERT C. DAVIDSON,
J. V. P. QUACKENBUSH,
WM. A. FASSETT,
O. M. HUNGERFORD
JOHN HOGAN,
HENRY LANSING,
S. HAND,
M. K. COHEN,
JOHN CUTLER,
C. VAN BENTHUYSEN,
GEORGE H. THACHER,
C. W. ARMSTRONG,
WILLIAM DOYLE,
FRANKLIN TOWNSEND,
WILLIAM APPLETON,
B. R. SPELMAN,
JAMES MCKOWN,
A. H. TREMAIN,
DANIEL SHAW,
W. SIMON,
A. E. STIMSON,
ISAAC LEDERER.

ALBANY, June 30, 1863.

No. 11.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS.

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed.

THE ELECTION IN IOWA.

BY HON. CHARLES MASON.

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF IOWA: The candidates of the Democratic party are now before you, and the time is at hand when, in the manner provided by law, you will be called upon to decide between the principles of which they are the exponents and those presented by the opposite party. We invite attention to some of those principles.

The great question now presented for your consideration is that of peace or war. Not that we propose immediate, unconditional peace. We contend that the war should continue so long as it is necessary "to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease."

On this point our antagonists take a clear and distinct issue. They intend to overthrow slavery in the States, if not the States themselves, by the military power of the Federal government, and insist that peace should not be granted on any terms until that object is attained. Upon the former basis the war might be ended in ninety days, and without endangering our republican liberties. Upon the latter, it must continue for years, and finally end in lasting separation, or in military despotism, or in both.

We do not assert that all the members of the Republican party insist as a *sine qua non* upon the sudden emancipation of these 4,000,000 slaves, but we do say that if such is not their purpose, they are in a false position, and that their duty to themselves, to their country, and to the momentous interests of civil liberty, require that they should take a careful "observation" for the purpose of ascertaining whither they have been unconsciously drifting; and that they should now change their course accordingly.

It is true that some of the presses and leading men of the party advocate

different notions, but no one can deny that the extremists of the party control its action, and that the President himself—however reluctantly—has at length been brought into entire subserviency to their extreme projects, and has made emancipation paramount to peace.

But, whatever may be the views and opinions of the republican party elsewhere, it is certain that in this State they are as is above represented. Their candidate for governor has openly taken that ground. He has stated in one of his public speeches since his nomination, that this is "an abolition war, and that it will be continued as such as long as there is one slave in the South to be made free—*that peace can never be made, nor is peace desirable, until the last link of slavery is abolished.*"

Thus then we see that while the Democrats in their State convention have solemnly resolved that they are opposed to the prosecution of the war for the purpose of carrying out the emancipation proclamation of the President, the Republicans, by their acts and declarations, have not only sustained that policy, but have made it paramount to all other considerations. This is the most important point of difference between us. If in the coming election they are successful, it will amount to a decision by the people of this State, that in their opinion peace ought not, under any circumstances, to be restored until all the slaves in the Southern States are emancipated. All those, therefore, who would be willing to obtain peace on any other terms, should support the Democratic candidates.

Under "Republican" policy, we should be at once overrun with hordes of this black population, who as a class are indolent and vicious. These would not only crowd our poor-houses and prisons, but they would occupy the places which would otherwise be filled by white laborers, and thus exclude from among us a more industrious, enterprising, and thrifty class of immigrants. The fact that they are now excluded from Illinois and Indiana would greatly increase the number who would make their way to Iowa.

An analysis of the census returns of 1850 and 1860 fully shows that among the free blacks in the Northern States there are nearly twelve times as many convicts as among the whites, in proportion to their respective numbers. Are we anxious to make our State a moral pest-house, to be crowded with these colored subjects of crime?

The history of the West-India Islands is replete with evidence showing the utter indolence and want of thrift of the manumitted slave. Have we not already sufficient pauperism with which to be burdened, but must we desire more?

The immigration of the free black is objectionable on other grounds. To the reasons for excluding the convict and pauper the still greater one is to be added, that the negro and his posterity must always remain a distinct class, never bound to the country by the same tie of allegiance as the white, and therefore the proper instrument to be used by those who would create riots and tumults or any other violation of the laws of the land.

But a still greater injury, of a different character, will result to us of the West, from the immediate and entire abolition of slavery. We shall lose our only reliable market for our great staple commodities. The slaves on the Southern plantations are fed chiefly on bacon and corn. It is found to be the best economy to employ these laborers in the culture of cotton and sugar and rice, and to supply them with provisions from regions farther North. Not less than $50,000,000 annually has heretofore thus been paid for food for slave on the Southern plantations, a very large portion of which came from the valley of the Upper Mississippi. The inconveniences we have sustained, and the losses which have resulted from the closing of the Mississippi River for the past two years, will enable us in some degree to appreciate the value of this market.

The emancipation policy will deprive us of this market entirely, and will serve as a perpetual blockade of the Mississippi River, so far as our great staples are concerned. We can still send them South; but there will be no one to con-

sume them, and therefore no one to buy.

But will not the emancipated slave still have the same appetite as now? Doubtless; but he will gratify it in a different way. Instead of the large fields of cotton which have heretofore supplied the market of the world, and furnished the means of purchasing the products of our North-western prairies, each "free American citizen of African descent" will have his little patch of sweet-potatoes and of corn, his pigs and his chickens, and that is all. He will raise just what is necessary to support life, and nothing more.

Do you want proof of this? Look to Hayti and Jamaica, where the experiment now proposed here has already been tried. Emancipation took place in Hayti in 1790. At that time the annual exports from the Island were as follows:

Sugar,	163,405,220 lbs.
Coffee,	68,151,180 "
Cotton,	6,286,120 "

The value of all these exports was $27,828,000 annually.

In 1826 these exports were as follows:

Sugar,	32,864 lbs.
Coffee,	32,189,784 "
Cotton,	620,972 "

In 1849 they were reduced to

Sugar—none.	
Coffee,	30,608,343 lbs.
Cotton,	544,516 "

Mr. Sumner, in a recent speech in Congress, only claimed that the present exports of the island amounted to $2,673,000 annually, which is less than one tenth of what they were in 1790; and even this is probably much greater than the real amount.

In Jamaica emancipation was inaugurated in 1833, and consummated in 1838. The products in 1834 were as follows:

Sugar,	84,756 hhds.
Rum,	32,111 punch.
Pimento,	3,605,400 lbs.
Coffee,	17,725,731 "

In 1856 they had decreased to the following amount

Sugar,	25,920 hhds.
Rum,	14,470 punch.
Pimento,	6,848,622 lbs.
Coffee,	3,328,147 "

The pimento (or allspice) tree grows wild, and to a certain extent the coffee-tree, at present, also. The women and children gather the berries without previous cultivation, which accounts for the large quantities of those commodities still exported. The sugar-plantations are constantly going to decay, when they are neglected and abandoned. No new ones are opened, and the exports of sugar are constantly diminishing. The free negro basks in the sun, and only works to supply his immediate and most pressing wants. When freed from restraint, he surrenders himself to the indolence of his nature, leaving the future to take care of itself.

Such are the results which it is now sought to reproduce here as the great end and aim of the present civil war—a war which has already cost the nation the loss of at least six hundred thousand of her best and bravest sons, and plunged her in debt (reckoning only that of the loyal States) of more than $2,000,000,000, which, considering the high rate of interest paid, is more than twice as great, in proportion to our means of payment, as that of any nation on earth. And what is of still more consequence, it has placed in most extreme jeopardy—almost beyond hope—the free institutions which we have prized above all price. And yet we are told that the emancipation policy must still be pursued at whatever cost and sacrifice. Are we prepared for national suicide, rather than abandon this one fanatical idea?

It will be said that this is a question of justice to others, and not of mere advantage to ourselves. We reply, the course proposed will be still more detrimental to the black race than to the white.

We have already seen that the effect of sudden emancipation has always been to render them idle, and consequently vicious and unhappy. The boon of indolence is slight in comparison with the evils it engenders. This will be corroborated by another important fact.

The census of 1860 shows that for the previous twenty years the free blacks in the United States had increased in numbers less than one third as fast as the whites, and less than one half as fast as the slaves. And yet their numbers had been augmented by emancipation more than they had been diminished by emigration. No surer test of the comforts possessed by any people can be found than this. The slaves as a class are in a much better condition than the free blacks, as is shown by the rate of increase.

Besides, all experience shows that two free uncommingling races can never long coëxist in the same country. The weaker, like our Indian tribes, will soon become annihilated.

Whatever may be said to the contrary, the line between the black and the white race in this country can never be erased. Voluntary emigration can not be relied upon; and forced emigration will be both expensive and inhuman. Nothing remains but annihilation, or their continuance for the present in slavery.

But we shall be told that this is not a question of profit or advantage, but one of principle and duty, and that slavery is so heinous a sin that nothing must be allowed to prevent its immediate extirpation, though injury and ruin to either or both the races concerned should be the result.

And who comes to us with authority to speak thus dogmatically upon this subject? Has any new revelation of the Divine Will been now authoritatively promulgated? Has an institution which is as old as history, which was countenanced by the Mosaic law, which was widely prevalent in the time of Christ and his Apostles, without receiving any special reprobation, which existed in full force in every one of the States after the declaration of American independence, which is not only recognized and protected by our Federal Constitution, but is made the subject of one of its extraordinary provisions—has such an institution, by wiser and purer men than have ever before appeared on earth, been all at once ascertained to be "the sum of all villainy"? Must no truce be made, no faith be kept with it? Must fire and sword, impelled by hate and fury, be invoked for its extirpation, and all this in the name of duty, and religion, and patriotism? We do not believe it. They who teach thus are surely impostors. They will lead you to ruin if you continue to follow them.

We admit that the spirit of Christianity is opposed to the continuance of slavery; but is it not still more opposed to rapine and butchery, and all the other atrocities of civil war? It acts not by violence, but by its silent influences, which are more efficacious than the sword. Its "still small voice" is mightier than the whirlwind. Fire and fagot and tortures and dungeons, and all the other gross contrivances of men's brute instincts, were never an aid, but always a hindrance to its progress. The history of slavery furnishes another illustration of the same great truth.

In 1776 slavery existed in each of the thirteen States, and all the territory then owned by them. Within sixty years it had been voluntarily abolished in seven of their number. Without commotion or violence in one half the States, including the new ones formed from original slave territory, slavery had ceased to exist. Virginia had also in her constitutional convention only failed by one vote to adopt measures for prospective emancipation, and in the Legislature of Kentucky a like strength of opinion was manifested in the same direction. The progress of emancipation was constant, and there was no good reason why it should not continue.

In 1833 the Act of Parliament emancipating all the slaves in the British West India Islands was passed. The enemies of our peace and prosperity, under the garb of philanthropy, then turned their attention in this direction. They sent their emissaries hither to stir up dissensions, upon the pretext of hastening on the change which was then proceeding with such rapidity.

Many of the uneasy enthusiasts of the North weakly or wickedly fell into the snare. Unwilling "to let well enough alone," they commenced a system of intermeddling in the concerns of their Southern neighbors. This was done in such an obtrusive and impertinent man-

ner as to create indignation, and at length obstinate hostility.

Since then not one foot of slave territory has become free, if we except the results of the acts of legislative robbery which have been witnessed within the past two years. Had it not been for this impertinent intermeddling several of the slave States would already have been voluntarily far advanced in their career of emancipation.

But it has been urged on high authority that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between free and slave labor, and that a country can not exist part slave and part free. If this is really true, every principle of equity and fair dealing dictates that the free and the slave States should voluntarily separate. Neither has a right to become a robber of the other.

But it is not true. Slavery has existed since the earliest times; and in most countries where it has prevailed, free and slave labor have been found side by side. No such irreconcilable incompatibility as is now pretended was ever before observed, for the simple reason that it did not exist.

For a still stronger reason, no such incompatibility will produce any great practical inconvenience where the two kinds of labor, either simple or mixed, exist in separate States united under one Federal head.

So far from producing discord or weakness, this very difference is a source of union and strength. It causes diversity of production, and thus prevents rivalry; gives rise to commerce, increases intercourse, renders each section useful and necessary to the other, and secures union and harmony. Blacks can not be profitably employed in manufacturing, except it be of the coarser kinds. They can be more usefully engaged in producing the great staples for export than in the production of food. The South, therefore, receives its manufactures from the North-east, and its provisions from the North-west, while it furnishes the great staples which pay the foreign debt of all, and thus preserves the balance of trade between ours and all other countries. The system is thus rendered complete. If we had had all the ordering of it ourselves, could we have made it to suit us better, so far as its harmonious operation is concerned?

But the "slave power" is growing, encroaching, grasping, dangerous, and must be overturned in order to secure our own safety. These are expressions which, parrot-like, have been repeated till they are widely believed. Let us inquire into their truth.

The number of representatives from what are now the free and the slave States, under the six last apportionments, have been as follows:

	1811.	1822.	1832	1842.	1852.	1862.
Free States,	93	123	141	135	143	156
Slave States,	78	89	99	87	90	85
Difference,	15	34	42	48	53	71

From having a majority of only fifteen in the House of Representatives in 1811, we now have a majority of seventy-one, so that our strength in that body has been steadily increasing until it is now nearly two to one in comparison with theirs. This certainly does not look as though the influence of the slave States was likely to become so overpowering as to call for extraordinary measures for its suppression.

As to the alleged propensity to encroach upon the more powerful States of the North, it is not only contrary to nature, but is not sustained by facts, when honestly examined. Not one acre of soil originally free has ever been made slave territory. The old North-western Territory, where slavery was once legalized, was consecrated to freedom by one of the present slaveholding States. In the whole Louisiana purchase, which included our own State, slavery was not only indigenous, but was protected by treaty. And yet the admission of a slave State carved out of that very territory was fiercely resisted until by far the larger portion of that whole purchase had been grasped and retained by the free States. Let us confess the truth. The stronger party has here also manifested the chief disposition toward encroachment upon the weaker. More recent occurrences have greatly corroborated this truth.

But we hear it often asserted that slavery was the cause of the present

civil war, and that to avoid such effects hereafter we must remove this cause.

It is true that if there had been no slavery the war now raging might have been avoided. So if there was no property, there would be neither theft nor robbery. Shall the institution of property be abolished in order to prevent these crimes in future?

The *object* of an offense is very different from its *cause*. Among men disposed to be honest and just, property does not occasion crime, nor slavery war. It is only when a disposition to intermeddle with or encroach upon the rights of others is manifested that such results are witnessed. That disposition, then, is the cause of these evils. Extirpate this cause if you would avoid its effects.

We often hear it asserted as a reason for the inveterate hostility with which this institution is regarded by so many in the North, that it has governed the country most of the time since the organization of the Government. If that is true, it certainly deserves the credit of having well governed it. The Presidents and other high officers of State who have been selected from the South have not, in general, been unworthy of their exalted position. Whether the remedy we have now been administering is not likely to prove worse than the disease, we are fast becoming qualified to judge.

But admitting that undue advantages of this kind have been enjoyed by the South, have not preponderating benefits been received from the Government by the people of the North? Our revenue, navigation and fishery laws have all operated decidedly in favor of the North, until bleak and sterile New-England has become a country of palaces, from means derived from States more favored by nature both as to soil and climate. Immigration, also — one of our chief sources of wealth and power—has been encouraged in the North, and, in effect, prohibited in the South. Have we not had our full share of the substantial benefits of the Government? If the Southern people are satisfied with their portion in this distribution, ought not we to be so?

Such would have been the opinion of every impartial mind. So would have thought the people of this country if they could fairly have understood all the facts of the case. But so thought not the politicians of the Abolition order—they who, from fanaticism or some sinister motive, had become the willing instruments of the pseudo-philanthropists of Great Britain in striking perhaps a fatal blow at the prosperity, the unity, the very existence of their native country.

For the accomplishment of their purposes they resolved to build up a great anti-slavery party at the North, and, aided by circumstances, they at length fatally succeeded. They well understood that this would necessarily lead to the organization of parties divided by geographical lines; but they set at naught the maxims of wisdom as enunciated by Washington, and resolved to hazard the experiment.

They knew, too, that success could only be attained through civil war; but this did not deter these conspirators from their fell purpose. They determined to seek their own advantage, though ruin should result to their country and all its cherished institutions.

In pursuance of this determination, the doctrine of the "irrepressible conflict" was promulgated, and afterward sanctioned by placing its chief apostles in the highest seats of power. This was nothing less than a prospective declaration of hostilities against the South and its institutions.

The success of a purely sectional party upon such a platform, produced the result which every sagacious mind expected. State after State declared its formal withdrawal from the Union. Then was the time when every sentiment of patriotism in the American heart was stirred to its lowest depths; but, careless and unmoved, the Republican party looked on and smiled. They derided our apprehensions. In mockery they termed us "Union-savers," professed a willingness to be rid of the Southern States, insisted that they could not be "kicked out of the Union," and declared that a few companies of "wide-awakes" would be sufficient to suppress all infraction of the laws at any rate.

The lamented Crittenden proposed his resolutions in the Senate; and the same, in substance, were presented in the House by Mr. Clemens of Virginia. The most conclusive evidence was given that their cordial adoption would restore peace and union; but they received not one single Republican vote in either House. A like fate awaited the resolutions of the Peace Conference and many other similar propositions presented from other sources. They all failed. The Republicans seemed doggedly determined to take no step to ward off the danger which was evidently now so imminent.

The vital principle of the Crittenden proposition, and nearly all the others that were presented, was the restoration of the Missouri Compromise by a constitutional amendment. The Republicans had always professed great veneration for this compromise, and for several years after its repeal had taken high ground in favor of its restoration. They had now an opportunity of accomplishing their purpose, and at the same time preserving the Union and preventing civil war. That they refused to do this is to our minds conclusive proof that they desired war.

We will refer to one other single class of facts corroborative of the same conclusion. The war has not been prosecuted with the prime design of bringing it to an early and successful termination.

At its commencement, while there was union in the North there was great division of opinion in the South. In each of those States (except perhaps South-Carolina) a strong party always opposed secession. Good policy dictated that this feeling should be cherished and strengthened, that nothing should be done to enrage or exasperate, but every thing to mollify the public feeling until the mass of the people, convinced that we were their true friends, should voluntarily return to their duty.

No such course was ever attempted. With some creditable exceptions, a system of indiscriminate wrong and outrage of pillage and robbery was commenced and continued. This naturally excited feelings of vengeance, extinguished every sentiment of loyalty, gave undisputed predominance to the disunionists, and rendered the prospect of voluntary reconstruction hopeless.

Measures were urged through Congress in hot haste having a like but still more decisive tendency in the same direction. Projects of wholesale confiscation, of dividing the States, treating them as conquered provinces, depriving them of their separate sovereign existence; the arming of the slaves against their masters, emancipation in the District of Columbia, the appropriation of means from the Federal treasury in aid of emancipation in the States and subsequent colonization, and finally the general immediate uncompensated emancipation of the great body of the slaves by the bare proclamation of the President — these were the series of measures which were specially favored by the party in power, and which did more to unite and invigorate the confederates than all they could do for themselves; whilst the North was greatly distracted by a system of unconstitutional aggression upon the public liberty, both formidable and alarming.

Among men devoted to the Union, idolizing the Constitution, and jealous of their rights, these and other acts of a like character were calculated to raise a well-grounded doubt whether there was not a settled purpose on the part of the party in power to subvert our institutions and bring about results worse even than separation—thus greatly weakening the power of the Federal government.

Finally when by such a course they had aroused a formidable opposition to such illegal acts; when great and patriotic States had one after another pronounced against the Administration, such opposition was declared to be sympathy with rebellion, not only by partisan presses and orators, but even by high officers of the government themselves.

This was, in effect, saying to those in rebellion: "A great and growing party in the North are your friends and sympathizers. Persevere for a short time longer, and they will openly aid you." Could any thing be better calculated to give them comfort and encouragement.

But why should they desire thus to strengthen the hands of their enemies

and protract the contest? Simply for the reason already mentioned. They wished to convert the war into an engine of emancipation, and they took the only practicable way of attaining that end.

In July, 1861, both Houses of Congress, by a nearly unanimous vote, had declared the purpose of the war to be the preservation of the Union, and not the overthrow of slavery. While such was the public feeling, had the war ended, it could not have been made an instrument of abolition.

To give it such a character it must be long protracted. We must meet with great reverses. Immense sacrifices of life and property must be witnessed. National ruin and bankruptcy must stare us in the face. The bitterness of hate, the fury of exasperation, must be aroused until urged on by animosity and desperation, the public feeling would sanction any measure which promised success.

In this manner has the cherished purpose been pursued, until the nation now stands on the brink of ruin. Our resources have been recklessly lavished—a large proportion upon public plunderers—until the energies of the people are borne down by a hopeless burden of debt. Hundreds of thousands of our young men have been consigned to Southern graves, until we are fast becoming a nation of mourners and cripples. The efforts of the bravest armies that ever trod the earth, commanded by some of the ablest generals, have been thwarted by measures emanating from Washington, and all for the purpose of carrying out the original great design of those who control the party in power.

How has the mind of this people been led on from step to step in the prescribed direction! At first the arming of the negroes was felt to be abhorrent to every instinct of humanity; but it was alleged to be necessary for the suppression of the rebellion, and by degrees the people acquiesced.

Emancipation was attempted under the military power, but was at first quickly suppressed. Public sentiment had not as yet been sufficiently educated and fashioned upon such a model; but the matter was agitated, and the proper appliances made. The people were made to believe that slavery—which had always before been represented as the source of supreme weakness—was possessed of such vitality and power, that it must be extirpated before we could hope for success, and they seemingly have yielded to necessity.

Having accomplished thus much, the mask begins to be openly thrown off. It is proclaimed that the abolition of slavery is the prime object of the war, and that peace must never be known until that object is attained. The Republican candidate for Governor in this State did not speak without authority.

The second officer in the confederate government, bearing a message of peace, has been turned back at the threshold without a hearing, because it is well known that whatever the purport of that message, in other respects it would not admit of immediate emancipation. Delegations from great States inquire whether they can be allowed to return quietly to their old places in the Union, and are coldly repelled. A convenient legal adviser gives an official opinion that whole States which, as we insist, have all the while remained in the Union, can now be treated as conquered countries — be re-colonized and governed from the central government. All these are looking to the one great end—immediate emancipation. A brave and proud people are thus to be driven to desperation, while they still control large armies, and while subtle and powerful despots are watching us with no friendly eye, ready to take advantage of every opportunity that presents itself to do us harm. Has fanaticism made us mad?

Fellow-citizens, the question is broadly before you. The issue is fully made up, and will be tried in October. Shall we have peace as soon as it can be attained, with safety and honor, on the the basis of a restored Union and a preserved Constitution, or shall we still continue this sanguinary and destructive war for the single purpose of suddenly turning loose four millions of semi-barbarians to prey upon mankind, and in the end to be exterminated themselves. Choose ye now on which side of this great issue your votes shall be cast.

August, **No. 12.** 1863.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

AN ARGUMENT

ON THE

ETHICAL POSITION

OF

SLAVERY

IN THE

SOCIAL SYSTEM,

AND ITS

RELATION TO THE POLITICS OF THE DAY.

BY

SAMUEL F. B. MORSE.

"That to the height of this great argument,
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men."—MILTON.

"That *erroneous* political notions (they having become general and a part of the popular creed) have *practical consequences*, and these, of course, of a most *fearful nature*, is a truth as certain as historic evidence can make it.
"If there be any means, (if not of preventing yet of palliating the disease,) they are to be found only in an intelligible and thorough exposure of the error, and *through the discovery of the source*, from which it derives its speciousness and powers of influence on the human mind."—COLERIDGE.

PRESIDENT, PROF. S. F. B. MORSE,
SECRETARY, WM. McMURRAY,
TREASURER, LORING ANDREWS.

OFFICE OF THE SOCIETY,
No. 13 PARK ROW, NEW-YORK.
C. MASON, COR. SEC'Y,
To whom all communications may be addressed

READ—DISCUSS—DIFFUSE.

Resolved, That it be recommended to all citizens in the various cities, counties, and villages of this and other States, who approve of the objects expressed in this Constitution, that they organize auxiliary societies, and open communication with the New-York Society, for the purpose of procuring and circulating our papers.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge

AN ARGUMENT

ON

RADICAL REFORM

IN

S L A V E R Y

SOCIAL SYSTEM,

AND ITS

RELATION TO THE POLITICS OF THE DAY.

BY

SAMUEL E. R. MORSE.

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ARGUMENT.

To the politician, (by which term I do not mean a placeman, but one who makes political science a study,) my argument may seem to take the color rather of an ethical, than a political disquisition. I beg him, however, to reflect that, from the very nature of the subject, and the class of minds whom I would address, I can not reach the *political*, except through the proved positions of the *ethical* question; and when it is considered that so many of the clergy, as well as lay Christians, of various denominations, have taken such a zealous and prominent part in the political strifes of these troublous times, and that to their teachings and influence can be traced many of the lessons, and much of the moral support, of opinions in the public mind which have ripened into bloody war, it will not be considered altogether out of place to suggest to minds of this class a careful and serious revision of the fundamental principles on which they base their opinion and action.

Without intending to impeach the honesty or conscientiousness of the convictions of those who deem Slavery our great national sin, and the cause of our civil war, I may venture, nevertheless, to question the soundness of their convictions, and charge their unsoundness on their adoption of false premises, defective notions of human nature, of the social system, and of true philanthropy.

Nothing in these times of excitement is so calculated to pain and to perplex a benevolent and patriotic heart as the witnessing the constant outbursts of an intolerant, nay, an almost inhuman spirit, manifested in the conversations, in the writings, in the speeches, in the sermons, even in the prayers, of so many who hold a high position as Christians, whenever the subject of Slavery is broached. On all other topics, they will converse and write, and speak and preach, and pray with calmness, sobriety, and intelligence; but no sooner do they touch upon the subject of Slavery, than a sudden metamorphosis takes place, and symptoms of monomania are manifested. The calm and gentle man is all at once fierce, denunciatory, proscriptive; the tone of the humble and cautious has become positive, loud, and bold; the rational and logical argues has changed to the dogmatical and sophistical rhapsodist; the reverential habit of bowing to the teachings of Scripture has given place to a proud opinionativeness, which sits in judgment upon the allotments of Providence, and threatens even to reject the Bible altogether, if its teachings do not square with his preconceived notions of the method which God should adopt in ordaining the conditions of human society.

That there should be obliquity of vision in examining ethical questions, confusing and distorting the mind of the mere man of the world, and the self-seeking politician, is not so surprising, but it is indeed a marvel that men of Christian principle and education, and especially that men occupying the high and responsible position of teachers of the religion of the Prince of Peace, should use the influence of their talents and position to give consistency and lend support to the loose, anarchical ideas of a godless fanaticism. Where has the sense of decency fled, when the Sabbath is made the day, and the Church the place for partisan orgies; when flags flaunt in solemn mockery above the pulpits; and the Psalms of David, overflowing with the elevating praises of God, are exchanged for the vain-glorious, self-flattering gasconade of heathenish songs to a miscalled liberty, and on the plea of a vaunting patriotism; while the Gospel of Peace has been cast out of its proper temples, to give place to a religion, whose *Bible* is the *Declaration of Independence*, whose blood-stained *God* is *Human Freedom*, whose *Saviour* is the *National Flag*, and whose *Devil* is *Slavery?*

"The time is out of joint;" so complete a dislocation must have a cause com-

mensurate with the direful effect. Nor can we greatly err in asserting that so deep a stirring of the depths of human society must derive its force from serious disturbance, lying far back in fundamental principles. "What error leads must err." In circumstances so grave, it will not be deemed out of place narrowly and critically to examine the fundamental principles of Society.

Civil institutions have, of necessity, a theological basis. If our theology is wrong, we can not discover nor understand the true system of human society, a social system which will meet the wants and necessities of man as he is. Hence, we must begin at the beginning.

When a physician is called to a case of disease, how does he proceed to accomplish a cure? If he be a wise man, will he not consider it essential to make himself acquainted with the nature both of the constitution of his patient and the diagnosis of the disease, before he can prescribe judiciously? A knowledge of the nature of the human constitution in a state of health, and the general regimen necessary to keep it in that state, must lie at the foundation of all right practice. We should have little confidence in a physician who should prescribe rich and exciting food in the delirium of a fever, because such food is deemed proper in health.

What is the nature of man? Before proceeding another step, however, I wish it distinctly understood I shall assume that this question can be satisfactorily answered only by an appeal to the Bible. I shall go into no argument with any one to prove the paramount authority of the Bible in a question of this nature. If any reject this authority, they need go no further with this argument. It is not addressed to them. I assume at once the Bible to be an umpire from which there is no appeal. It is not the "higher law," but the *highest* Law; the court of last appeal. And if my argument stands not the test of this Court, reject it.

We can have no just notions of a political or civil system adapted to man, without acquainting ourselves with the nature of the being for whom the system is constructed. All writers, ancient as well as modern, heathen as well as Christian, who have treated of *Government*, concede this fundamental truth, in a greater or less degree; and we can have no just notions of the nature of man, aside from the revelations respecting man, which God has made in his Word.

Experience and observation, without Bible light, may indeed reveal to us certain traits of human character, particularly those which lie upon the surface, and these may lead to plausible theories and glittering speculations respecting the proper arrangements of society; but without the light of revelation, we can never dive into the actual inner life of man, and learn the secret springs of his actions; and so can have no solid basis upon which to found any comprehensive or harmonious social system. We witness every day the bursting of the unsubstantial bubbles of the so-called social reformers, who, rejecting the only true source of knowledge on a subject of all others grave and profound, and requiring the knowledge found only in the Bible, have theorized in vain, or only to expose themselves to ridicule from the shallowness of their philosophy, and the narrowness of scope as well as grossness of their socialistic dreams. If the reader desires to learn what crotchety conceit has been exhibited to the intellectual world and carried out into futile and fatal experiment, he will find in the visionary schemes of Fourier, of the Count Henri de St. Simon, of Emile de Girardin, and of Prudhon and others of the impracticable school of socialistic dreamers of the old world, enough *ad nauseam* to turn him away with utter disgust, and prepare him the more cordially to welcome the profound yet simple system of society, ordained by Him, who alone has the vastness of intellect to grasp so mighty a question, in all its length and breadth and height and depth, combined with the wisdom to devise, and the authority to establish, a social system perfectly adapted to man.

In answering, then, the first question to be resolved, *What is the nature of man?* we learn that man at his creation was the loftiest creature of the universe; of no other intelligent creature is it declared that he was created in the "image of God;" but of man it is so affirmed, not once, nor twice, nor even thrice, but *four times*, at his very birth, as if by a quadruple affirmation the great fact was intended to be made impressive in the strongest possible degree. "And God

said, Let us make man *in our image, after our likeness.* So God created man *in his own image*, in the *image of God created he him.*" This, then, was the original nature of *man;* he was partaker of the Divine nature; he was of the royal family of heaven, possessing in his original constitution, therefore, all those moral attributes and properties of his Creator that by possibility could be imparted to him as a created being. If such a fact has been so clearly and impressively announced, it should have its proper weight in our thoughts, and it is a great fact which bears most importantly on what follows in this argument.

We have now learned from the highest authority what *was* the Nature of Man. Is that his nature *now?* From the same high source we receive the sad answer that man has lost that nature, and all human experience throughout the long ages of the past confirms this fearful truth. Man was no sooner created than his loyalty, to the supreme will of Him who created him, was put to the test. It was to be made manifest to the universe of intelligent beings whether this exalted being, created with a will to choose, had determined to act in accord with the Will of his Creator, or preferred to act in opposition to that Will. God commanded, "Thou shalt not;" Man replied: "I will." He listens to the Tempter, and thus *Disobedience* was grafted into man's nature; and so man lost the image in which he was created, and voluntarily took the image of Satan, whose whole nature is opposition to the will of God. This is the Bible account of Man in health and of Man diseased. Was Man left unpitied in this his lost condition? Was there no physician with skill to understand his disease, and to apply a remedy? To a community who have been taught from childhood in the Christian system, it is hardly necessary to say that no sooner had the disease appeared, than the great Physician also appeared. In the Councils of Heaven, *Redemption*, or the restoration of man to his lost position, becomes the great absorbing enterprise of Heaven, and He, man's "elder brother," appears on earth, whose name emphatically is *Saviour*, and whose voluntary office is to eradicate the disease and to restore to Man his former health.

Knowing the disease of human nature, *Disobedience*, the parent of that countless brood of evils which afflict humanity, we are prepared to look into the philosophy of the remedy devised for him, and this can not be better understood than by studying the prescriptions of the great Physician. Yet reason at once suggests that as *Disobedience* is the disease, so *Obedience*, in some manner, was to be the remedy. Since resistance to the will of God was the fatal poison permeating the whole nature of man, how natural that the antidote should be the reïnstating in man's nature of *Obedience* or Submission to the *will of God.* Indeed there could be no restoration of the lost image of God in man but by the dethronement of *Disobedience* and the reënthronement of *Obedience.* We, therefore, should expect that a perfect system of instrumentalities, put in operation to accomplish man's restoration, would include the restoration of obedience in the human soul as the *dominant idea.* The Saviour, who devised the remedy, and came to earth to apply it, will show both what that remedy is and its manner of application.

Listen then to some of the passages from the Bible, which disclose the object of his great mission. Heb. 10 : 5 : "Wherefore, when *He* cometh into the world, he saith, Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared for me. In burnt-offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hast had no pleasure. Then said I, *Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.* Above, when he said, sacrifices and offering, and burnt-offerings, and offering for sin, thou wouldest not, neither hadst pleasure therein; which are offered by the law, then said he, *Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.* He taketh away the first, that he may establish the second, by the which *Will* we are sanctified," etc.

In this passage nothing can be clearer than that the chief mission of the Saviour, previous to his death, was to illustrate and enforce by his own example *perfect submission* or *Obedience to the Will of God*, declaring that the sacrifices and offerings of the ritual law were of no avail, and so discarding these, he declares that *obedience to the Will of God* reëstablished in the heart of man, is that which sanctifies, that which restores man, or

casts out the Great Sin of human nature, *Disobedience*, by implanting *Obedience*. On one occasion, when urged to eat, he says, John 4 : 34, "My meat is *to do the will* of him that sent me;" and 5 : 30, "I seek not *mine own will, but the will of the Father*, which hath sent me;" and again, 6 : 38, "For I came down from heaven not to do *my own will*, but the *will of him that sent me*."

In these passages he distinctly announces to his disciples the object of his mission. Man, lost by the *disobedience* of the original Head of humanity, is recovered by the *obedience* of Him who came to be the new head of humanity, the second Adam. Rom. 5 : 19 : "For as by one man's *disobedience* many were made sinners, so by the *obedience* of one shall many be made righteous."

Observe, in some of the incidents of his life, how the great object of his mission was constantly before his mind. When informed, for example, that his mother and brethren were seeking for him, he replies, (Mark 3 : 33, 35 :) "Who is my mother or my brethren? whosoever shall *do the will of God*, is my brother, and my sister, and my mother." And again, (Matt. 7 : 21 :) "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but *he that doeth the will of my Father* which is in heaven." But it was not by precept alone that he taught the great lesson of *obedience;* he is consistently true to his mission. If he declared he came *not to do his own will*, but the *will of the Father* who sent him, he is about to give to the universe the most astounding example of *obedience*, of subjection to the *will* of God under circumstances so inconceivably appalling that the human mind is foiled in the attempt to imagine them, and can only feebly comprehend the fact from the agonizing attempts which he made to change, if it were possible, his Father's will. Luke 22 : 42. "Father, *if thou be willing*, remove this cup from me : nevertheless *not* my *will but thine be done;*" and Matt. 26 : 39, "O my Father, if be possible, let this cup pass from me : nevertheless, *not my will but thine be done;*" and Matt. 26 : 42 : "O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me except I drink it, *thy will be done.*"

But he also taught a prayer to man which still ascends as it has ascended for more than eighteen hundred years, from the lips of uncounted millions in daily petition : "*Thy will be done on earth as in heaven.*" When this petition is consummated, when that *will* is done in earth, man will again be restored to his original nature, but not till all the instrumentalities for operating upon him and training him shall have been completely successful in the subduing of man's will to *obedience to the will of God*. This great extreme lesson of obedience, shown by the Saviour, was specially designed for man's imitation. The apostle Peter (1st Peter 4 : 1) alludes to this same great lesson for the purpose of enforcing it, "Forasmuch then as Christ hath suffered for us in the flesh, arm yourselves likewise *with the same mind*," (with that implicit obedience to the will of God under the most trying circumstances,) "for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin, that he no longer should live the rest of his time to the lusts of men, but to the *will of God*."

Is there not a profound significance, too, in the sublimely eloquent words of Paul with which he closes his epistle to the Hebrews in that beautiful benediction, concentrating in one glowing sentence this same great leading object and aim of the Saviour? "Now the God of Peace that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus Christ, make you perfect in every good work *to do his will*, working in you that which is *well pleasing in his sight* through Jesus Christ." I am confident Christians recognize the great truths which I have here feebly eliminated, since through their Christian education they have been early indoctrinated into the belief of them as fundamental doctrines of the Bible. It is not new doctrine to them. They need not be told that *Disobedience*, or opposition to the will of God, was the sin that cast man down from his original and exalted position, and they as fully accept the truth that the great object of the mission of the Saviour of the world was to recover man from the sin of *Disobedience*, and by his own perfect *obedience to the will of God*, to lead the way and set the example, and ordain the instrumentalities by which *Obedience to the will of God*, by Faith in his Son, shall be reinstated in the soul of man.

I am fully aware that these views will not be acceptable to those who deny the degeneracy of man, who look upon "human nature with unmingled feelings of pride and satisfaction, and represent all who speak of *mankind as degenerate*, as being the greatest enemies of the race."

I pause a moment simply to ask whether to this fundamental theological difference of views on the nature of man leading to the preaching of two opposite gospels, may not be logically traced the great physical strife now enacting before our eyes? It would not be difficult, I think, to show that the fierce *anti-slavery* element, which is the true cause of our sectional strife, and not *Slavery*, as so many have falsely been taught to believe, is the legitimate fruit of humanitarian doctrines.

Indeed, it is the boast of some eminent disciples of Channing, that to those who teach their gospel is the honor due of this anti-slavery war. "Honor to whom honor." If they find a satisfaction in this result of their zeal, it is a satisfaction which I confess I do not covet. The ruin of the noblest country of the world, the hecatomb of corpses of fathers and brothers murdered by fathers and brothers, the fearful chorus of widows' and orphans' cries wafted on every breeze from thousands of desolate homes, fields wasted, States depopulated—these, and such as these, are the boasted trophies of humanitarian philanthropy. And all for what? *Oh! to enthrone human Freedom! Great is the Goddess of Freedom!*

Commending this phase of the subject to the serious reflection and examination of Christians, I shall proceed on the assumption that the theological basis of the argument has thus far been proved, to wit, that the Saviour's mission to fallen man was to restore the lost image of God to man's soul, by the implanting therein of *Obedience* in place of *Disobedience*. We are now prepared to look into the Social System ordained for *man as he is;* and to inquire whether God in the Bible has not so organized human society, as to make its various relations coöperative to the same great end of man's restoration. I have alluded to the efforts of Socialistic dreamers to reform Society, prompted thereto by their observing the inequalities, the oppressions, the corruptions, the miseries, which the mass of men suffer under all known Governments and Social institutions, whatever their form. I have called their efforts folly, for in comparison with that Social System which God has clearly ordained, they are eminently foolish, for all of them have this fundamental and characteristic defect, that their tendency is rather to keep alive and to invigorate the great primal sin of our nature, *Disobedience*, and destroy its antidote, *Obedience*.

Man from his very nature dislikes *restraint;* he would have his own way, at all hazards, and hence it is that no appeal takes deeper hold of all his passions and instincts than an appeal to his love of *freedom;* it was the original bait of the Tempter, which lured man to his ruin, for he had not the forecast to scan the consequences, nor to discriminate between a true and false freedom; he did not, in his short-sightedness, comprehend that *Slavery to God was Man's highest Freedom*. The very word *Freedom* carries a thrill of ecstasy through his frame, whenever it is pronounced, and he rushes madly forward, regardless of all impediments, with uncontrollable frenzy, through the most appalling dangers, even to death itself, under the infatuation of this war-cry of freedom.

How shall such a nature, set on fire by a word that kindles at once all its fierceness, be curbed and repressed within the bounds of reason? We all know that those qualities in that noble animal, the horse, which, under due restraint, and with proper control, under the bit and rein, fit him best for the uses to which his nature adapts him, would, without this restraint, make him a scourge to man, and bring swift destruction upon himself. So man, having qualities which, rightly directed, fit him for society, is yet by his present nature under the control of a proud self-will; he needs, therefore, *a system of restraints*, and God has wisely and benevolently ordained a Social System for him, perfectly adapted to that nature.

What, then, is the Social System which God has ordained?

It consists of four distinct, clearly de-

fined, but cooperative relations, thus laid down in the New Testament:

First. CIVIL GOVERNMENT, in which the relation of *Ruler* and *Ruled* is ordained.* (See proofs in Appendix.)

Second. The MATRIMONIAL; in which the relation of *Husband* and *Wife* is ordained. (See Appendix.)

Third. The PARENTAL; in which the relation of *Parent* and *Child* is ordained. (See Appendix.) And

Fourth. The SERVILE; in which the relation of *Master* and *Slave* is ordained. (See Appendix.)

Now, here we have drawn out by the Pen of Inspiration a perfect Social System, the Divine plan adapted to man as a fallen being, in his disciplinary state; that is to say, to man as he is. Let us examine its structure.

In these four relations we discover several significant traits. They are seen to be *coöperative*, they each perform an essential part in the discipline of man, and act conjointly, each in its own sphere, to produce the same great result, which the mission of the Saviour was intended to produce, to wit, the establishment of *Obedience* in the soul of man. There is a unity of purpose in this arrangement which reveals the mind and hand of the same Divine Author.

Each relation, it will also be seen, is a *duality;* it consists of two parties—one a *superior*, the other an *inferior*, and *Obedience* is the significant lesson taught in each relation.

A. In the relation of *Civil Government*, the *Ruler* is *superior*, and the *ruled* are *inferior*, and *obedience* to the *Ruler* is commanded from the *ruled.*

B. In the *Matrimonial Relation*, the *Husband* is *superior*, "the head," and the *Wife* the *inferior*, "the weaker vessel," and *obedience* to the *Husband* is commanded from the *Wife.*

C. In the *Parental Relation*, the *Parent* is *superior*, and the *Child* is *inferior*, and *obedience* to the *Parent* is commanded from the *Child.*

D. In the *Servile Relation* the *Master* is *superior*, and the *Slave* the *inferior*, and *obedience* to the *Master* is commanded from the *Slave.*

* The quotations from the Bible, establishing these relations, are (for the convenience of reference) given in full in the Appendix, under their appropriate heads.

Can this unity of purpose, this arrangement of correlatives, be accidental? each and all enforcing one and the same idea, and that the one great central idea in Man's Redemption, to wit, *Obedience*, the natural antidote to *Disobedience?* We think it dangerous for a novice to tamper with the arrangements of a machine contrived by a skillful inventor to accomplish a definite purpose, and to venture to remove a wheel which, to his untutored mind, seems superfluous, or which he fancies is antagonistic to that purpose. How much more dangerous to tamper with the plans of God, and to arraign his wisdom in so deep and mysterious a design as the restoration of man's nature, and presumptuously to strike out from the Divine System of Human Society one of its four great regulators, and declare it to be not merely superfluous, not merely useless, but arrogantly to pronounce it *sinful?*

Have those who pronounce Slavery to be sin actually considered the fearful responsibility they incur by the utterance of such a reckless, and, we will say, such a sacrilegious dogma? Will the advocates of this dogma tell us on what principle they endeavor to sustain the validity of Civil Government, the Matrimonial Relation, and the Parental Relation, as ordinances of God, in each of which the essential idea of Slavery, *Obedience to a superior*, is inherent, and then single out the fourth relation—the Servile Relation—which, by divine command, is as distinctly and unqualifiedly regulated and made as much a component part of the Social System as the others, and not only deny it to be an ordinance of God, but declare it to be sinful?*

By what course of reasoning, then, or by what authority of the Bible, do they venture upon this glaring mutilation? Oh! it will be answered, and is answered: "It is revolting to all the instincts of humanity; nature cries out against it." Well, what then? Are the instincts of human nature, of fallen Human

* It is worthy of note, that the Etymology of our English word *Obedient* readily discovers its derivation from the Hebrew root "*Ebed*," a *slave; Ebed*, however compounded, in the Hebrew always carries into its derivatives the idea of Slavery; so that the command to *obey*, which is the central idea in all the Social relations, carries with it the inherent idea of *Slavery.*

nature, our guide? We know that human nature, as it is, chafes under restraint, it writhes under the infliction of the penalties that check its purpose to act as it pleases in all things.* But why single out the fourth relation, which regulates the relative duties of Master and Slave, for denunciation as sin, and not include the other three relations?

To be consistent, all the other ordained relations must be denounced, for each one has the essential idea of Slavery in it, to wit, *Obedience to authority.* Remove that, and the relation has no soul. The ultra abolitionists are more consistent in this respect than those who concentrate their objurgations upon the Servile relation alone. Making *Freedom* their starting-point, they do denounce Civil Government, because in commanding Obedience to Rulers, it restrains man's natural freedom. They do denounce the Matrimonial relation, because it binds woman in the bonds of marriage, commands *obedience* to her husband, and so restrains the free-love propensities of both. And there are women, we blush to say it, so inoculated with the ultra free notions of the day, as shamelessly to violate the proprieties and reserve of their Social position, and, aping the habits of men, have aspired to be political brawlers, to the destruction of that delicate unobtrusiveness which is their charm in their proper sphere, and which gives them, in their homes, their real power over man—a power which they foolishly sacrifice to grasp a shadow. If these dreamers seem more reserved, on the third relation, in their writings and speeches, it is more seeming than real, since our youth we find early indoctrinated into the notion that all restraint is tyranny, that Obedience is oppression and an infringement of their natural rights, and so are preparing to act their part in their day and generation in the great millennium of indiscriminate freedom.

How can we account for this monomania in regard to Slavery which has seized upon so many otherwise sane minds? It must be that most, if not all, of those so fierce in denouncing Slavery are deceived by an imaginary monster, dressed up by their imaginations with every attribute that is hideous and revolting, and which can excite disgust and horror; to them, slavery, tyranny, and oppression are synonymous, and in their speeches, sermons, and prayers they are convertible terms, and are thus indiscriminately used. They have made a man of straw, and with all the visionary enthusiasm of a Quixote, are fiercely bent on a valiant encounter with this phantom, the creation of their own heated fancy. Is it possible to reason with men thus exalted? Will they calmly, as well as boldly, look this phantom full in the face? If they will, they can not but perceive that those traits which have excited their horror, seen through the mist with which a proud infidel philosophy has enveloped them are altogether *extrinsic and accidental*, it is not the slavery of the Bible, nor of the Southern States, but a creature of their own imagination, clothed in a frightful livery, which has, studiously and persistently for years, been made up for it, from the *abuses* of the system. What then is Slavery? Slavery is the state of subjection which an individual, or a number of individuals, holds to authority, whether that authority be in a person, persons, sentiments, or things. That which compels *Obedience* is his *Master*, and to that, be it a person, a sentiment, or a thing, he is a *slave.* Nowhere is Slavery denounced in the Bible as sin *per se.* It is denounced when it is connected with that which is sinful, whether it be with a person, or sentiment, or thing, and it invariably receives its moral complexion from the moral character of the master. The slave of *Sin* is doubtless a *Sinner;* but how is it with the "*Slave of righteousness*," the "*Slave of God*," the "*Slave of Jesus Christ*"! for this is the phraseology used in the New Testament, a phraseology which of itself disproves the sinfulness of Slavery *per se.**

* No culprit feels the halter draw
With good opinion of the law.—Hudibras.

* In the passages quoted I have given the Greek word (δουλος, doulos) its true meaning in English. It is "*slave, bondman*, strictly one born so."

The *Greek text* is our guide, not a translation, however excellent. Many English words, since the times of the King James translation of the Bible, have changed their meaning. Our word "*servant*" is one of these. It has come to mean "*one who serves*," whether a bondman or a hired servant, thus confounding two distinct classes of domestics. The only way, therefore, of knowing the true

I can not, therefore, but think that to a false and exaggerated conception of the nature of Slavery, conjured up in the imaginations of men, unnaturally excited by dwelling upon extreme instances of the *abuse* of the relation, may be attributed that excessive vehemence against the relation itself which has warped the judgments, intensified the hate, and perverted the zeal of so many good men. That there is a relation expressed in the Bible by the terms Master and Slave, clearly ordained by God, is as certain as that he has ordained the cognate relations of Ruler and Ruled—Husband and Wife—Parent and Child; and it is quite as easy to dress up a hideous monster from the *abuses* in all and each of these cognate relations, by collecting together the instances of abuse of the power inherent in all of them, and dwelling upon their enormity till indignation is excited to fever heat, and then, instead of rightly directing that indignation to correct these abuses, which are abuses of administration, and not inherent in the system, adroitly pervert it to destroy the relation itself.

We say it is easy thus to call up a hideous phantom, and present it as the embodiment of each and all these relations, and so raise an outcry against the relation itself—this has already been done to our hand. There are sects of "*No Government*" enthusiasts, who have taken this very method to denounce all Government. There are sects of "*Free lovers*," who would abolish the matrimonial relation by the same method, attributing the ill-treatment, outrages, and murders of wives, details of which they find in abundance in every day's journals, to the restraint imposed by the bonds of matrimony. And if in respect to the Parental relation, no direct organization has been formed to abolish it, its power has been interfered with, and its machinery remodeled to suit the impracticable whims of those who would abolish the Matrimonial relation, on which the Parental relation so directly depends.

In view of the fact that Slavery or the Servile relation is proved to be one of the indispensable regulators of the Social system, divinely ordained for the discipline of the human race in this world, and that it is in perfect harmony not only with the cognate relations of Civil Government, the Matrimonial relation, and the Parental relation, but also with the great declared object of the Saviour's mission to earth, what influence should such a fact have upon some of the political questions of the day? If the Servile relation is an essential and indispensable divinely arranged part of the Social system, is not the attempt to blot it out altogether *by force* in any community, under the plea that it is sin, an evil, a wrong, and an outrage on humanity, or, indeed, on any other plea, sacrilegious? Let me not be misunderstood. I do not say that the relation may not be modified, indeed, like all the others, by those who have the legal control of it, by loosening or drawing tighter, according to circumstances, the restraints imposed on the inferior, even to that degree that

sense of the original text, is to recur to the original words; and in this case, the word in our version translated *servant*, wherever the original word in Greek is δουλος, (doulos,) or any of its derivatives, is *slave* or *bondman*, and I have, therefore, given in all instances where *doulos* is in the original, its true translation *slave*.

Another example of the change in the sense of English words, is in the word *prevent*. If we had not recourse to the original, our translation of the passage, "in the morning shall my prayer prevent thee," would seem to imply that our prayer *hindered* God from doing something; because, now, *prevent* means to *hinder*. But the meaning of prevent, at the time of our translation, was *to come before*. Recurring to the original then, to clear up the difficulty, it is readily done by giving the original meaning: "In the morning shall my prayer come before thee."

A few passages in which the word slave occurs, (doulos, δουλος,) will amply confirm the truth that Slavery receives its moral complexion from the moral character of the Master. Paul, in the Epistle to Romans and, in numerous other places, styles himself the "Slave of Jesus Christ." In Colossians he calls "Epaphras a Slave of Jesus Christ." Peter, and James, and Jude, as well as Paul, style themselves "Slaves of Jesus Christ," and the latter, in Romans 6:16, holds this language: "Know ye not that to whom ye yield yourselves *slaves* to obey, his slaves ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death or of obedience unto righteousness. But, God be thanked, that ye, having been the *slaves* of sin, (but ye) have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you. Being, then, made free from sin, *ye became enslaved* [edoulothete, εδουλωθητε] to righteousness; for as ye have yielded your members *slaves* to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity, even so now yield your members *slaves* to righteousness unto holiness. For when ye were *slaves* to sin, ye were free from righteousness, but now being made free from sin, and become *slaves of God*, ye have your fruit," etc.

restraints shall in effect disappear; but I do say that, in the present condition of humanity, no modification can legitimately obliterate the relation altogether, nor absolve the inferior from the duty of rendering obedience to the superior. *Civil Government* is modified by different forms throughout the world, from the most despotic to the most republican. There are evils in every form, because of the natural tendency of man to abuse his power. But because these evils, these accidents of the relation exist, is it a sound position to attempt with the "No Government" fanatics to put down all government? Yet with regard to Slavery, this is precisely the position of abolitionists. Government is modified in the severity of its restrictions just so far as the people, by their training to obedience to law, make it politic and wise; and a people intelligent, just, self-controlled, and truly religious, require none of the severities which are necessary to a people of the opposite character—ignorant, unjust, restive, factious, and irreligious. These changes from severe to mild, or *vice versa*, in proportion as a people or a race are prepared for them, will be inaugurated, whether man wills it or not; and the form of government will be imposed by a mightier hand than man's, according to the necessities of the case, in spite of all opposition; for man can not abrogate what God has ordained. Government will never be abandoned in this world till by its operation on character all men shall have bowed their own wills to the Supreme will. Government, says Herbert Spencer, "is an institution originating in man's imperfection—to the *bad* it is essential, to the *good* not. It is the check which *national wickedness* makes to itself, and exists only to the same degree that wickedness exists. Its continuance is proof of still existing barbarism. What a cage is to the wild beast, law is to the selfish man. Restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the violent; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent. All necessity for external force implies a morbid state. Dungeons for the felon; a strait-jacket for the maniac; crutches for the lame; stays for the weak-backed; *for the infirm of purpose a master;* for the foolish a guide; but for the sound mind, in a sound body, none of these. Were there no thieves and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary. Magisterial force is the sequence of social vice, and the policeman is the complement of the criminal. Therefore it is we call Government a necessary evil. Is it not the offspring of evil, bearing about it all the marks of its parentage? Does it not exist because crime exists? Is there not *more liberty*, that is, *less Government*, as crime diminishes?"

There is profound truth in all this, met with, it is true, in a field abounding with both flowers and nettles; yet this truth is sustained by coincident truth in the Bible. "The *law* is not made for a righteous man, but for the *lawless* and *disobedient*, for the ungodly and for sinners." (1 Tim. 1:19.) And again: "If ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law; the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance, *against such there is no law.*" (Gal. 5, 18:22.)

McCosh, in his admirable work on the Divine Government, holds substantially the same views. "Can we be wrong in supposing," he says, "that if man had been a being spotlessly pure, God would have governed him by a moral law, producing the same harmony throughout the world of mind as physical law does in the world of matter?" "It is questionable whether the mode of government best fitted for *holy beings* is at all adapted to those who have broken loose from the restraint of moral principle. When a father finds his children rebelling against him, and setting his authority at defiance, he must regulate his family on totally different principles from those adopted when the bonds that connected the members were confidence and love. God can not, in any case, abandon the government of any portion of his universe, and when he can not rule by moral laws, he must needs curb by *physical restraint.*"

No truth could be better expressed. When man fell from his original exalted state of subjection to the Divine will, then the instrumentalities for curbing him by physical restraint, by the strong arm of power, were devised and put in operation, and in the Divine plan of a Social System we have these several instrumentalities perfectly established, free from

all the inconsistencies and vulgarities, and shallow devices of the Social-System-mongers of the age.

All these relations are educational and disciplinary. Just in proportion as each of the two parties in the several relations conform to the Divine requirement of just rule on the one part, and cheerful obedience on the other, where these several relations are regulated by the law of Love, Society is peaceful, harmonious, prosperous, and the Slavery element in all of them is either so mitigated as to lose its severity, or it is made more stringent in its severity, just in proportion as the law is set at naught, being modified by the character of the individual or the community controlling or under control.

If in Civil Government the Ruler governs with justice, and is swayed by that love toward those over whom he rules which God has enjoined, it is readily perceived that his rule can not be oppressive or tyrannical, and the disposition to cheerful obedience on the part of the ruled is encouraged and strengthened. The Slavery, therefore, of this relation is in *effect* abrogated so soon and so far as it has accomplished its object in subduing the natural disobedience of the human heart, and tempered the character of a people with obedience to law. If, however, the ruled are fractious, turbulent, self-willed, vicious, the Slavery element inherent in government revives and manifests itself by more stringent measures, so that persistent disobedience is rebuked and subdued even by physical force. So in the Matrimonial relation, (where the Slavery element is of a milder type than in the other relations, being naturally tempered by a stronger Love in the two parties,) the obedience commanded becomes cheerful subjection, and then all revolting ideas of tyranny and oppression vanish, just so far as the parties conform to the rules that God has given for the regulation of that relation. When, however, the love that is enjoined disappears in the husband, and a willful, contrary, fractious spirit is manifested in the wife, then it is that disorder, contention, and wretchedness ensue in the family.

Again, in the Parental relation this same Slavery element is vigorous or mild, even disappearing altogether to suit the individual character of each child of a family. The Parent holding divinely appointed power, is commanded to use it temperately, not to provoke to wrath; but *obedience* is peremptorily commanded on the part of the child. Where the parental command is given in the temper required, and the child renders prompt and cheerful *obedience*, the bonds of its Slavery are not felt. But when the child is willful, headstrong, stubborn, unruly, then it is that the Slavery element of the relation asserts its power and brings its severities to bear, to subdue the native disobedience of the young heart, before its unrestrained exercise shall in manhood have given it a strength that will compel at a remoter period the Civil Governor to use the stronger and more effectual means of subjection, in order to protect Society from its violence.

And now in that relation in which the Slavery element is more strongly because directly pronounced, why should not the same reasoning be accepted? The Master is restrained from an unreasonable exercise of his power by motives drawn from his own responsibilities to a higher power; he must be just toward his Slave, but the Slave is commanded to *Obey;* when this obedience is cheerfully rendered by the Slave, and the Master exercises his power of command and direction in the temper required, are there any of those revolting appendages observable with which fanaticism delights to clothe it? On the contrary, are there not in this relation, when faithfully carried out according to the Divine directions, some of the most beautiful examples of domestic happiness and contentment that this fallen world knows? Protection and judicious guidance and careful provision on the one part; cheerful obedience, affection, and confidence on the other.

In the light of this argument, drawn from the *highest* law, we are able to detect the *inconsistencies* and *infraction of civil law* of those who hold that Slavery is Sin.

We see that if Slavery is Sin, it is not alone in the Servile relation proper, that this taint of Sin is found; but it is fundamental, is essential in the structure of all the other ordained relations of Society. But if in that relation in which it is more completely embodied, it is condemned as

the very essence of sin; or, to use its favorite designation, "*the sum of all villainies;*" by consequence, consistency requires that this sin in all its ramifications be rooted out of all the other relations. This is in effect to say that *Obedience*, or *subjection* to *authority*, must be altogether blotted out of the Social System. This accomplished, what then? Then comes the boasted reign of universal abolition Freedom! The God of the new religion will have triumphed. Are its worshipers prepared for such a consummation? But the light of this argument exposes infraction of Civil Law. There is at least an outward professed assent to the great truth that Civil Government is an ordinance of God; that "the powers that be are ordained of God." In this I shall assume that all are agreed. There should be among the intelligent citizens of this country no difficulty in discovering the number, the names, and the functions of these *Powers* to which they are subject, and the proper sphere in which they each of them act. The *Supreme power*, the *Sovereignty*—that power from which all other political power is derived, is, under our form of government, the *people*, or more properly stated in reference to the Federal Government, the PEOPLES of the States, each State being organized as *one people*. The People of each State being the Supreme power of that State, establish their own independent government, embody their will in a written Law called the Constitution, name the officers to wield powers delegated to them, and prescribe the duties and the limitations of each subordinate power; and this without legitimate interference from without the State, except such as may arise from the restraints of International law. These several States or peoples in their Sovereign capacity consult together, and devise and adopt a Federal Union of States, and delegate powers to form a Federal Government; appoint the various subordinate powers of that Government; instruct them and limit them in all their actions, and unitedly declare their will in a carefully prepared written instrument—the Supreme law of the land, or the Constitution.

To this Constitution or Supreme law, (being the embodiment of the will of the *Sovereign*—the *People*,) every officer, from the President to a politican, is amenable; for it is the highest of "the powers that be," whence all the subordinate "powers that be" are derived. Every officer, then, throughout the land, of whatever name or grade, whether a President of the United States or a Governor of a State, or a sheriff of a county, is one of the "powers that be," just so long as he performs his legitimate duties within the limits prescribed by that Supreme power which delegated to him the only power he possesses, and no longer. For so soon as he steps beyond the limits of his people-appointed sphere of duties, he is no longer one of the powers that be, but a usurper, an infractor of the Law, and as deserving of punishment as any other violator of Law. Now, if there is any law that is clearly defined, forbidding action on a specific subject, it is that law of the Constitution which says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." When, therefore, religious tenets are obtruded into the political arena, virtually demanding a settlement of conscientious differences of opinion by a political action which adopts the views of one of the parties, thus in effect "*prohibiting the free exercise*" of the opposite opinion to the other party, is not that action a palpable infraction of the Supreme Law? Such action is as truly *establishing by law* a *religious belief* as the passing of a law making one of the denominational creeds the religion of the State.

What is the tenet declaring *Slavery to be sin*, preached for over thirty years in abolition pulpits, but a setting forth of *a religious* belief? And what is the opposite tenet declaring Slavery to be an ordinance of God but the declaration of a *religious* belief? The believers in these two antagonistic tenets form two violently opposed sects, and both plead conscience in maintaining their respective tenets, and appeal to the Bible to sustain their creeds.

And can there be two religious sects in more perfect antagonism than one believing and maintaining that to be sin which the other believes and maintains to be ordained and established by God? If it be not a religious question, what means the sermons in the pulpits, on Fast and Thanksgiving occasions, so

universal at the present day, the lectures of the clergy and others, on Sundays and week days, the Resolutions of Synods and Conventions, and other Church organizations, and the rules of discipline in the various churches, excommunicating slaveholders, only because of their slaveholding, and their belief in the tenet, that Slavery is ordained of God? Do not these acts demonstrate the *religious* character of the crusade against that which they deem sin, and conclusively show it to be a religious question, upon which the political action of the Federal Government is urged with such zealous pertinacity? There are minds which can not, or at least, which do not, discriminate between political and religious duty; carried away by their religious feelings, they make all else bend to their own conscientious convictions. They have settled it immovably in their own minds that Slavery is sin, and therefore that it is right to press into the service of their consciences, political power, whether forbidden or not by the supreme law of the land. They cry *conscience*, and therefore believe themselves infallibly right. This is no imaginary or exaggerated statement. The affirmation that "John Brown was right because he acted conscientiously," is from a high political quarter.* This pleading of conscience, as a rule of right, should bear examination. They who believe Slavery to be sin, you say are conscientious. Granted. They also who believe it to be an ordinance of God, they who believe that abolitionists are the sinners, are also conscientious. Are both therefore, right? No, you will say; we are right, and they are wrong. Well, but they say that they are right, and you are wrong. How can that controversy be settled? Both plead conscience, both hold with pertinacity their own opinion, and therefore, according to your premises, both are right. John Brown is lauded, ay, canonized by some demented fanatics, because he carried out his conscientious convictions into act, and murdered innocent men and women in performing what he believed to be his duty. They who resisted him also carried out their conscientious convictions into act, captured, tried, and hung him. Why, on your principles, ought not they also to be lauded and canonized as well, especially as they acted under law, and he against law? Follow this out to the end, both now appeal to arms to sustain their conscientious convictions, what is the result? Let the condition of the country answer. The contests of conscience can in this way have no end but the annihilation of one or the other of the contestants. Do you say that it may be *compromised?* How? There can be no compromise between moral right and wrong. The annihilation, by force of arms, of those who admire the benevolence and the wisdom which they believe *they* see, if others do not, in the establishing of the Servile relation, can not make that *sin* which God has declared *wise and proper!* even after a thousand victories of arms. The question then forces itself upon us, What shall be done with this vexed subject of slavery? The answer is plain, *Let it alone.* Politically, as a Federal question, involving a religious conviction, we have certainly nothing to do with it; but whether Politically or Religiously, we have nothing to do with it in other States where Slavery exists. When the question, as a political one, is mooted, whether Slavery shall be established in the State of New-York, we, in New-York, can settle it for ourselves, without the aid or advice of the Federal Government, or of any of our sister States. Whatever our conscience or policy dictates in regard to our own State, is no rule or precedent for other States; and as to the judgment rendered by your conscience respecting their sentiments or actions, they may well ask: "Who art thou, who judgest another man's servant? To his own master he standeth or falleth." (Rom. 14 : 4.) "Why is my liberty judged by another man's conscience?" (1 Cor. 10 : 29.)

If action on this subject by any State is wrong, theirs is the responsibility; it is not ours.

But as an Ethical question, involving individual conscientious duty in regard to Slavery, there are some considerations which this argument suggests, which ought to have weight with Christians. It must be obvious to them, that many of the prominent errors of the day, manifested by social reformers, are traceable directly to a false theology, and the fruit

* Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts.

of the original fundamental error of *disbelief of the degeneracy* of man, the framing of social theories on the basis of the nature of man, in the image of his Maker, as originally created, as if man is *now* what he was at his creation, is a pregnant example.

Ignoring the great paramount fact of man's present condition, as no longer pos sessing his original character, how can a true social theory be the result?

A philosophy which leaves out of view such a vital fact as *man's degeneracy*, or treats it as a myth, can not arrive at other than erroneous conclusions.

It is a fact worthy of special notice, that the extreme abolitionists yield the Bible argument, and virtually acknowledge that the Bible is against them. Hence, having discovered this fact, like all fanatics who worship their theory in spite of reason or religion, they are ready with irreverent presumption, to throw compass and charts overboard, if these do not indicate the pre-determined course they stubbornly insist on pursuing. Therefore it is they demand a new compass and a new chart, and cry out for an "anti-Slavery Bible and an anti-Slavery God."*

What does this blasphemous demand prove but that the Bible as it is, and the God which it reveals, do not support their abolition views?

But I proceed to the consideration of a momentous fact, sustained by carefully collated statistics, that a great radical error, long since adopted by the Christian community, respecting the Christianization of barbarous nations, has led to a course, in relation to slavery, directly calculated to defeat the great object for which the Christian world has long been striving, to wit, the Christianization and civilization of these barbarous races.

In 1860, my brother, Sidney E. Morse, formerly editor of the New-York *Observer*, proposed some two hundred questions on the subject of slavery. One great fact, put in the form of a question, but which could only be answered affirmatively, struck me with great force at the time, to wit: "That from the official records of the Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and other Protestant churches, it was shown that nearly *four hundred thousand* (400,000) negroes (or one fifth part of the whole adult slave population of the Southern States) are members of Protestant Evangelical churches; while in all the churches of the Protestant missionary stations in the world, the number of converts is less than *two hundred thousand*, (200,000.)" Reflecting upon this statistical fact, seeing that the only great success of Christianity among the African race was precisely in that portion which was in slavery in the United States, I felt assured, that there must be somewhere a fundamental error, in regard to the influence of slavery upon that race, which had escaped detection by Christian men, and had led them into most dangerous paths. Hence, I presumed that an analysis of Bible principles of human society might lead to the detection of the error, and I thus was led to the method of investigation adopted in this argument. I had proceeded thus far in my labors, when I was put in possession of a work, through the courtesy of its learned author, which more than sustains, by indisputable data, the great fact above stated by my brother. This work, entitled, *Pulpit Politics*, a most valuable volume of over six hundred pages, is the result of the research and labor of Prof. David Christy, of Cincinnati. It is a careful collation of statistics from the best official sources, invaluable to Christian men, whether clergymen or laymen, and specially instructive to the statesmen and politicians of the day. It should be in the library of every citizen. I draw from this rich repository some important facts developed in the history of the past half-century, which fully confirm and strengthen this argument.

The great error of the day, in regard to slavery, lies imbedded far back in the history of anti-slavery agitation, and is of English origin, imported thence, and transplanted to a soil in New-England, but too congenial to its growth.

As far back as 1823, in England, the celebrated Mr. Buxton put forth in Parliament this dogma: "*The continuance of Slavery and the principles of the Christian religion are incompatible.*" Here was the embryo of that more positive tenet that *all slavery is sin*, afterward embodied in the programme of the American Anti-Slavery Society, in 1833,

* Hon. Anson Burlingame.

which Society took this ground, "that nothing short of *immediate and unconditional emancipation* could satisfy the demands of justice, and fulfill the righteous law of God." To Mr. Buxton's dogma, the celebrated Canning, clear-sighted and prophetic, replied in one of his most eloquent speeches, a paragraph from which is of great significance at this hour, and is earnestly commended to the attention of those so loudly laudatory of the President's Emancipation Proclamation. "Sir," said Mr. Canning, "we must remember that we are dealing with a being possessing the form and strength of a man, but the intellect only of a child. To turn him loose in the manhood of his physical strength, in the maturity of his physical passions, but in the infancy of his uninstructed reason, would be to raise up a creature resembling the splendid picture of romance; the hero of which can sketch a human form, with all the corporeal capabilities of a man, and with the thews and sinews of a giant; but being unable to impart to the work of his hands a perception of right and wrong, he finds too late that he has only created a more than mortal power of doing mischief, and himself recoils from the monster of his own creation."

We are experiencing at this very moment the beginnings of the work of this power of mischief, this monster conjured up and sedulously nurtured, and now, while I write, arming for his frightful work; preparing, under the influence of blind councils, for scenes of horror, which will call forth tears of blood from another and sobered generation. Deplorable as is this course marked out by short-sighted politicians, it is still more mournful to see some of the professed disciples of the Prince of Peace, under the spell of this horrible delusion, sustaining and encouraging it with all their zeal and eloquence as a Christian cause; but so it is that, having adopted as a truth, a dogma unsupported by any authority or experience from the Bible, or from Providential developments, but contradicted by both, and only taken to be truth on the dictum of a good but deluded man, they have been led into the most pernicious measures, directly counteracting their own benevolent purposes of salvation to a barbarous people, utterly ruinous to the country, to religion, and to the degraded race for whose benefit they profess to labor.

After nearly *fifty* (50) *years'* labor by the American churches in the *Foreign field*, they can count but about *forty-four thousand five hundred* (44,500) members among the *free* negroes, while the churches at the South can number more than half a million, *five hundred and twenty-four thousand seven hundred and sixty-six* (524,766) among their *slaves!* The Methodist missions in Liberia have labored *forty-two* (42) years, expended more than five hundred thousand (500,000) dollars, and in 1862, their report gives, as the grand result, sixty five (65) *native* members!

The united Presbyterian church in Trinidad, among the *free* negroes, has been organized for *twenty* (20) years, and numbered, as the result of their labors, *six* (6) converts!!

These are stubborn facts, confirmed by careful, laborious, dispassionate research. The details will be found in Professor Christy's work, to which we refer the reader.

Now, what is the logical inference from these facts? The most unfortunate and calamitous dictum of Mr. Buxton, however philanthropically intended, "*that the continuance of Slavery and the principles of Christianity are incompatible*," does not stand the test of fifty years' experimenting, on the ground that it is a truth.

No dogma ever uttered is proved to be more directly *opposite the truth*, more directly at variance with the teachings of the Bible and the experience of Missionary history.

Experience shows that the converse of this dogma, as a general rule, is the truth. CHRISTIANITY HAS BEEN MOST SUCCESSFULLY PROPAGATED AMONG A BARBAROUS RACE, WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN ENSLAVED TO A CHRISTIAN RACE. *Slavery* to them has been *Salvation*, and *Freedom, ruin*. This is a proposition that stands the test both of Scripture and experience. Observe how perfectly it conforms to the Divine plan of the Social System, brought to view in this argument.

It is a truth to be well pondered, that the whole human race without *government* is *barbarous*, and it is only by the

establishment of *government* in its various modifications, to suit the various classes and conditions of society, that man, from the earliest stages of his existence, has ever been civilized. No one will dispute this fact. In all these relations of the Social System, therefore, we perceive that *Obedience* is the central idea, and *Government* (more definitely and in its largest scope ordained in the *first* relation) is a notable and significant idea in all the other relations. The Matrimonial, the Parental, and the Servile relations, are all *governments* in limited spheres, adapted to operate upon the particular classes over which each relation extends. If this be so, as a moment's reflection will show, then when we consider that the great prevailing characteristic of a barbarous race is *anarchy;* that lawlessness, insubordination, and every conceivable form of licentiousness, are in the ascendant, we are shut up to the conclusion that such a race must first have a *government* imposed upon it from *without;* for, there are *no elements within it* from which to form a government. In the light of this truth, how does that ordinance of God which so many in our day have recklessly stamped as foolishness, illustrate the Bible truth that "the foolishness of God is wiser than men!" The Servile relation is a *government* adapted to just such a race, and God, in his wisdom and far-sighted benevolence, has ordained that despised and vilified *relation* as the means of bringing that race home to himself. This is the Bible theory, and the experience of the day sustains it in both aspects of the question. When the relation of Master and Slave is left to its natural workings under the regulations divinely established, and unobstructed by outside fanatic busybodyism, the result, on the enslaved and on society at large, is salutary and benevolent. When resisted, as it is by the abolitionism of the day, we have only to look around us to see the horrible fruits, in every frightful, and disorganizing, and bloody shape.

Crimination and recrimination, the bandying of opprobrious epithets, will not restore our Union. Force will not restore it. Peace, harmony, fraternal affection, can not come from the physical instrumentalities which *fanaticism* has brought into existence, and is using so fiercely to attain an impracticable end. Fanaticism, leaning on the church, fanaticism encouraged and hounded on, with all the wild zeal of a Peter the Hermit, supported by a false conscience, a wicked conscience, can never restore the Union.

The seeds of Peace must be sown by the true disciples of the Prince of Peace. As this war of separation commenced in the churches, so must the first steps for conciliation come up from the churches. They who have turned their pulpits into rostra for partisan harangues, must exorcise first their own hearts and then their pulpits from the demoniacal possession. It is they who are in fault, who have adopted, and who disseminate, with all their zeal, the false belief, and have joined in the deceptive cry that "*Slavery is Sin, and the cause of our civil war; down, therefore, with Slavery.*" If the doctrine in this argument is sound, they will be convinced that it is not Slavery, but the fanatic resolve to blot out an ordinance of God, which lies at the root of our national troubles. It is abolitionism that is our national sin, and a sin flagrant enough, too, to call down the judgments under which we suffer. Christians oppose the insane and licentious vagaries of the Free-love faction, a faction which would abolish the Matrimonial relation, on the ground of the abuses and cruelties which every day's police-reports expose to the world, and which, they say, should devote it to destruction. If these free-lovers should acquire political power sufficient to wield the resources of the government, and their political campaign-cry should be, "Down with Matrimony," they would be opposed to the death by every decent citizen, and a civil war would ensue. Would *Matrimony* or *anti-Matrimony* be the cause of that war? Would they who *uphold* that relation which God has ordained, or they who would *abolish* it as sin, be the responsible inciters of the strife? The absurdity, and wickedness, and impracticability of the attempt in this case of the free-love fanatics is at once perceived: can not the like absurdity in the case of Slavery and abolitionism be also discerned?

I am fully aware of the hold which the wide-spread and long-continued influence of abolition sophistry, through the *wrest-*

ings of Scripture,* and the inflammatory appeals to the instincts of human nature, has had on so many of the clergy individually and in conventions, and in the resolutions of various church organizations. How lamentable that many of these latter organizations should be left blindly to incur the fearful responsibility of adding to the catalogue of those sinful acts, which they have voted as deserving of the extremest church censure, to wit, *excommunication*, a presumed sin which can nowhere be found in the Bible. How is it possible that men with the Bible in their hands can be so deluded as not to see that by their sanctioning such an extreme measure for such a cause, they have rendered themselves amenable to a direct apostolic *excommunication*. See if this is not true. Consider for a moment how universal at the South is the opinion among those excellent men there, whom the Christian world esteem to be Christians, if others do not, that the relation of master and slave is a divine ordinance. You say they are in error; they say you are in error; they hold their opinions as conscientiously as you do yours; you, in conformity with your declared opinion, have proceeded to *excommunicate them* from the Church. Have you duly reflected, with how much more propriety, with what greater show of authority, they might proceed to excommunicate you from the Church? Read the First Epistle to Timothy at the 6th chapter.† Paul is giving special directions to Timothy on this very subject of Slavery, he charges him with the instructions to be given to each of the parties in this servile relation; how the slave is to esteem his master, and the master his slave; and he then describes the abolitionists of that day, they who "taught otherwise," and holding them up for stern rebuke, declares what discipline is to be dealt out to such disorganizers *αφίστασο απω των τοιουτων*, [*aphistaso apo ton toiouton*,] "separate from them," "remove from them."

* *Wrestings of Scripture.* Few are aware to what a fearful extent these *wrestings* have gone. The most popular quotations to sustain abolitionism are false, distorted, irrelevant applications of Scripture, *none* of them bearing sober examination. Take, for example, those made in Helper's book, *not one of them* having any true application to the subject.

† See Appendix and last column for a case in point.

In other words, he calls upon the Church summarily to *excommunicate them*. Can you find like authority in the teachings of the Saviour or of his apostles for any such rebuke of Slavery or Slaveholding? No one who examines, even in the most cursory manner, the aspect of public affairs, but must perceive that it is this *war upon Slavery*, and not *Slavery*, which is the apple of discord in Church and State. Even those who would have been shocked at the idea in the outset of waging a war to root out Slavery from the land, now acquiesce with a certain complacency, saying that although they would not commence a war for the purpose, yet since it has been commenced, and as they flatter themselves not by their fault, they are rejoiced that the final abolition of Slavery is insured. To such I say, Do you comprehend what such a position as you assume implies? It implies just this: you would not make war directly on an institution proved by the Bible and by experience to be divinely devised for good to a barbarous race, or barbarous men, but you are glad, on the whole, that war has been declared against it, and that its destruction is probably insured; the result, indeed, will be the placing them in a condition which will inevitably undo all that Christian benevolence has hitherto done for them, and reduce them again to barbarism. They will be taken from a position where Christianity has reached them, and does now reach them, and can continue to reach them successfully, and they will be put into a condition which you dignify with the name of *freedom*, a condition in which experience has proved conclusively they can not be reached.

If the *Bible truth* and *missionary experience* had their proper influence upon you, you would rather rejoice at the wise forecast which provided for a weak and degraded race the Christian supervision of governors suited to their condition, providing for their temporal as well as spiritual good, and making them a blessing instead of a curse to the world. But it may be you still insist that the *extirpation* of Slavery will be a blessing, and that it is to be accomplished in the present strife. You will be egregiously mistaken in the result. There may possibly be a change of the masters—they who have been instrumental in Christian-

izing the barbarous race committed to their training may be destroyed, and the Slaves turned over to a new set of inexperienced masters whose key-note is *freedom*—but they will be slaves still, despite of all your efforts to free them, or by whatever names of freedom you choose to call them. You may call them *freedmen*, you may proclaim liberty to them till doomsday, but when you see, as you inevitably will, the fruit of your folly, in your war on providential arrangements, and of your obstinate blind resistance of God's plan for elevating these degraded beings, then will come the bitter memories of the counsels of statesmen and Christians rejected, of warnings despised, "the name of God and his doctrine blasphemed," vain regrets for the best blood of the country poured forth like water, and for the millions of treasure worse than wasted in fraternal strife; awaking from the delusive dream of a hollow freedom, the figment of infidelity, you will find those chains which a false philanthropy had, in imagination, seen fettering the negro, in sad reality fastened upon your own limbs; the boasted liberty and equality which abolition fanaticism had forced upon the slave turned into disastrous license and hopeless debasement; the country divided, ruined; the scorn, the sport, and the prey of foreign powers; your own freedom a glittering shadow of the past, and your necks in the dust under the iron heel of military rule. This is the dark programme for a day of fasting and repentance, when abolitionism has done its work, and God shall write the doom of the country in letters of blood, for the warning of the world:

THIS IS THE NATION THAT PROUDLY DARED TO DEFY MY WISDOM, AND CALL MY ORDINANCES SIN.

APPENDIX.

FIRST RELATION—CIVIL GOVERNMENT; or the Relation of RULER, and RULED.

Titus 3: 1—Put them in mind to be *subject* to principalities and powers, to *obey* magistrates.

Romans 13—Let every soul *be subject* unto the higher powers, for there is no power but of God. The powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou not then be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou doest that which is evil, be afraid, for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.

Wherefore ye must needs *be subject* not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake, for this cause pay ye tribute also, for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render therefore, to all their dues, tribute to whom tribute, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor.

1 Peter 2: 13—*Submit* yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, whether it be to the King, as Supreme, (or the Supreme power,) or unto Governors, as to them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God. Honor all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honor the King.

SECOND RELATION—The MATRIMONIAL; or the Relation of HUSBAND and WIFE.

Titus 2: 4—Teach the young women to be sober, to love their husbands—*to be obedient* to their own husbands.

Eph. 5: 22—Wives, *submit* yourselves unto your own husbands as unto the Lord. For the husband is *the head* of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the church. Therefore, as the church is *subject* unto Christ, so let the wives *be subject* to their own husbands in every thing.

So ought men to *love* their wives as their own bodies. Let every one of you in particular so *love* his wife even as himself, and the wife see that she *reverence* her husband.

1 Pet. 3: 1—Likewise, ye wives, *be in subjection* to your own husbands. Let your adorning be the hidden man of the heart in that which is not corruptible—for after this manner in the olden time, the holy women also who trusted in God adorned themselves, *being in subjection to their own husbands*, even as Sarah *obeyed* Abraham, calling him Lord. Likewise, ye husbands, dwell with them, according to knowledge, giving honor unto the wife as unto the weaker vessel.

Colos. 3: 18—Wives, *submit yourselves* unto your own husbands as it is fit in the Lord. Husbands, love your wives, and be not bitter against them.

THIRD RELATION—The PARENTAL; or the Relation of PARENT and CHILD.

Colos. 3: 18—Children, *obey* your parents in all things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. Fathers, provoke not your children, less they be discouraged.

Eph. 6: 1—Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for this is right. Honor thy father and mother, which is the first commandment with promise. And, ye fathers, provoke not your children to wrath.

FOURTH RELATION—The SERVILE; or the Relation of MASTER and SLAVE.

Eph. 6: 5 — Slaves, δουλοι [douloi] *be obedient* to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in singleness of your heart as unto Christ, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but as the slaves [douloi] of Christ, doing the *will* of *God* from the heart; with good will doing service as to the Lord, and not to men. Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. And, ye masters, do the same things unto them, forbearing threatening, knowing that your master also is in heaven, neither is there respect of persons with him.

1 Tim. 6: 1 — Let as many slaves [douloi] as are under the yoke count their own masters worthy of all honor, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. If any man teach otherwise and consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the doctrine which is according to godliness, he is proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings of men of corrupt minds and destitute of the truth, supposing that gain is godliness—*from such withdraw thyself.*

Col. 3: 18—Slaves, [douloi,] *obey* in all things your masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service as men-pleasers, but in singleness of heart, fearing God, and whatever ye do, do it heartily as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing that of the Lord ye shall receive the reward of the inheritance, for ye serve the *master* Christ; but he that doeth wrong shall receive for the wrong which he hath done, and there is no respect of persons. Masters, give unto your slaves [douloi] that which is just and equal, knowing that ye have a master in heaven.

1 Pet. 2: 18—Servants, οἰκεται,* [oiketai,] *be subject to your masters* with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, for this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully; for what glory is it if when ye be buffeted for your faults ye shall take it patiently; but if when ye do well and suffer for it, ye take it patiently, this is acceptable to God.

Titus 2: 9 — Exhort slaves [douloi] to be *obedient* unto their own masters and to please them in all things, not answering again, not purloining, but showing all good fidelity.

A Presbytery of the "United Presbyterians," held in Steubenville, Ohio, very recently debated the question: "*Whether it was consistent with the principles of the United Presbyterian Church to vote for C. L. Vallandigham.*" Their report says: "The Presbytery considered that voting for that candidate involved *a great moral question*, and that no member of the United Presbyterian Church could vote for him without ignoring his principles *on slavery*, and countenancing and encouraging disloyalty." The Clerk of the Presbytery writes: "It was gratifying to see how unhesitatingly the elders, as well as the ministers, gave an emphatic No to the question." It was unanimously decided in the negative.

A distinguished clergyman of the West thus describes his own practice in the Church:

"I administered the Supper on last Sabbath, and *cut off* every Butternut* in the congregation from the *communion* of the Church. There is no use in half-way measures in these times. It is an insult to the intelligence of the Church for rebel sympathizers or *Butternuts* to remain in her communion, and if they will not peaceably withdraw, they should be *cut off.*"

These facts illustrate the lamentable apostasy which has been effected in the Church through *abolition* teachings, and the depth of degradation to which some religious teachers have been left to fall. True Christians in another age will look back upon the fanaticism of our days, as those of the present age now do upon the witchcraft delusions of the last century, with amazement and pity.

The above facts also illustrate the obtrusion of a religious sectarianism into the political arena, demanding, under penalty of Church censure, the support of a particular religious creed at the polls. With as much propriety the Baptists might threaten to excommunicate from their communion those of their members who should vote for a United Presbyterian because he believed in Pedo-baptism, this also being esteemed by Baptists a *great moral question.*

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* οἰκεται [oiketai] is not a synonym of δουλοι, [douloi,] but means strictly "*an inmate of one's house*," but most usually a "*house-slave*;" this meaning gives still greater force to the injunction to obedience: since if they who are *quasi-slaves*, not so absolutely *slaves* as the [douloi,] are commanded to *obey* even froward or tyrannical masters, how much more if he were a slave in the sense of [doulos]?

† A *Butternut*, in the nomenclature of that region is a *Slaveholder*, or one who is *an opposer of abolitionism.*

A BRAVE SOLDIER, A TRUE PATRIOT, A NOBLE MAN

DEFENDED AGAINST PARTISAN MALICE.

REPLY

OF

HON. REVERDY JOHNSON

TO THE PAPER WHICH JUDGE-ADVOCATE HOLT FURNISHED TO THE PRESIDENT, URGING GENERAL PORTER'S CONDEMNATION.

[It will be remembered by the public, that after the Court-Martial had made up their judgment and transmitted it to the President of the United States, Judge-Advocate-General Holt furnished to the President, without the knowledge of General Porter's Counsel, an argument in favor of condemning Porter. The able reply of Senator Johnson comes too late to save Porter from the cruel sentence inflicted on him, but not too late to save him in the hearts of his countrymen, who owe him all that a nation ever owed to a brave and faithful defender of her cause. It is a duty, in the performance of which all true Americans will unite, to give this document the widest possible circulation.—*New-York Publishers.*]

REPLY.

NOTE.—The references to the evidence, etc., are to the Record of the trial, as published by order of the House of Representatives.—Ex. Doc. No. 71. Thirty-seventh Congress, third Session.

THE preparation of this Reply was delayed until a printed copy of the Record in the case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter was obtained, and since, by professional engagements, which the writer was not at liberty to set aside. It is now submitted in the confidence that the intelligent and impartial reader will coïncide in opinion with the writer, that a greater injustice was never done through the forms of a judicial proceeding, than was done by the sentence of the Court-Martial in the case of that gallant officer.

BALTIMORE, July, 1863.

To vindicate a citizen unjustly assailed, is the duty of all men who properly estimate the value of individual character and its influence on the public good. The duty is the more imperative, if the services of such citizen have contributed to the honor of his country, and have been rendered with great toil and solicitude, and amidst frequent and imminent perils. To this general obligation in the instance which causes this paper, there is with the writer superinduced the special one growing out of the professional relation in which he has heretofore stood to the officer whose case forms its subject. His first personal acquaintance with Major-General Fitz-John Porter was, when he became one of his counsel on his recent trial. Before then, he knew him only, (and who did not so know him who has followed the history of our sad civil war?) as a patriotic, skillful and gallant officer, giving his days and nights to duty, ever discharging it to its fullest measure, and on all occasions answering the highest expectations of his superior officers, his friends and country. In his hands the military service had not only suffered no dishonor, but had attained even higher distinction. He had achieved for himself a name of which the nation was justly proud, and a reputation amongst all those of his brothers in arms, who, being themselves worthy of their noble profession, saw, without envy, every manifestation of his skill and gallantry, and rejoiced at it as enhancing the reputation of the service, and giving the assurance that a patriotic soldiery led, as Porter led his men, could not fail to extinguish the rebellion, restore the people to their former happiness and prosperity, reïnstate the Government in its rightful authority, and give it a name with the nations of the world, even brighter and more commanding than it had ever possessed. The high esteem in which, in common with all, the writer held Porter, was, if possible, increased after he became his counsel. And to that esteem was then soon added the closer and even stronger ties of personal friendship. For weeks, seeing him almost constantly, not only in the Court by whom his case was tried, but in private consultation, he had every opportunity of becoming acquainted with the man, and as far as he is capable of judging, with the officer. He witnessed in the former that freedom from vanity, that mildness of disposition with that firmness of purpose which are often united, and a strong sense of honor that won for him his highest regard, and in the latter a devotion to his profession, a perfect acquaintance with all the conflicts in which he had been engaged, a cheerful readiness in rendering honor where honor was due, a mildness of censure where he thought errors had been committed, an ardent love of country, and a confident consciousness of innocence of the charges which he was to answer, which, independent of all other evidence, satisfied him that such charges were in every particular wholly unfounded.

When the evidence was all given, he regrets to be compelled to say, that he was further satisfied that they were as malicious as unfounded. But, though then, and still so convinced, he would never have deemed it necessary to bring his case

again before the public in the form of a vindication, notwithstanding the sentence of the Court affirming their truth, but for the reasons he is about to give. A defense was made before the sentence was pronounced, and by all who heard it, or who have since read it, a defense considered as triumphant and unanswerable. So universal was this opinion, that when the evidence and the defense had been seen, an acquittal was anticipated with undoubting confidence. So great and general was that confidence, that never in the history of jurisprudence, civil, criminal, or military, was a judgment announced that so shocked and startled the sense of public justice. In speaking of the ability of the defense, the undersigned but pays a just tribute to his associate counsel, Mr. Charles Eames, by whom it was, in every thing deserving praise, exclusively prepared. But what occurred without the knowledge of General Porter, or his counsel, whilst the case was progressing, and in the Court, whilst the evidence was being given, and at the close of the reading of the defense, and what has since occurred has rendered it proper, in the opinion of the writer, that the public judgment should be again invoked. Upon various grounds, it is not less due to Porter, and to truth—than to the good of the military service, and to the confidence so material to that good which is to be placed in future military judgments, that the attention of the public mind should be once more invited. The grounds referred to are these:

I. Pending the trial, the evidence of three of the leading witnesses of the prosecution, Major-General Pope, Brigadier-General Roberts, and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas C. H. Smith, was secretly and anonymously published in Washington, in pamphlet form, with a title-page which, as evidently intended, would lead the reader to suppose that it contained either all the evidence in the case, or that the evidence that it did contain was in no particular rebutted by other proof. Porter has since discovered that the cost of this publication was paid by Smith, and that Roberts transmitted copies to persons in several of the Northern States, and as believed, to many members of the Senate of the United States, a fact disclosed in part in a short debate in that body at its recent session. On a motion calling for the Record for the purpose of publication—Mr. Fessenden objected, because, as he stated, the Record had already been printed, a copy of it having been sent to him, (by whom sent he did not say, because he did not know,) but doubtless by Roberts, or by his direction. Even by so discerning a gentleman and accomplished a lawyer as Fessenden, the fraud of the publication was not discovered.

II. The rulings of the Court, (which for obvious reasons could not be commented upon in the defense,) on questions of the admissibility of evidence in some instances, and as the undersigned believes in all, were so palpably erroneous, and so injurious to Porter, that they foreshadowed in colors too striking to be mistaken, the result to which a majority of the Court would arrive. These errors were so apparent as to excite the surprise, and incur the censure, as the writer knew at the time, of distinguished Judges, and members of the bar without an exception, unless the Judge-Advocate was one. It is not meant to say that he was, especially as on more than one occasion, he himself intimated the error and induced the Court to correct it.

III. When the evidence was all introduced, the counsel of Porter requested to have until the following Monday to prepare the defense, but the Court suggested, because of other pressing engagements of some of the members, the following Saturday. This suggestion was agreed to by the counsel with the understanding, sanctioned by the Court, that if the Judge-Advocate replied, the counsel should have the right to rejoin. Whether he would reply or not, that officer declined to say. The Court was then cleared, no one remaining with them but the Judge-Advocate. The evidence was, it is said, read over, doubtless commented upon by all, and from the celerity with which the sentence followed the reading of the defense, even charity can not but believe, that it was determined upon before a word of the defense was heard. The defense was read on Saturday, the tenth of January, 1863, and the moment it was concluded, which was about half-past two o'clock P.M., the Judge-Advocate said, orally, that he did

not propose to answer it, but that he submitted the case on the part of the Government without remark. The Court was then cleared, the Judge-Advocate again remaining with them, and before six o'clock P.M., the sentence pronounced, that the accused "be cashiered," and "be forever disqualified from holding any office under the Government of the United States." The character of the evidence, as published from day to day in the journals of the country, had so satisfied the public of Porter's innocence, and that conviction become the more fixed and absolute when it was seen that the Judge-Advocate declined to answer the defense, thereby seemingly submitting to a judgment by default, and that the Court decided so immediately after the defense was closed, that all saw it was impossible, even that the evidence could have been read, much less so considered as is due to proper judgment, or the defense either read or compared with the evidence, a measure called for by judicial propriety and necessary to a just and enlightened conclusion. In this state of the public opinion, as manifested by the concurrent voice of the entire press, that spoke at all, the record was placed in the hands of the President. Unless he had before been unofficially advised of it, he must, when he read the sentence, have been struck with the same surprise with which its after announcement struck the public ear. Of all the men in the country, he must have experienced not only astonishment, but concern. In May, 1861, he had commissioned Porter a Colonel in the regular army, in August of the same year, a Brigadier-General of volunteers, and in July, 1862, and for distinguished services in the Peninsular campaign, a Brevet-Brigadier-General in the regular army, and a Major-General of volunteers. Honors due to him, in the view of the President, for amongst others, the services rendered to his country in the battle of Malvern, a battle which, in the words of his Chief, McClellan, in a letter to the President written just afterward, and near the battle-ground, and speaking, as he said, "not from hearsay, but from personal observation," that had eclipsed, "in its result any other engagement in the campaign," and that too much credit could not "be given to General Porter for his skill and gallantry on the occasion."

The President, then, could not but have paused before approving such a sentence and asked himself how it was possible that Porter, the idol of his men, the boast of the army, the pride of his chief, and the recipient of honors which, from a sense of public justice and gratitude, he had conferred upon him for distinguished and valuable services rendered his country in a most perilous crisis, should all at once have been so recreant to his past patriotism, so forgetful of his then well-earned and universally acknowledged fame, as to have committed acts almost before the ink was dry upon the parchments containing his commissions, and whilst the public heart was so gladdened by his deeds of skill and daring, as to demand, in the judgment of a Court composed of brother officers, that he "be cashiered," and "forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States."

The Record was of great volume. As published by Congress, inclusive of the defense, it consists of two hundred and ninety-eight closely printed octavo pages. The President should have taken time, before approving of such a sentence, the writer respectfully submits, to have examined it to find what it could contain to justify such a judgment. The mere sentence itself gave him no such information. It was, as is usual, but a mere naked judgment, and must, therefore, have left his mind in the condition of amazement in which it could not but have placed him. Nor could he discover why, if at all, his distinguished Judge-Advocate should have sanctioned such a result. The Record contained no reasons of that officer, summary or in detail. It did contain the defense of the accused, and if he had read that, his amazement could but have been increased, as he would have seen that it was, what all but the Court, or to speak (as there is reason to believe) more accurately, a bare majority, thought a complete and perfect vindication. The President's time, however, was perhaps so engrossed by matters which he supposed to be of more pressing national moment, (as if anything was more important than justice,)

hat it was impossible, within the period, he twelfth of January, 1863, when the Record was placed in his hands, and his pproval of the sentence promulgated on he twenty-first of that month, that he ould have read it through carefully, or at ll, or examined the testimony, or tested he fairness or sufficiency of the defense, y an accurate or critical review of the vidence. Nor, as it now appears, did he ndertake what, in the interval referred o, would have been an impracticable task. or, as is stated in the review of the Judge-dvocate, which it is the main purpose of he writer to answer, on the thirteenth ay of January, 1863, the day after the Record was transmitted to him, the Presi-ent issued "written instructions" to that fficer, "to revise the proceedings of the ourt-Martial in the case of Major-General itz-John Porter, and to report fully upon ny legal questions that may have arisen n them, and upon the bearing of the estimony in reference to the charges and pecifications exhibited against the accused, nd upon which he was tried." These in-tructions produced an elaborate paper, lated the nineteenth of the same month. The Record between that day and the late of the instructions, and the prior hirteenth, must have been continuously n the exclusive possession of the Judge-Advocate. It is probable that the Record, with the review, was not returned to the President before the twentieth, but, how-ever that may be, it could not have been returned at the earliest sooner than the day of the date of the review, the nine-teenth, and on the twenty-first the sentence was approved. It is even, therefore, the more obvious than it would otherwise be, that in this short period of two days, proper examination and comparison of the proofs, and the bringing to their test Porter's defense, and subjecting to the same test the Judge-Advocate's review, (each vital to a proper consideration and just conclusion,) could not have been made by the President. The inference, there-fore, is irresistible, that in this instance at least; (with motives which his established character prevents our questioning, how much we may lament its weakness and in-justice,) he has rested his judgment, though severely calculated to dishonor a well-tried public servant whom he had but recently before, over and over again, honored by acts of distinguished official favor, upon the argument of his Judge-Advocate alone, without collating it even with the portions of the evidence quoted by that officer, much less with all the evidence so material to understand properly and justly the por-tions quoted, or even stopping to discover what is thought to be quite apparent, the depth of the prejudice which that officer entertained toward the accused. Repos-ing, however, confidence in the Judge-Advocate, he has, yielding to the pressure of other engagements, submitted his own judgment to the keeping of that officer. And he did this so entirely, that it does not seem to have occurred to him, that it was in any respect due to Porter that he should have an opportunity, through his counsel, of replying to the argument of the Judge-Advocate. What occurred in the Court on that point could not, therefore, have been made known to him. He could not have been told, that in the view of the Court, if a reply was made to the defense, it was due to the accused, and his privi-lege, that he should have the right to re-join. But it is most singular, and not to be accounted for, except that his other harassing and important engagements deadened his sense of justice, that a right so justly due to Porter, and so necessary to truth, had not suggested itself to his honest mind, and more especially, as his long experience as a lawyer must have taught him its importance.

But so it was. The accused then, as far as the President's action is concerned, has had his case decided on the argument of the Judge-Advocate's review, not only without having had accorded to him the privilege of reply, but without the Presi-dent's having taken time to read all the evidence, if he read any part of it, or to read the defense, or to test that or the re-view by comparing either with the whole evidence or with any part of it. The rule of military law as laid down by Sir Charles J. Napier, is now well settled, that no matter how many addresses are made by either party, "the prisoner has the right to speak last." *Bennet*, pp. 123, 124. In this instance, the rule was grossly violated. The last speech was made by the Judge-Advocate. Porter was not only not per-mitted to reply, but the existence even of

the review was apparently concealed from him, certainly was not known by him until in common with all, after the sentence was announced, approved and circulated by the War Department. To any mind accustomed to the investigation of truth and the ascertainment of facts through human testimony, such means are known not only to be important but essential. No conclusion arrived at in any other way, can be relied upon. No judgment, otherwise formed, is entitled to the least respect. In any instance it is as likely to be wrong as right, and more likely to be wrong, in a case where it affects injuriously the character of a citizen whose antecedents had challenged not only the good opinion of those who knew him, but their admiration, and whose claim to public esteem rests on admitted valuable and perilous public service. In such a case, mental imbecility or prejudice, so deep and dark as wholly to cloud reason, must be supposed to be the foundation of the error. And with an evident consciousness that the observing and correct mind of the country would be astounded at the result, with a zeal and industry worthy of a better cause, the same resort, which so evidently misled the President, has been adopted to quiet the certainly anticipated public condemnation. While the Senate refused to call for the Record in order to its publication, (because of their having been deceived through the degrading artifice of Roberts and Smith, into the belief that it had all been published,) that the people might see the whole case, the review of the Judge-Advocate was at once published at the expense of the War Department, and scattered broad-cast over the land. Other things, too, have happened, suggestive of most unpleasant reflections — reflections casting more than a doubt on the mere abstract correctness of the Court's sentence. Almost simultaneously with its publication, three of the members of the Court were made Major-Generals, all certainly most estimable gentlemen, and possibly competent soldiers, but with no claims to such promotion. One of them, Major-General Prentiss, the only one of the three who it is confidently believed, did not concur in the sentence, has recently proved himself worthy of his rank, by his skilful defense of Helena, Arkansas. But the public in vain at the time, endeavored to recollect any fact as to either calling for such an honor, and have not been more successful since, except and very recently as to Prentiss. And they have asked, and still ask, if their distinguished services and the good of the country required their elevation to such high rank, why was it not conferred before? And why, why above all, was it the immediate sequence of the sentence against Porter? Who can answer satisfactorily either question? None certainly has as yet come from any quarter. The President of the Court, Major-General Hunter, was also immediately returned to a command from which he had been shortly before removed for acts of alleged mistaken policy, or excess of authority, and from which it has been found necessary to remove him a second time.

Of the three witnesses, Major-General Pope was continued in an important command, notwithstanding his sad failure in his Virginia campaign. Brigadier-General Roberts was assigned to a more important one than he had ever held before, or to which any competent officer who had known him believed him equal—nor in his career since has he done any thing to attract attention, except in the way in which his former chief signalized the commencement of his Virginia career, the issuing of proclamations as uncalled for as they were ridiculous and futile. It has also been found necessary in his case, to take it from him, and he is now once more on Pope's staff.

What disposition has been made of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, is not known, and probably no one cares. (Appendix, No. 5, p. 86.) He perhaps continues to be one of the military family of Pope, ready whenever his exigencies may require it, to display for his benefit, the extraordinary faculty which he claims to possess—the reading of souls at first sight. The faculty of receiving, to use his own words, an "impression," although unable to analyze it from a few moments' intercourse with another—the power to obtain "one of those convictions that a man has a few times, perhaps, in his life, (he is modest enough not to claim to have it always at his command,) as to the character and purposes of a person who he sees for the first time," and although "no man can express altogether how such an im-

pression is gained from looks and manner, but it is clear."

Under all these circumstances, with every ingenious mind, a sentence announced as this was, would be without the slightest authority, and no reason could exist for subjecting it to serious examination. The fact, however, that the present one is maintained and justified by Mr. Judge-Advocate-General Holt, makes it in a measure advisable. The well-established reputation of that officer, his perfect loyalty, his eminent ability, and the somewhat plausible character of the review, considered by itself, seems to require that that review be answered. For, however, as the writer has good reasons for believing, this is thought to be unnecessary by those who have made themselves acquainted with all the evidence, there must be a numerous class of citizens, who not having done so, may have been led astray by it.

The ingenuity of the Judge-Advocate, and his deservedly high reputation, gives to it an authority to which it will be seen it is not entitled, when it comes to be examined. A reader uninformed as to the evidence, will be unable to detect his sophistry or discover his prejudice, a prejudice doubtless unknown to himself, but not the less strong, and perhaps stronger on that account. Under this impression, it is the purpose of the writer to subject the review to the ordeal of reason and of truth. This he feels to be not less due to Major-General Porter, than to the good of the service, and the benefit of the country. An officer, whose deeds on so many battle-fields in the present war have so enhanced the nation's fame, filling with gratitude the very "pulse and veins of the people," whose patriotism from the first, was not only never before called into doubt, but admitted, and signally honored and rewarded, should not be permitted to suffer in the estimation of one honest citizen from a paper, whatever of high character may belong to its author.

There are further considerations, which, in the judgment of the writer, call for an answer. Before the sentence was made public and since, Porter has been assailed, with a bitterness implying malignity as well as ignorance, and by a few persons filling high official places, and whose claim to capacity and confidence, (however ridiculous these are to those who know them,) may have misled a part of the public. Amongst these are some who pretend to be military critics. Possibly themselves led astray by their own turgid conceit, they may believe that they possess this highest of intellectual powers. And where they are not self-deluded, their blatant patriotism (ever the art of the demagogue) may possibly mislead the unsuspecting. These last are slow to believe that such pretenders to knowledge and virtue can design to delude. Their assumed wisdom for a time is taken at its nominal, not its real worth—their judgments, valued at their author's estimate, and not at their actual value. And for a period, miraculous even as it may appear, they are supposed to be infallible judges of military subjects, to be men whom nature has made chosen objects of her favor, imparting to them the faculty of mastering military science without either study or practice, although in all other respects they are seen to be placed low in the scale of human capacity. It is consequently possible that to some extent these pretenders may have given to the sentence of the Court some little sanction. This furnishes a further reason for the vindication of Porter, and to these several reasons, perhaps, is to be added yet another. It is not to be disguised that in the conduct of this sad war, different views of policy have been entertained in the army as well as in Congress. The resolution adopted in 1861, with so much unanimity by that body, declaring what the object of the Government in the war was, was approved with almost the same unanimity by the army, men as well as officers, and by the people. That policy, then so generally approved, has been since departed from, whether wisely or not it is not the writer's present design to inquire. The chief authors of the change have from the first charged almost every military disaster and the failure of a complete triumph over the rebellion to the want of concurrence in the wisdom and propriety of the change in a portion of our military leaders, and have literally clamored for their removal. To this class Porter was supposed to belong.

Whether he did or not the writer has no certain knowledge, though he thinks it probable, as by nature and intelligent patriotism he is conservative and national. But to suspect him of not changing his individual opinion as Congress changed its own, in the estimate of the men alluded to, was fault enough. In their view every officer whose opinions were supposed to be the same on certain subjects as those of McClellan and Porter, and who has failed to abandon them at party bidding, has been continuously assailed with the same bitterness. Even the present Commander-in-Chief is constantly subjected to its fury. Assaults are made upon him from day to day, and with ever increasing violence. His removal is demanded under the pretext of the public good, but really to gratify party purposes. His capacity is denied—his patriotism questioned, and the Presidential ear literally dinned with the ignorant and false clamor. Thus far, however, it has been without avail. His having abandoned his distant home on the Pacific, where every comfort surrounded him, and no peril threatened or could come, purely from a sense of patriotic duty to serve the country in the present crisis, and his having subsequently on the field and in the closet given his days and nights to her assistance, all avail nothing. These voracious hawkers after objects of party sacrifice seem literally to gloat, and with no concealed delight, over any officer, (the higher he stands in the public esteem the greater the pleasure,) who they think they can make a victim to their thirst for victims to promote party success.

Porter, too, was known to be a personal friend and admirer of McClellan. He had every means of judging of McClellan's capacity, of witnessing his love of country—his constant efforts to serve her, and his military skill and genius, and the result was, that he highly appreciated him as a citizen and an officer. And this, in the view of the men referred to, seemed to be almost if not fully as great an offense as treason. He became therefore at once an object of vituperation, and no efforts were spared to shake the confidence that the President had so conspicuously placed in him. When Pope's disgraceful failure was evidently stirring the public mind to the folly and injustice of taking from McClellan the command of the army of the Potomac, and arresting his plan of further campaign, it became apparently vital to party success that some safety-valve should be found for the harmless escape of the impending indignation. And it was thought that it would be found by ascribing that failure to treasonable conduct on the part of Porter, and this was done. A willing instrument for the purpose, Pope was supposed to be. It is but justice to that officer to say, that when he discovered it, he declined the degrading task. The charges at first were said to be his—he promptly disavowed them. That occurring, an informer was found in Roberts. The result is the dismissal of Porter from the service, whose fame he had so signally enhanced, and its being hailed with delight by the class referred to. Had Porter pursued a different course; had he, with the readiness of a mere party politician, regardless of his former opinions, adopted with instant and proclaimed zeal, those which Congress, forgetting their former opinions, afterward adopted; and especially, had he, oblivious of the teachings of his life, of his good name and honor, and of the opinion of the enlightened and patriotic, proved himself an inordinate braggart, boasted of his own merits, detracted from McClellan's, and stated that he, commanding the army, Richmond would long since have been ours—he, too, would doubtless now not only be in the service, but be the favorite and boast of the very men who have denounced him, and probably have been placed at its head. The rank ignorance of such men, their lofty pretensions, and supercilious arrogance, from its very extravagance, is in a measure captivating. Sublimity is at times found in the excess of the ridiculous. "An avenue of colossal toads might become sublime."

With these remarks, pertinent as the writer thinks to his purpose, he proceeds to answer the Judge-Advocate, and with all the brevity consistent with necessary fullness and perspicuity.

Evidently sensible of the insufficiency of the evidence considered by itself, and perhaps more sensible, that the President

would so view it, to affect the accused in the matters charged against him, the Judge-Advocate devotes four pages of the thirty of his review to discover what had been the ANIMUS of the accused. To note his language: "As the *animus* of the accused toward his Commanding General in pursuing the line of conduct alleged against him, must largely affect the question of his criminality, and may furnish a safe and valuable light for your guidance," (he is addressing the President, not the Court,) "in determining points, *otherwise left doubtful* by the evidence, it is proper that it should be ascertained before entering at large upon the review of the case, which you have instructed me to make."

What an exordium to a paper designed to induce a sanction of a judgment, dishonoring an officer whose life had been passed in faithfully discharging his duty to his country—whose loyalty and efficiency after the rebellion broke out, had been manifested in part under the orders of the reviewer himself, when he was at the head of the War Department, and to his entire satisfaction, and conspicuously displayed in the midst of great difficulties and peril, and whose conduct in the many battles in which he had been engaged, had excited the public admiration, and received the signal approval of the President.

The evidence alone, says the reviewer, is not sufficient to convict the accused, or to use his own words, his guilt is "*left doubtful by the evidence.*"

His *animus*, however, "may furnish a safe and reliable light," by which to discover his guilt. It may enable the President to determine what is otherwise doubtful. You must in this way supply, he tells the President, the deficiency in the proof. You must probe the mind of the accused. That may remove the darkness—furnish the light—explain the doubt. And to this, and with an earnestness that evinces a burning desire of success, he addresses himself with poetic license—with a beautiful though somewhat extravagant fancy, which, however it may please the ear, in the judgment of the wise, is a very unsafe guide to truth.

Not content with the asserted tendency of the telegrams, which he had offered in evidence to establish the so much wished for ANIMUS, "Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas C. H. Smith, an Aid-de-Camp in the staff of General Pope," is resorted to for the charitable purpose.

His power to see into the very hearts of men at a single and first interview of a few minutes' duration only, preceded by no prior acquaintance whatever, is, and with a confidence which under other circumstances would, by a plain judgment, be considered simply ridiculous, seriously relied upon. The defense had characterized what this witness had said in regard to it, (and as the impartial and intelligent reader will think justly,) as "ravings, wild fantasies, rubbish, which should not have been suffered to encumber the Record."

How unjust this is, says the Judge-Advocate. "The witness (he says) endeavored to lay bare the foundations on which his belief of the accused's meditated treachery rested." He said that the manner of the accused "was sneering throughout, whenever allusion was made to matters connected with General Pope, and to quote his words, "his look was that of a man having a crime on his mind." But the Judge-Advocate admits, that the task (discovering with the only opportunity which he had the state of Porter's mind) "was a difficult one, and may not have been *entirely successful.*"

In other words, he admits that in this Smith may have failed, and done the accused injustice. He adds that "it was physically impossible for the witness to reproduce the manner, the tone of voice, and the expression of the eye, and the play of the features, which may have so much influenced his judgment. Yet these often afford a language more to be relied on than that of the lips. He could not hold up before the Court, for its inspection and appreciation, the sneer of which he spoke. And yet we know that a sneer is as palpable to the mental, as a smile is to the natural vision. It is a life-long experience that souls read each other, and that there are intercommunings of spirits through instrumentalities which, while defying all human analysis, nevertheless completely command the homage of human faith. Great crimes, too, like great virtues, often reveal themselves to a close observer of character and conduct, as unmistakably as a flower-garden announces

its presence by the odors it breathes upon the air." From these quotations, the reader will see how vital, in the judgment of the Judge-Advocate, to the success of his palpable purpose to have the sentence approved, it was that the alleged criminal *animus* of Porter should be made out. Nor can he also fail to discover that, even with the reviewer's evident desire to discover it—his belief in spiritual "intercommunings"—his tendency to be led into error by his own imagination—his doctrine that the face often speaks the mind as unmistakably as the presence of a flower-garden is announced "by the odors it breathes upon the air"—he admits that in this instance the professor of the art, his lauded Lieutenant Colonel, "may not have been entirely successful."

He concedes that he may have misconceived "the look;" although, if the treachery "was then contemplated, it must be admitted as altogether probable that the shadow of such a crime struggling into being would have made itself manifest"

It is evident that the Judge-Advocate is not satisfied with the result of his search, so far, for the much wished criminal *animus* of the accused. A philosophic poet has said that there are occasions when—

"Thought meets thought ere from the lips it part,
And each warm wish springs mutual from the heart."

But to this, common feelings and a reciprocal nature are necessary.

Who that knows Porter, and has seen Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, could for a moment believe that such was their relative condition? Well might the reviewer, then, fear that his effort to establish, by such proof, the intended treachery of the accused, had failed. Well might he be sensible that such a task was even beyond his great powers, displayed either in imagination, spiritualism or argument. All exerted together for such an end, could not lift folly to respectability—make absurdity reason—a ridiculous pretense plausible, or for a moment with a considerate, honest, and unprejudiced judgment, injuriously affect a soldier, who, with fearless intrepidity and consummate and applauded skill, had so faithfully served his country, at a period when so many had proved faithless. In addition to the strong impediment which was thus interposed to the success of the Judge-Advocate's purpose, the was another. The witness himself, in addition to the nonsense already referred proved that he was not in this particul at least, to be relied upon. He was bewildered with his own conceited flu mery, that if he is to be believed, it w near making him the greatest of crimina He told the Court what the Judge-Adv cate omits to inform the President, that his return to his chief, after his ten minut interview with Porter, he stated to t former: "I was so certain that Fitz-Jo Porter was a traitor, that I would sh him that night, so far as any crime bef God was concerned, if the law would low me to do it." What an avowal, most a boast. That the laws of man alo restrained him, not the laws of God, fr committing murder. And yet, this witne with this horrible avowal fresh in his min the Judge-Advocate tells the President, "a man of fine intelligence," "that his *co scientiousness* rendered him careful, a guarded in his statements, and that evinced a depth and solemnity of co viction, rarely paralleled in judicial p ceedings."

What mind, but one so blinded by p judice, that its light was for a time exti guished, would not, on the contrary, once and with indignation, have rejecte the testimony of such a witness, even if transparent doltishness was less conspic ous. But prejudice jaundices the finest well as the weakest intellect, and mak every thing appear of its own color. T immaterial facts and idle fancies, it attac es substance and reality. It affects t very warp and woof of the mind, engende suspicion, and gives to idle and trivial ci cumstances, the weight of unanswerabl proofs. He who read through all heart and knew and described man in his lofties exhibition of virtue—his grandest of crim and his lowest of weaknesses, says jealous (and in this it resembles prejudice) is on of his frailties. "Trifles, light as air, a to the jealous, confirmation strong as proo of holy writ," and "shapes faults that ar not."

These observations are not made in an unkind spirit toward the Judge-Advocate His talents are admired, and his publi services and patriotic virtue in this epoch of our history, have given him an honore

ace in the grateful heart of the nation. ut this renders it the more important, hen his great authority is used to justify e sentence against Porter, a soldier to om the country is yet more indebted, at that authority should be examined, at it may be taken only at its intrinsic, d not at its adventitious worth. If it s been depreciated by what has been eady said, such depreciation can not but pair it throughout, and cause the reader receive with more than doubt all that it ges against Porter.

Notwithstanding his evident foregone nclusion of the guilt of Porter, and his lief that to establish it to the satisfaction the dullest and least charitable, it was ost important to make good the hypoth- is of his antecedent meditated treachery, d not satisfied that what were properly aracterized as the "ravings and wild ntasies" of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, ould have that effect, he seeks to ac- mplish the end by resorting to certain legrams, sent from time to time, during e campaign, by Porter to General Burn- de. Some of these are in part given, d as the reader will see, most unjustly plied. Porter reported to Pope in writ- g, on the twenty-sixth, and in person on e twenty-seventh of August, '62. He had ft Burnside, (under whose command he d been for some days before,) and he as requested by that officer to inform m from time to time by telegraph, how atters progressed. This request was rtually an order, and so considered, and ted upon by both officers. General urnside said that he regarded sending the spatches to him by Porter, "as an official t done by him in the performance of his uty," under his "direction." But this, ys the Judge-Advocate, (p. 180,) "so r as the purpose for which they were ffered by the Government is concerned, is wholly immaterial under whose rompting, or *for what end* they were ritten."

Not for what end? However important the public good the information they ave was—however patriotic the motive, he sending of the dispatches was imma- erial in an inquiry as to the guilty or in- ocent purpose of the *animus* of the ac- used in the sending of them. They were ffered by the Government to prove that Porter, at the time, "entertained feelings of contempt and hostility toward the army of Virginia, at its commander," and, "it matters not whether in a private and confidential, or in an official communication."

So reasons the Judge-Advocate. Besides its shallowness, which of itself condemns it, he does not inform the President that they were sent under orders, or of what was proved by Burnside and others, though both facts were most important to enable the President to pass understandingly upon the case, *that every fact communicated by the dispatches was true.* Burnside was asked by the Court, "From what you know now, have you any reason to believe that the information given by General Porter in these telegrams, (meaning all that were sent to him,) as to the actual state of the army under General Pope, was not correct?" and he answered: "I *am myself quite satisfied that it was correct.*" "But that opinion is merely one based upon the information I then received, and what I have since heard." (P. 184.) And the Government offered no evidence to prove that they were not correct to the letter. Nor does the Judge-Advocate give the President, nor allude to it in any part of his review, the benefit of General Burnside's opinion, formed on these dispatches, as well as on his whole intercourse with and knowledge of Porter, that from the first, and to the period when he testified, he, Burnside, was satisfied that he would *prove, and had proved, true to his duty, to Pope and the country.* This is, too, the more surprising, as his very first question to Burnside discovers that he considered his opinion important. Could he have obtained the one he desired, would he not have used it, and even with more confidence than he uses the supposed "intercommunings of spirits," to show that Porter meditated treachery? His question was: "Will you state whether at the time these dispatches were received from General Porter, (say between twenty-sixth and twenty-ninth of August inclusive,) any of them excited in your mind the apprehension that General Porter might not be inclined to do his whole duty as a subordinate under General Pope?" The answer was: "I RECEIVED NO SUCH IMPRESSION AS THAT FROM THE DISPATCHES. *I saw in General Porter's dispatches exactly what*

I heard expressed by a large portion of the officers with whom I happened to be in communication at the time, a very great lack of confidence in the management of the campaign. It was not confined to General Porter. I saw in his dispatches and I told General Porter himself so, what may have been indiscreet language; BUT NOTHING THAT LED ME, FOR ONE MOMENT, TO FEEL THAT HE WOULD NOT DO HIS WHOLE DUTY." (P. 181.)

This evidence (could it have been by design?) was not only not given to the President, but its existence was not even intimated, although the Judge-Advocate was instructed by the President "to report fully upon the bearing of the testimony (the whole, of course) in reference to the charges and specifications," upon which Porter was tried. Neither was the President informed that, in answering the question by the Court, (the one already quoted,) which was intended, if possible, to find out whether Porter went under the command of General Pope with unfavorable impressions towards that officer, or whether such "impressions were gained after he was on the ground," the same witness testified: "He moved his troops off rapidly, and marched them at night, and every thing within my limits appeared to me to indicate that he was DETERMINED TO GET HIS TROOPS UP THERE AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. I SAW NOTHING TO INDICATE THE REVERSE," (p. 182.) Nor was the President advised that Burnside had testified, that in departing from an order of General McClellan as to the movement of his command from the Peninsula, and when it was known that they were to go to the aid of Pope, Porter was enabled to accelerate the movement—in the words of the witness, "to embark that much sooner and send the transports back for others," (p. 184.) Nor, finally, was the President informed that, in answering a question of the accused, the same witness had said, "I have never seen any thing to lead me to think that he (the accused) was ANY THING BUT A FAITHFUL AND LOYAL OFFICER;" nor that, in his opinion, every officer who knew him, and had witnessed his conduct throughout the war, as well as when he was under Pope's command, expressed, and in the strongest terms, PERFECT CONCURRENCE IN THIS OPINION.

General McClellan, under whose speci eye he had served in council and on th field, so spoke of him. He said that fro the time Porter "knew he was to go t the assistance of General Pope," he did, i his opinion, do "all that an energetic, an zealous, and patriotic officer could hav done," (page 196.)

But the opinions of sensible men—me of well-known character, intelligence, an patriotism—seem to have been considere by the Judge-Advocate light as air, whe contrasted with those of Smith and Robert The former, he appears to have though possessed but the ordinary means natu furnishes ordinary men to form opinion whilst to one, of the latter, at least, Smit she had supplied "instrumentalities whic while defying all human analysis, neve theless completely command the homag of human faith," and as to Roberts, h well-known and universally acknowledge character for perfect veracity, almos chronic love of truth and spotless reput tion with his brother officers, placed h evidence and the sincerity of his opinion beyond all possible suspicion.

That a chivalrous officer, whose life ha been given to his country, and who bu recently had so added to the reputation o its flag, should be sacrificed to reasonin so repugnant to common-sense that th unprejudiced mind rejects it at once as a insult to its intelligence, is one of the man extraordinary occurrences which, durin the present rebellion, has so astounded th public. What, but intellect perverted could claim, as is done, for treason, th nobleness of patriotism—for oaths violated the character of virtue—for rebellion, th justification of an absurd theory, or of a oppression that existed nowhere but in diseased fancy? And what adds, if tha be possible, to the injustice of the us attempted to be made of these dispatches and so strongly indicates a predetermine conclusion against Porter, is the fact that although stated to be offered to establis his alleged contemplated treachery, th Judge-Advocate objected to Porter' giving in evidence other dispatches t General Burnside a few days before an after the twenty-sixth and twenty-ninth o August, (the dates of those offered by th Government,) that is, from the twenty second of August to the first of September

disprove the alleged purpose, the *animus*. Strange as it may seem, the objection was sustained by the Court, and the proof rejected. A protest was entered. (See Appendix I.) That protest was published in the papers of the day, and in short period the Court and the Judge-Advocate saw that the ruling of the Court was received with astonishment and disapprobation by the intelligent press of the country. Clearly illegal as the decision was, and strange as it is that it did not so appear to the Judge-Advocate and the Court at the first, they adhered to it until the manifestation of public opinion on the subject caused him to suggest the waiving of his objection, and the Court to admit the evidence. The dispatches were then received, but no one, aware of the circumstances under which they were received, believed that, however conclusive they were in disproving the alleged criminal intent or *animus*, they would have the slightest effect with the Court or the Judge-Advocate. The result proved that this opinion there was no error. Nor does the Judge-Advocate, in his review, even notice them. The only reference he makes to them is to a single one of these dispatches which Porter desired to send, and was not permitted to send, to Major-General McClellan, dated second of September, 1862, and that one is not given at length; and, although admitted to be full of fervent patriotism and professions of devotion to his duty in connection with the Army of Virginia and its commander," the Judge-Advocate adds that, "unhappily came too late." The merest trifle, which a fair mind would exclude as evidence of charges of dishonor and treachery against any one, much less a soldier, ever before esteemed, is seized upon with avidity and tortured, or sought to be tortured, inconsistent as the effort is with common-sense, into proof of guilt, whilst the weightiest facts, those which, with such a mind, would be conclusive of innocence, for the most part are not mentioned at all, or when in part referred to, are rejected as unimportant, or as coming "too late." The President, however, should have been told of them, and the public should see the nature of the facts so discarded as not proving, or hardly as tending to prove, Porter's innocence of purpose. The Judge-Advocate, even in regard to the dispatches which he uses as establishing, in his view, the guilty purpose, omits to give the whole of any one of them. He extracts a few expressions from each, without alluding to its context, a practice ever unfair and unreliable. Had even the whole of these dispatches been disclosed, the President would have seen, and the public, for whom the review of the Judge-Advocate was also designed, as proved by its general circulation by the War Department, that these dispatches themselves proved no faithlessness on Porter's part to Pope or the country, either actual or contemplated. Whilst those which he does not give at all, or even allude to, with the exception of the one just mentioned, to McClellan, of second September, all demonstrate a fixed purpose and earnest solicitude to do his full duty to both. (The reader will find these dispatches in pp. 228–235.) It is confidently asserted that every one of them evinces not only a mere willingness, but the strongest wish to do every thing in his power to render the campaign successful, or, failing in that, to lessen, as far as possible, any disaster that might befall it, and especially to save the Capitol. His orders, too, to his corps commanders, to be found in the same pages, evidence intelligence, zeal, and energy, and the dispatch referred to, to McClellan, of second September, whilst he was still under the command of Pope, and involved in his fate, breathes the same patriotic spirit. That dispatch was an answer to one from McClellan of the day before, urging him "and all friends" to give "the fullest and most cordial coöperation to General Pope." A dispatch written, as McClellan states, (p. 197,) at the instance of and to satisfy the apprehensions of the President, and not to remove any apprehensions of his own. To quote McClellan's words: "I had no doubt then in my own mind but that the Army of the Potomac, and all connected with it, would do their duty without there being any necessity for any action on my part." To that message, Porter's of the second says: "YOU MAY REST ASSURED THAT ALL YOUR FRIENDS, AS WELL AS EVERY LOVER OF HIS COUNTRY, WILL EVER GIVE, AS THEY HAVE GIVEN, TO GENERAL POPE, THEIR CORDIAL CO-OPERA-

TION AND CONSTANT SUPPORT IN THE EXECUTION OF ALL ORDERS AND PLANS. OUR KILLED AND WOUNDED AND ENFEEBLED TROOPS ATTEST OUR DEVOTION TO DUTY."

So conscious was Porter of having fully performed his duty, the moment he received McClellan's dispatch he sought Pope, showed it to him, and asked: "Why he supposed such a dispatch had been sent to him?" (p. 20.) Pope could give him no explanation. His answer to McClellan he was not allowed to send, but it clearly evinces the utter groundlessness of suspicion. His "killed and wounded and enfeebled troops" he points to, as he well might, as the witnesses of duty devotedly performed. Of his command, gallantly led by himself (for he ever led it) in the battle of the thirtieth of August, three days before, in a vain effort to turn the tide of Pope's defeat, and save the honor of our flag, consisting of about seven thousand men, he lost in killed and wounded OVER TWO THOUSAND AND THIRTY-TWO, INCLUDING IN THE KILLED ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN OFFICERS. All this, however, in the view of the Judge-Advocate, was "too late"—gallantry too tardily displayed—wounds and deaths proving nothing, patriotism and sense of duty speaking but for the day, and not an hour before. The twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, and twenty-ninth of August found him a traitor in fact, as well as intent. The thirtieth, a noble soldier and patriot! And yet, with the transparent injustice of such reasoning, the Judge-Advocate, without seeming to be aware of it and of its absurdity, tells the President and the country, in concluding his review, that "the Court was careful to give to the accused the benefit of all well-founded doubts that arose in their minds in reference either to the fact of disobedience or in reference to the measure of criminality that prompted it, and hence found him not guilty of the fourth and fifth specifications of the first charge;" and that, in the same spirit of generous clemency, he himself withdrew "the fourth specification of the second charge," (p. 317.)

And this statement is seriously made, without even intimating that in the support of the specifications of the first charge to which he refers, there was not only no evidence offered by the Government, but that what it did give, without considerin what was produced by the accused, esta lished the utter groundlessness of bot and without informing the President th the specification of the second charg which he claims credit for having gen rously withdrawn, related to Porter's co duct in the very battle of the thirtieth August, where, under his lead, the batt ground was literally mired with the blo of his devoted followers, and where h efforts were so greatly instrumental i diminishing the disaster of the day.

Having thus, it is confidently submitte shown not only that there is no proof t establish the alleged criminal *animus* Porter, but conclusive evidence to th contrary, the assumption of which *anim* constitutes the very foundation of th argument of the Judge-Advocate, th charges and specifications will be co sidered in their order, and in connectio with the whole evidence.

FIRST CHARGE—FIRST SPECIFICATION.

The first charge was the "Violation o the Ninth Article of War," and the firs specification, a failure to obey the followin order of Major-General Pope, dated "Bri tow Station, August twenty-seventh, 186 half-past six P.M., Major-General F. J Porter, Warrenton Junction:"

"GENERAL: The Major-General Com manding directs that you start at on o'clock to-night, and come forward wit your whole corps, or such part of it as i with you, so as to be here by daylight to morrow morning. Hooker has had a ver severe action with the enemy, with a los of about three hundred killed and wounded The enemy has been *driven back*, but *i retiring* along the railroad. We mus drive him from Manassas, and clear th country between that place and Gaines ville, where General McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send word t him to push forward immediately; also send word to Banks to hurry forward wit all speed, to take your place at Warrento Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch who wil conduct you to this place. Be sure t send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direc

n of Bealton. Say to Banks, also, that had best run back the railroad trains to s side of Cedar Run. If he is not with n, write him to that effect.

'P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton nction, leave a regiment of infantry and o pieces of artillery, as a guard till he nes up, with instructions to follow you nediately. If Banks is not at the Junc-n, instruct Colonel Cleary to run the ins back to this side of Cedar Run, and t a regiment and section of artillery h it."

The Judge-Advocate devotes five pages his review to maintain this specification. th what justice, we will now see:

First.—The order was to bring by the cified time, "daylight," the following rning, not a *part* merely, but his "whole ps," or the whole of "such part as is h you." Porter had artillery with him, arm of vital moment, at the time, to the omplishment of Pope's purpose, and to safety of his own command. This part his force, too, the body of his order rly embraced.

And if that could be doubted, the post-pt made it clear. For in the postscript was told that, in the event of his not ding *Banks* "at Warrenton Junction," was to "leave a regiment of infantry l two *pieces of artillery*, as a guard un-he comes up, with instructions to follow," t is, to follow with his own and these two ces. The *artillery* of Porter was, there-e, manifestly included in the order. No rt of that arm was to be left behind, ex-pt in the contingency mentioned, and n only two guns, and but for a time. On s fact, the Judge-Advocate is *silent*, al-ugh its significance is most important. e order exacted the movement of Por-'s entire force, and embraced, in words, artillery. To have left that behind, uld have been disobedience; and if any toward result had ensued to his own mmand or to Pope's, he should, and no ubt would, have been held responsible. arly all the witnesses proved that the illery could not have been moved at e o'clock. In this part of the case, and leed throughout, the prejudice of the dge-Advocate reveals itself. After re-ng, and illogically and uncharitably using the portion of the evidence which he quotes, as bearing on the question involved in this specification, he tells the President, "That there are certain other facts disclosed in the testimony, which go far to indicate a settled purpose on the part of the accused to disregard" the order. On receiving it, he said to the Generals who were with him, "There is something for you to sleep upon," instead of telling them what the Judge-Advocate, in his enthusiasm, says he should have told them, though he fails to say what that was.

Conceding that what he did say is correctly given, one would suppose that if it did not for a moment excite the surprise of the officers to whom it was addressed, (and against whom no fault of motive or want of skill is attributed, and all of whom are now faithfully serving their country,) officers who knew the actual condition of things, and saw the manner and heard the tone in which Porter spoke, an unprejudiced mind would find in that fact alone, ample confutation of the imputation, and dismiss, as wholly unjust and uncharitable, all suspicious speculations that could be founded upon it.

But Porter did not say what is stated by the Judge-Advocate. The reliable proof is the other way. What he did say was not in any degree "saddening or discouraging" to the officers who heard it, or to those who believe "that in the prosecution of this war, much vigor is much wisdom." In that maxim no one more decidedly concurs than Porter himself. This is evidenced by his whole conduct since the war commenced. What he did say, on reading the order to his Generals, was proved by General Butterfield, one of those present at the time. That officer states, that as soon as Porter received the order, he handed it "to General Morell, or to General Sykes, who were present, and said there was a *chance for a short nap*, or something of that sort, (I do not remember the exact words,) *indicating that there was but little time for preparation*." And the same witness further stated, that on objections being made by Sykes or Morell, or both, to marching at one A.M., (they both testified that they did so object,) Porter stated what the Judge-Advocate neither gives or alludes to: "In reply to

these remarks, *General Porter spoke rather decidedly, that there was the order — it must be obeyed; that those who gave the order knew whether the necessities of the case would warrant the exertions that had to be made to comply with it.* I do not state that as his exact words, but as the substance of what he said." (P. 185.)

What evidence is this of want of vigor, or of a purpose to disobey? No wonder that neither Sykes, Morell, nor Butterfield saw in it nothing to regret—nothing indicating a purpose or a willingness to disobey the order. Nothing "to the last degree saddening or discouraging for those who believe that in the prosecution of this war much vigor is much wisdom." Nothing sad or discouraging at all, but on the contrary, an ardent desire to obey the order. The Judge-Advocate, however, though *he* heard not the words, nor the tone, nor saw "the expression of the eye and the play of the features," which he tells us "often afford a language more to be relied on than that of the lips," (p. 301,) ruminating in his study, and even without a Smith, or any other expert in the reading of "the intercommunings of spirits," to supply his own possible want of information, and, with assumed confidence, construes them to have been most sad and discouraging, and to have exhibited nothing of "vigor," or of "wisdom." Can this be reconciled with his well-known ability, except upon the ground of his fixed antecedent hypothesis of Porter's guilt?

I. But to the evidence.

The order was received, as admitted by the Judge-Advocate, between half-past nine and ten o'clock of the evening of the twenty-seventh of August. The Generals who were present, Morell, Sykes and Butterfield, all say it was about ten o'clock.

II. When was the march under the order begun?

The Judge-Advocate says, it was not until about dawn. To make that statement good, he quotes a sentence or two from the testimony of a few witnesses. But why not all that these witnesses said? And especially why not have given the evidence of the Generals, who were present when the order was received, and had charge of the movement, and of th of General Griffin, Lieutenant-Colon Locke, Captains Martin and Montiet and Lieutenant Weld? In fairness, it obvious that this should have been don General Morell was asked, "about wh time did the march or movement of troo commence," and answered, "*at thr o'clock, or very near that time.* Th was the hour designated." (P. 145.)

General Butterfield (by Presidenti appointment the chief of General Hoo er's staff, whilst he was in command the army) says, that General Port fixed three o'clock as the hour, and th the witness "wrote an order in Gener Porter's tent, for my command to be line to march at *three o'clock.*" And reply to the question, "Did you march attempt to march at three o'clock?" sai "*I did*;" "I had my column formed a staff-officers sent out to notify me whe the head of my column should take i place in the line. We marched from t camp up to the road, and there wait until we could take our place, which w at the rear of General Morell's division (Pp. 185, 186.) General Griffin, said: " received an order about twelve o'clock the night of the twenty-seventh of A gust, to move my brigade at three o'clo in the morning. *At three o'clock in t morning* I started from my camp towa Bristow Station, and marched about mile or two, to where I halted, and the I remained at the head of my colun until about two hours after daylight (Why this delay he satisfactorily e plains.) (Pp. 160, 161.)

Lieutenant-Colonel Locke being aske "Did the corps march at three o'clock? answered, "yes." (P. 134.) Captai Montieth: "At what time that mornin did General Porter begin to move h troops?" "I should think it was *abo* three o'clock." (P. 127.) And such the testimony of all the witnesses upo this point, in fact of all who had the be opportunities of knowing, including th Generals whose duty, to move at thre o'clock, under the order they all say the received from General Porter the nigh before, it was to see that that order wa obeyed, and to superintend the move ment. How idle it is to disregard all this evidence as unreliable, and to find

act inconsistent with it upon such testimony, little, too, as that is to which the Judge-Advocate refers, and of that little to General Pope's, who was not present at the time, who, to an inquiry, "Whether on the receipt of certain messages from the accused, the latter was on his march, in obedience to the order of the twenty-seventh of August," answered, "I do not know that he was. On the contrary, from a note I had received from him, (not however, produced, as were none of Porter's notes to this witness, who said that he had mislaid them all,) I did not understand that he would march until daylight in the morning." A story at war with the fact, that he had ordered the march to commence at three, and, as proved by the witness just referred to, that it did commence at that hour.

But, independent of the positive proof as to the time of the march, and supposing that the mind could possibly doubt upon the point with that proof before it, what are the probabilities? Every General and other officer present when the order was received, or who was in Porter's tent afterward on that evening, tells us that Porter gave a positive order to march at *three o'clock.*

If not obeyed, these Generals, who had to execute the order, were liable to censure. Who censures them? Not the Government, certainly. For, as before stated, and fortunately for the country, they are all of them in high favor. Porter is the only victim. He alone has been sacrificed, or rather as far as his reputation is concerned, a futile effort has been made to sacrifice him.

III. But, admitting that he did begin his march at three A.M., the Judge-Advocate maintains that he was guilty of disobedience, meriting the sentence of the Court, because he should have marched, or attempted to march at one A.M.

However positive in that respect the order was, it was confidently stated in the defense, upon the authority of a military maxim of Napoleon, that passive obedience to a military order is only exacted "where it is given by a superior who is present on the spot at the moment when he gives it." The authority of this maxim is not disputed by the Judge-Advocate—he only denies its application in this instance. And he does this but doubtingly. "Nor is it *believed*" (says he) that the accused can "find shelter" under it. And why—can the reader imagine? because, as this official military jurist says: "The discretion it allows to a subordinate, separated from his superior officer, is *understood* to relate to the *means*, and not to the *end* of an order. When the accused determined that instead of starting at one o'clock he would start at three or four, (he adds an hour, for all agreed that Porter ordered the march to begin at three,) he did not resolve he would arrive at Bristow Station by daylight in a different manner from that indicated by his Commanding General, but that he would not arrive there by daylight at all. In regard to this, the end of the order, he had no discretion." (P. 360.)

What technicality! A just and enlightened Judge once said of a like display in in a case before him, "it is stretching technicality to the very verge of quibbling."

A few observations will show the weakness of the reasoning of the Judge-Advocate.

I. In the first place, no such qualification of the maxim is anywhere suggested by its great author. His language is general, comprehensive of end as well as means. Passive obedience to an order in any particular, whether of end or means, is not to be exacted when the superior who gives it is not present at the place where it is to be executed. In the words of Napoleon, such obedience is to be exacted "*only* when it is given by a superior who is present on the spot at the moment when he gives it." And, as was his wont, he assigns succinctly, but clearly, the reasons for the rule. Having then, (that is, when he is present on the spot,) knowledge of the state of things, he can listen to the objections, "and give the necessary explanations to him who should execute the order." This, of course, he can not do when he is not present. To enforce absolute obedience to an order given by a superior who is not present, and may not know the condition of the country, or the difficulties in the way of its execution, might at times lead to the most disastrous results—imperil a corps, frustrate the very

purpose of the superior, and so far from aiding, lead to his utter defeat.

II. What authority, other than his own, is there for his statement, that the maxim "is understood to relate to the means and not to the end of an order"? He cites none. Would he not, if he had known of one? And would he not have known if there be one? He shows himself to be fond of military literature, and to have its leading points fastened in his memory. He graphically calls to the President's recollection, the stirring scenes of Hohen Linden—the great gallantry and matchless energy of Richpanse—the dashing onset of Ney, and unites his own tribute to that of the renowned historian of *The Consulate and the Empire* to the consummate skill of Moreau, as being illustrated more brilliantly than in any of his other battles in this, "the greatest in the present century."

Who can doubt that a mind which so evidently delights in military reading, and whose office of Judge-Advocate-General makes it his duty to do all that he can to master the science, as far, at least, as concerns obedience to orders, could have failed to discover in what authority, great or small, it is stated, that the quoted maxim of Napoleon was understood by him or any one else, military man or not, to relate "to the means and not the end of an order"?

III. But conceding, for a moment, that such is its meaning, how does that meaning deprive Porter of the benefit of the maxim?

I. It is said by the Judge-Advocate, that "the end of the order was that Porter should be with his command at Bristow Station by daylight the following morning."

II. That Porter did not decide to get there at that time, "in a different manner from that indicated by the order, but that he would not get there at all, at that time, and that as to get there at that time, was "the end of the order, he had no discretion upon the subject." Was the end of the order as suggested? The end must be the object to be accomplished by the order. The order stated that "Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred men killed and wounded. The enemy h been driven back, but is retiring along t railroad; we must drive him from Man sas, and clear the country between th place and Gainesville, where General M Dowell is." To clear this portion of t country then was Pope's object. He issu the order with that view. As a means effect it he desired Porter's corps. what condition? In fighting conditio In what way to get to him? By the be and shortest way. Time was importar but time was to yield to the object to accomplished. Pope did not, and cou not, know what would be the condition Porter's command when the order wou be received. He did not fully, if at a know the condition of the roads, nor wh would be the character of the night. his designation of the time of arrival Bristow's Station, did he mean to say, th no matter in what plight the troops shou be—how far they may have marched th day and evening—what meals they ma have had—what rest—what the state the roads—what the character of the nigh and what the opinion of every officer the command as to the practicability getting to Bristow Station at daylight- did he mean that, regardless of all the considerations, the order was to be literall obeyed? He did not, and could not hav been supposed by Porter to have so mean except on the supposition that he was a imbecile. The character for intelligenc of Pope, therefore, should save him fro the damaging effect of such a propositio But in fact that was not his meaning. H conduct, the next day, when the troo did arrive at the designated place, whic he says was twenty minutes past ten A.M (Porter was, in fact, there about eigh A.M.,) (p. 19,) proves, that he was guilt of no such folly. His order, according t the view, adopted by the Court and b the Judge-Advocate, had been shameless disobeyed. He had every reason, tha view assumes, to know that it might hav been obeyed. That Porter should be ther at daylight with his command, was, it i said, the very end of the order.

That end had failed without justificatio or excuse, says the Judge-Advocate. I so, how are we to account for the manne of Pope's reception of Porter at eigh o'clock that morning, or at any time afte

he command arrived? On cross-examination, Pope was asked: "Had you any onversation with him (Porter) in relation o the order of the twenty-seventh, and is having obeyed or disobeyed and if so, hat?" He answered: "I do not remember any conversation with him in reference o obeying or disobeying the order, although I had much conversation with him." n replying to another question, requesting im to try and refresh his recollection, he aid: "I should not be likely to complain to y subordinate officer of a disobedience to y orders, (why, he does not explain except that Porter was his subordinate,) I M THEREFORE VERY SURE THAT I DID NOT OMPLAIN TO GENERAL PORTER." He dded: "I am not sure that he gave me any xplanations. I have a general recollection at he spoke to me of *his march, and the ifficulties that he had in getting wagons t of the road, but the particulars I do ot remember*, for I was very much occuied, and the necessity which made his resence important, had passed away." P. 18.) On his examination also, in chief y the Judge-Advocate, he was asked: Did he (Porter,) at that time, (the time of s arrival,) or at any time before," "explain you the reason why he did not obey the rder?" He answered: "He wrote me a ote which I received I think in the morng of the twenty-eighth, very early in the orning, perhaps a little before daylight. am not quite sure about the time. The ote I have mislaid (as before stated, he id that he had mislaid all of Porter's otes to him—strange negligence this, and ie that credulity itself could scarcely elieve, if the witness's character for verasty and his repugnance to exaggeration, ther delicate or gorgeous, was not so iversally acknowledged.) I can give ie substance. I remember the *reasons iven* by General Porter; if it is necessary state them, I can do so." Porter inuired if the witness had looked for the ote, and he said he had, "but had not been ble to find it." The Judge-Advocate then, though the inquiry *was his own*, and orter *said* "*I do not object*" to the witss giving his recollection of the contents the notes, said: "I will not press the uestion." (P. 13.) It appears then, that ope had received before daylight on the venty-eighth, from Porter a written note, giving his reasons why he would not be able to execute his order literally. He sent no answer reiterating the order, nor did he rebuke, or in any way find fault with the failure in its passive obedience. And when Porter and himself met face to face, at eight A.M., and afterward on that day, also during the whole time, when Porter was under his command, and the whole subject was spoken of between them, and the difficulties of the actual march explained, did a single word, as Pope testifies, escape him, even faintly murmuring regret, much less censure! This of itself is conclusive of the groundlessness of the charge. The officer who gave the order, when he was made acquainted with all the circumstances attending its execution found no fault. Defeat had not then given his pride of command a sore wound. His ambition he no doubt thought would yet be gratified. He had at the time, Porter and his command with him, and he trusted, as he well might, to both, and by his own conduct at that time, it is demonstrable that he never intended to charge Porter with disobedience to that order. His doing so was obviously an after-thought. Defeat and not success was soon his fate. Defeat, great, overwhelming defeat. The public were indignant. If the result could not be attributed to Pope, (and that it could be it is not necessary here to charge,) the getters up of the campaign as well as Pope, impelled by natural mortification, looked for escape from the censure which they were certain to receive, to any victim that could with the slightest probability be found, and Porter was selected. His conduct, his disobedience, his meditated treachery were at once alleged to be the cause of the defeat. His telegrams were searched and criticised, his conversations hunted up and examined, and each expression, howsoever made or to whomsoever made, evincing a want of confidence in Pope's skill and capacity for the command, were seized upon and pressed into the service. Whilst it is known that some desired his life, the Court satisfied itself by displacing him from the army, and idly assuming to disfranchise him from all places of honor and trust under the Government. And yet, who in his senses concurs in the justice of that sentence, or fails to stamp it as a gross wrong to Porter and the

country? For a time he may not again be permitted to honor his profession, and serve the nation by other deeds of skill and valor, but of the past he is not deprived. The place in the hearts of his fellow-citizens, which he filled after his crowning achievement of Malvern, is his still. And soon will the people order those, who, as they should do, *will* listen to the public voice, and be alive to the public honor, that he must be restored to their service, and afforded an opportunity of adding, if that be possible, to his own reputation, and to the military renown of the nation.

But to return to the evidence. It is true that to a certain extent he criticised in his dispatches to Burnside, the plans of his chief. As he did it, was it a crime in any view, military or otherwise? His criticisms were for the eyes of Burnside only, and of those of the President and Commander-in-Chief, to whom he must have known they would be communicated. If he really believed in their truth, so far from offending, it was his duty to give the information, and instead of being punished, he should have been thanked by the Government. Not only was the honor of the flag involved, but the very safety of the Capitol. Porter saw that both were in danger by what he believed to be the incompetency of Pope. Was he to keep this conviction in his own breast, regardless of the army and the nation? Or was he not on the contrary, bound to speak his fears to those who had the power to guard against the apprehended peril? Were his fears honestly entertained? Was his motive for stating them patriotic? Let his dispatch to McClellan of first September, half-past eight P.M., give the answer. After telling him of Bayard's report of the movements of the enemy, he says: "I can see the dust and flags: columns evidently moving directly North: evidently towards Leesburgh. If you can, I hope you will protect the fords into Maryland, and guard the Railroad to Baltimore. I think we will have a fight before night. The enemy are between us and Fairfax Court-House, and shelled our trains last night. We will fight, or they will avoid us, and strike our rear first. We have been held on thirty-six hours too long, and we are bound to work our way to Alexandria. I only regret that we have not been distributed to forts, and to the fords over the Potomac into Maryland. GOD SPEED YOUR OPERATIONS, AND ENABLE YOU AND OTHERS IN AUTHORITY TO SAVE OUR COUNTRY," (p. 233.) His whole thoughts were evidently given to his country, its honor, and its safety. He apprehended, and as the result proved correctly, the marching of the enemy into Maryland, and perhaps further North. He was alarmed, too, (it was the alarm of a brave and patriotic man,) for the safety of the Capitol. He ardently wished to avert both dangers, and in words of patriotism that evidently gushed from his heart, he invoked McClellan to be on the alert—to watch the foe and guard the passes, and prayed God to "speed" his "operation, and enable him," and "others in authority, to save the country." Alas! for our good name, this is the man who is charged with faithlessness to duty and treason to the nation. And as yet more dishonoring to it, this is the man whom a Court consisting of nine officers, have been induced to find guilty of the foul dishonoring crime, and whose sentence is supported by the highest military, legal officer, and in a moment of blindness to justice, the result of over confidence in others, a sentence which the President, whose mind is naturally honest, to the prejudice of his own good name, without taking time properly to investigate the subject for himself promptly approved. But is criticism on a commander's capacity, or of his plans by a subordinate officer so criminal as to demand, or at all justify dismissal from service? The wars of Europe furnish very many instances to the contrary. Even Napoleon, the strictest of disciplinarians as well as the greatest military man the world has ever known, not only did not punish, but encouraged it. He went further, he excused at times even a failure to obey orders. It is singular that this was not in the memory of the Judge-Advocate affluent as it would seem to be with such learning.

When *Massena*, in 1810, was, against his wish, placed by Napoleon in command of the army of Portugal, and in spite of his criticisms to Napoleon himself on his plan of campaign, in obedience to orders decided to lay siege to Ciudad Rodrigo

overruling in that respect the advice of his subordinates, Junot and Ney, who recommended an attack first upon that part of Wellington's army encamped at Viseu, Thiers tells us, that those two officers spread abroad amongst their several corps, that it was *Massena, who, grown old*, and no longer the same man, preferred yearisome and murderous sieges to an active and "decisive campaign." (Vol. 12, *History of the Consulate and the Empire*, London edition, p. 151.) To criticise Napoleon, to advise against his plan of campaign, was harmless in Massena, and to disparage Massena with his army, was harmless in Junot and Ney. But for Porter to question Pope's plans, to speak despairingly of his strategy, though only to the superiors of both, to evince for Pope as a commander, though only to the superiors of both, "contemptuous and unfriendly feelings," is not to be tolerated or excused. Pope should have been held sacred, because infallible, and Porter condemned for questioning it—whilst Ney and Junot and Massena were properly esteemed guiltless, because Massena and Napoleon possessed no title to infallibility.

II. On the twelfth of March, 1811, after the triumph of the French in the battle of Redinha, Massena, who was still in command, implored Ney "to resist to the utmost, as the nature of the ground would well enable him to do, on his way to Condeixa." "Scarcely," says the same historian, "had Massena departed, than Ney began to watch the least movements of the English," and, hurried on by the fear of "being isolated from the main body" of the French army, "he disputed but for a few moments the heights of Condeixa, and then hastened to quit them." As soon as Massena heard of it he was indignant—"expressed aloud his indignation to Fririon, the chief of his staff, and was so greatly angered as to entertain for a moment the idea of depriving Ney of his command, and yet the purpose was only for a moment entertained, and, as far as we are informed, when he was acquainted with it, Napoleon never entertained it even for a moment, or thought that it required him even to censure Ney. Ney had, however, clearly violated a positive order, and by doing so, as the historian tells us, "for the sake of avoiding an imaginary, or, at most, doubtful danger, he exposed the army to a certain peril," (ib. pp. 210, 211.) How striking is the contrast, even supposing an intended violation by Porter of the order of the twenty-seventh of August, between the conduct of Massena and Napoleon in Ney's case, and that of Pope, the Court, the Judge-Advocate, and the President, in Porter's case.

III. In November, 1812, when Wellington's whole army did not exceed sixty thousand men, and King Joseph's, Napoleon's brother, numbered eighty-five thousand, and Hill's command, left by Wellington at Alba de Tormes, fifteen thousand, the King, Jourdan and all the Generals but Soult, advised an "advance between the English Generals." Soult opposed it, and from deference to his authority the project which was apparently perfectly practicable, and might have led to the destruction of the English army, was abandoned, and another plan, advised by Soult, adopted. And then, on the thirteenth of the same month, when the French crossed the Tormes above Alba, and advanced as far as Neustra, Senora de Retiro, the King and Jourdan insisted upon the advisability of throwing the French cavalry upon the English army, visible on the right, Soult objected to the measure, on account of the obscurity of the atmosphere, etc." "and the result was, that when the eighty-five thousand French troops were assembled the English were already out of their reach, and in full retreat upon the Ciudad Rodrigo route," and the object of the campaign thereby lost, (ib. vol. 15, pp. 73, 74.) Soult nevertheless was continued in command, and escaped, as far as we know, even censure on the part of Napoleon. It can not be necessary to multiply instances from European armies. There are two recent ones, in our own army, occurring under the very eyes of the Government, that also strongly illustrate the injustice of the strict rule applied to Porter.

I. Whilst the Court-Martial in his case was in session, and in the same building, a military inquisition, instituted at the request of Major-General McDowell, of an extraordinary character was examining

into the conduct of that officer, and with power to investigate his whole military career, although no charges of any kind had been made against him by any one in authority. Why this favor was shown to McDowell, and Porter was held to rigid and most technical proof, created in the minds of the observing, great surprise; but it is referred to in this connection with no view to censure. In the course of that inquisition, it appeared that McDowell had received a positive order from Pope, (under whose command he was,) which he failed to obey. Instead of doing so, he left his own troops and went in search of Pope, whose exact locality, however, he did not know. For this separation from his own corps, say the Court in his case, there was "clearly" nothing in another order upon which he relied, which contained even an implication to justify it. The result of his conduct, too, in that particular, had proved most disastrous, as proved by Pope, whose evidence in regard to it was adopted by the Court. Upon hearing of the battle, that a part of his corps had had that evening, Pope said: "I stated to several of my staff officers who were present, that the game was in our own hands, (meaning, if his order had been executed,) that it was impossible for Jackson to escape without very heavy loss, if at all."

McDowell's excuse, that he desired to give "the expression of his views to General Pope in person," "could be of no avail when the misconduct of his own corps thwarted a plan, the execution of which afforded an opportunity for speedy victory."

To this unauthorized and inexcusable failure of McDowell, if it frustrated, as Pope says it did, the almost certain destruction of Jackson's command, and probably its capture, may with much more show of reason be attributed the failure of the campaign, (if that was not owing to the inherent defect of the plan of the campaign and the incompetency of the commander,) than to any or all of the failures, even were they established, alleged against Porter.

He, however, is cashiered, whilst McDowell is honorably acquitted, and at once placed on important duty, because, as the Court in his case say, gross as his fault was, "grave" as the "error committed by him," (disobedience of an express order which, as the Judge-Advocate says, and cites De Hart for it, "is a crime which the law has stigmatized as of the highest degree, and against which is denounced the extreme punishment of death,") "his subsequent efforts, on the twenty-ninth, to repair the consequences of that unfortunate movement of his corps, and to press them forward into action, were earnest and energetic, and disclosed fully that the separation of which this Court has stated its disapproval, was inconsiderate and unauthorized, but was *not induced by any unworthy motives.*" The italics are the Court's. And this moderate reproof, if reproof it can be called, is for the violation of a clear, positive order, leaving the subordinate no discretion, and committed upon his own judgment alone, without consulting, for aught that appeared, a single officer in his command.

His conduct "was not induced by any unworthy motive." Evidenced, in the Court's view, by his course on the following day. Had he confidence in Pope? Was he asked? If he had been, who that knows him, can doubt what his answer would have been, had he said what he thought? The very fact, that at such a moment, he left his command in the hands of his own subordinates, to find Pope, to counsel with him as to the very order, and probably to advise against it, evinces strongly such want of confidence. But his next day's conduct exempts him from serious censure, as it proved his "motive" pure. And, besides, adds the Court, "it feels itself bound (why, but because it was material to the inquiry) to report the fact, that his commanding officer (General Pope) not only omitted to hold him culpable for this separation, but emphatically commended his whole conduct while under his command, without exception or qualification."

How different the facts and the course of the Court in Porter's case.

I. Before deciding not to attempt to execute the order of the twenty-seventh, by marching at one A.M., Porter was strongly advised against it by all of his general officers who were present when he received it. Officers, who have ever been above all suspicion of want of fidelity, and

who now, and deservedly, stand high in Executive favor. On their almost positive remonstrance, he only agreed (they could persuade him to no longer delay) to wait till three A.M., but two hours, and he and they issued at once their orders accordingly; and who also proved that Bristow Station was reached as soon as if the march had been attempted at one.

II. His conduct on the bloody field of the thirtieth, red with the blood of thousands of his command, and illustrated by his usual fearless gallantry, and greatly diminishing the day's disaster.

III. Not only the omission of Pope even to intimate to him that he was held culpable for the alleged disobedience of the order of the twenty-seventh, but telling him, as he almost admits in his own evidence, and as was positively proved by Colonel Ruggles, (hereafter to be given,) that he had no fault to find; but, on the contrary, was satisfied with his whole conduct, and his omission afterward to report him to the Department, were all, in the judgment of the Court in his case, of no importance whatever, proving nothing in his favor, either as to act or intent—having not even a tendency to show that in his conduct in relation to the order, he "was not induced by any unworthy motive." For the one—McDowell—facts of the same character, not as strong, are a conclusive defense to proved disobedience. For the other—Porter—such facts, if they have any effect, either come "too late," or prove nothing, or if any thing, prove guilt. Such is the striking difference in the administration of its justice, exhibited by the Government through two of its Military Courts toward these two officers. The one, adjudged to be guiltless, and no doubt properly, who, from misfortune rather than want of skill, had signally failed *not only* to excite the admiration and gratitude of the Republic, but had received its censure—the other, adjudged guilty and cashiered, who, throughout his career, had evidenced rare skill and daring courage, and in the public estimation had won for himself a name of which the best of Napoleon's Marshals would have had reason to be proud.

How is this to be explained, and the reputation of the Government to pass unharmed? Can any reflecting, unprejudiced citizen give a satisfactory answer? And yet, how priceless to a "nation is even-handed justice." How imperative the interest, and the duty, to observe and enforce it.

But the opinion of the McDowell Court furnishes another instance of duty not performed in the same unfortunate campaign, and at the time known by Pope not to have been performed, and also by the War Department and the President, after that opinion was given—and yet, to this day, not even censured. And what makes that instance the more striking, is, that it was on the part of General King, one of the members of the Court that convicted and sentenced Porter. The division of that officer, as Pope testified before the McDowell Court, had had a successful fight with the enemy, "who were retreating from Centreville, on the night of the twenty-eighth of August, had remained masters of the field, still interposing between Jackson's forces and the main body of the enemy, and that the information was, he thought, brought to him by a staff-officer of General King." This filled him, as it well might, with high hopes of success, and he says that he "immediately" "directed General Kearny, whose division occupied Centreville, to push forward cautiously at one o'clock that night, in the direction of Gainesville, to drive in the pickets of the enemy," etc. "I directed him, at the first blush of daylight, to attack the enemy with his right advanced, and informed him that Hooker and Reno would be with him immediately after daylight. *To my surprise and dissatisfaction*, I learned toward daylight, on the morning of the twenty-ninth, that King's division had been withdrawn in the direction of Manassas Junction, leaving open the road to Thoroughfare Gap. This withdrawal of that division made necessary a great change in the movement, *and was a most serious and unlooked for mistake.*" McDowell, under whose command King was, had before left his corps improperly, as the Court found. He, of course, did not give King the order to withdraw. If he had, the Court says, "it could not be controverted that he would be justly held responsible for their retreat, and the conse-

quent derangements of the plan of battle then formed by General Pope." By whose order, then, was the retreat made? By King's. Why was not he called to answer for it? Did he know that it was important to hold his ground? Pope says that he was "so impressed with the necessity, that that division (King's) should hold its ground, that I sent several orders to General King (*one by his own staff-officer,*) during that night, to hold his ground at all hazards, and to prevent the retreat of the enemy, and informed him that our whole force from the direction of Centreville and Manassas Junction would fall upon the enemy at daylight."

The testimony of General Pope, in relation to these orders, the Court adopt, "as a faithful statement of the facts." Was the first order, or either of the succeeding ones, known to or received by King? If they were, how is it that he has not been charged with disobedience? If he did know of the orders, did he satisfy his before *surprised and dissatisfied chief* that he had good grounds for his disobedience, or, at least, that he "was not induced by any unworthy motive," or has he since satisfied the Department? If he has, then disobedience is not always censurable. Then "the Napoleonic maxim" includes ends as well as means.

That General King, who is known to be a patriotic soldier, had good motives for his failure, disastrous as Pope says it was to his plans, those who are acquainted with him will readily believe.

But to condemn Porter of disobedience, and to cashier him in the face of the reasons which are proved to have governed him, the concurrent and strong advice, and almost remonstrance, of his three Generals, and when the order itself afterward proved to be useless, and not only not to question King, but, on the contrary, to make him one of Porter's judges, and to continue him in high command, is conduct on the part of those in authority which no explanation can justify or excuse.

III. A yet more recent case, in the Army of the Potomac, illustrates still stronger the injustice done to Porter. On the removal from its command, as we all unfortunately now know it to have been, of General McClellan, General Burnside was placed at its head. The high character f gallantry and patriotism of that soldier one that has watched his career will ev question. Whether it was well or ill a vised, his subsequent attack on the enen at Fredericksburgh, proved most dis trous. To redeem the honor of his arm and retrieve, at the same time, his ov weakened reputation, he resolved on a other attack, and on a different plan. Th was at once, not to him only, but to all, cri icised with severity by his officers; and tw of his Generals, with, as it was stated, tl knowledge of others, visited the Presider to protest against it, and did so. The resu was, the President, on their advice, pr hibited the movement. Burnside at onc before he had seen the President, for th insubordination, issued an order, subje to the President's approval, dismissing fro the service several of the highest officer in his command, and many others, and soon after, informed the President in pe son that his sanctioning the order was ir dispensable not only to his remaining i command of the army, but to his contir uing in the military service. He testifie as the reader will remember, before th Committee of Congress on the Conduct o the War, that the President told him tha his order of dismissal was right, but tha before acting upon it, he must consult hi advisers, and that by persuasion he induce the witness to relinquish his purpose t leave the service. The result, and as it i to be supposed of his consultation with hi Cabinet, was that not only were none o the officers who were to be dismissed by the order dismissed, but, on the contrary, that General Hooker, one of the number, was put in the chief command.

Here again criticisms showing, if unexplained, "contempt" for the skill of a Commander-in-Chief may be so explained as to be held innocent, and may even place, notwithstanding his own example of insubordination, one of the critics in the place of the Chief.

IV. Another strong instance must be in the recollection of all. General Charles P. Stone, more than a year since, for alleged disloyalty and insinuated charge of treason, was taken from his then command, and for many weary months imprisoned in Fort Lafayette. Futile were his and his friends'

forts to ascertain what were the specific
cts of disloyalty, or the grounds of im-
ated treason. No explanation was given
could be obtained. And when his case
as made a matter of inquiry in the Sen-
e of the United States, the Chairman of
e Military Committee of that body, who
as also Chairman of the Committee on
e Conduct of the War, stated, in sub-
ance, that the evidence before the latter
mmittee fully justified the imprisonment,
d the President afterward, in replying
a call of the Senate, virtually said the
me thing. But now what a change.
o Court-Martial or inquiry was ordered,
ough frequently solicited by Stone. No
ecification or other definition of the char-
s ever given him, and yet but the other
y he was ordered into service in the
rmy of the Gulf, and is now at the head
the command which recently so distin-
ished itself under the lead of the gallant
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ndly loves.

But to return to the evidence, it is said
the Judge-Advocate, that neither the
aracter of the night, nor the state of the
ad, nor the condition of his command
caused Porter for his failure literally to
mply with the order to start at one A.M.
These objections will be considered in
eir order.

I.—As to the Night.

Its darkness had been given as a reason
r not starting at one A.M. The Judge-
dvocate answers this as he does every
rt of the case by giving but detached
d partial statements of the evidence of a
w of the witnesses, and omitting alto-
ther what was proved by those who
ere clearly the most to be relied upon.
he parts of the testimony that he does
ve, are from the evidence of Captain
uryea, Major Barstow, Lieutenant-Colo-
l Myers, General Pope, and General
Roberts. What was proved by Generals Morell, Griffin, Sykes, Butterfield and Reynolds, Colonel Cleary, Lieutenant-Colonel Locke, Captain Fifield, and Montieth, and Lieutenant Weld, all present when the order was received, or was being executed, is not given at all, and the reader will ask why? And can he give a satisfactory answer? This obviously unfair omission will now be supplied.

1. *Morell* says: "It was a *very* dark night. It was cloudy, threatening to rain, and did rain before morning." (P. 145.)

2. *Griffin.*—"The night of the twenty-seventh, and the morning of the twenty-eighth *was very* dark," I "know that at three o'clock, it was very dark, so dark that I used candles with my leading regiments to get through a little piece of woods which we left, in which we had been encamped." (Pp. 160–63.)

3. *Sykes.*—"The night was unusually dark." "Before I directed the advance to be sounded, I sent an aid-de-camp to find the road, so as to lead the column upon it. He returned in a short time, and told me that the darkness was so great, that he could not distinguish the road. He also told me that he was assisted in that search by several soldiers." (Pp. 176, 177.)

4. *Butterfield*, after stating, as before mentioned, what occurred in Porter's tent, when the order was received, and Porter's answer to the objections of his Generals to his marching at one A.M., added: "When we got outside, the darkness was so apparent, (to use such an expression,) and it seemed such a matter of impossibility to move, that General Porter said: "In consideration of all the circumstances, I will fix the hour at three o'clock instead of one. You will be ready to move promptly." He also stated that De Kay, who was sent by Pope with the order, said: "That it would be very difficult in getting back. That he would have hard work to find the way." (Pp. 185, 186.)

5. *Reynolds*, (alas! now of our illustrious dead.)—"It was a *very dark night*, as was the succeeding night. I recollect both of

them *distinctly from having been about a good deal, until after twelve o'clock on each night.*" (P. 169.)

6. *Cleary.*—"It was dark, cloudy." (P. 121.)

7. *Locke.*—The night was "*extremely dark.*" "*I received a very severe injury, groping about in the darkness.*" (P. 134.)

8. *Fifield.*—"The early part of the night was an ordinary star-light night of summer, without any moon. About half-past eleven o'clock, it commenced overcasting, and threatened rain. Very black clouds came up, and it did sprinkle a little. *It was very dark from that time till toward morning.*"

"It was very dark," "every thing so obscure from the *extreme darkness* of the night, that it would be very difficult for me to give any thing like a reasonable answer, in regard to that matter." (The matter was as to the extent and density of the wood along the road.) He also said "the night was very dark, and it was like a man groping his way in the darkness, without being able to see his hand before him, much of the way through the wood." (Pp. 122–125.)

This witness testified also that he was on duty from half-past ten o'clock, the entire balance of the night.

9. *Montieth.*—The night was "*very dark.*" (P. 126.)

10. *Weld.*—The night "*was very dark indeed.*" (P. 129.)

With all this evidence before him, the Judge-Advocate advises the President, that the night was not so dark before eleven o'clock, at least, if at any hour, as to have made it impossible for Porter, "to obey the order," to move at one A.M., and that it was a noticeable fact, "that the determination not to move at that hour, was not occasioned by *this* extreme darkness, (the admission that the darkness was extreme, thus leaked out,) but had been taken before Captain De Kay lay down, which was at eleven o'clock." And this is told to the President, though the Judge-Advocate knew, or should have known, that General Butterfield had before testified *positively*, that Porter, and that, too unwillingly, only agreed to postpone the time of marching from one to three A.M. when he, with his Generals, got outside of his tent and saw "the darkness so apparent," that it "seemed to be such a matter of impossibility to move." It was then and not before that Porter yielded to the advice and remonstrance of his three Generals, saying: "In consideration of all the circumstances I will fix the hour at three o'clock, instead of one." Why was the fact represented otherwise, and without even an intimation, that there was proof to the contrary? And especially, why was the President not informed of this evidence of Butterfield? It can not be necessary to say more on this head.

II.—The Condition of the Road.

That, says the Judge-Advocate, afforded no excuse for failing to march at one A.M. However dark the night was—whatever may have been the condition of his men—however worn down by immediately preceding day and night marches—however deprived of rest and food, there was nothing in the condition of the roads, that offered even an apology for not moving. But to the fact. What was the condition of the road?

The witnesses who were on the road that night, Major Cleary and Captain Fifield proved beyond all cavil, the existence of serious obstructions.

1. *Cleary.*—"At ten o'clock that night I received a note from General Porter to move the trains east of the railroad beyond and east of Cedar Run, toward Bristow Station. I gave the order to the proper persons connected with the trains, and they commenced immediately to move," "the removal of the trains occupied me from ten o'clock, till two o'clock in the morning, at which time, or perhaps a little later, I myself left that point for Bristow Station." "The road for some three miles, I think, was occupied by wagons, and was obstructed so as to render it very difficult for me and my party to pass along." (P. 121.) He testified also that his party consisted of ten or twelve persons only, that he traveled on horseback, and that they did not get to Bristow Station that night.

2. *Fifield*—He testified that he received rough Colonel Cleary, an order from eneral Porter on the evening of the venty-seventh of August, "to have the ains moved from Warrenton Junction own as far as possible in the neighborhood Bristow Station." He said that he proeded to execute it, and that it was not lly effected till about four o'clock in the orning, because it could not have been oner done, and added, "that the moving the trains during the night, would have evented the possibility of moving troops the railroad track." He also said, that tween "three and four miles" of the ad, (not the railroad,) was occupied by agons, and in reply to inquiries of the dge-Advocate, stated: "I know of no ad except on one side, (that is, on one le of the railroad,) and that the wagons that, were very much jammed and reining stationary. I found a great deal difficulty even in getting through them horseback." (Pp. 122–124.)

II.—The Condition of the Troops.

1. *Morell.*—They were *very much exusted from their previous marching.* ey had marched all the way from James ver, except from Fortress Monroe to Acia Creek." "They had marched (laboriisly) and as fast as possible," "and somenes at night." On being told by Porter the order, he said, that he, and *Sykes* d *Butterfield*, "immediately spoke of the ndition of our troops, *they being so much tigued*," as well as of "the darkness of e night, and told him that we did not lieve we could make any better progress attempting to start at that hour, (one M.) than if we waited till daylight." (Pp. 4, 145.)

2. *Sykes.*—I told Porter, on his informg me of the order to march at one A.M., y reasons for his not attempting it, That a night march is always exceedgly fatiguing and injurious to troops. *hat my command had already marched om twelve to fourteen miles that day,*" c. (P. 176.)

3. *Butterfield.*—My men "*were very uch fatigued.* They had marched from elly's Ford to Bealton, and from there up to Warrenton Junction, almost all the way without water, in the dust. It was very warm, and it was with great difficulty that we got them along." (P. 186.)

No portion of this testimony was the President advised of, and yet its materiality is most apparent. Why did the Judge-Advocate omit it, in executing an order, which directed him to report "*fully*" upon the bearing of all the testimony? Why select a part? Can these inquiries possibly be met satisfactorily? What fair mind will say they can?

The darkness of the night then, the state of the road, the condition of the troops, rendered it, in the opinion of his three Generals, not only inadvisable, but *impossible*, to execute literally as to time, the order of the twenty-seventh of August. Did the President, when he approved the sentence, know these facts? For the sake of his own character, of his sense of justice, his duty to the country, it is hoped, and believed, that he did not. Did he know, could he have known, that Porter's decision was based not on his own experience merely, but, as proved by *Sykes*, "upon the opinions of the three General officers in his corps next in rank to himself," (p. 176,) and that each one of them, in his testimony before the Court, maintained the same opinion?

Did he know, that all concurred in saying that "nothing whatever" would have been gained by a different decision? And, finally, did he know, what they all also stated, (as did Pope,) that the "military necessity for the movement to be at one o'clock A.M., on the twenty-eighth, so as to be at Bristow Station at daylight, did not appear, on the twenty-eighth," when Porter's command reached that point? (P. 177.)

Ignorance, however, of these circumstances can not be used in vindication of the Court. How they are to be vindicated, except upon the hypothesis of an obtuseness of intellect, the effect of prejudice, no fair mind can imagine.

But in the march, when it was begun, the Judge-Advocate says, "there was no haste or vigor displayed," and that the mud, spoken of by General *Griffin*, could not have been an obstacle "at such a season." "It was (he adds) in summer, and a season of drought, as appears from the

clouds of dust which are continually brought to our notice by the testimony," and that "he can not, therefore, be misled," by the alleged existence of mud.

A few words on these points are all that can be necessary:

1. The charge of the absence of haste and vigor rests on the evidence of De Kay. On his statement that the troops were marched "at the rate at which troops would move if there was no necessity for rapid movement," and that, in his "judgment," they could "have moved much faster than they did in point of fact."

In the first place, the evidence of this witness, who was on Pope's staff, is to be taken with many grains of allowance. He recollects little except what was thought to prejudice Porter. He remembers nothing of what Porter said to the attending Generals, except that he states Porter said, "Gentlemen, there is something for you to sleep upon," a fact positively disproved by Butterfield, and not stated by Sykes or Morell.

2. He said, "he could not recollect *precisely*" whether Porter announced his purpose, either to obey the order or not, a fact clearly proved by each of the Generals.

3. That he "was aware of the determination not to start until *daylight*," because *he* "went to sleep" on hearing so, when the Generals, all of them say, at first he resolved starting at once, and only delayed till three through their earnest advice.

4. He does not say, what Butterfield proved he did say, that he told Porter "it would be very difficult in getting back. That he would have hard work to find the way."

But, it is not necessary to rely on these circumstances. As the fact of the asserted want of haste and vigor, is *positively disproved* by each of the Generals, and by other officers, a fact also not disclosed to the President.

1. *Morell* answered "*Yes*" to this question. "After starting at three o'clock, did your own command, and so far as you know, the rest of the corps make the *best of their way, and push on as fast as p sible* toward Bristow Station?" (P. 14

2. *Sykes.*—"I led the advance on th morning, (the twenty-eighth,) and I co tinued my march to Bristow Station, wi the exception of the usual halts which co mands always have to allow men to pass the rear, and the one that I spoke of at t creek, when I said, I found it necessa to halt my command for some time, order to unite it." (P. 179.)

3. *Locke.*—"They (the troops) march as fast as they could under the circu stances," and by the circumstances, said, he meant "the darkness of the nig and the obstructions of the road." also stated that the troops "were ve much fatigued." (P. 134.)

How idle to disregard all this concurri proof, and rely not only on the unsupporte but the contradicted evidence of *De Ka* And how unfair to the President and the public, (the review was intended f both,) and unjust to Porter, not to giv the opposing and contradictory evidenc

II. That the mud was no obstacle "t the onward march of soldiers determine to do their duty." No evidence w offered to prove that there was no mud o any part of the line of march.

I. The Judge-Advocate infers it "fro the clouds of dust" continually brought t our notice by the evidence. How illogica What rare simplicity. The weather wa hot and dry. The parts of the road wher there was no water, were dusty. Ther could not, therefore, be mud, where ther was no dust, but water. Had the exigenc of his case required it, the acute an learned reviewer would have maintained that as Pennsylvania Avenue is at time excruciatingly dusty, there can not then b mud in the marshes of the Potomac.

II. But the fact of there being mud, an that it operated to impede the march, wa proved expressly by Generals Griffin an Butterfield. They were on the spot, lead ing the march of their respective columns and it is rather more than probable, tha they would know better whether ther

as mud in the route, and whether it in-posed an obstacle to the march, than an icial sitting in his study, and evidently nt on showing that there was nothing the way to impede "the onward march soldiers determined to do their duty."

1. *Griffin.*—"I know that the artillery hich followed the brigade, that is, a car-ge or two of the artillery which followed e brigade, got *stuck in the mud*, or in a tle creek, and had trouble in getting it. (P. 161.)

2. *Butterfield.*—In answer to a question the Judge-Advocate, he said: "I know at after it had got to be about daylight, went out to the head of my column, and found a difficult place to cross—that there as difficulty in getting the troops across. could see that it had been dark, and the oops had been impeded, but they began go on more rapidly, as light broke."

He was then asked again by the Judge-dvocate to "state the character of the fficulty—the character of the place—was mud or water, or what was it?" And e answered:

"It was *mud and water both*—one of ose streams that we almost always have *force troops over.* In the daytime you ould force them over very well—but at ight, when it can not be seen, it is a *very ifficult thing* to get men across such a lace." (P. 187.)

This testimony of Butterfield is not ven alluded to in the review. Then, un-ss Griffin and Butterfield swear falsely, for mistake as to such facts was impos-ible,) notwithstanding the hypothesis of he Judge-Advocate, resting on the exist-nce of dust on portions of the road, there vas mud and water in other portions, and o an extent interposing obstacles "to the nward march of soldiers determined to lo their duty." But, finally, on this head. Why is it, that Porter, alone of the com-mand is accused of want of "haste or vigor"?

As commander of the entire corps, his duty was but to issue the necessary orders to his division commanders, for the march. And this they all say, was done. It was their duty to superintend the execution of the orders. They are equally responsible for disregard of duty, as their immediate chief. He relied, as he had a right to rely, upon them to conduct the march with proper "haste" and "vigor." He had every reason for such reliance. They had been under his command on many battle-fields. He had seen them in the midst of countless perils, ever foremost in danger, unsurpassed in skill, and nobly devoted to duty. "To do their duty," he knew them to be "soldiers determined." If there was any failure, then, in the speed of the march, it is to be referred to them, and not to him." And yet, who has ever called their patriotism, or their efforts in regard to it, in question? The Government certainly has not. They are now, and have been continuously, from the twenty-seventh of August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, in its service, and on duty. To hold Porter responsible for their alleged misconduct, (for which, however, there is not the least ground,) and not only not even to censure them, but to keep them in honored commands, is an unequal measure of justice, that amounts to a gross and palpable wrong. One victim, however, was enough. To have sacrificed to the behest of party, or to the exigencies of an ill-planned campaign, and of an unfortunately selected Commander, Morell, Griffin and Butterfield, would have been too glaringly to have outraged public opinion, and it was not done. But the very omission of passing by these officers, and visiting upon their immediate chief, the sole responsibility for the asserted want of haste and vigor in the march of the twenty-eighth of August, which, if it was true, was their fault, and not his, demonstrates the depth and the enormity of the injustice done to Porter.

SECOND SPECIFICATION—FIRST CHARGE.

II. The second specification of the first charge is, Porter's failure to obey the joint order to himself and McDowell of the twenty-ninth August, eighteen hundred and sixty-two. That order was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,
CENTREVILLE, August 29th, 1862.

"GENERALS MCDOWELL AND PORTER:

"You will please move forward with your joint command towards Gainesville.

I sent General Porter written orders to that effect, an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies.

"I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movement of General McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aid-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike, until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear.

"I do not even know Ricketts's position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning.

"General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to join the other division of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position, from which they can reach Bull Run to-night, or by morning. The indications are, that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction, at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night, or the next day. My own headquarters will for the present be with Heintzelman's or at this place.

"JOHN POPE,
"Major-General Commanding."

I. The first inquiry on this head is, what, in one particular, was the meaning of the order? Was it that each of the two Generals was to act independently of each other, or that, being together when received, and being executed, they were to be governed by the sixty-second Article of War? This, as will be seen, is a material point, and was so considered by the Judge-Advocate. He endeavors to give it the former interpretation, and relies for that purpose mainly on Pope's evidence. Pope, he says, testified that his "intention" was, that they "should act independently of each other, and each in direct subordination to himself." (P. 306.) But even with this assistance, he admits that the point is not clear. Anxious as he was to maintain that construction, he could not bring himself to say, in its support, more than that "under these circumstances, it may *well be questioned* whether, under the Article of War referred to "General McDowell could continue the command which he had assumed over these joint forces." Here, again, as throughout, contrary to the universal rule, doubt, however reasonable, is to be solved to the prejudice of Porter. "Full weight," says Bennet, and all other authorities, is to be given "to every argument or presumption in favor of the prisoner." (P. 126.) Porter was, by the Court and Judge-Advocate, denied the benefit of this rule.

In fact, however, there is no room for doubt. The construction maintained by the Judge-Advocate as probable, is manifestly wrong.

II. To call to the aid of that construction Pope's oral proof before the Court, of his intention, is in violation of the best-established rules of evidence.

The order must be its own interpreter. To construe written matter by evidence *aliunde*, every professional man knows to be inadmissible. Nothing but confusion, mistake and injustice would be the result of such a course. And in this instance, to refer to Pope's evidence, given months after the order, not made known to McDowell and Porter when they received it, or afterward, until he gave such evidence, is as absurd as it is unjust. How were either of them to know Pope's intention, except as the order disclosed it? He was twelve miles away from them. The order was received, without any explanation or message from Pope. His mind, his intent, they could but collect from the order itself; and certainly they could not foresee that, months afterward, Pope would seek to give it an intent, not only not consentaneous with, but contradictory with its terms. Pope is presumed to have known of the sixty-second Article of War. If by that article, McDowell, as "the officer highest in rank," would have the right to "com-

and the whole," then, at least, in the sence of any direction from himself to e contrary, Pope is to be assumed to ve so intended.

The different view taken by the Judge-dvocate serves to deprive Porter of the fense to this specification, that in what is charged to have done, or to have itted, in supposed violation of this der, he acted under the command of eneral McDowell, his senior in rank.

The very fact that such a view is taken the Judge-Advocate, satisfactorily ows, that he thought the opposite one uld, upon the evidence, be a full an-er to the specification. He seeks also maintain his interpretation upon the rther ground, that the article "excludes e idea of the presence of an officer su-rior in rank to those commanding the fferent corps of which it speaks." Cer-inly it does. But was Pope present hen he gave the order? when it was ceived? or was being executed? The dge-Advocate does not say he was, it does say he "was absent but a few iles." How many miles, he does not form the President, or how many miles uld, in his opinion, constitute absence d not presence. As the fact in this nnection was material, he should have ated if he knew, and he ought to have own, the evidence being before him, w far off Pope was, that the President ight judge, as he gave no opinion of his vn to guide him, whether such distance as absence or not. Pope was at *Cen-eville*, a distance of *twelve miles*. To y then that he was present would seem be absurd. The Article looks to pres-nt and immediate joint duty.

It was such duty that the order em-raced. The two commands were to act gether. The officers were told to "move rward with your *joint command* ward ainesville." It contemplated its union ith the forces of *Heintzelman*, *Sigel*, nd *Reno*, and that that occurring, "the hole force should halt." They were also ld, "that the troops (that is, all of them) ust occupy a position from which they n reach Bull Run to-night or by morn-g." In the forward movement of the vo corps, who was to command? Who give the order to halt? Who to de-cide upon the position to be held to enable the command to reach Bull Run that night or morning?

The Article contemplates this very state of things, and provides for it. "If on marches," or "doing duty together" different corps of the army shall happen to join, the officer highest in rank of the line of the army, "shall command the whole, and give orders for what is needful to the service." No matter how the junction is brought about, when it exists, the Article embraces it, and establishes a positive rule, that "the officer highest in rank in the line of the army" is to command the whole with the single exception that it shall be "otherwise specially directed by the President of the United States." To hold that, under the circumstances of this joint command, what was to be done in executing the joint order, was to be done by Pope, who was *twelve miles distant*, upon the theory that he was, notwithstanding, to be considered present, every one will see is wholly untenable. How was he to judge when to move the command? when to halt, or what position to take with a view to retire to Bull Run that night or the next morning? These two corps were placed by the order and the sixty-second Article under the command of McDowell. No one but the President had the authority to take the command out of the operation of that Article. And even if Pope thought that he had the power, he did not attempt to exert it by the joint order.

II. The specification does not state in what particular the order was disobeyed. It only alleges that Porter "did then and there disobey."

We are to look then, to the evidence and review, for the information. The finding of the Court, merely finds disobedience in fact, without stating in what it consisted.

The President therefore had no knowledge upon the point, except as he obtained it from the Review. That told him that, "the Court concluded and justly, that his (Porter's) falling back under the circumstances, and for the purpose mentioned in his note to Generals McDowell

and King, was a violation of the joint order to himself and McDowell." (P. 308.)

As this is the only information we have of what was considered by the Court disobedience, it would be sufficient to confine these remarks to that point. But, as the Judge-Advocate has suggested many things, tending to disparage Porter in other particulars, these will be first noticed.

I. It is said, that when the two corps were together, and the front of Porter's column (his corps being in advance) "had reached some three miles beyond *Bethlehem Church*," "General McDowell then rode forward to the head of the column of the accused, when an interview and conference took place between them. They discussed the joint order, and General McDowell determined, *for himself*, that there were considerable advantages to be gained by departing from it," and by moving with his forces along the Sudley Springs road toward the field of a battle, then being fought by the main army of General Pope, at the distance of three or four miles. His purpose was to throw himself on the enemy's centre, and he wished the accused to attack his right flank. He then said to Porter: "You put your forces in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of troops engaged at that point with the enemy." (P. 307.)

From this statement, the reader will suppose that McDowell considered himself entitled to direct Porter's movement. The Judge-Advocate should at least be consistent with himself. If upon the theory that Pope was to be considered as present, Porter was not under McDowell's command, then the latter had no right to direct his movements. Of these Porter had the sole control, subject only to Pope.

If they were to "act independently of each other," (and the Judge-Advocate says they were to do so,) and that such was Pope's "intention," then if McDowell's alleged direction to Porter was given authoritatively, it was but intrusive. If on the contrary, as in this part of his review, the Judge-Advocate implies, a different opinion of their relation toward each other, is the correct one, Porter w under the command of McDowell, th it is most important to ascertain wh order, if any, was given by the latter Porter. If he was subject to McDowel command, (as it is confidently believe and as in this part of his argument, conceded by the Judge-Advocate,) th his duty in the execution of the joi order was to act in subordination to th officer. And if in doing so, the joi order was disobeyed, the offender w McDowell, not Porter. Where was M Dowell, when he gave the order to P ter, and what was that order?

I. He was present with the joint co mand, and had the control of it. H leaving it afterward, and going with h own corps to another part of the field, no way impairs the validity or effect his prior order; whatever that was, Po ter was bound to obey it.

II. If McDowell gave an order, wh was it?

The Judge-Advocate would have us b lieve, that it was that Porter should a tack "the enemy's right flank"—shou put his "force in here," meaning, in fro of the then locality of the two corps. H does not intimate even, that a word w uttered by McDowell contrary to this a leged order, and yet the proof is clea (McDowell to the contrary, notwithstan ing,) that there was an order, and not onl that, but that the one alleged was n given at all.

I. *Lieutenant-Colonel Locke*, Chief o Porter's staff, and his Assistant Adjutan General. He saw McDowell on the twen ty-ninth, "on the ground where he ha taken up our position in the direction o Gainesville, and near the Manassas Rail road," "where Porter was forming hi corps in line of battle." "He had mad considerable progress in the disposition of his troops, a battery was in position and the troops were being deployed Skirmishers were being thrown out i front." On seeing it, McDowell said "Porter, you are out too far already this is no place to fight a battle." (P. 135.)

If this evidence is to be relied upon, and this will soon be examined,) Porter was preparing for battle. He was not then certainly providing for "the personal safety of (himself) and staff," as the reviewer most charitably suggests, was his motive subsequently in another asserted movement on the same day.

2. *Captain A. P. Martin*, a Captain in the Third Massachusetts battery, commanding "Division Artillery of General Morell's division." He saw a meeting between McDowell and Porter, about eleven o'clock on the morning of the twenty-ninth, "on the road leading from Manassas Junction to Gainesville," and "at the head of the column," (Porter's.) Heard McDowell say to Porter: "PORTER, THIS IS NO PLACE TO FIGHT A BATTLE, YOU ARE OUT TOO FAR." Colonel Locke, he said was present, and within hearing at the time. Porter "had sent out skirmishers to the front, and the troops were moving, closing up apparently *en masse*, as I supposed, preparing to form a line of battle, *which was afterward done.* These movements "were continued. The brigade that was leading were being disposed off, on the hill near where the conversation referred to, had taken place—one brigade, and one battery moved off to the right shortly after, evidently preparing to form on the right of the brigade on the hill. I went with the battery that moved to the right, to see the position. One battery was placed where the conversation was held, about that time." (P. 144.)

Both of these witnesses were unimpeached by evidence as to character or otherwise, and in their cross-examination, the Judge-Advocate made no attempt to weaken their testimony. Not a question was propounded, suggesting even a possibility that they could be mistaken. And when McDowell was recalled for the purpose, in part, of rebutting this evidence, he was only asked by the Judge-Advocate, if he had or not, "recollection of having said to Porter," at his interview with him on the twenty-ninth, (he had admitted the fact of the interview,) what was sworn to by Locke and Martin, and his answer was: "I can not recollect *precisely* what occurred, or *what conversation*, and what words passed between us at that time. I can not say what language I used, or how it may have been understood, whilst talking on that point," (the joint order.) (Pp. 217, 218.)

He stated also, that he thought the conversation related chiefly to Pope's joint order. It is then, but a failure to remember whether he did or not tell Porter what Locke and Martin positively testified. *Non me recordo.* In using this phrase, a classic one, since the trial of England's former Queen, it is not intended to intimate, that it was the purpose of McDowell to conceal what he did know, but merely to show that his evidence rebutted nothing, but merely proved a want of memory, as to the fact that he was called to rebut. Every lawyer, every man of sense, knows, that such evidence has not a feather's weight against positive proof. Intelligent experience ever discards it as wholly unreliable. If, in this instance, influence was given to it, it is but another proof of the weakness to which prejudice has reduced the minds of the Court.

The state of things then existing at eleven A.M, on the twenty-ninth, was:

I. That Porter was preparing for battle at the point where McDowell and he met. That his corps were all placed by his order, or were being placed in position for that purpose.

II. That he was told by McDowell, that he was not to fight there, the place not being a proper one for a battle, and that "he was too far advanced." McDowell supposed he was too far forward, that his position was an unfit one, and, of course, a dangerous one, for a conflict, and yet it is insinuated by the Judge-Advocate, that he retreated an hour or two only afterward, on the same day, for the degrading and cowardly purpose of securing "the personal safety of (himself) and staff." (P. 308.)

Was ever a party dealt with so unjustly? Could it have been thought possible, that a gallant officer, who in the many battles through which he had passed, was always in the front, or where danger was greatest —devoting his energies, and periling his life for the honor and existence of his country, whilst the Judge-Advocate was

safely seated in his office, where no danger could come, or if it did, could readily be escaped from, would be arraigned by that officer, before the President and the public, as having abandoned his duty, and cravenly fled from the foe for the vile and disgraceful purpose of "personal safety." Is all generosity gone? Is no magnanimity left? Is all gratitude fled? It is of the many dreadful evils of this war, that suspicion takes the place of confidence, prejudice of impartiality, the darkest passions of the highest virtues. Porter a coward! Let him who charges it, go to the noble troops he has so often led to battle, and ask of them if the charge is not true. He would soon be found, if not himself wholly regardless of danger, looking to his "personal safety." Go to the officers who have been with him in battle, and never saw his eye dimmed, except when he discovered his comrades wounded and dying around him, and see with what surprise and scorn the charge would be received. Go to the troops and the officers constituting his corps on the twenty-ninth, and listen to the contempt with which the imputation would be regarded. The enlightened public will never sanction such an accusation by whomsoever made. They are ever grateful to such a public servant as they know Porter to have been. Individuals may be found wanting in that virtue. But such a public, never. Ingratitude, that "crime of deeper die than all the guilty train of human vices," is never found in them.

III. Conceding, however, that the joint order did not direct an attack on the enemy at that point, or elsewhere, on that day, and that McDowell gave Porter no such order, or if he did, that it was without authority, the Judge-Advocate says: "It would *seem* to have been a manifest violation of the duty resting on Porter in the position in which he was then placed, without reference to any specific order or direction, leading or directing him to engage the enemy," not to have done so. (P. 308.)

I. It would be a conclusive reply to this view that the specification charges only disobedience of the joint order of the twenty-ninth. If it was the purpose of the Judge-Advocate to rely on any such general military duty, as is here stated, fairness, as well as the laws of military pleading, required that it should have be alleged. To specify a particular offens and on the trial rely upon another and t tally different one, is as repugnant to ju tice as to every legal principle. How the accused to prepare for his defense? know what witnesses to summon? or wh proof he is to meet? It is impossible th the law in this respect can be unknown t the Judge-Advocate. A long abando ment of the profession, which he for yea so greatly adorned, may have had its usu result, the making him somewhat rusty i some branches of the science. But th rule of pleading and evidence is so fam iar, and so challenges the assent of ever sensible mind, that he could not have fo gotten it. Why then rely on a charge n stated in the specification? Why prese it to the President as one of the reaso for his approving the finding on the actu specification? Can it be accounted f except because he was satisfied, or appr hended the President would be satisfie that the offense specified was not estal lished by the evidence? Did he urge th same view upon the Court? Did th Court adopt it, or itself take it? If s both he and the Court offended again the law, and committed a legal outrag upon Porter. The same observations a applicable to the further view of the Judg Advocate, that Porter on the same da violated an "elementary principle," "th in the absence of positive restraining order the march shall always be toward th sound of the guns. (Ib.) That is not th offense specified. Nothing can be cleare than this. But, waiving this objectio conclusive as it is, what foundation in fac is there for either of these charges?

II. The ground of the first is said to b that the officer is bound to hold his colum so, "in the advance, as to be ready t afford mutual assistance in time of need." (Ib.) *Need*, then, is to exist, to make th principle applicable. Who is to judge o it? The officer in command of the colum If he judges erroneously, it is no offense provided he does so honestly. Thos who know Porter require no proof to con vince them that, unless prohibited by "re straining orders," he would ever assist hi brother soldiers in time of need. Did h believe it was wanted in this instance? The columns supposed to have required his aid were not in his sight, but severa

niles off. Nor could he leave his own command to ascertain their condition, or the desire of their immediate officers, or of the Commander-in-Chief. McDowell, leaving his column under the same circumstances, to consult Pope, the Court in his case adjudged committed a clear offense, and only omitted to punish for it from an impression that his motives were innocent. Porter remained, as he should, with his troops, and sent one of his aids, Lieutenant Weld, to Pope. That officer states, "about four o'clock on the afternoon of the twenty-ninth," he started on his errand. He bore a written and verbal message to Pope from Porter. The latter was "to the effect that General Morell would soon be strongly engaged; that there was a large force in front of us." The glance that he had of the written one showed him, he said, that it was to the same purport, "but much more minutely, with details"—what they were, he did not remember. He found Pope, "and delivered the message to him, both written and verbal," and asked if there was an answer. Pope told him, "Tell General Porter we are having a hard fight," and said, that "was all he had to send to General Porter." The witness wrote this down, and afterward delivered it in person to Porter. He further stated, that on the way to Pope he "saw General Hatch," who was in command of King's division, that officer, as Hatch said, being sick, and not present. That he gave Hatch both of the messages, as Porter had authorized, and asked him for an answer, and was told, "Tell General Porter that we have whipped the enemy, and are driving them," but soon added, Don't deliver that answer, but this, "Tell General Porter we have driven the enemy in the woods." (P. 129.) This also was delivered to Porter. With these facts in his possession, on what ground could Porter have supposed that Pope needed on his battle-ground Porter's column?

Who was best able to judge? Pope, who was on the site of the battle, and in command of all the forces engaged, or Porter, who was several miles distant? Had Porter not a right to consider that if his assistance was needed, a request, or order to that effect, would have been sent by Pope, in reply to his written and verbal messages by Weld? Pope had the right to demand his assistance. But he not only failed to do this, but even to intimate that he desired it. If the assistance was needed, and not asked, (and it is clear that it was not,) then one of these conclusions follows:

I. Either Pope designedly failed in his duty, or II., had not the intelligence to know (though on the spot) that Porter's corps was needed. But he is not blamed by the Judge-Advocate. On the contrary, (however it may excite surprise, or cause a smile with those who remember the disorganized army that fell back upon the Washington defenses, and its crest-fallen chief,) he tells us, "That it can not be improper to add, what the Record will sustain me in saying, that so far as light is shed upon the subject by the testimony, the Army of Virginia appears to have nobly performed the arduous and perilous work committed to its hands. Its campaign was brief, but marked by signal *vigor and ability*, and animated by a spirit which, shrinking from neither toil nor exposure, nor danger, bravely struck the enemy whenever and wherever he could be found." (P. 316.) The only way to account for so singular an opinion, is by supposing that the Judge-Advocate closed his eyes to all the evidence in the Record, except that of Pope, Roberts, and Smith, (a fault belonging to the whole of his review,) and also by supposing that the universal voice of the public upon the campaign, which literally filled the land, never found its way within the walls of his office. But it is strange, that when he was penning this eulogium and lauding "the signal vigor and ability of Pope," it did not occur to him, that it was possible the people would find in the fact, that when the President discovered the Capitol in imminent peril, he at once relieved the so much lauded chief, and about the second of September, placed the army under the command of Major-General McClellan, and on the fifth of the same month gave to Porter the command of eighteen thousand men, to guard the most important portion of the intrenchments around the city, and continued him in that position until the twelfth, when he ordered him to the command of his former corps, to which a new division was attached, in the army, with which McClellan, to his great honor and to the incalculable advantage of the country, and the safety of the Capitol and the Executive, fought the battles of South-

Mountain and Antietam—conclusive evidence that the President did not then share in the confidence of the Judge-Advocate in Pope, or in the truth of his eulogium, or participate in his present detraction of Porter.

II. But as the joint order, for the reasons already assigned, as long as McDowell and Porter were together, placed the command of their united forces in McDowell, his order was conclusive on Porter. To have disobeyed it would have been a high military offense. Did McDowell give an order, and what was it? The facts that he gave one, and what the order was, are conclusively proved by the evidence of Locke and Martin, before referred to, and which was not at all weakened, much less rebutted by that of McDowell.

III. Porter's "falling back," the Judge-Advocate says, was the ground on which the Court decided that there "was a violation of the joint order." (P. 308.)

I. The only proof urged to sustain the fact that there was a falling back is a note (which will be given hereafter) of Porter to McDowell and King, without date, but no doubt written and sent on the twenty-ninth, after those officers had left Porter's corps. At this time, Porter was, as before stated, authorized to judge for himself. That this was his right, McDowell having then separated from him, the Judge-Advocate nowhere contests. On the contrary, he admits that McDowell then ceased to have any rightful authority over Porter, and that he (Porter) was left "untrammeled," and empowered to decide for himself what was to be done under the joint order. (P. 307.) He not only makes this concession, but in another part of his review, as has been seen, he goes farther, and maintains that even McDowell present, Porter had the right, under the order, to act independently of him. In this latter opinion he is certainly mistaken, but in the other, clearly right. The order told Porter that "it may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night," and that "one thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night, or by morning," "and that if any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out." The power, therefore, to judge whether departing from the order would produce "any considerable advantages" was given to Porter exclusively. He had the right to decide on that as fully as Pope himself would have had if personally present. Error in judging of it is no offense if committed honestly. The power, however, was made subject to this positive limitation, that it was not to be exercised so as to place his troops in a position from which they might not be able to "reach Bull Run that night or by morning." Every thing to be done was to be in subordination to that object. To march in a different direction, or to attack the enemy, or to do any thing else would probably hazard that end, it was not to be done. And who was to decide this? Porter. Had he acted without regard to that primary purpose, and by doing so had frustrated it, he would have violated the order, and been justly liable to punishment. Now, what evidence is there that in any thing he did, after McDowell left him, Porter did not decide honestly? His Generals and several of his other officers were examined, and they exculpated him in this, as indeed they did in regard to all the charges. Nor, as to this, did the Judge-Advocate attempt to prove the contrary by any one of them.

If, therefore, Porter had in fact fallen "back," he was empowered to do so if he really judged it expedient, looking to the positive injunction, as to Bull Run, or to "advantages" that he thought would result from it. This proposition, however, is not necessary to his vindication. For there is not only no proof that he did fall back, but positive proof that he did not. "Falling back," as the Judge-Advocate uses the term, means *retreat*. Did his troops fall back or retreat on the twenty-ninth? There is not a scinctilla of evidence of it; nor does the Judge-Advocate offer any evidence of any fact that even tends to establish it. He not only substitutes surmise for proof, but, in favor of surmise, he rejects positive and uncontradicted proof.

The proof is this:

1. *Morell.*—He stated that he received an order from Porter, written in pencil, a little before sunset on that evening, and soon after, through Colonel Locke, a verbal message to the same effect, direct-

ig him "to make dispositions to attack he enemy," and that he did so. That the rder was afterward countermanded, because of the lateness of the hour, as suggested by him, and he added: "I was irected to remain where I was during the ight." That he made his dispositions ccordingly, describing them, and said, in that way we passed the night." (Pp. 46, 147.)

The written order was produced, on the ross-examination of the Judge-Advocate, nd was as follows:

"GENERAL MORELL: I wish you to push p two regiments, supported by two others, receded by skirmishers; the regiments t intervals of two hundred yards, and ttack the party with a section of a battery, pposed to you. The battle works well n our right, and the enemy are said to be etiring up the pike. Give the enemy a ood shelling when our troops advance.

"F. J. PORTER,
"Major-General Commanding."

What conclusive proof this, that Porter, on that day, was thinking of "the personal safety of (himself) and staff"! It is commended as such to the special meditation of the charitable Judge-Advocate. The witness further stated, "I received from General Porter an order to remain all night where I was," in line of battle, immediately in front of the enemy, and *did so*.

2. *Butterfield, Sykes, Locke, and B. F. Smith* proved that the troops remained in their position in front of the enemy, all *the night of the twenty-ninth*. *Locke* said that they continued there "until the next morning at daylight," and to the question, "was there any *retreat* at all, answered *no*." (P. 195.) *Smith*, a witness of the Government, examined by the Judge-Advocate, and whose evidence he fully relied upon for another purpose, was asked by him, "Was there or not any such display of the enemy's forces as to make it necessary, in your judgment, to retreat before them?" and answered: "I had no means of knowing. When we moved back from that position I supposed it was for some proper cause, but I did not understand at all what the cause was. *I did not receive any impression that we were retreating from the enemy.* I supposed that we were making a reconnoissance to feel the enemy in that direction, and, having found him, that we had moved back for some other purpose and, not knowing about the orders to the General, I remained under that impression. (P. 113.) Is it not then passing strange, that with this clear proof, the Court should, as the Judge-Advocate says they did, "and justly," have found that Porter did fall back, did retreat on that evening, and in that way (the only one suggested) violated the joint order? It can but be accounted for as other gross errors can only be by assuming the existence from *some cause aliunde* of judicial and official blindness. The only ground relied upon by the Judge-Advocate is the following note, heretofore referred to, from Porter to McDowell and King.

"GENERALS MCDOWELL AND KING: I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the roads to Groveton. The enemy are in strong force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going. Had you not better send your train back? I will communicate with you.

"F. J. PORTER,
"Major-General."

Waiving for the present, what however is most obvious, that if Porter had withdrawn to Manassas, (his purpose when this note was written,) the movement would have been within the discretion vested in him by the joint order, yet as the evidence is clear, *that he did not so withdraw, but, on the contrary, continued where he was in front of the enemy*, when the note was written, and until the morning to the thirtieth, and then only marched under a positive order from Pope, he could have been found guilty of falling back or retreating upon the twenty-ninth, only upon the hypothesis, that an *unexecuted purpose* is the exact equivalent of an *executed one*. In the view of ordinary minds, to do is one thing, and to intend to do, another—

but with this Court and Judge-Advocate, they are in fact and in law identical, and Porter has been adjudged guilty of disobedience, not because he did disobey, but because he, for a moment, contemplated disobedience. There is no better way of meeting such reasoning than to state it. Like all palpable follies, it answers itself.

The Judge-Advocate asserts, however, that the purpose to "retreat," "most energetically," as he says announced in the note, "was promptly carried out substantially if not to the letter, because at between five and six o'clock, the accused was found at or near Bethlehem Church, surrounded by his troops, whose arms were stacked." (P. 308.) He omits, however, to inform the President, or even to allude to it, that the greater part of his troops, Morell's division, as proved by Morell himself, remained during the night, and, by Porter's order, where McDowell left them, in the immediate front of the enemy, and in line of battle, prepared either to repel or attack, as the occurrences of the night might require. That all the troops were not there, upon the point in question, proves nothing. The Judge-Advocate would seem to think that there was a retreat, if the whole corps was not retained at the spot—placed in solid column, standing erect, and with arms at the shoulder. But this is mere fancy. What witness proved a retreat in a military sense? Not one, whilst Morell, Locke, and B. F. Smith testified that there was no retreat, in fact, and no order given for one. Here again hypothesis is made to do more than take the place of proof—it is used to supplant it. The Judge-Advocate, conscious that the order from McDowell to Porter of the twenty-ninth, which Colonel Locke positively swears he received and delivered that afternoon, would be a full justification for Porter's not attacking the enemy, assails the witness. This he does, not by calling witnesses to impeach his character for veracity, or in any other respect, but by proving, I., by McDowell, that he did not recollect giving the order; II., by King, that he was not with McDowell (as Locke had said he was) when McDowell, as *stated by Locke*, gave the order. The reviewer says, that McDowell "declared that none such was sent by him." This is not so. He made no such statement—on the contrary, he studiously avoided doing so. He but professed not to *recollect* having given it. King's evidence was to the same effect. He was only asked by the Judge-Advocate if he *remembered* being with McDowell about the time when Locke testified he received the order, and said that he did not. And to another question he answered, that he did *not remember* hearing McDowell give any such order that day. In his case, then, as in McDowell's, there existed but *a want of recollection*. Is this to destroy the evidence of a witness not otherwise impeached, who swears that the order was given? As far as there is proof, and as those who are acquainted with the parties, know to be the fact, Locke's character for veracity is as perfect as that of McDowell's or King's. Why then is his truth assailed and their being mistaken even, treated as impossible? King admitted that he was sick on that day, and although he did not state what his disease was, yet, as he said, he was too sick to take part in the battle of the succeeding day, and was forced to leave his division to be led by Hatch; as his loyalty and gallantry are beyond all question, his sickness must have been severe. Certain diseases we all know (and King's may have been of that kind) produce listlessness and impair memory. And yet on this negative and wholly unreliable evidence, it is maintained by the Judge-Advocate, that no such order was given, and that Locke, the equal in virtue of McDowell and King, willfully swore false.

Mistake as to the fact to which he testified was impossible. If the order was not delivered by McDowell to Locke, then the latter knew it, and his testimony was designedly untrue. But, whether the order was in fact sent by McDowell, Locke positively swears he delivered it to Porter as coming from McDowell. No one contradicts this, either positively or negatively. To receive it as true, therefore, would seem to be unavoidable; but it is not so with the Judge-Advocate. He assumes, without charging it designed falsehood on the part of Locke in his statement, that the order was sent by McDowell, and then maintains that the other fact proved by him, the delivery of such an order to Porter, is to be rejected as untrue on the authority of the maxim, which, according to his reading, is "*falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus*," (it should be

"*falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*") Desirous, however, as he evidently was to impeach the credibility of Locke, he could not bring himself to charge him with willful falsehood. And yet the maxim has no application to any other. And it applies there, because in such a case, the very ground on which credit is given to human testimony fails. You can not be certain in such a case whether there is truth in any part of the witness's evidence. Having (says the Judge-Advocate) been discredited as laboring under a complete *misapprehension* in regard to the first, the receiving the order from McDowell,) his discredit necessarily attaches to the second, (the delivery of such an order to Porter,) and under the *maxim quoted*, his entire statement falls to the ground." (P. 314.)

Mistake—"misapprehension," as to one fact, the Judge-Advocate asserts—taints the whole evidence of the witness, and demands its rejection. It establishes, therefore, in the sense of the maxim, according to his understanding of it, falsehood. If this was its true construction, in how many cases could testimony be of any avail? What witness but proves at times to be mistaken, or to misapprehend some of the facts to which he testifies? Human memory often honestly fails — is human testimony on that account to be rejected? But if misapprehension as to a fact legally and morally discredits every other portion of the evidence of a witness, for the same reason the misapprehension of the meaning of a legal maxim, would deny to him who entertains it any legal knowledge. The misapprehension of the meaning of the maxim quoted by the Judge-Advocate, every student will see is clear beyond all doubt. Its meaning is stated with his accustomed perspicuity by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of the Santissima, 7 Wheat. 338. "Where a party speaks to a fact in respect to which he can not be presumed liable to mistake, as in relation to the country of his birth, or his being in a vessel on a particular voyage, or living in a particular place, it is extremely difficult to exempt him from the charge of *deliberate falsehood;* and Courts of Justice, under *such circumstances*, are bound upon principles of law, and morality, and justice, to apply the maxim *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.* What ground of judicial belief can there be left, when the party has shown such gross insensibility to the difference between right and wrong, between truth and falsehood?" But yet how unfair it would be to deny to the Judge-Advocate even very distinguished legal attainments! He so wished to get rid of the fact fatal to his immediate purpose, the approval of the sentence against Porter, that he was oblivious for a moment of the true sense of the maxim or of the moral principle on which it rests.

It is unaccountable also why the Judge-Advocate did not call the President's attention to the positive statement by Porter in his defense, that Locke delivered the order to him. Did he doubt Porter's truth? Did he think his statement false? He could not. He must have known, or could have informed himself, that in the estimation of all who knew them, Porter, as a gentleman, and man of honor, is in every respect the peer of McDowell and King and himself. It is no answer to this suggestion, that Porter's defense is not evidence. It is not legally, but it is morally. Locke being confirmed by Porter, whose veracity no gentleman will question, should have saved Locke from the charge of perjury, so recklessly made by the Judge-Advocate.

But the evidence of Locke, after McDowell and King were examined, is so clear that it is impossible not to credit it. After stating why he considered McDowell's message to Porter singular and important, he said that on that account "it impressed me very strongly all the way up to the time that I gave it to General Porter." That its character was such that he thought no one should hear it but Porter, and that he therefore "delivered it to him in an under-tone," and that he had "*never forgotten* the messages or the incidents connected therewith." He also described minutely where he found McDowell and King. At the time he knew the former well, but not the latter. And in conclusion was asked this question, "Are you entirely positive, as much as you can be of any fact, that you did deliver to General Porter, on the afternoon of the twenty-ninth of August, words which purported to be a message from General McDowell, to the effect that General King was to be taken away, and that he, Porter, was to remain where he was"? and answered: "I AM POSITIVELY CERTAIN OF IT." (Pp. 223, 224.)

It is not thought that there was a per-

son present when this evidence was given, not excepting the Judge-Advocate, who did not fully believe it. It was impossible to do otherwise. The manner of the witness, his evident intelligence, the reason he assigned for his conviction, all united to challenge absolute confidence in his truthfulness and accuracy. To discredit him as to the fact of delivering the message to Porter, on the authority of the legal maxim quoted by the Judge-Advocate, is as cruel as it is legally absurd. With as much, indeed greater propriety, could the maxim be used to destroy the whole evidence of McDowell and King. The one is proved by Locke to have given the order, the other to have heard it given. No fair legal mind can doubt this. They say, they do not recollect the facts. The Judge-Advocate maintains "that, under the circumstances, this is in effect the same as positively swearing that the facts did not occur."

They then are found to have labored "under a complete misapprehension in regard to" them, and, being to that extent "discredited," the discredit necessarily attaches to "all the evidence," and under the maxim, "*falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus*," to use the Judge-Advocate's Latin, the entire evidence "falls to the ground." That an accusation of falsehood against these officers, on that ground, would be most unjust and disreputable to him who should make it, all will agree, and none, it is supposed, more decidedly than the Judge-Advocate. And yet such an imputation is cast by him on Locke, on that very ground and no other. The topic is too unpleasant to be further considered. But finally, on this specification, how the Court could find it against Porter is incredible. It averred only disobedience of Pope's joint order.

Whether that existed or not was best known to Pope. Porter's conduct was all before him. He was informed of every thing that he had done under the joint order. And yet with this information, in no part of his evidence did he state or intimate that the order had not been obeyed. All that he said on the subject, or that the Judge-Advocate could induce him to say, was not that that order was not obeyed, but the subsequent one of half-past four of that day. At the time this last order was received, the proof is clear and uncontradicted, that Porter was doing every thing required by the joint one.

Neither Pope nor any other witness testified to the contrary. And yet the Court found the specification true. Such a finding under all the circumstances can serve but to disparage their intelligence in the estimation of the public.

THIRD SPECIFICATION.—FIRST CHARGE.

Disobedience of the half-past four order of the twenty-ninth of August. The order was as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
"August 29, 1862, 4.30 P.M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER: Your line of march brings you on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries—keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

"JOHN POPE,
"Major-General Commanding."

I. It will be seen that this order assumes that Porter's line of march under the joint one would bring him "on the enemy's right flank."

It directs him, therefore, when he gets on that flank, to attack it "at once," and if possible the enemy's "rear." To do this last, the flank was necessarily to be first turned. So that the order with reference to both the flank and rear attacks, was intended to depend on the contingency of Porter's march under the previous order, bringing him "on the enemy's right flank." As this, however, necessarily involved the line of the enemy's march, as well as that of Porter's, and neither he nor Pope could control the former, Pope could not have been certain when he issued the half-past four order, that Porter would be brought by the route he was pursuing under the joint order on the enemy's right flank. Pope therefore could not have designed (the words indeed of the half-past four

der negative such a design) that Porter as to attack, unless his march brought m on that flank of the enemy. If it ould bring him on the enemy's left or ntre, then the order from necessity be- me inoperative.

II. Where then, pursuing as it is admit- d he did, the route prescribed by the joint der, was Porter's command when he re- ived that of half-past four? The proof ll one way. He was not on the enemy's ght flank, but in his immediate front, and ere he was in full force. Not only then s the order inoperative, but to have at- npted in that position of his troops to ve marched them toward the enemy's ght flank with a view to attack that, and, possible, his rear, would not only have led, but almost certainly have been fol- ved by serious if not fatal consequences his command. What was the fact? as the enemy in his front, and in force, en he received the half-past four order?

I. At what hour did he receive it?

The Judge-Advocate on this, as well as every other point of doubt, decides so to prejudice Porter. The rule is other- se in every system of civilized jurispru- nce, and this is believed to be the first se in which it has been uniformly de- rted from.

Facts have not only been disregarded, erences, the wildest and most uncharit- ble, indulged in, but the best established gal principles, without even a sophistical ason to excuse it, totally repudiated. at when did Porter in fact receive the der? The Judge-Advocate admits that regard to this, "there is a decided con- ct in the testimony." He seems rather clined to conclude for himself, that it was ceived about half-past five o'clock. And suggests that "it may be that after refully considering all the circumstances, e Court felt that the explicit and intel- ent statements of Captain Pope and his derly, fortified by the corroborative evi- nce of Generals Pope, McDowell, and berts, were not overcome by the opin- ns of the five officers examined on the rt of Porter. (P. 309.)

But what is the evidence?

1. *Captain Pope of General Pope's staff.*—He says that he supposes that the distance between Pope and Porter, when he got from the former, the half-past four order, was "three miles," and swears that it was in Porter's hands "by five o'clock." On cross-examination, he admitted that he fixed the hour when it was handed to him, by Pope, from the time stated on the face of the order. He did not profess other knowledge of it. He described the road he took to get to Porter, and said that he returned by the same road. (P. 57.)

2. *Charles Duffer*, the orderly.—He fixed the distance between the two Generals, not at three, but at "about *five* miles, as near as he could judge from traveling the road." This is the distance that the Judge-Advocate adopts, discarding, in that respect, what he calls "the explicit and intelligent statement of Captain Pope." He says that Pope "rode as fast as his horse could carry him, and had but about five miles to travel, and yet, according to the theory of the defense, that he did not arrive until sunset, or half-past six, he was two hours on the way," and then asks, with an air of triumphant logical confidence: "Is it credible that a staff-officer, bearing an important order in the midst of a fiercely contested battle, would have traveled at this rate, and this too when he was conducted by an orderly acquainted with the road, and encountered no obstacle? Is it not much more probable that but a single hour was occupied, and that, in point of fact, he arrived at half-past five?" (P 309.) He thus rejects as to the time of arrival, as he had done as to distance, Pope's evidence, and adopts that of the orderly, and yet tells us, that the statements of both, though materially conflicting, were adopted by the Court as being "explicit and intelligent." He also says that these statements were "fortified by the corroborative evidence of Generals Pope, McDowell, and Roberts." How this could be, when the statements were contradictory of each other, it is not very easy to comprehend. But let that pass. What is the supposed corroborative evidence?

1. *General Pope.*—"I know that an aid-de-camp, riding *rapidly*, could go from the field of battle to Manassas Junction, or to any point west of Manassas Junction, within an hour, by going at *speed.*

2. *Roberts*, the disinterested prosecutor of Porter—he says that he was present when the order was issued, and gives it as his opinion that it should have been delivered "in half an hour or less, as orders are generally delivered on such occasions."

3. *McDowell.*—He agreed with young Pope as to the time and place, when he says he saw the witness. Neither of these officers even profess to know when the order in fact was delivered to Porter, nor at what rate of speed the messenger traveled, nor the character of the road he passed over; and yet their opinions are gravely relied upon as confirming the statements of the messenger and his orderly, although they vitally conflicted with each other. And their statements and their supposed corroboration are held sufficient wholly to rebut the positive proof of five witnesses of admitted intelligence and unquestioned integrity, who were present when the order was delivered, and concurred as to the time.

That this would be manifestly unreasonable if the evidence of the two was the same, and if neither was contradicted in any material fact, every impartial mind will agree. But in this instance, it is the more obviously unreasonable since Pope is contradicted as to other material facts than the hour at which he says he delivered the order, and, H., Duffer, the orderly, disproves the facts on which Pope and Roberts, and the Judge-Advocate, base their opinions. Captain Pope stated first, that after giving the order to Porter, he returned by the same road by which he had arrived; second, that no one pointed out to him the road on his return, except his orderly.

In both these particulars he is expressly contradicted.

1. *By Lieutenant Weld.*—In his evidence in chief, he says, that he carried, on the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, an order from Porter to General Pope, and adds, I "got back *after sundown*—I think it was about a quarter to seven o'clock when I got back, as near as I can recollect." That General Pope's messenger to Porter (admitted to be Captain Pope) "*came afterward.*" "I was told to show this messenger the direct road back to General Pope. I did show it to him, and described it, and even drew on a piece of paper the road I had taken, which I afterward found out was not the direct road; there was little variation in it. He could not see the road; he did not seem to understand where the road was, where it crossed the railroad. Some one then told me that I had better go and show him where the road was, and I went up to the railroad with him, and pointed out the road that I had taken." "He started on it." (P. 130.)

2. *Lieutenant George T. Ingham*, Aid-de-Camp to General Sykes.—Was present, he said, when the order was delivered to Porter, and knew Pope, the messenger, "*it was after sunset.*" That Pope did not remain "there more than twenty or twenty-five minutes at the outside." That after he had left, the witness was sent by Porter to recall him. "I rode on pretty rapidly and I found Captain Pope had got between a quarter and a half-mile. There were several officers on the road, and I had to ride up close to Captain Pope to see who he was, it was *so dark at that time.*" He further stated that Pope, on starting to return, did not take "the Sudley Spring Road, the road he finally took," but "was bearing off down the railroad, toward Manassas Junction, and that he then told him to take the left-hand road, and that then Lieutenant Weld (the former witness) went down to the road with Pope, to show him which road to take." (P. 199.) It will be remembered that Pope had sworn that he had returned by the same road that he had come, and that no one had pointed out to him any other.

3. *Major General Sykes.*—He was present when Captain Pope delivered the order to Porter. It was "as near sunset as I can remember; *certainly*, within a little before sunset, or after sunset." (P. 177.)

4. *Locke.*—He witnessed the delivery, and said it was "between sundown and dusk." (P. 136.)

5. *Montieth.*—Was present, knew Pope, and says he delivered the order about "sundown." (P. 127.)

All this evidence, however, is rejected by the Judge-Advocate, and, as he tells us, by the Court, although the witnesses

re with Porter when the order was de-
red, saw it delivered, and concurred in
ting that it was about sundown. Their
tements are at least equally "explicit
l intelligent" as Pope's and his orderly's,
; they are passed over, and theirs
pted.

I. Nor does the corroborative evidence
ed upon in support of the latter amount
ny thing. It consists of mere opinion,
ilst the rejected evidence was positive
ement of facts, made on personal
wledge. When the order could have
n delivered, in the judgment of Gener-
Pope and Roberts, and how long it
uld take a messenger to go from the
nt where he saw McDowell to Porter's
t, can be but mere opinion. General
pe says an hour. Roberts says a half-
ur; in no exigency, does he fail, the
lge-Advocate. But to carry the mes-
e within either an hour or half-hour,
y unite in saying that speed was neces-
y. Pope says it could be done within
time he named, "by going at speed"—
berts, in his "half-hour or less, if car-
l as orders are generally carried on
h occasions." Whether it was in fact
ried "with speed," or as is "generally"
e, neither ventures to say. The Judge-
vocate presumes "speed," from the
racter of the message. He can not be-
e it "credible that a staff-officer" could
more than an hour in performing such
uty. In his view, it is nothing that
intelligent and honorable witnesses
ar positively to a later delivery. He,
, as he says, the Court, adopts the
ements of Pope and his orderly, not
y not corroborated in any manner, but
ressly contradicted in the very material
of the roads traveled coming or re-
ning. The reasoning of the Judge-Ad-
ate is, that the messenger did what he
fesses to have done, because he should
e done it.

He also maintains, in the support of his
othesis, that Pope "rode as fast as his
se could carry him." How fast that
s, depended on the character of his horse
l of his orderly's, and the nature of the
d. To suppose all horses go at the
e pace, and that their speed is irre-
ctive of the nature of the road, is not
ctly logical, if experience is to be con-
ered. And in this case, too, to conclude
t actual speed was had in the sense in which the term is used by Generals Pope and Roberts and the Judge-Advocate, is to disregard the evidence of the orderly. It is apparent that the Court, who alone examined this witness, (he was produced by the Government, after Porter had "rested his case,") would like to have had him prove that great speed was used in the transmission of the order, but in this they failed. He said: "Sometimes we were on a trot, sometimes on a walk, and sometimes on a canter, going about as fast as we thought our horses could travel." (P. 208.) He was then asked: "How much of the way did you gallop?" And answered: "That is more than I can tell you. We went as fast as we could from the nature of the road, and as we thought our horses could travel." He was further asked: "Do you remember whether you trotted or walked, or galloped the most of the way?" and replied: "*We had to go a good deal of the way quite slow, on account of the road being very* bad, *rough in places.*" The Court, unwilling to abandon their purpose, asked this additional question: "Did you gallop any at all?" And were answered: "Yes, sir, we did." I recollect galloping *some*, in other places we had to go *quite slow.* (Pp. 209, 210.)

The speed, therefore, required, in the judgment of Generals Pope and Roberts, for the delivery of the order by five, or five and a half o'clock, was not used, unless to travel "a good deal of the way *quite slow*," as proved by the orderly, and not disproved by young Pope, is to go with *speed.* It is not only true, therefore, that the preponderance of evidence shows that the time of the delivery of the order was about sunset, but that there is not any reliable evidence to the contrary. Even, however, if the first part of the remark alone was correct, the Court should have found the fact, that the delivery was at that time. They had neither the legal nor moral right to find it otherwise. Where witnesses are equally intelligent and fair in character, the testimony of the greatest number is to prevail. The probabilities of mistake (designed mistake in such case being impossible) are less likely with many than a few. The Court, consequently, in pursuing the course attributed to them by the Judge-Advocate, violated both legal and moral principle. In addition, however, to the distinct proof of the five witnesses, which was made to yield

to that of the two, though one of the two was positively contradicted, and the evidence of the other but served to confirm that of the five, there was before the Court, in regard of the transmission of other orders in which no error was intimated, evidence that strongly confirmed that of the five. It is this:

The important and urgent order of three A.M., of the twenty-ninth, (p. 28,) for the corps to march at dawn of day, was not delivered till six A.M., (about two hours after dawn,) though the distance was only *five* miles. The one of seven P.M., of the twenty-sixth, (p. 154,) not till eleven P.M., and another of four A.M., of the twenty-seventh, (p. 153,) was also four hours in its delivery, though the distance was but six miles. And the one of eight-fifty P.M., of the twenty-ninth, (p. 7,) dispatched to and from the same point as the four-thirty order, was six hours and forty minutes in its delivery, the distance being but four miles.

Neither of the officers who bore those several orders were reprimanded by Pope for delay. Nor could they have been, justly. The roads were very bad, and comparatively unknown, and the horses much broken down by prior hard work. Speed, of course, was impossible. It can not be necessary to pursue the inquiry further.

The order, then, having been received about sundown, or, as General Sykes says, "*certainly* within a little before sunset, or about sunset,"

I. Was it obeyed? And

II. If not, why not?

The proof is distinct, that the moment it was received, Porter sent an order to Morell, who was in the advance, to attack the enemy.

1. *Locke* says, Porter handed me the order, and "very soon afterward ordered me to ride up to General Morell, and direct him to move forward and attack the enemy *immediately*, and to say, that he would be up himself right after me." (P. 136.)

2. *Morell* says, that soon after sunset, Locke "came to me with an order from General Porter to make the attack, (he had been preparing for one under a prior order.") "I told him, (and I think in message to General Porter, I spoke of lateness of the day,) that we could not it before dark." (P. 147.) This or was afterward, and in the judgment Morell, properly, countermanded. thought that the day was too far vanced, and the enemy too well strongly posted in the front, and in great force to justify the attempt. In opinion all the officers in the comm concurred. Colonel Marshall, as will seen presently, most decidedly.

The Judge-Advocate states, that "the inaction" of Porter's command, by its "falling back," (a charge before futed,) "the enemy had been so far couraged in their advance, that at hour, the front of (Porter's) column not separated from the advance of rebels by more than a mile, or a mile a a half," and that "little time therefore required to make the attack." He fa however, to inform the President, wha evidently true, that the joint order of twenty-ninth from Pope, was designed prevent the junction of Longstreet's cor supposed to be twenty-four thousa and Jackson's twenty five thousand. T it was for that purpose, that Pope, by t order, united the commands of McDow and Porter. Before McDowell separat from Porter, he had read General Bufor note to General Ricketts, as appears by evidence. (P. 83.) That note was dat at half-past nine o'clock A.M. on the twen ninth, and stated that "seventeen re ments, one battery, five hundred caval passed through Gainesville three quart of an hour ago, on the Centreville ro I think this division should join our for now engaged at once. Please forwa this." (P. 84.) He also said the re ments averaged 800 men. Buford, at t time he sent this note, was at Groveto about four miles from Gainesville. T proof is most conclusive that it was Lon street's corps that Buford referred to, a that it was that corps which was in t immediate front of Porter. If it was, is supposed, the purpose of the joint ord that an attack should be made to preve the junction of Longstreet and Jackso by the blended commands of McDow and Porter, it should have been made that time. Instead of this, McDowell, w being the senior in rank, had the contr

the whole force, retired with his own
ps, taking with him a division of Por-
's, (King's,) and repaired to a distant
int, which he was several hours in reach-
g, and where he was beyond a support-
g distance from Porter. This is alluded
under the present head, to confirm the
tement before made, that prior to his
thdrawing and reducing by more than
e half, the force which Pope had assign-
for the attack, and leaving Porter with
enemy over double his own force in
nt, he never gave Porter an order to
ke the attack. This conclusion is neces-
y to exempt McDowell from the impu-
ion of reckless folly, gross military ig-
rance, and a disregard of what he must
ve known was the design of the Com-
nder-in-Chief. It was in this condition
his force, that Porter received the order
half-past four. And as already appears,
gave orders, without the least delay, to
ke the attack, and abandoned the pur-
se afterward, because of the approach
night, which made it, in the judgment
Morell, as well as in his own, impossible
make an effective one. It is asserted
the Judge-Advocate, that there was
t an "earnest or vigorous effort on the
rt of (Porter) to obey the order." Mo-
ll says, as has been already seen, that the
oment he received Porter's order through
ocke, he proceeded to place "the men in
sition to make the attack." And Locke
ys, that the moment Porter received the
der, he carried one from Porter to Mo-
ll to attack, "*at once.*" The Judge-Ad-
ocate assumes that there was but a small
rce in Porter's front, and rests for his
sumption principally upon the testimony
General Roberts. It is sufficient to say,
relation to his evidence, and to show
w totally unworthy of consideration it
in this particular, that he does not pre-
nd to have seen Porter's position on that
ay, later than "*about one o'clock.*" He
uld not therefore have seen the position,
had any information of the strength of
e enemy in Porter's front, later than that
our. Nor does he pretend to have been
earer to it, at any time of the day, than
a mile and a half." He says, too, "I
ould not see his command, there were
oods intervening," nor could I "see his
nmediate front." (P. 215.) And yet,
lthough it was literally impossible that he
ould have any information to justify it, he
ives it as his opinion that there was "only a cavalry force with some light artillery," in Porter's front. And yet, more strange is it, that the Judge-Advocate adopts this opinion in preference to the testimony of Major Hyland, attached to Colonel Marshall's regiment of skirmishers, and who was eight hundred or a thousand yards in advance of Morell, and near the enemy, of Lieut. Stevenson, of Colonel Marshall, Morell, and of every other officer examined, who was with Morell's command on that evening. Under the circumstances, his criticism upon the testimony of Stevenson, that "he was a young man with limited experience," is amusing, when it is remembered with what confidence he relies upon the testimony and opinion of young Pope, Smith the orderly, and Roberts, with his admitted ignorance of the facts upon which he gives his opinion. The reliable evidence upon the point which was rejected by the Judge-Advocate is, however, conclusive.

1. *Major Hyland.* — He belonged to Morell's division, and was on the evening of the twenty-ninth in "the front of it." That his regiment was at the time "employed as skirmishers," "from about one o'clock of the afternoon of the twenty-ninth, until daylight of the next day. That the Twenty-second Massachusetts and Berdan's sharpshooters were placed on our left in the evening." That the enemy "commenced forming between two or three o'clock," in our front, "there appeared to be two columns of them." The witness indicated the position of his regiment, and the enemy on the map, which was before the Court. That no portion of the enemy was on the left of his regiment. That he knows of their forming to attack (Porter's force) during the day. He "could hear the commands plainly as if forming in line, and the movements of their artillery coming into position." On cross-examination by the Judge-Advocate, in answering this question with reference to the number of the enemy, "Can you state how many thousands, or divisions, or regiments?" he answered: "I could not state the number of thousands, or divisions. I judge, from the movement and from the commands given, that there *was a very large force* indeed, *probably a larger force than we had.*" He reported the force to Colonel Marshall, his commanding officer. He further stated that

he thought it "*was sufficient to have made a successful resistance to General Porter's entire corps.*" Although unable to state with accuracy the number of the enemy, he yet added, that "from what information I had, and from what I could get from the other officers, I thought their force was *very heavy indeed.* I should think there were probably ten thousand troops in front of us. Judging by the columns of dust that I also saw coming from the same direction." And in reply to a question by the Court, he stated that in his opinion "the strength of the enemy," in Morell's front, was increased by the "strength of their position." (Pp. 174–176.)

2. *Stevenson*, of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Marshall's regiment. On the twenty-ninth, he went on horseback "from the left flank of General Pope's army to the position then occupied by" his regiment. That the distance was "between a mile and a mile and three quarters." That he was almost an hour in traveling it, and reached his regiment "between one and four o'clock in the afternoon." That when he got there he could "*see the enemy*," and "judge him to be about between twelve and fifteen thousand." That he could "see his forces of different arms, infantry and artillery," and could see that "he was receiving reinforcements."

3. *Colonel E. G. Marshall*, of the Thirteenth New-York Volunteers, was with his regiment on duty with General Morell's division, on the twenty-ninth. "About one o'clock, I was detailed by General Porter to go with my regiment across an open country and a ravine, to some timber that was facing our line of battle, and deploy skirmishers to find out the position of the enemy, and any thing else that I could find out concerning them." They were "*a very large force, and they were drawn up in line of battle as they came down.*" After describing the manner in which the enemy approached, and saying that he deemed it so important, that Morell should know their position, that he was unwilling to trust his orderlies or others with messages, he said that he repaired himself to Morell to confer with him "concerning the enemy." "This was about dusk." Upon hearing from Morell, that he had orders from Porter to attack the enemy, and finding that Morell was much troubl concerning it, and that he "asked my vice," says, "I told him BY ALL ME NOT TO ATTACK, THAT IT WAS CERTAIN STRUCTION FOR US TO DO SO; THAT I one did not wish to go into that tim and attack the enemy." Their position a very strong one, and they were certai in force at that time, TWICE AS LARGE OUR OWN FORCE, ALL OF GENERAL P TER'S CORPS." He also said, "that if had attacked them, I felt that it CERTAIN DESTRUCTION." "Afterward, dark, I was sent for by General Port and questioned very stringently with re ence to the enemy; and my remarks him were the same as I am now maki and as I made to General Morell." (1 189, 190.)

The force of the evidence of this l witness, the Judge-Advocate attempts avoid by asserting, that he was "large influenced in forming his opinion from t clouds of dust which (the Judge-Advoc says, not the witness) may have arisen much from the movement of ambulanc and wagons as from the march of troo The witness, in answer to this questi of the Judge-Advocate, "Did you ma your estimate of the amount of that for *principally* from the extent of the line indicated by the *clouds* of dust, or h you other means than that of judging said, "My estimate was made *mostly* fro the *length of time*, which they were comi down—there appeared to be artillery an infantry—and the time that we were a tacked, and also from what I had seen o the enemy's dust prior to going on th duty, and the *length of their lines*, as muc as I could see of it in our front."

There is no foundation, therefore, in fac for the criticism of the Judge-Advocat Of the intelligence, integrity, and patrio ism of this witness, the Judge-Advocat does not even insinuate a doubt. No does he question his military capacity He was a Captain in the regular army, an for his ability and gallantry was mad Colonel of his regiment. His gallantry wa greatly displayed in the then recent battl of Fredericksburgh, where he was severel wounded. The Court repaired to hi chamber, where he was confined, and there took his testimony. To discard the evi dence and opinions of this witness, and of Hyland and Stevenson, and to adopt the

diculous opinion of Roberts—ridiculous, cause founded in ignorance, as he adtted, of the facts—is an insult to the derstanding.

It being then clear, that it would have en madness in Porter to have attacked e enemy, who were in his front, at sun- on the twenty-ninth, and equally clear, t to have done so would not have been stified by the 4.30 order, but, on the trary, would have been a violation of as it directed him to attack the "ene- 's flank, and if possible, his rear;" let see whether, when he received it, could have made such attacks. At t time there was, as proved by Marll, and the other witnesses referred to Porter's front, a force of the enemy ice as great as his own. To have ched their flank he must have marched front and to the entire distance of the emy's line. Their force consisted of intry, cavalry, and artillery. With this ce they could have assailed him in ery foot of his progress, and readily ve attained a position in his own rear, nich must have ended, in all human probility, in his annihilation, and if so, in e destruction or capture of Pope's army. t, in addition to this, the country over nich he would have had to pass was so oken and filled with ravines and timber, at it would have been impossible, in the rkness which then prevailed, to have oved his infantry in any thing like order, d utterly impossible to have moved his tillery. To have left the latter behind n would have subjected it to certain pture, and would have been a direct vilation of the order, as that directed him his march to "keep heavy reserves and *e your batteries.*"

The Judge-Advocate says, "It may be mitted, and perhaps the *testimony reires the admission* to be made, that fallg upon the enemy on the afternoon of e twenty-ninth, (Porter,) would have enuntered both difficulty and danger," but lds the very original remark that "difflty and danger in time of war are daily d hourly in the category of the soldier's e. Their presence should be for him, t a discouragement, but an inspiration. o grapple with them should be his ambion; to overcome them, his glory." (P. 12.) Without meaning to call into doubt ie capacity of the Judge-Advocate to udge what would be a soldier's ambition or "glory" in such an exigency, it is certainly not discourteous to him, to say that such soldiers as Hyland, Marshall, Morell, and Porter, who saw the difficulty and danger, are judges more to be relied upon. In comparing in this particular the Judge-Advocate with Porter, no disparagement is intended of the former. When he shall have been in as many battles—shall have conducted himself with as much skill and valor—shall have won the same grateful applause—have received such signal manifestations of approval from the Government—have done so much to fill the whole measure of a soldier's ambition and glory, he will then, and not before, have a right to be heard with respect, as to what, in any particular instance, should be a soldier's ambition and glory. Let us, however, examine what was the extent of the "difficulty and danger" which the Judge-Advocate admits to have existed. In considering this question, the Judge-Advocate accepts the least and rejects the most satisfactory evidence. He relies on the opinions of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith and McDowell, formed in ignorance of the country to be passed over, or of the length of the march, and of the force of the enemy in Porter's front. That such opinions are entitled to no weight, must be obvious to every fair mind. In a court of justice, where the principles of evidence are apprehended and impartially applied, they would be promptly rejected, and the counsel who endeavored to maintain them lose reputation with the bench and bar. The reliable evidence is this:

1. *General Reynolds.*—He had passed over the country on the twenty-eighth with his command, and says, he found it "so broken, wooded, and obstructed that I had to turn into a road leading along the railroad from Gainesville to Manassas Junction, and finally marched on that road in one column, around to Bethlehem Church, toward the old battle-field of Bull Run, late in the evening." That the country between New-Market and Groveton was "very broken by ravines and wooded; I will state that *I know that from having passed over it on horseback that night*, from somewhere in the neighborhood of New-Market over to the Warrenton Pike, near Groveton." In his judgment, a command could not have passed over that country in force, with artillery,

in proper order to face an enemy, if it had to "move in the immediate presence of an enemy."

On cross-examination by the Judge-Advocate, he was asked: "You say that a command with artillery, etc., could not have passed over the country between New-Market and Groveton, in the immediate presence of the enemy: was not the ground equally bad for the enemy as for General Porter? And if the enemy could take position there, why could not General Porter's troops have taken position against them?" And answered: "*It was impossible to manœuvre troops over that country.*" They could take position there, of course, and they could be attacked in position by troops. *But it would have been very difficult to have got artillery up through that broken country, and a very disadvantageous attack would have been made.*" He was afterward asked: "Did you or not pass over the country stretching from your left toward General Porter's position, on the twenty-ninth, while on the march from Gainesville toward Manassas Junction?" And answered: "*Not with my command.*" "Did not the enemy, in attacking the left and rear of General Pope on Saturday, the thirtieth of August, pass with artillery and infantry much of the country that General Porter would have had to pass over on the twenty-ninth to attack the right of the Confederates?" He replied: "*I think not;* I think it had gotten in, as it were, between that broken country and our position on that day, occupying a ridge which crossed the turnpike there, and having the broken country behind him. Because I manœuvred the day before, the twenty-ninth, all over, up to that broken country, and got partially on that ridge with one brigade." The Court, evidently unwilling to abandon their desire to show that Porter could have made the attack, not satisfied with this answer, put to the witness this additional question: "Could so large a force as passed around your left on Saturday, have done so without passing over a long distance toward where General Porter was?" And received this answer: "He had the Warrenton Turnpike open for him, and by coming down that turnpike, he filed in off that turnpike, as I supposed, though at a different point, through this broken country. He had that advantage in coming down and occupying this ridg (Pp. 170–173.)

2. *Morell.*—This inquiry was made him: "Seeing your own position and t of General Porter's command, so far you knew it, at the period of the day question, between sundown and the g of the evening, and seeing all that knew and believed of the position of enemy at that time, please to state whet an attack by General Porter's comm upon the right flank and rear of the ene at that time was possible." And answer "The only attack we could have made that time would have been *directly front.* The firing of which I spoke far to the right, and at that time we co not have got there. The troops of enemy in front of us were under cover the woods. If we had moved forward would have gone over this open spa where our men would have been expo to the fire of the enemy, without any p sibility of effectively returning it."

"Such being the case as to a movem on your left to attack the enemy by fla ing him on his right, please to state whe er you could have passed through woods on your own right in any good or to attack the enemy in that directio "I doubt whether we could have got artillery through, *even by daylight.* might have passed through the wo with our infantry, but *not in any fight order at all.*"

"Would it have been possible to ca your artillery through that wood night?" "*No sir*, I think not." (P. 14

The force of this testimony was not tempted to be weakened by the exami tion of either the Judge-Advocate or Court. The intelligence of the witn and his well-known high character, wo have rendered such an effort fruitless.

3. *Marshall.*—"Was it possible, (he asked,) without the greatest danger, General Porter to have made a movem to his right to attempt to reach and tack Jackson on his right?" "No it was *impossible to have done so.* In first place, it was impracticable to cr the country in that position during day. Again, we would have been obli to have whipped the very force in fr of us, large as it was, to have got the

d it was very doubtful if we could have ne it."

He also said, that if Porter had "at- mpted the movement," the enemy would have attacked our flank." The dge-Advocate did not think it prudent examine the witness at all upon the int, but the Court were less cautious. ey asked whether, "from the position the forces, both those of the enemy d our own, would the march of General rter, to reach the right flank of Jack- n, have been direct or circuitous?" And re answered:

"*It would have been circuitous, through broken country.* If he had endeavored go the most direct route, it would have en through a broken country. But I not conceive that it was *practicable* for n to have gone that route. I think that order to have acted upon the enemy he uld have had to go back the same route took the next morning in retreating." Not practicable, (the Court further in- ired,) because of the character of the untry or the position of the enemy?" nd were answered:

"Because of the broken country; it is rocky, and then a part of it was very avily timbered, and it would have been *practicable to have carried artillery rough there*, besides being fired upon d met by the enemy in our front." p. 191–193.)

There was other testimony to the same ect, but it is unnecessary to give it in tail. It is submitted with perfect confi- nce that this evidence is conclusive to ow that the order of 4.30, which alone rms the subject of this specification, uld not have been, at the time it was re- ived, executed. In this opinion, *all of orter's officers who were acquainted with e condition of things concurred.* Under ese circumstances, if Porter had made e attempt to execute the order, and had en, as he certainly would have been ac- rding to this testimony, defeated with eat, if not total loss, he would have com- itted a most serious military offense, for hich he should have been, and no doubt uld have been, held responsible and se- rely punished. If that had occurred, o, judging from the treatment he has re- ived, no one can doubt that the failure Pope's campaign would have been attri- ted to such rash and unmilitary conduct.

How ridiculous it is to reject the evi- dence of the above-named officers; and how insulting to the intelligence of a reader, to ask him to put faith in the opinions, not statements of facts, of Smith and McDowell, given in admitted igno- rance of the facts which rendered a com- pliance with the order impracticable Smith's opinion is based, as he states, "on the fact that that portion of the country over which (as he understood it) the corps of (Porter) would have moved upon the enemy, "*was sufficiently practi- cable to enable the enemy, as they did, to make a similar movement on our left on the next day.*" (P. 77.) The Italics are the Judge-Advocate's. Not only did he omit to imform the President, what in fairness he should have done, of the evi- dence here given, but to advise him that the fact on which Smith's opinion was formed, was not true. That Reynolds had proved that the enemy's movement on the thirtieth *was not over the ground which Porter must have passed on the twenty- ninth* to have attacked their right flank. And McDowell's opinion was based upon the same misapprehension, and only upon what (as he said) was his "knowledge of the country, derived principally from hav- ing gone over the railroad from Manassas to Gainesville in a car, or on a locomotive, which gave me but little idea of it, as I was engaged whilst going over with mat- ters which prevented my paying attention to the country." And upon several other facts, for the most part immaterial, and unknown to him except upon hearsay. (P. 93.) The Judge-Advocate seeks to aggravate Porter's supposed offense by stating with entire confidence, that if the order had been obeyed it "would have secured a triumph for our arms, and not only the overthrow of the rebel forces, but probably the destruction or capture of Jackson's army." He states that this would have been the result if a vigorous attack had been made by Porter "at any time between twelve o'clock, when the battle (between Pope and the enemy) began, and dark, when it closed." And for this he refers to the opinions of Pope, McDowell, Roberts, and Smith, "all of whom participated in the engagement, and were well qualified to judge." This confidence is somewhat amusing, when it is remembered that Pope and McDowell never achieved a victory, Roberts no one

thought could ever achieve one, and Smith was a volunteer of but a few months' standing, and never before under fire.

But, waiving this, how totally immaterial are those opinions when the proof is clear to the dullest comprehension, that the attack directed by the order, when that was received, could not have been made, and when there was no prior order stated in this specification, or either of the other two under the first charge, directing an attack to be *made* at all.

First, Second, and Third Specification of the Second Charge.

These will be considered together. They are framed under the fifty-second Article of War, which embraces "misbehavior before the enemy." They charge Porter with such misbehavior on the twenty-ninth. It will be seen that this concedes that there was no order from Pope to make an attack on that day. This charge has been substantially anticipated. It has been proved conclusively, that no attack could have been made, except with the almost certain result of serious defeat, if not destruction. Either of which would have been fatal to Pope. Nor is the fact true upon which the Judge-Advocate relies, that during the time from twelve o'clock to sunset on that day, a severe battle was raging between the rest of Pope's command and the enemy, within the hearing of Porter. On the contrary, the officers, all of them who were with Porter, agreed in stating that the battle appeared to be mainly with artillery, and at some miles from his position. That Porter had no reason to believe, and did not believe that an attack by him was necessary for Pope's safety or success, appears by his order to Morell, brought out on the cross-examination of the Judge-Advocate, and received about sunset, or a little before sunset. (P. 150.) That order informed Morell, "*the battle works well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike.*"

This reply has assumed dimensions greater than was anticipated. It was found unavoidable however, from the necessity of giving in detail many portions of the evidence. The object of the writer was to expose the injustice done Porter by the Judge-Advocate—to rescue him from the influence of the reputation of that office; and to demonstrate to t public the gross wrong done him by t Court, and unconsciously, as is thoug from misplaced confidence, by the Pre dent. In this he can not have failed. I thinks that in the public judgment, wh the case is fully understood, the finding the Court will be considered to be witho explanation, except upon the ground mental imbecility or blinding prejudi The first certainly did not exist. The l ter is believed to be established.

With a view to avoid this last concl sion, one which the Judge-Advocate s pears to have anticipated, he ventur (and in so doing, greatly compromises legal reputation) to say: "It is not believ that there remains upon the Record single ruling of the Court to which exce tion could be seriously taken." The rulings are on pages 17, 21, 24, 39, 41, 5 71, 96, 214, 221.

There were several others which Porte counsel considered erroneous, but omitt to except to them, in order to save tim and from their then having no hope, th any thing they could say, would chan the rulings. These involve two propo tions—first, whether it is competent for witness to state his opinion upon t meaning of orders written or verbal; a second, whether, when the prosecutio with a view to show the alleged crimin *animus* of Porter, had given in evide his telegrams and conduct, on the twent seventh, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, an thirtieth of August, it was not compete to Porter, in order to disprove such *a mus*, and to show his loyalty and his d termination to do his full duty before ge ting, and after coming under Pope's co mand, to offer in evidence his telegram and conduct on the twenty-fifth, twent sixth, thirty-first of August, and the firs second, and third of September telegram constituting a series, of which those offer by the prosecution, were a part.

I. Without stopping to inquire if a d cision on this head was correct, whic either admitted or rejected the evidenc all will agree, that to admit it in some i stances, and reject it in others, can not b be erroneous. And that is just what w done by the Court. When Porter aske the opinion of a witness, the question wa objected to and overruled. When th Judge-Advocate, or any member of th

ourt, asked such a question, though ob-
cted to by Porter, because the same
ivilege was not allowed him, the ob-
ction was overruled, and the evidence
ceived. The Record will show that this
as uniformly the case. Its evident par-
ality and palpable injustice render further
marks unnecessary.

II. To exclude statements and conduct
ade and occurring a day or two before
id after the date of those relied upon to
tablish Porter's criminal *animus* when
fered to explain the latter, and to disprove
ch *animus*, is an error so gross, that it
amazing how the Court, though not
wyers, could have fallen into it, and more
nazing how the Judge-Advocate could
nction it. The admissibility of the evi
ence is proved, clearly, it is thought, in
orter's protest, Appendix No. 1.

But notwithstanding the finding and
ntence of the Court, and its approval,
id the malignant and bitter assaults upon
m, before and since, Porter will stand
harmed through the potent power of
uth and the public judgment. The latter
er cheers the patriot, and sooner or later
ustrates the aim of the demagogue, and
lsies the arm of the traitor. In addi-
on, too, to this support, he possesses in
mself one even yet more potential. He
self-sustained in the consciousness of in-
ocence, and conviction of duty fully per-
rmed.

What shield against injustice is more in-
lnerable? It abides with the injured at
l times and everywhere; consoles him
adversity—enhances his prosperity. It
an adjunct to truth and justice, an anti-
ote to falsehood and calumny, and in the
id is certain to bring their authors before
e public in full relief, to be the scorn or
e jest of the honest.

The friends of Porter, therefore, need
l no further concern for him. He and
is accusers stand for judgment before a
ist and enlightened tribunal, and what
ir mind can doubt the issue?

But we must all feel deep solicitude for
e country, now passing through a dread-
il crisis. No people was ever subjected
a more perilous one. But this solici-
ude is not because we doubt the result,
the Government is true to its own duty.
f it is, the danger will soon be over, and
ho can doubt that it will be? If keeping
single eye to the extinction of the re-
bellion in conducting the war, they dis-
card mere party, cast off intrusive and
ignorant politicians, observe in the loyal
States, where the ordinary course of jus-
tice is unobstructed, all the constitutional
guarantees of personal liberty, recognize
every individual right, regard freedom of
speech and of the press, (a freedom which
the people will never suffer to be impair-
ed,) restrain the excessive enthusiasm or
madness of misjudging officers, instruct
them that it is their duty to war with the
rebel enemy alone, and to observe in so
doing all the humane rules of the modern
laws of war, suffering no harm to be done
to private property, nor the appropria-
tion of it for other than military purposes,
cease to foster the incompetent, and in an
enlarged and enlightened statemanship,
sword in one hand and the olive-branch
of forgiveness, conciliation, and compro-
mise in the other, (the enemies are our
brothers, and we but seek to bring them
back to the common household,) all will
ere long be well again. The rebellion now
so shaking the land, like as

> "Ocean's mighty swing,
> When heaving on tempest's wing,
> It breaks upon the shore,"

will have subsided, and before the histo-
rian shall have written its history, even
its vast wrecks of material wealth, and its
vaster and more distressing wrecks of
former harmony and affection, will have
been forgotten in the magnitude and uni-
versality of the blessings in which the
whole land will then be rejoicing.

Nor portentous of destruction as is the
black cloud that lowers over us is there
serious ground for despondency, much
less despair. A beneficent Providence
can not design so to affect us, and,
through us, the world. Great as our
national sins may have been, and deserv-
ing of punishment, as they no doubt are,
it can not be that such a Being will strike
a nation like ours out of existence. Pro-
tected and regulated freedom is so im-
portant to human happiness, that, if we
may, with reverence, speculate on such a
subject, it must be within the scope of
Heaven's design to secure it to all. And
in the past what has contributed more to
that result than our example? With in-
stitutions resting as their sole foundation
on individual liberty, we have by its in-
herent and almost magic power prospered

as never people prospered before; so unexampled and striking has this been, that all nations looked at us with wonder—the rulers of some with envy—the oppressed, everywhere, with hope and gratitude. Is such an example to end forever? Believe it not. If, however, in the inscrutable dispositions of Heaven, it is so to be, and we are hereafter to live but in memory, of one thing we may rest assured, that that dire calamity will not be caused by the fulfillment of the object of this rebellion. That object, even ostentatiously and shamelessly avowed, is not to vindicate and maintain freedom, nor even to rescue human slavery as it at present exists, in some of the States, from the hazard of a possible early overthrow, but to extend and perpetuate it through all time. In the very City and State of their nativity, and which for so many years were guided, benefited, and honored by the wisdom and presence of Mason, Jefferson, Madison, Marshall, and Washington, in defiance of all the doctrines which they inculcated, and shocking the world by their astounding and iniquitous degeneracy, it is proclaimed, without rebuke, and no doubt by the authority of him who sacrilegiously holds out Washington as his model, that the main object of the rebellion is to establish a Confederacy which will be "A DISTINCT REACTION AGAINST THE WHOLE COURSE OF THE MISTAKEN CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE." "THAT FOR LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY THEY HAVE DELIBERATELY SUBSTITUTED SLAVERY, SUBORDINATION, AND GOVERNMENT. THAT HOWEVER AMONG EQUALS EQUALITY IS RIGHT, AMONG THOSE WHO NATURALLY ARE UNEQUAL EQUALITY IS CHAOS." "THAT THERE ARE SLAVE RACES BORN TO SERVE, MASTER RACES BORN TO GOVERN." Such are the fundamental principles (what a profanation of the term!) which, addressing themselves to the universe of man, they say: "We inherit from the ancient world, which we lifted up in the face of a perverse generation, that has forgotten the wisdom of its fathers." (Spirits of the great departed, let us hope that you do not hear the vile calumny!) "By these principles we live, and by their defense we have shown ourselves ready to die; reverently we feel that our Confederacy is a God-sent missionary to the nations with great truths to preach." "A who hath ears to hear let him hear."*

No, no. Through such an instrume tality God will never work our destructic He libels Deity who for a moment cred it. An honest man might as soon be su pected of effecting an end by fraud, p jury, or murder.

There is then no reason for despa The rebellion will not triumph. Its fa is already sealed. The lamentations ov its anticipated early death are heard in t wailings of the conspirators. The muc boasted army of Lee has been arrested its recent invasion of Maryland and Pen sylvania by the unsurpassed bravery the Army of the Potomac, handled wi consummate skill by Meade, the gentl man and soldier, and driven back, wi terrific slaughter, to its own impoverishe and desolated Virginia, stealing away night, under the cover of darkness an storm, in the demoralizing fear that th arm of the Union was approaching utter to crush them. Vicksburgh and Po Hudson have fallen, and the States Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Weste Virginia, Maryland, and Mississippi, a ours, and the Father of Waters knows n standard but the Stars and Stripes. Th very leader of the conspiring band, f years the plotters of the treason, is losin heart. In the beginning of his wicke career, he ridiculed the power of the loy States, and vauntingly threatened the with the feeling of "Southern steel" an "the smell of Southern powder." Now he stands conscience-stricken and appalle He sees, and well he may, the finger God in their dreadful reverses, and call upon his deluded and ruined followers "t unite in prayer and humble submissio under God's chastening hand." He tell them that they are to attribute their trial and afflictions to their forgetfulness o Him, and to their "love of lucre," (wha an admission for proud chivalry!) whic had "eaten like a gangrene into the very heart of the land, converting too many o them into worshipers of gain, and render ing them UNMINDFUL OF THEIR DUTY TO THEIR COUNTRY, TO THEIR FELLOW-MEN, AND TO THEIR GOD." †

To their country! How could he have

* See *Richmond Examiner*, May, 1863.

† Davis's Fast-day Proclamation of the 25th of July

er even dreamed that forgetfulness of
ity to country, to fellow-man, and God
ould not meet with the chastening hand
heaven? Davis, the educated and often
nored child of the Union, over and over
ain pledged by solemn oath to support
, is at last aroused to a sense of the guilt
oaths violated and duty to country for-
tten, and on his knees implores the for-
veness of Omnipotence. What stronger
idence could there be that despair of
ecess of his criminal career now fills his
ry soul?

It has, too, in its very form of govern-
ent, the seed of its own certain dissolution
-secession is made the vital principle of
s organism. No government is certain
living a day, but, on the contrary, is
rtain of a speedy death under such
ronic and ever active disease. Whilst
defies cure, it is certain, sooner or later,
produce death. And before a single
tion has recognized its legitimate ex-
tence, the disease has manifested its fatal
nature. GEORGIA and NORTH-CAROLINA have already disputed the Confederate authority, and threatened withdrawal under the acknowledged theory of secession. So alarming has the threat become, and so obviously fatal to the Confederacy, that notwithstanding its constitutional recognition of the right, it has been denied in serious debate in their Congress, and the insubordinate members menaced with the exertion of the central military power. Our own downfall then, if ever, is not to be now. The rebellion will be put down. If not by force, as it may be, if our rulers are equal to the emergency, and as it is believed it will be, it will fall through the very feebleness of its form of government. Fall it will. Fall it must, and the United States be restored to the condition in which our fathers left it. A nation of which its citizens can speak with an honest pride as being destined to make "the world its debtor by its discoveries of truth and example of virtuous freedom."

APPENDIX.

I.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 26, 1862.

WITH all proper respect for the ruling of the
ourt on Wednesday, refusing the accused the
ght to give in evidence the telegrams and mes-
ges he then offered, dated before and after
e twenty-ninth of August, (that is to say,
om August twenty-second to September first,
862,) he begs leave to enter on its proceedings
is protest.

The accused is charged, among other things,
ith having disobeyed the several orders stated
the specifications of the twenty-seventh Au-
ust, 1862, twenty-ninth August, 1862, (4.30
M.,) and twenty-ninth August, 1862, (8.50
M.,) and the prosecution has endeavored to
rove that such disobedience was by design,
ecause of a fixed purpose on the part of the
ccused not only to coöperate with the General
command in the existing campaign, but to
il in his duty in that regard.

With this view, certain papers, being a part
f the same series of telegrams with those re-
ected, were offered by the Judge-Advocate,
ot objected to by the accused, when the pur-
ose for which they were offered was stated,
nd received by the Court.

And with the same object the opinions of the witnesses, Roberts and Smith, founded, as they said, on what they represent to be the manner and conversation of the accused, and also on what the first said he heard from another that the accused would fail the Commander-in-Chief.

In the words of the Judge-Advocate, this evidence was produced to show the *animus* of the accused toward his chief, and in that aspect was admitted by the Court. The accused respectfully maintains, that if evidence of that description, for such a purpose, be admissible, (as he concedes it is,) it is equally admissible, and is his right, to show by his conduct just before, at, and after he came under the command of General Pope, by what he did and by what he said, orally or in writing, that the asserted purpose—the alleged ANIMUS—is wholly untrue but that, on the contrary, his real purpose—his real *animus*—from the first to the last, was to do his whole duty to the utmost of his ability, and render his General and his country all the aid in his power.

If the prosecution had contented itself with exhibiting the orders in the specifications which he is said to have disobeyed, and given evidence of the fact of disobedience, the accused is advised that, even then, the proof which the Court has ruled out should have been received. But when, not content with that course, it has at-

tempted to prove his mental purpose—to fathom his mind—to show that from personal grudge to his General, or other cause, he designedly disobeyed such orders, he is advised that the evidence rejected is clearly admissible.

The general rules of evidence are the same in Courts-Martial as in other Courts. They are based on principles of universal application, and which, as experience has demonstrated, are best calculated to ascertain the truth. One of these, as well settled as any known to the law, is, that where a mental intent with which an act is done is in issue, the acts and declarations of the party a few days before, at, or a few days after the time when the intent is charged to have existed, bearing on such intent, may be given in evidence by either party. This is a familiar rule in cases, among others, of acts of alleged bankruptcy or insolvency, change of residence, and of many acts of alleged fraud. In the first, whether the act charged as an act of bankruptcy is one or not, often depends on the intent with which it is done; and what the party did before or after is constantly admitted as legitimately illustrating the actual intent.

In the *second*, Whether a man has changed his residence often, also depends on intent. He may have removed, to remain permanently or temporarily; and what he has done or said before and after removing is allowed to prove or disprove intent.

In the *third*, Whether the imputed fraud was perpetrated or not, often depends on intent unexplained. The mere act itself may appear criminal or innocent. It is the purpose which gives it its actual character, and this purpose may be shown by either party, by acts and declarations of the person charged before and after the period of the impeached act. This principle, I am advised, is fully settled, not only in all the elementary writers on evidence, but by the Supreme Court of the United States in, among other cases, that of Wood *vs.* United States. (16 Peters, 362.)

And it is respectfully hoped that the Court will, on further consideration, see the justice of the rule. Its justice is strikingly illustrated in this instance: the accused is charged with the dishonorable, traitorous purpose of having isregarded the orders of his Chief, to gratify me supposed personal dissatisfaction with m, wholly reckless of its consequences to his untry. He is charged with having caused e defeat of our arms, and hazarded the safety of the Capitol, under the same degrading impulse. One of the witnesses has sworn, without objection from the Judge-Advocate or the Court, that a deceased officer of chivalrous character and spotless patriotism had declared to him, before the date of either of the orders, that the accused would fail his Chief. Another has stated, also without objection, that his conduct and manner in his presence were such that he was satisfied that he was a traitor, and that nothing but the fear of human laws prevented his killing the accused on the spot. This evidence was offered and received to show his *animus*—his intent. Proudly conscious of his innocence, and knowing the baseness of the calumny, he did not object to its introduction, being perfectly willing to let it all go for what it is worth. But to deny him the right, after it is received by the Court, to meet it by proving what is wholly inconsistent with it—acts of duty about the same period, orders, and messages, having no possible purpose but a faithful discharge of duty to his Chief and his country—it is submitted is a violation of the rule of evidence, and is to deprive him of the very best and most persuasive proof that the nature of the accusation admits of.

To show that he was not a traitor, he desired to establish constant acts of duty immediately preceding and succeeding the acts which he is charged to have done traitorously. To show faithfulness to duty to his Chief, he desires to prove, as the rejected evidence does, that to get to his command, and after he reached it, he did every thing that diligence, zeal, ardor, and all the skill and ability which he possessed enabled him to do to assist his Chief in every possible way, and at every possible hazard, so as to render his campaign a successful one.

Your ruling puts this out of his power, and, respectfully protesting against it, he can do nothing further than to submit it to your more mature consideration. (P. 253, 254.)

F. J. Porter, Major-General.

II.

In addition to the propositions embraced as mentioned in the text, other gross errors characterized the rulings of the Court. 1. As will be seen, (p. 21,) this question was propounded to Pope.

"If, as you have stated, you were of the opinion that the army under your command had been defeated, and in danger of still greater defeat, and the Capitol of the country in danger of capture by the enemy, and you thought that these calamities would have been obviated if General Porter had obeyed your orders, why was it that you doubted on the second of September whether you would or would not take any action against him?"

The witness declined to answer it, "as not being *relevant* to this investigation." The Court was thereupon cleared, and when opened, the Judge-Advocate stated its decision was, "that the question was *irrelevant!*" Porter submitted a protest in writing. The Court was again cleared, and after some time was opened, and Porter told that his protest would be held "under advisement until" the next day. On the next day, the protest was read by the Judge-Advocate, and is as follows:

"The witness having, in his examination in

hief, attributed the disasters of the army under his command in Virginia, in August last, to the ailure of the accused to obey all or some of his rders, and having stated that he was of the pinion that such orders might have been beyed; and it being so far as the prosecution as gone, upon his evidence that such disobe- ience occurred that the prosecution has endeav- red to be maintained; the accused is advised y his counsel that the question just ruled out y the Court is not only relevant and legal, but ost material in order to show that the recollec- on of the witness in such his examination in hief is not to be relied upon; and that he for he first time afterward charged the alleged dis- bedience upon the accused; because it was the uty of the witness, not only to doubt whether e would take any action in relation to the mat- r, but to report the same as a grave offense on he part of the accused; and his determination r doubt whether he would take such action, or ake such report, are facts not only admissible nt material evidence, that at the time to which he question relates he did not believe there had een any such disobedience on the part of the ccused, and thereupon respectfully requests to ave this protest entered on the proceedings of he Court against the exclusion of the question eferred to.

"F. J. Porter, Major General."

The Judge-Advocate said: "The witness re- uests the permission of the Court to answer he question referred to in the protest just read."

The accused made no objection.

The Court was cleared and after some time pened, and the Judge-Advocate announced the ecision to be that the witness have permis- ion to answer the question. When the witness bjected to the question for *irrelevancy*, his ob- ection is sustained. After the protest is heard y him and the Court, and he requested to be ermitted to answer the question, it was decided, lthough still as far as is known in the opinion f the Court, irrelevant to allow him the per- ission. As the Court had no authority to re- eive any but relevant testimony, the result of is ruling was to leave the relevancy or irrele- ancy of the question to the decision of the wit- ess.

III.

The same course was adopted by the Court n regard to another question put by Porter to he same witness. (P. 24.)

IV.

General McClellan, whose evidence was trongly in favor of Porter, was asked by one of he Court, and evidently with a view to impair s effect, *whether his feelings toward General Pope were not unfriendly.* The gross indelica- y of the inquiry, caused another member of the ourt to object to it, and it was then withdrawn. Porter by his counsel protested against its with- drawal, because as it was apparent that the member of the Court propounding it was under the impression that such feelings existed, it was Porter's right to have the truth of the imputa- tion tested, and the right of the witness to be permitted to exonerate himself from it. But the Court decided that it should not be answer- ed, and neither the question, nor what occurred in relation to it, were permitted to appear in the Record.

V.

In the Reply, (p. 11,) it is said that th writer did not know what, if any thing had been done, for Lieut.-Colonel *Thomas C. H. Smith.* He has since ascertained that he was appointed a Brigadier-General, to date from the twenty- ninth of November, 1862. The Court was open- ed on the twenty-fifth of that month. On what day the appointment was made he is not inform- ed, but it must have been after he gave this tes- timony against Porter, on the eleventh of De cember, in the same year, as at that time he stated himself to be a Lieutenant-Colonel, under a commission dated the twenty-fourth of Au gust, 1861. As he admitted upon his examin ation that he had never been in any army before that date, and never received a military educa- tion, and never was in a battle prior to Pope's Virginia campaign, and there being nothing to show that he displayed there either scientific knowledge or conspicuous valor, it must be true that his promotion to the high rank of General was not a reward for gallant service in the field or distinguished military ability. But looking to the time when he gave his evidence in Por- ter's case, and the character of that evidence, and his conduct in publishing and circulating his testimony and Pope's, and Roberts's only, without any other part of the proof, it is left to the reader to decide for himself to what cause it is to be referred.

VI.

The Judge-Advocate considers as immaterial the testimony of Porter's "former services and character for faithfulness and efficiency as an officer," although he admits it to be "full and earnest," because such evidence, he says, "is held to be entitled to but little weight except in doubtful cases," and to no weight when "it comes into conflict with evidence that is bot positive and reliable."

That no such evidence as the latter was given against Porter the reader has seen in The Reply. He will also have seen that the case made against him by the Government, in view of an impartial and fair mind, was not *even* a doubtful one. It is due, however, to Porter, that it should be known how strong were the testimo- nials to his former "faithfulness and efficiency" by those who had known him longest and best.

1. *Major-General Burnside.*—"I have never seen any thing to lead me to think that he was

any thing but a ZEALOUS, FAITHFUL, AND LOYAL OFFICER." (P. 181.)

2. *General Reynolds.*—"I have had opportunities to judge of General Porter's conduct, and I have always considered him AN ENERGETIC, FAITHFUL, AND DEVOTED OFFICER." (P. 170.)

3. *General Morell.*—"I do not think that *ever failed* to do his duty." (P. 149.)

4. *General Sykes.*—He was asked, did you ver see in Porter "any slackness to do his duty, any evidence of a disposition to fail his commanding officer or his country," and answered:

No; I never have. General Porter is an officer whose zeal is so well established, that I hardly see the necessity of that question. I would like to add that General Porter's foresight, his providence for the wants of his command, and his attention to all the minutiæ of his command, are such and so great that I have often thought that he relied or trusted too little to the capacity of his division commanders. He seemed to do every thing himself. (P. 177.)

5. *General Butterfield.*—(Roberts had said that Major-General Kearny had told him that Porter "would fail General Pope.") Butterfield was asked whether he had had conversations with Kearny in relation to Porter, and said, "frequently," and "that he always spoke in the HIGHEST TERMS of General Porter, both as a BRAVE OFFICER AND A GENTLEMAN, AND AS A HARD WORKER." And Butterfield also stated for himself that he never saw in any thing that he did or said before, or when it was understood that he was to come under Pope's command, *any evidence of an indisposition to be faithful to General Pope and to his country.*

6. *Major-General McClellan*, under whose immediate eye Porter was during his command of the Army of the Potomac, said, that from what he saw of his conduct, or from what he heard him say, after he knew that he was to go to the assistance of Pope, he did, in his opinion, "ALL THAT AN ENERGETIC AND ZEALOUS AND PATRIOTIC OFFICER COULD HAVE DONE," and that he never had any reason whatever, at any time after he received notice that he was to go to Pope's aid, "TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD FAIL GENERAL POPE OR THE COUNTRY IN THE DISCHARGE OF HIS DUTY." (P. 196.)

VII.

The very material evidence on one point, of Colonel George D. Ruggles, was omitted in the Reply. It is here given.

He says that he was in a room of the headquarters of General Pope, at Fairfax Court House, on the morning of the second of September, 1862, that Porter and General Pope were in the room, and that "I was engaged at the time, (he was Pope's Assistant Adjutant-General, and chief of staff,) writing orders for the position of troops." "While I was writing these orders, General Porter and General Pope had a conversation lasting about *twenty minutes.*"

"Whilst this time, studiously avoiding overhearing their conversation, I heard scraps enough of it to *know they were talking about the incidents of a few days previous.* At the conclusion of the interview, General Pope and Porter got up, and I heard *General Pope say to General Porter, that his explanations were satisfactory, with the exception of the matter* of the one brigade. I think he said, 'ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY,'" "though as to the word entirely, I can not swear positively." I think General Porter replied, "that (the brigade) can be easily explained," though I am not positive about his answer. He also stated that his recollection was, that he reminded Pope of this "conversation on the fifth or sixth of September, 1862." The Judge Advocate, in order to destroy the force of this evidence, succeeded only in getting the witness to repeat what he had said before, that he was not positive in his recollection of the latter fact stated by him, but that with regard to the other, Pope's telling Porter that he was satisfied, he was *positive and certain.* (Pp. 155, 156.) Nor did Pope, who was examined before in regard to it, deny it; on the contrary, he virtually admitted it. He said that he remembered that upon the occasion referred to, "I told General Porter that I had not reported him to the Department in Washington, and as matters stood, I thought *I should not take any action in reference to his case*, though I felt bound to do so in the case of Griffin." And when asked upon cross-examination whether he remembered the conversation between himself and Ruggles, testified to by the latter, he only said he had "*no remembrance* of it," but was "not *certain* that he had not," but was "very certain that Colonel Ruggles never stated a thing of that kind to him," although he was "not prepared to swear *that he did not.*" The bearing of Ruggles's evidence upon the accuracy, if nothing else, of General Pope's testimony and its conclusiveness of the fact, that Pope when he was made acquainted by Porter with all the circumstances connected with his conduct under Pope's several orders, expressed himself satisfied, can not fail to be apparent to the reader, and fatal, in any fair judgment, to the finding of the Court.

No. 14.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

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SPEECH OF EX-GOV. HUNT,

AT LOCKPORT.

He commenced by reminding the meeting that they had assembled to deliberate on subjects of transcendent importance to the American people, not only of the present time, but to the long line of coming generations. The fate of our country and its nationality, our Union and Constitution, was trembling in the balance, and the issue must depend upon the people themselves. He came before them once more to plead for the supremacy of the Constitution. Let us maintain and defend it from armed enemies, from the encroachments of official usurpation. If we preserve it in its true spirit and integrity, the country will be saved and free government rescued from destruction. On the other hand, if people are indifferent to the sense of duty and danger, and recreant to their sacred trust as freemen, their rights and liberties are lost and nothing will remain but for history to add another to the long list of republics which have flourished for a season and disappeared forever.

Before proceeding to express his views on the national crisis, he said he felt constrained to pause and dwell for a moment on the right of discussion. Do we still possess freedom of speech and the right to canvas the measures of government and the conduct of our public agents? It has been assumed that this inestimable prerogative of freedom is suspended during the war; and attempts have been made to suppress its exercise by arbitrary and summary proceedings. He utterly repelled this doctrine. It annihilates one of the most sacred of our constitutional guarantees. He was aware that the pretensions of power in this matter find many apologists even among those who in better days claimed to represent the great principle of free speech. Their theory is, that in seasons of repose, when there is nothing but subordinate administrative questions to be discussed, the people may speak freely; but that in times of peril, when the safety of the nation is at stake, we must either approve or stand mute, and no matter what may be done or attempted by our official agents, true loyalty requires passive obedience and the abject silence of those oriental nations, whose language has no word expressive of political liberty.

But he contended that the Constitution was made for all times and seasons, and especially for *war-time*. It contains ample provisions for the prosecution of war, the suppression of rebellion, and the punishment of treason. It is in times of war and commotion, when executive power is vastly augmented, that the safeguards intended for the protection of the citizen are specially needed, for then our only security from arbitrary caprice must be found behind the barri-

ers of constitutional law. By the theory of our government, the political power resides in the people. All authority emanates from them, and under the Constitution is to be exercised for their good and according to their will. It is their sovereign prerogative, not merely to elect the public agents and representatives, but to hold them to a just responsibility. More than this, all measures of policy, whether in peace or war, must be ultimately determined by the people themselves. It is for them to decide when and for what objects wars shall be prosecuted. For they alone furnish the victims and bear the burdens of the conflict. No higher or more sacred responsibility can devolve upon a free people than to determine upon the occasions of war, the purposes for which it shall be pursued, the conditions upon which it shall be concluded. For the intelligent and wise discharge of this duty, it is indispensable that the citizens should enjoy, in its most perfect sense, the right of free public discussion and deliberation.

A just cause has nothing to fear from investigation and an honest interchange and expression of opinion.

Governed by these principles of duty, he claimed and intended to exercise the constitutional right to discuss all public questions freely, including the conduct of the government in the management of the war, the objects for which it was commenced, and the purposes which are now avowed in many quarters as the chief end and inducement for its prosecution. It would be his aim to express his opinions in a calm, loyal, patriotic spirit, which occasions of public peril and anxiety ought always to inspire. He had no factious feelings to indulge. On the contrary, the only aspiration of his heart was for the welfare and safety of our country and the preservation of its free institutions. Far from wishing to embarrass the government, he desired, above all things, to strengthen and uphold it, and insure its perpetuity as a free constitutional government, to protect the people in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties during all coming time.

Before proceeding to examine the present posture of affairs, Governor Hunt observed that he deemed it but just and proper to say a few words in regard to the position of the Conservative Union men of the North at the commencement of the war. For several years an angry political conflict had raged between the sections. Party organizations were formed on a sectional antagonism resulting from the different systems of society and industry, North and South, and all the national interests in common between them which the Union was formed to protect, were sedulously banished from popular discussion. Instead of common interests and a common destiny—instead of cherishing a kindly memory of joint efforts and trials and glories in the past, nothing was heard but words of insult, reproach, and defiance. Many of us were profoundly apprehensive of the consequences of this system of organized strife, by which vast and distant communities of men, few of whom, though related by federal compact, had personally seen or understood each other, were inflamed to madness and mutually taught to entertain sentiments of animosity and contempt.

We deemed this warfare wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the federal compact, subversive of the great ends for which the Union was established, and dangerous to its harmony and stability. Under these convictions, we endeavored to allay feelings of sectional irritation, and preserve sentiments of fraternity and peace. Acting in conjunction with a large and patriotic body of true Union men in the South, we labored earnestly for years to keep the spirit of sectional hostility within bounds, pleading for moderation and justice, and exposing the abyss into which the country was madly rushing forward. But appeals and warnings and entreaties were unavailing. Popular passions had been aroused and swept onward in their course. All ideas of danger were treated with levity, and too many were persuaded that the contest was a mere political tournament for the prizes of power. The strongest section made the President, the weaker refused to submit. Even then noble and heroic efforts were made to avert the impending collision by a just and honorable compromise. But all was in vain. The extremists and agitators on both sides disdained compromise, and preferred to defy consequences.

When the struggle came and the attempt was made to break up the Union by force of arms, what was the conduct of the national union men of the North who had so firmly resisted the whole system of agitation and strife, the prolific source of so many calamities? Did we falter in our loyalty or swerve from the discharge of our duty to the Government? *No, no.* We were still as now and ever, faithful to the Union and Constitution. We promptly rushed to the support of the Executive in his efforts to subdue rebellion and maintain the federal authority. We had always regarded the Constitution as a sacred covenant, binding upon the people and the States under all circumstances; it was enough for us that it was assailed and in peril. We had no sympathies with secession. We felt that no temporary excess or perversion of popular passions was sufficient to justify resistance to government, or to absolve any portion of our countrymen from their allegiance.

Those who felt aggrieved were bound to adopt constitutional remedies, and await the return of sober judgment and reflection among the people. Therefore we hesitated not to rally to the support of the Government in a spirit of disinterested patriotism. For the time being we put all former dissensions far from us, drawing the vail of oblivion over the past, anxious only to discharge our duty and aid in the deliverance of our country. We indulged in no reproaches toward the men whom so many honestly deemed the responsible authors of the national misfortunes. We rendered prompt and efficient support to an administration from which we neither desired nor expected any favor, but that it would be faithful to the Constitution. We readily, and, as time has shown, too confidingly, accepted the assurance of the Administration that the war should be conducted solely for the defense of the Constitution, according to its clear and well-defined provisions. This assurance was subsequently confirmed by the resolution of Congress adopted by a vote almost unanimous. Such was the language of nearly the entire press in the interest of the Administration. It would have been most fortunate for the country if this pledge had been faithfully observed. So long as the war was prosecuted for the preservation of the Constitution in its integrity, and until other objects were avowed, the President had the united support of the Northern people. No conscription was necessary.

Men of all parties rushed to the field as volunteers. An army was rapidly formed far more numerous than the world had ever seen in the annals of civil war. They went forth in a loyal spirit to put down rebellion and uphold the Constitution. A majority of the people in the border States, where public sentiment was divided, decided to adhere to the old Union and give an active support to the Government. Besides the declaration of Congress, they were distinctly assured by the Executive, that a Conservative policy should be pursued, and that the war should not be perverted into a crusade upon the rights and institutions of the States. Never was a more sacred pledge given to any people; never in the history of the world was a pledge more wantonly violated. Unfortunately for the Government and country, the President was surrounded by a class of political visionaries and ideologists maddened by the fell spirit of abolition fanaticism.

It is evident that they had resolved to seize upon the war to carry their utopian theories into execution. They insisted on making it a war for emancipation. The President was plied by argument, persuasion, and menace. For long he repulsed these architects of ruin, and manifested respect for his plighted faith, and his oath to support the Constitution. He contended that a decree of emancipation would be unauthorized and inoperative, and likened it to "the Pope's bull against the comet." His Secretary of State repelled the proposition, and demonstrated that it was monstrous and impossible. But the radicals were not to be foiled. They prolonged the struggle. They are men of indomitable energy of will, and had fully determined to secure control of the Executive power of the Government. At length they succeeded in obtaining a mastery over the President. He was made to believe that the Northern people required the war to be prosecuted for the abolition of slavery throughout the Southern States, and that nothing was needed but an avowal of this pur-

pose to secure a fresh outburst of popular enthusiasm in support of the Administration, and in an evil hour he yielded to the delusion. From that moment he seems to have been *in custodiam*, with every avenue of approach vigilantly guarded. The White House is said to be beleaguered by radical Senators, Governors, and missionaries, during the recess of Congress, forming a self-constituted committee of permanence to manipulate the Executive, apparently superseding the responsible Cabinet, and wielding "a power behind the throne greater than the throne itself."

Governor Hunt then proceeded to discuss the practical operation and effect of the President's abolition Proclamation. He contended that in a legal sense it was altogether null and void. It was an attempt by one department of the Federal Government to usurp a power that belongs exclusively to the States. It assumes to repeal the fundamental laws of more than one third of the States in regard to a question of races purely internal and domestic. To contend that a measure so sweeping comes within the military power of the Commander-in-Chief was too absurd to admit of serious argument. The war power in this respect is limited to orders and regulations necessary to facilitate and strengthen the army in the field, and must be confined to the theatre of military operations. Where the commanders of the army have emancipated or appropriated slaves for the actual service of the army he deemed it legitimate, and all slaves who have become free by virtue of military law and usage are to be protected in their freedom at the close of the war. But the attempt to go beyond this limit is a naked usurpation of power. He had seen some efforts to justify it as a confiscation of rebel property; and yet those who use this argument commonly deny that negroes are or can be property. The power of confiscation and forfeiture is defined by the Constitution, and must be exercised according to law. It operates only upon the guilty, after due conviction. But this Proclamation confiscates the property of entire communities, confounding the innocent with the guilty, and making no distinction between the friends and enemies of the Union. The President, in a recent letter holds the following language:

"But the Proclamation is law and valid, or is not valid. If it is not valid, it needs no retraction. If it is valid, it can not be retracted any more than the dead can be brought to life."

It is only in governments purely despotic that valid law can be ordained by executive edict, and even there decrees are modified or retracted, according to the changing will and caprice of the monarch. This mode of government is peculiarly Asiatic and oriental. It has been extended over some portions of Europe after violent struggles. In England the attempt to make law by proclamation cost Charles the First his head, and James the Second his throne. But here in republican America, where the powers of domestic legislation remain in the States, and the limited legislative power of the Federal Government is vested in Congress by a written Constitution, it is gravely assumed that the President's Proclamation, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, is unchangeable and superior to all other laws, and even to the Constitution itself! Such a pretension will not be recognized by the people of this country until they are prepared to renounce self-government and demolish the fabric of constitutional liberty.

He contended that the Constitution is still the supreme law in all the States, that acts of secession by any of them are legally void, and whenever the rebellion is suppressed, the Southern States will return with their constitutional rights unimpaired, and the Federal Government will have acquired no powers not conferred by the original compact. It becomes important to consider the practical effect of the Proclamation in its bearing upon the war and the rebellion. He regarded it as the great stumbling block in the way of a restoration of the Union. We have abundant evidence that it has paralyzed Union men in the South and, strengthened the spirit of resistance. Until it is abandoned, he firmly believed that any approach to a genuine and lasting peace will be found impossible. We see many indications that large numbers of people in the South desire to return to the Union. But they naturally inquire upon what terms and conditions they are to be received? To what are they expected to submit? Are the States to remain States with

their ancient rights under the old Constitution, or must they come mutilated, dwarfed, and divested of their essential attributes and powers? Are they to regulate the relations between the black and white population within their limits, or is this important function to be usurped by the Federal Government? Are the white men of the South to exercise again the rights of self-government, or shall they be ruled as a subjugated people and compelled to forced equality with the negro? These are questions which must be met and answered by both government and people, sooner or later. They are points upon which grave anxiety must naturally arise in the minds of the more considerate and reflecting men in the South who have become weary of this unnatural strife, and who would make a stand in favor of peace upon receiving an assurance of constitutional protection.

Now how stands the matter? What is the position of the Administration on this vital question?

According to the best light before us, its purpose is to continue the war until slavery is abolished, even though the Southern States and people should consent to lay down their arms and return to their constitutional allegiance. In the first place, this policy is announced by many leading Senators and Representatives in the confidence of the Administration. It is distinctly proclaimed by the Solicitor of the War Department, who declares that the Southern States are not to be received into the Union on the constitutional basis, but are to be held in subjection by military force as conquered territories, and large portions of the country distributed among the emancipated slaves.

In harmony with the same design, the Adjutant-General of the United States informs us (to his eternal infamy be it spoken) that he arrested and imprisoned in the guard-house a considerable body of American soldiers, because they refused to respond in cheers for the "negro policy" of the Government. And these were soldiers who had bravely fought under the glorious flag of the Union, in defense of the Constitution. And what is the intention of the President himself? He was recently visited by a delegation from Louisiana, representing a respectable portion of the people of that State, proposing to return to the Union, and offering to hold a constitutional election of representatives. Did he welcome them back and hail with joy this evidence of returning patriotism and reason among a misguided people?

Far from it. His responses were ambiguous. He answered "with *buts* and *ifs* and *ands*"—but finally refused to consent to an election under the old Constitution of Louisiana. And in his letter, already referred to, he assumes that his proclamation is an unchangeable law, which, being interpreted, means that the war must go on until slavery in all the States of the South shall be abolished.

It remains for the American people to consider and determine whether the war shall be waged and prolonged for this purpose, or prosecuted only for the preservation of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union as originally founded. For himself, he contended that whenever the Union is restored, it must be upon the basis of the Constitution. Any other conclusion involves a complete revolution in the frame and spirit of our Government. Instead of a federation of *United States*, possessing equal powers in their respective spheres, and bearing the same relations to each other and to the Federal power, who would wish to see one large class of States annihilated, their people outlawed, and their territory held by the strong arm of military power? It concerns the Northern people to avert any such catastrophe. Any government which is enabled permanently to hold a large portion of its territory and people in subjection by mere military strength, must become too strong for constitutional checks and restrictions, and in the sequel will exercise arbitrary power over the whole country. The examples of history are numerous and nearly uniform in support of the truth of this proposition. If we would remain free ourselves, we must not hold neighboring States in a condition of political servitude.

Of late it has been rather fashionable to assume that there are no Union men in the seceded States whose feelings or opinions are entitled to any regard. But this is an erroneous impression. In nearly every State of the South there

was a large minority opposed to secession. The majority were carried away at a time of unparalleled excitement and delusion, and all popular delusions subside sooner or later. The minority were compelled, for the time being, to submit to the Government *de facto;* for our Government was unable to afford them any protection, and they were at the mercy of the rebel authorities. When the Union is restored and peace proclaimed, this large class of original Union men in the South will be found worthy of generous forbearance and sympathy. He did not allow himself to believe that the people of the North and South are to be enemies forever. They are enemies in war; in peace they will again be friends. Then the angry passions excited by the conflict will gradually subside, and more generous emotions will resume their sway in every manly breast.

He had a few words to say in perfect candor and friendship to those who assume that the only solution of our troubles is to be found in the abolition of slavery. Their argument is, that slavery was the cause of the war, therefore it should be extirpated. This statement of the case is far from being strictly accurate.

The free and slave States united voluntarily and moved on harmoniously for more than half a century, notwithstanding this difference in their domestic condition. It was the energy of party passions and the animosities engendered by sectional spirit which disturbed their union. The true nature and design of the Federal relation between the States has been widely misunderstood. The compact relates only to a few national and well-defined objects, leaving all besides to the separate and exclusive control of the States themselves. This fundamental condition must be observed, and allowed to regulate the popular action. Otherwise no possible confederation or union of States can be of permanent duration.

Formerly the emancipation of the slaves was urged as an inestimable blessing to the white race, who were degraded by contact with slavery; now, instead of a friendly boon, it is proposed to inflict it upon them as a punishment at the point of the bayonet. It ought to be borne in mind that whatever system of change may be proposed in regard to the negro population, whether gradual or immediate, its practical execution must at last devolve upon the white people among whom they dwell. They alone occupy the position to carry it into practical effect. Is it conceivable that they will execute a new code repugnant to their sentiments, under military coercion? Any system for the elevation or enfranchisement of the African, to insure success, must be adopted with the voluntary concurrence of the people with whom that race is in personal relation and contact. Otherwise it will be a failure, and "their last state will be worse than the first." He had no confidence in measures of amelioration and philanthropy which are to be accomplished by fire and sword and widespread desolation. If the structure of States is to be reformed, and a degraded race elevated to a better condition, more pacific agencies must be employed. Slavery has been seriously impaired by the war, and some of the States will doubtless take measures of their own accord for its gradual removal. But the whole subject must finally be left to the voluntary action of the States themselves. The arming of large bodies of negroes will not bring peace to the country or liberty to the slave. It is far more likely to produce an interminable warfare, and evolve scenes of cruelty and horror which will shock the civilized world, and compel every true American to weep bitter tears of national humiliation and remorse. It will probably make it impossible for the two races ever to dwell in peace on the same soil. These are consequences which the Government and people are admonished to foresee in time, and if possible to avert.

In confirmation of the opinions he had expressed in regard to the practical tendency of the abolition policy of the Administration, he might produce expressions from some of the most devoted Union men in the border States. He would content himself by selecting but one. It came from a noble and illustrious patriot who now sleeps in his grave, to which he was hastened by the calamities of his country. It was the calm, earnest voice of John J. Critten-

len. For many years it had been his good fortune to enjoy the friendship of that wise and patriotic statesman, whose loss the whole country mourns as a great national bereavement, and which he deeply felt as a personal affliction, severing another of the cherished ties which connected him with the past. In a letter received from Mr. Crittenden, a short time before his death, he held the following language:

"The fate of the country depends to a great extent upon the course and conduct of your great State. Her word bravely and patriotically spoken will have a mighty influence throughout the Union, and will control the policy on which the war is to be prosecuted; and upon that policy depends, mainly, the results of the war. If it is to be prosecuted simply and wholly for the restoration of the Constitution and the Union, it will be successful; but if it is to be perverted into a war for abolition and for desolation—a war for vengeance—then I should say the war will be *fatal* to the Union and to the country, if I had not a superstitious confidence that God will save us from our own madness. I think the people should express with manly firmness their opinion on the mighty questions of constitutionality and expediency that are involved in or connected with this war as now prosecuted and conducted by the Administration. They can not consider it as unimportant whether the war is to be prosecuted for the abolition of slavery or not, or whether the President had the constitutional power to issue his proclamation. These questions enter into and form part and parcel of the war. It seems to me that the policy to be observed, in the prosecution of the war, is an essential part of it, on which its issues for weal or woe must depend. It is my anxious desire for the preservation of the Constitution and Union, that makes me so anxious that no false step should be taken in the prosecution of the war, and especially none so mischievous as the course now pursued by the Administration."

These words of the departed and honored patriot had sunk deeply into his heart. Sometimes he almost fancied that he heard his voice, as if speaking from the tomb, reproaching him with apathy, and arousing him to one more effort for the salvation of the country. In the presence of the mighty issues which are to decide the destiny of our Government, we ought all to feel that silence is treasonable, and indifference a crime against our native land.

But the question arises, what is to be done? In what manner can we contribute to the restoration of the Union, and the deliverance of the country from peril? It may be said that we have no power to influence the action of the Administration, as now constituted. But we can exercise the rights of freemen, and discharge our duty in a manly, fearless spirit, leaving consequences with that overruling Providence, by whom nations are built up and destroyed. We can still express our opinions, (at least, in the State of New-York,) without fear of provost-marshals; we can exercise the right of suffrage, and contend for the cause of constitutional right and liberty, with patriotic energy and zeal. The time has come for the people to declare their will, with an emphatic voice which can not be doubted or misunderstood. We can exercise our constitutional right of petition to the Government of the United States. The President has doubtless been persuaded that the people of the North desire him to abolish slavery in all the States, and to prosecute the war for that purpose. He feared that Mr. Lincoln was kept in a state of honest ignorance respecting the true opinion of the country. He must be the victim of an illusion, which ought to be dispelled. It is time the President should be undeceived. Let it be made known to him, by clear and unquestionable evidence, that the people demand that this war shall be prosecuted solely for the restoration of the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was, and not for the annihilation of States, or the forcible emancipation of Southern negroes. At any rate, he desired that the people of Niagara should speak out, and with this view he had prepared a Petition to the President, asking him to revoke his abolition proclamation, and proclaim the supremacy of the Constitution. It would be submitted to the meeting for its consideration. He intended to sign it, and hoped a majority of the people of this county would do likewise. If the voice of our own county is thus expressed, we may fairly infer that it is an index to the pop.

ular sentiment in other sections of the country. It will thus be seen how many of our citizens desire that the war shall be prosecuted and finally concluded according to the principles of the Constitution. He was confident that a large majority are in favor of making the restoration of the Union as it was the sole object of the war. If there be any who prefer a different policy, it is competent for them to resort to the same method of declaring their sentiments.

Indeed, he was informed that petitions are now in circulation, in some of the counties, urging the President never to end the war till the last negro slave is set free. This fact had suggested to his mind the idea of a counter movement. If one set of people may petition the President to disregard the Constitution, other people may properly ask him to adhere to it, and defend it according to his oath. Let both sides be heard, and it will soon be known where the true strength of the country is to be found on this question. If it should be objected that a repeal of the Proclamation would involve its author in inconsistency, it is easy to answer that its abandonment would be far more consistent and honorable and constitutional than its original promulgation.

If a false step has been taken, it is more noble and praiseworthy to recall than to persevere in it.

Our petition can not embarrass the Government in the prosecution of the war. Congress has given the President an unlimited command of men and money, and he has nothing to do but to use them. We have a right to ask that he shall wield these enormous powers in accordance with the organic law of the land, and it is not for us to assume that he will finally disregard the deliberate will of the people. If he should, it will remain for them to apply the proper remedy in due season.

To guard against any misconception, he desired to say that he was still ready to go as far as those who go farthest to uphold the Government in the exercise of all its rightful powers, and in the prosecution of the war for the constitutional purpose of maintaining the Union. He wanted no dishonorable peace, none which will not preserve the Union in its integrity. He would never consent to its dissolution. But every patriotic man ought to desire that a policy should b adopted which will insure the origina and only legitimate object of the war, i the shortest period, and with the smal est effusion of blood. If wise and en lightened counsels prevail, he believe that the mighty drama which had con vulsed the country would soon draw t a close, and peace, effulgent, blesse peace, will once more smile upon ou afflicted land. Who that has a hear within him does not desire to witnes this glorious consummation? For mor than two years, this war has raged o battle-fields innumerable, and thousand yea, hundreds of thousands, of fellow citizens and brethren have fallen by eac other's hands in sanguinary strife. Man of the fairest portions of the land hav been ravaged and desolated, towns de stroyed by fire, women and childre driven from their homes, amid scenes o agony, which no language can depict The spirit of havoc and rapine "has hel high carnival". It is the invariable ten dency of civil war to transform men int furies. The most intense passions of hu man nature are roused to the most vic lent action. It is probably the first tim in the history of civilized nations that domestic struggle so vast and destruc tive has been so long continued withou one word of parley looking to the future nor so much as one effort at pacification or a single appeal to the insurgent peo ple to return to their allegiance, and trust to the justice and magnanimity o a paternal government. The armies o the Union have been victorious. They have gained great and decisive advan tages. Whatever may be said by the leading spirits of the rebellion, large bodies of people in the South evince a desire to return to the Union, and enjoy peace and security under the protecting shield of the Federal Constitution. This is especially true in North-Carolina, Ten nessee, and Louisiana. At such a junc ture we ought to act a noble and gener ous part. Let us rise to the level of the occasion, discard all baser passions, and show that we are inspired by an exalted patriotism, and capable of the virtues o clemency and magnanimity. Then may we claim a proud and illustrious rank in the scale of nations, and history will at test that our conduct was worthy of a free, powerful, and Christian people.

No. 15.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge

Prof. S. F. B. MORSE, Pres't C. MASON, Cor. Sec'y, 13 Park Row, New-York.

SPEECH OF HON. AMASA J. PARKER

AT THE

COOPER INSTITUTE.

In meeting together this evening, my fellow-citizens, to discuss the issues before the country and to consult upon the public welfare, we are not only exercising a right dear to freemen, but we are also discharging a high political duty, the neglect of which, in the imminent peril now impending over us, would be grossly criminal.

Throughout the Northern States a great struggle is in progress between power and the people. It is a struggle for the maintenance of popular rights against the infringements and the usurpations of a centralized Federal power. The right of personal liberty, without which the government is worthless; of free speech and a free press, without which the people can not govern, and which are inconsistent only with arbitrary power; the right of protection against wrong and outrage, and of remedies in the courts for redress of injuries; the right to that great bulwark of personal liberty, the writ of *habeas corpus*, the establishment of which cost two hundred years of contest in England—all these have been invaded by the Federal Government. These struggles for the maintenance of popular rights have existed, with various results, in all countries and at all periods of history. In some countries these rights have been trodden out under the iron heel of despotic power; in others they have been partially recognized under the form of a constitutional monachy, and, comparatively, it is only within a very narrow limit of territory that they have been admitted to their full extent. It is indeed one of the marvels of the age that these popular rights, for the preservation of which our own government was instituted, and upon which it was built, should be trampled upon with impunity here, and should be in absolute danger of extermination. Fortunately our own form of government has furnished us with peaceful means of protection and redress. We can effect, at the ballot-box, a successful and bloodless revolution. If that be left to us—if it be not invaded by Federal bayonets, or controlled by Federal power, and if we fully understand the questions involved, and duly appreciate the high duty devolved upon us, we may yet be saved. Three years have elapsed since the election took place which brought the present national administration into power. Up to that time there was no nation upon the face of the earth so prosperous and so happy as our own. Thirty-four States, inhabited by more than thirty millions of freemen, enjoying every blessing that a free government could secure them, excited the envy and admiration of the world. Our nation was a first-class

power; its influence everywhere felt and recognized; its commerce unequaled; rich beyond all estimate in its intelligence and industry, as well as material wealth, and with a future in prospect of boundless prosperity and glory.

And how is it now, after that Administration has ruled us less than three years? Our country is practically divided. A civil war has been raging for two years and a half, with no prospect of an early termination. A million of men withdrawn from the industrial pursuits of life, are in arms, engaged in deadly strife; hundreds of thousands of brave men have fallen in battle or died of lingering diseases, incident to the conflict. The nation, in its agony, sweats great drops of blood. Habiliments of mourning and sounds of woe have become familiar to us. Widows and orphans surround us on every side. Extensive regions of country have been made desolate. Ruthless guerrillas murder and burn and plunder. In the wake of armies, women starve and children cry for food. Pirates prey upon our commerce and drive it from the ocean. Bitter sectional hatred has taken the place of fraternal affection. A national debt, almost beyond computation, hangs over us and our posterity. And through this black cloud of miseries which hangs like a pall over the land, there comes hardly a ray of hope to our relief. All these accumulated horrors have gathered over us since the election of Mr. Lincoln, and are the consequences of the triumph of a sectional party based upon one single idea—that of hostility to the cherished institutions of the South. No one can for a moment suppose that the country would not have been still prosperous and happy if either of the other presidential candidates had been elected instead of Mr. Lincoln. Conservative men everywhere—through the press, on the stump, and in private warnings—predicted the direful consequences that would surely follow bringing into power the principles of Black Republicanism. They predicted it, not because the triumph of abolition doctrine would justify rebellion, but because, regardless of justification, human nature would not fail to rebel under such circumstances. We must take human nature as we find it. But warnings were in vain. An irrepressible conflict had been proclaimed, and it is still in progress. And though a majority of the people were not thus misled, Mr. Lincoln was constitutionally elected. Then came secession, and of course civil war followed. I concede, nay, I maintain, there was not the slightest justification for the rebellion. The wickedness of the leaders in that great conspiracy can not be over-stated. They should have submitted, and patiently have waited for relief until it could have been obtained by constitutional means through the ballot-box. They should have looked for protection against the mad schemes of the abolitionists, to the Constitution and the laws — to the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the courts. Constituted as they were, they would not have appealed to them in vain. The returning wave of public sentiment would have been conservative and patriotic. There was still time between the election and the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln to have averted civil war. But the fanatical party which had elected him was mad with joy. Its leaders elevated the Chicago platform above the Constitution. They would neither concede nor conciliate. When a kind word might have saved the Union, they would not utter it. The men who had sympathized with John Brown in his raid upon Virginia, and who have since canonized him—who hang his picture over their mantles, in token of their veneration and love—pressed on the advantage they had gained at the election, and determined that the war against slavery should be waged without quarter. The extreme Southern States passed acts of secession. The danger became imminent. Separation or civil war stared us in the face. Conservative men appealed to the leaders of the triumphant party, while yet the Border States were with us, and while they were still anxious to preserve the Union, but appealed in vain. They exacted their "pound of flesh," though it should take with it the life-blood of the Union.

Senator Chandler, who is now sent to

this State to instruct us in political duty, openly advocated "blood-letting." The Peace Congress met with but little favor in that quarter. Delegates from the black Republican States were reluctantly sent, and men selected so as to represent the most radical ideas. In our own State, the Republican legislature postponed action, and there was great danger that we should be unrepresented in the Peace Congress. It was at this crisis that the conservative men of this State gathered in convention at Albany, in February, 1861, to see what could be done to save the Union and avert civil war. There has never been in this State an assemblage of men more high-minded and patriotic. Determined that their State should not go unrepresented in the proposed Peace Congress to be held at Washington, and hoping that the influence of this State might be cast on the side of fraternity and union, that convention appointed delegates — conservative men — to represent the State, in case the legislature should fail to appoint. That drove the Republican legislature to act upon the propositions, and it selected and appointed a delegation to the Peace Congress of highly respectable gentlemen, a majority of whom, however, were advocates of the most radical and unyielding policy. The consequence was the votes of the conservative majority of that delegation were of no avail. The vote of the State, being determined by a majority of the delegates, was cast in favor of no adequate measure of conciliation or hope. The Chicago platform triumphed over the Constitution. When the impartial historian shall write the history of these eventful times, he will charge the responsibility for all the direful evils which now afflict us to the extreme fanatics of the North and South. Both preferred disunion to an abandonment of favorite theories. The conservative Democracy of the nation, standing midway between these extremes, did all in their power to resist their machinations. They stood up for the constitutional rights of the South against the enroachments of Northern abolitionists, till they were overcome by the tide of fanaticism. They saw sectional parties gradually engendering sectional hatred, and that it must eventually lead to collision; but no warnings of theirs was heeded. Even in the spring of 1861, after the extreme Southern States had seceded, and while intermediate States were trembling in the balance, and when some of the more sagacious men, like Mr. Weed, fell back aghast at the ruin spread before them, and honestly sought the means to avert the imminent danger, the more radical leaders of the Republican party, and the same men who have since obtained such complete control over the President, would listen to no suggestion of conciliation. They pressed forward regardless of consequences. They were either blind to the dangers before us, or they courted the bloody drama which has followed. When the first blow was struck at Fort Sumter, all hope ceased. The whole North rose as one man to maintain the Constitution and defend the Union against a wicked rebellion. I insist that the course pursued by the Democratic party of the North at this crisis was sublimely patriotic and magnanimous. They forgot the wrongs of the Administration in their love for the government. They rushed to the national standard though it was borne by those in whom they had little confidence. They placed men and means at the disposal of those in power, till Senator Wilson, who is now perambulating this State to abuse us, cried: "Hold, enough." It made no difference that the Administration was at the same proscribing Democrats and filling their places with Republicans. The Democracy, always on the side of the country, whether it be against foreign or domestic foes, sought neither power nor place. They submitted without complaint to persecution. They acted the patriot while the Administration played the partisan. And how have they been treated in return by the men in power? They have been denounced as traitors, loaded with opprobrious epithets, imprisoned without warrant and without accusation, or lawlessly kidnapped and sent out of the State. While abolition newspapers that openly advocated disunion went undisturbed, Democratic papers were seized and suppressed, or denied trans-

mission by the mails, for merely discussing measures of national policy. While loud-mouthed abolitionists, openly preaching disunion, were suffered to go at large, Democrats of unquestionable loyalty were imprisoned. The world will never believe that for the purpose of subduing rebellion at the South, it was necessary to make war upon the liberties of the North. Are we not entitled to the protection of the same Constitution at the North which we are called upon to defend with our life's blood at the South? Was not the Constitution made for the whole country—for the North as well as the South? Was it not designed to protect our personal rights in war as well as in peace? If not, it is of little value. The plea of *necessity* is always the excuse for oppression. The tyrant pleads it to justify his act—the highway robber as an excuse for his crime. I insist that there is within and under the Constitution of our country ample power to defend it against both domestic foes and foreign enemies. The tribunals of justice vindicate innocence as well as punish guilt. But the plea of necessity, if it can be admitted in any case, can never be made applicable to the Free States of the North so far removed from the scene of conflict. There has never been a moment since the civil war began when the courts of the Free States were not open for accusation and trial—not a moment when judges or juries would have hesitated to convict where guilt was proved. No fair-minded man can doubt but the arbitrary power so freely exercised, in violation of the personal liberties and rights of Northern Democrats, has been prompted by partisan prejudice, or that the arrests were the reckless acts of those who place a low estimate upon the value of personal liberty.

Could it have been necessary to arrest the Messrs Flanders in Franklin County, at the extreme north of the State, the farthest possible removed from the rebellion, and to imprison them for months in Fort Warren, without warrant, without accusation, and without explanation? Their newspaper had but a limited circulation, never extending to the disaffected district. They are gentlemen of high personal character, as loyal and as honest as any in the land. Was it *necessary* to the safety of the State to arrest the little hunchback newsboy who peddled newspapers on the New-Haven Railroad, and thus supported himself and his mother, and to imprison him in Fort Lafayette? Was it necessary, to enable the Government to put down the rebellion, that the Rev. Mr. Benedict, a pious and exemplary clergyman at Aurora, Erie County, should be seized and carried off to Washington and imprisoned there? Is the gospel of peace so dangerous to the welfare of the Government that it shall not be permitted to be preched in the pulpit by the clergy even so far distant from Washington as our northern frontier? The Apostles themselves would have stood but a small chance of personal liberty if they had lived or preached the Gospel of the divine Master in these days. The present National Administration, like that which ruled in Judea in the time of King Agrippa, would no doubt imprison St. Paul, if he were here, as "a pestilent fellow and a mover of sedition." Will the civilized world ever believe that it was really necessary to successfully put down the rebellion, that Fort Lafayette and Fort Warren should be converted into bastiles and crowded with freemen of the North, sent there in violation of every legal and constitutional right, those in power refusing all investigation and inquiry, and interposing the guns of the fortress in answer to the writ of *habeas corpus?* Will the lovers of freedom in any part of the world ever believe that suppressing newspapers, and stifling free discussion here, were among the means necessary to subdue men in rebellion in distant States? These were the first invasions by the Administration of our liberties, and the steps subsequently taken seemed designed for the completion of a system that, when carried out, shall leave us deprived of every constitutional right, if not of all hope of regaining it. To sustain the Administration in future aggressions, and to protect it from a just punishment in the Courts for past wrongs, "*the indemnity act*" was passed by an abolition Congress, and the fourth section of that act clothes

he President with absolute power over he persons and property of every citi-:en of the republic. It declared the or-ler of the President, or under his au-hority, a good defense in all Courts, to ny prosecution, civil or criminal, pend-ng or future, for any search, seizure, ar-est, or imprisonment. This atrocious ict thus makes the will of the President he law of the land, and places the peo-le at the mercy of the many thousand who act under his authority. You may e torn from your family; your whole roperty may be seized; you have no edress. Kidnapping, murder, robbery, ape, all are to go unpunished and un-edressed, if committed by the order of he President or *under his authority.* The odious doctrine of tyrants that "the King can do no wrong," is enacted as aw, in even a more objectionable form, n this Republic of ours, and the full laze of the light of the nineteenth cen-ury. Will not the people of the North f all parties seek protection at the bal-ot-box against an act of usurpation which would be tolerated in no absolute monarchy of the Old World? Step by step, as if feeling the way, these en-croachments upon the rights of the peo-le have been made. One by one our hands have been bound, and recently, as f to complete the plan and stifle even complaint of wrong, the writ of *habeas corpus* is suspended by the President's Proclamation. By this act the Courts are paralyzed. Their powers and func-tions in the protection of human liberty cease. Pending proceedings fall to the ground. Hereafter there can be no in-quiry into the cause of imprisonment. *Sic volo sic jubeo.* The innocent and the guilty are huddled together in one common prison. Provost-Marshals and military agents are spread over the land in thousands. Their cupidity is stimu-lated by raising the reward for arresting a deserter from five dollars to thirty. If they were all honest, which *experience* disproves, they could not fail to make many mistakes. In identity alone, hun-dreds have already been made. But they are hurried off, handcuffed and fet-tered, to the loathsome prison. If you are drawn as a conscript, though you may not be within the ages of liability, though you are clearly, for any cause, exempt, the decision of the military board against you is conclusive. No Court is allowed to correct the error. Though it be the result of partisan ma-lice, and you be seventy years of age, you must submit to the wrong. The writ of deliverance for the innocent is gone. Such, fellow-citizens, is now the condition of this once free North.

I say "fellow-citizens," perhaps I ought to say "fellow-subjects.' But, though bound hand and foot, the peo-ple of the North are still struggling to be free. One year ago the Democratic State Convention denounced these arbi-trary arrests as "a usurpation and a crime," and a majority of the people sustained that denunciation by the elec-tion of Governor Seymour. With that able and intrepid champion of popular rights at the head of the State Govern-ment, we continue the struggle with confidence and hope. You well know how unequal is the contest. The whole power and patronage of the Federal Government are brought to bear against us. Federal office-holders, both civil and military, swarm over the land like the locusts of Egypt. Federal Generals abandon their appropriate field of duty to engage in partisan strife and preach abolition doctrines upon the stump. Shoddy contractors give largely of their suddenly acquired wealth to sustain this Administration at the polls, for the end of the war would terminate their pro-fits. Corruption stalks abroad at noon-day. The mercenary are purchased, while the timid are frightened. Yet, in the face of all this power, and patron-age, and terror, nearly two hundred thousand freemen of Ohio have boldly denounced the arrest of Mr. Vallandig-ham by Burnside, and his banishment by the President, "as a usurpation and a crime." And this has been done in spite of wide differences of opinion ex-isting between Mr. Vallandigham and many who supported him as to the policy of the war. Irrespective of such differences, the vote was due, and was given as a condemnation of an outrage upon personal liberty. Nearly two hun-dred thousand citizens deliberately re-buked the act of tyranny by their votes,

and the Administration rejoices beyond measure that it was not three hundred thousand. It well knows that the majority who voted in Ohio did not approve the act, for most of the leading Republican presses at the time admitted its illegality. *Intolerance* is a leading characteristic of the party in power. It repudiates the Jeffersonian doctrine, that "there is nothing to be feared from error while truth is left free to combat it." It would chain down the mind as well as the body. It denies the right of free discussion. Its presses teem with abuse of every Democrat who exercises the right of discussing public affairs. Following an imperial example, it compels whole regiments to vote in accordance with its will. Lieutenant Edgerly is stricken from the roll for voting the Democratic ticket, and in the same spirit, Secretary Stanton himself, with an impudence unparalleled, sends a telegram to Mr. Forney, on learning the result of the election in Pennsylvania, in which he charges, in substance, that the Democracy are rebels, like those driven from that State in June "with steel and cannon-shot." Shame upon such partisan injustice! It is a deliberate insult to the Democracy of the entire North, as well as of Pennsylvania. The head of the War Department can not so soon have forgotten the fervent appeals he made to the Democratic Governor of this State for aid in that emergency, nor the promptness with which it was furnished, nor the profusion of his thankfulness, expressed to Governor Seymour upon that occasion. Shame upon such ingratitude!

Let me be more specific on this point. On the fifteenth of June last, when the rebel army threatened Washington, Mr. Secretary Stanton, in his emergency, sent to Governor Seymour the following telegram:

"*To his Excellency Governor Seymour:*

"The movements of the rebel forces in Virginia are now sufficiently developed to show that General Lee, with his whole army, is moving forward to invade the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and other States.

"The President, to repel the invasion promptly, has called upon Ohio, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Western Virginia for one hundred thousand militia for six months, unless sooner discharged. It is important to have the largest possible force in the least possible time, and if other States would furnish militia for a short time, to be credited on the draft, it would greatly advance the object. Will you please inform me immediately if, in answer to a special call of the President, you can raise and forward say twenty thousand militia as volunteers, without bounty, to be credited in the draft of your State, or what number you can possibly raise?

"E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War.*"

Governor Seymour answered promptly in the affirmative, and immediately set about raising troops. Not a moment was lost. Regiments were on their way in a few hours, and on the same day the following telegram was received:

"*To Governor Seymour:*

"*The President directs me to return you his thanks, and those of the Department, for your prompt response.* A strong movement of *your city regiments* to Philadelphia would be a very encouraging movement, and do great good in giving strength to that State. The call had to be for six months, unless sooner discharged, in order to comply with the law. It is not likely that more than thirty days' service, perhaps not so long, would be required. *Can you forward your city regiments speedily?* Please reply early.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War."

You see what was asked of your city regiments, and the whole world knows how promptly they moved, and how gallantly they bore themselves in the field. They did indeed "give great strength to that State." Their example roused the slumbering energies of the people of Pennsylvania. It was the example and the effort of the citizen soldiers of your own city, thrown into the scale at the right moment and when it was nicely balanced, that enabled our army to make a successful stand against the invaders. I insist that there has been manifested nowhere else in the history of this war such promptness and energy as characterized the action of the Governor and his staff in this emergency. And so thought the President and Mr. Secretary Stanton. The latter wrote a letter to the Governor, expressing warmly his thanks, and also sent to the Adjutant-General of the State the following telegram:

JUNE 19, 1863.

To ADJUTANT-GENERAL SPRAGUE, S. N. G.:

The President directs me to return his thanks to his Excellency Governor Seymour, and his staff, for their energetic and prompt action. Whether

ny further force is likely to be required will be communicated to you to-morrow, by which time, is expected, the movements of the enemy will e more fully developed.

EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

The letter was as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, June 27.

DEAR SIR: I can not forbear expressing to you he deep obligation I feel for the prompt and can-id support you have given to the Government in he present emergency. The energy, activity, nd patriotism you have exhibited I may be per-itted personally and officially to acknowledge ithout arrogating any personal claims on my art to such service or to any service whatever.

I shall be happy always to be esteemed your riend, EDWIN M. STANTON.

His Excellency HORATIO SEYMOUR.

The following is the telegram sent on the 4th October instant to Mr. Forney:

To JOHN W. FORNEY, Esq.:

Thanks for your telegram. All honor to the Keystone State. She upheld the Federal arch in une, and with steel and cannon shot drove the ebel invaders from her soil; and now, in Octo-er, she has again rallied for the Union, and over-whelmed the foe at the ballot-box.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

I repeat, every word of this missive is a gross insult to the Democracy. Who upheld the Federal arch in June? Who drove the invaders from her soil? Was it done by Republicans alone? Ask the Democrats of New-York who hurried to the rescue and shed their blood upon the battle-field. Ask the Democrats of Pennsylvania who were there also. Were the persons overwhelmed at the ballot-box really the rebel foe as charged, or were they the Democrats of the State, who had borne their full share in repelling invasion? How much more truthfully Mr. Stanton could have said the Democracy of the State have been overwhelmed by the appliances of Federal power and patronage. Pray, how many thousands did Mr. Stanton send to Pennsylvania to help achieve the result? Let the depleted and retreating Army of the Potomac answer. This abuse of the Democracy of the North is becoming intolerable. The State of New-York has been especially singled out for misrepresentation and calumny. While it is confidently believed that far more than its just proportion of troops have been claimed and furnished from this State, the Democracy of the State, with its Democratic Governor at its head, are charged with interposing obstacles to the prosecution of the war. The truth is carefully concealed from the public. It has not been permitted to know as the fact is, that about sixteen thousand volunteers have been furnished to the General Government by the State since Governor Seymour was inaugurated, on the first day of January last. And this is in addition to the fourteen thousand five hundred troops sent to the rescue when Pennsylvania was invaded; whereas, all the General Government has raised from the State under the Conscription law, including substitutes, is, up to this time, less than six thousand. Pray, what States of the Union, under abolition rule, has done so well, proportionably, in raising volunteer troops, as this State of New-York, under Democratic auspices? And yet the Democracy are stigmatized by the abolition press as "Copperheads and traitors," and by the head of the War Department they are classed with the "rebel foe." Rebuke such intolerance at the ballot-box. Let the Administration "call off its dogs" from the Northern Democrats, and give its whole energies to the putting down of the rebellion. The time, and money, and men, and effort devoted to controlling the Northern elections would, if properly concentrated and applied, have subdued the rebellion long ago. The Democrats have interposed no obstacle to a successful prosecution of the war. On the contrary, they have aided in men and voluntary offerings to an extent, it is believed, far beyond what those have done who are responsible for bringing this Administration into power and bringing on the war. I appeal to the experience and observation of citizens throughout the State to prove that, in the raising of more than 230,000 volunteers in this State, the Democracy were everywhere most active and efficient. Without their earnest coöperation, it could never have been accomplished. We complain that the war is not prosecuted to a speedy termination. We complain that its object and purposes are perverted to partisan ends. A war waged for the single purpose of suppressing the rebellion and restoring the Union would have ended long ago. A war for the extermination of slavery will be interminable. We complain that the President has forfeited his pledge as to the object and mode of prosecuting the war, and has surrendered himself to the influence of the most radical abolitionists, thus repelling the cordial support of conservative men of the North, and driving the South together into one solid column of resistance. The President said, in his inaugural address: "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery where it exists. I believe I have no right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so."

In palpable violation of this pledge, he said, at a later day, in his Emancipation Proclamation: "I order and declare that all per

sons held as slaves in the said designated States and parts of States, are and hereafter shall be free." The party in power pledged itself, by the adoption in Congress of the Crittenden resolutions, that the war should be prosecuted only for the restoration of the Union. This idea was long ago abandoned, and the purpose of subjugation is now openly avowed. In June last, General Butler, in a speech made at a partisan assemblage at Concord, New-Hampshire, declared the States in which rebellion exists to be foreign States, and advocated their entire subjugation — their reduction to the condition of conquered Territories — and the extermination of slavery. He swings, like the pendulum of a clock, from one extreme to the other. Wearing the uniform of the Union, and enjoying its pay, he recognizes the sovereignty of but the Northern part of it. He places himself upon the platform of Wendell Phillips, and Sumner, and Chandler, and the rest of that company of radical abolitionists who induced the President to violate his inaugural pledge and issue his Emancipation Proclamation, and whose machinations for the continuance of the war beyond the limit of a restoration of the Union, excite the alarm even of the more conservative members of the Cabinet, as we may judge from the recent speech of the Postmaster-General. General Butler's argument is a *felo de se*. To hold those States to be foreign States concedes the validity of their acts of secession. It takes away from us our right to subdue rebellion, and places us in the false position of unjustifiable invaders. It puts us in the wrong and makes us the aggressors; for if the States had a right to secede, we have no right to controvert their acts. General Butler thus places himself upon the rebel side of the question, and assumes a position palpably untenable. We hold the acts of secession to be void. The States have never gone out of the Union, and so Mr. Lincoln admitted in one of his messages to Congress. People, not States are in rebellion. The people in rebellion are to be subdued, and we have a right to subject them to the Constitution and the laws, because they have not the power to take their States out of the Union. The States are still in existence, with their State organizations and laws, with every right reserved at the formation of the Union. Let the people return to their allegiance, and let the States and the people again claim their representation in the national councils, and we may once more move on in harmony. Profiting by past lessons of sad experience, we may learn to avoid sectional controversies in the future. The indomitable energy and courage displayed on both sides will increase their mutual respect for each other. Reünited, they may once more share in the glory of a common ancestry, a common language, and a common destiny. A corrected public sentiment would exclude from the councils of the nation the extreme fanatics, both of the North and South, whose evil councils have brought on us all our national ills. Time will stamp their memories with a common infamy. Why may not this nation yet hope to be united, prosperous, and happy, and to move on with a vigor and strength not likely to be again weakened by domestic broils? *We can not, under any circumstances, consent to disunion.* To prevent it, we should exert the whole power of the Government, and should make every honorable effort at conciliation. It is believed that, even now, States are ready to return if they could be protected in all their rights under the Constitution. But the radical policy that unfortunately controls the Administration, is not willing to receive them. It demands more — subjugation — the obliteration of existing State lines and a dependent Territorial condition. It demands the extinction of slavery. It demands what will never be yielded, but what will protract the war indefinitely. It will be a long time before even the desolation and human suffering, falling now chiefly upon the women and children of the South, and at all times upon the loyal as well as the rebellious, can be the successful means of exacting such degrading terms.

Fellow-Citizens, our remedy for all these wrongs is at the ballot-box, and we must submit patiently till we can obtain redress by constitutional and lawful means. We respect and uphold the Constitution and the laws, and we complain of their violation by the party in power. The road to redress is still open to us. Federal bayonets have not yet, in this State, been suffered to drive us from the ballot-box. We have a ticket in nomination worthy of your cordial support. Its election would go far in its influence toward giving a proper direction to the war, and toward securing a restoration of our violated personal liberties. Moderate and conservative men of all parties should see how deeply the country is interested in our success, and coöperate with us. It will require all your efforts, all your watchfulness, to meet and guard against the corrupt appliances of a reckless Administration. *See, then, that not one vote is lost.* A single vote may decide this great struggle between power and the rights of the people, and may be the means of inaugurating a wiser national policy.

Rally, then, to the rescue. Arrest the encroachments of arbitrary power. Rebuke intolerance. Bring back the Administration to the path of duty. Hasten the time for the restoration of the Union and the termination of the war.

SPEECH BY HON. SANFORD E. CHURCH,

AT

BATAVIA, OCTOBER 13, 1863.

FELLOW-CITIZENS:

You are assembled at a very critical and important period in the history of the country. Never before within your recollection and mine have interests so vast been at stake. In my judgment it is the duty now of every citizen to devote himself to National affairs. Questions of the most momentous character are crowding upon us with such rapidity that we are in danger of becoming bewildered and neglecting to discharge those duties which in a free government devolve upon the people, and which can not now be neglected without endangering the Government itself.

All questions which have heretofore agitated parties and arrayed men upon opposite sides, as important as they have sometimes been regarded, sink into utter insignificance when compared with the issues of the present moment—issues upon the determination of which depend the future destinies of the country. The glorious Union, constructed by our fathers, and cemented with their blood, and the free institutions secured by it, are now trembling upon the verge of destruction, and can only be rescued and saved by the dispassionate and patriotic efforts of all the people. In our action as citizens, at this time, we should lay aside all our partisan feeling and prejudice. If the election involved only the question whether one class of men or another was to fill the offices, we might allow our fancy, and even our passions and prejudices, full play, without endangering constitutional and vital interests. It is of slight moment to the mass of the people whether one man or another is chosen to discharge the duties of a particular office. The State offices would be reasonably well filled by the election of either ticket in the field, and so far as the particular duties of such officers are concerned, it would matter but little which was elected. But I regard the election this fall as vitally important, on account of the influence it will have in restoring our distracted country to its original vigor and usefulness, and in determining the future policy of the government with reference to it, and it will be my purpose to ascertain what the real issue to be decided by the people is, and what questions every citizen should examine and determine for himself, before he deposits his ballot.

For two and a half years we have been engaged in a civil war for which history furnishes *no parallel*. When the war commenced and became an existing fact, I deemed it my duty to sustain the Government, and to the extent of my influence and means I have labored (with what success, I leave others to decide) to furnish the Government with all the men and money necessary to crush the Rebellion and restore the legitimate authority of the nation. I occupy the same position to-day. So long as men are arrayed against the rightful authority of the Government, with arms in their hands, there is no other course to pursue but to meet them with force.

Whatever our views may be upon the causes which led to this terrible strife, and whatever blame we believe justly attaches to extreme men of the North, still the attempt forcibly to break down the authority of the Constitution over the whole country for fancied or real grievances, was an unlawful and criminal act which can not be justified or tolerated; while to admit the right of secession is to give up the supreme authority of the Government, even as to the powers expressly conferred upon it. Nor am I in favor of any peace based upon a separation. I will never consent to any but a country reünited and restored.

In expressing these views I but reïterate the sentiments of the Democratic party. At a convention recently held in Albany, composed of representatives of the highest character, ability, and patriotism from every Assembly District in the State, the following resolution was *unanimously* adopted:

Resolved, That we reäffirm the platform adopted by the Democratic Convention of 1862, namely:

First. That we will continue to render the Government our sincere and united support in the use of all legitimate means to suppress the rebellion and to restore the Union as it was, and to maintain the Constitution as it is—believing that that sacred instrument, founded in wisdom by our Fathers, clothes the constituted authorities with full power to accomplish such purpose.

Nor have the members of the Democratic party in their individual action been wanting in energy and effectiveness in supplying the calls of the Government. Whenever men were wanted, a full equal portion have been given from the ranks of that party. Every battle-field will attest the bravery and patriotism of members of the Democratic party.

Whenever money was called for, they have opened their coffers and furnished the required sum. Without receiving or desiring the patronage of the Administration, and without any selfish motives except such as result from a desire to enjoy the blessings of a free government, they have, at all times and under all circumstances, evinced a readiness to aid in carrying on the war and restoring the country.

I make these remarks merely to say, that upon this question there is no issue. You will find occasionally a man so wedded to

party and so blinded by passion or prejudice, as to denounce Democrats as copperheads and traitors; but I have found from considerable political experience, that epithets applied to an adversary never injure him, nor benefit those who employ them. The history of the world does not furnish a parallel to the unity of action exhibited in the Northern States, in sustaining this Administration in all its legitimate demands, and whenever an impartial history shall be written of those who have participated in the conflict, its brightest page will contain the unselfish and patriotic action of those against whom these epithets are hurled.

Those who claim that there is any issue upon this question of maintaining the authority of the Government, are either thoroughly deceived or are attempting to deceive others. Still more false and deceptive is the pretense which I see extensively put forth by public speakers and by the press, that there has been something in the action or sayings of Governor Seymour which ought to influence people in determining their action at the polls. I have examined several of their statements, and have failed to find a single specific charge made or a single act specified, and I therefore conclude that the general clamor on that subject is set up to hide the real questions that are at issue, and prevent, if possible, a consideration of them by the people. Governor Seymour quelled the riot in New-York before it became necessary to declare martial law, and he made an effort to obtain from the Administration at Washington, the privilege of furnishing men by volunteering instead of drafting, and he endeavored to secure to our State the credits to which it was entitled, by reason of having furnished an excess over Massachusetts and other States, on previous calls; and when a neighboring State was invaded, he promptly sent more soldiers to its defense than all the other Northern States combined, and confessedly contributed to, if he did not secure, the defeat of the rebel forces at Gettysburgh.

If these acts were in controversy in this election, I should feel entirely confident in submitting them to the determination of the people; but I fully agree with the New-York *Herald*, when it reminded these gentlemen that *Gov. Seymour* was elected in 1862, and that we have entered upon a new campaign with issues belonging to it.

No, fellow-citizens! the questions for you to answer are of a different character entirely, and you should allow no false issues and subterfuges to interfere with their proper determination. What, then, are the issues of the present campaign?

When the war was commenced, the President solemnly pledged the country, that it should be prosecuted for the restoration of the Union and the maintenance of the Constitution. The theory proclaimed to the people was, that the act of secession did not dissolve the Union, nor dissever the lawful connection between the States seceding and the other States; that the rebellion only suspended for the time being the authority of the Government, and that when that was restored, the States could then rightfully exercise all the powers and privileges appertaining to them under the Constitution.

When our army was defeated at the battle of Bull Run, and driven back into the very streets of Washington, a Republican Congress, under the advice of a Republican President, placed upon the records of the country, a resolution (which passed almost unanimously) reiterating, in the most authentic and solemn manner, the pledge before given by the President, and declaring the purposes and objects of the war.

I will now read to you the resolution, and I beg that you will ponder its words and import:

"*Resolved*, That the present deplorable civil war has been brought upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States now in arms against the Constitutional Government, and in arms around the Capital; that in this national emergency, Congress, banishing all feelings of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged, on their part, in any spirit of oppression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States; but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

If the distinguished and lamented Kentuckian who penned and introduced this resolution had never done any other act worthy of public attention, the truthful and constitutional sentiments, and the glowing, patriotic words embodied in it, with the noble motives which prompted its introduction, would have been sufficient to immortalize his name and cause his memory to be cherished to the latest posterity.

Under these pledges, a million and a half of our young men have left their homes and all the endearments of home and friends, and enlisted under the banner of their country. Untold millions of treasure have been freely sacrificed by the people. They have been willing to give every thing—to sacrifice every thing, and only demanded the restoration of their country and the preservation of our free institutions.

Are these pledges being fulfilled? I answer, No. On the contrary, they have been and are being shamefully violated and disregarded. No sooner are our armies victorious in the field of battle, giving promise of a restored country, than the cloven foot of

abolitionism reveals itself, and the whole purpose and objects of the war are avowedly changed. It is now deliberately proclaimed that the war is not to be prosecuted "to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution," nor "to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired," but to destroy the Southern States and strike them out of existence—to subjugate their people, and desolate their country, and destroy their institutions. I do not make this charge against all the members of the Republican party. The great body of them I believe to be as honest and patriotic as any other class of citizens, and I believe that they have no wish to become aiders and abettors to this new programme which has been promulgated by their leaders; but it is expected that the force of party discipline will be sufficient to insure their support. We shall see.

I wish to be distinctly understood. I charge the radical and abolition leaders of the Republican party, who control its action and the action of the Administration, with the deliberate design to adopt and carry out a series of measures, the effect and object of which is to subvert the Union, and not to restore it—to overthrow the Constitution, and not to preserve it, and to carry on this war until these purposes have been accomplished, regardless of all consequences.

These measures consist in an attempt to subjugate the Southern States and reduce them to territories; and to absorb, centralize, and consolidate the rights and powers of the loyal States in the General Government. I make this charge in no spirit of party feeling or animosity, but with a solemn conviction of its truth, and of the duty of every citizen to sound the alarm before it is too late to prevent its consummation, and I would be the last to make it upon slight or unsatisfactory evidence. It is with feelings of sadness that I aver that the evidence to sustain this charge is overwhelming—a portion of which only I shall have time to present this evening. Charles Sumner has, perhaps, promulgated this scheme in the most authentic form. He occupies a prominent, if not a controlling influence in the Administration and the Republican party. In a recent article in the *Atlantic Monthly* he puts forth deliberately the proposition that Congress should assume jurisdiction over the seceded States, hold them as territories, establish provisional governments over them, or make their "admission or recognition depend upon the action of Congress." He says: "*The essential feature of the proposition is that Congress shall assume jurisdiction of the rebel States.*" Which he explains to mean that Congress shall take and hold those States as conquered provinces or territories until the people will consent to ask to come into the Union with such Constitutions as Congress shall dictate and accept, and intimates that when the people ask to come into the Union without slavery, Massachusetts may be willing to admit them. In the mean time Massachusetts would be willing to control the political power of the country, and to superintend generally the affairs of the world. Similar views have been expressed by the Washington *Chronicle*, which claims to be the official organ of the Administration, and the *Missouri Democrat*, the leading radical organ of the West, and other leading Administration organs.

Mr. Whiting, Solicitor of the War Department, in a recent opinion elaborately written, with the approbation, as we are bound to presume, of the head of that Department and the President himself, declares that when the Southern people cease fighting and lay down their arms, still they can not return to the Union, except upon such terms as Congress shall dictate, and that they should not be permitted to return until they consented to change their Constitutions and abolish slavery. This paragraph will give us the substance of his opinion:

"If the inhabitants of a large part of the Union have, by becoming public enemies, surrendered and annulled their former rights, the question arises, can they recover them? *Such rights can not be regained by reason of their having ceased to fight.* The character of a public enemy having once been stamped upon them by the laws of war, remains fixed *until it shall have been by our consent removed.*"

The New-York *Tribune*, with its widely-extended circulation, is understood to be the New-York organ of the radicals, and it has scarcely attempted to conceal its opposition to the restoration of the Union. Even before the war broke out, the *Tribune* advocated the policy of allowing the seceded States to separate. It contained the following sentiment:

"Whenever it shall be clear that the great body of the Southern people have become conclusively alienated from the Union, and anxious to escape from it, WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO FORWARD THEIR VIEWS."

It now advocates the new policy of subjugation, and of carrying on the war for the abolition of slavery. Next to Wendell Phillips, Mr. Greeley is unquestionably the most open and determined disunionist in the country.

Thad. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, a leading member of the House of Representatives, and of course in the confidence of the Administration, said:

"This talk of restoring the Union as it was under the Constitution as it is, is one of the absurdities which I have heard repeated until I have become about sick of it. The Union can never be restored as it was. There are many things which render such an event

impossible. This Union never shall, with my consent, be restored under the Constitution as it is, with slavery to be protected by it."

M. F. Conway, a member of Congress from Kansas, and a leader in the Republican party, in a letter written in May last, stated:

"As to the Union, I would not give a cent for it unless it stood as a guarantee for freedom to every man, woman, and child within its entire jurisdiction. I consider the idea that every thing must be sacrificed to the Union utterly preposterous. What was the Union made for? That we should sacrifice ourselves to it? I, for one, would beg to be excused. *As things stand, I would sacrifice the Union to Freedom any morning before breakfast.*"

These sentiments are now being avowed and advocated in every section of the country.

Mr. HAMLIN, the Vice-President of the United States, in a recent speech, avowed the same sentiments.

At the recent Republican State Convention of Massachusetts, which renominated Governor Andrew, these disloyal sentiments were firmly and boldly promulgated. I will read a paragraph from the speech of Governor Boutwell on that occasion, which is a fair sample of all the others:

"He said that a State could only exist by the will of the people within its limits, and that by adopting ordinances of secession the rebellious States have given up their organization under the Union. But the Federal Government had a prior authority over the people and the territory of each State, which can only be restrained by force. Wherever our armies penetrate, that power is asserted, and the people must remain under the guardianship of the Federal authorities until unconditional Union men shall form a new State government, and ask for readmission to the Union. When that time should come, he would make it a condition precedent upon their readmission that they should come in as Free States."

To show how the sentiments of this convention are regarded by its friends, I will read a paragraph from the correspondent of the New-York *Tribune* in relation to it:

"In their admirable speeches, Wilson and Boutwell, Dana and Elliott, ranged themselves fully alongside of Phillips and Garrison, and the convention, with united and enthusiastic voices, said Amen!"

Who are Phillips and Garrison? The former an avowed disunionist, and the latter always declared that the Constitution was a *covenant with hell!* and the Massachusetts Republicans have confessedly ranged themselves alongside of them on this subject, and Massachusetts has to-day a more controlling influence over the Administration than all the other Northern States.

General Butler, in a recent speech in Pennsylvania, declared that he was opposed to the reconstruction of the Union as it was, and he was ordered into that State to make these speeches under the full pay of a *Major-General.* These are only samples of an innumerable number of authoritative expressions, establishing the fact that a wide-spread conspiracy exists against the Union, and that an effort is to be made to use the Republican organization to carry it out. The Republican organization in this State is under the control of the revolutionists. At the recent State Convention held at Syracuse, an independent resolution was introduced, indorsing the emancipation proclamation. The principal speaker declared the object of this resolution in the following language:

"Sir, as a member of the old Republican party, I stand here to say, representing my constituents, that I believe the additional resolution is necessary, in order to avoid the possible construction of the resolutions already adopted, that we are ready to let these men come back into the Union with the institution of slavery guaranteed."

And although it was insisted that there were many members of the party who were not prepared to adopt this new policy, yet the radical majority adopted it.

To show that I do not misstate this abolition programme, I will read a paragraph or two from a speech recently made by MONTGOMERY BLAIR, a member of the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln:

"But even while we are indulging these well founded hopes that our country is saved from destruction by the rebellion, we are menaced by the ambition of the ultra-abolitionists, which is equally despotic in its tendencies, and which, if successful, could not fail to be alike fatal to Republican institutions."

. . . "The abolition programme assumes, on the contrary, that, because violence has trodden down State governments and State rights, they have ceased to exist; that a loyal people, in whom they still survive and have being, and to whom the United States stands pledged to guarantee them forever, must also have perished; and that a congress of the other States may step in and take absolute authority over the whole region as vacated States and Territories, and legislate for it, founding this new usurpation upon fictions as absurd as those on which the rebellion founds itself."

In the State of Missouri, the radical party have progressed farther than in any other State, and have arrived almost at the brink of a war of extermination against all who do not subscribe to their fanatical heresies.

Frank Blair, who is a Republican member of Congress, and a Brigadier-General in General Grant's army, in a recent speech at St. Louis, felt himself called upon to denounce these radicals as enemies of their country. I will read a paragraph from his speech to show you how Republicans who are not abolitionists are becoming alarmed at the monstrous

strides toward usurpation and despotism which the leaders of the party are everywhere making:

"And yet these men, while they openly avow that they are conspiring against this Government, turn round and coolly inform you that they are the only *loyal* men in the State; and the men who came back grimed all over with powder from our battle-fields, where they have been endeavoring to uphold the banner of our country and maintain the laws and Constitution in the face of the open foe—these men, when they come back here, are denounced by these upstart factionists as *Copperheads*. (Laughter and applause.) There is not the slightest difference of opinion tolerated by them. If there is a variation of a hair's breadth—if a man attempts to say one single thing that differs with the plan which they have laid down for exterminating all these Southern States—why he is denounced at once; not as men with political differences are usually denounced—they do not call upon the people and let them know that his opinions are dangerous, unsound, and unwise, but they denounce him as a *Copperhead*, by which they mean he is a man against the Government of the United States, although he may be a man who has exposed his life over and over again in defense of that Government."

You will not fail to observe that the epithet of *Copperhead* is applied to all, whether Democrats or Republicans, who do not vote the abolition disunion ticket and support to the fullest extent the abolition radical doctrines.

Now I propose to call Thurlow Weed to the stand as a witness. He has had a full opportunity to form a correct judgment. He is undoubtedly as familiar with the political history of the country and with public men as any living man, and I will do him the justice to say that I believe he is at heart a friend to the Union, and desires to see it restored. I will give you his words, deliberately written:

"I desire to make this record: If it comes to be understood that the views and policy of Messrs. Sumner, Greeley, Wendell Phillips, Ward Beecher, etc., etc., obtain in the conduct of the war, IT WILL RESULT IN THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR GOVERNMENT AND UNION, AND A TRIUMPH OF REBELLION AND SLAVERY."

How Mr. Weed can continue even a nominal connection with an organization controlled by men whom he denounces as enemies of the country, I am at loss to comprehend. But we know that he is right in the opinion I have read. You and I and every man knows that ten or twelve States can only be held in subjection by military despotism, and that the exercise of this despotism over the subjugated States, will render it a necessity to exercise military power over the other States. It will require a large standing army and a ruinous system of taxation. The idea of enjoying the institutions of our fathers—the liberty they fought for and bequeathed to us, under a Government holding one-third of its people in military subjugation, is too absurd to require illustration. When this doctrine shall prevail, and subjugation be consummated, we shall have seen the last day of American freedom. But it is sometimes said that Mr. Lincoln has not avowed himself in favor of this scheme, and although all the appliances of party machinery are in favor of it, yet he may be opposed to it. Well, I have no disposition to speak harshly of Mr. Lincoln, but the truth should be told. Mr. Lincoln is a negative man. He is operated upon. He moves by outward pressure, and not by internal power. It was said that he was opposed to the emancipation proclamation; indeed he said so himself, and yet he issued it upon radical pressure. Gov. Andrew declared that the highways of Massachusetts would swarm with soldiers if that was issued, and Greeley declared that 900,000 men would rush to the field with two muskets each, and although they procured the proclamation by these means, not one Greeley man has been known to have even one musket, and not a swarm in a Massachusetts highway has been seen except when the conscripts were going to swear to their physical inability to perform military duty. The President frankly told a committee of Border State men that he could not yield to their wishes lest he should lose the support of the radicals; and I assert that in every single instance where the test has been made, the radical or abolition wing of the party has prevailed with the President.

They demanded the removal of McClellan after the peninsular campaign, and it was done. When the army of the Potomac were driven back upon Washington, defeated and demoralized, and the Capitol was in imminent danger, he was restored, but after he had fought and won a brilliant victory with undisciplined and defeated troops at Antietam and drove the invaders from Maryland, and when in full march and in face of the enemy, upon the demand of the radicals, he was again removed, and what is most significant, the removal was made on the morning after the election in New-York in 1862, when the Democratic party was triumphant

The radicals demanded a sweeping confiscation act, which Senator Collamer, of Vermont, and other Republican Senators declared unconstitutional, and they got it.

They demanded emancipation and they got it.

When citizens from Louisiana asked the privilege of electing officers under the State constitution, the President substantially declined to allow it, intimating that their constitution would be changed or altered.

The citizens of North-Carolina and other seceded States have recently evinced a disposition to return to the Union and enjoy the benefits of their own Constitution, under the

protection of the Government. Has there been any disposition on the part of the President to allow them to do so? Not the slightest. I have not the slightest doubt but large numbers of the people of the South would rejoice to assume again their position in the Union. Are they encouraged to do so? So far from it, Mr. Lincoln informs them and the rest of mankind, that his proclamation is "valid or invalid." It certainly does not require the President to issue an official document to make a man of ordinary comprehension understand that the proclamation, like every other instrument, is *either valid or invalid.* But the people of North-Carolina and other States have become tired of the tyranny exercised over them, and are longing to return to their allegiance to the Union, and with uplifted hands and anxious hearts, they desire to know of Mr. Lincoln whether he regards the proclamation as of any force or power beyond the actual duration of the war. They wish to know how his administration regard it. What they intend to claim. For the people of these States know, as we all do, that courts even are influenced by outside pressure and partisan clamor, and they ask Mr. Lincoln, I repeat, to say what course he intends to pursue, and the only response is: "It is either valid or invalid." What encouragement have the people of the seceded States to attempt even to return to the Union? As matters now stand, there is confiscation to take all their property, emancipation to take their negroes, a test oath to prevent their holding office in the Union, and a treason act to hang them. With these alternatives, I do not think that many will voluntarily return.

These facts furnish conclusive evidence to my mind that Mr. Lincoln either entertains these views of subjugation, or that he is under the control of those who do. There are but two modes of dealing with the fanatics. You must either yield to their views and wishes in every point, or be denounced by them, and as Mr. Lincoln has thus far not dared to disagree with them, and has thus far yielded in the end to all their demands, I conclude that he will continue to do so.

In addition to a subjugation of the Southern States, it is designed, as I have already stated, to consolidate all the power of the loyal States in the General Government, and in this scheme Mr. Lincoln has been a prominent actor. I have been amazed at the strides toward consolidated power made by this administration.

The conscription act authorizes the exercise of power directly from the Government to the individual, overlooking State authority and individual influence. The banking scheme is another and far more dangerous exercise of power. The conscription act, however unwise as a policy, may be technically constitutional under the power "to raise armies," but the banking law has no warrant in the Constitution. Nor is it pretended to be a "war measure," or that any "war necessity" existed for it. On the contrary, it was evidently the intention, under the pressure of the times, to fasten this scheme upon the country as a permanent institution. It is designed to wipe out all State banks and center in Washington all the monied interests of the Nation. The people of the United States struggled long under the leadership of that great and good man, Gen. Jackson, to eradicate the United States Bank, because it was deemed dangerous to our free institutions to give the Government control of the monetary interests of the nation, but this scheme is far worse than that. This destroys State banks, and places all banking operations under control of the officers of the government not only, but subjects the business of the country to the fitful and uncertain policy of those who happen to be in power. Besides, it will depreciate the stocks of the several States which now form the basis of banking, and throw upon the people an additional burden of hundreds of millions. Moreover, it establishes a precedent of the most dangerous character. If these institutions can be thus obliterated by National legislation, every other State institution may be. Our system of internal improvement, our schools, in short, every State interest, may become absorbed in the general Government. Federalism of the olden time would blush at such centralism as is now contended for.

But the crowning act of infamy is the late suspension of the *Habeas Corpus.* Heretofore we have rested secure under the shield of the Constitution and the protection of the laws. We could gather around our hearthstones in security, and retire at night confident that the unseen but potent shield would guard and protect us and our families and homes from invasion and violence. With a single stroke of the pen this writ of protection to personal liberty has been suspended, and for the time being obliterated. And why has it been done? No man can tell us a reason — no man has attempted to give a reason for it. I have inquired of officials, high and low, why this extraordinary act has been done, and no explanation has been or could be given. There was no reason for it. It was an unnecessary act of despotism. The courts, so far from evincing a disposition to thwart the action of the Government, have been over-cautious, and the State Judges, so far as my observations have extended, have fallen far short of maintaining State authority and individual liberty in a laudable desire not to obstruct the action of the Government in the present crisis.

But we are told that no *loyal man* will be injured. No *loyal man* injured! Who is to decide on my loyalty or yours? Why, the officer who makes the arrest, and if, in his opinion, we have interfered in word, act, or deed with the military or naval service, he is authorized to act as judge, jury, and execu-

ioner. It is enough if men *may* be injured. What is a government worth which does not furnish protection to its people? They have a right to demand a fixed and affirmative rule of protection, and will not tolerate a system which places them at the mercy of petty officials.

But *loyal* people are injured and outraged every day by the suspension of this writ. Repeated instances have taken place within a few days of arrests of persons as deserters who have either never been enlisted or been honorably discharged, and they have been dragged into a military camp and confined for days and weeks. I know of one instance where a man who had been discharged was arrested three different times by different officers and taken into the army, and each time the officer received his reward. If your own son who had been in the army, and, it may be, passed through all the battles of the Potomac, should, after being honorably discharged, be arrested as a deserter, you would think that he ought to have an opportunity to bring the question before a court. The writ of *habeas corpus* simply allows a party to go into court and inquire why he is restrained from his liberty. If good cause is shown, he is remanded to custody; if not, he is discharged. A recruiting officer may enlist your boy, fourteen years of age, in violation of an act of Congress, and you have no civil remedy. There is no outrage upon personal liberty which may not be committed. The country literally swarms with officers of the Government, paid by taxation, and outrages are being and will be perpetrated.

I have called your attention, fellow-citizens, to these acts and schemes for the purpose of inducing you to examine the subject, and see where we are drifting. If we change our Union, tell me what kind of a Union we shall have? If we change the essential features of our Government, who can tell what our Government will be? If we override our Constitution, who is wise enough to tell us what will be substituted? If we strike ten from the bright galaxy of stars composing our Union, what power will ever restore them or give them vital action? If we commence to change our institutions, there will be no end but anarchy and despotism.

You have often heard it said, that free government was an experiment. The experiment consists in determining whether a people will permanently abide by the laws of a written constitution. In quiet and prosperous times, we would scarcely need a constitution at all. It is when adversity comes upon us — when temptation allures or necessity exists, that restrictions in organic laws are in danger of being violated. Written constitutions are of no value; they are worse than useless, except they are sufficient to restrain acts which we desire to perform.

The controlling influences of the Republican party have inaugurated all these measures and carried them through, and have besides infused into the whole body of the Republican leaders the poison of Abolitionism. They control the party and the Administration. In every State where the election has resulted in favor of the Republicans, the result has been claimed as a verdict in favor of the subjugation and consolidation policy, and, if this State should so result, it would be used as a tremendous "pressure" upon Mr. Lincoln and his administration in the same direction.

Now, fellow-citizens, I say that any man who is in favor of protracting this war one day beyond the time when the Union may be restored, is an enemy to his country. I have heard it said that the war has brought prosperity with it; but it is not a legitimate and permanent prosperity. We are in a state of unnatural exhilaration which will ultimately prove fatal to every business interest. The drunken man, reeling and staggering through the streets, imagines himself the richest man in the world, but when the artificial stimulus is gone he sinks into degradation and despair, and this is our condition now. By artificial means the business interests of the country are greatly inflated, but it will as certainly become depressed as that effect will follow cause.

A legalized irredeemable paper currency is the greatest curse which can afflict a people. It enriches the few, but it impoverishes the many. It pampers the idle, while it degrades the industrious, and the apparent benefits which it confers are most delusive and deceptive.

I am opposed to this whole scheme, because I know it will result in the destruction of the Union and the overthrow of the Constitution.

Subjugation, in my judgment, is impossible, and its attempt will procrastinate the war interminably. If it is possible, it is not desirable, because it would necessarily inaugurate despotism.

Whilst we will sacrifice all for the Union, we can not afford to continue this war for the visionary purpose of abolishing slavery, or the criminal purpose of experimenting for a change in our institutions.

No man in this administration dares to inform us what the amount of our present indebtedness is. The reports of the Secretary of the Treasury are utterly unsatisfactory on this point. I have endeavored from all the light I can obtain to estimate this indebtedness, and I maintain the opinion that if this war shall close during the present fiscal year, it will not be less than three thousand millions of dollars! I think it will be more, but I am sure it can not be less. I arrive at this conclusion from the known expenses of maintaining men in the field—from the reports of the Treasury Department—the estimates of Mr. Spaulding, Chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means of the last House of Repre-

sentatives, and the authorized statements emenating from Washington from time to time during the war.

Of this sum NewYork would be liable, if the Union was restored with the original wealth of the seceded States, for about one ninth, or more than $330,000,000! the annual interest on which is nearly twenty millions of dollars.

This indebtedness is about one quarter of all the taxable property of the country before the war. The proportion of this debt for the county of Genesee is about four millions of dollars, the interest on which is two hundred and forty thousand dollars, which you will be required to pay annually in some form. In fact, the amount to be paid by New-York will be much larger, because the property in the South has been largely reduced during the war. I have estimated at the lowest figure.

Besides, after the war has ceased, the annual expenses of the Government can not be less than $150,000,000. Assuming that we may realize $50,000,000 by Customs, it will leave two hundred millions to be raised by taxation, and if New-York pays only one ninth, it will add more than ten millions to the annual tax of the State, so that for interest alone upon our portion of the National debt, and of our portion of the annual expenses we shall be obliged to pay more than thirty millions annually, which is equal to our whole State debt, and this sum, remember, is in addition to State, County, and Municipal taxes.

The national debt of England is only about $3,400,000,000, and their taxable property is more than double the amount of ours, while their rate of interest upon the public debt is only three per cent, or half the amount of ours; so that while our debt is nominally $400,000,000 less than theirs, it is practically in its burdens upon the nation much larger.

I do not speak of these things because we should falter in the least to make this sacrifice, and much more, if necessary, to restore the Union, but shall we, ought we to do it, to further the views of the Abolitionists?

The burden of all taxation falls upon labor. The farmer, mechanic, and laboring men and all professional men suffer heavily, while taxation grinds the poor to the earth. What is it that literally enslaves one half the population of Great Britain and compels them to work from early morn till late at night for a scanty subsistence? They have a fine climate, good soil, and excel in manufactures, and they boast of a free constitution. Why, then, this degradation? It is because of the oppressive taxes which fall upon the back of labor. Heretofore, in this country, we have been comparatively free from taxation, and labor has received its reward and had the benefit of it.

If you take from the laboring man a portion of his earnings, which are necessary for the comfortable support of himself and family, you detract from his independence as a man and a citizen, and, therefore, the mock philantropists, in their fruitless efforts to liberate three millions of black slaves, will make ten millions of white slaves, and entail upon posterity degradation, misery, and crime.

I beg that you will bear in mind, also, that by an act of Congress the stocks of the Government are made exempt from all taxation. One quarter of all taxable property is thus withdrawn from liability, and its burden cast upon the remainder. Those who have money can invest it in Government securities, and then escape all the burdens of Government, while the farmer's lands and the home of the mechanic and laboring man must bear the burden which belongs to their more fortunate neighbor.

But I have already detained you too long, and I can not pursue the subject further.

I ask you to determine at the ballot-box, whether your influence shall be thrown in favor of this monstrous scheme of subjugation and consolidation. I put this question not only to Democrats and conservative men, but to those who have heretofore acted with the Republicans; and I am gratified to see many of them here to-night. Are you willing, in behalf of yourselves and your families, to try this new experiment? Are you in favor of carrying on this war for the visionary purpose of abolishing slavery, when its effect will certainly be to destroy the free institutions under which you have enjoyed so many blessings? Shall the influence of New-York be thrown in the scale of subjugation and disunion? Before you deposit your ballot for this destructive policy, consult your wives and children. Tell them that we have so far overcome the military power of the rebel States that an opportunity is afforded, by conciliation with the Union men of the South, to restore the old Union and maintain the Constitution, but that it is now proposed by the radical leaders to go farther, and carry on the war for the ostensible purpose of abolishing slavery, but really with the design of changing the whole character of the Government itself. Tell them that one quarter of all you possess is already mortgaged for the expenses of the war, and that this new scheme will not only encumber your property to a much greater extent, but will be a never-ending burden upon the industry and energies—nay, upon the very bones and muscles of your children!

I feel an abiding confidence that New-York will cast her imperial influence in the right direction. Whatever other States may do, our own Empire State will stand firm and true. Let others yield if they will, but let us stand firm, and we shall have the proud consolation of having rescued our beloved land from its enemies at the South and its enemies at the North.

DEBTS, TAXES,

AND THE

PERMANENT CONSEQUENCES

TO

FARMERS AND MECHANICS.

The permanent war debt of England is a modern experiment in social philosophy, and has a well known history, which our people may now review with advantage. *Temporary* war debt, to be paid out of the taxes of the *passing year* was common to the ancients, but a *permanent* war debt dates back only to Charles II. Indeed, the war debt, which has become a *permanent burden on the productive labor* of England, was not acknowledged as such until 1829, and after the whole debt had been incurred, when all attempts at diminishing the debt were abandoned by Parliament, leaving the interest on about four thousand millions of dollars to be paid perpetually by the labor of England to the children of those people who lent the money to the Government instead of paying it in taxes to support the war.

The beginning of the debt was curious. Charles had borrowed six and a half millions of dollars from the goldsmiths, (who were the bankers of the rich people), and given them an order on the exchequer for the return of the loan when the taxes of the year should be collected. But, when the time came for payment, the doors of the exchequer were shut against the goldsmiths. The owners of the money were ruined. London was filled with dismay. Bitter and loud reproaches fell on the king. He was assailed from the pulpits. Sermons were preached from the text, "Put not your trust in princes." Indications of violence were common in the streets.

To quiet this clamor, it was arranged that annual interest should be paid out of the revenues of each year to the owners of this money. Thus, the *burden* of the *passing year* was thrown on the *earnings* of *following years*. William and Mary, finding this precedent, followed it, and borrowed on terminable bonds, resembling our "five twenties," always promising and endeavoring to pay after the war. With various attempts to pay in time of peace, but steadily increasing the debt in time of war, the amount had reached six hundred and sixty-five milllons of dollars, in 1765.

The question of paying this debt was anxiously discussed; projects to this end were presented in Parliament; but, the discussion was turned aside by the introduction of a new financial scheme which turned the heads of men in power, and carried away the popular judgment. The fallacy was this: It was asserted that a small sum of money kept at compound interest, in the hands of commissioners, would ultimately pay the largest possible amount of public debt. The Reverend Dr. Price the reputed father of this fallacy, was as sincerely deluded as other reformers have been. He confidently showed that one penny, compounded from the birth of Christ, would produce globes of gold at the present day. The government believed it had found the lamp of Aladdin and applied it to finance. Accordingly the sum of only a few millions of dollars was borrowed and committed to a board of trusty men as a *sinking fund*, which was sure to redeem England out of any war debt which might be incurred.

From that time the English people cherished the war temper without compunction or restraint. No fear of pecuniary consequences tempered the taste for war. The poets and the pulpits called for blood. The exchequer called for loans, and got them, while it was thought quite impertinent to tax present wealth for the payment of war expenses, which the sinking fund was sure to pay.

Time, and two wars with America and perpetual war with France, brought England to Waterloo, and to four thousand millions of war debt. Then Professor Hamilton proved to the satisfaction of all that, the sinking fund was a mere fallacy, and that nothing but increased taxes or diminished expenses could extinguish one penny of the debt. The history of the fallacy is remarkable. At first, there were only a few millions set apart to pay in future all possible war debt. As the wars went on and the debt rolled up, Dr. Price seems to have had some misgiving of this theory, and strenuously insisted on borrowing more money to increase the sinking fund. So that, when the fallacy was exploded and the fund abolished, it was found that the cost of making these loans and managing the fund had wasted some three millions of dollars. How such a gross fallacy should have deluded a whole nation is now the special wonder of English statesmen. But, convenient

allacies are always popular at the beginning of a war.

Faithful to the old idea of paying a war debt in time of peace, the Parliament resolved, in 1819, to set apart twenty-five millions of dollars in each year for this purpose. This would have extinguished the debt in 160 years. But the pressure was too great; and after a few years, the resolve to pay was abandoned, and never renewed. In 1829 the holders of these five-twenties were invited to bring in their bonds and exchange them for permanent bonds.

No one now can doubt that, the popular fallacy of the sinking fund made war the popular amusement of Englishmen during forty years. This amusement gave offices to the sons of unoccupied families and to the younger sons of the nobility. Of course, the clergy, dependent on these families, prayed earnestly for the war. Unlike feudal incomes, which bound only the products of a *single* tenant, this permanent debt bound the whole productive labor of all the industrial classes, and bound them for all time: while it gave to the unoccupied owners of the bonds a complete and perpetual security for a fixed income, however it might become harder for the laborers to earn that income. Owners of these bonds are loud in their praises of a national war debt; but the more prudent of them would dislike to see the debt increased.

But, in consequence of this perpetual burden on the labor of England one-eighth of the people of England is in the poor house, and a large part of another eighth has escaped from want to the Colonies.

By way of apology for William and Mary, it is said that it was vital to the people of England that a Dutchman should rule instead of a Scotchman. So when the war of our revolution was commenced, it was said to be vital to the people of England that an English governor should rule here rather than Washington. And when the war with France was begun in 1793, it was deemed of the greatest importance to the people of England that a Bourbon rather than a Bonaparte should rule France. Washington did rule in this country, and a Bonaparte does rule in France. Had these questions been decided the other way, would the condition of any laborer in the mines, the factories or the fields of England have been better than it now is? No one thinks it would have been better. But, had the wars with America and France been omitted, the laborers would have been spared the burdens of permanent debt

But, could these wars have been avoided? Let us see. The money borrowed for these wars was already laid up by Englishmen. It could have been taken, in the form of tax, and applied to the support of the wars, instead of being taken as loans on exchequer bonds bearing interest. Now, suppose the government had called together the owners of this money and asked them the question—shall these wars be made, and your money be taken to foot the bills, and you go to work again to lay up new estates If not then the wars ought not to have been commenced. For, will any one pretend that the classes of mere labor are to be benefitted by a war, which kills off the able bodied of their members, fills the ranks of their survivors with cripples, and the land with widows and orphans; and, then, when a new race of vigorous laborers has been produced, lays on these a perpetual burden which sends one-eighth of their whole number to the poor house. In the long peace, which followed Waterloo, while industrial arts have flourished in England more than in any other country or age, yet, in consequence of the war debt, Carlisle says of the laboring class, "Two millions are out of the boat, and five millions are hanging over the side."

The war debt of England was one hundred and fifty years accumulating, and was incurred under false expectations about *the sinking fund*. The best statesmen of England came with unaffected sorrow, to the conclusion that the debt could never be paid. While dwelling sadly on this subject, after Waterloo, the greatest of English statesman said in Parliament—"War is a game at which few would play if the people were wise." But, had he made this remark at the opening of the American Revolution or of the war with Napoleon, he would probably have been charged with treason

UNTIL the outbreak of the present war the United States enjoyed among nations the deserved reputation of being the only government which had ever paid off its debt in full, principal and interest, unaided by the tax-gatherer. The freedom of its industrial population and the abundance of its untaxed lands had called hither the enterprising of all nations, and its wealth and population grew on an unprecedented scale. The progress of the whole country may be briefly represented in the following figures from official sources:

Decades.	Immigration.	Population.	Manufactures.	Exports.	Valuation.
1800.....	——	5,303,937.....	——	$293,634,645.....	$479,246,636
1810.....	——	7,239,814.....	$145,385,906.....	383,401,077.....	——
1820.....	——	9,638,191.....	62,766,385.....	462,701,288.....	613,180,107
1830.....	151,634.....	12,066,020.....	111,645,466.....	536,104,918.....	——
1840.....	272,716.....	17,069,453.....	483,278,215.....	892,889,909.....	——
1850.....	1,479,478.....	23,191,876.....	1,055,595,899.....	1,131,458,801.....	7,115,790,180
1860.....	3,075,900.....	31,443,790.....	1,900,000,000.....	2,766,799,881.....	17,008,417,635

The column of immigration gives the whole number that arrived in each decade; and most, if not all of them, settled at the North and West. The population column is composed of the census returns each ten years. The manufactures are the official returns of the annual production at each period. The exports are not the annual exports, but the whole quantity exported for each period of ten years. The valuations are the official returns. The first, for purposes of taxation, was made in 1798, and the second, for the same purpose, in 1815. Those for 1850 and 1860 are the census returns. This return for 1860 indicates a very large increase in value, but it can not all be taken as an accumulation of wealth, since a very large portion consists of land settled at $1 *a* $1 25 per acre, and valued subsequently at much higher rates according to production. The large production in agriculture, manufactures, mining, etc., is always nearly all consumed in the year. That portion which is saved and invested in buildings, roads, ships, banks, companies, accumulated stocks of goods, coin, etc., as instruments of production and trade, bear but a small proportion to the whole annual production. The State and Federal expenses have been very small, comparatively, and the Government has not extracted much from the producers to support large armies, civil officers, government stockholders, and other non-producers, as has been the case in other countries. Nearly the whole of the earnings of the people had remained for their own enjoyment, and to accumulate in a manner to employ more extended industry, and therefore to swell the annual production. The great wealth of the country has thus been generally distributed among the people. It has long been a source of complaint with the agricultural sections, that the operation of the customs revenue has been to draw wealth from the producers of the national exports and put it into the pockets of the manufacturers. When the protective system was inaugurated at the peace of 1815, it was earnestly opposed on the ground that it would impoverish the agricultural States to enrich the manufacturing States, and this opposition, growing with the development of the protective system, led to the Compromise of 1831. That compromise was to operate by biennial reduction of the duties to 1841, when the rate was to be 20 per cent., not to be exceeded thereafter. As soon as that point was reached, the tariff was restored, against the protest of Mr. Calhoun, who said: "I shall not dwell on the fact that it openly violates the compromise act, and the pledges given by its author and by Governor Davis, of Massachusetts, that if the South would adhere to the compromise while it was operating favorably for the manufacturers, they would stand by it when it came to operate favorably for the South. I dwell not on those double breaches of plighted faith, although they are of a serious character, and likely to exercise a very pernicious influence over our future legislation, by preventing amicable adjustments of questions that may hereafter threaten the peace of the country."

The revenue of the Federal Government, since its organization, may be said to have been derived entirely from the

customs duties. These have, ordinarily, been equal to the expenditure. In the war of 1812 an attempt was made to eke out the revenues by means of internal taxes, with no great success, however. The lands have given a certain amount of revenue, but it has been estimated that cost and expense of management have never been reimbursed: hence that the Government proper has received no aid from that source. The whole revenue and expenditure from March 4, 1789, to July 1, 1861, have been as follows: —

Customs revenue		$1,575,152,579 92
Land sales	$175,817,961 00	
Taxes and miscellaneous	95,305,322 56	271,123,283 56
Total ordinary revenue		$1,846,275,863 48
Total ordinary expenditure		1,453,790,786 00
Total excess revenue		$392,485,077 48
Received for loans	$462,935,644 64	
Paid " "	781,886,375 00	
Excess paid		$318,950,730 36

The excess of loans paid includes the Revolutionary debt; the $60,000,000, principal and interest, paid for Louisiana and Florida; also the sums paid Mexico and Texas. It results that the customs revenues have paid the whole expense of the Government proper. When financial revulsions have overtaken the country, causing the revenues to decline, loans have been made which the swelling revenues consequent upon returning prosperity have discharged.

Those customs revenues have been derived entirely from a tax upon imports, or the goods that have come back into the country as the proceeds of produce sold. Without the produce, it is very clear, there could have been no imports, and, as a consequence, no customs duties. If, then, we turn to the Treasury tables to ascertain the extent of the exports, we shall have as follows: —

Net importations of goods, 1790 to 1860	$7,104,890,932
Domestic produce exported	6,466,900,519
Excess imports	$637,990,413

This excess of imports consists of proceeds of stocks, State and corporate, sold in Europe; earnings of American vessels abroad; and other items. It will be observed that the whole amount received from customs is 22 per cent. of the whole amount of imports. Those imported goods went to the consumers charged with that tax. Inasmuch as they were the producers of the merchandise exported to pay for the goods, the whole amount of the customs was in fact paid by them. If now we look into the character of the exports, we find them to have been as follows since 1820, when the regular official tables commenced: —

Total value domestic exports, 1820 to 1860		$4,856,863,368
Value of Cotton	$2,574,834,491	
" Tobacco	455,181,067	
" Rice	87,854,511	
" Naval stores	76,181,210	
" Food, etc	1,006,951,235	
" Cotton and other manufactures	655,861,254	
		4,856,863,368
Net import of goods		5,394,671,668
Excess imports		$537,808,300

This excess was met, as previously stated, by an excess of $347,419,646 in the exports of specie over the imports; by the exports of stocks; earnings of shipping, etc. Of the exports of food, a considerable portion was of Southern origin; and, of the cotton manufactures exported, two thirds of the value is due to the raw material. It results, then, that the origin of the exports has been as follows: —

Southern States	74 per cent.	$3,581,291,381
Northern States	26 per cent.	1,275,571,987

Thus the productions of the Southern States, although interchanged for Northern productions, has paid a large portion. The net imports and customs duties from 1820 to 1860 were as follows:

Net imports of goods		$5,394,671,668
Net customs duties	22.8 per cent.	1,231,456,168
Net customs paid by Southern products	$911,277,565	
" " " Northern "	320,178,603	
		$1,231,456,168

Thus the average expenditure of the Federal Government during the forty years embraced in this last table, has been $30,780,000, of which only $7,800,000 has been supplied by Northern productions.

Under this system of small Government expenses and absence of internal taxes, the whole country flourished, even although the accumulation of wealth in the manufacturing States was much more rapid than in the

agricultural States. A great and disastrous change has taken place, however, with the outbreak of the present war. From a fertile country, filled with peaceful arts, an industrial population of saving habits and economical administration of public affairs, we became an immense battle-field, supplied with a hand so lavish that four years of strife have swallowed up the wealth earned in the peaceful pursuits of the nation's lifetime.

The expenditures and debt of the government for several years have been as follows, being four years of peace, and four years of war.

	Expense.	Debt at close.
1858.	$73,943,894	$44,910,777
1859.	68,965,070	58,754,699
1860.	63,154,733	64,769,703
1861.	66,691,329	92,989,709
1862.	474,644,778	514,211,372
1863.	714,709,995	1,098,793,181
1864.	849,681,207	1,733,810,119
1865.	1,050,000,000	2,800,000,000

The total for four years of peace was $272,755,026, and the four years of war $3,089,035,880. The expenditure for the three months ending March 31, 1864, were $287,016,014 or 15,000,000 more than for the whole four years ending with 1861. The expenses for the year 1865 are partly estimated on official data, thus the appropriations for the year are $1,300,000,000, but the next session of Congress will be called upon for deficiency bills, and the first quarter of the year already elapsed shows a vote of expenditure larger than the estimate. The estimates of the debt are on the same data, thus the official figure for July 1 was $1,733,810,119 and for Sept. 30, being the end of the first quarter of the fiscal year 1865, it was 2,026,949,092, an increase of $293,138,973 for the quarter, which would give for the year $1,200,000,000, making the debt next July 2,933,000,000. Something must be allowed however for growing disability to borrow. The loans hitherto have been a reflex of paper paid out. In order to have a clear understanding of the debt, we give the official statements at six periods, the beginning of the war, the end of each fiscal year, and the end of the first quarter Sept., 1864, of the fiscal year 1865

UNITED STATES DEBT.

Act.	Interest.	Payable.	June 30, '61.	June 30, '62.	June 30, 1863.	Sept. 1863.	June, 1864.	Sept. 30, 1864
Old Debt,	5 and 6		$51,802,048	$51,915,164	$49,342,489	$49,281,340	$47,514,591	$48,586,59
" Tr. Note,	5 and 12		22,464,761	2,849,111				
Feb. 1851,	6	1880	18,415,000	18,415,000	18,415,000	18,415,000	18,415,000	18,415,00
Mar. 1861,	6	1881	307,900	998,600	1,798,050	1,528,900	1,016,000	1,016,00
July, 1861,	6	1881		50,000,000	50,028,500	50,320,000	76,408,200	164,537,30
July, 1861,	7.3	1864		122,836,550	139,970,500	139,679,000	113,591,150	25,410,40
Feb. 1862,	6	5-20		9,907,850	168,880,250	278,511,500	510,756,900	510,756,90
Mar. 1863,	6	1881						73,922,15
Mar. 1864,	5	10-40					72,005,450	81,630,60
June, 1864,	6	5-20						40,000,00
	Total gold interest.		$92,989,709	$256,882,275	$428,434,789	$537,415,740	$839,717,291	$963,085,94
July, 1862,	4	40 days,			35,381,101	35,500,000	662,475	548,22
Jul., 1862,	5	40 days,		57,746,117	67,002,974	69,434,102	9,395,453	1,125,60
July, 1862,	6	40 days,					64,959,582	47,876,51
Mar. 1862,	6	1 year,		49,881,979	156,784,242	156,918,437	156,531,000	229,946,00
June, 1864,	7.3	3 years, convertible,						55,897,60
Mar. 1863,	5	1 year, legal tender,					44,520,000	44,520,00
Mar. 1863,	5	2 years, legal tender,					16,480,000	16,480,00
Mar. 1863,	5	2 years, legal coup'n,					101,091,950	65,862,25
Mar. 1863,	6	3 years, legal comp.					2,500,000	15,000,00
Mar. 1864,	6	3 years, legal comp.						87,329,68
	Total interest in paper,			$107,627,084	$259,168,327	$261,852,539	$396,140,460	$564,585,87
July 17, 1861,	Gold notes,			53,040,000	3,351,020	2,022,173	795,643	615,66
Feb. 1862,	Legal tender,			96,620,000	387,646,589	402,737,051	425,777,397	433,160,56
July, 1862,	Legal tender, fractions,				20,192,456	17,766,056	21,817,158	24,502,41
	Arrear requisitions,						49,192,000	34,641,36
	Debt, interest ceased,						370,170	356,97
	Total, no interest,	.....		149,660,000	411,190,065	432,525,280	497,952,368	499,277,27
	Total, paper debt,		$92,989,709	$514,211,372	$1,098,793,181	$1,222,113,559	$1,733,810,119	$2,026,949,09

This table shows all the kinds of paper that have been issued by the Treasury department, and generally in the order of their issue. In the first portion of the table it will be observed that the 6 per cent. stock of 1861 being the fifth line of figures, has rapidly increased, while the 7 3-10 in the next line have decreased. This is caused by the conversion of the latter into the former stock. The 5-20's reached their limit under the old law 1st Feb., but under the law of June, 1864, the Secretary can issue 400,000,000 of those stocks, and 40,000,000, have been issued.

There is then 564,585,874 of paper interest securities that are of short dates, and constantly maturing, of these 223,000,000 are legal tender, and make with paper money 722,000,000 of paper currency, in addition to which is an issue of $55,000,000 National Bank notes. The table itself shows the course of the issues, and how much legal tender has been pressed in the last quarter. We have now to bear in mind that these loans are not the whole debt; they are simply that portion which has been audited and actually paid in paper. There are about $300,000,000 of debts due and unsettled, being for navy and other contracts, army pay, &c. But these debts do not represent the whole expense. They do not embrace that portion raised by taxes. The whole will stand nearly as follows for three years:—

Debt outstanding,			$2,026,949,092
Unpaid debt,			300,000,000
	Gold,	Paper,	
Customs,	$190,669,057,	$267,181,201	
Lands		756,101	
Internal taxes,		190,090,000	
Total taxes,			$458,027,302
Total expenses three years,			$2,784,976,394

It will be observed that the amount of gold collected for customs is applicable only to the interest on the public debt, which is paid in gold. It may therefore be supposed that as the gold is paid out by the government that it should not be charged in expenses at the paper value. This would be a mistake, since the gold customs are paid by the importers, who buy the gold in the market for paper, and add the amount in paper to the goods sold, hence the tax falls upon the people at its paper value. The mode in which this operates may be seen in any article, say 11-4 bed-blankets which weigh six lbs. per pair, the duties in gold are 40 per cent. and 24 cts. per lb.

These cost 10s. sterling		$2 42
40 per cent. is	97	
24 cents lb.	144	
Duties	241	
Gold premium	150 360	6 01
Gold prem. on exchange		3 63
Total cost of blankets		$12 06

Thus, when gold, as in the summer, was at 250, the duty paid by the consumer was 250 per cent. on those articles, and 150 more for exchange, or thus, the tax received by the treasury was $2.41, and the tax paid by the consumer, in consequence of the depreciated currency, was $7.23 each pair of blankets.

The amount of gold collected in three years has been, it appears, $190,669,057, which, at the average price of gold, has risen to $267,181,201 in paper value, which, with the land revenues and the proceeds of the internal taxes amount to $458,027,302, and the whole reaches the immense

Amount of expenses	$2,784,976,394
Expenses 72 years, 1789 to 1861	1,431,790,786
Excess of present war expenses	$1,331,185,608

It will be necessary to deduct from this amount the sum that the ordinary expenses of the government would have reached in three years had there been no war. This would have been $200,000,000. Hence the war in three years has cost the Federal Government $1,131,185,608, more than the whole expenses of the government for 72 years previous, including the war of 1812, the Florida war, the Mexican war and indemnities, the purchase of Louisiana and Florida, and the annexation of Texas.

This is, however, very far from being the whole of the expense. Tthere was advanced by the people and never charged upon the government, nearly $80,000,000 in the first year of the war to fit out and forward volunteers.

In addition to that, towns, counties, and states have largely increased their expenses, and created debts for the objects of the war and for the support of the families of volunteers. But the most onerous and direct burden has been the money paid for commutation and substitutes. In order to convey some idea of the magnitude of this operation, we

may recur to the official calls for troops, under each date as follows: —

OFFICIAL CALLS FOR TROOPS.

1861.	April 16	75,000	
	May 4	64,743	
	July 22	500,000	
	July 29	25,000	
			664,473
1862.	June 1	40,000	
	July 1	300,000	
	Aug. 9	300,000	
	Sept.—Invasion	100,000	
			740,000
1863.	May 14	300,000	
	June 15	100,000	
	Oct. 15	300,000	
			700,000
1864.	Feb. 1	500,000	
	Mar. 14	200,000	
	Oct. 14	500,000	
			1,200,000
	Total calls, men		3,304,743

There were a number of calls for troops in addition to these for temporary purposes, and which are not included in the table. It may be remarked that the call, in February, 1864, for 500,000 men, included what had not been obtained under the call of the previous October, and which amounted to 150,000 men, leaving the net aggregate call 3,154,743 men.

These calls, it will be observed, have borne with greater pressure upon the people each succeeding year, and within the last twelve months the number obtained has been 1,200,000 men. This solemn fact has made but light impression upon the public mind; but its startling truth was made clearly manifest in the United States Senate, in the debate of June 14, 1864. It will be observed in the above table that from Oct. 14, 1863, to the date of the debate, the calls had been for 850,000 men. On that day Mr. Wilson, chairman of the Military Committee, in reply to Mr. Conness, of California, said: —

"*Does the Senator know that we have raised or re-enlisted since the 17th day of October last six hundred thousand men, not to count black men, and that within the last year we have put in the field seven hundred thousand men: that we have made an exertion such as few nations ever made, and few nations can make; that we have spent* $125,000,000 *in bounties; that we have drafted; that we have used the whole power and influence of the government to increase our military forces?* Sir, we have put forth an effort that excites the astonishment and commands the admiration of the world; yet the Senator from California, whose constituents are not drafted nor called upon, rises to-day and rebukes the administration, rebukes us, and talks glibly of the timid counsels of men who are quite as hopeful, determined and brave as himself. Mr. President, I do not question the devotion or the courage of the men of California. They have proved their devotion to the country on more than one occasion. But, sir, that Senator should remember that some of us live in communities where the calls are over and over again, where sons, brothers, relatives, friends, neighbors, all have been summoned to the field of duty, and have responded to these calls. While we, their representatives, are ready to vote men and to vote money, we want to make these sacrifices of men and of blood bear as lightly as possible upon our people. Humanity and justice alike demand it. Gen. Grant is in front of Richmond. This rebellion is 'coiled,' to use the language of Gen. Hooker, at Richmond, and within ten miles of that capital of treason. *We have sent forty-eight thousand men to reinforce Gen. Grant since the commencement of the march (six weeks) toward the rebel capital.* Within thirty days we have gathered up over the country these reinforcements, two thousand of whom are the one hundred days' men raised in the State of Ohio."

Mr. Wade. Over two thousand have gone.

Mr. Wilson. Two thousand of them are already there, and others are hastening to that field of duty. The government is casting a drag-net over the country, gathering up all the soldiers it can, and hurrying them forward to the support of Gen. Grant. If we had fifty thousand, or one hundred thousand fresh men to send to his support to-day, this rebellion would, I believe, *go down within sixty days to rise not again.*

Mr. Conness. I ask the Senator why we have not got them?

Mr. Wilson. *We have raised men during the past eight months as rapidly as we could do it*, and we have put them into the field. *Since the 17th day of October, we have put seven hundred thousand men in the field*, and it is an unparalleled exertion of the power and the patriotism of the people.

Since these great exertions thus described by Mr. Wilson, 500,000 more men, instead of the 50 or 100 thousand that Mr. Wilson believed would finish the rebellion in sixty

days, have been raised. Grant's army has swallowed them nearly all, and the reader knows with what result. Under these repeated calls, which Mr. Wilson shows press so heavily upon the people, the price of substitutes has risen from $500 to $1000 per man. The million of men obtained have cost an average of $600 each, giving the astounding sum of $600,000,000, that has been raised by individuals, towns, and counties. The counties of New York have contracted bounty debts to the amount of $60,000,000, and other States have been heavily charged. The whole of the bounty and substitute money is estimated at $750,000,000, which sum must be added to the war expenses. There are also $100,000,000 extra expenses that have been paid by states, towns, etc. The whole expense is then approximated thus:

Federal expenses	$2,784,976,394
County bounties, &c.	750,000,000
State war expenses	100,000,000
Total, 3 years	$3,634,976,394

We now come to the fact that the armies are no farther advanced than they were last year, before the draft of this 1,000,000 of men and the expenditure of the following money within the year:

Increase Federal debt	$758,219,572
Customs	170,000,000
Internal taxes	100,000,000
Total Federal expenses	$1,028,219,572
Bounties, 1,000,000 men	500,000,000
Town, county, & state expenses	150,000,000
Total, one year	$1,678,219,572

There is now, apparently, no alternative but to proceed with the drafts, and there will be required as many men for the coming year as for the last, but in consequence of the growing exhaustion which Senator Wilson pointed out, the price of men rises, and a like number of men will cost a thousand millions, to be taxed upon counties, while the federal expenses will be $1,050,000,000.

There is no occupant of land but feels the pressure of the bounty tax, it presses directly upon the land, while it is very clear that there is no prospect of its cessation.

It is very apparent from what has been here shown that the annual expense of the government will henceforth, with the continuance of the war, be a light portion of the annual burden compared with that caused by drafts.

It is the avowed intention of the present administration to continue the war for other purposes than the restoration of the Union. It will, therefore, continue one year, at least; and, if the administration is reëlected, it will not end short of three more years. The expenses will increase because of the double influence of rising prices and scarcity of men. But we will estimate the expense at the same as the last three years, as follows: —

	Call for men.	Money.
1862–3–4	3,304,743	$3,634,976,394
1865–5–7	3,000,000	4,000,000,000
	6,304,743	$7,634,976,394

Total for six years.

If we suppose that the war may terminate in another year when 1,000,000 more men shall have been called out, the situation must then be $1,000,000,000 of debt, in the shape of county bonds, to pay for the troops. Every individual knows how many men his county has been compelled to furnish in the last year to make up the million of men. A like number must be again furnished, and for each man the county must run in debt $1,000. A county of which is required 50 men must issue $50,000 bonds, in addition to those now out, if the men can be got at that price, which is very doubtful. The whole number of men of the military age, when the war began, was 5,000,000; of those drafted there were 30 per cent. unfit for service. Hence there were only 3,500,000 able-bodied men. Now if all the men in the above calls had been fresh men the whole strength of our country would have been exhausted. They were, however, large reënlistments at higher rates. To get another million the price must be much higher.

In addition to the county bounty debts the federal debt will be, as we have seen, fully $3,000,000,000 bearing interest $180,000,000 per annum, in gold. This will be the case, because the whole of the debt will be funded in gold interest stock as it falls due, and it will all be due in two years.

The sinking fund and expenses of the government will be annually $370,000,000 including interest. The town, city, county, and state expenses will be added, thus:

Federal expenses	$370,000,000
County bounty debt interest	60,000,000
City, town, and state expenses	100,000,000
Annual expense	$530,000,000

This immense burden must be imposed mostly upon the farming interests. It must be paid out of the *annual productions* of industry. This is a fact which must be steadily borne in mind. A great parade is sometimes made of the assessed or supposed *value* of property as compared with the debt, to show how small is the latter as compared with the supposed property. The assessed value of property in the northern states is given, as follows: —

Population	18,808,102
Real estate	$9,674,947,031
Personal	1,955,820,248
Total	$11,630,757,279
United States debt	$2,326,949,092
State & bounty debt	750,000,000 — $3,076,949,092

Thus the debt is but one third of the property, and therefore alleged to be small. That is a very fallacious mode of estimate. The valuation for all purposes of taxation is entirely nominal, and can in no wise be applicable to the payment of debt. The amount is the accumulated savings of the people for 200 years since the country was settled. It is only the annual earnings of the property, real and personal, that can be applied to the purposes of taxation and payment of debt. Thus the land of Ohio is valued at $687,518,121, but the same land has been there since the flood. It had no value whatever until the hand of man began to draw forth its annual fruits, and the assessed value is in proportion to that yield. A farmer who took 100 acres of wild land, after a few years made it yield a handsome annual living for himself and family. The State then valued land at, say $5,000, and taxed it, — the tax to be paid out of the products. The cattle, furniture, implements, &c., are personal property, the savings of many years, and are necessary aids to production. It is obvious at once that the surplus product of the farm is that which remains after the consumption of the producer and his stock is deducted. The proceeds of that surplus pay store and medical bills, &c., and taxes. Now, it is evident, that if the latter are more than the surplus products the producer must consume less, scrimp his family, or refuse to pay. There can be no application of the farm and personal property to the public debt, because it falls alike upon the whole nation, and a nation cannot be sold out. The federal government, for instance, holds many millions of property, but neither the Capitol nor the White House could well be sold for the benefit of creditors.

The annual earnings of manufacturing establishments may be estimated from the data furnished by the census, page 190 : —

Annual production of 110,000 factories and shops,		$1,754,650,000
Cost of labor, 1,001,460 males and 273,530 females	$600,000,000	
" " Raw material,	939,335,000	— 1,539,335,000
Net amount of production,		$215,315,000
Capital employed by 110,000 concerns,		$949,000,000

This net amount supports the families of the manufacturers, keeps good the capital, wear and tear of machines, &c., and leaves a profit, or surplus, which is employed in new machines, stock, or other investments, and from which alone the tax can be paid. If the amount of tax is sufficient to absorb all the surplus, the manufacturing capital would soon be dried up, and the national wealth consumed. It is very evident that this net surplus averaging $1,900 per annum, is the fund from which the public debt is to be paid. The buildings, tools, machines, &c., which constitute the capital of $949,000,000, that is enumerated as personal property, can in no wise be applicable to the public debt.

Again, there is about 500 millions of railroad stock, called personal property. Of what value would that be if the railroads are worked at a loss? Clearly, the only way in which that stock can aid the government is by a portion of the dividends. There are $500,000,000 of railroad bonds, which are taxed, a portion of the interest paid on them, but their value consists only in the interest paid.

The $530,000,000 per annum which, as given above, is to be raised to meet the present public obligations, is to be taken from the annual production of industry, — with this proviso, that the $2,000,000,000 which has been taken from other employments, where it earned an annual income, and which has been placed in government bonds, *is exempt from taxation;* as a consequence, the burden upon capital employed in other industries must be doubled.

To illustrate. Suppose two factories of

00,000 capital each were earning $16,000 r annum each, each being taxed 3 per nt. on its production, would pay $5,000 x to government. If one of them with- aws his capital, sells his stock, discharges s hands, and invests the capital in Fede- l stocks, he will be free from local tax; then e government, to raise the same amount of oney, must tax the other factory double.

The mode of raising the tax now is by in- rect taxes, or taxes on goods to be consumed. is is a very delusive plan, and has by no eans answered the expectations of the pro- sers. The mass of people, or those who ve a stake in the community, suppose that ey avoid the taxes by refusing to purchase e taxed articles. This is fallacious reason- g. Thus, we find that the interest on the blic debt is $72,000,000 in gold, which is ised by gold-taxes on imported articles. is carries the prices of those articles very gh, and they are not consumed. The amount tax raised will then fall to, say, $40,- 00,000. What then happens? Either the bt will not be paid, or a more efficient tax ust be laid to reach those who have vaded the indirect tax. The weight of the bt cannot be escaped from. There are no eans of paying but by taxes. If one tax not paid, another must be tried. There e many, however, who are indifferent to the owth of the debt, because they think the xes can be avoided. This is not the case; ot only must the county-taxes, but the fed- al debts be paid by land.

Again, suppose the land-owners generally efuse to buy taxed manufactures. The man- facturers will stop works, will discharge hands, nd stop buying wool or other material. The nternal taxes will fail to give revenue, and he loan will come back upon the farmer, who as failed to sell his wool, for a direct tax.

There is no escaping the inevitable result hat the whole industry of all the people will e taxed to its utmost to meet these terrible ills that are now rolling up. What this na- ion is now going through, England has gone hrough. She expended, in fruitless wars, noney, which left her, on the 11th March, 863, with a debt as follows: —

BRITISH DEBT.

Amount,	£779,802,139	— $3,999,010,695
Annual int't,	26,320,444	131,602,220

The average rate upon this debt is 3¼ per cent. This burden has borne very heavily upon the English people. During its operation, in the last fifty years, it has constantly drawn money from the working many and given it the few. The result has been to make workers very poor and capitalists very rich, although those capitalists have been required to pay taxes. The present United States debt, as compared with the English, is as follows: —

United States Debt.		British Debt.
Federal debt,	$2,026,949,092	
State "	135,486,047	
City "	100,000,000	
County "	500,000,000	
Total	$2,762,435,139	£3,999,010,695
Interest	165,746,107	131,602,220

Thus, the existing debt is $34,000,000 annually more than the British debt. By the end of another year, it will be $150,000,000 per annum more. Now, under this burden, the British Government reduced its taxes to a system. It removed all exemptions; every man is taxed alike before the law. And to reach equality as nearly as possible, it levies an income-tax, the return of which shows the amount of annual income in the nation. This, in pounds and dollars was as follows, for the past year: —

The tax at present, 9d. in the pound or 3¾ per cent., is laid upon the gross income, so that the tax becomes an integral part of the annual expenses of each individual. The amount of income under each general head is as follows: —

AMOUNT OF INCOME.		
Lands, manors, &c.	£55,005,120	$275,025,600
House property	57,761,745	288,808,725
Mines and iron works	5,515,699	27,578,495
Railway, canal, gas, &c.	19,908,473	99,542,365
Farms	16,554,930	82,772,650
Trades, professions, &c.	87,555,625	437,777,125
Dividends, funds	29,083,200	125,416,000
Public companies	6,134,256	30,671,280
Salaries, &c.	20,071,240	100,356,200
Quarries, fines, pensions, &c.	714,649	3,573,245
	£298,304,937	$1,471,521,685
Tax	11,048,148	55,240,740

Under the head of lands, manors, &c., figure the sums derived by owners of land from rent; under the head "farms," is the income derived from the land of the occupiers who pay rent. The total is the amount of gross income of the whole nation. From this income is to be deducted the support of the owners, and the net is the surplus. The annual increase of the income is indicated by the increase of the tax. If the same amount of

tax gives an increase next year, that increase will be 3¼ per cent. of the actual increase of annual savings. On this process it has been computed that the average annual surplus in Great Britain is £120,000,000, or $600,000,000. This is the sum from which, under the present burden of taxation, improvements may be carried on, railroads, houses, and ships built, banks, companies, and stores, and other forms of capital, be created.

Now, it will be borne in mind, that England is a rich nation; and yet her estimated net-income is barely more than, as we have seen above, the American people will be required to pay annually for interest, without discharging the principal.

It is well known that the English Government honestly intended to pay the war debt; and a law for that purpose was passed in 1819, which, if it had been enforced, would, by this time, have extinguished about one-fourth of the whole. But the yearly cost of the peace establishment had been so enormously increased that this, added to the interest on the war-debt, was all that the nation could endure without endangering revolution and repudiation. Even this pressure sends one-eighth of the people to the poor-house; and if England had not the Colonies as well as the poor-house she would want more soldiers at hand to prevent revolution.

England is the richest nation on earth, and more able than any other to pay the principal of a war debt. Wealth, available for the payment of such debt, must be measured by money incomes, and by resources which labor may convert into money after paying the laborers and the interest of the capital employed. Among these resources gold is king, and iron is queen; and incomes in gold and silver are their beautiful children.

The coal raised from the English mines last year was eighty millions of tons. The iron made and sent out of England was about four millions of tons.

Taking these as rough measures of ability to pay, and comparing them with the ability of the United States to pay a war-debt, we find their power to be about seven times as great as our own. We raised about eleven millions of tons of coal in the last year — about one-seventh of the quantity raised by England. The iron products were not very far from the same proportion. But it may be thought that the taxable incomes would be a more just measure of comparative ability to pay. N if incomes may be measured by the amc they yield in taxes, we are able to give exact figures. The revenue derived from income tax last year was $11,241,101, w that of England amounted to $53,240,00

Here we find that the proportion does differ essentially from the proportion of t coal to ours. Should it be said that our comes have not yet learned to pay taxe may be replied that, under present arra ments, our incomes are likely to pay rather than more in the future. Those have seen the figures, and made the estima declare that England taxes five times as m wealth as the United States, and the inc tax confirms it. The indications from c iron and incomes look in that direction. I however that may be, it will not be q tioned that the ability of England to pay war debt is much (if not many times) gre than ours. She cannot pay hers; can we ours? This is the question.

When the English statesmen found that principal of their war debt could not be p they next inquired how they could pro for prompt payment of the interest.

1. They did all in their power to red the interest to the lowest possible rate. S part of the debt was contracted at high r of interest. But by good management, thro a series of years, they brought it down to th and one-half per cent., which is the pres rate. With a long peace, great commer prosperity, and a vast increase of the g production, they may be able to reduce rate still lower. But, meanwhile, the inte was accruing.

2. The English statesmen employed th ingenuity in devising a system of taxes wh could be endured, and yet be sufficient. T stern resolve to pay promptly inspired people to endure bravely. The return peace made personal abstinence hopeful welcome. But the experiment was new; while war raged, they had continued to l row: now they saw that borrowing must ce when the hope of payment was gone; they knew not, even then, on whom the pr sure of the tax for interest must ultimat fall. The simple doctrines, since develo by J. S. Mill, were vaguely perceived. T thought that taxing beer at the brewery tobacco at the warehouse laid the burden the brewer and the merchant, but Mill

ught them that the laborer must ultimately
l the whole pressure on his pipe and cup,
cause the beer and the tobacco would cease
be produced unless the capitalist was first
id his interest and profit, and the manufac-
rer his share; while every tax must be
ded to the commodity and collected from
e consumer, taking from the wages every
ch addition; otherwise the capital would go
other occupations or other countries.

Then it was obvious that the day-laborer
eded as much beer and tobacco as the mer-
ant or the landlord; but while the latter
uld bear this burden without stinting his
ead or his shoes the day-laborer could not.
the day-laborer was pinched experimentally
all points until sickness completed his dis-
ırangement, and he sought refuge in the
or-house or got a free ticket of leave to the
olonies. The poor house and the Colonies
re not taxed.

To mitigate the pressure on the class of
bor the corn-laws were repealed, so that la-
rers might have a chance for cheaper food.
hen the income tax was imposed to give
me relief to labor. But, "once a pauper
ways a pauper." The poor house flourished.
eliefs have been and still are tried, but yet
e pauper class outgrows all others. It in-
udes one-eighth of the whole people.

The laborer is not taxed on his wages, but
e is taxed on everything bought with his
ages; and, on most articles, he pays the
me tax as the landlord or the merchant.

Look at it in another light, and the result
even worse. All the wealth produced in
e year to pay this interest is produced by
anual labor, which is applied, in wages, to
e machinery, raw material and provisions
reviously laid up by the capitalist. Capital
n float to any country where it will give the
st return to the owner. The average profit
f capital in the whole world must be gained
England, or the capital will migrate. Not
the laborer; he is bound by habit, family,
id language; and the larger his class, the
maller his pay. The whole product of labor
pplied to capital goes first to remunerate the
apitalist: after him comes the tax-gatherer;
r his share is taken out of what would *other-
ise* go to the laborers, and what remains is
ages. The capitalist may *advance* the tax,
ut to be returned to him by the merchant,
ho collects it, in the advance price of the
ommodity, from the consumer; and the labor-
rs, being nine-tenths of the whole people, pay
the great body of the tax. In England, there is one relief for labor: what is collected as tax from the incomes of the rich is so much saved to the tax on labor. But, with this exception, labor must produce the interest on the war debt. Under this course of things, capitalists grow richer. England is the richest country on earth, because she has the coal and iron and machinery on the easiest terms; but this does not diminish her paupers. Nor can any power on earth change this case, unless by lowering the rate of interest or raising the income-tax.

When the permanent funding of the public debt was adopted as the future plan of the exchequer, the *owners* of these bonds were *pleased*. Capitalists were ready to buy them, instead of engaging in commerce or manufactures; and it was common to speak of them as a part of the capital of the kingdom. The labor which was at work in the fields, the mines, and the factories, knew nothing and thought nothing of what was being done in its behalf. But men began at length to examine the nature of this capital, represented by 4,000,000,000 of dollars of bonds. They found that the bonds not only did not answer to any of the descriptions of capital given by economists, but that they were to the productive capital of England a minus quantity: they represented *so much capital* which had been carried to America, India, France, and Spain, and had been *entirely consumed* in war, no part of it appearing in any new form of wealth in England; but it did re-appear in the *ghostly form of so much poverty*, which could be appeased only by taking 140 millions of dollars from the labor and incomes of the people every year to lay this ghost, *before the laborers could feed or clothe their families*. It raised the laborer to early tasks, pricked him on when his strength failed, and haunted his dreams when he slept.

But, heavy as this poverty was, it was not attended by the common miseries of war — there had been no destruction of private property in England. England endured, with great composure, the destruction her soldiers and subsidies carried to homes in other lands; and her laborers had not new homes to prepare for themselves before applying their shoulders to the yearly burden of an eternal debt.

The products of English labor, taken to pay this interest, pass through numberless changes to reach the consumer: every im-

prover and conveyer of a commodity has added a value; and, at every change, the merchant has advanced the tax, and *taken it out of the laborer's share*, so that the commodity may be kept low, and compete in the market of the world with like commodities produced in countries not so taxed.

3. If we turn now to the prospect before American labor, we have only to apply the experience of English labor for the last forty years. If the interest on our debt were three and a half per cent., and if incomes in our country could and would pay as largely as the incomes of Englishmen, yet there would be against our labor the comparative advantage the English enjoy in the maturity of their manufactures and commerce, and the ease with which they obtain coal and iron to send their products over the world. But, unfortunately, our debt has been contracted at five and six per cent.; and, by a strange oversight, our bondholders are excused from the payment of taxes. Any attempt to reduce the rate of interest, or to tax these bonds, will be resisted by arguments and influence, which nothing but the fear of repudiation would subdue. And to oppose these arguments would be an attempt at repudiation. But, meanwhile, it is obvious, that, with the nearest and earliest possible close of the war, the labor of this country must hereafter carry a yearly load more than twice as heavy as that which the labor of England has carried during the last forty years.

Questions more profound, more obviously affecting men's daily bread, and far less hopeful of solution, than ever agitated the North and the South, are sure to spring up on this subject. Every day men will look with more anxious interest for the appearance of a statesmanship which will compose our affairs, and quiet the apprehensions about prolonged and ineffectual war. Thoughtful men are weighing the value of a constitutional government, which gives a worse promise for labor than the constitutional monarchy of England now gives to English labor. Nor can the true state of this case—the actual and future condition of our public finances—be much longer kept out of the winter-evening talk of our farmers, mechanics, and tradespeople, who meet around their home-fires, and inquire what the future of the country promises for them and their children. They will see the condition of English labor consequent on the payment of their interest; they w observe that the pressure on labor here w be twice as great as there; they will inqu what relief our labor may expect from t income tax; and when they are told th English labor was relieved, last year, by income tax of fifty-three millions, while t American income tax, last year, was on eleven millions, they will look despairingly the prospect before them and their children

CONCLUSION.

The financial scheme of the English par which prosecuted the war against Ameri and France rested largely on the fallacy the sinking fund. Mr. Pitt did not clear foresee what a load he was preparing f English labor to carry through all time. B English labor had groaned forty years und the burden, and the groans had reached o shores by every emigrant ship before 186 The English poorhouse was well understo here before Dickens laid bare its enormiti — before Oliver Twist was born.

Our rulers *knew what* they were doin and *why*, when they neglected to levy a collect the amount of the war burden in ea year of the war; but instead of taxing, we on to run up a war debt, which they w knew could never be paid; and which th knew as well *then* as *now* must drain its i terest, forever, from the yearly earnings productive labor, except so far as income t might relieve it. And what relief will elev millions of income tax give to a yearly tax hundreds of millions to be earned in ea year, to stop the gap made in the commo wealth by borrowing for war purposes fo thousand millions of dollars?

The best apology for our rulers is found i the example of the rulers of Europe on th same subject. In nearly all the Europea countries the rulers have run up a war deb of which only the interest can be paid; debt which they dare not increase, for fear resistance from the tax-payers—a debt th interest on which is only to be collected by *strong government*. The peace of Europe i insured, mainly, by the danger of revolutio which would be incurred by increasing th war debt. Is such to be our governmen and such our security for future peace? An such fortunes reserved for the children o the people who filled the world with the fam of their constitutional liberty, and their co sequent prosperity?

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate at the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought.

I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add, what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union.

As to the other subjects presented in the resolutions of the Convention, I need only say that I should seek, in the Constitution of the United States and the laws framed in accordance therewith, the rule of my duty, and the limitations of executive power; endeavor to restore economy in public expenditure, reëstablish the supremacy of law, and, by the operation of a more vigorous nationality, resume our commanding position among the nations of the earth.

The condition of our finances, the depreciation of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system; while the rights

of citizens, and the rights of States, and the binding authority of law over President, army, and people, are subjects of not less vital importance in war than in peace.

Believing that the views here expressed are those of the Convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibility to be borne should the people ratify your choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I can only seek fervently the guidance of the Ruler of the universe, and, relying on His all-powerful aid, do my best to restore union and peace to a suffering people, and to establish and guard their liberties and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

General McClellan's Views of the War and the Country.

The Harrison's Bar Letter.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blockading our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical; and I earnestly desire in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions; and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, or foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property, taken for military use, should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order, and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for suppressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted; and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State; thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men; would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the Government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support will soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army: one who posesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

No. 13.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

S. F. B. MORSE, Prest. C. MASON, Cor. Sec., 13 Park Row.

"LET US REASON TOGETHER."

By HON. GEORGE F. COMSTOCK,

OF SYRACUSE,

Late Justice of the Court of Appeals.

THE WRITER of the following pages will only venture to say of himself that he brings to the subjects of discussion a mind somewhat accustomed to the examination of questions of constitutional and public law, and an anxious wish to be right in the views which he presents. To him it is a source of unspeakable amazement, that the simplest and most obvious principles underlying the fabric of society and government, in this country, have become so unsettled in the public mind as to be in danger of absolute overthrow. He will endeavor to reassert some of those principles with all the simplicity and plainness of argument at his command, and to show how fearfully and fatally we are departing from them. If he feels obliged to speak with the utmost freedom of political parties and their action, this must be pardoned, because it is a necessity of the occasion. The awful crisis in which we stand compels a choice between the great parties which divide the suffrages of the people, and that choice must be soberly and intelligently made. In times of smooth and peaceful administration the ascendancy of this or that political party does not involve the safety of the government or people; but now, in the hour of *supreme peril*, when the differences between those who have the conduct of national affairs and their opponents are so broad and so fundamental that whichever party is right the other is fatally wrong. There is no longer a middle ground, upon which the man of hesitation and doubt can permit himself to linger or stand.

What, then, is our situation? By what processes have we reached it? and to what results are we tending? Let us reason together on these momentous subjects. It certainly ought not to be assumed that a majority of the people of this country do not prefer to stand by a Constitution and Government under which they have been prosperous and happy beyond any example afforded in history. Yet it is true—alas! too true—that at the present moment this Constitution and the beneficent Government which springs from it, are passing away in the roar and whirlwind of revolution. The danger is extreme that we shall lose both the principles and forms of our institutions, and that society itself will receive incalculable injury, while we are engaged in a great and passionate struggle of arms—a struggle not merely to preserve the territorial unity of the republic, but to extend over it a government not derived from a written constitution, and unknown to any law which has the sanction of civilized men. It may not yet be too late to arrest the downward course of events, by calm appeals to the intelligence, the reason, and the conscience of the people.

One of the delusions of the hour is, that the Union must be maintained at the expense of the Constitution, and even after the Constitution is overthrown. This is a sentiment which demands unity of territory and people *without a Constitution!* Such is the Union of bleeding and prostrate Poland with despotic Russia, and such is the Union which it is now proposed shall be

forced by the power of arms upon millions of unwilling people. The sentiment may be paraphrased thus: Perish the Union under the Constitution; perish the Constitution itself, which made the Union and is the Union; perish the independence and sovereignty of the States; perish the States themselves, with their constitutions and laws; perish all things else, so that the *National unity* be maintained. A fitting adjunct to this novel theory of our nationality is the dogma that in the different parts of our empire there must be uniformity of social systems and institutions; and to compel this very uniformity has now become the primary object of the terrible struggle which is desolating the country. This precise statement of fact admits of no candid denial, because the National Administration to-day stands pledged before the world, by the repeated and solemn proclamations of its chief, to accept no peace—no submission from the rebellious States—without the immediate surrender and destruction of the institution of slavery

But a National Union outside of the written compact of the Constitution! who can define such a form of government? Who can say what are the limitations of its power, and what the rights of the people, and of the States subject to its dominion? If the Union has outgrown and can outlive the Constitution, what shall we call it? What are its characteristics? Do the States remain, or are they to be extinguished and blotted out? If they remain are they to be provinces, merely, of a central authority, or will the people who inhabit them retain the power of self government, through local laws and local administrations? What and where is to be the dividing line between the sovereignty which the people exercise, through their State Legislatures, Governors and Judiciary, and the sovereignty and power of a National Union, which of necessity is to exist without restraint; when we have rejected the restraints of the Constitution? Will there be any such dividing line? Most assuredly there cannot be, because the partition of powers cannot exist at all, any more than a partition of land or territory can exist without some deed, compact or constitution, in which the boundary is defined. Conflict and chaos, therefore, are the necessary conditions of such a Union, until the States yield their attributes and become mere departments of a consolidated empire.

In France and in Russia national unity is a perfectly simple and intelligible conception, because the whole mass of sovereignty is possessed and wielded by a single government. In those magnificent empires there are no republics with the attributes of States, possessing political and sovereign power But such is not the unity of the American people and States. We have a Union or central government, and we have local and State governments. One of these conclusions must, therefore, be the basis of all government in this country: either—1. The Union must have all power and the States must perish; or—2. The States must have all power and the Union must perish; or—3. The powers of sovereignty must be divided by an inflexible organic law, assigning to each its due proportion, and erecting an impassable barrier against invasion or transgression by either. That organic law is the Constitution. Under it the Union and the States both exist, and may exist forever. But the very idea of National Union, without the Constitution as its basis and life, is absurd and impossible. Infinitely more than this, it is a revolutionary and chaotic idea, engendering discord and strife, and sapping the foundations of government and society. The direct consequence of this vague and shadowy conception of a Union with attributes and functions not derived from a written constitution, has been to mingle social theories and moral questions with national politics, producing hatred and strife between the great sections of the country, and culminating in the civil war which now desolates the whole land,

Our safety then must be found in a faithful adherence to the Constitution, because we thereby preserve from annihilation or disturbance the just sovereignty of the States, and the local laws and institutions which have immediate relation to the happiness and wants of every individual. Our highest duty lies in the same direction. The Federal Government has no more right to invade one section of the Union for a purpose outside of the Constitution, no more right to propagate by force of arms in one State the theories, sentiments and opinions of other States, than it has to invade the Kingdom of Brazil to abolish slavery, or the Turkish Empire to abolish poligamy. And if such is become the fixed and determined character of the war, as now

vaged by the National Government, we are enacting a stupendous crime, unsurpassed in atrocity by any recorded in the history of nations. The laws of the civilized world denounce such a crime, and it is equally condemned by the dictates of unchangeable and eternal justice.

It is an elementary and fundamental truth of our political system, that the Constitution and the Union are essentially the same. If a difference of phraseology can be employed in describing them, it is this: the Constitution is the compact or instrument from which the Union sprung, and Union is the condition of the States and of the people under the Constitution. So from the marriage contract springs the relation or condition of matrimony: and it is quite as intelligible to speak of the relation of husband and wife, without any agreement of the parties, as to speak of the Union of the States without the written Constitution which brought them together. It is true, that men and women may find their affinities, but the American States do not live together by affinity. They are united only by the legal bond of the Constitution.

And what is this Constitution in its grand and fundamental characteristics? After nearly eighty years of National existence under it, this is a question which springs suddenly into a living and vital significance. So smooth and peaceful have been the events of our history—so few and so light have been the shocks felt by the political and social fabric—that we forget how we became, and why we are a Nation. We have looked at the grandeur of results, and minds which do not or cannot discriminate have contemplated our nationality and our Union as they do the nationality and unity of other empires or republics of the past or present. We seem to have outlived the Constitution, and to have grown into a national unity resting on ideas, habits and emotions; and from this illusion have sprung theories and convictions fatally hostile to the Union established by the Constitution and to the peace of the country. The suppositious sins and errors of local communities have troubled the consciences of other communities as sins and errors of the whole nation. The opinions and sentiments of the North opposed to those of the South, aroused angry and dangerous discussion. Ambitious statesmen seized upon the subject of strife, and converted it into a political issue. A thousand pens and ten thousand tongues united in the chorus of invective and denunciation; and the invasion prompted by the blinded patriotism and burning conscience of John Brown, became the true and appropriate illustration of the ideal and emotional Union which seemed to have taken the place of the legal and constitutional Union established by our fathers.

Standing, as we do, in the presence of a great revolution which is rocking society to its base, we look around us for some safe standard of political duty and conduct, for some prop to steady and support the tottering fabric; and where shall we find it but in the Constitution? If we appeal to those moral and social impressions which prevail in one State or class of States, we are met by directly opposite convictions in other States and communities, and we thus invoke the very issue involved in the terrible struggle which has caused a shudder in every truly Christian and benevolent heart throughout the civilized world. In demanding uniformity of institutions, habits and thoughts, we demand no less than a surrender by those who differ from us of their own institutions, habits and modes of thought; and when we seek to enforce this demand by the power of arms, we appeal to the spirit of intolerance and conquest which in all ages has been so fatal to the peace of the world. Holland and the Netherlands were once dependencies of the Spanish monarchy, but they rejected the Roman Catholic religion with its adjuncts of the Inquisition and torture. An intolerant monarch, fanatically devoted to his religion, invaded those provinces, and ravaged them with fire and sword to "preserve the life of his nation," to maintain the unity of his empire, and to enforce uniformity of religious faith and observance. From the Spanish point of view, Protestantism was the cause of a war which, after a struggle of eighty years' duration—marked by every circumstance of atrocity and horror—resulted in separation and disunion; and Protestantism must, therefore, be abolished. In a sense altogether and exactly similar, slavery in the Southern States is the cause of the war, shocking to the humanity and civilization of the age, which now rages between the sections of this coun-

try. Philip II was a fanatic, a propagandist, and consequently a tyrant. He merited and has received the execrations of mankind. Let the casuist—let the ministers of religion answer how much better we shall stand before the Throne of Eternal Justice, if, overleaping constitutional barriers in pursuit of our own theories of national unity and social organization, we carry fire and sword and desolation into sister communities, having equal dignity and rights with us. The wail of anguish from the whole land, the shrieks of the wounded and dying, the smoke of burning cities and towns, have ascended to heaven, and as certainly as there is a Judge of all the Earth, so certainly must all men answer for the part they take in this terrible drama.

If the revolution which is shaking the pillars of society cannot be arrested, it is because it has proceeded too far for the utterance, the comprehension, and the acceptance of the plainest and simplest constitutional truths. But let us never despair while there is ground for hope. We say, then, it is a fundamental truth, to be accepted or rejected by men, as they wish to save or destroy the political institutions of their country, *that under the Constitution of the United States there is no shadow of right, in peace or war, by its laws or its military power, to spread or to propagate the opinions or sentiments of any class or section, upon social and moral questions.* Let this great truth sink into the minds of the people; let it be carried at once into their political action, and, while on the one hand it leaves all the material power of the nation free to be exercised in the enforcement of law, on the other it puts aside issues and purposes which are revolutionary and aggressive, and which impart to the pending contest its bitterness of sentiment and a despairing energy of resistance.

How then did we become a nation, and what is our mode of national existence? The colonies were separate appendages of the crown of Great Britain. By their declaration of independence they announced themselves to the world as "Free and independent States, with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do." By the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain they were acknowledged to be "Free and independent States." By the Articles of Confederation, adopted during the revolutionary struggle, they styled themselves "The United States of America," but declared thus: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right which is not by this Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Those articles then set forth the terms of "a firm league of friendship between the States, for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare." Less than ten years later they were superseded by the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, which, like the Confederation, was a compact between the same States, separately accepted and ratified by each; a compact which delegated certain named powers and functions to the United States, but reserved all other powers, in the following exact and comprehensive language: "*The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.*" The grand distinction between the Confederation and the Constitution was, that the former established no government to execute the specified powers which were granted, while the latter did establish one in the three departments—Legislative, Judicial, and Executive. The Confederation was more a treaty than a government. The Constitution is more a government than a treaty. If we have to-day any rightful National Government it is this Constitution. No other has ever been ordained. It is not a Government of ideas, emotions, or traditions. Its powers are derivative, and they are defined by a written instrument. They are ample for the national purposes intended, and they are, according to Northern opinion, incapable of revocation by the States which granted them.

There are many good and intelligent people, who will be astonished to know the smallness, not in dignity and importance, but in number and specification, of the powers of sovereignty which the States, by this Constitution, granted to the Union. In these enumerated powers, legislative and executive, and in a judiciary department to interpret the Constitution, treaties and the laws of Congress, is comprehended the whole sovereignty of the Union, while all the other attributes of sovereign and independent communities are reserved to the States. The Government of the Union is certainly of

great dignity and importance. It regulates commercial and diplomatic intercourse with other nations. It holds in its hands the destinies of peace and war. It coins the currency of the country. It establishes postal communications, and it has certain other relations to the general happiness and welfare. But with all its dignity and power it cannot pass a law for the observance of the Sabbath; it cannot enact a single regulation of internal trade; it cannot prescribe the requisites of a deed or will; it cannot regulate the protest of a note; it has nothing to do with the marriage relation, with parental or filial duties; it cannot punish adultery, polygamy, or petit larceny; it cannot suppress immorality of any description; it has no general jurisdiction over crime or the civil rights of the citizens of the States; it cannot dissolve the indenture of an apprentice, and it cannot MAKE OR EMANCIPATE A SLAVE. Of course we are speaking only of powers to be exercised within the States.

There are few minds which consider, and none which can grasp the infinite number and variety of the relations which, in a civilized and commercial country, exist between political sovereignty or government on the one hand and the citizen on the other. They are indeed without number, and wholly incapable of specification; and we arrive at some just conception of our political duties and situation when we reflect that in all these relations, except the few enumerated and specified in the constitutional grant of power to the National Union, it is State sovereignty and State law which impose their restraints upon us and throw around us their protection. All government is organized human society, and the range of subjects over which it extends its visible and invisible influence is therefore boundless and infinite. If, then, we take the number one thousand to represent conventionally the total mass of political sovereignty, we cannot hesitate to affirm that nine hundred and ninety-nine parts belong to the government of each State, while only one is held by the common agent of all the States, the Government of the Union.

Not merely the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution of the United States, but the fundamental laws and constitutions of the States themselves, announce their sovereignty in the most unmistakable language. The Constitution of Massachusetts declares as follows:—"The People of this Commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of governing themselves as a free and independent State." And again: "The People inhabiting the territory of Massachusetts Bay do hereby solemnly and mutually agree with each other to form themselves into a sovereign and independent body politic or State, by the name of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." The organic law of New Hampshire is cast in the same language. The Constitution of Maine declares that, "We, the people of Maine, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the name and style of the State of Maine." In the first Constitution of New York it is ordained and declared "that no authority shall, on any pretence whatever, be exercised over the people or members of this State, but such as shall be derived from and granted by them." Similar declarations of sovereignty may be found in the fundamental ordinances of all the States In Louisiana, where the President is now engaged in regulating the elective franchise, and in establishing a government to be based on military force and the consent of *one tenth of the people*, the State Constitution declares:—"We, the people of Louisiana, do form ourselves into a free and independent State;" and further, "no power of suspending the laws of this State shall be exercised unless by the Legislature or its authority." The President has not merely suspended but annulled those laws, and proposes to force upon nine tenths of the people, whether loyal or disloyal, another constitution and different laws!

There is a further and most conclusive illustration of this subject. Nothing so distinctly marks political sovereignty as the right of succession to the land or soil of a country, when there is no individual owner—in other words, when the private owner dies without a will and without heirs entitled to the inheritance It is a fundamental principle of the Constitution of Great Britain that the Crown is the original proprietor of all lands within the realm, that all private titles are derived from the Crown, and that the King succeeds by escheat when the title becomes vacant by intestacy and the want of heirs. When the American Re-

volution separated the colonies from that Empire, each colony succeeded as a State to this prerogative of the Crown. The State governments, as political sovereignties, became the original and ultimate proprietors of all lands within their boundaries, and no other power on earth exercised the slightest dominion over their soil. This principle of sovereignty, which prevails incontestably in every State in the Union, is expressed with entire accuracy in an organic statute of New York: "The people of this State, in their right of sovereignty, are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the State; and all lands the title to which shall fail from a defect of heirs, shall revert on escheat to the people." And again says another statute: "The sovereignty and jurisdiction of this State extend to all places within the boundaries thereof, but the extent of such jurisdiction over places that have been or may be ceded to the United States, shall be qualified by the terms of such cession." Probably, in all the States, locations have been granted or ceded to the Union for forts, arsenals, hospitals, military or naval schools, etc., and in those localities the Union exercises such a degree of political sovereignty as the States have thought proper to yield, and no other.

Now it would seem to be a doctrine to be accepted by every person of common intelligence, that the sovereignty of a country is that authority, whether wielded by king or people, under and from which the land within its boundaries is held by subjects or citizens, and to which the land returns when private ownership ceases. The principle has been received for ages, and if we try the question by this standard, there can be no hesitation in affirming that in this country original and primary sovereignty belongs to the States, as organized political societies.

This sovereignty, as we have seen, comprehends the innumerable mass of political powers which are wielded to meet the ever varying and extending wants and wishes of human society. It nevertheless lacks something of completeness and perfection, because each State, on entering into the Union, agreed by the compact of the Constitution to surrender certain particular powers, exceedingly few in number, although conceded to be of great importance to the general welfare and defence. The powers surrendered, as we have also seen, are enumerated with great precision of language, while all others are reserved.

Our political system is, therefore, a compound one, because with us sovereignty, in its complete and perfect sense, is compounded by that which belongs to the Union and that which belongs to the States. If to the latter we add the limited and special powers granted to the Union, the result is government in the fullness of all its attributes. As the powers of government are thus wielded by two agencies, with a line of distinction or separation between them which is marked by the Constitution, so the allegiance of the citizen must correspond exactly with that division. To the Federal Government he owes allegiance in respect to the powers which the States in the Constitution have granted to it, and he owes to it no other allegiance, deference or duty. To the State of which he is a citizen, and whose laws protect him in the great mass of his interests and social relations, he owes all other allegiance. Allegiance to the Federal Government is special, because its powers and functions are special. Allegiance to the State is general, because its powers and sovereignty are general, and exist without enumeration or specification, or grant from any other power.

Now, those who advocate the doctrine of secession as a Constitutional right simply maintain that as the government of the Union is incontestably a grant of certain powers by the States, so the States can revoke the grant, and thus dissolve the allegiance of the citizen to that government. This pretension is met by the antagonistic proposition that the grant is irrevocable and perpetual. So we think—so we maintain. And this is the true question between the Union and the rebellious States. It can only be in a mind and conscience darkened by error or passion that the soldiers and bayonets of the Federal Government have any other mission upon the soil of those States than to enforce the powers granted to the Union by the Constitution. It is a mission of force whenever resistance exists. When resistance ceases the mission is accomplished; the Union remains, the States remain; and government, no longer obstructed in its functions, re-

sumes its peaceful sway. This is the doctrine of all true and enlightened loyalists, of all men who have a sincere and intelligent wish for peace, with the restoration of order and law; of all men who have a rational hope of saving from the fathomless gulf of anarchy the political and social institutions of this country. Whoever has purposes of a different character, whoever invokes the terrible agencies of war and desolation for the dissemination of his own theories and wishes, upon social and moral questions, is a propagandist and revolutionist, whether he be the busy Politician of a Ward, a Preacher of the Gospel, a Senator in Congress, or the President of the United States.

Rejecting, as we do, the heresy of secession, the States cannot absolve the citizen from the obedience which he owes to the constitutional powers of the Union. But as he owes to the State all other obedience, it is a conclusion of common sense and public law equally plain, that there is no power in any branch of the Federal Government which can dissolve the allegiance due from the citizen to the State. This divided yet harmonious allegiance, resulting from the partition of powers between two sovereignties, is the grand and chief characteristic of our institutions. Each of these sovereignties acts directly upon the citizen and demands equally his obedience. The sovereignty of the Union is not over the States or the laws amd constitutions of the States. On the contrary, it is wholly derived by a grant from the States as the original and primary sovereigns. It is a sovereignty over the citizen precisely commensurate with that grant. Every attempt to exercise over him a power not conferred by the Constitution, is simply an attempt to interfere with his allegiance to the State, which is a duty not less solemn and sacred than his allegiance to the Union. In the sum total of allegiance due from the citizen, the whole belongs to the State, except the portion substracted by the terms of the written Constitution and transferred by the States to the Union. The exertion of armed power by one sovereign to subvert the allegiance of the citizen or subject of another, by assuming to itself the sovereign power, is identical with an effort to overthrow such other sovereignty. Invasion and conquest are the principles involved in such an effort, and this is condemned by the laws of the civilized world. The invaded sovereign and people have not only the right, but it is their duty to repel such invasion.

This very doctrine that the Federal Government acts only upon individual in the exercise of its enumerated powers, is exactly the opposite of secession by States. In it lies the strength and majesty of the Union. It exhibits the Union as supreme in the exercise of its granted powers over all the citizens of this country, while it admits the supremacy of the States in the exercise of all other powers. It is a doctrine which alone gives to the judicial arm of the government the power and right to arraign, to try, and to punish the individual for treason to its sovereignty, while it clothes the government with the thunders and panoply of war, to put down armed resistance to its just authority.

The Constitution of the United States recognizes and defines the crime of treason against its sovereignty, and primarily it consists in "*levying war against them.* Nothing can more distinctly proclaim the sovereignty of the Union to be over individuals, and not over States, or the laws and constitutions of States. Confining our attention to domestic war against the United States, the traitor is the party who levies the war, and the party who levies the war is the traitor. But treason, like other crimes, is an individual offence, to be charged by indictment, tried by jury, and punished according to the laws of the land. To impute treason to a State involves an utter absurdity. A State cannot be indicted and tried for treason, any more than it can for a misdemeanor or a burglary. A State cannot be imprisoned or put to death. It cannot be subjected to forfeiture or punishment of any description, because it is incapable of the commission of crime. It cannot forfeit its sovereignty, its constitution and laws. A State no more owes allegiance to the Union than the Union does to a State, and neither owes such allegiance. But the citizens of each State owe part of their allegiance to the Union and all the residue to the States. Citizens in greater or in smaller numbers may be rebels and traitors, by "levying war," but the States, as political societies, cannot. If such, at the present moment, is not the true relation between the Union

and the rebellious people of the South, then Jefferson Davis is not a traitor to the government of the United States. We repeat, States cannot rebel. Nor can they secede. They are fixed in the Union forever, and can no more forsake it than a planet can forsake its orbit around the sun. The citizens of a State combining in sufficient numbers may gain possession of the powers of administration in a State government and wield those powers against the Union; but sovereignty is not lost or destroyed, although its powers are misdirected. A sovereignty may be subjugated by force, but it cannot be a rebel.

But, say the advocates of war overleaping the bounds of the Constitution, of desolating and exterminating war, "*Slavery, by rebellion, has sinned away its day of grace.*" We answer neither virtue nor vice, nor social institutions, whether good or bad, can be guilty of the crime of rebellion. They cannot be indicted and tried. They are incapable of personification except in the rhapsodies of transcendental politicians and preachers who seek to pervert a war to enforce obedience to a fixed Constitution and established laws, into a war of aggression and conquest; a war upon ideas, habits and institutions. Such are the wars which in all ages have desolated the earth. Certainly the owner of slaves may be a rebel, and so may a Roman Catholic or a Presbyterian. So may the sinless Puritan of Massachusetts. The defence of a principle or an institution may prompt the action of the individual. But Government, in the maintenance of its just authority, deals with the individual and not with the principle, opinion or institution which animates his conduct. Undoubtedly, Governments whose sovereignty is unlimited may enact laws which bear upon social relations and moral questions. But the sovereignty of the United States has no such attribute or function to be exercised within the States. How stupendous the crime, then, of attempting to accomplish by the terrible agencies of force, of fire and sword, that which the national sovereignty is utterly powerless to ordain by law!

The relation between the Union and the States is that of co-ordinate sovereignties, the former having the right to execute its enumerated powers within the territory of the latter. To execute those powers the Union has a Judiciary, an Army and a Navy. Whosoever resists their execution is guilty of the offence of treason. If resistance assumes the form of organized war, all engaged in it are guilty of that offence. War may be made upon them, they may be wounded or slain in battle, even as an armed band of smugglers may who forcibly defy the law. Such a war may even assume vast proportions, according to the strength and numbers of those engaged in resistance; and questions may spring up during its continuance to be determined by the rules which regulate the conduct of belligerent nations. Prisoners may be exchanged, and captures on the sea may be condemned as prizes of war. But the moment that armed rebellion is suppressed, and the war ended, all such questions pass away; constitutions and laws resume their peaceful sway, and disturbance no longer exists in the fixed relations between the Government and the citizen.

Standing on the principles herein enunciated, on the one hand we hold the sovereignty of the Union strictly to its circumscribed powers, while on the other we maintain the allegiance of every citizen of this land to the Constitution and laws. On the same principles we also maintain that the Union is a perpetual and unchangeable relation of the States to each other and to the national Government. If we are right, the Union is not dissolved, but is now composed of thirty-four States, fixed in their positions by a perpetual Constitution as the planets are fixed in their orbits by an irreversible law of nature. If to-morrow every rebel should lay down his arms and return to allegiance, the Union would remain not only perfect in theory, perfect in all its parts, but undisturbed in the exercise of its constitutional and accustomed functions and powers. But as the Union cannot be perfect with less than all the States, the States would also remain in all their perfection as local sovereignties, with their constitutions and laws unimpaired. And there is no power on earth, except armed and lawless power, to change the Constitution and laws of a single one of these thirty-four States. We say the Union is perpetual because the States with their just sovereignty and rights are perpetually its members, and there is no Union without the parts of

which it is composed. The assurance of perpetuity is in the unchangeable law of the Constitution, made by the States themselves, in the benefits of Union, in the love which it ought to inspire, and in the power of coercion to compel individuals everywhere to submit to its authority. When all the citizens who compose the sovereignty of a State are obedient also to the sovereignty of the Union, when their allegiance is rendered to each sovereignty according to the constitutional partition of powers, the State, by a logical and constitutional necessity, is in the Union, and all parts of our noble political system work harmoniously together.

In opposition to those principles which alone can save the government and preserve society from the shocks of revolution, we find the leaders and guides of a great political party disseminating over the land crude and monstrous theories which admit and proclaim the Union already dissolved, and the Constitution already overthrown. Animated by one ruling and all pervading wish, that of overthrowing the institutions and sovereignty of the Southern States, they find the doctrine of a fixed and perpetual Union under the limitations of the Constitution, a Union such as the fathers of the republic ordained, standing directly in their way, and this must therefore be disposed by some new conception of the crisis into which they have plunged the country. We purpose to notice these deformed and misbegotten theories. But first let us recall what but recently seemed to be the opinion of the whole country concerning the rebellion and the duties of the situation.

On the 4th of March, 1861, Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States. The people of six States had then passed ordinances of secession, and had organized the Southern Confederacy. On that imposing occasion Mr. Lincoln, after taking a solemn oath "to protect and defend the Constitution," in the course of his inaugural address said "If the destruction of the Union by all or a part only of the States be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost its vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union; that laws and ordinances to that effect are equally void, and that acts of violence within any State against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary according to circumstances. *I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and laws, the Union is unbroken.*" As Mr. Lincoln then said, so the country believed. Widely as men differed as to the policy which had brought the crisis upon us, and as to the mode of treating it, the sentiment that the Union was indestructible and the Constitution in force, with all its authority and all its limitations, met with a universal response. As Mr. Lincoln then said, so we have now said, and maintained with all the power of argument and illustration at our command.

Again, less than two months later, on the 22d of April, 1861, after the flame of actual war had been kindled, Mr. Seward, the President's Prime Minister, thus expressed himself in a diplomatic paper: "The condition of slavery in the States will remain just the same whether it (the rebellion) shall succeed or fail. There is not even a pretext for the complaint that the disaffected States are to be conquered by the United States if the revolution fail, for the rights of the States and the condition of every human being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws and forms of administration whether the rebellion shall succeed or shall fail. Their constitution, laws, customs, habits and institutions, in either case, will remain the same. It is hardly necessary to add to this incontestable statement the further fact, that the new President, as well as the citizens through whose suffrage he has come into the administration, has always repudiated all designs, whatever and wherever imputed to him, of disturbing the system of slavery as it is existing under the constitution and laws. The case would, however, not be fully presented if I were to omit to say that any such efforts on his part would be unconstitutional."

Such were the sentiments of the President, as enunciated in his name and by his authority, and such we are told were the views of "the citizens" by whose suffrage he had been elevated to power. Since then how fearful and how rapid has been the descent into the abyss of revolution and crime.

And again, two months later, on the 22d of July, 1861, when eleven States had seceded from the Union, when we stood in the midst of the terrible realities of war,

the Congress of the United States, in order to arouse and confirm the loyalty of the people in all sections of the country, and to repel all charges that the war was to be prosecuted for any unconstitutional and revolutionary purpose, unanimously resolved, "That this war is not waged in any spirit of aggression, or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering in the rights or established institutions of the States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired, and that as soon as those are objects accomplished the war ought to cease."

Such then were the issues and purposes of the war as proclaimed by the President and the Congress of the United States. It was to be a war to maintain a Union unbroken by ordinances of secession, unbroken even by the actual presence of rebellion and war, a war to maintain an existing and perpetual Union of equal States by the suppression of armed resistance to its authority. Let us mark the shameful contrast. Now, in the same Representative hall from which the foregoing resolution was sent forth to arouse the patriotism of the people, an unsexed woman proclaims a new purpose of war, to wit, the overthrow of States and Constitutions by conquest—proclaims a new Union founded on the emotions of passion and hate, of love for the negro and hatred for the whites—a Union unknown to the political system of this country; and this is done with the President of the United States sitting on her right hand, Vice-President on her left, and the Speaker in the chair! A responsive echo to this passionate female voice is found in the public declaration of Mr. Chase, a cabinet minister, and perhaps the greatest of the leaders of Republican opinion, who tells us "*the Nation is to be born again*," This is the very language of the Dantons, the Marats and the Robespierres of the French Revolution. It is the language of revolution and anarchy in all ages and countries.

That the sudden and violent enfranchisement of the four millions of slaves in the Southern States has now become the leading principle and animating purpose of the war as carried on by the National Administration, we suppose, is no langer a disputed proposition. When the President, in September, 1862, launched his preliminary, and on the 1st January, 1863, his final thunderbolt of emancipation, a great body of his supporters failed to see the vast and revolutionary scope of that edict. Many were unconscious themselves of a purpose to overthrow the constitutions and laws of eleven States of the Union. The meaning of the edict was sufficiently plain because, by its very terms, it declared the slaves to be "forever free," and pledged the armies and navies of the Union to "maintain that freedom." But as this political decree could not have its literal effect without overthrowing the constitution and subverting the fundamental principles on which the Union is based, timid and halting Republicans interpreted it as a mere order of a military commander inviting slaves to join the invading forces, but totally powerless to change the constitution and laws of States; and therefore powerless to affect the *legal status* or condition of any human being. This was in substance denying to it any effect whatever, except as an illusive and deceptive invitation to slaves to abandon their masters. But with this false and erroneous interpretation of the Presidential manifesto, it received the plaudits of a united party. The hesitating Seward, who had denied even the possibility of such an invasion of the sovereignty and constitutional rights of States, approved it as a "war measure," while the exultant Chase grasped its literal, its terrible import.

The false interpretation of this imperial decree has been removed by its author. The President in his message and "amnesty" proclamation of December, 1863, has plainly announced to the world his purpose of continuing this devastating and exhausting war, not merely until resistance to the laws of the Union has ceased, but until the laws and constitutions of the States maintaining the institution of slavery shall be changed by the compulsion of arms. And those who approved the proclamation of emancipation under a frivolous interpretation which deprived it of all legal significance are now understood to have surrendered their transient scruples, and to yield to it their support without that or any other reservation. We state what we suppose to be now an admitted fact when we say, that nowhere in all the councils of the republican party is there a single voice raised in favor of the Union of the States without emancipation, and with the equality and rights to which the Constitution entitles

them. We know that the words "Union and the Constitution" have not wholly passed from use. But they mean simply unity and consolidation under the pressure of power to be enforced by a desolating and exterminating war, and not the union of co-equal sovereignties ordained by the Constitution.

It is, however, a conclusion plain even to passionate fanatics and heated partisans that the Constitution does not justify the proposed invasion of equal States and the intended destruction of their institutions. Every mind must assent to the doctrine that if we proceed according to the Constitution, it must not be transcended, and that simple obedience to its authority is the object and the limit of war. But the purpose to use the military power of the nation, in order to overthrow all the laws and constitutions of States by which slavery is maintained, has diffused itself throughout a great political party, and this purpose must find some doctrinal justification or be abandoned. Out of this necessity various theories have arisen to justify a war of invasion and conquest *outside of the Constitution.*

The first of these theories is the illogical and illshapen conception of Mr. Sumner. According to his view of the political situation, an abolition war is justified upon the doctrine that State sovereignty was lost, and the Southern States themselves extinguished by their ordinances of secession and their resistance to constitutional authority. This being assumed, it is then asserted that the States, in a sense both geographical and political, have become mere provinces or territories of the Union, and as such may be governed absolutely. From the right to govern absolutely, necessarily flows the right to annul all local laws and overturn all local institutions.

To these conclusions, we oppose the self-evident proposition that a State or sovereignty cannot commit suicide. A political State is composed of its people, their laws and constitution of government, and perpetual succession and sovereignty are its necessary attributes. It may be invaded and conquered by lawless power, but it cannot cease to exist by the force of a legal or logical proposition. The very conception of forfeiture implies that the whole of sovereignty with its infinite mass of power is held of some superior sovereign, and this is a contradiction in terms. That which has a superior cannot be a sovereign. The separate sovereignties of the Union and of the States have been elucidated in those pages. As we have shown each is exercised upon different questions or subjects with a constitutional line of partition between them, and each is perpetual, if the Constitution is perpetual. But from the very nature of the system, if all the States should withdraw from the compact the sovereignty of the Union would be lost. But the Union cannot withdraw the sovereignty of the States or of any of them. It can enforce obedience to its constitutional authority, but there its rightful powers end.

Equally false and illogical is the Sumner theory in another aspect. The States which formed the Union were certainly never territories of the Union. The Union sprung from the States and not the States from the Union. As pre-existing sovereignties their soil never belonged to the Union. By inevitable logic, if the separation of States is possible, they return to their original situation, with all the attributes of perfect and separate sovereignty. The separation of a State, if possible, is simply a revocation of the enumerated powers granted to the Union. So far it impairs the sovereignty of the latter and reannexes to the State the portion which had been granted away. Jefferson Davis says this separation is possible, and so says Mr. Sumner. We hold them both to be wrong, and that ordinances of secession are void and inoperative to all intents and purposes whatever. If they are not void, then Mr. Davis is right as to all the consequences and results which flow from the separation. Then the seceded States are in the rightful possession of a perfect sovereignty, and Mr. Sumner proposes a war of invasion and conquest, for which there is not only no warrant in the Constitution, but which is condemned by the rules of Christianity and the law of the civilized world.

Opposed to the Sumner theory of State suicide, but equally false, is another, probably of still wider influence. One of its most prominent advocates is Mr. Stevens, "The Chancellor of the Exchequer" in the House of Representatives, whose speech is before us as we write. Like Mr. Sumner, he declares the seceding

States to be out of the Union, but with infinitely better logic, instead of remanding them to a territorial and provincial condition, he holds them to be foreign powers, and that the war against the "Confederate States" is a war against a foreign nation. He, too, like Sumner, is an Abolitionist; and, upon this doctrine, he relieves himself from the restraints of the Constitution. He says: "'*The Union as it was and the Constitution as it is*,' *is an atrocious idea*;" and thus throwing off all constitutional restraints, those who darken their intelligence and delude their consciences by this doctrine, write "emancipation" on their banners, and march their invading hosts against the sovereignty, institutions, and laws of a foreign power. By a singular incongruity of logic and of thought, these theorists, after conquering and subduing the Southern States as a foreign power, propose to punish the citizens of those States as domestic traitors. Confiscation, widespread and universal, desolation and destruction, are the concomitants of this humane and enlightened policy!

Now, the transparent vice of this theory is, that it accepts the secession of States not only as a fact, but as a fixed conclusion of public law. To this conclusion, also, we oppose the doctrine of the perpetuity of the Union and the irrevocable compact of the Constitution. As Mr. Lincoln said, in 1861, as all loyal men then said so we say now: the Union is legally and constitutionally unbroken, and the only mission of our army is to vindicate its just authority, and that mission, we say here, should be attended by the mightier agencies of conciliation and kindness.

Words need not be wasted on a doctrine which proclaims the Union already dissolved. If Mr. Thaddeus Stevens is right, so, we repeat, Jefferson Davis is right; for they both agree in the essential proposition that the seceding States are a foreign power. But, in imputing to them that character, it is necessarily implied that they are rightfully independent of all other powers on the earth. What can be more absurd in logic or atrocious in morals than a doctrine which assigns to the Southern States a place outside of the Union for the purpose of carrying on a war against them outside of the Constitution, yet instantly returns them to the Union for the purpose of confiscation ar punishment for treason to its authority Such an absurdity needs no refutatio If the doctrine is right in its first ar fundamental proposition, that the sece ing States are a foreign power, then th war is without cause and cannot be righ fully prosecuted a moment longer. W have no cause of war with the South: a foreign nation; and, in the name of ou raged humanity and Christian civiliz tion, let it come to an end. If there be settled maxim in the law of the moder world, it is, that the independence of n tions ought to be respected, and th no social or moral theories can justify a invasion of their sovereignty or soi Christian Europe has for ages not onl tolerated but maintained the polygamou Empire of Turkey. This great princip lies at the very foundation of the peace the world. More than any thing else, distinguishes modern civilization from th intolerance and barbarism of other time "Death or the Koran" was the battle-cr of the Mohammedan hosts, as they swe over the nations to disseminate the rel gion of their prophet. "Death or Ab lition" is now the motto of a great polit cal party and the Oriflamme borne at th head of our invading armies.

But the President of the United State has also a doctrine and a policy of hi own, which are exhibited in his lates message to Congress, and in the contem poraneous so-called "Amnesty Proclama tion." Unable to withdraw himself fro the fearful and revolutionary pledge co tained in his Proclamation of Emancip tion, and rejecting the interpretatio which falsified its meaning, he has in vented a grotesque and novel theory t relieve himself from the inconvenienc of the Constitution which he swore t maintain in peace and in war. Accord ingly he has found in the pardoning func tion of his office a power to overthrow the constitutions of eleven States of th Union. By an inversion of logic of thought and sentiment which would b astonishing were it not so common, the attribute of pardoning mercy which the Constitution has bestowed on the chief magistrate of the Union is converted into a power which the whole government of the United States does not possess, and into a terrible engine of oppression and wrong.

Stripped of all useless and circumlocu-

ory forms of expression, this latest manifestation of the President's views and policy may be stated in the following sequence: 1st. All persons who have been engaged in the present Rebellion are guilty of treason. 2d. The President has, under the Constitution, the pardoning power. 3. He will graciously pardon the greater number of those persons provided they will support his Proclamation of Emancipation and all other proclamations, past or future, relating to slavery, and will take an oath to that effect. 4th. He will recognize new State governments without the institution of slavery, which governments are to be created and organized by the suffrages of one-tenth of the voters in the States who take such oath. Necessarily the *existing* constitutions, laws, and sovereignty of the States are annulled and destroyed. 5. The other nine-tenths of the people refusing to take the oath are outlawed, even if they were never rebels, or if, having been rebels, they are willing to lay down their arms and submit to the Constitution and laws of the United States. We beg to be understood as stating in this sequence, with entire and absolute accuracy, the policy of Mr. Lincoln as announced to the country in his last message and proclamation.

Now if this policy, like that of Thaddeus Stevens, regards the seceded States as foreign powers; or if, like that of Mr. Sumner, it considers them extinguished and degraded to mere Territories, then besides the fatal objections already considered, it is liable to the further and equally fatal one, that the President has no shadow of authority to recognize or admit new States into the Union. If he can do this, then by the power of arms and a presidential edict Cuba can be annexed. If he can do this, then he may admit the Territory of Nevada as a State with such a constitution as he chooses to dictate. These assumptions need no further refutation.

But the President probably regards the Union as unbroken, as stated in his inaugural address, and all the States as held in the Union by the perpetual bond of the Constitution. Such is our doctrine. But by inexorable logic it follows that acts of secession and war are the treasonable acts of the individuals engaged in them; and the States being in the Union are necessarily there with their sovereignty, their constitutions, and laws. How, then, can the President overthrow that sovereignty and expunge those constitutions and laws by the punishment or the pardon of individuals, or by any power known to the Constitution? The very conception of punishment or pardon implies that the persons who are subjects of either of these dispensations owe allegiance to the Union. But that is impossible, unless they are citizens of a State which is a member of the Union.

But again, the President's amnesty is conditioned on the emancipation of slaves, and an oath to observe and obey all his proclamations on that subject. Now, a conditional pardon or amnesty *is a punishment for the supposed crime.* A remission of a sentence of death, on a condition of perpetual imprisonment, is simply a punishment for the offense by a perpetual imprisonment. But neither the President nor Congress has any power to punish. They can only make war against armed insurrection or treason. The power to punish, by a sacred provision of the Constitution, belongs to the judiciary alone, which must proceed by indictment and trial. But without indictment, trial, or sentence, the President proposes by his conditional pardon or amnesty, to punish by a universal confiscation of property. The alternatives are outlawry and exile, or death. Submission to the laws simply and purely he refuses to accept. Submission to the laws is submission to all the chances of indictment and trial according to law. The President demands, not this submission, but without trial he exacts a punishment which can be inflicted only after a trial and conviction in the courts. We repeat, a conditional pardon is a punishment precisely commensurate with the condition imposed.

This punishment, we add, is universal. Millions of people rebel, and millions are to be punished. Such an atrocious and vindictive assertion of sovereignty was never before heard of, or even conceived, in the history of the whole world. A large number of the people of England engaged in the rebellion of Monmouth against the throne and sovereignty of James the Second. Some three hundred of them were punished, not by the king, but tried and condemned according to law. "The bloody assizes," and the name of Judge Jeffries, have received the

execrations of mankind. Mr. Lincoln, without the attributes of a judge, hurls the penalty of confiscation against a million of offenders. But infinitely worse, he punishes the innocent with the guilty. The impressed soldier and voluntary rebel fall equally under his condemnation. Women and minors, non-combatants and Unionists, equally with the open traitor, are assumed to need a pardon which mercifully spares their lives on condition of submitting to a different form of punishment.

But the crowning feature of this extraordinary policy is its assertion of authority, not merely to overthrow State governments, but to re-create them by the vote of one-tenth of the people who by the pressure of arms may be willing to accept the proffered amnesty. These new governments are to be "recognized," and necessarily the power of the Union is pledged to sustain them against the other nine-tenths of the people who may adhere to their existing constitutions and laws. Of this nine-tenths, all who have been rebels may be willing to lay down their arms and submit to the authority of the Union, claiming only the rights to which they are entitled under the laws of their States. Yet unless they are willing also to accept the pardon of the President with its punitive conditions, they are excluded from citizenship and subjected to the political domination of the remaining one-tenth, and this relation between the majority and the minority is to be maintained by the military power of the nation. In the result the pardoned traitors in all the rebellious States amounting to one-tenth of the voting population may wield all the powers of sovereignty over more than equal numbers of subject and enslaved people who, having never been disloyal, decline to accept a vindictive pardon for their loyalty. In this manner Mr. Lincoln and his Generals are now proceeding to organize new civil governments in the Southern States. If the powers thus assumed by him were known to the Constitution, their execution would nevertheless be a monstrous and gigantic wrong. But in the consummation of such a scheme the Constitution itself must be trampled under foot. The President has no power to admit or "recognize" States, or to organize or reorganize civil governments in them. He is commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, and he may execute the laws of the Union. But he is not the sovereign of this country, nor can he establish such a tyranny in any portion of it until constitutional liberty is crushed beneath the iron heel of military power.

This one-tenth of the voting population composed of repentant and pardoned rebels, of camp followers and parasites of power, sustained by the soldiers and bayonets of the United States, is not only to wield the sovereignties of eleven States but the same minorities will bring these sovereignties into the Government of the Union. Each spurious State will be entitled to two senators in Congress, and the number of its representatives in the other house will be undiminished by the exclusion from civil rights of the proscribed nine-tenths of the people.

Now, one-tenth of the white population of the seceded States amounts to but little over half a million of souls. Their representation in the Senate of the United States will equal that of eleven loyal States having a population of more than sixteen millions; and in the other branch of the National Legislature it will equal that of States which number over eight millions. Such is to be the Government of this Union under the administration of Abraham Lincoln. Let us conceive a President of the United States chosen by electoral votes counted in the Capitol at Washington on the appointed day and based on eleven State sovereignties thus "recognized" and created. The Union would be shaken from center to circumference. It needs no prophetic eye to foresee that the days of such a Government must be speedily numbered.

We have done with the policy of Mr. Lincoln. We have done also with the other wild and fantastic theories which have been invented to drug the intellect and appease the consciences of men whose overmastering wish is to escape plain constitutional restraints and duties so that the spirit of intolerance and the lust of conquest may have free scope to accomplish their unholy purposes. We have, as we persuade ourselves, presented the undeniable truths of our political system—truths which impose upon every citizen in every station not only the restraints of the fundamental law, but the very highest corresponding moral obligations; and we have dissected and examined all the false conceptions and ideas

of the situation, which having assumed a tangible form, and having responsible authors, seemed to challenge discussion.

There are still other illusions floating in minds incapable of rational deduction or consecutive thought. One of these takes the form of a postulate like the following: "The rebels having rejected and repudiated the Constitution, are not entitled to demand its protection." This exceedingly shallow sophistry, perhaps, has done more to unsettle minds and plunge the country into the vortex of revolution, than even the mischievous dogmas which we have examined. Shallow as the sophistry is, it deserves to be rebuted for the evil it has done.

The rebellious people of the South most certainly have rejected the Constitution and laws, and have resisted them by force. What, then, is their offence? Every mind must answer, it is simply *treason*. It is no more and no less. They are in the eye of the law criminals, and that is all. Their offence is defined by the Constitution, and the laws have provided the mode of punishment. Now the greatest criminal, equally with the most exalted saint, is entitled to the protection of law. He is entitled to be tried by his peers, and, if convicted, to be punished only *according to the law*. When law is broken, Government must keep within it, and may inflict the punishment which it prescribes. If Government goes one step further, it becomes itself the offender, and resistance to its usurpation is an undoubted right. When citizens defy the laws, the business of Government is to compel them to submit to the laws. The feeblest mind can comprehend and apply the principle. The rebels resist the authority of the Constitution, and force may be used to compel their obedience to it. But as their obedience is only due to the Constitution and the laws, the use of force by the Government to overthrow the Constitution, and to set up in its place some other authority, instantly reverses the relations of the parties and changes the principles of the contest. And thus a lawless rebellion may be converted at once into a necessary self-defence, justified by the laws of nature and of all nations. If such has now become the relative situation of the Government and the present rebellion, it is an unspeakable misfortune, into which the country has been plunged by the blind infatuation of party, which embraces every wretched delusion and inverts all principle and truth.

But the rebellious people of the Southern States *do not demand the protection of the Constitution*. On the contrary, they say they are *outside* of the Constitution; and so says the miserable sophism we are refuting. And this postulate being agreed on, the rebels demand not the protection of the Constitution, but peace and repose. Accepting the formula, "you are outside of the Constitution," they press these terrible questions upon us, "Why then do you invade us? Why then do you march your armed hosts to desolate our land? Why do you wrap a continent in the all devouring and devastating flame of war? If not for the sake of your Constitution, why is humanity compelled to shudder at the scenes you are enacting?" How shall we escape the inexorable logic of these all searching enquiries? Let those whom constitutions and laws cannot bind, come forward and answer.

In the meantime, a powerful political organization is sweeping on in its work of destruction. One class of revolutionists adopts the theory of State suicid and the degradation of States to territorial and provincial subjection. Another maintains that the States, bound to the Union by a a perpetual constitution, have passed into the condition of foreign powers, and are to be conquered and subdued as such in opposition to the laws of the civilized and Christian world. Others, like the President, find in the pardoning power, mercifully bestowed on the national executive, an authority to inflict universal punishment without trial, to overturn States and re-create them by the terrible instrumentalities of war and desolation. Thousands seem to be profoundly ignorant of all political institutions and restraints, while numbers equally great are reckless of every social and constitutional obligation. To all these add the numberless throng of official dependents and expectants, of mercenaries and parasites, and we have a great political party whose brief but disastrous domination has brought and is bringing upon the country greater calamities than would the visitations of God in the forms of pestilence and famine.

Let us not despair. The time for the

great yet peaceful uprising of the people is approaching. There are millions of loyal and Christian hearts which are not in a war of aggression, conquest and revolution, which are not in a war whose duration is interminable, because it necessarily awakens the fiercest passions of human nature, and arouses a resistance to be maintained by the tremendous energies of despair. There are millions hearts which sigh for the peace and pose of a constitutional governmen and there is an all-pervading intelligen which is able to comprehend the cris and the obligations it imposes. Reas will resume her throne, and conscien will assert her imperial sway over t wills and the conduct of men.

FINIS.

EXTRACT.

What you need, as it seems to me, is to be fully impressed with a belief in your mission, and in your capacity to fulfil it. That mission is to save the Constitution of the United States. By saving it I mean, of course, that you are to save it for the whole Union—for the South and the North, for the East and the West—with every right which it protects completely reëstablished. I can see no other mode of saving it; for it is to my mind apparent that a war prosecuted against the South, for the acquisition of power over their domestic institutions, which the Constitution expressly withholds from the Federal Government, can result in nothing but the establishment of a system under which there can be no local rights of self-government left for any section or any State. This it is your mission to prevent. You cannot prevent it by uniting with those who proffer support of the war without the slightest protest against the unconstitutional policy with which it is prosecuted. In all the late popular proceedings looking to the establishment of what are styled "Loyal Leagues," I have not seen one word of indignant remonstrance against the unconstitutional measures of the Administration. You cannot expect, and need not look for such remonstrance from assemblies largely composed of those who are the peculiar political supporters of the Administration, and who are more or less responsible for its measures. Public opinion, if it is to make itself *heard* and *felt* against all violations of the Constitution, must make its utterances through the action and the voice of those who have never failed to protest against t policy that has created for us so muc peril. If that public opinion fails to r cognize this necessary channel of expre sion—if it yields itself to a fatal apath or *will not* see how it can at once save Government and change an Administr tion—then all will be lost, and there wi remain to us only the consolation that w have individually done our duty.

You are then (permit me to add) seek, by every constitutional and upright method, to obtain the control of all t organisms of government. If, in t meantime, you cannot induce the presen Executive of the United States to chang his policy, then, remembering his pos tion, possess your souls in patience unt you can give him a constitutional su cessor. Let everything be prepared wit one fixed and unselfish purpose—namely to make every successive election revers the doctrines, and dogmas, and usurpa tions which you know you should con demn. By this course of action instea of weakening you will strengthen you government, for you will make it appa rent to the whole world that the presen arbitrary rule is to be succeeded by period when the CONSTITUTION is onc more, in all its beneficence and all it power, to be "THE SUPREME LAW OF TH LAND." Fail to do this, and the Nation losing heart and hope, will lose sight o the methods by which a constitutiona succession can be preserved to a bette day, and will yield itself to the despai which welcomes despotism, or to the rage wh welcomes monarchy

No. 19.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY
FOR THE
Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

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A PAGE OF HISTORY.

From the N. Y. Journal of Commerce.

I am losing my patience in reading Gen. McClellan's Report. The injustice to him, and the atrocious wrong to his noble army and the country, are enough to make the blood of honest and patriotic men boil within them.

AMOS KENDALL.

There is no passage in history which is more deeply interesting, none on which the pen of the historian will dwell with more eloquence, than that which relates to the condition of the United States, its army and its capital, on the last day of August, 1862. The report of Gen. McClellan now for the first time collects and makes clear the various incidents which are to fill this important page in our national record. We regret that the Congressional edition, the Rebellion Record edition, and other cheap editions of the report are incomplete and inaccurate, omitting entirely some portions which present the most interesting and important view of the relations of Gen. McClellan to the Cabinet, the army, and the country. The edition published under Gen. McClellan's authority is accurate. The omission was doubtless unintentional, some pages of copy having fallen from a compositor's desk, or been mislaid, in the Government printing office, and the reprinters who have followed that edition have produced imperfect copies.

Gen. McClellan was not at that time removed from the command of the army, but the army was removed from his command by an ingenious device of the War Department. He was treated with contemptuous indifference by Gen. Halleck. When ordered to abandon the Peninsula he was so anxious for an interview with Gen. Halleck, and a free consultation, that he proceeded from Harrison's Bar to the nearest telegraph station, and there, finding that the wires were broken under water, he crossed Chesapeake Bay, arriving at Cherry Stone Inlet, on the east shore, about midnight. He immediately telegraphed to Washington, informing Gen. Halleck that he had come all this distance to consult with him, and requested him to come to the War Department end of the wire. Gen. Halleck came and sent a brief and somewhat ill-humored reply. While Gen. McClellan was deciphering this reply (it was in their private cipher), the operator informed him that Gen. Halleck had left the Washington office without so much as saying good-night, and that further telegraphing was useless! Gen. McClellan returned to his army, brought it away from the scene of its noble exploits, stood himself, last man of all, on the deserted ground, and left the Peninsula with the conviction that a great error was in progress at Washington. At Fort Monroe he wrote a despatch to Gen. Halleck, mournfully eloquent, speaking of the services of his brave army, and begging Halleck to recognize them. He said:

"Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburgh, West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the seven days and the recent retreat. No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good and strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it."

Verily they did deserve it. They were an army of heroes, brought home from fields of as gallant fighting as the world ever saw. But there was no reply to the request of their general. They received no kind word, no cheer, no thanks. They were hurried home, to be hurled into the jaws of death under a commander selected to displace the general who had hitherto shared their fortunes. McClellan came to Alexandria. What was his position and relation to the army? He himself did not know. The process of depriving him of his command was going forward. Pope's Army of Virginia absorbed the Army of

the Potomac. For seven days that noble army disappears from history. It had no existence. McClellan was left at Alexandria, still the commanding general of the Army of the Potomac, but there is an eloquence which every heart must feel in his simple narrative of what remained to him of his once magnificent command. Less than one hundred men, most of these invalids, wounded men, orderlies, and members of bands, were the sole representatives of the Army of the Potomac! So grand is the contrast which this narrative affords between the days which preceded and those which followed the last of August, that it may by some be suspected as intentional that the narrative is omitted from the incomplete editions of the report. But we prefer to regard it as accidental, especially in view of other and numerous errors which occur in the same editions.

The secret history of political manœuvring at Washington at this time would, if made public, explain the whole responsibility for the disastrous campaign of Pope. The blood of our thousands, lost on those fatal plains of Manassas, is chargeable directly on the intrigues of Washington politicians of the radical party, who only desired to remove McClellan from the public view, because they feared that the splendor of his genius, the devotion of his army, the nobleness of his character, might bring him before the people as a fit man to lead the whole nation through war to peace and union under the Constitution. For this they intrigued, and for this they wasted thousands on thousands of young lives, poured out on fruitless battle-fields. And some of this secret history may be recovered from a close examination of the despatches and orders issued at Washington, between the 29th August and the 2d September, 1862. Five days—brief time—but filled with great events. The politicians had succeeded; McClellan was debased and disgraced. He asks Halleck for specific orders as to what he is to do at Alexandria. Halleck replies, giving general orders and finding fault. "Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible despatch," telegraphs Halleck, at 1:45 o'clock on the 30th. McClellan replies at 2:10. "I know nothing of the calibre of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all wagons sent to him." Halleck finds fault that Franklin was not sooner sent forward. McClellan replies that Franklin had no transportation, and finally marched without wagons, and of course without ammunition or subsistence.

Then McClellan sends a despatch which will be memorable in all future time:

"I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men if nothing more; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command, even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. *Please reply to this to-night.*"

No sleep that long night in the little camp at Alexandria. Every moment they expected the answer permitting them to share the fate of the army—a fate which all the wisest soldiers were looking to with the most solemn apprehensions. But no answer came. Not even the common courtesy of a reply was given, till the next day came Halleck's cold despatch:

"I cannot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the department."

It was too much trouble for any one in General Halleck's office to send to the President the night before, or even that morning, and say, "The fate of the nation hangs in the balance; McClellan asks leave to go to the field as a volunteer, may he go?"

But the insults were not yet ended. This same day, the 31st August, General Halleck telegraphs McClellan:

"As many as possible of the new regiments should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent to the vicinity of Chain Bridge."

McClellan replies that it is General Casey's province to attend to the new regiments, and General Barnard's to order others to Chain Bridge. "By the War Department order I have no right to give them orders." Here was one of those

ery common Washington complications nder the present management. "I have ot seen the order," replies Halleck. It as the last insult of the War Depart- ent, that order, devised in the same pirit which a few weeks later dictated the rder sending the victor of South Moun- ain and Antietam to report at Trenton. he order was derisive. "General McClel- n commands that portion of the Army f the Potomac that has not been sent rward to General Pope's command." ow they must have chuckled at the War epartment over the keen wit of this rder. It was issued on the afternoon of ugust 30th, and after the receipt from eneral McClellan of his dispatch of 2:10 . M., saying :

"I have no sharpshooters except the uard around my camp. I have sent off very man but those, and will now send em with the train, as you direct. I will so send my only remaining squadron of valry with General Sumner. I can do more. *You now have every man of the rmy of the Potomac who is within my ach.*"

Certainly it was sharp satire, very keen nd biting wit, which dictated, after that st sentence, the words of the order : Gen. McClellan commands that portion the Army of the Potomac that has not en sent forward !"

But the morning of the 31st brought to ashington some startling intelligence. alleck had been for four days busy re- ucing McClellan's position, finding fault, eglecting and even insulting him. The resident and Secretary of War had elded to the radical politicians who ere hounding the young general, and on e evening of the 30th, when the War De- rtment issued its order, Washington dicalism was jubilant, and all believed at there was truth in Pope's despatches nd that he was sweeping the rebel army th the besom of destruction. McClel- n was down, and a great victory won Pope. Men who were in Washington at night will remember the triumph of e radical faction. But the next day a ange came over the spirit of the radi- l dream. Halleck telegraphs McClel- n that he had not seen the order, and evidently begins to think that possi- y they have been a little too fast in ashington. The news from Pope is t rose-colored to-day. McClellan be- ns to loom up again in the minds of e managers.

"You will retain the command of *everything in this vicinity* not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I am entirely tired out."

So says General Halleck at 10:07 P. M. on the 31st. Well he might be tired. The experiment had failed. The whole plan of abandoning the peninsular campaign and disgracing McClellan was proving a disastrous failure. The "ability and experience" of McClellan was now worth thinking of once more. At half past eleven that night McClellan telegraphs Halleck that Pope was defeated, the road filled with wagons, and stragglers coming toward Alexandria ; that Pope's right is entirely exposed, that he fears the gravest consequences. He adds : "To speak frankly—and the occasion requires it—there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army."

"I shall be up all night," says McClellan from Alexandria. "I shall be up all night," says Halleck from Washington. It was a fearful night. The morning brought truth from Pope's army and wisdom to the heads in Washington. McClellan is sent for. All day disastrous intelligence comes in. McClellan is ordered to take command of the defences of Washington, but his orders are limited. They do not yet dare to face the indignation of the radical politicians, who would have seen Washington destroyed rather than McClellan restored. But the morning of the 2d leaves them in doubt no longer. The hope of the nation hangs on the man they had disgraced and ridiculed on the 30th. The President and General Halleck seek McClellan at his house and "commit everything" to his hands, directing him to go out and meet the returning army.

The crossing of the Potomac that day by McClellan is a scene for long remembrance. The shouts that went rolling over the hills, the exultation of men who had regarded themselves as doomed, but who now welcomed order. wisdom, genius, "ability and experience," all which they had proved and known—this has been described and is recorded. How the general took the shattered army, restored its *morale*, led it into Maryland, and in fourteen days won the victories of South Mountain and Antietam ; how Halleck complained of his slow march to South

Mountain, and radicals everywhere growled sullenly over the salvation of the Capital by McClellan—this is already history.

It is sometimes curious as well as instructive to look back. We find outside of General McClellan's Report a piece of history which is illustrative of some of the points in it. When, on the memorable 2d of September, 1862, the President and General Halleck sought him at his house and begged him to save the capital and the nation, the radical faction who had accomplished his overthrow and disgrace a few days previous, were in the highest excitement. The indignation which they expressed was not measured by any ordinary terms of language. A very curious circumstance, which took place that day, may serve to illustrate the fear in which the Administration stood of these radicals who had surrounded and possessed them. The order restoring General McClellan to the command of the army, and placing the fate of the nation in his hands, was made in writing, probably after the interview of the President with him. In the Report this order does not appear. It is given in a foot note in the New York edition of Sheldon & Co. But the curious fact is this. The order was telegraphed to the New York papers on the evening of the 2d September, 1862. We published it the next morning, simultaneously with other newspapers. It was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2, 1862.

By direction of the President, Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops, for the defence of the Capital

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. General.

But this order seems to have raised a storm among the radicals which neither the President nor the Secretary of War cared to face. Can it be possible that at this moment, when the fate of the nation was trembling in the balance, such a consideration as political capital controlled the movements of the highest officials?

It would seem so, for the order was re-published in an amended form, suppressing the names of the President and the Secretary of war, and so far relieving them from any apparent connection with the restoration of McClellan to the command. On the 3d September, a despatch came from Washington, stating that the order should read as follows:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 2, 1862.

Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops, for the defence of the Capital. By command of

Major General HALLECK.

E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G.

Can any one assign a sensible reason for this change of a plain order, except the desire to suppress the names of the President and the Secretary of War in connection with it, for the sake of preserving favor with the radical enemies of McClellan?

Why was the order originally couched in such dubious language? Every one remembers that it was not till explained by telegraph that the people even understood that McClellan was in command of the whole Army of the Potomac. It was undoubtedly ingeniously worded to avoid the storm of radical indignation which was anticipated. Instead of a frank, noble order, expressing clearly the duties of the general on whom the very destiny of the republic was that day reposed, we have this ingenious phraseology sent forth to the nation, to deceive them into the idea that McClellan was only placed in command of the forts. So the radical papers declared at the time. It was only General Halleck's o der, placing McClellan in the fortifications—just t work he was suited for.

But mark the astounding truth now first made pla and public, though our readers will remember that v long ago inferred it from other facts. Under th order, ingeniously worded, and under no other order word of command from President, Secretary of War, General Halleck, bearing no authority but that whi this tricked-up form of words doubtfully gave him, Ge McClellan led the army into Maryland and gained t victories of South Mountain and Antietam. Halleck, will be borne in mind, expressly tells McClellan, his despatch of October 26, 1862: "Since you l Washington * * I have given you no orders." Neith had any one else, up to the close of Antietam. T simple truth was that McClellan, the only man Washington fit for the occasion, as the inaction every one else abundantly confesses, having be charged with the defence of the Capital, mount his horse when he thought the time a proper one, a went into the field to victory and the salvation of t Capital and of the nation. President, Secretary War, Halleck, all were paralyzed so far as anythi they said or did remains to indicate. They look idly on while McClellan saved them and the count Halleck indeed sent grumbling thunder after him o the wires. Thus, on the 9th Sept., Halleck telegraph "Until we have better advices about the numbers the enemy at Drainsville, I think we must be ve cautious about stripping too much the forts on the V ginia side."

Again, on the 13th, he growls: "You are wrong thus uncovering the Capital." Again, on the 14t "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia si of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing yo left and rear." Again, on the 16th, at 12.03 P. M Halleck telegraphs: "I think you will find that t whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed t river. I fear now more than ever, that they will cross at Harper's Ferry, or below and turn your le thus cutting you off from Washington."

One can imagine the smile of McClellan as he re that last despatch amid the thunders of the cannon the evening of the 16th—the evening before Antieta And Halleck, after these daily fits of tremor a nervousness about McClellan's uncovering the Capita after despatch on despatch, begging McClellan not get so far off from the Capital and leave them to t invasion of the rebels; after discouraging every step McClellan's advance in Maryland, up to the hour of t victory of Antietam, this same General Halleck co plains of the slow advance of McClellan in Maryland —talks about the astonishing fact that he marched on a few miles a day!—and writes an official report, a suming the credit of the campaign, saying that "M Clellan *was directed* to pursue him" (the enemy) in Maryland, after Pope's defeat. A year ago we e posed the untruthfulness of this assumption. Now it proved untrue. No such direction was given, but t whole Maryland campaign stands out as the work McClellan, untrammelled only because the people in Wa ington were so thoroughly frightened that for once th permitted a military man to conduct a campaign his own plans.

But what is to be said of the treatment these sam men gave McClellan when he had relieved them fro their fright and saved the Capital and the nation?

History will doubtless find the truth about these ma ters. McClellan will be honored by the remotest gen rations of Americans. Silent when ill treated, swi when called to serve his country, firm, faithful, true steel, trustworthy always, he is to-day nearer than an other man to him who was first in war, first in peac and first in the hearts of his countrymen. Washingto for a glorious memory; McClellan for a living leader!

☞ The most full and perfect Report of McClellan, edited by himself is published by SHELDON & CO., No. 335 Broadway, New York.

No. 20.

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FOR THE

Diffusion of Political Knowledge.

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Remarks of Mr. Brooks in the House of Representatives, March 7th.

The Biggest Deficiency Bill ever known in the World's History.

☞ $103,422,817. ☜

Over 102 Millions beyond the Estimates.

War against Napoleon cost only $906,000,000 in Six Years.

WE SPEND $1,000,000,000 IN A SINGLE YEAR.

Lawless Use of the Public Money.

Thirty Millions to carry Elections under the mock name of Transportation.

Mr Brooks. Mr. Chairman, when the deficiency bill, then under seven millions, was before the House some time ago, I expressed my surprise at its magnitude, and referred to the estimates to show that the appropriations were far beyond what the Secretaries asked. I have none of those remarks to retract. I rise now to remind the House that the objections I then made to this bill have greater force to the extraordinary additions made to this bill as it reaches us amended, that is, added to, by the Senate. The original estimates submitted to the House for deficiencies for the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1864, were only $4,180,581 13. These were made up of estimates—

For civil list, foreign intercourse, and miscellaneous	$1,311,371 13
For Interior Department, (Indian)	4,210 00
For Navy Department	2,865,000 00

And here I wish to call the attention of the House to the fact that though it must have been as well known then as now that the time of enlistment of a large body of our troops was about expiring, yet there was not a call for a dollar of "deficiency" from the War Department. The Secretary of War admitted, by his silence, that he had all the money he wanted. The Committee of Ways and Means, however, paid but little attention to the deficiency estimates of the Secretary of the Treasury, (4,180,581,) and the House of Representatives paid less, for both committee and House shot far beyond the original. As the bill went to the Senate it appropriated $7,469,109 65. The Senate sent it back to us with additional appropriations for deficiencies of $98,953,608. So the deficiency bill, as added to by the Senate, stands forward with the gigantic appropriation of $106,424,718 20. The Committee of Ways and Means have amended that bill by striking out $151,000, and the deficiency bill, as amended by the Committee of Ways and Means,

asks us to appropriate $106,271,218. The table may be stated thus :

Amount contained in original (House) bill	$7,469,109 65
Senate amendments thereto	98,953,608 75
Total	$106,422,718 40
Amount inserted by Senate, in which the Committee of Ways and Means recommended non-concurrence	151,500 00
Total amount in bill as now reported	$106,271,218 00

Mr. Stevens. The gentleman from New York will not fail to say that the Committee of Ways and Means do not ask that sum. That is the amount of the bill as returned from the Senate. The Committee of Ways and Means ask only about eight millions. All the remainder has been sent from the Senate. I will say to the gentleman that the committee have concluded to ask the House to non-concur in all the amendments of the Senate.

Mr. Brooks. I take the report of the action of the Committee of Ways and Means as annexed to the bill itself, in which they recommend concurrence in the first, second, fourth, fifth, sixth, sixth and a half, eighth, ninth, tenth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and sixteenth amendments of the Senate.

Mr. Stevens. That is so, but at a subsequent meeting of the Committee they thought it best to non-concur, if the House would agree to it.

Mr. Brooks. I am correct, then.

Mr. Stevens. Correct in reference to the first action of the committee.

Mr. Brooks—I am both pleased and amazed at the change of action now first announced upon the part of the Committee of Ways and Means. I am pleased because the idea of non-concurrence shows they are appalled with the magnitude of the Senate appropriations as well as so humble a member of the House as myself. But I am more than amazed that they propose to take from this House, by the simple proposition to non-concur, the deliberate and detailed action of the House upon these enormous expenditures, and abandon the constitutional powers and functions of this House to examine in detail all these amendments of the Senate, and to throw that whole power from us into the hands of a mere committee of conference to be appointed by the Chair. To non-concur with the Senate upon this bill in its present stage is to abandon all our right, all our authority, all our duty to examine the details of expenditures proposed by the action of the Senate, and to throw the whole discussion and deliberation, which justly belong to this House, exclusively into the hands of a committee of conference

The result of such action has recently been seen on the whiskey bill. That bill was lost in this House by a large majority, defeated over and over again, the House having affirmed its intention to pass a retroactive law upon the stock of whiskey on hand; yet the House was by mere parliamentary action, or by the action of a committee of conference, deprived of its legitimate power to impose a retroactive duty, as it intended upon the stock on hand, and the Senate, by concurrence with the adhering action of the House was enabled to pass the bill almost as originally intended by the Senate, despite all the resolves and re-resolves of the House.

I warn the House, therefore, in a bill of this enormous magnitude, disposing of over a hundred and five million dollars, not to abandon at this stage of the bill its legitimate function of examination in detail by bestowing it upon a mere committee of conference.

Mr. Colfax, (the Speaker.)—The gentleman will allow me to correct him as to a matter of fact. The reason why the bill did not have the retroactive feature in it when it finally passed, is because the House did not appoint a committee of conference at the last, but upon the motion of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Stevens] adhered to its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate, and allowed the Senate to recede from its amendments, thus leaving the bill without the retroactive feature.

Of course the gentleman will be just to the Chair by saying that in each instance a majority of the members of the committee on the part of the House agreed in their votes with the majority of the House.

Mr. Brooks.—I was far from casting any imputation whatever upon the action of the Speaker. He fairly represented on the committee of conference the majority of the House. I was but showing that though the House had determined by forty majority to have the thing its own way and repeated that determination over and over again by ten and fifteen majority, yet by parliamentary action the determination of the House was reversed and the bill passed without this retroactive feature.

Mr. Colfax.—It was because the House refused to raise another committee of conference, but under the operation of the rules voted an adherence. The Senate then receded, and the bill passed.

Mr. Stevens. The bill as it passed is precisely as the House agreed to it.

Mr. Brooks. I understand all that. I comprehend the parliamentary tactics, comprehended them at the time, and if I had not intended to vote with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, I should have resisted his proposition. It is because he is the old parliamentarian that he is now taking, that he would still wish, if he could, to take, from the discussion and examination of this House the details of this bill by the action of a conference committee, by transferring the forum of discussion——

Mr. Dawes—The gentleman makes a mistake. The reason why we have not a tax upon whiskey on hand now, is not because of parliamentary tactics. There is no trace of parliamentary tactics about it, and a reference to the facts will show it. The House put a tax on whiskey on hand. The Senate struck that out as an amendment; it came back to the House, and the House concurred in that amendment; and the reason why there is no tax upon whiskey on hand today is because the majority of the House, in its legitimate functions, and in discharging its duty, without the aid or skill of my friend from Pennsylvania (Mr. Stevens) at all, concurred in the action of the Senate. It was done by the concurrent action of the two Houses, and not by any committee of conference; and that is the reason why there is no tax on whiskey on hand.

Mr. Brooks. I comprehend all that thoroughly.

Mr. Dawes. Then the gentleman has less excuse for misstating it.

Mr. Brooks. I comprehend it perfectly and do not misstate it. I will not take time to discuss this matter. I simply state the fact that this House, at one time by forty-four majority, and at other times by majorities of ten and twelve, resolved and re-resolved to tax the whiskey on hand, and the whiskey on hand is not taxed despite the resolution of the House. The country understands that, and we will not dispute about the ways and means by which it was done. I say it was parliamentary tactics and conference committees. Other gentlemen think differently. The great facts are before us: the *modus operandi* we will not dispute about.

Mr. Chairman, whiskey is an exciting and entrancing question, and I have been led altogether from the *figurative* speech I have on hand to the discussion of a far more exciting and thrilling topic than that of a mere bill of deficiencies.—But tempting as is the theme, I must recall the attention of the House, however, to the dryer topic which we have on hand, namely, this $106,271,218 appropriation, as a Deficiency for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1863, and ending June 30, 1864.

I call the attention of the House first to the fact that in this deficiency bill there are for the War Department alone appropriations amounting to about ninety-nine millions, when at the beginning of the session, in the estimates submitted by the War Department through the Secretary of the Treasury, not one single cent was asked for by the Secretary of War for a deficiency in his appropriations. And yet now, when all the facts relating to deficiencies must have been just as well known to the Secretary of War in the beginning of the session; and now that Secretary comes before the Senate, and through the Senate before this House, without any estimates whatever being submitted to this House, and asks an additional appropriation of over ninety-eight millions to make up a deficiency in the appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864.

Why, sir, the whole expenses of this Government in the year 1815, during the last war with Great Britain, that contest which this then comparatively feeble nation carried on with the greatest Power upon earth, were but $48,244,495. The expenses of the Army for that war were, in 1813, $19,662,013 02; in 1814, $20,350,806 86; in 1815, $14,794,294 22; and yet the deficiency asked for by the Secretary of War for one single year amounts to four and five times the cost of any one year of the war of 1812.

The whole appropriations of this Government in 1847-48, the years of the Mexican war, were but little over sixty millions per annum. The actual expenses of the War Department were, in 1847, $35,776,495; in 1848, $27,838,374. And that war, which was not upon our own soil, but was costly in the transfer of troops from our own country to a foreign country; that war, in which our troops, landing at Vera Cruz, passed on through the *tierra caliente*, the hot region of Mexico, to its mountains, to Churubusco and Chapultepec, on to the Garita of Mexico; that glorious war, in which we humbled Mexico and brought the Mexicans to our own terms, cost this Government but $35,776,495, the highest sum in the year 1847; and yet here is a war deficiency bill of over ninety-eight millions for the War Department alone for one year, or over sixty-three millions beyond what the war with Mexico cost a year.

There is something wrong in all this; there must be something wrong; and hence the House should not abandon its functions, but should look

into these expenditures, and see when, how, and where this money has been appropriated, and where these enormous sums of money have gone, who have had them, in what quarters they have been paid, why they are called for, and what they are to effect. Sir, if these disbursements for the War Department are to go on for three, four, or five years longer, it will be beyond the power of this country or of any other country on the face of the earth to endure them.

The Secretary of War in his estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, (see Treasury Report, page 30), asked for and had appropriated $885,479, 511. The Secretary of the Treasury, when he submitted that report to Congress, felt sure in his own mind that $885,479,511 was ample and enough for all the expenditures of the War Department for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864, and hence not a single cent additional was then called for either by the Secretary of the Treasury or by the Secretary of War himself. And yet here in February and March we propose to add to this already appropriated sum of $885,479,511, a deficiency in this bill of $98,500,000. What calculations are all these? Can man thus carry on war, or provide the men and means for carrying on war?

More than that. Recall a little of the past history of our legislation during this session. At an early period of the session, before the Christmas holidays, there went through this House, in twenty minutes by the clock, a deficiency of $20,000,000 for bounties—a million a minute—uncalled for by the Secretary of War, or by the Secretary of the Treasury in his estimate. I made some quiet remarks on that occasion. I called the attention of the other side of the House to the subject, but I found that my remarks were not pleasant to the other side, and I refrained from discussing the subject at length, leaving the responsibility with those to whom it belonged.

In a few days after the Christmas holidays, the Secretary of War called upon us to change that bounty appropriation of $20,000,000, and in a very few minutes, opposed only by an honorable gentleman from Ohio, on the other side, there went quietly through a bill for bounties, which I said then had in it $100,000,000. Now, under the continuance of the bounty system to April 1, that bill has in it at least $124,000,000 to be added to the estimate of the Secretary of War. Take not my word for it. I quote from the Chairman of the Military Committee in the Senate (Mr. Wilson):

"I suppose that we have, since the 17th October, paid and agreed to pay for these bounties from ninety to one hundred million dollars. It must be over ninety millions, for we have paid bounties, I think, to very near three hundred thousand men. * * *

"I suppose if the payment of these bounties is extended and we go on raising men at the rate we are now raising them, that we shall raise during the coming month somewhere from sixty to eighty thousand men, paying a portion of them $400, and another portion $300."

Which, counting seventy thousand men at the average of $350 per man, will make $24,500,000; so that if you take the actual expenditures and appropriations of the Department as now put upon paper as recorded in the Treasury report, at $885,479,511, add to that $98,500,000 deficiency and $120,000,000 for bounty, there will have been appropriated for the War Department of this Government alone, for the fiscal year ending 30th June, 1864, the gigantic sum of $1,103, 979,511.

Mr. Kellogg, of Michigan. I wish to correct the gentleman in one respect, if he will permit me.

Mr. Brooks. Certainly.

Mr. Kellogg, of Michigan. The payment of these bounties is extended over the whole term of enlistment, and only a small portion is to be expended this year.

Mr. Brooks. Not a small portion—a considerable portion.

Mr. Kellogg, of Michigan. One fourth, I think.

Mr. Brooks. What I am speaking about is the appropriations for this year. I do not suppose that the bounties will be all expended in th year.

Mr. Kellogg, of Michigan. About a fourth of the moneys to be expended in bounties will be expended this year.

Mr. Brooks. More than that. But, nevertheless, it is the sum of money appropriated that I am speaking of—the appropriations of Congress for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1864. The more money that is saved the better; but all these bounties are to be paid in some time or other.

I hold in my hand a record of the expenses of the British army from 1810 to 1816, in each year—those terrible years of struggle in which the little island of Great Britain and the lesser isle of Ireland were coping against the gigantic power of Napoleon, who had taken the French armies in triumph from the sands of Egypt to the snows of Moscow—that little island which was subsidizing all the other powers of Europe to fight her battles against that mighty Napoleon.—The expenditures in the British army in the year

1810 were $84,415,000; and in 1813, on the closing scenes of the battle of Waterloo, they were $171,035,000. The aggregate expenditures for the seven years from 1810 to 1816 inclusive, were $906,730,000. The details were thus:

Expenditures of the British army in the years—	
1810	$84,415,000
1811	90,680,000
1812	119,345,000
1813	124,935,000
1814	147,345,000
1815	168,975,000
1816	171,035,000
Total	$906,730,000

But, sir, for the single fiscal year of 1863-64, we, who are coping with no Napoleon, with no combination of powers for our overthrow—but with a few rebellious States, starting without resources and full of all the elements of weakness, we have appropriated more money in a single year to subdue the rebellion than was appropriated for the whole British empire in the six years from 1810 to 1816 to subdue the august Napoleon, at the time combining all the continental nations of Europe for British overthrow.

I do not allude to these things for the purpose of creating alarm or exciting the fears of the country, only to arouse the country to comprehend the magnitude of this war, and to begin now to lay the necessary taxation to support it, so that we may not in the future find ourselves unable to sustain the credit of the country. That is my object and intention in calling the attention of the House to the enormous expenditures of the War Department.

A thousand million dollars per annum, Mr. Chairman, a billion dollars—I do not know how it is with others,—but I must confess that to my humble mind these sums are so appalling that I can hardly begin to comprehend their gigantic magnitude when we are called upon to transmit them to our children as a public debt. I confess that I often turn back to the olden times in the history of this Government. I was here in this House at a time when the expenditure by this Government of forty-four, forty-six, or forty-eight millions was regarded as an enormous extravagance, and that was not long ago, in 1849-50, 1851-52. I recollect when the then chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, then an honorable gentleman from Alabama, well known to the present chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, educated in a country where cotton even was not raised, but in northern Alabama, where corn and wheat were the productions, and where a dollar was estimated by the price of a bushel of corn or the price of a bushel of wheat—I recollect well how appalled he was at the enormous magnitude of the expenditure by this Government of forty-four, forty-six, or forty-eight million dollars. Indeed, he had a mind so constituted that members who served with him upon the floor of the House will remember that he could not comprehend anything above half a million dollars. Whenever a sum came up in our appropriations of as much as a hundred thousand dollars he was wont to be confused, but when it ran up to half a million dollars he would often abandon his appropriation bill and exclaim, "Good God, what is the country coming to?" Why, sir, if he was here this day he would be lost in inextricable confusion by these enormous appropriations for the War Department only.

Indeed, we in the great cities who are somewhat accustomed to figures, and who represent millionaires, will soon be compelled, if these expenditures go on, to bring to our aid something more than mere arithmetic, the science of geometry or mensuration say, and measure a million by an inch, a billion by two inches, a trillion by three inches, a quadrillion by four inches, a quintillion by five inches, and so on, or if that does not present numeration or measurement sufficient to enable us to understand these sums, we shall have to resort to the science of algebra, apply x as an unknown quantity of expenditure, and work with that. An equation may be stated thus: AB+CD×EF=XYZ=LMNOPQ. [Laughter.]

Sir, it is becoming beyond the power of arithmetic or the power of simple mathematics to compute these appropriations, or to understand the loans or systems of loans on which they are being founded. The whole concern anon will be more puzzling than the consols or exchequers in the debt of England.

The estimates of the War Department for 1865 are, in round numbers, $536,000,000. Sir, it is evident from these appropriations for 1863-64 we are now making that if this war is to continue these estimates for 1865 are not worth the paper they are written upon, for the actual expenditure of the present fiscal year for 1864 of the War Department will amount to almost if not quite a thousand million dollars—certainly, if we pay up the war warrants of the quartermasters, their certificates of obligation, and the great debts now due to the States for money and troops advanced to the Federal Government for military services rendered.

Now, Mr. Chairman, is it right, is it proper, is it a legitimate mode of coming before the country with an estimate in December of only $4,180,581 deficiency, and then before the bill is perfected require, as sanctioned by the Senate, a deficiency of over $106,000,000? I repeat, sir, is it right or just to the country thus to throw dust in their eyes? Is it not wise, is it not now our duty at the start to look this war with all its consequences fully in the face and to provide for this enormous expenditure and these enormous appropriations the only means by which, if the war is to be persisted in, the credit of the country can be sustained, a system of taxation which shall be proportionate to our expenditure? Is it just for us to leave for posterity the full payment of these loans? Sir, under a concordant Cabinet, or any *unit* administration of the Government, these discords between estimates and appropriations could not occur. But every Secretary we see now "runs his own machine." The Secretary of State runs his, and thrusts in appropriations for lawless foreign missions; the Secretary of War runs his, and thrusts in over ninety-eight millions of deficiencies, two months after he says he has enough in the annual appropriations; the Secretary of the Navy runs his; while the Secretary of the Treasury, the victim of all, because he has to find paper money for all, runs his printing machines, and his presidential machine, one and all. Is it any wonder that under such an administration of the Government we are annually spending more money to subdue a few million starving Rebels than Great Britain spent in six years to bring down the world-wandering eagles of the great Napoleon?

I availed myself on a former opportunity to denounce this whole system of deficiency bills. I showed that appropriations were made without law. I exhibited in this bill, and it is here reproduced, the creation of four hundred and forty odd clerks utterly without law. I showed the creation of a foreign mission by the Secretary of State without law.

The recklessness of law has become so rife among the Departments that even the Commissioner of Agriculture turns up in this bill in the most extraordinary demand for a deficiency.—When we have deficiencies in the Departments it is not to be wondered at that the Commissioner of Agriculture comes before Congress and tells it that he has purchased things without law for which he must have an appropriation. I find in the Senate amendments the following:

To supply deficiencies in the Department of Agriculture for the current year, as follows:
For the purchase of sorghum seed $2,000.
For rebuilding shop in the propagating garden, $800
For postage, $1,320.
For carpets, furniture, cans for fruit $350
For fuel, $300.

This is the farcical part of the bill. I allude to it not in resistance to the purchase of these humble matters, for seed may do some good to the country, while appropriations for this war are all lost except as they may serve to restore the Union. This gentleman with the illustrious name, in a letter to the Finance Committee of the Senate, says:

"The destructive frosts of last autumn in a large part of the West rendered entirely worthless many important seeds which I have been called upon to supply, chief of which is the sorghum, now becoming one of the most important crops in the country. In several of the large States the seed was so generally destroyed that I have felt obliged, at the urgent call of the farmers, to send abroad for a fresh supply of pure seed."

Great sorghum-seed seller!

"An increasing belief among the people in the feasibility of producing an excellent article of silk from the ailanthus silkworm, and repeated inquiries for the means of its production, have led me to order a large quantity of cocoons from France, where it has proved a perfect success."

Importer of cocoons!

"An extensive failure of the corn crops, with other causes, has created a great demand for new and different varieties of wheat for both fall and spring sowing, which has been met by importations from England, Russia, and the Mediterranean, and by purchases of improved varieties of American growth."

Great wheat-seed dealer!

"The very great and increasing interest in the culture of the grape, and the consequent demand for vines, has induced a large increase in the expenses of the propagating garden."

Vines for the propagating garden! Well, well! All this in a deficiency bill. What next may we be coming to?

The Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture gives no excuse for his lawless purchase of carpet, furniture, and cans for fruit, except that he has expended the money, and wants an appropriation for it!

This is a mere farce. It is not worthy of notice, except to show that the higher officers of the Government, by the creation of foreign missions, by enormous expenditures, without law, have induced the Commissioner of Agriculture to purchase canned fruit, sorghum seed, carpet, and furniture, all in humble imitation of the higher powers that thus act without law.

But there are other appropriations in this bill, which are far from being farcical, and which may be termed tragical. To these I call the attention of the House. The quartermaster comes before the country, and asks for $25,000,000 deficiency for additional transportation for the Army for the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1864. The Senate have increased that, and increased it

to $30,000,000 in the bill now before the House. The Quartermaster General says:

"This deficiency is caused by the activity of movement of the armies, the great expense of the transportation of the army operating against Vicksburg, the transfer of army corps from the army of the Potomac to the division of the Mississippi, the Texas expedition, the transportation furnished to veteran volunteers to and from their homes, furloughed or re-enlisting, and the purchase of transports."

But the Quartermaster General has not told the whole truth. These $30,000,000 deficiencies have also been made necessary by the transportation of troops to influence and carry elections in the country. If we could have the details of these quartermaster expenditures the House would find that a large part of this new deficiency was created in the expense of the transportation of a regiment or two to New Hampshire a year ago to carry the election in that State. If we could have a history of the transportation of troops we would find that several regiments and portions of regiments supposed to be favorable to the dominant party were carried to and fro to vote at the expense of the Government. There has been transportation of the Army solely to execute the purposes of the party in power.

If we could have the history of the transportation of the Army, we would find that a large number of troops selected for being favorable to the Administration party were sent last October and November to New York, Pennsylvania, or to the Western States, and afterwards to Maryland and Delaware to carry the election there. There is where the deficiency of $30,000 000 reported by the Committee of Ways and Means is mainly due. It is due to the efforts of the War Department to carry the elections of the country. There is where the money has gone. It is not for the legitimate expenditures of this war; it is not for the capture, overthrow, and destruction of the rebel army, and it is not to plant the stars and stripes upon the capitol hill of Richmond, or on the forts of Mobile and Charleston; but it is to subdue the Democracy, the conservative power of New Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and of the great West; in short, to overawe by arms before the ballot boxes the people of the country. I denounce it with all the vigor and power of which I am capable. Here and hereafter, will I denounce it, and I appeal from the majority of this House to the God of Heaven to put the mark of reprobation upon these wicked and criminal acts; I appeal to the genius of liberty which has so long hovered over and protected this hitherto blessed country to overthrow the party in power, that thus illegitimately perverts the valor and the generosity and the patriotism of a great people to overthrow their free institutions. I appeal to history and to posterity to brand with everlasting infamy the men who thus bring arms into elections, and who with the cartridge-box trample the ballot-box under foot. I know I shall not be heard or heeded on the floor of this House; but the brand of history and the curse of posterity will be the just doom of all these destroyers of the liberties of their country.

Mr. Morris, of New York. I would like to inquire of my colleague whether it would not be less expensive to let the soldiers of New York vote in the Army than to send them home?

Mr. Brooks. I do not choose now to be drawn into that discussion.

I voted for this first deficiency bill of $7,000,000. I voted for it not cheerfully, but because in time of war it seemed necessary to be generous, extravagant, if you please, in generosity. I have voted for all the appropriation bills which have gone from this House, but I am going to leave this bill to be voted for by such as approve these Quartermaster deficiencies in it. Some time since it was remarked by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Davis] in good Virgilian Latin, that the times "did not need help from this side of the House or such helpers as we are." I am disposed to accept him and his friends at his word—to let them pass this large deficiency bill. As for myself, I shall not vote a single dollar as a deficiency for transportation for the Army until this transporting of the military to carry the elections is disproved. Those who favor such an appropriation as this must and shall vote for it. As for myself I never will take the responsibility of voting for a single cent of it, and in justification of my course upon this subject I shall appeal to the public, whom I desire to bear in mind that this House has not before it a single item of legitimate estimate for any of these deficiencies and appropriations. The Committee of Ways and Means may have had them, but the House has not got them. There has been no inquiry what the expenditures have been in New England, in the Northern States, in Maryland, and in the Western States; and until we have a detail of these expenditures for election purposes, if not a single other vote is given against this bill, I shall on this deficiency bill, with the greatest pleasure with which I have given any vote in my life, vote "No."

How an Additional Loan of 11 Millions of Dollars was Created without Law, and how $444,000 in Premiums were Pocketed by Corruptionists from it.

[*Remarks of Mr. Brooks upon the Items in the Civil Bill, Appropriating Considerable Sums for Treasury "Contingencies"*]

Let us strike all of them out, (said Mr. Brooks.) I move to strike them out. The Treasury has no need for appropriations for Contingencies,—for the way in which it is now managed, it can be made a self-supporting institution.

Sir,—we were called upon here, in this Hall, a few days ago,—as if it would now seem, in utter mockery, to authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to issue Eleven Millions of additional 5-20 Bonds,—beyond the $500,000,000 before authorized by law. We went through all the mock forms of Legislation,—as if we had been real *bona fide* men, with brains as well as bodies, to thus authorize the Secretary to exceed this Five Hundred Million act by Eleven Million more. We were told, gravely told,—that it was indispensibly necessary to give the Secretary this authority, because nearly $11,000,000 had been bid for beyond the amount sanctioned by Law, and that he could not distinguish these real late bids, from antecedent bids on the authorized Loan. The House gave the Secretary what he asked for.—but judge of what tools were made of us, when, by the March 1st Report of the Debt of the Treasury, we find that the Secretary even then had issued over $510,000,000 of the Loan, Ten Million beyond the Law,—and beyond the authority, which in this Congress was not given im till March 4th or 5th!

Now, sir, let us look into this transaction. Let us calculate the profits of it, and ask who got these profits. These Eleven Millions of additional 5-20's were worth, March 4th, from 10. to 108 premium,—that is to say, for every one hundred dollars thus loaned, the Government could have got in the New York market a premium of $108. The profit, hence, was not altogether that, because there was an accruing interest of about 3 per cent., so that the profit only was but 4 per cent. Now this premium profit of 104 for 100 on Eleven Millions of additional stock was worth $444,000 to somebody. Who has it? Where has it gone? It is not pretended that it is in the Treasury, or if it is there, it pays ten times over all these contingencies for the Treasury, in this bill, and therefore we need not vote a single cent of appropriation to provide for them. I know, sir, full well, where these $444,000 have gone,—not exactly into whose hands,—but into what class of hands,—into the hands of Pet Brokers, who surround and envelope the Treasury, and fatten and gorge upon the miseries of their country and their countrymen. These $444,000 premiums have been thrown away upon favorites, and thrown away when the country is suffering in all the agonies of war. All I can do, Mr. Chairman, is here on the floor of this House, as a representative of the people, to expose and denounce such transactions. All I can do is to make a record of them for the people, and for the Historian hereafter,—as a specimen of the corruption and fraud of the times. I discharge my duty—but it is now all in vain. No man now can be heard or heeded, amid the corruptions that surround this capital.

THE

HON. JAMES BROOKS' SPEECH,

BEFORE THE UNION DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION,

932 BROADWAY,

Tuesday Evening, December 30, 1862.

"HOLD FAST TO THE CONSTITUTION."

"CLING TO THE CONSTITUTION AS THE SHIPWRECKED MARINER CLINGS TO THE LAST PLANK, WHEN NIGHT AND THE TEMPEST CLOSE AROUND HIM."—DANIEL WEBSTER.

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THE

HON. JAMES BROOKS' SPEECH

Before the Union Democratic Association, 932 Broadway, Tuesday Evening, December 30, 1862.

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The President of the Union Democratic Association, the Hon. LUKE F. COZANS, after some appropriate remarks upon the services rendered by the Association, said, that a speaker would now address them, by whose ability and eloquence, the large audience present would be well rewarded for their attendance on so stormy an evening. He, therefore, introduced the Hon. JAMES BROOKS. After the repeated and prolonged cheering that welcomed Mr. Brooks, had subsided, he said:—

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN—If any of you expect from me this evening, any exciting, or excited remarks, you will be disappointed. There are times so impressive, crises in public affairs so solemn, that any flourishes of rhetoric, any pompous display of periods, or sesquipedalian words, but detract from the gravity and dignity of the theme. Hence, in the crisis of a civil war like ours, where the blood of kith and kin is poured forth like water, and when this civil war is becoming complicated in fresher, and yet more fearful issues, the simplest language becomes the sublimest expression. (Applause.) The ancient heathen orators in times like these, when they were wont to address their public assemblies, invoked their *Dii Immortales*, their Immortal Gods. How much more then, should Christians, who assemble now, in the midst of Battle and Blood, invoke *the* immortal God to guide our deliberations. (Applause,)

THE TWO PROCLAMATIONS AND WAR ORDER OF SEPTEMBER, 1862.

When I last had the honor of addressing this Association, late in September last, there were threatening the people two PROCLAMATIONS and one WAR ORDER: One Proclamation threatening the people of the North, that if they discussed the other, the War Order would, through Courts Martial or Provost Marshals, suspend Process, Bail, Jury Trial, Habeas Corpus, and arrest and incarcerate all engaged in such discussion. The Civil Courts were to be suspended, and Military Courts were to be substituted in their places. The very first opportunity after the promulgation of these Edicts, I ventured in this Hall to denounce them, as in violation, not only of *Magna Charta*, the Common Law of England and of the United States, and of the rights of man, but of the Constitution of the United States, and of our State of New York; and you, in your responses, here in this Hall and elsewhere, so ably, so eloquently supported and cheered me, that the Edicts fell powerless before a brave and determined People. The President, indeed, who fulminated these Edicts, under the influence of our, and other elections, the offspring of what we proclaimed, we *would* have, *viz.*: free discussion, recalled, nullified, abrogated his War Order, and that Proclamation Edict which threatened to subvert all Liberty in the North. The Provost Marshals shrank back before the majesty of an indignant People, and the Judges and the Courts were re-inaugurated, reinstalled by that People. (Cheers.)

THE PROCLAMATION OF JANUARY, 1863.

But, gentlemen, there is left now another proclamation, not annulled,—that, for the South and Southwest,—in force, or if possible, to be put in force January 1st, 1863,—which I propose, this evening more fully to discuss. (Applause.) The President does not claim, nor do the President's friends claim, that for this Proclamation he has any warrant, in or under the Constitution of the United States,—whereby, thus, he subverts, or attempts to subvert, whole States, with the whole organization of their society,—their statute, their civil, their municipal, as well as their constitutional laws; nor does he claim, that under the laws of nations, he has any such prerogative or

power, save what is indefinitely declared to be the laws of war, the war power, or the military necessity of war. I propose, this evening, gentlemen, to discuss all these weighty matters, and you must put up with, as a necessity of this discussion, the recitation of some of our past history, and with the reading of such documents as proof makes necessary, however heavy such reading may be in a popular assembly. (Cries of "Go on. It is what we want to hear.")

WAR FOR THE CONSTITUTION.

Gentlemen, as I said at the start, we are in the midst of a bloody civil war, the magnitude of which is unlike anything in the record of human history, except the civil wars of Rome, that drenched the huge Roman Empire in human gore. We, who were not of the Administration, were driven into this war, reluctantly driven in, by the force of unhappy events, and by the then solemn pledge of the Administration, that it was a war, only to maintain the Government and the Constitution of the United States, with the integrity of the Union. (Applause.) We are not now, and we never pretended to be, supporters of the Administration. We drew at first, as we draw now, the Constitutional distinction between supporting the Government, and a temporary administration of that Government. (Applause.) We recognize no loyalty, nor fealty, nor allegiance due to any mere administration of the Government, to no mere man, in no one branch of it,—Executive, Legislative, or Judicial,—but we do recognise fealty, loyalty, love, devotion, with the whole heart and soul, as due to that great charter of human liberty known as the Constitution of the United States. (Loud and prolonged cheering.) That Constitution, in my earlier days, when not as well booked up as I am now, I supposed to be some impromptu inspiration of Divine Wisdom, far above all human intelligence, or human instinct,—the work of men inspired, as were the Holy Apostles, who handed down to us the Holy Scriptures, and I revered and worshipped that Constitution as the Bible guide on earth to men struggling for Law and Liberty. But upon fuller and maturer reading, I discovered, that our Fathers of the Constitution were not so much inspired men, as condensers or codifiers of centuries of human wisdom, the writers up, and abridgers of human law, the common law of England,—of the principles, rights, liberties, our British forefathers, after five or six centuries of struggle, wrested from the Kings and Despots of England, and affixed to great charters of Human Rights, the *Magna Charta* of 1215 won sword in hand by the Barons of England from King John, or the Petition of Right 1628, or the *Habeas Corpus* 1679, or the Bill of Rights 1689. The Constitution of the United States brought to a *focus* these great Lights of Liberty, Law, Human Progress and Civilization. The eyes of our fathers were then but the lenses of the Past to see their Present, and so to provide for the great Future. (Applause).

THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE AND THE PLEDGE OF THE WAR.

Hence, when in December, now two years gone by, after the Presidential election, there assembled in South Carolina, a Convention of the States, enacting an ordinance of secession, separating that State from the United States and from the Constitution of the United States, which had not gratified South Carolina in that election: Hence, when in the subsequent February there assembled in Montgomery, Alabama, a convention of a few other States, subverting and annulling the Constitution of the United States, and not only that, but creating a new Constitution, and changing the old Flag,—both the reason and the sentiment of the country felt indignant, and uprose to express that indignation. The magazine so well prepared for explosion during twenty-five years of preparation by extreme men, both North and South, was fired at Fort Sumter, and the explosion took place, involving some thirty millions of people in its destruction. The North uprose in mass almost,—not to maintain or uphold Abraham Lincoln, or the Cabinet Administration of Abraham Lincoln,—but to uphold the Constitution, the three branches of the Government of the United States, its Judiciary as well as its Executive, and Legislative authority. (Applause.) "The Constitution *shall* be maintained:" "The Flag *shall* be respected:" "The Union *must* and *shall* be preserved," were the universal rallying cries of the Northern People. (Applause.) The Rebel Enemy authoritatively, through one of its Cabinet officers (Mr. Walker), avowed its intent to march upon, and to seize, Washington;—and hence, when the President called for his 75,000 men, more than a million were earnest to volunteer to protect the Capital, to uphold the Flag, to stand by the Constitution. The war then, was solely and avowedly for the maintenance of the Constitution, and the Flag as the symbol of that Constitution.

THE PLEDGE OF THE INAUGURAL.

The President himself, in his Inaugural, March 4th, 1861, thus pledged himself against the Abolitionists in his own party, and against his Proclamation of Abolitionism:

"I have no purpose, *directly* or *indirectly*, to INTERFERE with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe *I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no intention, to do so.*"

THE PLEDGES OF THE HOUSE.

The House of Representatives, by a nearly unanimous vote, in February, 1861, passed the following resolutions:

Resolved, That neither the Federal Government nor the people or governments of the non-slaveholding states *have a purpose or a constitutional right to legislate upon or interfere with slavery in any of the States of the Union.*

Resolved, That those persons in the North who do not subscribe to the foregoing proposition *are too insignificant in numbers and influence* to exite the serious attention or alarm of any portion of the people of the Republic, and that the increase of their numbers and influence does not keep pace with the increase of the aggregate population of the Union.

THE CRITTENDEN PLEDGE.

In July, 1861, was introduced into the House, and passed almost unanimously, (only two dissenting,) the well known Crittenden Pledge or Resolution, *viz.:*

"That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States, now in arms against the constitutional government, *and in arms around the Capitol:* that in this national emergency, Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not waged on their part in any spirit of oppression, or *for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the*

Union with all the dignity, *equality* and *rights* of the several States unimpaired; and that, as soon as these objects are accomplished, the war ought to cease."

THE SENATE PLEDGE.

In the Senate, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, had introduced, and the Senate had passed, a like resolution. Thus three branches of the Legislative Government—the Executive, the Senate, the House—solemnly pledged itself to the country to carry on a war, only for the SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION. The armies were created, and the soldiers were enlisted upon that solemn pledge,—and, upon many a battle field, many a life has been freely offered up to carry out, defend, protect, and promulgate that pledge. This was the war, the North entered into,—the war of the Conservative men of the North,—the war of the great Democratic Party. We never committed ourselves to any other war (cheers), and they who are for breaking these pledges, or for creating another war,—or, who have committed us to, or enlisted us in this war, under what now seems false pretences, or false pledges,—they are in honor bound to dismiss us from this war, and to carry it on, themselves. (Loud and prolonged cheering, many of the audience rising and waving their hats.)

THE REVERSE PICTURE—THE PROCLAMATION OF SEPTEMBER 22D.

These being the pledges of Mr. Lincoln, the President, and of the Congress assembled in Washington, now look at the reverse picture, and say, who can, that the whole purpose, the whole *programme* of the war have not been changed? Say,—who can, that twenty millions of Northern white men are not now called upon to endure Conscription and Taxation, and to sacrifice themselves in Southern latitudes, mainly to free three or four million of negroes. (Applause) The President in his September 22d Proclamation says:

"On the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, *shall be, thenceforward, and then, forever free;* and the *Executive Government* of the United States, including the military and naval AUTHORITY thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, or any of them, in ANY effort, they may make for their actual freedom"

THE PRESIDENT'S EXTRAORDINARY USE OF WORDS.

Let me first call attention here to the extraordinary words of the Proclamation. The President speaks of himself, elected for but four years, two of them now nearly expired, as the EXECUTIVE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES! Who created Abraham Lincoln the *Government of the United States?* Who created, who elected him, a man made of no better flesh and blood than the rest of us, to be the GOVERNMENT of thirty millions of people in the United States?

A VOICE.—The people. "Cries of "No, no;" "Put him out," "Let him be.")

MR. BROOKS.—The people! *Never!* (Exciting cheers.) Never, NEVER did the people give him a majority of their suffrages. (Continued cheers.) He is a minority President, *appointed* by the operations of the Constitution in spite of the people of the United States. (Cheers.) A large majority of the people voted against him, and he was created President in, and under that very Constitution he would overthrow by his proclamations. (Great, and continued cheers.)

In this Proclamation, the President also speaks of "the Military and Naval AUTHORITY. Authority is a legal power, or a right to command, such as Prince over subject, as Parent over child. The Government has authority: or, the President acting in obedience to Law, and so the Precedents or Decisions of a Court, are *authority* or *authorities;* but the AUTHORITY of the Army or Navy is more novel even than this declaration of Mr. Lincoln, that I am the Executive Government of the United States,—for there is a precedent for that, in the French *L'Etat c'est moi* (I am the State.) The Army and Navy are the agencies of civil authority,—but, under our form of Government, they are no authority of themselves. When the State is the Emperor or the King, the Army or the Navy are only his means of executing his authority,—but, under our form of Government, they are no *authority*, only the military Agencies of the Civil Government of the United States. As names often are things, or more than things, I thus dwell in verbal criticisms upon these words. When a President sets himself up as the Executive Government of the United States, and calls the Army and Navy his *authority* for overriding States, and the Laws of States, and the Constitution of the United States, we cannot be too watchful of mere words. Naval and military men, then, be it understood, are but Agents, only, of civil authority, to execute Civil and Constitutional Law. (That's so; cheers.) The Army and the Navy are, certainly, not "authority," under any known or recognized "Executive Government of the United States" (Cheers.)

There is another part of the Proclamation, which chalks out, or seems to chalk out, a servile war, which contemplates, or seems to contemplate, the exciting of the slaves to the destruction not only of their masters, but of women and children, and to add the horrors of a servile, thus to the civil war. The words are—

"The Executive Government * * will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons (negro slaves) * * * in any effort they may make for their actual freedom."

I do not know that the President means to excite a servile insurrection. I will not impute to him the horrible intent of converting the Southern country into a Hayti, or St. Domingo, with the "Authority" of his army and navy to help, but I say, that the language is susceptible of that meaning, and such meaning has been given to it throughout the civilized world. (Applause) When the "Executive Government" thus addresses negroes or slaves, words ought to be used that negroes or slaves cannot pervert into authority to burn, slay, destroy, without regard to condition, age, or sex. (Applause.)

THE HOUSE BREAKING ITS PLEDGES.

But the President alone is not responsible for this violation of the Pledge and Principle, that enlisted the conservative men of the country in this war. The House of Representatives thus, December, 1862, reversed the Crittenden Resolution of July, 1862, the Hon. Sam. C. Fessenden, of Me., offering the following Resolution, which passed, ayes 78, noes 51:

Resolved, That the Proclamation of the President, of the date of Sept. 22, 1862, is warranted by the Constitution; that the policy of emancipation as indicated therein is well adapted to hasten the restoration of peace, is well chosen as a war measure, and is an exercise of power with proper regard to the rights of citizens and the perpetuity of a free government.

ISSUE TAKEN ON PROCLAMATION POWER.

And now, my friends, here, we take issue on that Resolution, such as we took in September, here, in this Hall, on the Proclamation, pending that reign of terror, when moral courage was needed to speak, not as now, when we can speak, and dare to speak with freedom, of all the efforts of the administration of the government to subvert the law. When I said to you in the beginning of my remarks, that the Constitution of the United States was the embodiment of the common law of England and of the wisdom of our British ancestors for 500 years, I omitted to say that there was nothing in that Constitution which forbade Executive Proclamations. There are certain things so settled in human life, that it is not necessary to stipulate against them, such as the right to eat, to breathe, to live. When our British forefathers, in their second Revolution, stipulated against almost every form of executive despotic power, they did not deem it necessary expressly to stipulate against Proclamations, or to define the limits of uttering a Proclamation,—because the common law of England had long settled, that Kings could not make law by proclamation, or ordain law, or override law. When our Constitution was formed, such a practice had not been set up in England for 200 years. No monarch of England, for that long period of time, had attempted to exercise, by proclamation such powers and prerogatives as the President of the United States sets up in his Proclamation of September 22, 1862. (Applause)

Queen Elizabeth as long ago as 1580 began to make Law by Proclamation, then, against the Anabaptists of England, and against Irishmen straying away from home, and against seditious and schismatic books tending to prejudice the then rising Church of England. James the 1st prohibited by Proclamation country gentlemen from coming to London, and regulated, or attempted to regulate, the habiliments of their women and children. (Laughter.) Charles the 1st, unfortunately for himself, in prohibiting by Proclamation, emigration to New England, prohibited Cromwell and Hampden from emigrating there. Queen Elizabeth, however, respected her People enough, to listen to, and to yield to some of the remonstrances of that People against this power of Proclamation. Charles the 1st went to the Block, because of the unholy exercise of this, and similar Prerogatives and Powers. (Applause) The Tudors, and the Stuarts claimed not only the power to proclaim and to ordain Law by Proclamation, but the power to dispense with Law, and to suspend Law. What cost these dynasties their existence is that which calls itself "*the Executive Government* of the United States, and is now attempting upon us, Americans. (Applause.) Abraham Lincoln *suspends* Law,—the *Habeas Corpus*,—*dispenses* not only with Law, but even with the Courts of Law, and, by Proclamation, *ordains* Law. (Cheering.) Our Fathers did not stipulate against these Executive or Royal Prerogatives, in the Constitution,—because for 200 years in England, the exercise of such Prerogatives had scarcely been thought of. But what no King of England for two centuries dared to do,—what broke down the Tudors and the Stuarts, Abraham Lincoln is doing, and his upholders are claiming that he has a right to do. (Applause).

A PRONUNCIAMIENTO, NOT A PROCLAMATION.

Now, no man doubts the right of the President to utter a Proclamation; at times, it is his duty even,—but a *Proclamation* is one thing, and a PRONUNCIAMIENTO is another. The one is English, on English precedent; the other is Spanish, and comes to us from Spain, or, from the Revolutions of Spanish America. The Kings or Queens of England, utter Proclamations now,—and there are numerous precedents for them, from the Administration of Washington, on to this era and age,—but the Kings of England, now, and the previous Presidents of the United States, utter Proclamations, not to MAKE Law, or to ORDAIN Law, but to proclaim what the Law *is*, and to forewarn ill-disposed people against the violation of existing Common, Constitutional, or Statute Laws. The Queen of England, Queen-born, has forewarned her British subjects not to violate British (neutrality) Law,—but our four-years old President suspends Law, dispenses with Law, ordains Law, and overthrows both Constitutional and Statute Law. He *pronounces* (in the Spanish meaning of the word), not *proclaims* Law. He scorns Common Law, Statute Law, Constitutional Law, Latin *Magna Charta*, and *Habeas Corpus*, and English, as well as American written Constitutions, and introduces here, not from England, the PROCLAMATION, but from Spanish America, the *Pronunciamiento*, that is, REVOLUTION. A Proclamation upholds Law; the Pronunciamiento overthrows Law. The President has fulminated a Spanish Pronunciamiento.

NO SUCH MILITARY POLICY NECESSARY.

But, we are told this *Pronunciamiento* against whole States, or upon whole States, is, as a matter of mere military policy, or necessity, a wise exercise of the War Power; and it is insinuated that when the negro is thus "pronounced" free on paper, then Sambo, and Scipio and Cæsar will embrace their Rebel masters, and bring them into the ranks of our army, and surrender them as prisoners of war to the utterer of this Paper Proclamation. (Laughter and applause.) We shall see. We shall see. But I deny that there is any wisdom in this Paper as a war measure. I deny that it is a military policy. Its first effect has been to disunite the North, and to raise up a large majority in that North, certainly in the central States of the North, in opposition to this species of administration. (Applause.)—And the next effect has been, while thus disuniting the North, to unite the whole South as one man against a government carrying on a war on such principles. (A voice—"That's so.') We, who were united, have become a *divided* People, and they, who were divided, have become a united people;—and if this be military policy, I must say, I don't see it. Do you? (Laughter.) It is a matter of record, too, that since the utterance of this Paper, while Providence before blessed our arms, when fighting for the Constitution and the Laws; now, Providence in a good degree has ceased to smile upon us. Delaware, Maryland, Western Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri came to us under the Inaugural of the President and the Crittenden Resolutions; New Orleans was taken; Norfolk surrendered; nearly the whole coast of North Carolina became ours; a Union party more or less existed everywhere in the South;—while now, vast armies are in the field against us, fighting not alone for Independence, but for life, home, family, fireside, wife, children, everything dear to man. The military policy of the President has made popular, South, what was there but an odious conscription, and what the people were

preparing to resist. A war, becoming unpopular, has there been made popular; while a war here, at the start popular, is becoming unpopular, because of the false pretences under which men were engaged or enlisted in it. (Applause.) Hence, I deny that there is any military necessity for this Paper, or, that there is any military policy in it. (Cheers.) It is costing us already seas of blood, and will cost us, if thus persisted in, the entailment of a debt upon generation after generation, so that labor, for centuries, will be subjected to capital. (Cheers)

NEGRO PROCLAMATIONS IN THE WAR OF THE REVOLUTION.

And now, as a matter of history, gentlemen, there is no one thing upon which the American people, or the United States Government, are more committed than against this use of negro-freeing Proclamations, or the use, in any way, of negroes in war, civil or foreign. The British Generals on our own Continent, pending our own Revolution of 1776, uttered Proclamations like this of Abraham Lincoln. Sir Henry Clinton and Sir William Howe *proclaimed* in New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania the freedom of our negroes; Lord Dunmore did the like in Virginia, and Lord Cornwallis, further South. Our Statesmen and our Generals made good points of appeal to the civilization of the world against this British employment of Indians and negroes in civil war, and they spoke of the Indian savage and negro barbarism in the same breath. The use of such means and men, by Englishmen to subdue Englishmen, was pronounced to be against the law of nations, the law of nature, and the law of God. (Applause) That great man, Edmund Burke, whom Heaven had so gifted with intellect, that he seemed able to concentre the great lights of the Past, and to spread and to reflect them all over the Future,—that great man foresaw what England was driving America into, and often held up the lights of that luminous intellect to forewarn his countrymen to beware. What he, what Lord Chatham, and others, said in the British Parliament, ought now to be read and re-read by every North American. In an address to the King of England, exhorting that King not to drive the war to extreme measures, said Burke:

"To excite, by a Proclamation issued by your Military Governors, an universal insurrection of negro slaves in any of the Colonies, is a *measure full of complicated horrors, absolutely illegal, suitable neither to the practice of war nor to the time of peace.*"

In an address to the then British Colonies, Mr. Burke said:

"We likewise saw with shame the African slaves, who had been sold to you in public faith, and under the sanction of acts of Parliament, to be your servants and guards, employed to cut the throats of their masters."

The effect of these remonstrances from Burke, from Chatham, and other liberal Englishmen, upon Parliament, against these proclamations for the use, or sudden liberation of negro slaves by the British generals, did more than anything to destroy the popularity of the war in England and to tempt the British government and people to end so wicked a war, by the recognition of their colonies as independent States. (Applause) Great Britain herself, as a government, confessed the Proclamation respecting the negroes to be so wrong that in the treaty of 1783, 7th article, is this solemn stipulation:

That His Britannic Majesty should, "with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or *carrying away of negroes*, or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the United States, and from every part, and place, and harbor within the same."

When the treaty came to be executed, long controversies arose upon what definition should be given to this "*carrying away of negroes, or other property.*" Whoever will look into the American archives will find long diplomatic papers, and then long diplomatic controversies,—and he will find, too, that not only such Southern men as Jefferson and Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, were committed against the abduction, use, or employment of negroes in war, freed by proclamation or otherwise, but such New Yorkers as John Jay and Egbert Benson. In the end the British government acquiesced in the justice of these remonstrances, and paid for the deported negroes, thus freed or abducted. (Applause.)

NEGRO PROCLAMATIONS IN THE WAR OF 1812.

A like passage of history was repeated after the war of 1812. Admiral Cochrane, upon the waters of the Chesapeake, issued a Proclamation, which, while it avoided the use of the word slave, in order to seem thus not to violate the understanding, or law of nations, that forbade the use of slaves, or the stirring them up to insurrection, nevertheless invited such persons to enter his Majesty's service, or to emigrate to British possessions in North America. Admiral Cochrane, in short, was following in the footsteps of Clinton, Howe, Dunmore, and Cornwallis of the Revolution. When the Treaty of Ghent was made, (1815,) in the 1st article was inserted a stipulation resembling that in the 7th article of the Treaty of 1783, *viz:*

"That all places captured by either party should be restored without delay, without carrying away any private property captured in such places, or *any slaves, or other private property*"

OPINION OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

John Quincy Adams, to whose name and memory, the Republican party profess to look up with so much respect, it so happens, was Minister at the Court of St. James, charged with the negotiation of this Treaty on the part of the United States. In a letter to the Secretary of State, August 22, 1815, he reports his conversation with Lord Castlereagh upon the subject, in part, as follows:

"Had the British plenipotentiaries asked of us an explanation of our proposal to transpose the words [of the treaty] we should certainly have given it; we evidently had an object in making the proposal; and we thought the words themselves fully disclosed it. Our object was the restoration of all property which, by the usages of war among civilized nations, ought not to have been taken. All private property on shore was of that description; it was entitled by the laws of war to exemption from capture,—*slaves were private property.*" Further on he continues: "It was true, proclamations inviting slaves to desert from their masters had been issued by British officers; we believe them *deviations from the usages of war*; we believe that the British government itself would, when the hostile passions arising from the state of war should subside, consider them in the same light. * * * * * Lord Liverpool manifested no dissatisfaction at these remarks, nor did he attempt to justify the proclamation to which I partially alluded."

In a letter of instructions (July 5th, 1820) to Mr. Middleton, our Minister to St. Petersburg, where this article of Treaty of Ghent had been referred, upon difficulties arising as to construction similar to those in the Treaty of 1783, Mr. Adams enters into a sustained argument to

prove that the emancipation of an enemy's slaves is not authorized by the laws of war.—The following extract is sufficient to clearly exhibit his opinion:

"It has been repeatedly alleged on the part of the British government that it could not be supposed they would have agreed to an article which would oblige them to deliver up to their masters slaves who, during the war, had taken refuge under their protection. The reply to this observation is, that if that had been an objection to their agreeing to the article, it should have been made before the signing of the article, and the engagement not to carry away slaves at all. They had in fact numbers of slaves by these different modes of capture,—one of such as had been seduced to run away from their masters by proclamations from British officers, a second of voluntary fugitives whom they received; and a third of such as had been taken in predatory excursions. You will find in Niles's Register, vol. vi., p. 242, the proclamation of Admiral Cochrane, instigating the desertion of slaves from their masters. * * * * It is not openly addressed to slaves, nor does it avow its real object. From the use of the phraseology which it adopts, the inference is conclusive that the real object was such as the admiral did not choose to avow, and the only supposable motive for the disguise is the consciousness that it was not conformable to the established usages of war among civilized nations. The wrong was in the proclamation. Admiral Cochrane had no lawful authority to give freedom to the slaves belonging to the citizens of the United States. The recognition of them by Great Britain in the treaty as property is a complete disclaimer of the right to destroy that property by making them free. An engagement contracted with them to that effect was, in relation to the owners of the property wrongful; and, if, in relation to the slaves themselves, it was an engagement which the British government assumed upon themselves and sanctioned, it could not divest the owners of the slaves of their property, nor release the British government from the obligation to the United States, and to the owners, to evacuate the place without carrying them away."

Mr. Adams wrote to Mr. Rush, at London, as follows:

"The only equity of the British side is that they signed the article without being aware of its full import, and that the stipulation was incompatible with their previous promises to the negroes. This is the real knot of the question between us, and its solution is, that they had no right to make any such promises to the negroes. The principle is, that the emancipation of an enemy's slaves is not among the acts of legitimate war—as it relates to the owners; it is a destruction of private property, nowhere warranted by the usages of war. This principle must, I think, be peculiarly familiar to the Emperor of Russia, and may be pressed upon his attention in the case of reference with effect."

On the 18th of October, Mr. Adams again wrote to Mr. Middleton, and expressed his views in the strongest language. He said:

"In the statement of the British ground of argument upon the claim in the submission, they have broadly asserted the right of emancipating slaves—private property—as a legitimate right of war. This is utterly incomprehensible on the part of a nation whose subjects hold slaves by millions, and who, in this very treaty, recognize them as private property. No such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers who admit any limitation. The right of putting to death all prisoners in cold blood and without special cause might as well be pretended to be a law of war, or the right to use poisoned weapons, or to assassinate. I think the Emperor will not recognize the right of emancipation a legitimate warfare, and am persuaded you will present the argument against it."

Now, gentlemen, no language can be stronger than this, which Mr. Adams here uses against what Mr. Lincoln has done, or is to do. "The Emancipation of an Enemy's slaves (he says) is *not* among the acts of legitimate war," almost the language of Edmund Burke. "No such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers, who admit of any limitation." Mr. Adams expresses his horror of such war, by classing it "*with putting to death all prisoners* in cold blood," or "*the use of poisoned weapons*," or "*assassination*." The Emperor of Russia decided on the words of the Treaty, that the slaves must be paid for, and they were paid for, $1,200,000 under this, the Treaty of Ghent, and the Treaty of 1783.

It is now said, that at a late period of life, Mr. Adams retreated from these positions, and excused himself for so doing, that he wrote under instructions from the then administration, and did not express his own opinions. It is true, that after Mr. Adams had been defeated for the Presidency in 1828,—as, he deemed, by the South, exasperated, it may be by that defeat, he did agree, that "the War Power" could abolish slavery, but his "War Power" was not laid down to be in a Proclamation from the President of the United States, but in Congress. CONGRESS (he said) (speech of 1842) has power (thus) to carry on the war, and not the President alone. One of the laws of war, he sets down to be:

"When a country *is invaded* and two hostile armies are set in martial array, the Commanders in both armies have power to emancipate Slaves *in the invaded territory*."

But our President in the White House, with no sword buckled on his belt, even, 1000 miles or more from Texas, &c., which our armies have never *invaded*, fulminates from that White House, in a mere Proclamation, a law of war, liberating the slaves in a Territory he has never even seen. (Applause.)

It matters not, however, what Mr. Adams said, in the heat of debate in 1842,—for then he was but Mr. Adams,—whereas as Minister to England, and as Secretary of State, representing and acting for the Government of the United States, he committed this Government, and the People, in 1815 and in 1820, to principles which no honest, consistent successor in that Government can now retract. Mr. Adams in 1815 and 1820 spoke for the United States: in 1842, he spoke for Mr. Adams alone. *There* is our record, a record made up from 1776, on to 1818, in two Treaties of Peace, in diplomatic correspondence, and in the receipt of moneys thereon, and this record cannot be got over, or put under,—for it stares us in the face, on every side we turn. (Applause.) The emancipation and the use of negro slaves, as President Lincoln is using and emancipating them, is, then, in violation of every principle and every precedent of our intercourse in such matters, with foreign States. (Great cheers.)

Gentlemen, these historical recollections, I am well aware, in a popular assembly like this, are somewhat dull,—but I feel in addressing you that through this Association I am addressing no inconsiderable portion of our Northern countrymen, and Trust, directly or indirectly, some of the conservative people of the South. (Applause.) Hence it is not declamation that is useful now, but instruction, the right reading of the right records. We must show both the North and the South, that the war waged was a war for the Constitution and the Laws, not a war to break Constitutions and Laws,—and a war to be waged according to the laws of nations, as expounded by such eminent men as John Jay and John Quincy Adams, when they were addressing other nations.

THE WAR POWER.

But we are told, gentlemen,—no matter what Constitution, no matter what the laws of nations,

this is a war power, President Lincoln is using to support the very life of the nation. He has the right to exert any, and whatsoever power he may deem best fitted to subdue the common enemy. Or, in other words, the President of the United States has but to involve the people in a war, with anybody, ostensibly to maintain the Constitution, and he can then pervert that war, to subvert that Constitution, and to extinguish the life of the nation. (Applause.) What proposition more absurd? What better confutation than the mere simple statement of such an absurd proposition. (Applause.) In an abstract struggle, then, for the Republic, we must die in Despotism! To live, we must commit suicide! To restore the Union, we must make the Union not worth a restoration! Now this is not the sort of Government under which we bargained to live, or to die even. (Cries of "no, no.") We have never agreed to subvert the Constitution in order to restore the Union. We have never agreed to surrender Liberty, Property, Free Speech, Free discussion, or Freedom in the concrete or abstract to any Executive Government, or Executive Power. (Cries of Never, never.) And if ever the time comes, when under any "War Power," it may be necessary to subvert the Constitution, and thus to give up our Rights and Liberties, it is a matter of indifference to me, whether a Union thus achieved, be maintained or not; and I say here, and hesitate not to say, that the quicker we be rid of such a Union, under such a Government, the better for all concerned. (Loud, and prolonged, and reiterated applause, the audience rising, and giving three cheers for Mr. Brooks.) This War Power is a new name for a very old thing. It is the new name of Despotism, and of Military Despotism, the very worst sort of despotism on earth. When the Roman Republic was changed into the Roman Empire—when the Romans lost their Consuls, the Tribunes, their Senate, all but in the name, and thus lost all their rights and liberties, their IMPERATOR, the Latin name for their Abraham Lincoln, their Commander-in-Chief, was scarcely changed by the War Power into the modern word, EMPEROR. Augustus, or Tiberius Cæsar, but became *Kaiser*, or *Czar*, that is Cæsar. Hence, let us put down our foot at the start, and declare, we recoguize no Presidential War Power, no *Imperator* to be turned into any *Emperor*, no Cæsar to be made into any *Kaiser*, or *Czar*. He who attempts to govern the People, under any other Power than the Powers of the Constitution; he who leaps over the Laws of Civil Liberty, and the Civil Law, into that boundless field of Despotism, claimed as a War Power, establishes principles and precedents, from Emperors and Cæsars, and merits the execrations of every free man. (Applause.) Hence, I say, when a President ordains Law by Proclamation, under the pretence that he has such right, under any unknown, illimitable War Power, his Proclamation is not to be regarded as Law; it is not Law—(cheers)—and the President of the United States has no more right to declare it Law, than you or I, or any other man. No General in the field is bound to respect such Proclamation. No soldier in the field owes it obedience, or fidelity. (Tremendous and long continued cheering.)

Gentlemen, your cheers remind me, that this is strong language,—but it is such as the crisis demands. Somebody must speak, when the great bulwarks of Law are being broken down, and everything is thus being put in peril, and I may as well speak as other men. Some humble sentinel must stand on the outposts of the Constitution, and the Law, and standing there, must speak, and cry out against Proclamation Law, against Executives dispensing with, or suspending Law. Two months ago, I know it would not have been safe thus to uphold Law, or to declare against the violation of Law,—but it is safe now. Then the casernes of Fort Lafayette, or Fort Warren would have been my doom. (Cries, not now, never, never; we 've put a stop to all that.) But when a President is unfaithful to his oath to uphold the Constitution and the Law, and subverts that Constitution and the Law,—it is my duty, it is your duty, before God and man, to denounce all his arbitrary uses of Power. (Great applause, and three cheers for the Speaker.)

SUBJUGATION IMPOSSIBLE.

In the beginning of this war,—when it was a war for the Constitution, and for the whole United States, not only were the people of the North a unit, or nearly so,—but we had a great and powerful party in some of the Southern States of the Union;—and for that Constitution, and under that Flag, which was the symbol of the Constitution, there was a fair prospect, not of subjugating, not of exterminating, not of crushing out the people of the South,—but by prudence and wisdom, and a fair adhesion to the principles of the Constitution, and of the Laws of Civilization as well as of Nations, of bringing back the great body of the Southern people to the embrace of the Union, and to the reverence of that ancient and honorable Flag. It was their Flag, as well as our Flag,—and the associations connected with it, were as dear to them as to us. (Applause.) But I hesitate not now to say,—what hitherto I have refrained from saying, though often felt, that it is vain, utterly vain, to attempt to subjugate, extinguish, or exterminate six or seven millions of Anglo-Saxon people. (Applause.) Their race is our race. The blood that runs in our veins is their blood. The same pulsations that beat in our hearts, beat in theirs. The same current of life that flows in us, flow s in them. Now, who of us, standing here on this Northern soil, believes, Southron or Saxon, Celt or Teuton, or Frank, can invade, or conquer, or subjugate us. All Britain, all France, the whole South, combined, could never shake us from our propriety, and make us tremble, and yield, under invasion. (Applause.) Subjugation—*subjugo*—is not a word of Anglo-Saxon derivation or origin. (Cheers.) Anglo-Saxons never were, never are, never will be, brought under the yoke—*subjugated*, conquered, crushed out, exterminated. (Cheers.) Edmund Burke well comprehended all this, and in that masterly speech of his on "Conciliation with America," cited four cases where, for years and years, the British government had attempted to subjugate a neighboring people—the people of Ireland,—of Wales, and of the Counties Palatine of Durham and Chester. Ireland was five hundred years, he shows, in the process of subjugation, and arms never did conquer her. "It was not English arms (says Burke), but the English Constitution that conquered Ireland." The British, at last, threw over her the protecting mantle of British liberty, and Ireland then began to be subjugated. When England piled fifteen acts of penal legislation upon

Wales and Welshmen, "no Englishman traveling in that country could go six yards from the high road without being murdered." (Laughter.) "When, after two hundred years of struggle, the day star of the English Constitution," adds Burke, "had arisen in their hearts, all was harmony, within, and without—

——Simul alba nautis
Stella refulsit,
Defluit saxis agitatus humor, &c. &c.

And the like is said of the Counties Palatine, Durham and Chester. Hence how vain this attempt to subjugate, crush out, or exterminate millions of our own people, of our own flesh and blood,—protected as they are by an almost boundless territory, stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande,—a territory almost without high roads, in large plantations, without visible population,—in winter, no inconsiderable portion under water; in summer, the heat so oppressive that the man of the North can hardly endure exposure to the rays of the sun. Such a territory, if there were no defenders upon it, would be almost unconquerable, geographically, or climatically, if I may coin the word. The subjugation, therefore, of such a people, or such a territory, in such a climate, may as well be abandoned first as last. If we wish then to bring them back into the Union, we must bring back to them the Constitution and the Protection of the laws. We must do what Burke said was done for Ireland and Wales, throw over them the protecting folds of the Constitution, in the spirit in which that Constitution was formed. We must re-lift up from the ground where it was trodden under foot, the Constitution, and only the Constitution. (Applause.) We must do Equity and Justice, and then we can exact Equity and Justice. We must hold out Equality for the States, and then we can enforce Equality. We must respect our own rights, and the rights of States, and then we can compel respect for these rights upon others. We must rear up here in the North, a Conservative, Constitutional Party, and when that Party is reared up, which accepts the Constitution not as this man or that man expounds it,—but as the Supreme Court has expounded it (cheers), then, and not till then shall we be a re-united States. Then, and not till then, shall we begin to subjugate the South. Force nor Violence can ever win back a People to love. Conquest would but impose the necessity for re-conquest, until here, as in Europe, we should ever be revolving in the ruinous circle of War and Despotism. We hold in the South, now, only what is under the range of our guns. Our conquest is only of the soil on which we are treading. To hold all this, to possess, to occupy a territory so vast, not alone are one million of men indispensable to hold,—but a million more, to conquer, to subjugate, as well as to occupy, or to re-fill the ever thinning ranks of those who do conquer and subjugate. How much better, then, how much wiser is the law of self-Government, or of that home Government, that State Government, which relieves a nation from obligations so vast, and impresses the duty of Government, upon every individual. Rely upon it, then, the only army for subjugation is the Constitution of the United States, and the principles of free self-government, interwoven in every part of it. But what we are doing now,—organizing and arming negroes, forming negro Battalions, Regiments, and Brigades,—is but outraging public sentiment. All Europe is crying out against it. The whole civilized world shrinks from, and abhors any prospect of the repetition of the bloody scenes of Hayti and St. Domingo. That European sympathy and civilization which has hitherto looked up to us as the model Republic, now turns with horror from white men co-operating with African slaves to shed fraternal blood. We have no hope, then, from the world; we can have no hope in ourselves, until we retreat from this disgraceful exhibition of twenty millions of white men calling on four millions of negroes to fight eight millions, at the most, of white fellow men. Let us, then, hasten back to the principles of Washington, and of the Fathers of the Republic, as soon as possible, and put the Republic back upon the old track of the Constitution. These were principles of compromise, and concession, the North to the South, and the South to the North, and under them, from 1776, on to 1860, we carried on a successful and united government. (Applause.) I do not expect an immediate, nor an early, re-establishment of confidence between the North and the South; the demagogues have been too long successfully at work in parting us,—but I do expect, that when we can successfully re-establish the principles and spirit of the Constitution in the North, we shall be answered by a corresponding party, South. Or, in other words, when we can effectually subvert Abolitionism, North, a corresponding party in the South will successfully subvert Secessionism there. (Applause.)

THE PURPOSES OF THIS GOVERNMENT.

But, I am asked,—what is our *programme*?—what we intend to do? Do we intend to lay down our arms, we are tauntingly asked, and to submit to Rebellion, and let Rebellion ride rough-shod over us? Do we intend to let the capital of our country be taken,—our armies surrender,—and our cities, perhaps, be sacked? No; we have no such intent, no such purpose. (Applause.) We now have no such idea, and we never had. We think, and we feel, first,—that if we act upon the purposes, and upon the principles, which created this Government, the war will soon, of itself, cease. When the Constitution in 1787 was created, it was not altogether the work of Patriotism, or the love of Liberty, that inspired our Fathers. The treaty of 1783, with Great Britain, had secured the Liberty of the People, and the Independence of the States. There was not a right then, we have now, that every body had not then. The great principles of British and of American personal Liberty were as well secured under the old Confederation of States, as under the Confederation of the United States. But there were other things wanting we had not under the Constitution,—free trade, free intercourse, a common currency,—and, above all, protection and security from European intervention, or invasion. Thirteen independent States had thirteen different Custom Houses, and thirteen different laws, and regulations of commerce, and of trade. There was one rate of duties in Newport, Rhode Island, and another in New York, and yet another in Baltimore, or Norfolk. The Fathers of the Republic then felt the great business necessity of creating order out of this chaos,—and of adding to a Free People, a system of Free Trade, and of Free intercourse. It was INTEREST, then, SELF-INTEREST, as much as patriotism, that laid the foundations of our Government. There were debts to be discharged, obligations to be met, a navy to

be created for the protection of commerce, that could only be achieved by a government of the United States. Under the guidance of these impulses of self-interest, on the 11th of September, 1786, Commissioners from several States assembled in Annapolis (Md.) "to consider upon the best means of remedying the defects of the Federal Government." Their very platform was "to take into consideration the TRADE and COMMERCE of the United States, and to consider how far an uniform system, in their commercial intercourse and regulations, might be necessary to their common INTEREST and permanent harmony." The vulgar inspiration of Trade started the Convention held in Philadelphia, afterwards, in 1787. Such men as Washington, Hamilton, Madison, Franklin, Roger Sherman, Rutledge, and Pinckney, did not hesitate to assemble, and to act upon this great inspiration of self Interest, and of Commerce and Trade. Free trade, a free intercourse, free rivers, they well reasoned, were indispensably necessary among a free people. The main purpose for which this Government was created, our Constitutional history shows, was to have but one system of customs, and of duties, from Georgia to Maine. Or, in other words, more tersely expressed, this is an *exterior*, not an *interior*, Government. The Federal Government was created, not for morals, not for religion, not for slavery or anti-slavery,—but to promote the "general welfare," or, in other, more vulgar parlance, to collect duties, to raise revenue thereby, to *coin* money, to have uniform weights and measures, to have one patent office, and to regulate commerce with foreign nations. I repeat, our great Fathers created a Government of, and founded it upon, self-interest, and only upon these principles of self interest can it be maintained. When we interfere with morals, or religion, or attempt to govern by Theology, or Philosophy, our Government fails. When we attempt to enforce opinions, or to use Government to enforce opinions, the Government fails,—for it never can do, what it never was created to do. Hence, when an attempt is made to free negroes, or emancipate negroes in the South, the Government fails, just as if it attempted to emancipate them in Brazil or Cuba, or to emancipate the Sepoys of the East Indies. Hence, when we prosecute war to free four millions of of Southern negroes,—though there are twenty millions of us, North concerned it,—we must fail, under our form of Government; for the Government was created exactly for reverse purposes,—the purposes of *self-interest*,—South as well as North—(applause)—and it is not the *interest* of the South to live among free negroes. (Continued applause.) If, then, we wish to end the war, we must resort to the principles of interest that laid the foundations of the Government, and we must make it the interest of the South to live with us—as our fathers did, when they created the Government. We must, then, go back and remember, this is an exterior, not an interior Government, and that slaves and slavery in Georgia or in Carolina do not concern us, as it is our concern to regulate commerce, to collect duties, to have uniform weights and measures, and common patent laws—not to free negroes. We want one system of trade, —one uniform commerce upon the sea coast, and the free navigation of such great Rivers as the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, the Red River, the Arkansas, etc. The true programme, then, is to go back, and go back as fast as possible, to the re-establishment of our Custom Houses, our uniform system of duties. What they are doing in the interior of Virginia, whether they are in rebellion or not in Texas, or Georgia, but little concern us, if we hold on to Galveston, to Fort Pulaski, to New Orleans, to Norfolk, and collect the Revenue, and attend to the weights and measures. (A laugh.) If in Tennessee, ever, they choose to rebel, let them rebel till they are tired of it, provided at New Orleans they will pay the duties, and let us alone in Kentucky, and on the navigation of the Rivers. The beauty of our form of Government is, that we have little or nothing to do with what is going on in Tennessee, or Alabama, or Mississippi. If the People there think it their interest to be in rebellion, let them rebel, as long as they will confine their rebellion in their own limits. I do not propose to surrender New Orleans, no, never. (Applause.) That Post and that Port are indispensable to the great West,—where millions and millions more of people are hereafter to live, and who cannot even run the risk, that England or France, or some other Power may take it from the South, as we took it from her, under Farragut. What Gibraltar is to the great Mediterranean, New Orleans is to the Great West, —the Key, the gateway of the commerce of thirty or forty thousand miles of interior River Navigation. (Applause.) I do not propose to surrender Key West. The possession of it is indispensable to our navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. It is our self-interest to hold it, and hold it, we must. I do not propose to surrender Norfolk or Fortress Monroe. They are the keys of the Chesapeake, and the gates to the Capital in Washington. The duty of this Government is to collect duties in Mobile, in Charleston, as well as in North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, and Louisiana,—and I would remove anything which stands in the way of the execution of this Exterior duty.

UNION A NECESSITY.

The God of Nature, I may say here, to the Southern People,—(Oh, that they may heed it to avert eternal wars!)—the God of Nature has written upon our very geography—"One Country, one Constitution, one Destiny." [Applause.] It is written on the long lines of the Missouri and Mississippi, on the Ohio, and all their numerous tributaries, that empty into the Gulf of Mexico. The Father of his Country is not more eloquent in his Farewell Address upon this necessity of Union and Indivisibility, than is the Father of Waters, for four thousand miles,—as he gathers up his reasons in the rising rivulets of the icy Rocky Mountains, and rolls them on, into volumes of irresistible logic toward the Gulf of Mexico. (Applause.) These great waters must,—it is the law of inexorable necessity,—belong to one people, and be in one country. The holding on to what we have got, on the Mississippi, on the Gulf, on the Chesapeake, on the Capes of Virginia, is as indispensable to our safety as it is for the safety of the South to have them too. We are bound together thus, we are linked together, for weal or woe,—and no wise man will fight to put asunder what God has thus joined together. (Applause.) If we part by Treaty, we part but soon to meet again in war. Eternal War, or Eternal Union, seems to be our Destiny. (Applause.) Tell me not, that the Ohio can divide us, as the Rhine divides France and

Germany, or, as the Danube parts Nationalities, —tell me not all this, unless you tell me, in the same breath, the numbers of the huge standing armies, that garrison the Rhine and the Danube, and secure Peace only by bristling in arms, eternally. (Applause) England could not live without Scotland and Wales, and France perished in provinces, and Germany has been drenched with human gore,—because,*there* there was one people, speaking one language, cut up, divided into Kingdoms, Dukedoms, Landgraves, etc. It is essential, indispensably essential, for the security of our American Liberty, that we be one People. (Applause.) If but a river part us, or a chain of mountains, huge standing armies must stand as sentinels on every such river, or on every such mountain pass,—and there must be cordons of custom houses, and passports, and restrictions, all utterly destructive of human liberty. Standing armies are the Death of Freedom. Where the sword reigns, the Genius of Liberty runs off in terror and affright,—and the People soon succumb to Despotism. (Applause.) Three hundred thousand men on your side, and three hundred thousand on our side, to act as Policemen, will be indispensably necessary to keep apart a People speaking one tongue, and these inflamed by discordant free and slave institutions. Your negroes would run off, and we should keep them, and you, in revenge would burn, pillage and destroy.—Eternal war, or huge standing armies, I repeat then, would be our destiny,—and where War is, we see now, both North and South, there is no Liberty. In the name of God, then, if we will throw down our arms, throw down yours, and come back to us, or, it God has abandoned men to passion, and blood, in the name of Liberty, that hereditary Liberty, bequeathed to us all, we invoke you, to unite with us, and rescue our country from a destiny that shocks the patriot even in imagination to contemplate. (Great applause.)

UNION OUR SALVATION.

But, gentleman, Union is not only essential to liberty, but essential to our salvation. Republics exist on earth only as exceptional governments. Monarchies and despotisms are the common Law, if not the common destiny of nations. All Europe smiles, or seems to smile, upon our divisions, our battles, and the torrents of blood we shed in order to destroy the only great Republic on earth. Monarchy and Despotism both grin their ghastly smile,—while Liberty, the earth over, shrieks over the unnatural, the suicidal war.

Gentleman, "Divide and Conquer" is the principle of monarchies against republics everywhere. Divide and conquer is the principle which now inspires the British Government, if not the Emperor of France. Divide the North and South, and then if possible conquer both when both are exhausted. Unity and universality of government are therefore a necessity for us both North and South, and the quicker and deeper and wider, this principle is comprehended universally, the quicker we shall lay down our arms and stop this horrible effusion of human blood. (Applause.)

PRACTICAL RESOLUTIONS.

Gentlemen, I love to speak for practical purposes, and hence I have prepared two or three resolutions to present for your consideration, for your discussion hereafter, not for action at this time and this place, but for submission to this Democratic Association. I see nothing else that is left to us except the principles that are embodied in these resolutions. Revolution is the last thing to be thought of, under a form of government like ours, where grievances can be redressed at the ballot-box. We have to endure this Congress, we have to endure this President; it is wiser to endure them than to overthrow them by revolution. It is possible, barely possible, that at last they may be awakened, and may hear and heed the voice of the people. Hence I have selected a state as a medium through which my resolutions may be presented to the people both of the North and the South. A State of the Revolution ; one of the Old Thirteen, of high and holy history, which has never been alien, either to the North or to the South, and which has ever been faithful to the Constitution of our common country, and that is, the State, the glorious State of New Jersey. (Loud cheers.) I propose, therefore, the following resolutions, to be submitted to the Democratic Association for discussion, for action, and if you approve of them, for presentation to the Government of New Jersey. And let me remark here that the Government of New Jersey is a homogenous government; the three branches are all of one faith and one opinion, and hence I name her in preference to the Government of our own New York.

THE APPEAL TO NEW JERSEY.

Resolved, That the State of New Jersey, through her State Government, be respectfully requested to interpose in order to arrest the existing civil war:

1. By inviting the non-slaveholding States and the loyal slaveholding States—Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri—to meet in convention in Louisville, Ky., on the — day of February next.

2. By requesting the permission of the President of the United States to send Commissioners to Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, and Tennessee, to invite them also to meet in like national convention. And

3. *Be it further Resolved*, That the President be requested by the State Government of New Jersey to declare an armistice with or for such State or States as may accept this call for a national convention.

Resolved, That a committee be created on the part of this Association to present these resolutions to the Governor and Legislature of New Jersey, and to urge upon that state, that, in consideration of her revolutionary history and patriotic associations, she is entitled thus to lead in a national convention for the restoration of the Union of these States.

The resolutions were greeted with a torrent of cheers, and it was asked that they be passed upon immediately. The President therefore put the question, and they were carried unanimously.

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 27.

LETTER TO
REV. NATHANIEL HALL,

OF DORCHESTER, MASS.,

BY NAHUM CAPEN,

ON

POLITICS FROM THE PULPIT.

It is nine years since the letter of Mr. Capen was published, and, during that period, much has happened to confirm the soundness of his views. It was highly commended by eminent men, and by some of the most distinguished clergymen of the country. A large edition was published for distribution, and it was reprinted in most of the States. It was first published in the *Boston Post*, September 24, 1855, and the following extracts are from the editorial introductory: —

"We commend to our readers the accompanying letter from the pen of NAHUM CAPEN, Esq., on the subject of politics and the pulpit. It is written in an easy, chaste style, and discusses the question in a spirit so calm and Christian-like, that the worthy clergyman, to whom the letter is addressed, will be the last to complain. This gentleman, at the 4th of July celebration in Dorchester, when Hon. Edward Everett delivered his elegant oration, felt it to be his duty to proffer to the Throne of Grace a most terrible anti-compromise abolition prayer, and it is probable that this well meant but ill-conceived service has resulted in the good of eliciting from Mr. Capen this patriotic letter."

"The correct sentiment, the true Christian spirit, the wise philosophy, the pure philanthropy, of this well-conceived and happily expressed letter, present a system of religious ethics, worthy the highest and clearest order of intellect. We are glad this important subject has received the attention of a mind so capable of grasping and elucidating it, and so willing to speak freely and justly of the duties due from and to clergymen of every denomination. Each of the '*three thousand New England clergymen*' might study it with advantage."

The great evil of political preaching still prevails throughout the country, and many of the professed servants of the Prince of Peace are among the most violent instigators of war. They assume the prerogatives of Deity, in their weakness to control the opinions and acts of men much better informed than themselves, and they often bring contempt upon their sacred calling and upon religion, either by their ignorance or want of judgment. They speak arrogantly, and "*in the name of the Lord.*" Such fanatics were understood by CROMWELL. One of them asked Cromwell, "in the name of the Lord," to what place a certain fleet was destined. He instantly replied, "the Lord shall know! thou shalt go with it." He ordered his arrest, and sent him on board. They also speak of the "*Lord's Cause*," of "*the Lord's candidate*," of "*the Lord's party*," as if any portion of "poor humanity" can claim the special favor of God in the ordinary discussions of duty. One might be justly led to suppose by their language that *Divine Providence* was under

their special control, and that when their opinions or predictions proved false, the standard of *Truth* had indeed fallen. Some years ago, a writer in Ohio addressed a letter to the *Liberator*, Boston, challenging the Almighty God of the universe upon the subject of *slavery*, and we have a recent example in Massachusetts (see *Atlantic Monthly*), in the son of a clergyman, — a professor of Harvard College, — whose blasphemous prayer is even commended by men claiming to be Christians. It is sufficient to quote, without comment : —

"Lord, strangle this monster that struggles to birth,
Or mock *us* no more with *Thy* kingdom on earth."

This spirit was signally illustrated by a leading Abolitionist, when he exclaimed that, "we want an anti-slavery constitution; an anti-slavery Bible; an anti-slavery God."

The sad fruits of such fanaticism are to be seen in the growing indifference to the service of the church; in declining respect for the clergy; in impious and irreverent language, addressed to Deity; and in alarming tendencies to irreligion and infidelity. History is full of instruction upon this subject. In 1652, in allusion to Cromwell's victory over the Dutch, Mr. Peters said, "The business was so long doubtful, that God was brought to his hums and hawes which way he should fling the victory." A Scot's clergyman, of the same period, thus addressed his MAKER : "To be free with you, Lord, we have done many things for Thee that never entered into Thy noddle; and yet we are content that Thou take all the glory." Another, speaking of malignants, asks, "Lord, what wilt Thou do with these malignants? I'll tell Thee; e'en take them up by the heels, and roast them in the chimney of hell. Lord, take the pestle of thy vengeance, and the mortar-piece of thy wrath, and make the brains of malignants a hodge-podge." In 1643, a Presbyterian minister, in his prayer, asks, "O, Lord, when wilt Thou take a chair and sit among the House of Peers? When wilt Thou vote among the honorable Commons?" It was this spirit of unhallowed zeal that led to the suppression of Christianity in France, in 1794, and to the startling decree which was voted "*That Death is an eternal sleep!*" When man, in his frenzied weakness, assumes to govern his fellow-mortals in their business affairs, in the name of the Lord, he becomes so blind to his own errors and failures, that he does not hesitate to doubt Infinite Wisdom, even the existence of God.

It was stated in a recent Republican paper, that a Universalist clergyman, who had alway preached the doctrine of universal salvation expressed his confident belief, in view o the wickedness of Southern men in the pre ent war, that "*hell had become a militar necessity*," thus beginning to doubt his chie *axiom*, that "*God is Love.*" We migl cite numerous examples of this kind, but thes must suffice for our present purpose. W have taken examples from a period of two hun dred years ago to illustrate principles and t show that human nature continues unchanged Such preaching is sure to be followed by lam entable consequences. As the "Lord' party," or the "Lord's candidate" is fre quently beaten at the polls, and, as politica preachers are frequently compelled to modif or retract absurd statements or opinions uttere from the pulpit, and in the Lord's name, it i not surprising that the young, the women, an confiding men connected with the church should become indifferent and sceptical in re spect to all teachings proclaimed in the nam of the Lord. It is frequently asserted, wit utter disregard to the Bible and to the instruc tive examples of Christ, and to the teaching of history, that *slavery* is not a political sub ject! when the great fact is to be found everywhere upon record, in all civilize nations, that it is a subject solely in the hand of the legislator, for legal action and disposi tion. But of what use are FACTS, to a self sufficient fanatic!

In an interesting volume of PROF. CHRISTY he says, in his Introduction, "The burden of the ecclesiastical legislation of the United States on slavery has been based upon the theories started in Great Britain. It is well, therefore, that some allusion should be made to them here. The principal one, as argued by MR. BUXTON, in 1823, and stated by MR. CANNING, is as follows: "*The continuance of slavery and the principles of the Christian religion, are incompatible.*" In the course of the debates, MR. CANNING said, "Religion ought to control the acts and to regulate the consciences of governments, as well as individuals; but when it is put forward to serve a political purpose, however laudable, it is done, I think, after the example of ill times, and I cannot but remember the ill objects to which, in those times, such a practice was applied. . . . If it be meant that, in the Christian religion, there is a special denunciation of slavery; that slavery and Christianity cannot exist together — I think the honorable gentleman himself must admit that the proposition is HISTORICALLY FALSE. One peculiar characteristic of the Christian dispensa-

n — if I must venture in this place upon ch a theme — is, that it has accommodated elf to all states of society, rather than that has selected any particular state of society, the peculiar exercise of its influence. If has added lustre to the sceptre of its sover-gn, it has equally been the consolation of e slave. It applies to all ranks of life, to conditions of men; and the sufferings of is world — even to those upon whom they ess most heavily — are rendered compara-ely indifferent by the prospect of compen-tion in the world of which Christianity affords e assurance. True, it certainly is, that hristianity generally tends to elevate — not to grade — the character of man; but it is not ue in the specific sense conveyed in the norable gentleman's resolution; IT IS NOT UE that there is that in the Christian religion hich makes it impossible that it should co-ist with slavery in the world. Slavery has een known in all times and under all systems religion, whether true or false." Eminent en, in all periods of Christianity, have ex-ressed similar views.

EDMUND BURKE uttered the following uthful language: "Politics and the pulpit re terms that have little agreement. *No ound ought to be heard in the church but the oice of healing charity.* The cause of civil berty and civil government gains as little as iat of religion, by this confusion of duties. Those who quit their proper character, to as-ume what does not belong to them, are, for he greater part, ignorant both of the charac-er they have and of the character they as-ume. Wholly unacquainted with the world, n which they are so fondly meddling, and in-xperienced in all its affairs, on which they ronounce with so much confidence, they ave nothing of politics but the passions they xcite. *Surely the church is a place where ne day's truce ought to be allowed to the issensions and animosities of mankind.*"

JEFFERSON, in a long letter to a clergyman, aid, "I suppose that there is not an instance f a single congregation which has employed heir preacher for the mixed purposes of lec-uring them from the pulpit on chemistry, n medicine, on law, on the science and prin-iples of government, or in anything but re-ligion, exclusively. Whenever, therefore, preachers, instead of a lesson in religion, put them off with a discourse on the Copernican sys-tem, on chemical affinities, on the construction of government, on the characters or conduct of those administering it, it is a breach of con-tract, depriving their audience of the kind of service for which they are salaried, and giving them, instead of it, what they did not want, or, if wanted, would rather seek from better sources in that particular art or science. In choosing our pastor, we look to his religious qualifications, without inquiring into his physi-cal or political dogmas — with which we mean to have nothing to do." . . . "I do not deny that a congregation may, if they please, agree with their preacher that he shall instruct them in medicine, also in law, or poli-tics. *Then*, lectures in these from the pulpit, become not only a matter of right, but of duty also. But this must be with the consent of every individual; because the association being voluntary, the mere majority has no right to apply the contributions of the minor-ity to purposes unspecified in the agreement of the congregation."

The true philosophy of religious teaching is plainly indicated by ROBERT HALL. He says: —

"Christianity was subsequent to the exist-ence and creation of man, It is an institution intended to improve and ennoble our nature, not by subverting its constitution, or its powers, by giving us a more enlarged view of the designs of Providence, and opening a prospect into eternity. As the existence of man is not to be *dated* from the publication of Christianity, so neither is that order of things that flows from his relation to the present world, altered or impaired by that divine system of religion. Man, under the Christian dispensation, is not a new structure erected on the ruin of the for-mer; he may rather be compared to an ancient fabric, restored when it had fallen into decay, and beautified afresh by the hand of its orig-inal founder. Since Christianity has made its appearance in the world, he has continued the same kind of being he was before; fills the same scale in the order of existence, and is distinguished by the same propensities and powers.

"In short, Christianity is not a reorganiza-tion of the principles of man; but an insti-tution for his improvement. Hence, it fol-lows, that whatever rights are founded on the constitution of human nature, cannot be dimin-ished or impaired by the introduction of re-vealed religion, which occupies itself entirely on the interests of a future world, and takes no share in the concerns of the present in any other light than as it is a state of preparation and trial. Christianity is a discovery of a future life, and acquaints us with the means by which its happiness may be secured; civil government is altogether an affair of the pres-ent state, and is no more than a provision of human skill, designed to insure freedom and

tranquillity during our continuance in this temporary stage of existence. Between institutions so different in their nature and their object, it is plain no real opposition can subsist; and, if ever they are represented in this light, nor held inconsistent with each other, it must proceed from an ignorance of their respective genius and functions.

Our relations to this world demand t existence of civil government; our relatio to the future renders us dependent on the a of the Christian institution; so that in reali there is no kind of contrariety between ther but each may continue without interference its full operation."

LETTER.

Mt. Ida, Dorchester, Mass., Sept. 8, 1855.

My dear Sir, — In asking your deliberate consideration of thoughts, respectfully submitted in the following letter, with regard to Politics from the Pulpit, which have been suggested and elicited by recent events, and which there is no present occasion to recite, no doubt is entertained but you will give to the subject that serious and candid scrutiny for which your established habits of sincerity have been so long distinguished.

That the motives which originated this communication may not be misunderstood, nor misconstrued, I beg leave to speak of the dignity and responsibility of the ministerial calling, and while all who concur with me in opinion, feel it to be their duty to claim for it a considerate protection, they would not divest it of its high and sacred character, nor derogate from its prerogatives of independence.

They believe that the servants of Christ should imitate his examples — by teaching the great and sublime truths of Christianity to all people of different origin, minds, habits, culture, opinions, and under the varying circumstances of civilization, government, freedom, education, prosperity, adversity, goodness, crime, peace, war, or revolution. Christianity is a system of duty for the guidance of men under all the circumstances of life, whether public or private, pleasurable or painful, and not a system for the conformity of opinions on any subject, except it be on those fundamental principles recognized by all Christian denominations, and which are to be found in the attributes of Deity.

The Christian teacher cannot create the conscience of the individual, nor command the adoption of opinions — the reasonableness of which he cannot see, nor the manifestation of sentiments, the reality of whic he cannot feel.

The most that he can hope to accon plish, is to exercise and keep alive th conscience to all that belongs to integrit and justice, to elevate the standard of dut in the adoption of opinions deliberatel formed, and to insist upon a practice tha shall be in harmony with the declared wil of God, and those laws and constitution of men which, according to their best judg ment and knowledge, from time to time are ordained by general consent for th common good of society. As he canno divest the individual of his moral respon sibility, he can claim no right to dictat opinions for his adoption which his en lightened judgment does not approve.

He is the teacher of duty to the rich and to the poor, without the authority of controlling the property of either; he is the religious adviser of the young and aged, but not their political guardian; he is the appointed exhorter of the reckless and the wicked, but not their governor nor keeper; he is the chosen consoler of the afflicted and dying, but not their judge; he should be the counsellor of statesmen of all parties, but not the offensive partizan of any; he should be the spiritual and independent adviser of the magistrate, in the numerous positions of authority and official duty, but not the controlling gatherer of his knowledge, the responsible agent of his power, the director of his opinions, nor the arbiter of his acts. He should give to the legislator the inspiring benefit of his prayers, encourage in him an honest zeal for investigation, increase in him the love of truth, the sentiment of self-respect and duty, and leave him to act according to the judgment which he deliberately forms by the help of so many Christian aids. He is a preacher of the gospel to all men, of all

ations; the guardian of souls exposed to mptation, against the dangers of sin in s hideous variety, against oppression in olation of law, the promoter of peace ac- rding to law, the encourager of duty in asons of danger; but he is invested with authority by his Divine Master to as- me the prerogatives of private judgment, r to denounce his fellow-sinners for non- ncurrence in matters of opinion on sub- cts in regard to which the good and the le of the entire community are divided, d where the cause of truth demands a rfect freedom, exempted from all party d sectarian dictation.

What air and light are to the body, hristianity is to the soul; it constitutes e indispensable elements of healthful owth and spiritual existence. It enno- es the motives to lofty endeavor, it en- urages endeavor according to the stern quisitions of integrity; it enlivens the ffections, but it does not seek to control eir application; it creates a thirst for nowledge, and engenders a love for truth the man, the woman, and the child of very condition, and in every pursuit of fe, but it leaves each to choose his path, nd to walk his way, according to his con- cience and his knowledge. It is a mis- on above and beyond the temporary ex- edients and excitements incident to the ormy conflicts of opinion. Its guiding and should not be obscured by the clouds f passion nor stiffened by the hand of igotry, but it should be seen pointing pward to the serener atmosphere of a con- dent hope, an abiding faith, a practical harity. It is a mission to the world in its iversity, and its most glorious themes are hose which invest the spirit of controversy ith a dignified forbearance, and the power f knowledge with the sublime beauty of neekness.

In protesting, as an humble citizen, gainst the practice of introducing politi- al topics into the pulpit, with a party pirit, — a practice which it is to be re- retted too much prevails for the best good f the mission of religious instruction, — I eg most distinctly and emphatically to lisclaim all purposes tending to narrow the phere of the Christian minister, or to essen the means of his usefulness. On he contrary, most with whom I have ex- hanged opinions upon the subject, are leeply impressed with the importance of nlarging the sphere of his mission — in- vesting it with a higher character, loftier aims, holier aspirations, and with a more extended knowledge, and comprehensive views. It is to be viewed as a mission to the people of all time, however divided by sects or parties, diffusing that spiritual dignity and benign temper of Christ among men, whose differences of thought and habits of feeling require the constant reproduction of his examples of love, and the repetition of his lessons of wisdom.

The subject of slavery, or more properly speaking, the way and the means of providing for the best good and advancement of the dependent races of men, is regulated by the enactments of government in states or civilized nations, and like all other subjects relating to humanity, and submitted for adjustment to the human judgment in conventional authority, is differently regarded by different men. Its regulation or removal is necessarily a business of a political nature, it is that of legislation, and it may be regarded as one of the most difficult problems which statesmen are called upon to solve. It is more a question of time, method, and means, than of principle — to say nothing of the unjustifiable interference of citizens who assume the visionary right to aggravate its evils without sharing the realities of its burdens. It has been discussed by the learned, the good and the wise, during all time, and the discussion will be continued so long as man is subdivided into different races of varying capacity and condition, so long as man continues to be a being of progress. The process of Christian civilization is to be seen in periods of centuries, which are but moments to infinity, and the reverential student will not fail to find, in the historical lessons of Providence, that the same Almighty power that numbers and guards the sparrow in its flight and fall, no less protects and controls, during all the transitions of humanity, his image in man. He will find that races and nations are advanced and elevated according to eternal laws, and by the unchangeable instrumentalities of infinite wisdom. He who studies and regards most those laws and means most conforms to the will of Him whose omniscience pervades eternity.

The discussion of slavery in this country has been so long and so impressively identified with fanaticism, impracticable measures of philanthropy, with the abrupt and revolting language of party and of impatient ignorance; with a morbid and sickening despondency — that would substitute

days of fasting and of mourning for those of national rejoicing, because a greater blessing was yet to be achieved; with reckless and culpable denunciations against law and the authority of government, and even with the desperate and malevolent breathings of treason against our beloved Union; with impious declamations against the Bible and the church; that it is difficult, nay, almost impossible, to divest it of its unholy associations, or to introduce it into the pulpit, with its correlative topics, without exciting anew all those extreme manifestations of indignation and disgust to which an offended patriotism is sure to give expression, and seldom attempts to disguise or to conceal.

Fanaticism is excessive zeal. It has its providential mission, — but like that of the whirlwind, it has no inherent self-directing power. Its tract is ever characterized by the plunges of impatient haste and ill-timed violence. It demands a greater but an impracticable good. It is earnest in prayer and rapid in thought, but indifferent to knowledge and blind to judgment. It waits for no season, listens to no warning, and cares for no consequences. It invokingly holds up an abstract truth, detached from the practical conditions of society, and demands its instant adoption and impossible practice. It is prolific in its propositions, and it always assumes that their nature is imperative, urgent, and holy, that their importance is paramount and unquestionable. They are rapidly and incessantly multiplied and forced upon the individual, the family, the school, the town, the state, the nation, and the pulpit. All need to be guarded with an unsleeping vigilance, but no place more sacredly than the Christian pulpit.

All men confess a desire to lessen slavery and to increase freedom; to check the prevalence of evil and to promote the sway of good; to withstand temptations to sin, and to encourage the spirit of duty; to advance truth and to suppress error; but they may honestly and intelligently differ with regard to the best means for the accomplishment of ends so momentous to man — so acceptable to God.

The Christian minister, standing as he does, the professed servant of Divinity — commissioned by society to promulgate eternal truths revealed by God, and adapted to the condition and wants of humanity; to exhibit the spirit of his Divine Master by examples of loyalty to civil government; of fidelity to public and private trusts; of dignity and impartiality in the manner of presenting his convictions of truth and adjusting differences of opinion; of charity in speaking of the weaknesses and ignorance of men; of sublime simplicity in making known the will of the Father, — is placed in fearful relations of responsibility to God and to the world, — whenever he presents himself as a teacher on subjects not specially taught by his Divine Master and which, to be truthfully set forth, require vast research, long and careful study, patient and practical inquiry, diversified observation, test comparisons, resulting verifications, and a profound self-distrust. To assume to be the teacher of men in the practical or experimental details and complications of government or of science, is to imply a consciousness of knowledge superior to that of the statesman and philosopher, and to claim them as his pupils. That he can do much, in the proper discussion of all great topics, to inspire the lovers of truth with a spirit of duty; in acquiring knowledge divested of pride and prejudice; by examples of thorough inquiry, comprehensive views, conciliatory manners, and of forbearance and magnanimity, and by a spirit of enlightened humility which should ever characterize the servant of Christ, — all will admit, no one will deny. But who, let me ask, that is subject to the conditions of mortality, will deliberately assume, in addition to the great task of his Christian mission, the awful and immeasurable responsibility of teaching so much, in a life so brief, and with means so small?

Besides, as the clergy of different denominations represent the different views and sentiments of the varying parties of the nation, what would constitute a safe standard of conscience for one to adopt would be safe for all, — that is, each for himself and *no one for others*, — and the pulpit would be sought, controlled, and used for the exciting and temporary discussions of the times, and the church would become the place for the manifestations of passion and violence, and the Sabbath the great caucus day of the land. Religion would become but another name for politics, and piety a cloak for cunning. The floating errors of party, the falsehoods of designing and unprincipled politicians, — always assuming the attractive garb of truth for deceptive purposes, — would be more or less received and honestly adopted by the credulous

eacher, and sermons based upon decep-
on, and prayers upon error, would soon
evail and degrade the professed disciples
Christ to the common level of vulgar
rife, and subject them and their mission
the contempt of considerate men, and
scure the fair beauties of Christianity by
e unsightly deformities of sin.

The true conscience deeply scrutinizes
self, and employs an enlightened judg-
ent to guard against the mistakes of igno-
nce, the impositions of the sinful, and the
sumptions of will.

The Christian teacher is protected by
w in his position as the dispenser of truth,
id as he cannot be answered by the dis-
ntients of his congregation in respect to
ie possible fallacy of his views, nor be
orrected if he communicates the false-
oods of others as truths to be adopted, he
norantly becomes, for a time at least, a
ost dangerous though unintentional agent
f the wicked, and inflicts upon his confid-
ig and uninformed hearers, and upon so-
iety, a wound that irritates and mortifies
he commendable pride of the hearer and
ssens his respect for the preacher.

Let the great aim of the clergy be rather
o influence men to become Christian citi-
ens, and they will do a thousand times
iore for the safety of their government,
or the advancement of humanity, and for
he permanent sympathy for the oppressed
verywhere, than by actively uniting them-
elves with the brief, fierce, and fluctuating
truggles of party.

If, indeed, they are actuated by an irre-
istible sense of duty to participate in those
iovements which are connected with the
egislation of their country, and desire to
iake known facts and opinions not com-
nunicated by others, the way is open at all
imes and everywhere, — and they may
iave opportunities to say more, and to do
iore, and to present their views to larger
iumbers, on special occasions, or by speak-
ng at political meetings, — than they can
ossibly accomplish in the pulpit and with-
in the hallowed circle of the Christian
church.

The Sabbath and the sanctuary should
be sacredly protected against the breathings
of angry disputation, the discordant lan-
guage of party violence, and the wild in-
vective of passion — the invariable and
legitimate fruits of political preaching to a
congregation where members of the differ-
ent parties are associated for religious wor-
ship. The Christian soul demands at
church a quiet atmosphere, the cheerful
serenity of a peaceful trust, the impressive
associations of grandeur consistent with
prayer, a dignity becoming the sublime
spirit of truth, a gladsome temper that
harmonizes with the Christian's hope, the
exalting hymn, and the joyous anthem.

On all subjects of magnitude the great
and the good, the learned and the wise, the
pure and the holy, in all ages, have failed
to unite in opinion as to the best plans for
the advancement of the great cause of
truth. The clergy, in common with all
men, and with no special nor supernatural
exemption from sin or error, have not either
practically nor theoretically been able to
harmonize even their own views with re-
spect to the teachings of Christianity, and
they profess to realize an inward sense of
glory on account of their differences; and
while no one would presume to arraign
them for their diversity of opinion with re-
gard to the true means of progress and
course of duty, it cannot be claimed, with
any show of meekness or Christian pro-
priety, that they are authorized to require a
conformity in others which they are unable
to secure among themselves.

This communication was substantially
prepared for signatures of such members of
your church and society as might concur
with the views expressed. In reviewing,
however, the circumstances and the motives
which led me to write it; in considering
the magnitude of the subject and the ex-
pressed wishes of several highly respected
and intelligent gentlemen, who desired to
give the letter a circulation commensurate
with the nature and importance of the
questions involved; in wishing to avoid all
proselyting anxiety, or seeming solicitation,
incompatible with a confidence in principle,
which is above and superior to the convic-
tion of mere verbal persuasion, and in the
hope that it would have a tendency to lead
to unrestrained exchanges of opinion upon
the subject, — I have asked the written
committal of no one, that all may be free
deliberately and intelligently to form their
own conclusions, each for himself, and
without embarrassment of any supposed
antagonism between individuals either of
the family or of the social circle.

I have written with a deep sense of re-
sponsibility, from which no American citi-
zen, however humble, should feel himself
exempted. I have endeavored faithfully to
examine, though briefly, those serious and
delicate relations of accountability, which

no member of a Christian community, however imperfect, should seek to evade or to suppress. I have not hesitated to express myself with a freedom and a frankness alike due to the spirit of sincerity and to the cause of truth, in the confidence that you will appreciate my motives as you may hope to have others appreciate yours, and will regard the imperfect suggestions which have been made rather with a view to public duty than with any feeling of personal considerations or of party differences.

I have the honor to be, with considerations of respect and true regard, your most obedient servant and friend,

NAHUM CAPEN.

To Rev. Nathaniel Hall, Dorchester, Mass.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, Nov.* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with the Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of military operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Dispatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partizanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

SPEECH

OF

HON. REVERDY JOHNSON,

OF MARYLAND,

DELIVERED BEFORE THE

Brooklyn McClellan Central Association, October 21, 1864.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE ASSOCIATION.

Mr. President and Gentlemen: —

The return which I am sure you will most appreciate that I make for the kindness of your reception (a kindness that I shall ever gratefully remember), is to proceed at once to the consideration of the topics that belong to the occasion. None more momentous were ever submitted to a people. They involve the destiny of the nation. Is liberty to survive? Is our nationality to be restored? Is our form of constitutional government to be preserved? These are the great issues in the presidential canvass; and it is to these that I propose to speak. I have said that the issues are momentous. They involve no mere temporary prosperity, no mere suspension of general and private happiness, no mere eclipse of national power, no mere abeyance of national existence; but our nation's life or death rests upon their solution. (Applause.) The annals of time, since history's record commenced, furnish us with no parallel. A people but recently among if not the happiest on the globe, living under a government with a written constitution containing, in the plainest language, every guaranty for individual and social freedom that a sagacious and liberty-loving ancestry could devise, are now in the midst of a war more gigantic than civilized or savage man ever before knew, — with hostile armies vaster than Xerxes marshalled, — hearing, in almost every wind that blows, the strife of the battle-field, the cheers of the victors, now on this side, and now on that; the shrieks of the dying, the agonies of the wounded (brothers all); feeling the tottering condition of our country; its ruin at times apparently imminent; hope, even, at periods, gone, then revived; a debt already fearful in amount, and daily increasing at a more fearful rate, threatening that last calamity, national bankruptcy, we are now, after nearly four years of suffering and solicitude, called on to consider whether there is no remedy. Must there be, is there to be, another like four years? ("No, no!") And if there is, who is so mentally obtuse, or so blinded by partisan feeling, as not to see that political chaos will overtake us, and freedom, as the result in all human probability, be forever lost? (Applause.) Gentlemen, are these apprehensions chimerical or well founded? What the past four years have brought us to, we know. The symbols of woe, seen in almost every household in the land, tell us what human misery they have produced. The bones of nearly half a million of men, the just pride of our country, and who were but lately united to us by the strongest ties of affection, that now whiten hundreds of battle-fields, tell us of fearful slaughter. A funded debt of more than $2,000,000,000, and an unfunded one of almost, if not quite, as many millions more, tell us of a land mortgaged to an amount that already

shakes the nation's credit, and fills every reflecting patriotic mind with the deepest solicitude.

And yet, with all this individual misery, this dreadful loss of life, this already crushing amount of debt, the present time, now nearly at the end of the four years, tells us that the Union, so dear to us, continues dissolved; and that a united spirit of hostility, where before there was division, animates our brethren of the rebellious States, and which, if another like four years are continued, will lead them to prefer annihilation to a return to their original allegiance; to prefer death to submission, if the fate designed and prepared for them by the policy, civil and military, of the years that have passed is to be theirs,—a policy which leads directly to the loss of all their property, of all their past political freedom, and of all the securities for both guaranteed by the Constitution, to whose fold they are told we wish them to return. Social equality with their former slaves they are to admit. This is insisted by an influential, and, at this time, a controlling portion of the friends of Mr. Lincoln. The slaves, as proposed by the same party, are also to become the owners of the land, leaving to the white men and women only the occupation of daily laborers. A fate, like this, is infinitely worse than death. Obvious as in my judgment it is, that the rebellion was in the beginning without justification or excuse (and I am sure you concur in that opinion), it is not to be denied that its continuance and present strength are mainly to be referred to the condition to which the administration has reduced our Southern brethren, and the still worse condition to which its threatened policy will reduce them; and, judging from the past, that policy is sure to be adopted if Mr. Lincoln is reëlected. That this is the conviction of a large part, and, it is believed, of a decided majority, of the people of the loyal States, no man, who properly estimates their intelligence, or regards the signs of the times, can doubt. They think, as all the people of such States, including the President in the beginning, thought, that the sole purpose to be attained, and the sole authority to attain it under the Constitution by force of arms, was the restoration of the Union: the States returning to have all the rights that they before possessed. That this was the view of the President, and of the Convention by whom he was originally nominated, is past all question. One of the resolutions of that body was, "That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and *especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively*, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depends. (Applause.) And we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State, under any pretext, as among the gravest of crimes." Nothing can be plainer than the meaning of this resolution. The affirmance of the "right of each State to order and control its domestic institutions," refers, and can alone refer, to the right to retain domestic slavery. The denunciation of "the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any State" was intended to apply to the case of John Brown's invasion of Virginia. Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural of March, 1861, inserted this resolution at length, and declared that to him it would be "a law;" and added, "I now reiterate these sentiments," and, "in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most *conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration.*" In the same state paper he had before said, quoting approvingly from one of his own speeches, "I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it now exists;" and subjoined, "*I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.*"

At this time, it will be remembered, South Carolina had seceded. Her ordinance was passed on the 20th of the preceding December, and several other states had followed her example. Mr. Lincoln, therefore, when he addressed the nation in March, 1861, and announced the opinions I have given in his own words, knew that he would be compelled to resort to force to maintain the authority of the Union within these states. To do this he also knew would be the exercise of the war power conferred by the Constitution. And yet, with that fact and knowledge, he not only disclaimed all purpose to interfere with slavery in the states where it existed, but declared that he had "no lawful right to do so." (Applause.) The institution, therefore, of slavery, he, and the convention that nominated him, proclaimed it to

be, "especially the right of each state to order and control," "according to its own judgment exclusively." He never pretended at that period that, by virtue of the war or any other power known to the Constitution, he, as President, had a right to abolish slavery. His present opinion in that regard, if he was sincere in March, 1861 (as no doubt he was), is manifestly an after-thought, or rather has been since, and against his own judgment, forced upon him by influences, which, unfortunately for the country, he was too feeble to resist. He could not, to use his own reported language at that time, afford to break with "the Greeley faction;" and he never has had the time or manliness to do so since, although at one time he apparently thought that the safety of the nation required it. (Laughter.) These gentlemen constituted a power in his party. They are men of talents, of decided will, enthusiasts, fanatical as I believe, but therefore honest on the subject of slavery; and their united force, Mr. Lincoln's feeble, reed-like firmness was as impotent to resist, as human arm to arrest the march of the clouds. He saw, too, in the future, the prize of a continuing presidency. ("That's it.") He doubtless saw, or thought he saw, as he should resist or submit to their importunities, its possession or its loss, and unable to raise himself to the elevation of considering duty performed as the only foundation for an honest fame, he surrendered the conviction which he had before so recently solemnly announced, and agreed to attempt, and did attempt, not only indirectly, but directly, "to interfere with the institution," in spite of his prior solemn declaration that he had "no lawful right to do so." "Lead us not into temptation" is an invocation so vital to man's safety as to have been especially suggested by Heaven itself. The temptation of ambition has often led its victim to slaughter hecatombs of his race. It caused Napoleon to wade through blood and slaughter to a throne, and the subjection of all surrounding nations, until under the retributive justice of God, sure to be sooner or later visited upon sinning and erring man, he died an exile and in wretchedness on a bleak and barren island of the ocean. And, to compare great things with small (laughter), it has induced Mr. Lincoln to abandon his often recorded opinions, with the hope to attain thereby another lease of power; but for our salvation the same retributive justice is above us, destined in its own good time, and that we trust is near at hand, to send him to his home in Springfield, a sadder and a wiser man. (Cheers.) I say he has changed his policy — that he has abandoned his opinion of his power. But this was not done at once. In the interval, he often repeated and reiterated the views of his inaugural. It would detain you too long to specify each instance. A few will be sufficient.

1. In his message to Congress of the 6th of March, 1862, known as his compensation message, after recommending to that body that they should pass a resolution that the United States ought to co-operate with the States by means of pecuniary aid in effecting the gradual abolishment of slavery, he expressly disavows for the Government any authority over the subject, except with State assent. His language is, that his proposition "sets up no claim of a right by federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, to the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. (Applause.)

2. The act of Congress of the 6th of August, '61, emancipated only the slaves of rebels employed in the rebellion, and submitted the decision of such cases exclusively to the courts. Major-General Fremont, on the 30th of that month, he being then in command in Missouri, by proclamation, declared free all the slaves within the state. This, as soon as it came to his knowledge, he disapproved; and declared it, in a formal order of the 11th of September, to be void as far as it transcended the provision of the act of Congress. And in a letter of Mr. Joseph Holt to the President, of the 22d of the month, that gentleman, being alarmed for the effect of Fremont's order, states that "the act of Congress was believed to embody the conservative policy of your administration." This statement Mr. Lincoln never denied.

3. On the 9th of May, 1862, Major-General Hunter, military commander of the department of the South, embracing Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, by an order of that date, declared all slaves within such states free. On the 19th of the month, even before he was officially advised of the measure, Mr. Lincoln, by proclamation, declared the same, "whether genuine or false," to be "altogether void." In neither of these instances is there the slightest intimation of a change of opinion by Mr. Lincoln either on

the question of policy or of power. As to both, as far as we knew then, or know now, if we do him the justice to believe in his frankness and sincerity, he then entertained the same opinion that he announced in his inaugural. (Applause.)

4. But the evidence of this does not stop here. Congress and the President declared their views of policy and power. On the 22d of July, 1862, Mr. Crittenden proposed, in the House of Repretentatives, a resolution, which, after truly stating that the war was "forced upon the country by the disunionists" of the Southern States, declared that it "is not waged on (our) part in any spirit of oppression or for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or the established institution of these States (the seceded), but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and the rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease. (Cheers.) In the House only two votes were cast against it, and in the Senate but one Republican vote, and it was at once, and without hesitation, approved by the President. No pretence here suggested that slavery was to be abolished, or that any of the rights of the States in regard to it were to be interfered with. On the contrary, that it was our duty to carry on the war then raging, as long, and only as long, as it should be necessary to "defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution;" and that, the Union restored, "all the rights of the several States" would remain unimpaired. This conservative and constitutional policy was, soon after, and almost fatally, not only abandoned, but totally reversed. Emancipation proclamations, under a claim of executive war power — the first on the 22d of September, in the same year, and the second on the 1st on the succeeding January — were put forth. In the last, all slaves in certain States, or parts of States, were declared free; whether the territory or the slaves should fall within the military occupation of the United States or not: thus totally disregarding his declarations as to his want of power, made at the very moment of taking his official oath. Forgetting that oath and his then solemnly announced opinion, he now avers his sincere belief to be that the measure referred to was "warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity." Military necessity! (Laughter.) What power, as construed by the President and by some of his generals, does it not comprise? What restraints upon executive power does it not remove? How absolutely does it become its own sole restraint? How perfectly does vest in the President all authority, executiv legislative, and judicial? Its only limitatio is the necessity out of which it springs, a the sole judge of that necessity is the Pre dent. How alarming and how palpably a surd is the doctrine! and yet it is upon th and upon that alone, that the President re his proclamations of September and Januar See the outrageous results to which it lead The President thinks that the rebellion cann be suppressed, if Congress is permitted to i terfere. He thinks it cannot be done if cou or judges, though acting under the authori of law, are suffered to intervene their functio It being his sworn duty to suppress the reb lion, and whatever in his judgment becom necessary to that end constitutes a case military necessity. He disperses Congre closes courts, imprisons judges. Who is blind as not to see that this doctrine rests the President's unrestricted and absolu power; and, not only as concerns the gene Government, but those of the States, tra forms him from an officer, with careful limited authority delegated by the Consti tion, into a mere autocrat? The States el members of the House of Representativ Senators are chosen by their legislatures. legislature, loyal in an executive sense, t is, friendly to the President — the mode constitutional test of loyalty — must be chose The executive arm may be palsied by differe results, and its power to extinguish the r bellion enfeebled, if not destroyed. Th presents a case of military necessity. T freedom of election, therefore, in these Stat must be assailed; soldiers must be muster around the polls; no vote must be cast, n none such is to be permitted, but for t President's candidates; this, as we know a great extent, has already been shameless done in the case of the last elections in Mar land and Kentucky. ("That's so." A plause.)

The legislature is elected; and it is fear that an enemy of the administration will chosen senator: this must be prevented, a the members are therefore arrested, or, und fear of imprisonment, are forced to vote f the President's choice. It is a case of mi tary necessity. The press criticises wi frankness, but with truth, and for the intere and safety of the country, and as is its dut the conduct of the President. This tends, i thinks, to weaken and embarrass him. must be stopped: military necessity demand it; and it is done. Papers are suppressed

and editors arrested and imprisoned. Ministers of the gospel pray as in their consciences they believe to be right. They are supposed thereby to weaken the President's arm. It is a case of military necessity, and they are arrested, confined, and their churches closed and handed over to some more pliant pastors. ("Shame, shame.") These are no mere hypothesis — no mere fancy sketches. We know that such things have occurred in Missouri, Indiana, West Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, and New York; and yet, even to question the legality, much less to denounce them in words that burn — a patriotic, almost a holy duty — is, by some of the supporters of the President, deemed disloyal (derisive laughter), and abuse — scurrilous abuse — is heaped upon all who have had the manliness to do so; and who, in doing so, but maintain their inherited freedom. No warrant for such a doctrine is to be found in the Constitution; no military necessity is there mentioned as the source of power, or mentioned at all; no provision, except in relation to the writ of *habeas corpus* (cheers), is there to be found giving the authority to remove, or to suspend, under any circumstances whatever, the express guaranties which it contains of personal and political liberty, State sovereignty, and the freedom of religion and of the press. But Mr. Lincoln and his advisers have, nevertheless, discovered what no man before ever dreamed of, that there exists, as an independent source of executive power, either in the Constitution or outside of it, in the time of war, — a military necessity which gives the President, as long as such necessity exists — and of its continuance he is to be the exclusive judge — the right to disregard and extinguish the expressly and exclusively delegated powers of Congress, courts, and judges: the reserved rights and powers of the States, the guaranteed privileges of the citizen, the freedom of religion and the press, all, all are to succumb to executive power in time of war, civil or national, on the ground of military necessity. Wise and patriotic men have heretofore filled the office of President, and have been cabinet ministers. During the long interval between Washington and Mr. Lincoln's accession to power, a formidable insurrection and two foreign wars occurred, yet no one ever even suggested that any necessity could arise, which would not merely be cumulative of power in the President, but inconsistent with and destructive of those granted by the Constitution to the other departments of the Government, and of the securities of individual liberty which it contains. (Applause.) The first article of the amendment to the Constitution proposed by Congress on the 4th of March, 1789, with a view "to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers," declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." But futile the provision, if the doctrines of the present day are to be maintained! In a purer period of the Republic, however, it was found to be most potential. In 1798 the alien and sedition law was passed. The people were instantly aroused, and demanded, and at the earliest moment effected, its repeal. The Constitution was thus vindicated, and its violation rebuked by an almost universal public opinion, expressed through a free ballot-box. If, in that day, Mr. Adams had surrounded one voting precinct with armed soldiers, and there had been no other remedy with the free men of the time, his life would not have been worth a day's purchase. The friends of our Government in that age never believed that there could be any security for its continuance except in the preservation of all the guaranties the Constitution contained, and doubtless supposed that no further attempt would be made to violate them. How mistaken! Military necessity had not then asserted its function. Years elapsed: the people and the States enjoyed perfect freedom under the Constitution. Mr. Lincoln's administration begins, and soon afterward this monstrous and tyrannic doctrine is announced, and from time to time has been despotically enforced. It is now virtually claimed that the amendment referred to was designed only to limit congressional, and not executive power. It is true that Congress is the department alone mentioned in it; but it was because neither that body nor the people even dreamed that any other department would attempt to exert the powers prohibited. (Applause.) Had a suggestion to that effect been made at that time, it would have been received but with ridicule or contempt. (Applause.) And yet at this day, under the pretext of military necessity, of which the President is the sole judge, a power is involved to prohibit the free exercise of religion, to abridge the freedom of speech, the right to assemble and petition for a redress of grievances. And, as we have seen, Mr. Lincoln has done nearly all these wrongs. In so doing it is

hoped that he has not been himself influenced by a desire to trample upon the rights of the citizen, but has merely yielded to the stronger will of others, or to the temptation which, for the past two years, he has evidently had before him, of securing a re-election.

In the former days of the Government, when the political atmosphere took its hue from the complexion of the patriot sages of the Revlution, when love of country and of freedom were the animating principles of every heart, it may be confidently said that if such a pretension and such conduct had been claimed and pursued even by Washington (cheers) (I beg pardon of his memory for the supposition), deeply seated as he was in the affections of his countrymen, it would have excited a feeling of indignation throughout the land, so universal and so strong that he would have lost his place in their hearts, and would have shaken even his firmness and rendered his re-election impossible. Constitutional *liberty* the men of that day esteemed so priceless that they would have surrendered Washington rather than have sanctioned such gross departures from it. No man can doubt this who is familiar with their history. But to return to Mr. Lincoln's course in regard to slavery. Now that the day of election approaches, he goes a rifle-shot even beyond the measures of his emancipation proclamations. In these to put the rebellion down by means of emancipation was his sole avowed object. That accomplished, no matter when or by what means, the military necessity ceasing, slavery, except so far as it might be then effected, was to remain. His resort to the measure, as declared in his final proclamation, was solely, as he said, because he esteemed it "a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing" the rebellion. That object attained, emancipation was to terminate. Nor did the measure embrace all of the seceded States, or either of the loyal slave States. Of the former, part of Louisiana, of Virginia, and the whole of West Virginia were excepted. With the rebellion ended, slavery was to continue in these excepted localities, and also in Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland. But now what are we told? Under an authority which Mr. Greeley supposed was amply sufficient he agreed with Messrs. Clay and Holcomb to obtain a permit for them to go to and return from Washington, with a view to some peace negotiation. That Mr. Lincoln in the first instance consented to grant such a permit, no one can doubt who believes in Mr. Greeley's veracity. Mr. Lincoln, however, on the 8th of July last, withdrew his consent by sending to that gentleman, to be exhibited to Messrs. Cla and Holcomb, a withdrawal of his consent i the rather discourteous and offensive form o an address, "To whom it may concern." I this paper he refuses to allow those gentle men, or any other, to repair to Washington i order to negotiate a peace, except upon a pre liminary understanding and condition tha such peace is not only to embrace "the integri ty of the whole Union," but "the abandon ment of slavery," and that the negotiations ar to come "by an authority that can control th armies now at war with the United States." T treat of peace, even to speak of peace with a view to amicable results, with or to any par ties from the seceded States, or force any on of such States, is here declared to be wholly inadvisable, and is directly refused, unless i is first stipulated, that in every one of suc States slavery is to be abandoned. He, there fore, virtually proclaims to the citizens o those States, "I know you have had the in stitution of slavery among you — some of you before, and all of you continuously since, the Constitution was adopted — and have held it unquestioned, I know that that instrument guarantees it to you. In my inaugural message, I so said. I there declared that what is known as the fugitive clause in the Constitution 'was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves, and the intention of the lawgiver is the law:' and that I was about to take an oath that would bind me to enforce it, and that I intended to enforce it. Whether truly or not, I know that you think the institution indispensable to your industry and to the enjoyment of your domestic life. I know that the most of you are at war with the United States only because you think it in danger. It is also, I know, true that I have said that I have neither the inclination nor the power to interfere with it: and it is so far true, that I have done so, but to a limited extent, and as a necessary war measure; and have even expressed a doubt whether in going to that extent I have not transcended my authority. It is true that Congress proclaimed that the sole design of the war on the part of the United States was the suppression of the rebellion, and that, that accomplished, all of your rights, including that of slavery, would remain to you. It is true that on the 22d of August, 1862, in a letter to Mr. Greeley, I declared that my 'paramount object was the restoration of the Union, and not the safety or destruction of slavery. That if I could save the Union without freeing the slaves I would do it; that if I could save it

y freeing them all, I would do it ; or if by reeing a portion, and leaving others alone, I ould do that: my sole purpose being to ave the Union, irrespective of the question f slavery.' It is true that your land and ine is filled with mourning; that your fields re drenched with our kindred blood; that he war continues to be a frightful drain upon he resources, credit, and lives of both sec- ons. It is true that the vast and horrid pectacle of fraternal strife we are exhibiting nocks the Christian sentiment of the world. is true that it is now being carried on by oth sides in disregard of all civilized rules f warfare. All these things, and even worse, know to be true, and that they will be dread- lly augmented, to our mutual ruin, if the rife is not terminated ; yet I tell you that I ill not even listen to any proposition to ter- inate it that is not preceded by an assent, on our part, to abandon slavery."

Was ever man so inconsistent with him- elf? Was there ever, in any war, a refusal o treat for peace, — for arresting the shed- ing of blood above all, the shedding of blood y brother of brother? (Cheers.) Under ll these circumstances, could there be a refu- al so insane, so reckless, so inhuman, so arbarous? Thank God, Mr. Lincoln will ot always be our President! Thank God, if e are now true to ourselves, his lease of ower is nearly expired! Thank God, that a hange of man and measures seems to be ear at hand, and that, that occurring, no such nexampled, unconstitutional, inhuman, and arbarous refusal will dishonor the Govern- ent. Measures, humane and constitutional, ill then be adopted, which, to the vindication f our good name, will soon lead to a restora- ion of the Union, to the gathering together f all the States under one Government, un- er one grand political edifice, of whose arch ennsylvania as from the first will again form he "Keystone." She has recently demon- trated that that is her firm, her settled pur- ose. We know that Mr. Lincoln's unconsti- utional condition will not then be exacted as n indispensable one to peace. We know hat it has been strongly censured by many f his decided supporters. No one dislikes lavery more than I do. No one would re- oice more to see it constitutionally abolished. No one more devoutly wishes to see the whole f the race of man free. (Applause.) Nor s any one more persuaded that the extinction f the institution would result advantageously o all, and especially white men, and the white nen of the South. But I am not authorized ; ny oath frequently taken to support the con- stitution tells me that I cannot lend my aid toward the continuance of this war, until the States in rebellion consent to abandon slavery, if it can be terminated and the Union restor- ed by other means. I would have slavery abolished by constitutional amendment, or by State action. But if neither is done, I am glad to believe, the Union restored, that the institution cannot for many years longer exist. The present war, brought on through the am- bition and the arts of comparatively a very few Southern men, aided by the course of a few Northern men, has given it a death-blow — certainly has destroyed forever all of its for- mer political power. Its spread, beyond what will be its limits when the Union is restored, will be impossible. Its fate, therefore, is doomed. Even if the mild but powerful in- fluence of our Christian dispensation shall fail to terminate it, a conviction which must soon fasten itself upon the mind of the South, of the superiority of free over slave labor, will lead to that result. Its advocates were im- pressed with the opinion that the world was so interested in the peculiar products of the South, which could not be produced, as they asserted, but by slave labor, that however it might dislike the institution, it would yield its opinion to its love of gain, and rush at once to the support of the rebellion, although its gov- ernment was shamelessly announced to have, for its very corner-stone, human slavery. Sad, indeed, has been their disappointment. They are yet unrecognized. Their agents, though assuming the part of ambassadors, have been seen during the past four years, hovering around the purlieus of St. James and St. Cloud in vain; while their subordinates have been uselessly seeking, through that portion of the foreign press found willing to barter conscience for gold, to bring recognition about: but all has been in vain. The rebel govern- ment still stands alone among the family of nations. No single one, small or great, will admit it to fellowship. Cotton, the rebels find, is not king. (Cheers.) Nor in this age of the world can mere material wealth ever be king. Law, order, virtue, duty performed, oaths observed, manly industry and enterprise, liberty, and the inventive genius which ever goes hand and hand with her, filling the land and ocean with their triumphs, and a deter- mined resolution of a people to stand by their nation's honor and life — these will ever be the king that a virtuous and Christian world will alone recognize. (Loud cheering.)

Gentlemen, so far I have spoken to you of the ascertained sad results of Mr. Lincoln's presidency. Let us now see what counter-

vailing benefits have attended it. What progress has been made toward the restoration of the Union, — the object declared by the convention that nominated him, by Congress, and by himself, to be the sole object of the war.

Has he effected the return to the Union of a single State? Not one. Has he acquired the confidence and won the affections of the people of any one State, or even part of a State? ("No, no.") We know that he has not. His policy made that impossible. Has he obtained a permanent and safe foothold even in any portion of any single State? Has he even retained possession of portions once conquered by our brave army and navy? He has not. To our dishonor be it said, he has not. Union men, strong in their attachment to the nation's flag, have been seen to gather around it, shedding tears of joy at the belief that they would be under its permanent protection, — have, in more instances than one, been left, by its withdrawal to the cruelties of the merciless foe. ("That's so.") Over and over again has this occurred in Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, Texas, and Virginia. (Applause.) In portions of Arkansas and Louisiana, attempts that would be ludicrous but for the gravity and importance of the principles involved, have been made to organize State Governments by force of the bayonet; and, in a great measure, by the votes of soldiers, and almost if not within the sound of rebel guns. Under the lead of an attache of the President, an effort was made to the same end in Florida, that was followed by the defeat of our arms and the sacrifice of thousands of lives of our soldiers. ("Shame!")

A proclamation of amnesty and for the reorganization of the States was issued by the President, and received only with derision and contempt by the rebels. And on its face it was so anti-republican and so tended to increase Mr. Lincoln's power and subserve his re-election, that Congress, at its recent session, attempted to defeat it by legislation, — an attempt which he frustrated by refusing to sanction it; for which he soon afterward received a deserved and severe official rebuke from Messrs Wade and Davis as chairmen, respectively, of the committees of the two Houses, who had had the charge of the law, — gentlemen of ability, perfectly loyal and influential members of his party.

Arkansas, under the authority of his amnesty edict, went through the form of a State organization, elected a legislature, appointed State officers, and chose two United States senators. These last repaired for Washington, applied for their seats, but were denied them by a vote almost unanimous. Louisiana has since pursued, or is about to pursue the same course, and is sure to meet with the same fate; and a like faith will attend Tennessee. Neither Andrew Johnson, Abraham Lincoln, nor the two united, can control the Senate of the United States. (Applause.)

Has the President succeeded in destroying the armed forces of the rebels? The country, to its cost and sorrow and mortification knows that he has not. (Applause.) A army that, from first to last, during the past six months numbered more than three hundred thousand men, led by a leader standing high in the confidence of the President, has failed to disperse, much less to destroy, the forces of General Lee, and is now apparently further from the capture of Richmond, the object of the campaign, than McClellan (loud cheers) was when with the aid of Fitz John Porter (cheers) and other gallant officers now dismissed or in exile because they were his friends, on the first day of July, '62, he fought the battle of Malvern hill, achieving a victory unsurpassed in military history, and when, if his prayers, over and over again for re-enforcements had been answered, as they might have been but for a cowardly fear, he would have been able to have followed it up that night or the following day with the capture of Richmond. This he could have done if he had had but 20,000 additional troops. Not an officer on the field who witnessed the demoralizing effect upon the foe of that victory, then or now, doubts this. (Loud applause. Three cheers for McClellan.)

Has the President protected the loyal States? Has he always held the capital itself in safety? ("No, no.") Here again we know he has not. Three times have Pennsylvania and Maryland been invaded, twice has the capital city of each been rescued from the ravages of the foe by the glorious Army of the Potomac, organized by McClellan (cheers), and made irresistible when success is possible, if properly led. Upon the first occasion, under the command of General McClellan, on the second, of Meade. On the first the capital was in the most imminent peril, and no one realized it more than the President. The only hope of saving it was through the Army of the Potomac. Pope's incompetency had caused such parts of it as had been under his command to be defeated, and they had returned to Washington dispirited and disorganized. It was obvious to the

President that further disaster, even the capture of the capital, was inevitable, unless the army could be brought again under the almost magic influence of their idolized chief. And in despair he was solicited to take command, and, if possible, save Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Governed, as ever, by patriotic and unselfish motives in the presence of his country's honor and danger, forgetting the wrongs that had been done him by the President, and trusting to renewed pledges of confidence and support, he cheerfully assented, and as was anticipated by those who knew the troops, their spirits instantaneously revived, discipline took the place of confusion, and confidence of despair. McClellan at the earliest moment afterward, as night was setting in, led them from the presence of an affrighted President and Cabinet amid the cheers of his men that made the very air vocal with their sounds, and were received as the certain harbinger of a coming victory. (Tremendous cheers.) On the second occasion Meade, now honored throughout the land, led them to another glorious victory, again resulting in the rescue of Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, and causing the heart of the Administration to beat without alarm. (Applause.) On the first occasion, the exigency over, Washington rescued, the President and Cabinet in safety, the hostility to McClellan was revived. Halting his army on the hard-earned battle-field of Antietam (applause), waiting for blankets to cover them, and for shoes to protect their bleeding feet, that he might better go in pursuit of the foe, complaints are first whispered, then loudly proclaimed, in administration circles, and yet the President was afraid or unwilling to strike. He permitted him to lead his troops across the Potomac to march in search of the enemy, and just as he was about to engage in battle with every prospect of success, he was most discourteously deprived of his command, and ordered to hand it over to General Burnside. What followed? — disaster. The army was defeated with fearful slaughter, and nothing gained. Burnside then asked to be relieved, and requested that Hooker be dismissed the service for having, as he alleged, been guilty of a gross violation of orders. The President, as Burnside testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, said that it ought and should be done, but on the next day, instead of doing so, he placed that officer in command of the army, and soon after came the yet more disastrous and almost fatal defeat of Chancellorsville. But to proceed. The perils of the invasions into Maryland and Pennsylvania, from which they were so nobly rescued by McClellan and Meade and the Army of the Potomac, it was supposed would be a sufficient warning to induce the President to guard against their repetition. It was thought that he would now act on the advice of McClellan — advice given early in his command, but rejected by General Halleck even with a discourteous sneer — and erect fortifications on the line of the Potomac. Had this been done, the last invasion of those States could not have occurred. But it was not done. All, as at first, was left unguarded. Incompetent officers (whose incompetency had been before demonstrated) were from time to time placed in command in that locality, and as all reasonable men in and out of the army anticipated, nothing but disgrace ensued.

1. The defeat at Winchester, the flight of the army, and the loss of millions and millions of dollars' worth of war material.

2. A third invasion. The flourishing town of Chambersburg was given to the flames in retaliation, as it was said (a barbarous excuse), for outrages of a like description before perpetrated and without rebuke by a general of the President's selection.

3. Baltimore and Washington were once more placed in imminent peril. The sound of the enemy's guns almost vibrated through the rooms of the White House. Millions of money would not indemnify our citizens for the losses sustained by that invasion. And nothing is more absolutely true, than that it is to be ascribed exclusively to the gross neglect of a President who is now being supported for re-election. As soon as this last effort of the enemy came to the knowledge of General Grant, that officer took steps to prevent further disaster. Political and abolition generals were not selected by him. They were relieved, and the army placed in charge of a young and accomplished officer, and the result has been that the valley of Virginia, that had before been so often the scene of our dishonor, at once became the scene of glorious victories — the last, to him especially, the most glorious — that have won for the youthful Sheridan, his officers, and men an ever-enduring fame. (Loud cheering.) How different are these victories and that recently achieved at Mobile by the unsurpassed skill and daring of Farragut and his command (cheers) received by the friends of McClellan, and the supporters of Mr. Lincoln! Whilst we hail them with joy as exhibitions of the valor and triumph of our arms and

as tending to the defeat of the rebellion and the restoration of the Union, they seem chiefly to value them for their supposed bearing on the presidential contest. They are laboring for the man, Mr. Lincoln; we for the country and the integrity of institutions that have made it what it recently was,—the freest and one of the happiest in the world. (Cheers.) We support McClellan because judging from his antecedents we feel assured that he will maintain those institutions, and restore the Union, to use his own words, "at all hazards." (Loud cheers.)

But to proceed. What success has Mr. Lincoln achieved for us on the ocean? His failure there is, if possible, more complete and disheartening than his failure on the land. Our commercial marine, that before his inauguration covered every sea, proudly sailing unchallenged under the safeguard of the stars and stripes, is now almost wholly driven from that domain. ("That's true.") More than one thousand of our ships we have been compelled to sell to foreigners, because our flag furnished no protection, but on the contrary is but the incentive to the pirate's torch. They are now traversing the ocean with American freemen and property under the shelter of foreign banners. Some four or five small piratical cruisers have been permitted to give to the flames hundreds of our vessels, and in some instances on our own coast and almost within sight of our cities. The insurance against war risk is now as high, if not higher than it was in the war with England of 1812, and much higher than in that with Mexico of 1846. What apology can be offered for this? No government ever possessed more noble or more accomplished naval officers, or braver or more skilful seamen; nor was any supplied with such an unlimited amount of treasure to increase its naval efficiency. Millions upon millions have been expended for that purpose, and yet our merchants, to save their ships from destruction, or to have them lie idle in our harbors, have been forced to dispose of them to aliens. I have said that our officers and men were brave. Is it not so? "Yes; in the annals of naval warfare were these qualities more strikingly exhibited than in Dupont's victory at Hilton Head (cheers); Rogers's capture of the Atlanta (cheers); Winslow's destruction of the Alabama (loud cheers); Porter's command of the Western squadron, or Farragut's success at New Orleans (cheers); his entire progress on the Mississippi, and his recent, and, if possible, yet more glorious achievement in Mobile Bay! (Loud cheers.) We know, too, that our ship owners, as intelligent and enterprising as any in the world, have over and over again solicited the Government to suffer them to fit out vessels to protect themselves, and save the nation from the dishonor of being driven from the ocean. But the solicitation was in vain. The few buccaneers, who could easily have been captured or destroyed if this request of the merchants had been granted, have been suffered with almost perfect impunity to roam the seas and our very roadsteads, and consign our ships to destruction, till our commercial marine has literally almost ceased to exist.

I have thus laid before you grounds enough for opposing Mr. Lincoln's re-election. And, adding one or two that I have thus far omitted to notice, let me briefly recapitulate them. In the loyal states, where the courts were open, and the administration of justice was unobstructed, he has imprisoned, or suffered to be imprisoned, thousands of citizens without explanation: detained them for months, refusing to bring them to trial before any tribunal, and then discharged them without redress. He has suffered his agents to suppress hundreds of newspapers in the same states, for no other imaginable reason than because they published articles denouncing his administration. In eighty-five instances it is ascertained that this was done by his own immediate order or subsequent approval. He has suffered churches to be closed, and their pastors to be arrested and imprisoned, only because they did not pray specially for him. He has suffered to be issued and enforced, and in Kentucky and Maryland directly approved, orders under which the military grossly interfered with the freedom of elections. He has failed to restore to the Union a single state or a material part of any state that was in rebellion on his accession to power. He has constantly, to the incalculable injury of the country, appointed and kept in important commands officers who were grossly incompetent. He has interfered, with most calamitous results, with our military campaigns. He has suffered our commercial marine to be driven from the ocean. He has proscribed officers of admitted ability and perfect patriotism, because they were supposed to be friendly to McClellan (cheers), and not to approve his policy or conduct. He has violated the Constitution by his abolition proclamations, notwithstanding his solemn promise to the contrary. He has violated it by his amnesty proclamation, and by his

using his assent to a law passed by the
t Congress to guard against consequences
ich his friends correctly thought to be most
rilous as well as illegal. He has failed to
otect the loyal states, and by such failure
ojected them at three several periods to the
st destructive invasions. He has suffered
capital itself to be placed at three different
riods in the greatest peril. He has, by his
licy and conduct, so injured us in the esti-
tion of France, that Napoleon has seized
o his hands, unquestioned, the destinies of
neighboring republic, and placed, on a throne
his own creation, a monarch belonging to
most despotic family of Europe; and in
s he has abandoned the uniform settled
icy of his predecessors. In palpable vio-
on of law and the recorded opinions of
shington, Jefferson, Clay, and every
orney-general to whom the question was
mitted, and to the great danger of every
eigner amongst us, whether naturalized or
, without trial, or giving an opportunity
trial, in the case of Arguelles, on the
uest of a Spanish subordinate, he has
ivered him to the tender mercies of that
cial. He has caused the currency of the
ntry to become in a great measure value-
s; and what is, if possible, still worse than
where there was division in the South, he
produced unanimity; and, where there
unanimity in the North, he has produced
ision. ("That's so," applause.) And
ly, he is seeking a re-election by the most
crupulous and unexampled abuse of pat-
age and power.

Do not all these things demonstrate his
er unfitness for the presidency? (Ap-
use.) The most that any of his friends
e said as to his fitness is that he is honest;
if honesty was a rare attribute of the
erican character. (Laughter.) But his
session of that quality is not admitted by
of his supporters. Messrs. Wade and
vis, as chairman of two committees of Con-
ss, in their manifesto of the fifth of August
, charge him with having committed (I
their own words) a "studied outrage on
legislative authority of the people," — with
ing "exercised a dictatorial usurpation in
isiana," — as holding, by his defeat of the
they refer to, the electoral votes of the
el states at the dictation of his personal
pition, and that his conduct in this respect
y cause "civil war for the presidency."
Mr. Lincoln is a sane man, he cannot but
that those charges are well founded; and
e does, as he perseveres in them, what has
of honesty? Is he not satisfied with the
blood now shed, and being shed, in the South-
ern states? For the prize of the presidency,
is he willing to extend the area of the frater-
nal slaughter? His associate in the Balti-
more nomination, by his recent military order
relative to the election in Tennessee, plainly
shows what his object is. Under that order, no
electors can be chosen who will not support
the President and himself. Has Mr. Lincoln
repudiated the order? Has he rebuked its
author? If he has done either, the country
is not advised of it. On the contrary, his
treatment the other day of a committee from
that state, who handed him a respectful but
conclusive protest against it, soliciting his
interference, shows that, to accomplish his
selfish purpose of a re-election, he means to
avail himself of it; and that his purpose is so
earnest, that it caused him to forget that a
President of the United States is bound at all
times to listen to the complaints of any portion
of the people, and to listen as a gentleman.
(Loud cheers.)

And yet so palpable is the usurpation of
that order, that two of the most respectable
of the journals of his party (none have ap-
proved of it) have denounced it in no meas-
ured terms, — the Springfield *Republican*,
of Massachusetts, and the New York *Com-
mercial Advertiser*. In speaking of it, the
former says, "He (Governor Johnson) has
no more right to require an oath against the
Chicago Platform than one against the Assem-
bly's Catechism as a condition of voting in
Tennessee. It is impossible to say one word
in justification, or even in palliation of it."
And the latter, quoting the above approv-
ingly, adds, "Mr. Lincoln lacks the courage,
even if he had the disposition, to repudiate
the conduct of his associate on the ticket, and
to unloose the fettered ballot in Tennessee."
And, finally, Messrs. Wade and Davis state,
"if electors for President be allowed to be
chosen" in States so organized, a "sinister
light will be cast on the motives which in-
duced the President to hold for nought the
will of Congress rather than" governments
of his creation. If these censures are just,
(and what fair mind can question them?) and
there was nothing more tending to the same
result, then even the quality of honesty
of purpose, — the only one that any of his
friends pretend to claim for him, — has no
foundation in fact. (Applause.) But there
is other matter. Look to the degrading fact
of the unblushing manner in which he is using
his power and patronage to secure the presi-
dency. Not an officer of the government,
from the highest to the lowest, not a con-

tractor, great or small, who is not, with his knowledge and authority, expressed or implied, levied upon pecuniarily to accomplish that end. Even the medical department, whose sole duty it should be to minister to the wants of the sick and wounded soldier, and whose compensation is barely sufficient to afford support, are mulcted for the same purpose. Who does not know that conduct like this, in the early and pure days of the republic, would not only have been denounced by a universal and indignant public sentiment, but have been punished by impeachment and dismissal from office? (Loud applause.) And it is now not only degrading us in our own eyes, but in those of the enlightened world. I might proceed and give instances almost without number of the same description, but my heart fails me. I trust, for our country's safety and honor, that ere long the memory of all these disparaging and degrading acts will be lost amidst the general joy of a restored Union, a renewed prosperity, and an honest and elevated public opinion. But to that end there must be a change; and here, leaving Mr. Lincoln, I proceed to a far more agreeable subject. (Laughter.)

Can we not effect a change? ("We will.") Is our nation so far gone in its progress to ruin, in which it is being led, that its fate cannot be arrested? I confidently think that it is in our power to arrest it. We have lost hundreds of thousands of our best men North and South. We have had inculcated in the minds of the people dangerous political heresies. We have had the political atmosphere tainted by dishonest doctrine and practice. We have contracted a debt of enormous amount. We are in a war of unparalleled magnitude. We have, by a suicidal policy, produced a state of feeling between the two sections of unexampled acrimony. But yet all is not lost. Our resources are still abundant; our enterprise as great as ever; our morality, though now in a measure dormant, as pure as was that of our fathers; and in both sections, whatever may now meet the eye, there is at heart, it cannot be otherwise, as deep an affection for the Union. A common pride in its past glories achieved by common valor, a fond reverence for the memories of a great common ancestry, Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, Saratoga, and Yorktown (loud cheers), these all appeal to us in one united voice to stand together again as our fathers stood, shoulder to shoulder, and heart to heart, and to live as they lived, and die as they died, the inheritors of a common freedom, protected by a common government, and glorying in the same great and hallow standard that covered and cheered them their days of trial, and blessed them with glad and starry influence in the last momer of their stay on earth. How, then, is this union of happiness and destiny to be attaine I say, in all the sincerity with which hum lips ever spoke, that I believe they can be tained by the election of McClellan. (Cheers He has the capacity, the patriotism, and t virtue which the great task requires. (Lo cheers.)

Gentlemen, I will not insult you or hi by stopping to refute in detail the numero false and calumnious accusations of whic since his nomination, he has been the obje He has been charged with actual treason with treasonably sympathizing with our sout ern brethren — with the want of any ca city, civil or military — with cowardice (de sive laughter) — and with a purpose to su render the Union. It must be sufficien with all honest men acquainted with his h tory during the pendency of the prese war, to refer to that history, as fully provi that each and every one of those charges absolutely false. Whose skill and valor re cued West Virginia from the tread of t foe, and achieved a succession of victori that electrified every loyal heart? McCl lan (cheers), who, because of those victorie was called to Washington to organize und ciplined troops. (Cheers.) Who broug them, as the Army of the Potomac, to a sta of discipline never excelled, and inspire them with a courage that has made ther when led by competent officers, the victo on every field where victory was possible human effort? McClellan. (Cheers.) W commanded them in the seven days' terrib battles of the Peninsula? (Cheers.) W was it, that, with a skill never surpassed equalled, rescued them from the dangers that campaign, a campaign only unsuccessf because of a want of Mr. Lincoln's pro ised support? Who afterward, when, by t mismanagement of their then recent leade they were demoralized, in a spirit of pure p triotism, at the solicitation of the tremblir President, and when, apparently, all was los placed himself, once more at their head, an instantly reduced them to a high state of di cipline, and made them once more invincible McClellan. (Cheers.) Who led them fort with to battle and victory at South Mounta and Antietam? (Cheers.) The same leade What was then thought of the now traduce McClellan? He received the thanks of t then commander-in-chief, Halleck, of t

President, and of Congress, expressed by each in terms as strong as our language supplies. In July, '61, Congress unanimously thanked him, his officers and soldiers, "for the recent brilliant victories over the rebels in Western Virginia;" in May, '62, "for the display of those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of human life." Who, with a full knowledge of his entire conduct in his Virginia campaign, were, or professed to be, his friends? The President, and Secretary of War, in terms of unstinted eulogy, did him all honor, and assured him of their perfect and continued confidence. In a letter recently brought to light, the authenticity of which has not been denied, dated the 5th of July, 1862, the Secretary assured him of his undiminished friendship, saying, (I use his words), "I can only say, in this brief moment, that there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes. No man had a truer friend than I have been to you, and shall continue to be." (Laughter.) Was the Secretary sincere? Will any friend of his say that he was not? He must have been. To suppose otherwise is to do him the foulest wrong — to charge him with a duplicity, that, if true, no language could too strongly rebuke. He must have been sincere. In answer, then, to all the accusations against McClellan, I appeal confidently to his whole military career; to the unbounded confidence of his troops; the daily observers of his conduct; to the testimony of the commander-in-chief, of the Secretary of War, the President and Congress. And for the same purpose, and with equal confidence, I appeal to his Harrison's Landing letter to the President, of the 7th of July; viz., a letter pregnant with wisdom, and demonstrative of undying devotion to his country. (Cheers.) He has been unjustly censured for writing that letter, as if military commanders in every age had not advised their governments relative to measures calculated to affect the object of the war. The writing of such a letter, instead of being obtrusive, was a high duty; and how dreadful the calamities that have resulted from the President's disregard of its advice! It may be suggested, that the President's mind was afterwards changed, and that he lost the confidence he before had in McClellan. Is this so? Do we not know that this is not? His late postmaster-general, in a recent speech in New York referring to McClellan, stated that the President held him to be patriotic, and had concerted with General Grant to bring him again into the field as his adjunct, if he turned his back on the proposal of the peace junto at Chicago." And, in a subsequent speech in Maryland, he reiterated the statement. Has Mr. Montgomery Blair since denied or qualified it? He has not. Is he ashamed of integrity? All who know him will answer, Yes, beyond all doubt. What he asserted was a fact, that he professed to know, and had every opportunity of knowing. An arrangement, he tells us, was made between the President and General Grant to bring McClellan again in the field as his adjunct, and that it was frustrated only because McClellan refused to say that the people of the country, if they desired it, should not be permitted to vote for him as a competitor of Mr. Lincoln for the presidency. What could be more unjust to the President than to suppose, that at this period, when our army before Richmond is relied upon to strike a blow that it is thought will be fatal to the rebellion, he would, even for the prize of the Presidency, place an incompetent soldier in an important command in that army, — a command second only to that of the commander-in-chief?

I have refrained only because I deemed it altogether unnecessary to do more than deal generally with the charges against our candidate. One, however, has been made, that with your permission I will more particularly notice. It is that, during the battle of Malvern, he took refuge on board one of our gunboats in the James river. (Laughter.) There never was an allegation more totally false, and those who make it, and who have read McClellan's report, must know it to be false. In that report, after referring to his purpose to make a stand at Malvern, and to his having given instructions to General Barnard "for posting the troops as they arrived," he adds: "I again left for Malvern soon after daybreak, accompanied by several general officers. I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rogers to select a final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to be anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity." How fully, if true, does this statement refute the calumny! Does any one doubt its truth? Has Captain Rogers or any general officer of the army been applied to to make good the charge, or has any one of them so dishonored himself as to attempt it? Not one; and yet,

MARK THE CONTRAST.

DEMOCRATIC PRICES.		ABOLITION PRICES.	
Groceries.			
Teas	45a50c per lb.	Teas	$1 00a$2
Sugars	8 9c "	Sugars	20
Coffees	14 16c "	Coffees	
Nutmegs	50 55c "	Nutmegs	$2
Pepper	8 9c "	Pepper	
Allspice	6 8c "	Allspice	
Cinnamon	20 22c "	Cinnamon	$1
Dry Goods — Domestic.			
Brown Sheetings	8½c per yd.	Brown Sheetings	65c per
Prints, Calicoes, etc.	5½c "	Prints, Calicoes, etc.	40c "
Bleached Muslins	5½c "	Bleached Muslins	75c "
Canton Flannels	10c "	Canton Flannels	90c "
Foreign.			
Delaines	15½c per yd.	Delaines	75c per
Dress Goods	25c "	Dress Goods	80c "
Velvets	$2 50c "	Velvets	$12 00c "
Raw Cotton, Etc.			
Cotton Laps	18c per lb.	Cotton Laps	$1 75 per
Wadding	40c "	Wadding	2 20 "
Carpet Chain	20c "	Carpet Chain	1 10 "
Lamp Wick	20c "	Lamp Wick	1 50 "
Metals, Etc.			
Lead	6c per lb.	Lead	32c per
Antimony	13c "	Antimony	75c "
Block Tin	31c "	Block Tin	90c "

Coal,

Of which the poor man's fire consumes as much as that which blazes in the r man's fire — in former days could be had for *four or five dollars;* it now costs *fo teen and fifteen dollars.*

Cloths.

Satinets	45a50c per yd	$1 76 per

Broadcloths, Cassimeres, etc., have increased from 106 to 150 per cent.

DRUGS have increased in price on an average of 200 per cent.

TOBACCO — Manufactured Cavendish Tobacco has risen from 35 cents $1 25 per pound.

CIGARS have advanced from $20 to $60 and $200 per thousand.

FOREIGN STATIONERY, since the scarcity of specie, has risen 50 per cen

ADDRESS

BY

HON. JAMES GALLATIN,

BEFORE

THE DEMOCRATIC UNION ASSOCIATION,

OCTOBER 18, 1864.

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eorge B. McClellan as a Patriot, a Warrior, and a Statesman.

COURSE OF THE ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF THE FINANCES, ETC., ETC.

When we call to mind the character of the n sent to the army, the navy, and the leg- ative and executive departments of Govern- nt, to co-operate with and support the im- rtal father of his country, drawing from his re example, and reflecting back upon him, influence of the ennobling virtues which tinguished the men of that age, our hearts nd with patriotic gratitude to the Supreme ler of Nations for bestowing such men up- our country. He, in his infinite mercy, continued these gifts, of great and good n, at every crisis in our history. When s last calamity fell upon us, all our distin- ished statesmen of the third generation — koning from the birth of the Republic — ving been gathered to their fathers, and re remained among us only one of the il- trious warriors of the third generation, the sciousness of his faithfulness to the flag rived the rebellion of half its terrors. His ne was a tower of strength. He rallied und him the requisite forces to maintain quillity at the capital, and to preserve the vernment from that sanguinary usurpation power with which, in their blind insanity, ne of the insurgent leaders had intended to nalize the month of December, 1860. A teful people continues and will ever contin- ue to love and respect that illustrious warrior. The infirmities of age could not drive him from his post of duty, until the progress of the military operations against the rebels had brought forward a successor, whom he deemed worthy of filling that post.

GENERAL MC'CLELLAN THE SUCCESSOR OF GENERAL SCOTT.

To this successor of the Hero of Lundy's Lane — to his character as a patriot, a statesman and a warrior — your kind attention is now invited. When yet a boy, he was dedicated, with his own and his parents' consent, to his country's service. Entering that service, on the completion of his military education at West Point, he soon found opportunity, in the war with Mexico, to realize the cherished hopes of his friends, by the display of great skill and valor. Wherever duty called, he was always present, faithful and watchful. When peace returned to bless our land, he was prepared, like Cincinnatus, to resume the occupations of a civilian, but ever ready to serve his country in any capacity. He was selected as one of the officers of the army to visit Europe during the Crimean War; and having fulfilled that mission, depositing in the national archives a clear exposition

of the progress of the military art as exhibited in that war, he accepted the laborious occupation of engineer on one of the Western Railroads: from whence he was called by Governor Dennison of Ohio, four days after the President issued his proclamation recognizing the existence of the rebellion, to take command of the troops organizing in the State of Ohio, in obedience to the call of the President, who, ten days subsequently, placed him in command of the Department of the Ohio, embracing the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.

GEN. MC'CLELLAN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

There was no arsenal belonging to the General Government in his department. The Western States were wholly unprepared for the struggle. Without arms or munitions of war, or money, belonging to the General Government, he appealed to the State authorities, and the Governors responded promptly to the calls which he made upon them. This service of the Governors he acknowledged with all that gratitude which distinguishes a true man. Without any plans or instructions from Washington, as to the course he should pursue, finding his Department invaded by the rebels, he proceeded, as he says in his report, "forthwith to drive out the enemy." He did it rapidly and effectually. He rolled in the tide of victory from Western Virginia by a succession of brilliant exploits which electrified the whole country. He proved that the rebellion could and would be conquered by the loyal patriotic men of the country, in accordance with the principles of civilized warfare, directed by skilful generals. But his victories in Western Virginia were soon clouded by the disastrous affair of Bull Run, which had been directed from official quarters at Washington, regardless of the opinions as to the plan of the campaign, of the venerable chief tain who was the nominal head of the military power, next to the commander-in-chief, and who had counselled the organization of a more powerful army to meet and subdue the rebel forces.

GEN. MC'CLELLAN CALLED TO WASHINGTON.

When the disaster of Bull Run became known at Washington the Government turned at once to the Hero of Western Virginia, calling him to Washington the very next day. He arrived there on the 26th of July, and forthwith proceeded to organize the scattered and disorganized forces. There were in all about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery men, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty pieces. There we no provisions for defence against a respe ble body of the enemy, — nothing to preve the enemy shelling the city from heights wi in easy range. Many soldiers had deserte the streets of Washington were crowded w straggling officers and men, absent withc authority, indicating a general want of dis pline and organization. By the 15th of O sober there were in and around Washingt an efficient, well organized army of 143,6 men. It is not requisite to go into further tails as to the condition of the forces at Wa ington. His distinguished services were knowledged by the President, who appoint him to the chief and general command of t all armies of the Union. In August, and ag in October, he communicated to the Pr ident, or Secretary of War, his views a opinions *in extenso*. On the fourth of A gust he urged the importance of increasi the army, remarking that "the authority the Government must be supported by ov whelming physical force." In October, remarked, "The unity of this nation, t preservation of our institutions, are so dea me that I have willingly sacrificed my priv happiness, with the single object of doing duty to my country. When the task is complished I shall be glad to return to the curity from which events have drawn m Yet, as if conscious of the inability of the ministration to understand the magnitude the work before them, he added: "Whate the determination of the Government may I will do the best I can with the Army of t Potomac, and I will share its fate, whate may be the task imposed upon me."

HIS COURSE AS GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

We now come to his course and conduct the General-in-chief; and we shall find t during his administration of that office views and opinions on public affairs were p cisely the same as that expressed in his rec letter accepting the nomination to the Pr dency. He assumed the duties of this off on the 1st of November, 1861, and six da thereafter wrote to Gen. Buell, commandi the Department of the Ohio, —

"You will please constantly bear in mi the precise issue for which we are fightin That issue is the preservation of the Unic and the restoration of the full authority of t General Government over all portions of o territory. We shall most readily suppr this rebellion, and restore the authority of t Government by *religiously respecting the co stitutional rights of all*. I know that

express the feelings and opinions of the President, when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the General Government." To the same, on the 12th of November, he said: "As far as military necessity will permit, religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Union."

Addressing General Halleck, then in Missouri, November 11th, he said: "In regard to the political conduct of affairs you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent States, that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our National Government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order."

Upon the despatch of the expedition to North Carolina, in charge of General Burnside, he wrote in the instructions to that general: —

"In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro. Merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the General Government; and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property."

His orders to all the other generals commanding the armies of the Union were of like tenor. He planned the expedition to North Carolina, as well as that to New Orleans; and the result of his grand combination was a series of brilliant victories, crowned by the capture of the defences of New Orleans on the 23d of April, exactly one year from the day on which Governor Dennison, of Ohio, called him from railroad engineering to military service. Every where, except around Washington, victory seemed to favor our arms. But the interference of partisans at Washington, with the army of the Potomac and the movements for the reduction of Richmond, knew no bounds. The President himself would seem not to have been his own master; for in several letters to the commander of that army he apologized for interfering with the plans of the campaign against Richmond. These remarkable words occur in the President's letter of March 31, 1862, apologizing to General McClellan for this interference: —

"If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it." And this "pressure" is explained by the author* of the history of the President's administration to mean "the importunities" of another general and his friends. Such were the means resorted to to cripple and thwart the commander of the army of the Potomac in his campaign against the rebel capital in 1862. Then there was the ambition of the President to be a great general, as evinced in "his plan" for taking Richmond, which has been exploded by sad experience; while Grant is now closing the great work upon the original plan of the commander of the army of the Potomac.

But why should not the President be a great general? Since we are told by his biographer that he joined a volunteer company, in 1832, at the age of twenty-three, in the Black Hawk War, and thus obtained, in the language of that biographer, "a bit of military experience." But when the same writer adds, that this experience was "much more, in fact, than the most of our brigadier-generals had had before the commencement of the war," he makes an apparently unconscious admission of the truth that important commands have been given to incompetent generals, — political speech-makers, transferred from generals to judges, electioneering throughout the country for their employers. Alas! how many of our brave soldiers have been sacrificed on the field of battle by the incompetency of such generals! It is as if the rebel chief had himself designated who should direct our battles. Such are the men whose military skill was esteemed superior to that of the commander of the army of the Potomac.

INCOMPETENCY IN THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT.

Nothing in all our history is more disgraceful to an administration than the attempts made, either through carelessness or ignorance, or worse, to embarrass the army of the Potomac in the campaign against Richmond, in 1862. The Navy Department, next to the War Department, made its imbecility most effective for evil upon that occasion, and had it not been for the enterprise of private individuals, in sending the little "Monitor" to Fortress Monroe in time to check the ravages of the rebel "Merrimac," the disaster would have been overwhelming. Upon this subject I am happy to be able to

* H. J. Raymond.

appeal to the testimony of that distinguished ship owner, C. H. Marshall, Esq., himself a partisan of the administration, who, at a meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, of this city, on the 12th of March, 1862, offered a series of resolutions, which were adopted in the following shape: —

"Whereas, the National Government has been furnished by the people of the loyal States with ample means for taking all precautions necessary to guard the public interest and the private property of citizens at every exposed point, as well as to prosecute the war with vigor and success; and whereas, in the recent disastrous engagement in Hampton Roads, by a sudden attack of the enemy, which our naval forces were wholly unprepared to resist, many lives have been sacrificed, several national vessels destroyed, the flag of the Union lowered to rebels, and discredit brought on the Government of the country; therefore,

"Resolved, That, in the opinion of this Chamber, the chief cause of this disaster lies in the culpable neglect by which the defences in Hampton Roads were suffered to remain, after a knowledge of the near completion of the rebel iron-clad steamer Merrimac, with no other protection than one steam-frigate (the Minnesota), one disabled steam-frigate (the Roanoke), whose shafts, which had been broken for four months, might have been replaced during any two of those months, and two or three sailing vessels.

"Resolved, That under the protecting care of Providence, the safety of the property and life in the waters connected with Hampton Roads, if not also of other important harbors on the Atlantic coast, are due to the scientific skill of Ericsson, who designed the Monitor, and to the active, energetic, and gallant conduct of Lieut. Commanding Worden, and those under his command, who successfully defended the honor of the national flag.

"Resolved, That the President of the United States be respectfully requested to adopt efficient measures for the future protection of Hampton Roads.

"Resolved, That, in the opinion of this Chamber, the bill now pending in Congress, for building ten mail-clad vessels, ought to be passed without delay.

"Resolved, That a copy of these resolutions, under seal of the Chamber, be sent to the President of the United States."

Many vessels of war built under the direction of the Navy Department have proved such failures that they cannot, actually, float upon the water. But, although the head of that department is the greatest failure of all, let us remember that we have commanders in the navy who are not failures, — men like Farragut, Winslow, Dupont, Porter! When the navy was required at Fortress Monroe to co-operate in the attack on Richmond, in 1862, Goldsborough was sent to North Carolina, and the fleet at the mouth of the James River was left without a flag-officer!

The James River, now open for naval co-operation with Grant, was then closed to our transports; and it is a remarkable fact that the delay in the movements of the army of the Potomac, caused by the rebel iron-clad, Merrimac, closing the James to our transports, was really made to appear to be the fault of the general-in-chief of the army. For instance, the Merrimac emerged from her hiding-place on the 8th of March, and spread havoc throughout the U. S. squadron, until checked the following day by the Monitor: on the 11th of March, the President removed General McClellan from the office of general-in-chief; and the President's biographer wholly omits to mention the delay caused by the neglect of the Navy Department to provide the requisite force to subdue or blockade the rebel monster. That cause of delay was not, certainly, chargeable to General McClellan. The advance was ordered for the 22d of February; but it was not until the 11th of May that the career of the Merrimac was terminated. The utter inability of the President and the Cabinet to comprehend the magnitude of the rebellion, notwithstanding the repeated suggestions of the ablest commanders in the service, was painfully manifest in the movements of the army of the Potomac throughout the whole progress of events, ending with the battle of Antietam. More than this, the course of those events demonstrated the absurdity, to use no harsher term, of men at the head of the Government undertaking to direct great military movements pertaining to the science of war, of which they were wholly ignorant. Mr. Seward recently took occasion to compliment Mr. Stanton with his military proficiency, — the village lawyers constituting the administration being a mutual admiration society, — but Stanton's successes have resulted wholly from his adherence to the original plans of McClellan, and his failures have usually resulted from departing from those plans, or from his inability to comprehend them. Mr. Lincoln's plans, and the plans of Mr. Stanton, for the campaign of the summer of 1862, were

persisted in long enough to defeat Gen. McClellan's plan. That was the end of the campaign on the Peninsula.

GEN. Mc'CLELLAN AGAIN SAVES WASHINGTON, AND GAINS THE VICTORY AT ANTIETAM.

Having got the army of the Potomac back to protect Washington, at the close of August, 1862, the President placed General Pope in command, leaving Gen. McClellan without any forces at Alexandria, where he could hear the sound of the guns in the battles which Gen. Pope was fighting with the enemy. Gen. McClellan asked permission to go to the front, that he might by his presence encourage the men he had so long been associated with. It was not granted. He was kept there, stripped of command, until news of the disaster to Gen. Pope's army reached Washington, when the President and Gen. Halleck hurried early in the morning to Gen. McClellan's residence, and placed the national capital and its defences once more in his hands. That was on the 2d of September. Again Gen. McClellan concentrated and reorganized a broken army, and led them to victory upon his own plans, without interference. Thirteen days after he took command, when the news of the defeat of the rebels began to reach Washington, the President telegraphed to him: "Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you. Destroy the rebel army, if possible." The battles terminated on the 17th of September, and that night our forces slept, conquerors, upon the battle-field of Antietam.

GEN. Mc'CLELLAN AGAIN REMOVED.

On the 7th of November Gen. McClellan was removed from command and Gen. Burnside appointed in his place.

The man who, within nineteen months, had twice saved the capital, who had three times organized an effective army, who first rolled in the tide of victory over this most cruel rebellion, who planned those combinations which resulted so victoriously wherever they could be carried out without interference of political partisans, — that man was set aside; and village lawyers, in their pride of power and of place, have now the audacity to boast the success of his plans as their own. But mark the patriotic docility with which this much abused general submitted to all that his superior officers were pleased to inflict upon him. When removed from the office of General-in-chief, he wrote to the President: —

"I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some Western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it; and you will find, that, under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self, will, in any manner, interfere with the discharge of my public duties."

When stripped of his command, at Alexandria, hearing the battle raging in the distance, he wrote to Gen. Halleck: —

"I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to be with my own men, if nothing more: they will fight none the worse for my being with them."

All who have served with him bear testimony to the affection which his men entertain for him. His solicitude for the welfare of his men, his skilful manœuvring to achieve victory at the smallest possible sacrifice of life, his personal bravery in battle, his consummate abilities as a general, and the purity of his character, readily account for that affection. It is due to the President to say that he frequently acknowledged Gen. McClellan's great abilities as a commander. At the close of the campaign on the Peninsula, July 5, 1862, the President wrote to him: —

"Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself, officers, and men, is [are] and forever will be appreciated." Again: "All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."

WHY THE ADMINISTRATION WISHED TO CRUSH GEN. Mc'CLELLAN.

It may well be asked why the President and Mr. Stanton treated Gen. McClellan as they did. The President himself has given the key to this secret, in his despatch referring to the "pressure" brought to bear upon him, by the politicians, to reduce Gen. McClellan's forces. Gen. McClellan was to be crushed if possible. He could not be made subservient to the schemes of the politicians; and the recent attempt of the elder Mr. Blair, to prevent the general being a candidate in opposition to President Lincoln, is the last link in that complete chain of evidence which fastens the intrigue upon the administration. The slowness of the General's movements, with the inadequate forces and raw levies under his

command, against a more numerous force fighting upon the defensive, was seized as a pretext to find fault with him. He has been vindicated by the terrible sacrifices made by those who have adopted or pursued different plans from his. The politicians have shown how absurd it is to expect success in arms, "when campaigns are intrusted to men who have no knowledge of war." Gen. Naglee, of Philadelphia, has, in a recent letter, dated the 27th of last month, made a full disclosure of the efforts of Mr. Stanton to destroy Gen. McClellan, and of the rudeness with which he carried his plans with the President. Mr. Stanton, it seems, aspired to the distinction of a great general, and the chief of the cabinet, Mr. Seward, has recently introduced him to the public in that capacity. Gen. Naglee states that as soon as Gen. McClellan left Washington, for the Peninsular Campaign,—all the arrangements for which had been made, and approved by the President and a council of Generals, McClellan's *force to be two hundred thousand men*, — Stanton relieved him of all the armies not under his immediate command, and assumed command of them himself. But it is too painful to follow the details of Stanton's generalship and intrigues, and I refer to Gen. Naglee's letters for the humiliating facts of the case.

MR. LINCOLNS APOLOGY TO GEN. MC'CLELLAN.

The President, on 31st March, 1862, appears to have been fully conscious of the mortifying situation he was placed in by Mr. Stanton and the politicians; for in his despatch of that date to General McClellan, announcing the breaking up of the original plan of the campaign, he confesses that he was pursuing a course which gave him "great pain." Let us hope that on the 4th of March next, at noon, General McClellan will relieve him of all such "pain."

The President's apology to General McClellan for breaking up the plan of the campaign referred to something else besides "pain." That despatch speaks of "pressure" in the case, and the President's historian alludes to the political friends of another general as making this "pressure." But that despatch made no reference to duty, to the sacredness of the inaugural oath, to the interests of the nation, the preservation of the Union, the suppression of the rebellion, &c. Oh, no! That despatch is not "honest old Abe." It is Abraham Lincoln the politician, the sorry transgressor confessing his iniquity, dividing the spoils of office, and regulating the scramble of the office-seekers, pandering to the lust for office, aiming at a re-election and the humiliation of a rising competitor, pushed on by Stanton at his back.

No double-dealing has ever been charged upon General McClellan. Ever honest and frank, he is always consistent with himself. General Naglee says that Stanton pretended to doubt his loyalty to the Union. That has been the trick of the corrupt minions of the administration, ever since the rebellion broke out, in regard to any one who would not unite with them in their schemes of personal gain or partisan aggrandizement. At first, any man who remonstrated against going or sending some one to the cells of Fort Lafayette at the bidding of Mr. Seward, was denounced as a "secessionist;" and now "a copperhead" is the favorite epithet with those who arrogate to themselves the attributes of infallibility in the administration of the Government. We are told that the administration is the Government, and that the Government, like the king in a despotism, "can do no wrong." This is the divine right of kings in a new shape. It certainly is the right divine to govern wrong, so far as Messrs. Lincoln, Seward, Stanton, and Welles are concerned.

GEN. MC'CLELLAN'S STRAIGHT-FORWARD CHARACTER.

I have said that General McClellan has always proved consistent with himself. In July, 1862, writing to the President, he said, "The Constitution and the Union must be preserved." He says the same thing, only more forcibly, in his recent letter accepting the nomination: "The Union must be preserved at all hazards." There is no double-dealing in these words. Like his military campaign in Western Virginia, they are direct, energetic, and decisive. And he always means exactly what he says: in this respect, his writings more resemble those of Washington than any other hero's with which I am acquainted. Indeed, there is a purity of style in all his writings, a straightforward honesty, exactly like that of Washington's despatches, letters, and State papers. With Washington, the Union — that Union which constitutes us our people — the Union which confers upon us the attributes of a nation — the Union which gives us a country and a flag — was the first, the highest object of affection, next to God. So it is with McClellan, — "the Union at all hazards." His character is a reflex of that of Washington in his religious devotion. Washington, in all his great battles as well as in the ordinary occurrences of life, sought the aid and guid-

ce of Almighty wisdom and power. So th McClellan: the same spotless purity of ivate life, which distinguished the one, char- erizes the other.

E CORRUPT PARTISAN POLICY OF THE AD- MINISTRATION.

Let us now turn to the public character, e policy, and the conduct of the men com- sing the administration which has expelled is great and good general from the army, d heaped upon him all these thankful indig- ties.

In April, 1861, when the conspirators ized Fort Sumter, there was a universal y of indignation. No man ever had a irer chance than Mr. Lincoln then had of aking himself the rallying point of all loyal tizens. The state of the country ought to ave dictated such a policy. But instead of a accommodation to the circumstances, the me of administration bore an analogy to that Louis the Fourteenth in the meridian of his lory and his triumphs. Party spirit might ave been disarmed of its rancor, had he arried into effect his own declarations as set orth in his inauguration speech, and we hould not have had the unfortunate divisions hat still exist amongst us. But he has taken different stand, and placed himself as the hief of a faction. The road to favor is hrough the quagmire of party discipline; and he recommendation to notice is to be esti- nated by the devotion to the doctrines of cer- ain political sectaries. The dangers and the orruptions and the prodigies of the times have ut an end to all neutrality in politics. The overnment is in the hands of a most per- icious faction. It is the task, it is the luty, of the friends of liberty and order — he old Jeffersonian and Jackson democrats, and the old constitutional whigs of the Clay and Webster school — to unite together and exert themselves; for every hour the rising tides are eating away the narrow isthmus upon which the adherents of the Constitution are stationed; and every hour it becomes more necessary to oppose some barrier to these en- croachments.

I will not insult you, at such a moment as the present, with any notice of the squabbles in the cabinet, of the recriminations of the ad- herents of Chase and Seward, the rivals for the succession. Mr. Lincoln has been nomin- ated for re-election, and Messrs. Chase and Blair have been removed from office, — the last named gentleman, you will remember, was expelled from the cabinet not long after his father had failed to induce General Mc- Clellan to decline the nomination to the Presi- dency. By the expulsion of Cameron, Chase, and Blair, the unscrupulous Seward, and his notorious adherents, have secured in their own hands the whole patronage of the Government. Hiram Barney is summarily ejected from the custom house in this city, where, as else- where, the poor clerks have been summoned to give up a portion of their earnings to the party leaders.

Time fails to enable me to give all the changes and movements effected by Seward, who is now in the ascendency and in undis- puted control. His plans are far-reaching and sagacious, as they have ever been. I will let him speak for himself: In November 1863, he repaired to Auburn, and made a speech in which he fulminated the threat that if his par- ty did not carry the then pending election, the Ship of State would be "drifted and dash- ed" against the rocks of a lee shore. And he added, as to the election this fall: — "What if they (the Democratic party) should then succeed in electing a President in 1864, against the majority who elected Abraham Lincoln in 1860? Can that majority be expected to acquiesce without voting and with- out bloodshed? Certainly not: and then you have perpetual civil war, which is nothing else than perpetual anarchy."

Here is a threat of repeating the very crime — that horrible and greatest civil crime — which the rebels committed. Seward was sup- posed to have been in a state of mental de- rangement when he made that speech, and very little attention was paid to it at the time. Recently, however, the recollection of it has been brought to the public mind by repetition of the same threat, during another visit to Auburn, in another speech which he made there a few weeks ago. Here is the form in which he made the threat in this last speech: "If such a thing could happen as that the Chicago candidate, nominated upon such an agreement, should be elected President of the United States on the first Tuesday of Novem- ber next, who can vouch for the safety of the country against the rebels, during the inter- val which must elapse before the new admin- istration can constitutionally come into power? It seems to me that such an election would tend equally to demoralize the Union, and to invite the insurgents to renew their efforts for its destruction."

He would be a traitor, you observe, in 1863, when he talked of "bloodshed;" but the threat is modified, in 1864, to take the form of an interrogatory, or an hypothetical conjec- ture as to what "seems" or what "would."

In a few weeks more he will be prepared to welcome General McClellan with open arms; and urge him to come to Washington at once, and prepare to enter upon his duties as President on the 4th of March next. Yes; and I have no doubt that Mr. Seward will declare that his dear and intimate friend, Mr. Thurlow Weed, and himself, desired nothing so much as the election of General McClellan to the presidency. I have no doubt that in less than a month the parlors of Mr. Seward will be thrown open for the reception of General McClellan and his friends, if they will only walk into them.

As to the unconstitutional acts of the administration, Mr. Lincoln's own friends, Senator Wade, of Ohio, and Henry Winter Davis, representative from Maryland, were constrained to issue a formal protest against his attempt to override the constitution and the proceedings of Congress relative to the re-organization of loyal governments in the rebel States. Does Mr. Lincoln believe that the American people could ever be imposed upon by such re-organizations: that they would ever approve of a system by which corruption would pay for votes in part, and fear force the remainder? Who at this time of day is unacquainted with the springs and wires that would be employed in such a miserable puppet show? How can the loyal people in those States believe themselves free and sovereign, when they would be made to take an oath, as a test to give them the right of voting? What could they object to all this, surrounded by armed men? They would only have to hold their tongues, and to bow down their heads before their masters. But he will probably abandon the attempt to re-elect himself by the votes of such States, for the *recent State elections* must admonish him, in the same words he applied to Mr. Montgomery Blair, when turning him out of the Cabinet a few days ago, that "his time has come."

The arbitary arrests made by Seward and Stanton in places where rebellion did not exist, were wholly injustifiable and unnecessary; because the constitutional forms of law could have been gone through with, in perfect safety.

Arbitary imprisonment and punishment upon mere suspicion, most vexations and odious instruments of despotic power, have been employed on several occasions and in many instances in places where there were no military operations. Barrière, in a report made to the Convention during the French Revolution in reference to a law which had abolished personal liberty in France, says, "The quality of mercy is the first sacrifice which a good republican owes to his country. In order to preserve the vigor of the government, an institution, terrible indeed but necessary, has been disseminated throughout all the sections &c. I mean the *law for the arrest of suspected persons.* The keen and piercing eye of jealous liberty has been fixed upon every citizen, has penetrated into every family, and pervaded every habitation. Public opinion has marked out the persons who ought to be suspected, and they have accordingly fallen under the severity of the law." Thus you have explained to you the principal advantage both of the theory and practice of the system of arbitrary arrest. It contains the principle of impartial persecution, equally applicable to the separate interests of every distinct class and description of the people, from the farmer and the banker and merchant down to the industrious manufacturer and hard working mechanic and day laborer. Are these the arts of government? Are these the means by which the discordant interests and the contending passions of our people can be brought to act in concert? I speak to men affectionately attached to the general principles of liberty — men accustomed to think on whatever can effect their interests and their happiness. Among such men, I am persuaded that I shall not be contradicted, if I were to contend that a tyranny so constituted must of necessity be odious to the people.

GEN. MC'CLELLAN'S PLAN OF PUTTING DOWN THE REBELLION.

As to slavery, whose votaries, commencing the rebellion, have destroyed themselves General McClellan showed how to deal with it constitutionally and effectually. It is no requisite to *exterminate* the *people* of the South to effect the subjugation of the rebellion. The rebels are fighting now only for terms of surrender. General McClellan began the conquest in Western Virginia, and would have completed it long since had he been permitted. His plan was and is a very simple and effective one. In Western Virginia it was simply this, to "proceed forthwith," as he stated, to drive the rebels out.

That was in April, 1861. In July following, he communicated it to the President, and it was, in his own words, "to crush out the rebellion in its very heart." In October of the same year, addressing the Secretary of War, he declared that "the great object to be accomplished" was "the crushing defeat of the rebel army." In all his letters, official as well as private, — and in all his re-

orts, — the same plan is advocated. In his West-Point speech, he declared that the only alternative for our choice is "the suppression of the rebellion or the destruction of our nationality," and that if we let the South go, as Mr. Sumner and others proposed, we would encounter "the fate of the divided republics of Italy and South America," and fly into fragments, at endless war with each other. In his letter of acceptance, so full of noble patriotic sentiments, he declares over and over again the same sentiments.

As for example, his appeal to his whole "course" through life, to the "record" of his public life, to his "long and varied services," to his "love and reverence" for the Union, and declaring, explicitly, that the war for "the preservation of our Union," the re-establishment of the Union in all its integrity," and that "the Union must be preserved at all hazards." Now, contrast his straightforward policy with the side issues which the administration and its adherents have raised, and the fickle, changing, ever-varying course of the President, who seems too weak to resist what he terms "pressure." In his card to whom it may concern, last summer, he refused to permit any one to approach him from the rebel States to negotiate peace without power to negotiate also for the abolition of slavery; but, few days thereafter, he lets Seward go to Auburn to declare that the rebel States may come back with their slaves and slavery. It is, indeed, true, as he said to the people of Kentucky in his celebrated conversation with the two visitors from that State, that he has not sought to control events, but has let events control him. Hence it is that his course has resembled the weather-cock, changing with every wind, in every direction, instantly "boxing the compass," as sailors term it. His platform is one thing one day, and another the next. But General McClellan's platform never varies; it is always the same, and has always been the same. It is the Union, the Constitution, the laws, the suppression of the rebellion, confiscation and the destruction of slavery under the constitution, wherever and whenever a rebel can be found in arms. He does not say as Mr. Sumner did, in substance, a few days ago in Faneuil Hall, Boston, that we must destroy the Constitution in order to complete confiscation and abolition; and let them go, rather than have them come back with their tattered rag of slavery. No: Gen. McClellan would not destroy the Constitution to complete the destruction of any national evil; but he would destroy every such evil in accordance with the principles of the Constitution. He would not set the house on fire, and burn it down, in order to clean out the soot that had gathered in the chimney. He would clean out the chimney. But to burn down the house, and drive all the family out of doors, seems to be the settled aim and policy of Mr. Lincoln's party. And here is precisely the difference which exists, and which has existed in all ages, between radical men and conservative men. The radical would destroy. He would tear down, burn down, and crush out any thing that stood in the way of his ambition or aims. Just so with Messrs Sumner and Stanton, &c. The conservative, on the other hand, would preserve whatever there is that is useful, and repair and improve it — reform it, patch it, mend it — and change it to conform to the progress of the age and the most enlightened Christian civilization.

Hence it is that radicals are always revolutionary, turbulent, and rebellious, and peculiarly dangerous in a republic, as we now find, by sad experience, from their insurrectionary violence in our Southern States. And hence, also, the impossibility of peace, so long as the radicals of the South reign at Richmond, and the radicals of the Constitutional Government are in power at Washington. The rebel leader fastened himself upon the Southern people for six years, and they cannot shake him off now, although they are well known to be heartily sick of him and his rebellion. But we can remove our radical rulers, in accordance with our Constitution and laws, and thus prepare the way for peace and reconciliation as early, at the very farthest, as 1866, when Davis's term expires, and he will no longer have any power over the rebels. My own opinion is, however, that the election of Gen. McClellan next month will give us peace in thirty days, or within six months thereafter; because, if the rebels will not submit at once, he will, as he did in Western Virginia, to use his own words, "proceed forthwith to drive them" into submission, *with such a force as it will be impossible for them to resist*; and if Jeff. Davis does not give up, he will be forced to escape probably into Mexico, for I apprehend that Mr. Wells's successor, under General McClellan, will stop Jefferson Davis's blockade runners, and shut up the Atlantic coast completely. We shall then get the cotton crop, and, by a tax on it, pay our national debt, and resume specie payments. Our debt, I know, is assuming frightful proportions; and al-

though poor Mr. Chase has been made the sole scape-goat of the financial blunders of the administration, Mr. Lincoln and his cabinet and friends cannot escape their share of the odium. It is notorious that Mr. Seward and all his friends, among whom Mr. Spalding, of this State — whom the people compelled afterwards to stay at home — was peculiarly officious, did every thing in their power to drive on the paper-money issues. Mr. Fessenden is now doing what he can to repair the evil; but he does it bunglingly, having had no practical skill.

THE GOLD BILL; THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONISTS.

He (Mr. Fessenden) deserves great credit, however, for getting the gold bill repealed. That, by the way, was one of Seward and Chase's greatest schemes: they pushed it through Congress with all their power, notwithstanding the remonstrances of business men of skill and experience. It was so outrageous, however, it was so much like the mad projects of the French Revolutionists of the last century, that it speedily worked its own cure, thanks to the intelligent and docile patriotism of our own great and good people. I must here call your attention to a remarkable statement, given by a distinguished statesman, of the fiscal operations of the French Revolutionary Government, in 1793, to procure gold and silver, which is particularly applicable to the present times: he says, "It will appear rather extraordinary that the first measure taken with this view should have been the proscription of those metals. A letter is received by the Minister of Finance from Fouché, commissioner in several of the departments, in which he expresses great indignation against gold and silver. He says, "Gold and silver have been the causes of all the calamities of the republic. I know not by what weak compliance those metals are still suffered to remain in the hands of suspected persons: let us degrade and vilify gold and silver; let us fling these deities of monarchy in the dirt, and establish the worship of the austere virtues of a republic." He however adds: "I send you seventeen chests filled with gold, silver, and plate of all sorts, the spoil of churches and castles: you will see with peculiar pleasure two crosiers, and a ducal coronet of silver gilt." This ingenious idea of vilifying and degrading valuable effects by seizing them for the use of the republic is not lost upon the Minister of Finance. A few days after the receipt of this letter, a citizen appears at the bar, and desires to be permitted to exchange certain pieces of gold and silver bearing the ima of the tyrant for republican paper. Th patriotic and disinterested offer, as you m imagine, was gladly accepted by the Conve tion; but upon a motion being made that ho orable mention of the transaction should inserted in the notes, the Minister of Finan rises with the utmost indignation to oppose monstrous a proposition. He delivers a mo eloquent and vehement invective against go and silver: he says, "In a short time t world will be too happy, if we should deig to receive pieces of metal bearing the effi of tyrants in exchange for Republican assi nats; already the whole nation rejects a despises those corrupting metals, which tyran originally brought from America for the sc purpose of enslaving us. I have in conte plation the plan of a sumptuary law, by whi I will drive the vile dung once more into t bowels of the earth." What was the sumpt ary law by which the Minister of Finan proposed to accomplish this salutary reform Here is that excellent law. "All gold a silver metal in specie or plate, all jewels, go and silver lace, or valuable effects which sh be discovered *buried in the earth*, or co cealed in cellars, walls, rubbish, floors pavements, hearths or chimneys, or in a secret place, shall be seized and confiscat for the use of the Republic; and the infor er shall receive a twentieth part of the val of whatever he shall discover, to be paid assignats." Concealment alone is the crim on which the law attaches, without even a of the ordinary pretences of disaffection. consequence of this decree, every place which it was possible to conceal treasure searched with the utmost rigor; the priva of every house is violated; every cellar a garden is dug up; and the Minister of F nance, with the most unrelenting spirit persecution, pursues the objects of his hatr and contempt even to the bowels of the eart where he had threatened to drive them.

THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

As to our financial condition, perhaps ought not to say much here — I have said great deal on that subject within the pa three years. I confess I am now very an ious about the future state of our finance If Lincoln should be re-elected, I loo with dread and alarm to our future financi situation. I tremble to think of what will l the condition of our people, when I call t mind the project of such financiers as Tha Stevens of Pennsylvania, Chairman of th Committee of Ways and Means of the Hous

ould issue a thousand millions of paper
, and pay the interest of the national
ith it, — who would run the barrel of
p to thirty dollars and the ton of coal
y dollars, rather than lay taxes to pay
war as far as possible, as we go along;
I am greatly apprehensive of terrible
ial disaster if Lincoln be re-elected.

o not know that I can better explain the
ial policy of Lincoln and Seward than
ing you the substance of a speech which
elivered in the Senate, by Senator Sher-
of Ohio, in May last. It was reported
Washington *Daily Globe* of June 1st,

e Hon. Senator spoke with that consci-
ss of authority and in that imperative
which implied a conviction that his man-
were to be obeyed, and that no differences
inion were to be permitted to swerve the
r which he represented from going for-
in the path he directed. It is, there-
of the greatest importance to the finan-
interests of the country that the princi-
and theories enunciated in this speech
ld be thoroughly understood.

he leading topic of the speech is the new
nal banking system. He explicitly de-
s that the paper money to be issued by
new banks is to be made to take the place
very other kind of paper money, whether
e Government or the State banks. Hav-
explained his plan "to compel the banks"
ithdraw their circulation — to "compel
to do so by taxation" — he proceeds to
are that it is the policy of the Government
educe the volume of the issues of legal-
er paper money, and to finally supersede
e issues altogether with the notes of the
national banks. Of the circulation of
kinds then in existence, he says: —

This large redundant circulation must be
ed as rapidly as possible, but I ask you
it can be done now, with two systems of
ks rivals with each other. Suppose the
vernment desires to reduce the circulating
lium. The very moment the Government
mences reducing its circulation, that very
ment these banks would commence to in-
ase theirs."

That is to say, the old banks would issue
ir own notes and encounter the risk of
nkruptcy, if the Government did not supply
al-tender notes to them. This is the same
nder that Mr. Hooper made in the House,
en he attempted to conceal the fact that it
the excess of the Government legal-tender
tes which enables the old banks, as well
as the new banks, to put out their own notes.

Mr. Sherman explains the plans of the Government, relative to the issues of the new banks taking the place of its own, in these words: —

"I take it to be the policy of the Government, as it is the plainest dictate of reason, to retire its circulation as fast as the national bank currency is issued. We can do it by funding; we can do it in various ways. We must do it. If the United States continue to issue its own notes in the form of currency, and also authorize national bank notes to be issued *pari passu*, both together, in overwhelming amounts, as a matter of course the result would be to destroy all values; but I take it that it is and must be the policy of the Government to retire as rapidly as possible the United States notes, and to substitute for them the national currency."

Not one word of explanation is given as to the mode in which this new "national currency" is to be redeemed in real money, or how specie payments are to be resumed under the new system. When it was proposed in the Senate to have the new banks accumulate a part of the specie obtained by them for interest on the Government stocks held by them, so as to prepare for resumption of specie payments, he opposed it. And having explained how the new banks are to be made to furnish a paper money, to supersede that of the Government, upon the basis of the capital subscribed by private citizens, one would naturally suppose that he would complete his theory with an explanation of the mode in which specie payment could be resumed by the Government and the new banks; but he is silent on this point: it is all paper, paper. He does not propose to make the new bank notes a legal tender: that would conflict with the Constitution. He says, indeed, that "the national bank currency will be better, and in less danger of repudiation, than the greenbacks;" but he does not make it appear how they are to be made any better, except through the seizure of the capital of the private citizens invested in or deposited with the new banks, which, he says, "*are always within the power of Congress: every man who goes into them knows that the system must be so conducted that the public sentiment will sustain them, or else theg will go to the wall. The law organizing them may be repealed, and they may be driven out at any time by the power of Congress. They are under bonds for good behavior. They*

file in the vaults of the United States more than the amount of their circulation in bonds of the United States taken at this time when it is necessary to sell our bonds."

This is the currency and banking system, thus prepared to become the cat's-paw of partisan strife and caprice, that is to supersede that standard of value in real money, which the constitution has established! One of the principal supporters of the system has thus clearly defined the policy by which it is to be controlled. The *exposé* is opportune. The people can now see the whole scheme. It is plainly an organized system for controlling the party politics of the country. It is the reflex of the old United States bank, and the State "pet bank," systems. It is a complete union of partisan organizations with banking associations, under the pretext of getting possession of the circulating medium of the country for the relief of the Government, instead of borrowing money upon bonds or treasury notes. The people have again and again frowned upon these schemes of partisans to make the economical affairs of the country the play-things of party. So they will again.

He confounds a paper money with money composed of the precious metals, comparing the assumed power to issue the former to the power of coining the latter; and thus misrepresents the operation of the natural laws governing monetary systems.

He compares the probable fate of the funded stocks, or debt of the United States, had Government issued bonds instead of notes, with that of the legal-tender paper money known as "assignats," issued in France, to prove the wisdom of adopting the legal-tender issues now in use in this country.

He refrains from explaining the ruinous tendencies of the amount of bank-note currency which he advocated, although he acknowledged that the currency was excessive; and he must have been aware of the fact that the proposed three hundred millions of new bank notes largely exceeded the amount of the circulation of the old banks.

He pleads the necessity of getting "money," to make every payment with, as an excuse for Government issues of "legal-tender" paper money, thus ignoring the employment of those media of exchange in which the business of the civilized world is conducted, without the active circulation of metallic money, upon a specie basis.

He conceals the fact that the ne
tional banks are keeping the public r
and loaning it out on interest, althoug
pay no interest to Government for the
that money, and draw interest on the s
deposited as security for the notes
issue.

He ignores the constitutional measu
standard of value; and advocates a p
money system without any avowed k
edge of the mode upon which that s
can be practically sustained, except b
threat of destroying the banks which
it, and confiscating the private proper
citizens invested in such banks.

He acknowledges the tendency to re
ation of a Government paper money is
in excess, yet defends the excessive i
that he has aided in Congress.

He expresses an opinion that it is
policy of the Government to reduce
quantity of legal-tender paper without
ing any returns to sustain the opi
when the price of gold was rising a
ninety premium, the dollar being wortl
tle more than fifty cents, which was a
indication of the extent to which the
rency was being inflated, and which
and still is, overwhelming the working
ple of the country in the deepest dist
compelling them to pay double, and
many cases more than double, for the
essaries of life.

He misrepresents or conceals the fact
relation to the circulation of the old ba
throughout the States, giving the circ
tion, in figures, of *nine* banks in this
which had expanded, and witholding
figures as to the other *forty-three* banks
this city, which had in some cases altoge
er withdrawn or greatly reduced their
culation.

He charged the old banks with wanto
inflating the currency because they rece
and deal in the issues of the Governme
which have been made a *compulsory* p
ment by the tender acts, and to refu
which would have been to refuse to recei
payment of debts due to them.

He pleads the use of paper money as
war measure, whereas the most successf
wars have been conducted to a triumpha
termination upon the basis of a real mon
system after paper money had proved di
astrous.

He conceals the facts as to the issues o
legal-tender paper having wrought a force
and cruel confiscation of the incomes o
widows and orphans derived from mortg

avings-bank deposits, life insurances, her permanent investments, while the sed taxation of the rich, and those ing fortunes by the war, has been ly met by the high premium on the btained for interest on the public debt. charges the inflation of the currency he old banks, without acknowledging ney were made to inflate, and the sus- n of specie payments made lawful, by excessive issues of Government paper, lawful money, which have deranged ues, aroused wild manias of specula- converted nearly every honest busi- ursuit into a species of lottery or ing, produced tendencies to vice and ality, and created a love for extrava- and display destructive to that eco- al and virtuous way of life which our lican fathers taught us was most be- g our character as a democratic re- an people.

h are the "financial authorities" that been and are yet guiding our econom- ffairs. Our brave armies have done e doing all that could be expected of All our disasters have come from of skill in our rulers. If an ignomin- eace be forced upon us, it will be from ismanagement of the finances. I pray merciful Providence may avert such mity.

PATRIOTISM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY.

to the course of the Democratic Par- e resolutions and votes in Congress, l unanimously, prove that they have mpathies with the rebellion. So also Mr. Pendleton. He voted supplies staining the Government and prosecu- he war. As to the views of the Dem- c party upon the question of negro en- nts, they have been fully sustained indicated by General Sherman, one r most successful commanders, in his of July 30, 1864.

to the character of the opposition to ral McClellan, an occurrence has re- y taken place in newspaper circles affords a good illustration. I quote llowing account of it:—

The inexperienced editor of some West- ournal having published the subjoined raphs under the impression that they extracts from a speech of the late Sena- ouglas, of Illinois, the New York *Trib-* eproduces them in its columns, saying:

The lamented Douglas thus powerfully expressed himself on the subject of submission to Rebels in arms:

"'To efface the insult offered to our flag, to secure ourselves from the fate of the divided Republics of Italy and South America, to preserve our Government from destruction, to enforce its just power and laws, to maintain our very existence as a nation,—these were the causes which compelled us to draw the sword. Rebellion against a Government like ours, which contains the means of self-adjustment and a pacific remedy for evils, should never be confounded with a revolution against despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs. Such a rebellion cannot be justified on ethical grounds; and the only alternatives for our choice are its suppression or the destruction of our nationality.

"'At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged into a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. It was in this cause, and with these motives, that so many of our comrades have given their lives, and to this we are all personally pledged in all honor and fidelity. Shall such devotion as that of our dead comrades be of no avail? Shall it be said in after ages that we lacked the vigor to complete the work thus begun? that, after all these noble lives freely given, we hesitated and failed to keep straight on until our land was saved? Forbid it, Heaven, and give us firmer, truer hearts than that.'"

The above "powerful" observations so heartily approved by the *Tribune*, supposing them to be utterances of "the lamented Douglas," are from the eloquent and patriotic oration of George B. McClellan at West Point. It will be seen that the *Tribune* can sometimes be just to Gen. McClellan, but only by accident."

One of the strangest occurrences in the conduct and policy of the administration related to the substitute brokers in this city. Secretary Stanton or the President at one time permitted them to go on with their business, then arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned them; and then on a recent occasion encouraged them to go on again, and actually granted them licenses to do so, Wilson's speech stopping recruits, and the course of Stanton in harmony with that speech, were in strange contrast with the constant demand of leading generals for more men and larger armies.

INTELLIGENCE AND SKILL REQUIRED IN THE ADMINISTRATION.

In conclusion, permit me to say that, in my humble judgment, the great want of our coun-

try now is ordinary intelligence in the men at the head of public affairs. The incompetency of our public men has led to innumerable failures. Our foreign affairs, too, have been so strangely mismanaged that foreign powers have ventured to foster privateers to prey upon our commerce, although the rebel government sending out these privateers has not been recognized as an independent power by any nation. Our Government, for some unexplained cause, would not license privateers to destroy the enemy's vessels, and thus our commerce has been destroyed; merchants compelled to stand with their hands tied, watching their burning ships, without being able to raise a hand to defend themselves. I dare say, Mr. Seward has some grand rhetorical exposition prepared to print in defence of such a policy, but I cannot understand the principles have governed him and Mr. Lincoln matter. The effect has been, practica destroy our mercantile marine, and t our commerce — once the greatest, in to in the world — to other nations, princip Great Britain, which has built and equ rebel privateers to destroy our ships.

With the election of Gen. McClell shall have patriotism, skill, honesty an or. His election will be the first-fruits purifying influence of our civil war. honor and integrity will replace the grov political tricksters now in power. True manship will once more direct our affair peace and prosperity, with the bless Providence, again bless our united coun

General McClellan's Views of the War and the Country

The Harrison's Bar Letter.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blockading our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical; and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions; and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, or foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property, taken for military use, should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of order, and the protection of political rights. M power should not be allowed to interfere with t tions of servitude, either by supporting or im the authority of the master, except for suppressi order, as in other cases. Slaves contraband un act of Congress, seeking military protection, receive it. The right of the Government to ap ate permanently to its own service claims to slave should be asserted; and the right of the owner t pensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grou military necessity and security, to all the slaves a particular State; thus working manumission i State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Vi also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expedie such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and con tive, and pervaded by the influences of Christiani freedom, would receive the support of almost all loyal men; would deeply impress the rebel mass all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hope it would commend itself to the favor of the Almi

Unless the principles governing the future cond our struggle shall be made known and approve effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hop A declaration of radical views, especially upon sl will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the Government must be support concentration of military power. The national should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of pation and numerous armies; but should be mainl lected into masses, and brought to bear upon the a of the Confederate States. Those armies thoro defeated, the political structure which they su will soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you form, you will require a commander-in-chief o army: one who possesses your confidence, unders your views, and who is competent to execute you ders by directing the military forces of the nati the accomplishment of the objects by you prop I do not ask that place for myself. I am willi serve you in such position as you may assign me, will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate s superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hop forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this with sincerity towards you and from love of country.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
G. B. McCLELLAN
Major-General Comman

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-vernment. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of r national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and od order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are hting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full thority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instruc-ns to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the vernment by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the each existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, ovember* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious rrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General urnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me iat I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing y duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial or-anization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a noment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be trictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities xist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be either demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in ny event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed orces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own rmy, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Des-patch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

MARK THE CONTRAST.

DEMOCRATIC PRICES.		ABOLITION PRICES.	
Groceries.			
Teas	45a50c per lb.	Teas	$1 00a$2
Sugars	8 9c "	Sugars	20
Coffees	14 16c "	Coffees	
Nutmegs	50 55c "	Nutmegs	$2
Pepper	8 9c "	Pepper	
Allspice	6 8c "	Allspice	
Cinnamon	20 22c "	Cinnamon	$1
Dry Goods — Domestic.			
Brown Sheetings	8½c per yd.	Brown Sheetings	65c per y
Prints, Calicoes, etc.	5½c "	Prints, Calicoes, etc.	40c "
Bleached Muslins	5½c "	Bleached Muslins	75c "
Canton Flannels	10c "	Canton Flannels	90c "
Foreign.			
Delaines	15½c per yd.	Delaines	75c per y
Dress Goods	25c "	Dress Goods	80c "
Velvets	$2 50c "	Velvets	$12 00c "
Raw Cotton, Etc.			
Cotton Laps	18c per lb.	Cotton Laps	$1 75 per lb
Wadding	40c "	Wadding	2 20 "
Carpet Chain	20c "	Carpet Chain	1 10 "
Lamp Wick	20c "	Lamp Wick	1 50 "
Metals, Etc.			
Lead	6c per lb.	Lead	32c per lb
Antimony	13c "	Antimony	75c "
Block Tin	31c "	Block Tin	90c "

Coal,

Of which the poor man's fire consumes as much as that which blazes in the rich man's fire — in former days could be had for *four or five dollars;* it now costs *fourteen and fifteen dollars.*

Cloths.

Satinets	45a50c per yd	$1 76 per yd

Broadcloths, Cassimeres, etc., have increased from 106 to 150 per cent.

DRUGS have increased in price on an average of 200 per cent.

TOBACCO — Manufactured Cavendish Tobacco has risen from 35 cents to $1 25 per pound.

CIGARS have advanced from $20 to $60 and $200 per thousand.

FOREIGN STATIONERY, since the scarcity of specie, has risen 50 per cent.

Document No. 12.

SOLD at 13 PARK ROW, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices.

LINCOLN'S TREATMENT OF GEN. GRANT.

WASHINGTON, *September* 22.

The following is a copy of a correspondence which took place between the President and Lieutenant-General Grant, and may prove interesting, as it furnishes an inside view of military affairs:

MR. LINCOLN TO GENERAL GRANT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, April 30.

Lieutenant-General Grant:

Not expecting to see you before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way, my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know, nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any restraints or constraints upon you, while I am very anxious that any real disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided. I know that these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there be anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it.

And now, with a brave army, and a just cause, may God sustain you.

Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.

GENERAL GRANT'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CULPEPPER C. H., Va., May 1, 1864.

Mr. President:

Your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future, and satisfaction for the past, in my military administration, is acknowledged with pride. It shall be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint, have never expressed or implied a complaint, against the Administration or the Secretary of War for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to be my duty.

Indeed, since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you.

Very truly, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

MR. LINCOLN'S TREATMENT OF GEN. McCLELLAN.

As a proper parallel to the above correspondence (which was but one of the pipes laid by the President to secure his renomination) we print below some of the instances in which Mr. Lincoln interfered with General McClellan, both when he was general-in-chief and afterward when he commanded the brave Army of the Potomac. These citations tell their own story without the necessity of any comment.

MR. LINCOLN ORDERS A GENERAL ADVANCE ON HIS OWN HOOK.

[From General McClellan's Report.]

On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued *without consultation with me.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 22.

President's General War Order, No. 1:

Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That, especially the army at and about For-

tress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be able to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

It will be borne in mind that at this time General McClellan was general-in-chief, and was supposed to have control of the movements of all our forces. Indeed, he supposed so himself until Mr. Lincoln issued this order.

MR. LINCOLN DIRECTS THE MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

As if the order just quoted was not enough of an interference with the general-in-chief, Mr. Lincoln, four days later, practically assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, as witness his order which is subjoined:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862.

President's Special War Orders, No. 1.

Ordered: That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"MY PLAN AND YOUR PLAN."

General McClellan *obtained permission* to submit, in writing, his objections to Mr. Lincoln's plan, as developed in the above orders, but before he had prepared them, he received the following note:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 1862.

Major-General McClellan:

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbano, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than *mine?* 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than *mine?* 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than *mine?* 4th. In fact, would it n be less valuable in this, that it would break no gre line of the enemy's communications, *while mi would?* 5th. In case of disaster, would not a retre be more difficult by your plan than *mine?*

Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN.

MR. LINCOLN AGAIN DIRECTS THE ARM OF THE POTOMAC.

Just a month after this civilian Preside had propounded to a skilful general "n plan" for a military campaign, he issued t following order in relation to the movemen of the army, under the immediate supervisi of that general:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 8, '62.

President's General War Order, No. 8.

Ordered: That no change of the base of operatio of the Army of the Potomac shall be made witho leaving in and about Washington such a force as, the opinion of the General-in-Chief and the co manders of army corps, shall leave said city entire secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fif thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac, sha be moved *en route* for a new base of operations, u til the navigation of the Potomac, from Washingt to the Chesapeake bay, shall be freed from enemy batteries and other obstructions, or until the Pres dent shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement, as aforesaid, *en route* for new base of operations, which may be ordered b the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended t move upon the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to mov upon the bay as early as the 18th of March inst., an the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it s moves as early as that day.

Ordered: That the army and navy co-operate i an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteri upon the Potomac between Washington and the Ches peake bay. A. LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

MR. LINCOLN DEPOSES THE GENERAL-IN CHIEF, AND CALLS MR. STANTON TO HI AID.

Only three days after promulgating th above, the President issued the following or der, of which General McClellan received n intimation until it chanced to meet his eye i *The National Intelligencer:*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 11, 1862.

President's War Order, No. 3.

Major-General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining the command of the Department of the Potomac.

Ordered further: That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be con-

idated and designated the Department of the Mis-sippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major-neral Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also: That the country west of the De-rtment of the Potomac, and east of the Department the Mississippi, be a military department, to be lled the Mountain Department; and that the same commanded by Major-General Fremont.

That all the commanders of departments, after the ceipt of this order by them, respectively report, verally and directly, to the Secretary of War, and at prompt, full, and frequent reports will be ex-cted of all and each of them. A. LINCOLN.

R. LINCOLN WITHDRAWS TROOPS FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S ARMY.

Just as General McClellan was about em-arking for Fortress Monroe, having previously nt his army thither, he received the follow-g note from Mr. Lincoln, notwithstanding e latter had, a few days before, promised ot to do what is ordered in the note:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 31, '62.

Major-General McClellan:

MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt constrained to rder Blenker's division to Fremont; and I will rite this to assure you that I did so with great ain, understanding that you would wish it other-ise. If you could know the full pressure of the ase, I am confident you would justify it, even be-ond a mere acknowledgment, that the commander-n-chief may order what he pleases.

Yours, very truly,
A. LINCOLN.

BLENKER'S DIVISION WITHDRAWN FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN.

Again did M. Lincoln, through his aid, Mr. Stanton, interfere with General McClellan and against the latter's wishes:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON D. C.
March 31, 1862.

Major-General McClellan:

The order in respect to Blenker is not designed to hinder or delay the movement of Richardson's or any other force. He can remain wherever you de-sire him so long as required for your movements, and in any position you may desire. The order is sim-ply to place him in position for reënforcing Fremont, as soon as your dispositions will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry, by such route and at such time as you shall direct—state your own wishes as to the movement—when and how it shall be made.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

ANOTHER INTERFERENCE — GENERAL WOOL'S TROOPS WITHDRAWN FROM McCLELLAN.

[From General McClellan's Report.]

"Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the War Department placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool, a division of about ten thousand men, which was to be assigned to the First corps. During the night of the 3d I received a telegram from the adjutant-general of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction.

"This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it."

MR. LINCOLN INTERFERES WHILE FIGHTING IS ACTUALLY GOING ON.

The following is too plain to require explanation:

The troops composing the advance of each column were, during the afternoon, under a warm artillery fire—the sharpshooters even of the right column being engaged, when covering reconnoissances. It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following telegram was sent to me:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
April 4, 1862.

General McClellan:

By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general is to report to the Secretary of War; letter by mail.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

MR. LINCOLN ASSUMES THE DIRECTION OF GENERAL McCLELLAN'S MOVEMENTS.

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1862, 8 P. M.

General G. B. McClellan:

Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade under your orders, is not and will not be interfered with. You have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick river at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. LINCOLN, President.

MR. LINCOLN EXPLAINS HIS STRATEGY, AND GEN. McCLELLAN MUST ADOPT IT.

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.

Major-General McClellan:

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and as I thought acquiesced in, certainly without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single battery, were all you designed to be left for the defence of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this even was to go to General Hooker's old position. General Bank's old corps, once designed for

Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented (or would present when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of *all* the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and *nothing* was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, "Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by twenty thousand unorganized troops?" This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the numbers of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over one hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making one hundred and eight thousand then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but eighty-five thousand when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of twenty-three thousand be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do, if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and if so, *I think it is the precise time to strike a blow.* By delay the enemy will relatively gain on you, that is, he will gain faster, by fortifications and reënforcements, than you can by reënforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. Yours, very truly,

A. Lincoln.

MR. LINCOLN SITS IN THE WHITE HOUSE AND DIRECTS THE MOVEMENTS OF McCLELLAN'S AND McDOWELL'S FORCES.

[Extract from order to General McDowell, dated May 17, 1862.]

While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, a communication between your left wing, and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of the rebel forces.

General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your column, before the junction of the two armies is effected.

A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed.

By order of the President.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

MR. LINCOLN AGAIN HAS A PLAN.

[Extract from his letter to Gen. McClellan, of May 24, 1862.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.

ANOTHER INTERFERENCE OF MR. LINCOLN —McDOWELL'S TROOPS WITHDRAWN.

May 24, 1862.
From Washington, 4 P. M., 1862.

Major-General George B. McClellan:

In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and part of General McDowell's in their rear.

A. Lincoln, President.

MR. LINCOLN IN THE MAZES OF A CAMPAIGN—HE PENETRATES THE REBEL DESIGNS AND ISSUES ORDERS TO GEN. McCLELLAN.

Washington, May 25, 1862. 2 P. M.

Major-General McClellan:

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and a concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defence of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

A. Lincoln, President.

LINCOLN'S NEXT DIRECTION TO GENERAL McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, MAY 26, 1862.

...or-General G. B. McClellan:

...an you not cut the Acquia Creek railroad? also, ...t impression have you as to intrenched works for ... to contend with in front of Richmond? Can you ...near enough to throw shells into the city?

A. LINCOLN, President.

...NERAL McCLELLAN'S ARMY ORDERED FROM THE PENINSULA.

...eneral McClellan, having withdrawn his ...ay triumphantly to the bank of the James, ...led for reënforcements that he might renew ... attack on Richmond. In reply he received ... following order:

WASHINGTON, AUG. 3, 1862. 7:45 P. M.

...jor-General Geo. B. McClellan:

... have waited most anxiously to learn the result of ...ur forced reconnoissance toward Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can.

* * * * * *

H. W. HALLECK,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding U. S. A.

Such, in brief, are some of the most notable instances in which Mr. Lincoln interfered with General McClellan when he occupied a position similar to that held by General Grant. They reflect so severely upon the President that no attempt to gloss them over by his apparent subsequent repentance can disabuse the patriotic portion of the nation of the matured conviction that he is to be held responsible for the lack of decisive victories in Eastern Virginia. The blame must and will rest upon him, to whom it belongs.

THE TAINT OF DISUNION.

"I will not vote for a man, no, not if he were my ...n brother, who had lain with me in the womb of ... mother, on whom there is the least shadow of ...spicion of disunion."—*Rev. G. W. Bethune, D.D., the Academy of Music, N. Y.*, 1860.

To learn the real sentiments of the men for ...hom we are asked to vote, we must look ...ack to the opinions they avowed and de...nded before they came before the country ...sking for its highest offices. Then they were ...nder no temptations to conceal their own ...pinions, nor to avow others. What they were ...hen they are now, unless they have retracted ...heir published declarations of political senti...ment. The leaders of the party now in power ...re and always have been *disunionists*—men ...who believe in the right of secession, and the ...luty of disunion on account of slavery.

This will be readily seen from their own ...writings and speeches.

1. ABRAHAM LINCOLN. In the House of Representatives, while a member of Congress, Mr. Lincoln said, in a speech:

"Any people, anywhere, being inclined and having the power, have the right to rise up and shake off the existing Government, and form a new one that suits them better. Nor is this right confined to cases where the people of an existing Government may choose to exercise it. Any portion of such people that can may revolutionize, putting down a minority intermingled with or near about them, who may oppose them."

This declaration of sentiment Mr. Lincoln has never modified nor retracted; and the manner in which he has conducted the war, the removal of generals when they were about to achieve great success, his frequent interference with military plans, his abandonment of the Constitution for the law of his own will, his reconstruction plans based on the State suicide theory of Charles Sumner, his neglect to attempt any negotiations with any power other than Jefferson Davis, and his refusal of those except only on the basis of abolition—so that he proposes, in effect, an agreement between himself and the Richmond dynasty, to consider the Constitution dead, and the Union gone, and to reconstruct a new Government—all this, coupled with the fact that he has never modified or explained his old secession doctrines, abundantly justifies the belief that he is deeply tainted with DISUNION. If he is "honest old Abe," he believes now what he advocated in the prime and vigor of his life—the right of secession in a State, county, or town! Has he not done everything that human power can invent to make Union difficult, even impossible? We are hopelessly divided if his plans are sustained by the people.

2. WILLIAM H. SEWARD. In 1856, Mr. Sew-

ard, predicting civil war between the North and South, said:

"Then the free States and slave States of the Atlantic, divided and warring with each other, would disgust the free States of the Pacific, and *they would have abundant cause and justification for withdrawing from a union* productive *no longer* of peace, safety, and liberty to themselves."

"In 1850, Senator Hale presented two petitions—'praying that some plan be devised for the *dissolution of the American Union.*' This petition received *three* votes—J. P. Hale, W. H. Seward, S. P. Chase.

3. THE "REPUBLICANS" IN MASSACHUSETTS. After the election of James Buchanan to the Presidency, a disunion convention was called in the following words:

"We, the undersigned, citizens of Worcester, believing the result of the recent Presidential election to involve four years more of pro-slavery Government, and a rapid increase in the hostility between the two sections of the Union;

"Believing this hostility to be the offspring not of party excitement, but of a fundamental difference in education, habits, and laws;

"Believing the existing Union to be a failure, as being a hopeless attempt to unite under one Government two antagonistic systems of society, which diverge more widely every year;

"And believing it to be the duty of intelligent and conscientious men to meet these facts with wisdom and firmness:

"Respectfully invite our fellow citizens of Massachusetts to meet in convention at Worcester, on Thursday, January 15, to consider the practicability, probability, and expediency of a separation between the free and slave States, and to take such other measures as the condition of the times may require."

4. THE ABOLITIONISTS. Witness the abundant proof, nor doubt that we can furnish volumes of the same sort of evidence:

"The Constitution of our Fathers was a mistake. *Tear it in pieces and make a better.* Don't say the machine is out of order—it is in order;—it does what its framers intended." "Our claim is DISUNION, *breaking up of the States!* I have shown you that our *work cannot be done under* our institutions (laws). The *Republican* party is the *first sectional party ever organized in this country.* It does not *know its own* face, and calls itself national, but it is sectional. It is a party of the North *pledged against* the South!" —*Wendell Phillips.*

At an anti-slavery meeting, in May, 1844, at New York—

Resolved, "That secession from the U. S. Government is the duty of every abolitionist."

Resolved, "That the only exodus of the slave to freedom, unless it be one of blood, *must be over the remains* of the present American Church, and the grave of the *present Union.*"

Resolved, "That the abolitionists of this country should make it one of the *primary* objects of *this agitation to dissolve the American Union.*"

"I have labored for twenty years to break up t Union, and I glory in the fact."—*Wendell Phill at Hartford, Feb.* 21, 1862.

"The Fremont party is moulding public sentim in the right direction for the specific work the a litionists are striving to accomplish: the dissoluti of the Union, and the abolition of slavery throug out the land."—*Wm. Lloyd Garrison*, 1856.

"No act of ours do we regard with more cons entious approval or higher satisfaction; none do submit more confidently to the tribunal of Heav and the moral verdict of mankind, than when, s eral years ago, on the 4th of July, in the presen of a great assembly, we committed to the flames t Constitution of the United States."—*William Llo Garrison.*

5. PROMINENT FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS MR. LINCOLN. The speeches, writings, acts these men, all form one black history of enmi to the Union. We make a few brief citations proofs, damning and disgraceful, and we cha lenge the radical party to meet these proofs.

"The Union as it was is played out."—*Senat "Jim Lane" of Kansas.*

"The Union as it was and the Constitution as it *God forbid it.*"—*Thaddeus Stevens.*

"Who in the name of God wants the Cotton Stat or any other State this side of perdition, to remain the Union, if slavery is to continue?"—*Senat Bingham of Ohio.*

"Any obstructions to abolition must inevitably attended with discord and war. We cannot hav both slavery and the Constitution. We ought revolutionize slavery out of existence."—*Brigadi General Phelps of Vermont.*

"Should this (the election of Fremont) fail, n true man would be any longer safe here from the a saults of the arrogant slave oligarchy, who then woul rule with an iron hand. For the free North woul be left the choice of a peaceful *dissolution of th Union, a civil war which would end in the same* or an unconditional surrender of every princip held dear by freemen."—*Francis E. Spinner, U. S Treasurer.*

"I have no doubt the free and slave State *ought to separate.* THE UNION IS NOT WOTH SUP PORTING *in connection with the South.*"—*James S Pike, Minister to Holland, appointed by Lincoln afte this avowal.*

Extract from the constitution of the "Emancipation League," William Cullen Bryant, president:

"Art. 1. The name of this Society shall be the Emancipation League in the City of New York.

"Art. 2. The objects of this Society shall be * * to insist that * * * NO STATE NOW IN REBELLION BE RECOGNIZED AS A MEMBER OF THE UNION EXCEPT ON THE CONDITION OF EMANCIPATION."

6. THE REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPERS. Here the evidence is overwhelming.

"Not a few of the Republican journals of the interior are working themselves up to the belief, which

ey are endeavoring to impress upon their readers, at the seceded States, be they few or many, will be ripped back into the Union. We caution all such at in language of that sort they are adding new el to the flame which is already blazing too fiercely; d that the probabilities now are that the result will ove them to be false prophets. No man knows hat public policy may demand of the incoming Administration; but the drift of opinion seems to be at, if peaceable secession is possible, the retiring tates will be assisted to go, that this needless and tter controversy may be brought to an end. If e Union is to be dissolved, a bloodless separation is all means to be coveted. Do not let us make at impossible."—*Chicago Tribune, Dec.* 1860.

From the Tribune of Nov. 9, 1860.

"If the Cotton States shall become satisfied that ey can do better out of the Union than in it, *we sist on letting them go in peace. The right to secede ay be a revolutionary one, but it exists nevertheless.* * * We must ever resist the right of any ate to remain in the Union and nullify or defy the ws thereof. *To withdraw from the Union is quite nother matter; whenever a considerable section of ur Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall sist all coercive measures designed to keep it in.* e hope never to live in a republic whereof one ction is pinned to another by bayonets."

From the Tribune, Nov. 26, 1860.

"If the Cotton States unitedly and earnestly wish withdraw peacefully from the Union, *we think they ould and would be allowed to go. Any attempt to mpel them by force to remain would be contrary to e principles enunciated in the immortal Declaration f Independence*, contrary to the fundamental ideas n which human liberty is based."

From the Tribune, Dec. 17, 1860.

"If it (the Declaration of Independence) justified ne secession from the British Empire of three millons of colonists in 1776, *we do not see why it would ot justify the secession of five millions of Southrons rom the Union in* 1861."

From the Tribune, February 28, 1861.

"*Whenever it shall become clear that the great body f the Southern people have become conclusively alienated from the Union, and anxious to escape from it,* WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO FORWARD THEIR VIEWS."

From the Tribune, January, 20, 1862.

"If *three months* more of earnest fighting shall not serve to make a serious impression on the rebels—if the end of that term shall find us no further advanced than its beginning—if some malignant Fate has decreed that the blood and treasure of the nation shall ever be squandered in fruitless efforts, *let us bow to our destiny*, AND MAKE THE BEST ATTAINABLE PEACE."

THE AMERICAN FLAG.

From the New York Tribune.

All hail the flaunting Lie!
The Stars grow pale and dim;
The stripes are bloody scars—
A lie the vaunting hymn.
It shields a pirate's deck,
It binds a man in chains,
It yokes the captive's neck,
And wipes the bloody stains
Tear down the flaunting Lie!
Half-mast the starry flag!
Insult no sunny sky
With hate's polluted rag!
Destroy it ye who can!
Deep sink it in the waves!
It bears a fellow man
To groan with fellow slaves.

Furl, furl the boasted Lie!
Till Freedom lives again,
To rule once more in truth
Among untrammelled men.
Roll up the starry sheen,
Conceal its bloody stains:
For in its folds are seen
The stamp of rustling chains.

From the Evening Post, Oct. —, 1863.

"The 'Union as it was,' means the utter destruction of those who now adhere to the Union; and in view of this fact it is the duty of every honorable American—of every one who values the loyalty of Northern men, to *work with all his might against the plot* of the slaveholders' friends."

Let the soberminded, intelligent, patriotic American people, who love the Union above property and life, read these opinions, and consider the conclusions to which they lead. Bear in mind that Mr. Lincoln, after he had avowed himself a firm believer in the doctrine of secession, was nominated by the influence, mainly, of *The Chicago Tribune* and *New York Tribune* men, who were the ultra abolitionists of the Republican party. He was elected by their enthusiastic support.

Not one of the men whose original deliberate opinions we have put on record above, has, in any shape or form, indicated any change of sentiment or purpose. They are to a man disunionists to-day. They have conducted the war with reference to that result, putting all possible obstacles in the way of adjustment, and seeking to make Union *impracticable.* With this key to their policy, their course is intelligible and consistent. If they obtain a lease of power for four years more, the destruction of the Union, and a separation of the North and South, which is their cherished purpose, will be an accomplished fact. These are hard sayings, but, in the face of the proof we have cited, who dare believe otherwise? Out of their own mouths we judge them, and the judgment is just. The Baltimore platform is a condensation of the quotations we have made.

BETRAYING THE UNION.

Having shown by copious extracts from the speeches of Abraham Lincoln, W. H. Seward, Wendell Phillips, Wm. Lloyd Garrison, and from the editorial writings of the Chicago *Tribune* and the N. Y. *Tribune*, and many other leading supporters of the present Administration, that they were all original secessionists and disunion men, we propose now to give the evidence that Mr. Lincoln himself has, within the last three months, been concerned in a movement to make peace with Jeff. Davis, on

terms involving the direct proposal to divide the Union and let the South go.

Two Republican self-appointed commissioners recently went to Richmond, with Mr. Lincoln's permission, to attempt to make peace with Jeff. Davis and the South. These commissioners were Messrs. Gilmore and Jacquess.

Mr. Gilmore first went to Washington, and had two interviews with Mr. Lincoln, and, in his report, Mr. G. says of Mr. Lincoln:

"He told me, in a clear, direct way, the terms he would give the Rebels. A portion of these terms have since been included in the amnesty proclamation; the rest *I do not feel at liberty to make public.*"

Mr. Gilmore was then authorized to communicate these private views to Mr. Jacquess. Subsequently these two men were permitted by Mr. Lincoln, with authority under his own hand, to go to Richmond to see Mr. Davis, and on their own account only, without consulting Mr. Lincoln, to talk about a plan of settlement. When in Richmond, Messrs. Gilmore and Jacquess sent the following note to Mr. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State:

"SPOTTSWOOD HOUSE, RICHMOND, VA.,
"July 17, 1864.

"Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, Secretary of State, &c.

"DEAR SIR: The undersigned respectfully solicit an interview with President Davis.

"They visit Richmond only as private citizens, and have no official character or authority; "*but they are acquainted with the views of the United States Government* and with the sentiments of the Northern people relative to an adjustment of the differences existing between the North and the South, and *earnestly hope that a free interchange of views between President Davis and themselves may open the way to such official negotiations as will result in restoring* PEACE *to the two sections of our distracted country.*

"They therefore ask an interview with the President, and, awaiting your reply, are,

"Truly, and respectfully, yours,
"JAMES F. JACQUESS, of Illinois.
"JAMES R. GILMORE, of Massachusetts."

We have seen how these men were authorized to say that they knew Mr. Lincoln's views. Their proposals therefore were, of course, in accord with his views. What was the proposal? Read it, as they themselves state that they laid it before Davis:

"Suppose the two Governments should agree to something like this: To go to the people with two propositions, say peace, with disunion and Southern independence, as your proposition—and peace, with union, emancipation, no confiscation, and universal amnesty, as ours. Let the citizens of all the United States (as they existed before the war) vote 'yes' or 'no,' on these two propositions, at a special election within sixty days. If a majority votes disunion, our Government to be bound by it, and to let you go in peace. If a majority, union, yours to be bound by it, and to stay in peace. The two Governments can contract in this way, and the people, though constitutionally unable to decide on peace or war, can elect which of the two propositions shall govern their rulers. *Let Lee and Grant, meanwhile, agree to an armistice. This would sheathe the sword; and, if once sheathed, it would never again be drawn by this generation.*'

Here we have Lincoln's plan! Armistice and disunion in so many words! We ask the solemn consideration of the American people to the facts here revealed by the confidential friends of Mr. Lincoln.

1. Mr. Lincoln told Mr. Gilmore "*in a clear, direct way,* the terms he would give the rebels."

2. Mr. Gilmore was permitted by Mr. Lincoln to communicate those views to Mr. Jacquess.

3. These two men were permitted to go South a pass in Mr. Lincoln's own hand, to have an int view with Jeff. Davis.

4. They gave a written pledge to the rebel "Pr ident" that they were in possession of the views the United States Government, in respect to ter of peace.

5. They laid their "views" before Mr. Davis, a these embraced: first, an armistice; and second DISUNION, OR UNION WITH ABOLITION, as the o question between the parties.

6. These men spoke of Davis as PRESIDENT DAV and of all negotiations as between TWO GOVE MENTS.

If the Democratic convention at Chicago had corporated a proposition so monstrous into its pl form, it would have been condemned as high treas by the indignant voice of every loyal man in t land; and yet Mr. Lincoln's party pretend to horrified at the idea of "a cessation of hostilities It is this proposal which the friends of Mr. Linc assured Mr. Davis to be the views of Mr. Linco which they were put in possession of before th came to Richmond by his permission!

Mr. Lincoln is therefore pledged by his friends this treasonable proposition. We have only to tha Jeff. Davis that the infamous proposal was not cepted!

If it had been accepted by him, where would be to-day? The South would vote for disunion a independence, and the abolition disunionists of t North would vote for disunion, as they are pledg to do, and as Mr. Lincoln knew they would, a thus a majority of the people would decide to d solve the Union and let the Southern Confeders become an accomplished fact.

This was the proposition made by the comm sioners who went to Richmond in full possession the views of the present Administration! We shri with horror from contemplating the gulf into whi the country was on the verge of being plunged!

But with the same disunion men in power, wi the same determination to divide the country unl they can secure universal abolition, we are expos to the same dangers every day, and God only kno in what unlucky hour our ruin may be consummate

Mark how Mr. Lincoln constantly keeps up t idea of negotiating only with Jefferson Davis. Wh does he never address himself to the people, or t States of the South? He can treat with people with States. But no, he disfranchises the peopl declares the States dead, and proposes to treat f union and abolition, or for disunion and indepen ence, with Jeff. Davis and only with him. Compa his policy with McClellan's expression of readine to receive any State when its people offer to subm to the Union. Mr. Lincoln declares the Union a ready dissolved. He regards the States as dead an gone. He magnifies and strengthens the position o the Richmond dynasty by everything he does. H recognizes Davis substantially from day to day.

It is time for all good men to pause and solemnl ask themselves if the destinies of our country ough to be again intrusted to the keeping of men who ar disunionists at heart, and have already offered t betray the Union.

Whoever loves his *country* more than *party* wi vote to expel disunion from the Government, and t put the helm into the hands of one who will guid the Ship of State into the port of UNION AND PEACE

Document No. 13.

SOLD at 13 PARK ROW, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices.

MR. LINCOLN'S ARBITRARY ARRESTS.

The Acts which the Baltimore Platform Approves.

THE Baltimore platform, on which Abraham Lincoln is presented to the people as a candidate for their election to the Presidency, approves all that he has done, specifically commending all his course.

If elected on that platform, he will regard it as a distinct verdict of the people in his favor, and will perpetuate his course as part of the American system of government. He will continue the same acts, will govern the country with the same autocratic will, and for years to come the constitutional guaranties of life, liberty, and property by which alone AMERICAN LIBERTY exists, will be disregarded and trampled under foot.

What are the acts which Abraham Lincoln has done, and which his party, by their Baltimore platform, propose to perpetuate in this country?

When the war began, the people of the North rose as one man to the defence of their constitution. There was no shadow of excuse for considering the North, or any one State in the North, as disloyal. On the contrary, Democrats and Republicans in every State poured out their money by millions and sent their men by crowds to the support of the flag. Yet, in the very beginning of the contest, the will of Abraham Lincoln was made the only law of the citizens' liberty, and a system of arbitrary and despotic seizure and imprisonment was inaugurated, which has continued up to the present month of September, 1864.

A calm review of the facts would astound every reader. Before the close of 1861 the name of American had become a scoff instead of an honor in all Europe. The people of Austria and Russia heard with indignant astonishment of a system of tyranny in existence in America which rivalled all their own memories of the worst of their monarchs. While liberty was advancing with gigantic strides in other parts of the world, she veiled her face and left the Western continent. But not forever! God grant not forever! Four years of such oppression and wrong have been enough for a people educated in 1776, and blessed as we have been from that time to 1860.

True, there was civil war and rebellion in the land. But it is equally true that the violation of constitution and law by Southern rebellion was no excuse for the violation by Northern authority. Law makers ought never to be law breakers. If Mr. Lincoln had guarded constitution and law, exhibiting to rebels and to the world the grandeur of a free people observing their own laws while they exacted obedience from others; if he had offered to the rebels in arms the firm, unsullied strength of the Constitution as the measure of their duty and his requirements, we might have expected to see them turn to it with longing, after a vain experiment of war. Instead of that, he crushed down the North to obedience of his own will, and then demanded of the South submission to the same will, enunciated in autocratic proclamations. Read the simple words of the AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:

[From the Amendments.]

ARTICLE THE FOURTH. *The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,* and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ARTICLE THE FIFTH. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, *unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,* except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-

pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, *nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law;* nor shall *private property* be taken for public use, without just compensation.

ARTICLE THE SIXTH. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury* of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and *to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation*; *to be confronted with the witnesses against him;* to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and *to have the assistance of counsel* for his defence.

ARTICLE THE EIGHT. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

And now read a brief sketch of some of the acts of Abraham Lincoln. We say brief, for a library of volumes would be necessary to describe all the cases. We have preserved with great care all accounts which came under our notice; and we have lying before us as we write (now in the hands of the Democratic campaign committee) particulars of more than one thousand cases, and brief mention, without particulars, of more cases than we could count without long labor, of arbitrary seizures and imprisonment of free citizens:

From a careful record made up from Townsend's Cyclopædia of the Rebellion—a work, containing, in some fifty volumes, a very full history of every event in the war—the following was compiled for the *N. Y. Mercury:*

Daniel Fish and Doctor Sabet, both of New York, were the first men arrested in the North by the order of the State Department, April 24, 1861, immediately after the fall of Fort Sumter. Up to November 30, 1861, a little more than seven months, 351 persons had been arrested and incarcerated by order of Mr. Seward, whose names are known and registered in *Townsend's Encyclopedia of the Great Rebellion.* In the same time, 150 are known to have been arrested at the instance of the same department, whose names have not been retained. Probably we shall never know the number of arrests made in the last three years. The record, if published, would be staggering. No usurpation in the history of the world would exhibit such astounding statistics. In several places of Mr. Townsend's book long lists of names of persons released appear. In many cases upward of a hundred names being transcribed at once—and the names of none of these were ever published when arrested. Hence they must have been spirited away, locked up without any trial whatever, and their friends probably knew nothing of their whereabouts, until, by one of Mr. Seward's arbitrary bulletins, they appeared out of jail. There cannot have been less than ten thousand State prisoners made by order of Lincoln and Seward since the opening of hostilities, and the number is probably more nearly three times that figure. How many of these ten thousand have had hearings? With the privilege of the *habeas corpus* set aside, with the judges overawed by the marshals or the soldiery, with Mr. Seward's "little bell," standing at his right hand to incarcerate some wretched being at every touch, how many men have gone into dungeons for a spite, a whim, or a lie? Has General Stone ever had a trial? He is now battling for the Union; but they have never taken the stigma of a long imprisonment from his name.

Great numbers of females appear among the incarcerated. In many cases there seems to have been no ground for the arrest, but an anonymous letter, some private gossip, or the allegation of a single office holder, whose severe ideas of loyalty would probably consign any political opponent to the penitentiary.

This record does not include many cases in our own collections. Great secrecy was observed by the Administration, and it was not easy to procure information.

All these seizures, in each and every instance, were made by order of Abraham Lincoln, without warrant, accusation, or authority of law, in the peaceful States of the North. In no one instance of all these has a man been brought to trial in any court. In no one instance has an accusation been filed, or an indictment obtained.

The writ of HABEAS CORPUS was first violated, and obedience to it refused, by Mr. Lincoln, in the case of JOHN MERRYMAN, in 1861. Mr. Lincoln had no color of authority for this at that time. His own party admitted his usurpation long afterward, and after hundreds of like cases had occurred, by passing an act of Congress (*ex post facto*) to save him from the consequences of his arbitrary use of power. The Merryman case brought out a decision from the venerable Judge TANEY, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, a loyal man of the best days of the Republic. Judge TANEY, boldly, and with a majesty that will long be remembered in history, announced his views as follows, from the bench:

I ordered the attachment yesterday, because upon the face of the return the detention of the prisoner was unlawful, upon two grounds:

First—The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize any military officer to do so.

Second—A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person, nor subject him to the rules and articles of war for an offence against the laws of the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority and subject to its control, and if the party is arrested by the military, it is the duty of the officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.

I forbore yesterday to state orally the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which make these principles the fundamental law of the Union, because an oral statement might be misunderstood in some portions of it, and I shall therefore put my opinion in writing, and file it in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, in the course of this week.

The Judge added that the military authority was always subordinate to civil; that, under ordinary circumstances, it would be the duty of the Marshal to proceed with *posse comitatus*, and bring the party named in the writ into court: but from the

notoriously superior force that he would encounter this would be impossible. He said the Marshal had done all in his power to discharge his duty.

During the week he should prepare his opinion in the premises, and forward it to the President, calling upon him to perform his constitutional duty, and see that the laws be faithfully executed, and enforce the decrees of this court.

The radical press at once attacked this noble old judge with torrents of abuse. They called him traitor in every radical newspaper in the land. The court was vilified. The intent of the party to make their one-man law superior to Constitution and right, was then confessed. They determined to crush the Supreme Court. They declared its authority inferior to Mr. Lincoln's military power. The *N. Y. Tribune*, on the 1st June, 1861, thus ridiculed the writ of *habeas corpus*, and threatened with vengeance the defenders of that noble writ of personal liberty:

The thin varnish of extemporized and lukewarm patriotism, with which two or three of our city contemporaries attempt to conceal their chronic sympathy with treason and rebellion, is easily seen through by loyal eyes. Let them not flatter themselves that anybody who knows them doubts for a moment that they are as much friends of the Southern rebels now, as they were five, yea, even three months ago—only the North having risen almost as one man to save the republic from utter wreck, those admirers of Davis, Hunter, Toombs, Mason & Co., dare not so openly exhibit it now as then.

Among the most insidious of these sympathizers is *The Journal of Commerce*. It seems to be the special champion of Judge Taney and the writ of *habeas corpus*. It is evident that it does not understand the character and objects of either of them. We pass over the writ. It can take care of itself.

Last winter, when the rebellion began to assume formidable dimensions, some persons in and near Washington kept a strict watch upon certain suspected officials and prominent politicians. Among those thus carefully observed were some of the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States. Facts are in possession of gentlemen of the highest character, which would authorize the prompt arrest of two or three of those Judges on charges of treason. The time not having arrived for proceeding in this matter, and, in fact the rebellion having gone on with such rapid strides as to get almost beyond the necessity of doing it, this serious matter remains in *statu quo*.

We tell the over-zealous champions of the Judges of the Supreme Court, that they had better be quiet.—*June* 1, 1861, *N. Y. Tribune*.

The madness which culminates in the Baltimore platform, took possession of them. Then followed countless instances of the refusal of Mr. Lincoln to allow the WRIT of liberty. Fort Lafayette, in New York harbor, a dismal, damp fortress, surrounded by water, was selected as the American bastile. Fort Warren, in Boston harbor, Fort McHenry, at Baltimore, the old Capitol prison, in Washington, and numerous other dungeons, one often another, were crowded with victims.

On the 20th day of July, 1861, Fort Lafayette opened its doors to the first political prisoner, Mr. E. S. Ruggles, of Fredericksburg, Virginia. Mr. Ruggles was alone for seven days, when Dr. Johnson, of Baltimore, joined him there. On the last day of July, seven persons had taken up their residence inside the fort, and from that time the number rapidly increased. The *Evening Post*, of Sept. 21st, 1861, contained a list of eighty-eight names of prisoners who had at that time been committed to the fort.

Mr. Lincoln at length issued an order to all policemen in the country, commanding their services in his lawless seizures. Wherever they were under Republican officers they obeyed. State machinery was thus subjected to his will. The police of New York city lent willing aid. The police stations were crowded with prisoners. Men of every station in life were brought up, tortured in CELL NUMBER FOUR (of which we shall give a description), and hurried off to Fort Lafayette, or elsewhere. At once began the same system pursued in France under the Reign of Terror. A high official at Washington informed us that Mr. Seward had received many thousands of letters accusing individuals of disloyalty, and recommending their arrest. Every radical politician seized the opportunity to persecute his Democratic neighbors. The same officer informed us that one clergyman in central New York had written more than thirty letters within two months, each letter containing a list of Democrats in his neighborhood whom he wished arrested, and that his letters grew more and more frantic from day to day, begging that he might be authorized to arrest them himself. "Democrat" was considered synonymous with "traitor."

Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Seward, Mr. Cameron, and subsequently Mr. Stanton, entered heart and soul into this crusade against political opponents. Men were seized at all hours of the day and night. The writ of *habeas corpus* was refused. Examinations were refused. Then followed the most infamous order on record in a free government. Mr. Seward proclaimed and caused to be read to the prisoners in Fort Lafayette his ukase, that *the employment of counsel by any prisoner would be regarded as a circumstance against him*, and forbidding any man to employ counsel! Not only were the laws suspended, but the miserable victims of tyranny were forbidden to enquire what the laws were, or had been in better days. We insert just here that most terrible record against Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of State. It was read on the 3d of Dec. 1861, by the commanding officer at Fort Lafayette, to the prisoners there:

TO THE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN FORT LAFAYETTE.

I am instructed by the Secretary of State, to inform you that the De-

partment of State of the United States *will not recognize any one as an attorney for political prisoners*, and will look with distrust upon all applications for release through such channels; and that such applications will be regarded *as additional reason for declining to release the prisoners*. And further, that if such prisoners wish to make any communication to Government, they are at liberty to make it directly to the State Department.

SETH C. HAWLEY.

And yet, in the face of this order, and this merciful offer to hear the prayers of prisoners, their letters were returned unopened—all their appeals were utterly vain—and to-day, men are languishing in those prisons, who have lain for three years, forgotten by all the world except their mourning families! Read the following, and compare it with Mr. Seward's promise to receive the communications of prisoners:

WAR DEPARTMENT, OCTOBER 4, 1861.

SIR; I acknowledge the receipt of a communication from Colonel Martin Burke, inclosing a letter from E. B. Schnabel, a prisoner at Fort Lafayette.

The person referred to is the son of a very worthy gentleman, a citizen of Pennsylvania, known to me for many years. He was educated at Princeton College, where he exhibited considerable talent. He came back to Pennsylvania, and has been "living on his wits" ever since. He is a man, I am sorry to say, of no character, *and I have no desire to open any communication from him; I therefore return the communication forwarded by Colonel Martin Burke, unopened.*

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

Lieut.-General W. SCOTT, General-in-Chief.

Was ever a more tyrannical letter written, or one more cowardly?

All avenues of help seemed closed; even public appeal was denied, for in September, 1861, the following order was issued in New York by the Superintendent of Police, subject to a resolution passed at a meeting of the Board of Police Commissioners:

GENERAL ORDER No. 275.

Resolved, That inasmuch as the publication of arrests and the attendant circumstances has caused serious embarrassment to the Departments, and has frustrated the attempts to arrest persons guilty of offences against the Government, that all information of arrests by members of the force, except such as is entered on the daily returns, be strictly forbidden, and that any violation of this rule will be deemed a cause for dismissal.—*Sept.* 18, 1861.

The Cabinet was in high glee. The Washington people, under Mr. Lincoln's facetious administration, thought the whole system a good joke. They went into it as great fun. The radical press throughout the country was jovial over the new plan. For example: the New York *Times* (under the editorship of the chief manager of the Baltimore convention and chairman of the Republican National Committee) gave this funny incident at Washington:

AN UNEXPECTED ARREST.

A singular instance of the adroitness of our authorities here in dealing with suspected persons occurred this morning at the Provost Marshal's office. A person, well known here as connected with a claim-agency broken up by the Government, presented himself, and desired a permit to see some friends confined in the Old Capitol. Upon hearing the name, the clerk looked up and said, "Yes, certainly"—proceeding at once to write it out. The gentleman received his permit, and upon presenting it at the Capitol, was ordered into a cell, and informed by the guard that he had brought with him an order for his own commitment.

The following extracts from papers will show the manner in which the system was built up and carried on. The New York *Tribune* of April 19th, 1861, contained the following paragraph:

MARK THE TRAITORS.

There are a few as genuine traitors scattered over the country as ever went lurking among honest men. It is not proposed to hang this class of sympathizers with rebellion, but it is proposed to mark, and, so far as it is possible, to withdraw all intercourse and trade with them. In short, to leave them alone in their glory. This course has been adopted in Mount Vernon, Westchester County. A brawling secessionist tavern keeper heads the list which the patriots are filling up as fast as the sentiments of the wretches are discovered. As soon as it is complete it will be published as the "blacklist of Mt. Vernon." Let the same plan be pursued in every town, village and neighborhood, and post the names in public places—so that the public may know who are open-mouthed shameless traitors, and let them be avoided by all patriotic citizens. * * Put their names on the "black list."

It was not long before the plan of "letting traitors alone in their glory," was dropped. The *Tribune* of Sept. 4, 1861, contained the following paragraph:

"FERRETING OUT TRAITORS.

The system of detective police adopted by Government is bearing the happiest fruits. Every day, for some time past, we have recorded the arrest of Southern spies and agents, and the confiscation of rebel property. * * * Every day the authorities are flooded with communications, authenticated and *anonymous*, respecting transient or permanent Southern residents. Frequently, the denunciations spring from petty malice or personal hatred, and the officers, after following up supposed important cases, for days and nights together, have finally become convinced of the innocence and loyalty of the suspected persons.

It should be considered the duty of all loyal citi-

zens to aid in the discovery and arrest of real traitors by denouncing them to the United States Marshal. Marshal Murray has collected about him a number of the most intelligent, experienced, and shrewd detectives in the country—two of whom have recently 'worked up' some of their cases with marvellous good judgment and dexterity."

Two days after, Sept. 6, 1861, the *Tribune* announced, through its Washington correspondent, as follows:

"FLIGHT OF TRAITORS.

"While information by telegraph is lodged against suspected traitors with the State Department here, and replies framed and returned, and while the final orders for arrest are being made in Washington, the guilty birds are often on the wing. The Government desires the coöperation of patriots all over the country. Arrests should be promptly made of the guilty, and by local action, without waiting for the motion from Washington."

The same day the radical papers announce that—

"EIGHT HUNDRED names are entered on the books of the secret political police in New York, of persons suspected of treason, and many arrests will be made."

The Hartford *Courant* of the same day says:

"A large number of arrests are daily made at the North, the number averaging ten or twelve a day. These are made generally on complaints lodged with the Departments in Washington. The Government is somewhat annoyed and astonished that petty cases of treason should be sent there for consideration. Any MILITARY COMMANDER CAN COMMIT FOR TREASONABLE ACTS, and the local officers should promptly act themselves, when there is necessity for so doing."

A few days before, the *Courant* had published the following:

"Government is considering the propriety of organizing a National Detective Police Force. New York, St. Louis, Chicago, and other cities, were represented in the conference. The plan is to have agents distributed through the country, forming a network of surveillance, through whose meshes secret traitors will find it hard to escape. The detective force in Washington is largely increased by recruits from New York and Philadelphia. The results are daily becoming apparent."

From the *Tribune* of Sept. 21st, 1861:

"IMPARTIAL OFFICIAL VIGILANCE.

"So long as the ends of justice can be compassed, Marshal Murray seems to care little what work he prosecutes. A while ago he was ferreting out slave captains and crews, and made himself a terror to the guilty men, while for some weeks past he has hunted down traitors, seized the property of the disloyal, and effectually broken up the secret cabals and agencies engaged in furthering the dirty work of J. Davis and Co. The moral effect of his vigorous arrest of traitors has been wonderful. A real panic seems to have seized upon them, and there is not a secret sympathizer with the rebels who has not either fled the city, or, if remaining, is not trembling lest his turn should come next. We have reason to know that certain parties in very high station among us who were liable to attainder, and who were actually *preparing* (?) to send important intelligence to the enemy, have left the city between two days to escape arrest."

From the *Tribune*, July 23d, 1862:

"CAUTION TO TRAITORS IN OUR MIDST.

"*Wilkes' Spirit* says: 'We are informed that the Commissioners of Police have been industriously engaged for some time past in forming lists of all persons of secession principles and doubtful loyalty, who, at present, infest the community. The whole force of the Department has been secretly employed in this good work, and the use to be made of it will probably be to direct the Government when drafting shall commence, where to go for its first levy. Information as to disloyal persons is solicited by the Department from all good persons.'"

The newspapers teemed with violent attacks on individuals. Men, women, and children were accused in radical papers. Hundreds of good citizens, of Democratic principles, were thus attacked. Every encouragement was given to the business of denouncing and seizing all who opposed the abolition policy. Every man who ventured to oppose that policy was at once accused of treason, or of discouraging enlistments, or of some other offence. Abolitionists were not interfered with. The Boston *Liberator* continued to flaunt its motto: "*The Constitution is a league with death and a covenant with hell;*" but Mr. Lincoln did not object to that. Abolitionists advocated disunion, but were not arrested.

CLERGYMEN WERE SEIZED WHILE AT PRAYER AT THE ALTAR, ON THE MORNING OF THE SABBATH DAY.

TO THE PUBLIC.

A scene occurred in St. Paul's Church, Alexandria, Virginia, on Sunday morning, February 9th, 1862, which has, perhaps, never had a parallel among civilized nations, certainly not in the history of this country. The officiating minister, Rev. K. J. Stewart, had just got through the Morning Prayer of the Episcopal Church as far as the Litany, the prayer for the President being *omitted*, but without anything in its place, and was proceeding with the Litany, when an interruption occurred of the character which the law designates as "brawling"—that is, the intervention of noise and tumult by certain persons, who had come to the church with the intention of interrupting the service, should it not proceed according to their wishes. These persons commenced the disturbance as soon as they found the prayer for the President omitted. One of them, Captain Farnsworth, of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, who sat near the chancel, dressed in uniform, with some five or six of his soldiers near him, undertook to officiate in prayer (if prayer it can be called) by reading the prayer for the President of the United States. How far he went in it does not appear in the confusion, but soon quitting his position as the offerer of prayer, he advanced to the altar where Mr. Stewart was kneeling, still continuing the Litany, and ordered his arrest. Mr. Stewart was dragged from his knees by the soldiers. The ground of the arrest Captain Farnsworth distinctly avowed to be the *omission of*

the prayer for the President of the United States. With this avowal, he said, "I arrest you by the authority of the United States, as a rebel and a traitor."—"And I," responded Mr. Stewart, who by this time had advanced to the chancel rails, to Capt. F., "summon you to answer at the judgment seat of the King of kings and Lord of lords for interfering, by force of arms, with His ambassador, while in the act of presenting the petitions of His people at His altar." The solemnity of this appeal apparently caused the parties to fall back and pause; but soon the soldiers were ordered to seize Mr. Stewart, which two of them did with great violence, forcing the prayer-book from his hands, one of them drawing a revolver. Another revolver was presented to an old and venerated citizen within the chancel, when the officer ordered the soldier not to fire. Very soon a considerable number of armed soldiers appeared in the church. Mr. Stewart, refusing to yield voluntarily, was dragged by force from the altar, and through the aisle, out of the church. He was in the surplice, which he wore through the streets, and at Col. Farnsworth's quarters, where he was taken.

Capt. Farnsworth said that he went to church intending to arrest Mr. Stewart if he should offer any prayer for the Confederate States. Near him, in the same pew, sat Mr. Morton, the "detective" agent of the United States government, who there gave orders to Captain Farnsworth to make the arrest, which was executed as above described. Mr. Morton has declared that he was acting under authority from Washington. The scene in the church was such as may be imagined under such circumstances. Gentlemen were indignant and excited, and ladies giving utterance to their feelings of grief and indignation; but, of course, no serious effort was made to prevent the arrest. Mr. Stewart was taken away, and the congregation dispersed.

It is proper to state that these proceedings were without the knowledge of Gen. Montgomery, the Military Governor of the city, and were strongly condemned by him when they came to his knowledge. He telegraphed to Washington for instructions from the government, which, when received, were of such a nature as to lead to Mr. Stewart's release, after a few hours' detention.

The issues involved in the transaction, thus imperfectly sketched, are too grave to admit of comment. It will, however, be well to state that Mr. Stewart only insists upon the rights of all ambassadors to communicate with their King, untrammelled by civil or military interference, and that in no case have any of the services of this church assumed a political aspect; no prayer has been offered, and no sentiment advanced at any time that was calculated to offend even the most sensitive critic; but public worship is interrupted, soldiers invade the chancel, and with drawn revolvers drag the minister of religion from its altar, because he will not do their bidding. The undersigned were present in church, and testify to the facts as above stated. It may be proper to state that by request of the vestry, in the absence of their rector, the Rev. George A. Smith and Rev. Mr. Stewart have been officiating in St. Paul's Church for several weeks past, and that Mr. Smith was in the chancel at the time these occurrences took place.

John West,	George A. Smith,
P. A. Clagett,	Cassius F. Lee,
James Green,	Stoney G. Miller,
Isaac Winston,	A. H. Currie,
Thomas W. Swann,	John A. Dixon,
James Entwistle,	W. H. Marbury,
Lewis Hooff,	Townsend D. Fendall,
Charles R. Hooff,	Albert E. Bassford,
J. D. Corse,	Edward C. Fletcher,
Stephen A. Green,	George H. Smoot,
S. F. Gregory,	J. J. Wheat,
John F. Dyer,	W. A. Harper,
George T. Baldwin,	Nathaniel Boush.

Other clergymen, over one hundred in all, were seized, in many instances *on the complaint of abolitionist clergymen.* We remind readers of a few cases:

Rev. F. Mercer, Nov., 1863; Rev. F. Gibson, Sept., 1863; Rev. Mr. Martin, April, 1863; Rev. Peyton Harrison, Aug., 1863; Rev. Lewis T. Jessup, Nov., 1862; Rev. Mr. Mitchell, Nov., 1861 (seized in church just before commencing service); Rev. T. N. Conrad, Aug., 1862; Rev. Mr. Brookes (Ohio), July, 1862; Rev. Mr. Hoyt (Ohio), July, 1862; Rev. J. W. R. Handy, July, 1863; Rev. Aug. McConnomy, Sept., 1863; Rev. James O'Reilly, Sept., 1863; Rev. James L. Vallandigham, July, 1863 (arrested on account of his name); Rev. J. J. Stein, Oct., 1862; Rev. Mr. Henkle, Dec., 1863; Rev. Geo. W. Henning, Oct., 1862; Rev. James D. Armstrong, March, 1864 (put to work on fortifications by Butler); Rev. S. H. Wingfield, March, 1864 (put to cleaning streets by Butler); Rev. G. M. Baine, March, 1864 (put to hard labor by Butler); Rev. John H. Dashiel, Feb., 1863; Rev. C. A. Hall, Oct., 1862; Rev. Judson D. Benedict, Sept., 1862; Rev. Henry M. Painter, July, 1861; Rev. I. M. Todd, Feb., 1864; Rev. Dr. McPheeters, March, 1863 (a case of almost unparalleled injustice and wrong.

[We pause in this list only for want of room.]

JUDGES WERE SEIZED AND IMPRISONED FOR JUDICIAL DECISIONS RENDERED ON THE BENCH.

There is not on record in civilized nations a more clear and manifest attempt to destroy the purity of the bench by interposing the power of a tyrannical autocracy than was exhibited in the treatment of judges. We cite the case of Judge Constable, of Illinois, arrested for a calm and correct judicial opinion, rendered in the court of which he is an honored judge.

[*From the Burlington Sentinel, March* 27, 1863.]

THE ARREST OF JUDGE CONSTABLE.

We do not propose to discuss the merits of this the latest evidence of the character of the times in which we are living, and of the men who rule us. A simple statement of the facts in the case is sufficient to induce us to cast about us, and inquire if it be really in the American Republic rather than within the realms of the Czar that such scenes are enacted. The facts to which we allude took place on the 13th inst. They are thus briefly set forth by a city cotemporary:

"While the Circuit Court of Clark county, in Illinois, was in session, a woman appeared before a justice of the peace, and made oath that two per-

sons from Indiana were attempting to kidnap her son upon the charge that he was a deserter from the Federal army. The justice thereupon issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused persons. They were brought before him, and at the request of their counsel the case was carried before the Circuit Court. Judge Constable of that court heard the case. It was established that a commission was in the possession of the accused authorizing two persons named 'to arrest deserters' in a certain district of the State of Indiana. It was not shown that the accused were the two persons named in this commission. Upon this, neither the question of desertion nor the persons of any alleged deserters being before him, Judge Constable held the accused to bail to answer for the crime of attempted kidnapping in the State of Illinois.

"These proceedings having been taken, Major-General Wright, military commander in the Indiana district, sent an officer under his orders, with a force of two hundred men, into the State of Illinois, arrested Judge Constable, and conveyed him out of that State to answer to the charge of 'harboring and protecting deserters.'"

This is the most serious outrage yet attempted upon personal freedom. The courts of law have always been looked to by the people as the great shield and safeguard against wrong or injustice committed by the executive upon the people. When this great protection is withdrawn, when the decisions of the judiciary are set aside as naught, and the persons of our judicial officers become the victims of administrative tyranny and violence, we may well feel that not only the substance but the form even of republican spirit and government has fled from amongst us.

We again say that this is but one instance among many. The attempt to suppress courts of law and justice by frightening judges was happily unsuccessful in the main, and we may point to a long list of able opinions of learned jurists, condemning the administration, and pronouncing its acts lawless and revolutionary. But, alas for Americans! the decrees of the courts were powerless, and they could not free the citizen from the grasp of radical persecution. Cases occurred, as in the instance of Rev. Mr. Benedict at Buffalo, where the United States Judge declared the accused free from stain, and ordered his release; but the United States Marshal, in the very presence of the Judge, refused to discharge the prisoner, seized him again in the court room, transported him from prison to prison, till he finally lodged him in the Old Capitol prison at Washington, under the very eye of Abraham Lincoln. Thus courts were defied, and law trampled on at the order of the President, who pretended to be enforcing the laws.

Judge Andrew H. Duff, one of the Circuit Judges of Illinois, was seized and taken to Washington, kept for months in prison, and finally discharged; no crime of any sort being found in him.

LADIES WERE SEIZED AND IMPRISONED, SUBJECTED TO NAMELESS INSULTS, FORBIDDEN THE VISITS OF FRIENDS, HURRIED FROM PRISON TO PRISON, AND MOST FOULLY TREATED BY THE OFFICERS OF MR. LINCOLN.

We recall the Brinsmade case. It has been almost forgotten in the rush of this fierce time. The following is from a statement made by her counsel to Simeon Draper, Esq., before the circumstances were fully known. It is accurately true in every sentence:

About two months since Mrs. Brinsmade, the wife of Dr. Brinsmade, a young lady of about twenty years of age, having a pass from Gen. Butler, arrived in this city from New Orleans, having been placed by the father, Theodore A. James, Esq., a highly respectable merchant of that city, in the charge of Dr. Phelps, one of the surgeons of the steamer upon which he had secured her passage.

She brought letters from her father to Messrs. J. D. Scott & Co., and other gentlemen of this city. Upon her arrival here she was accompanied to the Everett House by an invalid naval officer, who had been requested by Commodore Morris, at New Orleans, to protect and assist her.

Mrs. Brinsmade's object in visiting the North, was to reside with her uncles, one of them in Washington, the other in Troy. She remained a few days in this city and Brooklyn, and then went to Washington, where, after remaining four days, she was arrested by Marshal Baker, who kept her a close prisoner for four days, carefully guarded.

Some ten days after she left this city for Washington, a hackman called on one of her friends in New York, and said that a lady was brought on in the train of the previous night by a detective from Washington, and conveyed to the 47th street police station, and that her name was Mrs. Brinsmade.

An immediate application was made to Mr. Kennedy for the cause of her arrest, and for permission to see her. This was rudely refused by Mr. Kennedy, who threatened to lock up the applicant if the inquiry was repeated.

Another friend of Mrs. Brinsmade then saw a deputy marshal, and was informed that she could only be seen by permission of Mr. Kennedy. He stated that she was confined in the 47th street station house; that she was a giddy, foolish, secesh woman, who had been singing secesh songs; that it was thought best to send her home to her father, at New Orleans, and that she would sail in a day or two, but that no one would be allowed to see her.

With this assurance her friends were forced to be contented.

Thirty-five days afterward a letter was received by one of her friends, stating that she was still a close prisoner in the 47th street station house.

Application was at once made to you. Her friends were informed that you knew nothing of her case; that you would at once address the proper authority at Washington for information, and, if in your power, would release her.

Pending this correspondence, two ladies, the wives of two of our most reputable merchants, who had been for many years the neighbors and friends of Mrs. Brinsmade, called upon Mr. Kennedy for permission to see her.

They asked "What were the charges against her, and who were her accusers?"

Mr. Kennedy, in his usual manner, answered, "I, madam, am her accuser. She is a general spy. From the moment she set her foot in this city, my presence overshadowed her. I did not leave her a moment. She went to Brooklyn to visit her friends. I watched her, and when she returned to the Everett House, I watched her there. She went to Washington, and when I got her in the right place I arrested her and brought her back here, and put her where she is."

In reply to the inquiry if there was no more proper place for the confinement of this lady than a police station, he said, "No, that was the place for her. That her whole conduct on board ship indicated that she was a spy, and that she ought to be hung;—that a thoughtless, giddy *thing* like her, and the one who was arrested a few days since in Washington, who was making a wagon of herself, carrying quinine to the rebels, were the very ones to be employed as spies, and that they all ought to be hung."

In reply to the inquiry as to whether she was to be kept shut up where she then was, and had been for five weeks, and her friends unable to see her, or know where she was, he replied, "That is with the Department."

Through your kind intervention, after this long confinement, this lady was on Monday restored to her friends.

OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT,
NEW YORK, *Nov. 10th*, 1862.

DEAR SIR:—In reply to yours of the 8th inst., I can only state that up to the 29th ulto., I had no knowledge whatever with regard to Mrs. Brinsmade's case. On that day Mrs. Elliott called and informed me that she was under arrest, and inquired what was the cause.

I on the same day wrote to Washington, directing inquiry to be made of the Judge Advocate-General.

On the 1st inst., I was informed that the Judge Advocate-General knew nothing about the case.

Upon this, I asked Mr. Kennedy upon what authority he held her as a prisoner. He replied, that she was arrested and held by order of Col. Baker, the provost marshal of Washington. This I forwarded to Washington, and on the 3d inst., received from Col. Baker and the Assistant Secretary of War, information by telegraph to the effect that the arrest had been made by one of Mr. Kennedy's officers, and Mrs. Brinsmade was detained by him without authority from the War Department.

I then called upon Mr. Kennedy, received from him an order directing Mrs. Brinsmade's release, and went with it to the station house, took her from it, and placed her in charge of her friends.

The foregoing is all the information that I can give bearing on the subject.

Your obedient servant,
S. DRAPER, P. M. Gen'l.

It subsequently appeared, on the legal proceedings which were instituted in this case, that Mrs. Brinsmade was subjected to infamous proposals as the price of her release. For forty days she was in the power of the scoundrels who held her, in secret—unknown to the world or to her own friends. Here is part of her own testimony:

TESTIMONY OF MRS. ISABEL M. BRINSMADE.

Q. Where do you reside? A. In New Orleans. Q. Born there? A. Yes. Q. When did you leave it? A. On or about the 25th of August. Q. On what vessel? A. The Fulton. Q. For where? A. New York. Q. For what purpose? A. On purely personal business. Q. Who did you know on board ship? A. The captain and his wife, the surgeon, the purser, and one or two others. Q. When did you arrive in New York? A. On the 25th of September. Q. Where did you go? A. To the Everett House. Q. How long were you in New York? A. Eight or ten days. Q. Where did you then go? A. To Brooklyn. Q. Where did you there reside? A. With Mrs. O. T. Downs, in Bedford avenue. Q. Did you go from there to Washington? A. Yes. Q. Where did you stop there? A. With Mr. T. C. Downs, my father's uncle by marriage. Q. How long were you there? A. Four days. Q. Were you arrested? A. Yes. Q. By whom? A. By one Bowles and another officer. Q. What did Mr. Bowles say? A. That he arrested me by order of the provost marshal of Washington City, Col. Baker. Q. Did he take you away? A. Immediately. Q. Where? A. To Col. Baker's office. Q. Did he take your baggage? A. Yes, and papers, pictures, letters, and everything, and examined them. Q. What did Col. Baker say—what occurred on that examination when he examined your letters? Col. Baker told me he arrested me by order of the Secretary of War; that I was accused of being a rebel spy, having treasonable papers in my possession. My papers were examined and read, and he asked me what I came for. I told him private business. He then told me if I did not wish to go to New Orleans I should be sent to New York, and he pretended to the man Bowles, who had charge of me, that he would keep me as a prisoner at the St. Nicholas Hotel, as he had at Willard's, and that on Sunday he would release me. Q. Did he examine your private papers? A. Yes. Q. What did he say? A. He said there was no evidence to hold me. Q. What did he say about your letters? A. That they were very affectionate. Q. What did he say about your daguerreotypes? A. He said one or two were good-looking; and he proposed to keep them because they were good-looking. He promised me I should have my pictures the next day, because he had to show them to the Secretary of War before he gave them to me (laughter). Q. Well, you came on to New York in charge of Mr. Bowles? A. Yes; he brought me to Broome street in a carriage. Q. Who was Mr. Bowles? A. He told me he was employed in Mr. Baker's office, and would go back to the office in a few days. Q. What was Mr. Bowles's manner in escorting you to New York? A. He was exceedingly affectionate, and called me "My dear" and "Bella." Q. Had you ever seen him before? A. No, I never saw him before. Q. You were brought here to this office? A. Yes, I was brought to this station house on this corner. Q. What then was done? A. He got out of the carriage; he did not tell me what place it was, but said he must stop for some orders. The driver got down and I asked him wherever he drove me to tell me where it was, and to take a message to one of my friends in New York. Q. Where were you

taken then? A. To the Forty-seventh street station house. Q. You never saw Mr. Kennedy there, did you? A. Never saw him in my life, sir; I would not know him if I was to see him. Q. How long did Mr. Bowles remain there? A. For a week or ten days, taking me regularly to my meals at the next house; I saw the captain, policemen and sergeants in the house every day. Mr. Baker came after I had been in nearly two weeks, and told me he had come to release me. He said the Secretary of War and Mr. Kennedy had been very anxious to send me to New Orleans, but he had seen the Secretary of War and persuaded him he need not do so. He said he had put Mr. Kennedy off from time to time merely to please him (Mr. Kennedy) in that way, saying he would put me on a vessel, but it was only to satisfy him, because he was so anxious to have me go. Then he told me Mr. Kennedy asked him, when he arrived in New York, whether he had brought an order for my removal. He told Mr. Kennedy no, he had brought an order for my release. Mr. Kennedy wanted to serve it; he said no, he preferred to serve it himself.

Commissioner Bowen remarked that this was so important he would like to have it repeated for the better understanding of all.

Mrs. Brinsmade.—When he (Mr. Baker) came to the station house he told me he had got my release; the Secretary of War and Mr. Kennedy had both been anxious to send me to New Orleans, and he said he had persuaded the Secretary of War that it was not necessary, it was not worth while, or something of that kind; Mr. Kennedy had written to him repeatedly requesting an order to send me to New Orleans; he had told Mr. Kennedy to make inquiries about some ships that were leaving, but it was merely to please Mr. Kennedy, who was very anxious to send me away. Then he told me I would be released the next day; that he was going to Albany that night, and would be back at 9 or 12; when he came to New York, Mr. Kennedy asked him if he had brought an order to send me South. He (Mr. Baker) told him no, he had brought my release. Mr. Kennedy offered to serve it, but he (Baker) refused, saying he wanted to see me himself. He advised me to leave New York for a few days, because, if Mr. Kennedy knew where I was going, he would arrest me again (laughter). I asked this man Bowles, while I was in the station house, what was to be done with me. He said he did not know; he had his orders from the War Department. I frequently asked the officers for Mr. Kennedy, and the invariable reply was: "Mr. Kennedy can do nothing for you until he receives orders from Washington." Q. When Mr. Baker promised to let you out did he urge to remain in New York? A. He wanted me to go to Philadelphia with him. He said if I would go he knew where I could be safe. If I would go with him I would be safe, because then he could place me where neither Mr. Kennedy nor anybody else could arrest me again. Q. Who was captain in that station house? A. Captain Sloat. Q. He knew, of course, of your confinement? A. Yes. I always asked him when he went down to see if there was an order for my release. Q. Why were you arrested? A. Because I was a rebel spy. Q. Well, were you a rebel spy? A. No, sir.

Remark by Mr. Barlow.—She means because it was said she was a rebel spy.

Mrs. Brinsmade.—Certainly. Q. Were you guilty of any charges whatever; any political offence? A. No. I had not meddled with politics at all. It was disagreeable to me to live in New Orleans, and I wanted to come North. Q. After you came to New York, while you were in Brooklyn or Washington, did you send any message by telegraph or otherwise, or give any information to anybody whatever, having any bearing upon any political or military subject? A. No, sir. Q. None, whatever? A. No, sir. Q. Who told you you were a rebel spy? A. Mr. Baker. Q. If he thought you were a rebel spy how could he let you out and take you to Philadelphia? A. I do not know how he could do it, only he said he would do it. Q. With whom are you residing here now? A. With Mrs. John H. Elliot, in Twenty-third street.

By Mr. Barlow.—Are you a friend of Mrs. Elliot?

Mrs. Brinsmade.—Yes. I knew her when I was a very little girl. She resided in New Orleans. Q. What other friends have you here? A. Mrs. Converse, who also lives in Twenty-third street. She knew me when I was a young girl. Q. And has taken care of you since? A. Yes. Q. When you came away from New Orleans, did you come with permission of the Government? A. Yes. I came from New Orleans with a pass from a military commander. Q. You were put in the charge of Dr. Phelps, surgeon of the ship? A. Yes. Q. Had you letters? A. I had no letters with me; they were sent in the ship to Mr. Elliot, and a member of the firm of J. B. Scott & Co., by my father. Q. Authorizing him to give you money? A. Yes, authorizing him to give me any money that I needed. Q. When Mr. Baker asked you to go to Philadelphia, what did you reply? A. I told him it was not necessary for me to go with him, for I had friends of my own to take care of me.

EXAMINATION RESUMED BY JUDGE DEAN.

Q. You never knew Mr. Kennedy before? A. I never knew Mr. Kennedy. I never saw him during the time I was imprisoned. I just now asked Mr. Barlow to point out to me which of the gentlemen present is Mr. Kennedy. I have seen him today for the first time. Q. So far as you know, then, he had nothing to do with your imprisonment? A. I always understood that Mr. Kennedy had nothing to do with it. The officers who had me in charge said Mr. Kennedy could do nothing until he received orders from the War Department. Q. Then you understood yourself to be the prisoner of Mr. Baker? A. Yes. I was the prisoner of Mr. Baker, lodged in the Forty-seventh street station house. Mr. Baker told me I was a prisoner by order of the Secretary of War, and that Mr. Kennedy was merely requested to hold me.

Commissioner Bowen.—I am going to ask this question, not that it has any relevancy to the case, but merely for information: What was your treatment in the station house?

A. I was treated with the utmost respect by all the officers, policemen, and captain. I was treated very rudely by Mr. Baker and Mr. Bowles.

Examination continued by Judge Dean.—In what part of the station house were you kept? A. In a little room separate from the policemen. Q. And were taken to an adjoining house for your meals? A. Yes.

Commissioner Bowen.—This room was comfortable? A. Yes, it was tolerably comfortable, but very cold. It had no carpet when I first went there, but one of the officers, after I had been there some time, gave me a rug. Q. Then you were treated

respectfully? A. I was treated with entire respect, because they were convinced it was an outrage—my being sent there without a charge. Q. This room was not a cell? A. Oh, no! they would not dare put me in a cell (laughter).

By Mr. Barlow.—During this time that you were there were you allowed to send any letters or hold any communication with the outside world, or during that time was any one allowed to call upon you? A. No; I was not permitted to send any letters. I asked permission to send a letter to my friends, and it was refused, consequently I pitched it out of the window, and a man picked it up and put it in the post office. That was the last week I was there? Q. Had you asked permission to write letters? A. I had asked permission to write letters, subject to the inspection of the officers, but they said they had no authority to do so. I held no communication with my friends. None were allowed to see me. I told Mr. Baker, when I came, I was anxious to see Mr. Draper. Mr. Baker said Mr. Draper could do nothing for me, that he was a man of no influence or power, and could do nothing for me (laughter). Q. Until this did you have any means of communicating with your friends, or counsel, or any one else? A. No.

By Commissioner Bowen.—How long before your final release did Col. Baker call on you? A. nearly two weeks. Q. When was the last time Bowles was there? A. About five or six days before I was released I saw Bowles, who expressed extreme astonishment that I was still a prisoner. He said Mr. Kennedy would see me the next day, and I would have a hearing before the Board of Police Commissioners (laughter).

[*From the World.*]

ANOTHER INSTANCE of the seizure of females was the case of a poor girl in New York. A very beautiful and very honest servant girl lived for three years at domestic service in a family on Ninth avenue. For two years of the time she lived very happily, but unfortunately for her comfort, during the last year of her stay the head of the family endeavored to ruin her. This was the cause of her leaving his employ. She went to service in Madison street, but her former employer followed her there, visiting her frequently, and making overtures that she could not consent to receive. One day he essayed to take liberties which made her indignant, and which she resented by throwing a basin of dirty water over him. From her presence he went directly to the special provost-marshal, charged the poor girl with treason, stating that she had uttered disloyal sentiments. Among others, that she had hurrahed for Jeff. Davis, said she hoped President Lincoln would be hung, and as for Provost-Marshal Kennedy, she would like to hang him herself. She was immediately sent for, had a preliminary examination, and was then removed to the bedroom occupied by the detectives, just beyond "Number Four." Here she gave vent to her grief in cries and sobs. She was detained among felons and vile characters, and finally discharged, no one knows how.

In connection with these cases, we quote the *World's* remarks on New York arrests under Kennedy:

The case of Mrs. Brinsmade is by no means the most flagrant example of the abuse of power made by this man. Since his advent to office the sufferers at his hands may be numbered by scores and hundreds, and to such an extent was the business carried after his appointment as special provost-marshal, that upon the arrival in this city of the Hon. L. C. Turner, Judge Advocate General of the United States, to investigate into certain abuses existing here relative to prisoners of state, he found the station houses swarming with these unfortunates, who had been taken for no crime that they had been aware of, and who had been allowed no hearing either at the time of their arrest or subsequently. It is now stated that there are others still confined in the various station houses in the city, whose cases are of a character to call the blush of shame to the face of every man and woman in the community who has any regard for their liberties as residents of a republic under republican rule.

HOW ARRESTS WERE MADE.

It may not be generally known how arrests were made by the provost-marshal. Citizens were taken off Broadway and hurried before the Government official without a word of warning, or a whisper of what they were arrested for. Others were taken from their beds at midnight, and compelled to visit police headquarters, there to learn, for the first time, the nature of the charges preferred against them. No warrants were exhibited by the officers, no explanation given, nothing but the announcement: "The provost-marshal has ordered you to be brought to his office." It was useless to resist or ask questions. The officers were dumb, but they were powerful, and could listen to no expostulations, or make answer to any inquiry. These parties were usually held at headquarters over night; sometimes, however, the cells would be full, and the floor of the officers' room also covered with the sleeping victims. In such cases the parties were sent to some of the station houses adjacent to Broadway, and not unfrequently these would be full also, to such an extent was the business of arrests carried. The nearest station house to the police headquarters is that located in the Fourteenth precinct, in Spring street, near Marion.

Two parties, whose names can be obtained at this office, were arrested by Provost-Marshal Kennedy on the broad charge of disloyalty. They had been guilty of offering a resolution, at a public meeting, calling upon Government to make some compromise, upon the basis of which a peace could be effected. They were taken to the police headquarters, and interrogated after the style in vogue at that place, and from there were sent to the Fourteenth precinct station house, where they were put in solitary confinement in a cell. On Friday, the 19th of September, the following letter was received from one of these parties by a prominent business man in this city, a personal friend of the prisoner, and was the first intimation he was able to obtain of the locality in which his friend had been confined, although fourteen days had elapsed since his arrest. The letter was hardly legible, having been written in a dark cell with a pencil:

FOURTEENTH PRECINCT STATION HOUSE,
In Cell, Sept. 17, 1862.

To ——— ———:

MY DEAR SIR: You no doubt will think it curious to receive a correspondence from this place. I and a friend of mine were arrested on a charge of disloyalty on the 5th inst. We proposed a resolution at a meeting, which appears to have given offence to some persons. We were arrested with-

out a warrant, have had no hearing or trial, nor does there appear to be as yet any prospect of one. We are not permitted to utter a syllable in our defence. My brother prisoner is ———. I should very much like to have a personal interview with you. You will excuse this style of correspondence, as it is written hastily and stealthily, and in a dark cell, by your friend, ——— ———.

P. S.—It may be necessary for you to get an order from Kennedy to see me.

This letter, by a little financiering, was sent out of the station house, and in the course of two whole days and one night, arrived at the place of destination in Fulton street. The very day after it was received the party was discharged from custody by some process not fully explained.

THE PROVOST-MARSHAL THREATENS THE LAWYERS.

Abont two weeks after the establishment of the provost-marshal's office, a sailor, a British subject, was arrested on a charge that he was a citizen of the United States about to leave the country. He protested that he was a British subject, but it was alleged that he had once voted in Baltimore. He was seized and locked up in the Fifteenth Ward station house. His cousin applied to a well-known member of the bar in this city to act as the prisoner's counsel in the matter. This gentleman called upon Provost-Marshal Kennedy, and made a statement of the facts concerning the case, adding that he was to act as counsel for the accused party, and desired an interview.

The provost-marshal, who was resting from the labors of the day, with his heels upon the table, and himself almost lost in the huge chair he occupies, sprang to his feet with all the energy of his nervous nature, and exclaimed:

"I know you, sir. I know you. No, sir! You can't see him, sir! Are you aware, sir, that the writ of habeas corpus is suspended in this city?"

The gentleman was thunderstruck, but replied, mildly:

"I have said nothing about the habeas corpus. I simply called here to say I had been engaged to act as counsel for this man, and as such counsel requested the liberty of seeing my client."

Provost-Marshal: "Well, sir, if you come here again to interfere with my business, I'll send *you* down below."

Here he raised his voice almost to a pitch of fury, and advancing toward the gentleman, continued:

"Now, sir, I give you personal notice that if you or any other lawyer comes to interfere with my business, I'll lock him up. That's all, sir."

Of course that was all. The gentleman could not resent the insult, for he knew the man he was dealing with well enough to know that he would not scruple to incarcerate him on the spot if he should utter the words that burned in his bosom.

In this case the British consul was appealed to, investigated the matter, and obtained the man's release, he being proven a British subject.

ANOTHER CASE,

illustrating the treatment extended to parties applying to see relatives and friends shut up in station houses, was developed a day or two since.

On the 15th of August an Irish laborer, named Hugh Boyle, was arrested for discouraging enlistments. He was placed in the Fifteenth Ward station house. A wife and two children were dependent upon him for support. In this case his wife makes a statement to the effect that her husband was willing to take the oath of allegiance immediately after being arrested; that after his arrest she went to the provost-marshal with a letter from Gen. Corcoran, and upon a subsequent occasion with letters from other parties, but that they proved of no avail. She states that on the 19th of September she took another letter to the official from Archbishop Hughes. The letter was in behalf of the prisoner. She states that the answer returned was that the man would not be released if all the bishops and gentlemen of New York should intercede for him; and further, that he wondered that the old gentleman (the archbishop) should interfere with his business.

This man had been confined over a month without a hearing, although the third section of the order issued from the War Department authorizing arrests, expressly provides that cases shall be tried by military commission as soon as possible after the arrest of parties. Catharine Boyle, the wife of the prisoner, declares that the provost-marshal treated her and all the letters she took to him with the utmost scorn. She applied to every one whom she thought could have the slightest influence with the provost-marshal, and as a last resort, to have her husband restored to his family, which was actually suffering for the comforts of life in his absence, she was advised to request Archbishop Hughes to present the case to the War Department. This is only one of a long list of cases of a similar character, which, for all the great public may ever know, may teem with a myriad more disgusting details.

MOURNERS WERE SEIZED AT FUNERALS WHILE BURYING THEIR DEAD.

[From the Baltimore News, Aug. 12, 1863.]

THE ATTENDANTS OF A FUNERAL ARRESTED.

"Yesterday afternoon the funeral of the late Capt. William D. Brown took place at Greenmount Cemetery, and was attended by the relatives and friends of the family. Mr. Brown, the father of the deceased, stated that he had called on the military authorities and was told that there would be no objection to the funeral, and the body might be buried anywhere. The people assembled at the grave, the funeral ceremony was performed, and the body interred. A portion of those who had attended left the cemetery, shortly after which a detachment of soldiers appeared and arrested all who stood about the grave, numbering some eighteen or twenty persons, whose names are withheld at the instance of the military authorities for the present.

After reaching the Gillmore House they were placed in Gen. Tyler's room, where subsequently Col. Chesebrough, of Gen. Schenck's staff, made his appearance. He stated that information had reached Col. Don Piatt, Chief of Maj.-Gen. Schenck's staff, that the body of Capt. Brown had been dressed in a new Confederate uniform for burial, and upon that information the arrest of the parties was ordered. The superintendent of the cemetery declared that since the body was deposited in the vault it had not been touched. What was done with it before it reached the cemetery he knew not, but nothing of the kind had since occurred. After some conversation, Col. Chesebrough released the whole of the par-

ties to report at Maj.-Gen. Schenck's headquarters at nine o'clock this morning."

Dr. Samuel H. Bundy, of Marion, Ill., was seized, Aug. 18, 1862, while burying his little child, and carried off from his weeping family to the Old Capitol prison, a thousand miles distant. No charge was ever made public against him.

YOUNG CHILDREN WERE ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED FOR MONTHS, AND EVEN YEARS.

On Dec. 13, 1862, among the prisoners discharged from Fort Lafayette, was a boy of 17. No one could ascertain on what charge he had been imprisoned. He was poor and unknown. It was suspected that he was the son of a poor but ardent Democrat in Connecticut, whose political enemies had procured the arrest of his son as a means of persecuting him.

George Hubbell, a news-boy on the Naugatuck Railroad, was arrested Sept. 20, 1861. A poor, hump-backed boy, the only support of his mother. He was complained of by Connecticut abolitionists for selling Democratic newspapers on the cars. He was taken by a file of soldiers, carried under a large military guard to Brooklyn, received at Fort Lafayette by the Colonel in command with all the pomp of a dangerous rebel, and was there plunged into a military dungeon. The arrest of this poor boy was hailed with shouts of delight by the Connecticut radical party. Civilization was never more foully disgraced.

[From the Columbus Crisis, Dec. 24, 1862.]

"A little boy thirteen years old, belonging to Gallipolis, Ohio, was for months kept in Camp Chase garrison during the summer and early fall, whose only crime was that being on a boat, he owed a loyal woman, in Western Virginia, fifteen cents, a balance on washing she did for him while the boat laid at the wharf where she lived on the Ohio River. For this debt of fifteen cents he was reported to the military authorities as disloyal, was seized and sent to this political prison, where he was kept for months."

In Kentucky a school of boys was seized. The little fellows were required to take an oath prescribed by the provost marshal, including various arbitrary provisions. Most of the frightened boys submitted. Two little fellows about twelve years old, brothers, named Woolsey, stoutly refused. They were sent to jail. For more than two years they have remained in jail. They are there now.

We repeat that we are only giving a few instances to illustrate hundreds which occurred. There have been scores of young children seized and incarcerated by the authority of Abraham Lincoln, young frames broken down in dungeons, young hearts broken, young eyes dimmed forever by the cruelty of this American tyranny. Fathers, mothers, think of this, and pray God to forgive this poor President. He needs forgiveness!

THE VICTIMS OF MR. LINCOLN'S ARBITRARY SEIZURES IN NUMEROUS INSTANCES WERE DRIVEN TO MADNESS AND TO SUICIDE, OFTEN DIED UNDER THE CRUELTY OF THE TREATMENT THEY RECEIVED.

Capt. J. E. Elwood, confined on a false charge, forbidden to see any one but the man who brought him his meals, worn down by anguish, at length destroyed himself.

[From the N. Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1862.]

"SUICIDE OF CAPT. ELWOOD.—A good deal of excitement is caused by the suicide last night of Capt. J. E. ELWOOD, an inmate of the Carroll Prison, adjoining the Old Capitol. Capt. ELWOOD was an officer of the regular army, and was for some time Mustering and Disbursing Officer, but about a month preceding his arrest, was relieved and placed on duty in New York. While there he was selected as Colonel of one of the New York Regiments, but shortly afterwards was arrested by order of the Secretary of War, and committed to this prison, in which he has been kept in close confinement for about three months. He was a native of Pennsylvania, known to a large circle of acquaintances, and very popular among his friends, and great complaint has been made in consequence of the rigor of his confinement upon unknown charges. The suicide was committed by severing the jugular vein with a pocket knife, and he was this morning found dead in his cell. military inquest was held on the body."

MELANCHOLY RESULTS OF AN ARBITRARY ARREST.

[From the N. Y. Express.]

ONE OF THE ACCUSED PARTIES LOSES HIS REASON.

A brief paragraph appeared in the Express of yesterday, headed "Cheering for Jeff. Davis," in which it was stated that Alexander Hutchings, a Scotchman, and Henry Kerner, had been arrested for cheering for Jeff. Davis in a public bar-room and restaurant. Further particulars in regard to the case have since transpired, and as from the serious illness of one of the accused parties, fatal results may attend the arrest, we deem it proper to lay all the facts before the public.

It appears that three parties named Alexander Hutchings, Henry Kerner and John Marsh were in a drinking saloon and eating house down town, and that a wager was laid by one of the parties that he could drink the contents of a quart bottle of champagne at a draught. The champagne was opened and poured into a pitcher. The party who had made the wager, upon taking up the pitcher, exclaimed, "If this was Jeff. Davis himself, I could take it at a draught," and he swallowed the champagne and won the bet. Mr. Hutchings and his companion applauded the drinker for his success in gaining the wager. Two parties named Charles A. Meigs and James W. Warren, catching the words "Jeff. Davis," and hearing the applause, almost immediately afterward concluded the parties were uttering treasonable and disloyal sentiments and hurried off to inform the police. The trio were taken to the Police Court and from thence before Major-Gen. Wool, who, upon the affidavits of Meigs and Warren, gave the orders for the parties to be sent at once to Fort Lafayette. They were locked up over night, and in the morning taken to the office of U. S. Marshal Murray, preparatory to going down the bay in custody of one of the Marshal's officers. Fortunately, friends appeared in time, counter affidavits were made, the accusers themselves, upon being examined, were not quite sure of the facts stated, and the parties were paroled until orders could be had from the War Department.

The indignities to which these gentlemen were subjected could easily have been borne by them, but more serious results are likely to follow. Mr. Hutchings now lies in his house, a nearly hopeless lunatic. During the whole of last night he was wildly delirious, talking incessantly of the prison bars, and having horrid visions of dungeons and racks, that would make him scream out in agony. He is attended by the best physicians and may recover. The probabilities are, however, that he will entirely lose his reason. So that for a trifling word, imperfectly understood by his accusers, and not uttered by himself, this young man may be the inmate of a lunatic asylum for a life-time, while his accusers go unmolested, and still possessed of the power to make other indiscreet affidavits, and subject others of their fellows to the terrible experiences that have fallen upon Mr. Hutchings.

FURTHER PARTICULARS.—KENNEDY'S DOINGS IN THE MATTER.

We have received, from the friends of the parties interested, some further particulars in regard to the arrest of Messrs. Hutchinson (not Hutchings, as erroneously printed on Saturday), Kerner and Marsh, the gentlemen falsely charged with "cheering for Jeff. Davis" in Schultz's restaurant last week, which we deem of sufficient interest to lay before our readers, and thus enable them to see the arbitrary and cruel manner in which arrests are made by the police of this city. It appears that Mr. Marsh, who had been discharged shortly after his arrest on that day, when standing before the New York Hotel the same evening, was accosted by Captain Caffrey, of the 15th Precinct, who, having asked for his name, told him that he had orders from Superintendent Kennedy to arrest him. Mr. Marsh asked for Capt. Caffrey's warrant, to which the Captain replied that he had none, that there was no necessity for any warrant, and that he had Kennedy's peremptory orders to bring Mr. Marsh to headquarters; in fine, to use the Captain's own words: "You *must* come, sir." Mr. Marsh, seeing there was no way of escape, followed the Captain to headquarters, where he was detained all night, without any charge being brought against him. He, of course, was, with the remainder of his friends, discharged the next morning. It being ascertained the same evening, by the friends of Mr. Hutchinson, that the latter was detained at the First Precinct Station House, several gentlemen, among whom was Mr. John Collins, Jr., son of E. K. Collins, Esq., called upon the Superintendent to induce him to release his prisoner. They told Kennedy that the charge brought against Hutchinson was based upon error, and that Mr. Hutchinson had such a nervous temperament that a night's incarceration would certainly work to such an extent upon his mind, as to endanger his life. Mr. Kennedy's only response to the entreaties of these highly respectable gentlemen was, "a night's lodging in the station house is the best cure for such temperaments, much better than the assistance of all the N. Y. doctors." Mrs. Hutchinson [wife of the prisoner] soon after called upon Mr. Kennedy, and begged, entreated, aye, even almost prayed to him, to permit her to visit her husband in his cell, but "no, you can not," was the cruel, cold reply of our "Fouche." Poor Mrs. Hutchinson was so overcome with the coarse brutality of Kennedy, that on leaving headquarters she fainted, and had to be taken home in a carriage.

"Mr. S. H. Barry, released in December, 1862, became a helpless lunatic upon his release. Repeated attempts to obtain an examination and learn what was the accusation against him having failed, he sank into hopeless melancholy, and broke down in body and mind."

"DEATH OF A POLITICAL PRISONER.—Mr. A. L. Fessenden, of Wisconsin, was ordered to be released from the military prison in St. Louis, unconditionally, on the 16th inst., 'the charges against him not having been sustained.' The order for his release arrived at the prison hospital on the same day of, but a few hours subsequent to, his death."—*Dubuque Herald, Nov.* 30, 1862.

"ANOTHER ARBITRARY ARREST AND DEATH.—It is with profound sorrow that we announce the death of Hon. L. W. Hall, of Bucyrus, Ohio. He died last Sunday at his home in that place, aged about 50 years. Last fall, while in delicate health, he was arrested, taken to Camp Mansfield, and there incarcerated as a political prisoner. He was unconditionally released some time ago, and went home to die—his death doubtless having been hastened by what he endured while in durance. He was for some years a Common Pleas Judge, served a term in Congress, and was a man of acknowledged ability."—*Columbus (O.) Statesman, Jan.* 1863.

John W. Keyes, Editor of the Circleville Watchman, was imprisoned July 1, 1862, became a lunatic, and was sent to the State Asylum.

From the Malone (Franklin Co) Gazette.

CAPTAIN MICHAEL BERRY.

"It was our fortune, while an inmate of the Bastile to which we were consigned by the order of the brutal tyrant who is the first instrument and representative of the infamous, abolition, disunion party which holds the reins of power at Washington, to form many pleasant acquaintances, and some warm friendship. But of all with whom we were associated, none so won our regard as Capt. Michael Berry.

"He came to this country early in the present century, a poor, friendless, homeless Irish boy; but soon after his arrival he engaged as a cabin boy with a Connecticut shipmaster running a vessel between New York and Charleston. In the family of his employer he found a home where he was kindly treated and respectably reared and educated. He gradually arose from his first position to that of mate, and finally received the command of a vessel in the New York and Charleston line, and was the first to introduce steam in that line. He was ever a popular and trusted commander, never having suffered a shipwreck or lost a man from a vessel that he commanded. Such a favorite was he, that always when a new vessel was built and put into the line, he was given the command, turning over the vessel which he left to some other commander. When the present troubles broke out he was in command of the steamship Columbia, the newest and best vessel on the line. He was also a part owner, and had accumulated a handsome property, having considerable real estate in Charleston.

"For four months we were a room mate of Capt. Berry at Fort Warren, and daily and hourly during that period of trial and suffering did we have occasion to be thankful that we had such a companion to cheer our prison gloom and alleviate the hardships of prison life. A bluff, frank, manly sailor,

he was at the same time as gentle and tender-hearted as a woman. Generous, kind, considerate of all the rights and feelings of others, his heart instantly melted at a scene of suffering, and his purse was ever open and his hand ever ready to relieve and succor the unfortunate and distressed. In short—for we have not space to say more—he was the noblest man we ever knew.

"And this good old man is dead—has been killed by the tyrant who, without cause and without authority of law, had him kidnapped, and for six long months incarcerated in a military prison, from which he was finally discharged only to die.

"Capt. Berry was committed to Fort Lafayette on the 8th of October, from there was sent to Fort Warren with the other political prisoners the last of that month—and was discharged about a month ago. We saw, during the winter, that his spirits were failing and his physical system giving away under the confinement to which he was subjected, and the sense of wrong which was eating into his soul. We feared the consequences, and now our apprehensions are but too plainly realized.

"And why was this noble hearted old man persecuted and murdered? He was no politician—he had never cast a vote in his life—he had taken no part in the sectional troubles in which the country was involved. But private enmity and personal malignity marked him for destruction, and a pretext was found which brought the necessary order from Seward for his incarceration. It was charged that in March, 1861, when leaving New York harbor with his vessel, he raised the Palmetto Flag—the State Flag of South Carolina. The charge was true. But now for the explanation:

"It was a flag which he had used as a private signal and racing flag for fifteen years. Daniel Webster, Wm. H. Seward himself, and many other prominent men of the North had gone passengers with him under that very flag; and only two years ago, John A. Dix took passage with Capt Berry, to Charleston, on his way to Florida, whither he was hastening, with all possible speed, to the bedside of his sick wife, and was extremely anxious to reach Charleston in time to take the Florida steamer from there. Capt. Berry assured him that he should be put on board, or he would take him on to Florida himself. When they arrived near the port of Charleston, they found the Florida steamer just leaving, and had to give her chase, and finally signalled and brought her to with the same Palmetto Flag.

"Now what offence was there in raising the Palmetto Flag on the Columbia in March, 1861, more than at any other time? There was uninterrupted intercourse between the North and South. Vessels, passengers, and freight were allowed to go and come as before the troubles. The mails were still in operation between the two sections. And more than that, the Lincoln Administration was professing a peace policy, and assuring the country that there would be no war. When Capt. Berry left New York harbor on the occasion referred to, the steamship Yorktown, one of the New York and Richmond line, was just leaving port, and the two vessels went in for a trial of speed, and Capt. Berry, as in all such cases, raised the Palmetto Flag, and the Yorktown raised the Virginia State Flag. But both vessels had, at the appropriate and customary place, the United States Flag flying. This was all there was of it. The act was one of no political significance whatever. Captain Berry made several trips after that, and his vessel was not drawn off until the bombardment of Fort Sumter.

"Now mark—this was in March, and justice slept and vengeance did not strike till October, seven months after, during all which time Capt. Berry was openly in the City of New York. But then a leading Black Republican, who had a private grudge against the Captain, in consequence of his having detected and exposed him in some dishonorable act years ago—and who was probably the only enemy the Captain had in the world—told the story of the Palmetto Flag to Seward, and Seward, ever prompt and eager for new victims, had him kidnapped, and imprisoned, and resisted all appeals for his discharge, and there he was kept, dying by inches, till the Commissioners appointed by the Secretary of War visited Fort Warren a week since.

"As it was with Capt. Berry, so it has been with most of the political prisoners—they have been incarcerated upon equally groundless pretexts—and in most instances, as in his, at the instigation of private malice. How it was in this county, let the wretches whom we have in our eye, and who will yet be brought to a fearful reckoning, answer."

THE CONTEMPTIBLE AND TRIVIAL NATURE OF CHARGES AGAINST SOME MEN REMAIN AS MONUMENTS OF LINCOLNIAN FOLLY.

In *The New York Evening Post*, Oct. 3, 1863, we find an account of the arrest of what they called "a knot of cowardly traitors," "in the act of drinking the following infamous toast: '*Damn the goose that grew the quill that made the pen that wrote the Proclamation of Emancipation.*'"

Dr. L. M. Ross was arrested in Illinois, carried to Washington, and kept for months in the Old Capitol prison. The only charge against him was that he had been seen in the public street *to draw his finger under his nose.* This was suspected to be a private signal of a secret association, but it was subsequently proved that no such association existed. The Doctor learned, however, that in Mr. Lincoln's dominions a man cannot make free with his own fingers or his own nose without danger of months in the Old Capitol prison.

ARREST OF LADIES AT WASHINGTON.

On Tuesday, June —, 1863, the Washington gossips were furnished with a fresh subject by the arrest of three ladies—two of whom were the wife and daughter of a prominent officer of the Senate—while passing the Old Capitol prison, in which are confined the Rebel and State prisoners. One of them *raised her handkerchief to her face and passed it several times with rapidity over her mouth.* This movement was *observed by the guard*, who stopped the carriage and requested the ladies to alight. On being conducted to the guard room they were informed that they were *under arrest* for violating a public order prohibitory of any waving of handkerchiefs or making any other *signal* likely to be interpreted as a signal to the prisoners. The lady stated that *she had been eating oranges* and was merely *wiping her mouth.*

The mother and daughter were released on a promise to be careful not to violate the rule again. The other lady's case is as yet not disposed of.

The order is imperative on the officers to make such arrests.

[From the Columbus Crisis.]

THE CASE OF PETER HEFFNER.

We have intended several times to notice the imprisonment of Peter Heffner, an aged German, naturalized some dozen years ago.

Peter Heffner is a citizen of Meigs county, Ohio, and resides a few miles from Pomeroy, the county seat. By his own honest industry he purchased a few years ago a little farm, on which he resides. When the war broke out, a young German hired to work upon his farm, joined the regiment making up in that county, and went to the wars. Mr. Heffner himself had been a soldier in Europe, and served a full term in the army of his country.

During last summer Mr. Heffner was at Pomeroy with his wagon, and on his return home overtook one of his neighbors, an abolitionist, on foot, and invited him to ride in his wagon. While proceeding on their way, this abolitionist asked Heffner if he had heard from his young man in the army. Mr. Heffner said "no." The abolitionist then said that the young man was shot dead on the field in a recent battle. Mr. Heffner, in his very broken English, said, "Dat ish good," meaning, as he testified, and all the facts in the case corroborated it, that it was good that the young man was killed at once, instead of being wounded and left to suffer a thousand deaths, before his final death struggle. Mr. Heffner had been a soldier, and everybody knows that the soldier desires actual and sudden death in preference to mortal and lingering wounds.

But this declaration was enough for this black-hearted abolitionist—he had found a clear case of Democratic secesh. Forgetting the kindness—as such scoundrels always do—of a ride home, he proceeded to enter complaint against Mr. Heffner, and had him sent to Camp Chase, where he remained in close confinement for "disloyalty" near two months! His crops went to ruin, and he lost a wheat crop, as it was too late to sow when he regained his liberty from the loathsome prison.

This old man fled from a land of despotism, as he supposed, to one of freedom, and found himself within the walls of a prison, on the false charges of a perjured villain!

MORAL.

A Democrat was punished and an abolitionist got a few dollars fees!

ONE OF THE ARBITRARY ARRESTS.—The Utica *Herald*, one of the most abject apologists of arbitrary arrests, states the case of F. M. Ellis, of that city, who held a confidential post under government, the duties of which he fulfilled with remarkable fidelity, industry and tact. A subordinate official, to whom certain parties from prejudicial motives had made sundry charges, caused his arrest, basing their accusations upon certain documents found in his possession. When the time for the investigation came, it was satisfactorily shown that the documents were not legitimately held by Mr. Ellis, but they were actually requisite for the successful prosecution of his operations. *Yet he lay in prison three months, under this false charge.—Providence Post.*

David C. Wattles was arrested at North Branch, in Michigan, 23d November, 1862, carried to Fort Lafayette, New York, detained five months, and finally discharged. The following is from the *N. Y. Evening Post*, of April 24, 1862:

ANOTHER INDIGNANT FORT LAFAYETTE PRISONER. David C. Wattles, of North Branch, Michigan, who was arrested in November and sent to Fort Lafayette, was recently released, and on returning home amused himself by giving a long account of his experiences. We find the story carefully reported in the *Pontiac Jacksonian*, which paper says:

"On Monday of last week a commission, consisting of General Dix and Edwards Pierrepont, with a secretary appointed by the Government for the purpose, commenced what they were pleased to term an 'examination' of the political prisoners at Fort Lafayette. Mr. Wattles with nine others were first called up and asked the following questions:

"'When were you arrested?' 'Where were you arrested?' 'What is your age?' 'What were you arrested for?' These questions were each answered by Mr. Wattles, except the last one, which he informed them was one he was as anxious to have answered as they could be. After asking him if he sympathized with the rebels, and a few similar questions, the commission expressed themselves satisfied. Their secretary, however, was not so clear, and interposed to ask him if there was not a secession flag raised at North Branch, and if he did not participate in raising it? To this Mr. Wattles responded that he heard that Isaiah Butler had an old shirt which he had used in straining blackberry juice for wine making which he on an occasion exhibited as a secession flag, and that the story of this flag had travelled throughout the country, receiving additions as it went.

"This closed the examination, and Mr. Wattles was removed to the 'house of detention,' where he was retained until the day following, when he was again brought before the Commission and informed that he could have his liberty by signing the parole."

MALICIOUS ARRESTS.—The Burlington (Iowa) *Argus* tells us of the arrest of three men in that county. The facts of the case were these:

A recruiting officer came to Rome after volunteers, and remained there some days. While there, he took occasion to abuse a certain Doctor White, formerly of that place, who had entered the Federal army, and was killed at Pittsburgh Landing,—stating that he was glad he was killed; that he was a secessionist, etc. These persons—friends of Doctor White—protested against such language. They said that White was no secessionist; that he was a Democrat, and had given his life for his country; and no man should call him a secessionist in their presence. Their feelings and indignation were aroused, and they told the officer that he must stop abusing Federal soldiers, or leave the place. With a malignity most devilish, this miscreant proceeded to Mount Pleasant, and told that he had been threatened and forced to leave Rome for recruiting for the Federal army, and had the three men arrested for discouraging recruiting. They were arrested and sent to this city, without a form of trial or an opportunity to prove their innocence.

Supposing that they would not be taken from the State without a trial, their counsel obtained a writ of *habeas corpus*, to have the matter examined and the men set at liberty. The writ was served on the

sheriff, and Captain Newton pledged himself to obey its commands.

But, instead of complying with their agreement, and obeying the writ of court, last evening, after dark, the men were taken to the river, put into a skiff, and taken across the river to the cars for Chicago, and sent forward to an Eastern prison.

The case is the most damnable one that has yet transpired in the history of this country.

THE TREATMENT WHICH AMERICAN CITIZENS RECEIVED in many of these cases, is illustrated by the following statements.

[From the Kennebec Courier, of January, 1863.]

"LIBERTY IN MAINE.

It will be recollected that Captain Asa Turner, of Brooklin, Maine, was arrested and imprisoned in Fort Preble, a few months since, on a charge of 'resisting the draft.' Captain Preble has lately come out with the particulars of his offence and arrest, which reveal a story of high-handed wrong and oppression which would elicit condemnation in a land of despots. It appears he had two sons drafted. One of them was of age, and the father did not interfere at all with him, but left him to decide the question for himself. The other, on account of physical impediment, was unable to do military duty. He endeavored to get them examined, but a Dr. Drinkwater (an abolitionist), examining surgeon, told him that he should 'pronounce them sound, examination or no examination.' He said to the orderly sergeant that the youngest boy, not of age, should not go without his consent, as he did not consider him capable of doing military duty. This constituted the offence for which Captain Turner was dragged from his home and consigned to the tender mercies of a set of scoundrels who treated him like a brute. Captain Turner relates the circumstances as follows, and it is enough to cause the blood to boil with indignation.

"STATEMENT.

"I returned home to get help about mending my nets, &c., where I stopped for a day or two, and then, taking my sister, who lives with me, and a Mrs. Wilson, my partner's wife, and a boy to assist in rowing the boat, I started for the Island, but had not proceeded over three miles, when a boat containing six men rowed across the bow of my boat, and Nutter, who was one of the six, called out to me, 'You are my prisoner;' and like tigers on their prey, three or four bounded into my boat and on to me, and cursing and swearing, dragged me from my boat to theirs, and shoved me under a seat, when, taking my boat in tow, they pulled for the shore. I was then taken from the boat and *heavily ironed*. I demanded by what authority I was thus seized and brutally treated; was I guilty of any crime? Thereupon Nutter produced a paper, purporting to come from *Hodgdon, the Adjt.-Gen. of the State*, and proceeded to read. It commanded him to take my two sons and one Samuel E. Wilson, and take them to Bangor. My name was not mentioned. I asked him what that had to do with me. He replied *enough*, and said he should take my sons *dead or alive*. They were then about starting to take me away, when I requested to be allowed to send word by my sister to my family, that they might know where I was gone, and about my business, but this was peremptorily refused. After taking supper at Sargeant's, they took us directly by my house, not allowing me to speak for a moment to any one, to the store of Merrick & Reed, where they stopped with me for two or three hours, and then to Nutter's house, where we remained for the night.

The next day I was taken to Bucksport, where we stopped all night, being again ironed before starting. I have a sister residing in Bucksport, but was not permitted to see her, although bonds to any amount asked were offered for my appearance at any time they should mention, and at any place, if I could be allowed to go, either alone or under guard, to her house. I told them I wished to get some decent apparel before going further, as I was taken in my working clothes, and it was for this I wished to go to my sister's; but it was of no avail, they would not allow me to go. The next day I was taken to Bangor, where I remained at the barracks, under guard, till the next morning, then taken handcuffed and carried to Augusta by cars. By this time I was barely able to get one foot before the other. The treatment I had received, and the exposure had produced cramp colic, but notwithstanding I was suffering extreme pain, I was not permitted to have the irons from my hands, or to get anything to relieve me. At Augusta, I was taken first to the capitol, where I was exhibited to those in authority, and ordered to be lodged in jail. In the jail and the key turned, I was relieved of the irons, and sick and scarcely able to stand, I was immediately locked in a cell, where I found, TO ME IN SUCH A SITUATION, a more comfortable bed. The next day I was handcuffed by a Deputy U. S. Marshal, called Woodward, and taken to Portland and lodged in jail.

When taken from the jail in Augusta I was still suffering from the colic of the day before, and on my way to Portland, in the cars, the diarrhœa set in, when Woodward kindly consented to remove ONE handcuff. I remained in the jail at Portland two days, when I was taken to Fort Preble, and kept under guard two weeks and then released. I never made any threats to any one that I should resist the draft. I never procured arms or ammunition for that purpose, and the statement in some of the prints that I had guns for this purpose are base fabrications. This was my "resistance to the draft." For this, as alleged by the newspapers (I know nothing of my offence except what I have seen), I was brutally dragged from my home and family, denied counsel until my lodgment in the fort, or even an intercourse with friends, handcuffed like a felon, and treated in a manner that would cause a demon to blush if compelled to use such treatment; provided with no charges, and confronted by no witnesses; shut up in a fort under guard for two weeks, and then mysteriously released, to be told by the newspapers that the truth of the charges preferred against me were sufficiently established but that the process under which I was arrested was "irregular;" yet we live in the nineteenth century, in a land where constitutional liberty was bequeathed to us by our fathers, and, as I supposed, where a citizen could not be deprived of life, LIBERTY, or property without due process of law. From early boyhood I was thrown upon my own resources for support, and at the expense of my constitution I have earned an honest livelihood for myself and family. Feeble in health, I have not many years to live, but God grant that in the few years that remain to me I may see the once glorious Union restored, the Constitution obeyed and

espected, and liberty of speech, freedom of the ress and the person from unjust and 'irregular' rrest and imprisonment, once more established.
ASA TURNER."

Hon. HENRY CLAY DEANE, arrested at Keokuk, owa, May 13, 1863, thus describes his treatment:

After my arrest at the house of Judge Clagett, was placed in the front of the crowd, with a low-red, insolent man, who commenced asking me nsolent questions, which I of course took no no-ice of. After hurrying me through several streets, t length a hollow square was formed, where I was hreatened, taunted, and insulted for a full half our. I was first informed that death was entirely oo mild a punishment to be administered to a "Copperhead," who, in the choice language of heir newspaper, was "foolhardy and demented nough to venture through Keokuk."

The soldiers were all strangers to me, and were ed on and prompted to their action by a Puritan lique who had an unsettled account with me for ome very candid talk about the year 1860, when was a candidate for elector of the State at large n the Democratic ticket, headed by the name of Judge Douglas. These benevolent men thought nature at fault that she had not endowed me with our separate and distinct lives, that each of them night be entirely gratified in having me put to leath in his own choice way. On the outside of he crowd there stood a merchant of thin visage, harp nose, red head, and exceedingly thin lips who cried out at the top of his voice "He ought o be drowned, seeing the Mississippi is close at hand," when there went up a yell, "Drown him," "Drown him," "Drown him." Near by another of the malignants spoke up and said: "Drowning was entirely too easy and speedy a death for a Copperhead," and cried out "Hang him, hang, hang him!" Still another commenced, and the cry went up, "Shoot him," "Shoot him," "Shoot him."

A fourth, with the murderous laugh of a Pawnee, said burning would better measure out the allotted punishment, lengthen the scene of enjoyment, and minister more thoroughly to the gratification of the executioners. This gentleman found no response. Every manner of insult and opprobrious epithet was used to jeer, to mortify and offend.

After being thus brutally treated, I addressed the crowd for some moments, and told them I had been sick for nearly a week, was then taking medicine, and desired a place to be at rest. After much parleying, yelling, and coarse insult, I was marched down to the office of the provost marshal, and there commanded by this young man, Ball, to strip myself stark naked, which I had to do in the presence of a large crowd, and remaining in that condition for fifteen minutes, while my clothes were searched, and each one of the party had taken his full liberty in about the same kind of jesting that had occurred in the street, except that it was coarser and broader in the room. I told this young man, Ball, that I had understood that he was an officer, educated at West Point, from which I inferred that he was a gentleman. He informed me, to my surprise, that he was not a West Pointer, which I placed to the lasting credit of that institution. After I had been allowed to put on my clothes, my carpet-sack was sent for to the hotel, carefully searched, and my private letters and papers read aloud in the presence of the crowd, open to the inspection of everybody. The letters of my wife and my business papers were jumbled together, and my knife and other articles taken, which I have never been able to recover.

After all this was over, Mr. Ball sent some one of the crowd to inform the soldiers that he would assure them that I would be severely dealt with, and they were permitted to retire.

I was soon lodged in the guard-house, where there was neither chair, stool, table, nor stand. Sergeant Newport kindly furnished me a cot. One filthy towel was the wiping cloth for a large body of men, some with sore, diseased and scrofulous eyes. I cannot better describe the place than I have done in a brief sketch which I wrote in it, and which Sergeant Newport, in the presence of John H. Craig, Esq., and Judge Trimble, declared was true to life; and I take here great pleasure in stating that Sergeant Newport, and every other soldier of the provost guard, treated me with civility, courtesy, and respect, for which I am grateful.

[From the N. Y. Express, Dec. 15, 1862.]

NEGROES IN FORT LAFAYETTE.

There have been two rebel negroes in Fort Lafayette,—one, by the name of Stephens, who was taken for running the blockade. He was let loose some time since. The prisoners, more or less, often wrote to the officials in Washington, asking what they were confined for, but they got no answer. Stephens wrote, among others, and got no answer. At last, one of the prisoners said—"Stephens, write; tell them you are a colored man." Stephens *did* write; did say he was a colored man,—and in a very short time a letter came back from the Judge Advocate, opening the doors for Stephens, the colored man. *The negro was the only prisoner that could get an official answer from Washington.*

There is another rebel negro there, named Robinson. He was taken in running the blockade, as pilot or cook. He declines writing a letter to say he is a colored man; and hence, it may be, he is continued in prison. He considers it beneath his dignity to take the oath of allegiance or to write to Washington.

Conscious of the crimes they were committing, and fearful of the personal retribution they might sometime receive, these evil doers tried to force and often forced from their poor victims (when the prison doors were opened, and they were permitted, after months of languishing, to go forth again) the following oath:

COPY OF OATH AS ADMINISTERED.

I, ——— ———, of ———, do solemnly swear that I will support, protect and defend the constitution and government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution or law of any State convention or Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding; and further, that I do this with a full determination, pledge and purpose, without any mental reservation or evasion whatsoever; and further, that I will neither enter any of the States now in insurrection against the authority of the

federal government nor hold any correspondence whatever with them or with any person in them during the present rebellion, without permission of the Secretary of War, and that I will in all things deport myself as a good and loyal citizen of the United States and that I will not, at any future time, commence or cause any action or suit against the officers of any loyal State or of the United States for causing my arrest or imprisonment, so help me God.

Sworn to and subscribed before me, this 11th day of November, 1862.

L. C. TURNER, Judge Advocate.

CHARACTER OF THE PRISONS.

[From the Columbus (O.) Crisis.]

HORRIBLE DISCLOSURES IN RELATION TO A POLITICAL PRISON.

We speak wholly of the *political* prison, the prison of State, as we know nothing whatever of what occurs in the prison where "rebels taken in arms" are kept—that is, "the prisoners of war."

It must not be forgotten that there have been from six to seven hundred political prisoners at Camp Chase at a time; and although several hundred have been lately discharged without trial, there are yet there some four hundred—one or two hundred of those have arrived there within a few days past from Kentucky and Western Virginia. These men are taken from their homes, some from their beds at night, some from their houses in daytime, and a great many of them are picked up in their fields at work, and never suffered to see their families before being spirited off to Ohio and incarcerated in this celebrated Bastile, which will soon be as famous as Olmutz itself.

Our Ohioans are put into the same prison with these men from other States, and from them we have learned some facts which the people of Ohio ought to know. Many of these men have been kept in this prison for over one year, a great many for five, six, seven and eight months, without even seeing outside, or being allowed to communicate personally with any one, not even wife, child, father, mother, or stranger.

They are furnished with nothing but a single blanket, even these cold nights, unless they are able to purchase additional comforts with money they may be able to command. Many are poor men; and unable to purchase: they were not permitted to bring along a change of clothing, and many had on when seized nothing but summer wear, and that has become filthy, worn out, and scarcely hangs upon their backs.

They have no bedding, and are therefore compelled to sleep on the bare boards. They have not enough wood furnished to keep fires up all night, and hence the suffering is intensified by the cold weather. If they attempt, after night, to walk out in the yard to take off the chills of the dreary night, they are instantly threatened to be shot by the guards, as ordered by those in command.

Dr. Allen, of Columbia county, Ohio, said he laid on a bare board until his hips were black and blue. The wood furnished them is four feet long, and they are compelled, each mess, to chop it up for themselves. Recollect, always, that these are political prisoners, against whom no one appears as accuser, and no trial is permitted.

The prison has become filthy—awfully so—and the rats are in droves. If the prisoners attempt to kill one of these rats, they are forbidden, and threatened with being shot instantly. Recollect, always, as we said above, these are political prisoners, against whom some malicious negro-worshipper has created a suspicion of disloyalty, but whose name is kept secret, and hence there can be no trial.

The prison is perfectly alive with lice, and no chance is given to escape the living vermin. A dead man, one of the prisoners, was the other day carried out to the dead yard, and laid there over night, and when visited in the morning by other prisoners, who heard there was a dead man there, they found the hair on his head stiff with lice and nits—the lice creeping into his eyes in great numbers, and, as he lay with his mouth open, the lice were thick crawling in and out of his open mouth.

Not long since two of the prisoners got into a scuffle in trying their strength, and finally into a fight, as was supposed, and several other persons rushed to part them, when the guard from the lookout above fired on them, killing an old man by the name of Jones, from Western Virginia, and a ball grazing the skull of another, he fell, and it was supposed at first he was killed also; another of the balls passed through a board at the head of a sick man in the hospital, and only escaped him but a few inches. Two men in the scuffle were not hurt.

We might go further, but God knows, this is enough for once. It is enough to make one's blood run cold think of it.

Now, if any one doubts this—if the authorities at camp or at the State House doubt it, if the Legislature when it meets, will raise a committee, we promise to name the witnesses who, if sent for, will, under oath, prove all this, and as much more, some of which is too indecent to print in a newspaper for the public ear.

We do not bring these things to light for any other purpose than an act of humanity, out of respect to the fair fame of Ohio, and to direct public attention to them that the brutal authorities of that camp may have justice done them. The commandant of the camp is himself a member of the Ohio House of Representatives. He will no doubt appear on the first Monday of January to take his seat. Let him answer to his peers on that floor—let him answer to his constituents who elected him—let him answer to the whole people of Ohio, if he dare, whether these things are so or not. Heaven be blessed if any modification can be put upon these transactions—any excuse of the most trivial nature, by which the fame of Ohio may be vindicated from the crime and stigma which otherwise must go down to all time upon the pages of our history. * * * * * *

The officers in charge of prisoners, hit upon the plan of making a speculation out of them at the same time, as some of the prisoners were among the wealthiest men of Kentucky and Western Virginia, and some, we believe, all the way from Tennessee. The plan was arranged and carried out in this wise:

A man was put up on the parapet on guard (at night) where he could hold conversation with the prisoners. He would agree with them that for a certain consideration in money he would fix a plan for their escape. As they all wanted to get out of such a place as speedily as possible, some of whom

had been there for a year and no prospect for a trial or release, the prisoners bit at the offer ; and a certain hour the next night was fixed on for their exit. One of the prisoners gave the guard twenty dollars and a gold watch ; what others gave we never learned. At the time fixed an outer plank was pryed off, and the night being very dark, they commenced issuing from the prison. But before they had got many yards they heard a command given ; and instantly sprang up before them from the grass a file of soldiers, and click, click, went the rifle locks, and they were, all who got outside, brought up standing at the point of bayonets and cocked rifles and hustled back to prison !

The men who entered into the arrangement, and paid their money and gold watch, were punished by forty-eight hours in the dungeon, and the money and watch never returned ! Not even when they were discharged, which most of them were, because there were no charges against them.

[From the Sentinel, Indianapolis, Oct. 31, 1862.]

POLITICAL PRISONERS.

In the Government post-office building in this city seventeen persons are confined for alleged political offences. They were arrested upon affidavits made in some, if not all the cases, by partisan and personal enemies, upon which they are deprived of their liberty without any means of redress ; without the opportunity of disproving the charges made against them through the judicial tribunals of the country, a right guaranteed by the Constitution and which should be held sacred. If guilty of any crime against the Government these persons should be punished. If they have violated the law they should suffer the penalty therefor. But it is palpably unjust that citizens should be taken from their homes and business and incarcerated in a prison for weeks and months for alleged political offences, and denied the privileges granted the meanest criminals in the land. Three of the prisoners have very comfortable quarters, but fourteen are confined in cells built for criminals. In one cell, a small room, nine are confined, and in a still smaller one are five. Neither of them have side windows, but light and air comes through a skylight in the roof. Here they eat, sleep and live, shut out from the world, and only permitted to see the light of heaven through the small opening in the roof. Under no circumstances are they permitted to leave their cells, and before the iron grated door of their prison house, securely fastened, armed sentries, day and night, watch them. One prisoner, who came here sound in body and mind, for some days was insane through the effects of his confinement. Who two years ago would have anticipated that such arrests would have been made? Who would have thought two years ago that the President would have brought all the people of the United States under martial law, to be administered at his own discretion, and that in our magnificent Post-office building, in a State loyal to the Government and in which the administration of the civil law has never been obstructed, seventeen of its citizens would be confined, deprived of all their civil rights ?

[From the New York World, Sept., 1862.]

THE PROVOST-MARSHAL AND CELL NO. 4.

We rather tire of Secretary Stanton and Fort La Fayette ;—will our readers excuse us if we put them off this morning with Provost-Marshal Kennedy and Cell No. 4 ? A glimpse of these remarkable objects is offered in another column. They are not an agreeable picture, we admit. And yet there can be no understanding of the full depths of the infamy to which our good cause has been sunk by official folly and wickedness, if we leave the Provost-Marshal and his methods out of view.

Now it is generally imagined that torture was done away with, among the English-speaking race, a good many hundred years ago, even in the case of *convicted* offenders. The common law discouraged it ; positive statutes prohibited it. The tenth article of the Bill of Rights under the Restoration, provided against "cruel or unusual punishments." The coronation oath imposes it as an everlasting obligation upon English sovereigns to execute justice *with mercy*. Inquisitorial torture, inflicted *before* the guilt is established, has been even more opposed to the Anglo-Saxon spirit. It has been treated almost from time immemorial as an utterly barbarous and unconscionable resort. Even the old Roman pagans had enough of the same spirit to confine the criminal *quaestion*, as it was emphatically styled, to slaves ; and as long as the faintest remembrance of the national dignity was kept alive, they would never consent to violate the sacred person of a citizen, till they possessed the clearest evidence of his guilt. But American citizenship, in these days, has no immunities. There is no ignominy to which, in these parts at least, it is not exposed. We are simply indebted to the sovereign grace of the Provost-Marshal if we breathe this upper air at all. "In the palace lives a man who can cut my head off," said Quenay, describing the guarantees of Louis Fifteenth's monarchy. *At the corner of Elm and Broome Streets sits a man who can put us in Number Four*, sums up our own condition.

Provost-Marshal Kennedy, some fine summer morning, sends his detective commanding you to repair to his presence. Useless to question. Your business is to go. You accompany the officer. Ushered in, you find yourself called to account for some thoughtless word or act that may or may not have come from you. Be careful how you bear yourself. Answer promptly and humbly. Don't let any of your father's blood in your veins ruffle you. Though you are not wont to be catechised in this curt, imperious style, you must forget all that. This is a Provost-Marshal, remember, Try to be meek. Study to please. Help him to magnify his office. Perhaps he will be good to you, and, when he has finished, graciously bow you off to a room that a Christian man can manage to live in for a few days and nights. If, on the other hand, you chafe under his questionings, or in any wise fail in deference, or if you do not confess up to his expected mark, he will probably make short work of you. You are booked for Number Four. You need not expostulate. "That 's all, Sir." A wave of the hand ; a word to the officer ; and there you are, a subterranean.

Well, the iron door closes upon you. Now grope. You can't go foul. Three feet by six is all the measure. Don't trouble yourself about the furniture. A plank shelf for a pallet, a pine block for a a pillow, a dipper and a water waste—that is the sum total. Are you alone ? You are in luck. You should know that there have been as many as three men of your size—and you know you are

several sizes larger than the Provost—accommodated here at one and the same time, two sitting on the plank, and the third face downward on the floor. Now you have a chance to reflect upon the glorious blessings of constitutional government and the inscrutable dispensations of Provost-Marshals. No you haven't. Oh horrors! The swarms are upon you. Your flesh quivers. Your blood burns with poison. You are driven half mad with agony. You faint with heat. You gasp for air. Ah; you begin to understand now what meant that last vindictive look. You are getting a glimmer of what it costs to cross the humor of a Provost-Marshal. No danger now but that you will please him. To go from that den you would creep to his very feet. But be not impatient. Endure as you can. There will be no hurry to release you. You have not only to learn your lesson, but you have a little penalty to pay for your contumacy. Men no worse than you have been kept here for hours, nay days. Provost-Marshals are not so easily propitiated.

We may talk as we please of the thumb-screws, jack boots, wheels, racks, pinchers, and all the paraphernalia of mediæval persecution—they were all an infinitely more respectable means of propagating the true faith than this unutterable abomination which is used against political heretics, or those suspected to be such, in this so called land of freedom. Torquemada tortured, but he did it in a clean, gentlemanly way. He was content with ingenious applications of wood, and iron, and fire, and water. Fanatic as he was, he never degraded his cause by making loathsome vermin the ministers of its vengeance. It has been reserved for Provost-Marshal Kennedy to bring into requisition this new sort of *peine forte et dure*—the old anguish made all the more intolerable by an overpowering disgust.

In the name of American civilization, we protest against it. It calls for the execration, we will not say of every loyal but of every decent man. It is bad enough that we should be subjected to the arbitrary will of an officer unknown to the laws, however discreetly that will might be exercised; bad enough, at best, that we are hourly exposed to summary arrests, and commitments, and imprisonments, without bail, without trial, and even without offence:—but when it comes to this, that American manhood is made the prey of the vilest of creeping things, deliberately and expressly for inquisitorial purposes, it is adding to the lowest deep of ignominy a yet lower deep, which we are worse than slaves if we endure. Consent to such treatment forfeits not only our claims as freemen, but our titles as men.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT OF CELL NUMBER FOUR.

[From the World, September 12th, 1863.]

REFUSING TO GIVE A NAME.

Upon another occasion an individual was brought in for refusing to give his name to an enrolling officer.

PROVOST-MARSHAL—"What is your name, sir?"

UNKNOWN—"Well, I declined to give my name there, and I think I shall here."

PROVOST-MARSHAL—"Oh, you think so. Now I'll tell you what I think. I think you'll give it before you've been here a great while.

He sprung the bell again.

"Here is a man who won't give his name. Take him down and give him number four. He will probably give his name before many hours."

The young man, who was not above twenty years of age, seemed like a person hardly *compos*. He was pale-faced, and gaunt-looking, was seedily dressed, and had the appearance of having just come off a night's debauch. He was taken down to the detective office, again interrogated, and again declined to give his name.

"Give him number four," said the officer in charge, and he was at once seized and hurried off to the fated locality.

NUMBER FOUR.

Horror of horrors. Possibly no place since the black hole of Calcutta or the prison hulks of the Revolution could compete with cell number four at police headquarters.

Under the reign of the provost-marshal it became part and parcel of the machinery of the office, and was used as occasion called to hold fast the worst class of the prisoners arrested, or such as were considered the most flagrant cases.

Passing through the outer room of the detective office in the basement, you come into the sitting room—a close, badly ventilated chamber—the larger half of which is underground. Midway in the room at the right is a small half glass door cut in a partition, through which you enter upon a narrow corridor facing four small cells. These are numbered, beginning at the south end, one, two, three, four, the latter being at the extreme right as you enter the corridor, which is scarcely wide enough to admit the passage of a man.

The sides of cell number four are ceiled up with boards to the top. It is about three feet wide by six in depth. A stationary board fifteen inches wide is put up on the right hand for a sleeping pallet, and a three-cornered pine block, fastened at one end of the board, serves as a pillow—there being neither bed clothes, mattress or straw. A water waste and dipper in one corner completes the furniture of the cell. The sides of the place are thickly coated with whitewash in the vain effort to purify it. The door is composed of iron bars about one inch in width, and a quarter of an inch in thickness, arranged crosswise, so as to intersect each other at every two and a half inches. At the top is a small aperture eight inches square.

The entire place swarms with vermin. In dog-days, when the cell door was shut, and the door and windows leading to the outer apartment were closed, the atmosphere was stifling in its character, while the vermin ran riot over the unfortunate victims, who could neither lie down nor sit down from very agony, sometimes imploring in heaven's name to be let out, if only for a few moments. In the hottest weather of the season three persons have been confined in this cell at once, two of them sitting on the board and the third lying at full length on his face upon the floor, and all evidencing untold horror and misery.

Sergeant Young has often given directions to have the prisoners taken out at night, and allowed them to lie around on the floor of the outer room.

HOW THE UNKNOWN FARED.

The individual above alluded who would not give his name, was put in No. 4. The door of the

cell was shut and bolted and the outer door was closed also, although it was one of the hottest days of the season. In fifteen minutes his cries were heard, the door opened and he was found in a profuse perspiration with the vermin crawling over and tormenting him.

"For God's sake let me out of this," he said, "and I will do anything you want."

The man or beast that Number 4 cannot tame is beyond the reach of the most injurious torture. Every delinquent who is alluded to as an atrocious villain, is wished no worse fate than incarceration within its walls. "Number 4" is a by-word among the officers and frequenters of headquarters, and is promised as a sort of bugbear to such inmates of the detective office as behave themselves unruly.

One of the individuals who had been arrested for some criminal offence, upon reading an account in the paper of a Rebel victory, laid the paper down as if in disgust, and remarked, "That's the way with our boys, just prick 'em and they run." The words were reported up stairs and the order came down.

"Place him in number four. He will be pricked where he can't run."

The history of this awful receptacle for prisoners can never probably be fully told; and we have only briefly sketched it to show some portion of the machinery used in conducting the business of the provost-marshal's office.

From the Rochester Union.

AN ARBITRARY ARREST.

On Thursday last, a citizen of Canandaigua was riding from this city home in the cars, when he engaged in a political discussion. Being a Democrat, and disapproving of the policy of the Federal Administration in some particulars, he expressed his opinion freely, as he had a right to do. He did not say that President Lincoln was a traitor and deserved hanging—he did not want to push home the charge of treason upon the President—in fact his language in expressing his views of the policy of the Federal Administration was not personal upon the President or calculated to beget disrespect for the man—as is that of the radicals toward Governor Seymour. But the indignation of two men wearing shoulder straps was aroused. They had heard about the suspension of the habeas corpus and concluded that they had a right to arrest a citizen, if they thought he ought to be arrested, and lock him up. So they took the gentleman aforesaid into custody and carried him to Geneva. He made no resistance, and when he reached Geneva was ready to be locked up or otherwise disposed of as his captors might think proper. He presumed that they were acting under Lincoln law—which has displaced all others—and to resist would be rebellion and tend to anarchy, which, as a loyal Union man, he could not engage in. At length somebody advised these military chaps that they had been too fast in making the arrest, and might get into difficulty. Thus alarmed them—as it naturally would men who had taken the course they had—and they sought to get rid of their prisoner. They gave him an opportunity to run away, but he would not do anything of the kind. If he was a prisoner he would remain so till legally discharged. He would not go home a fugitive from custody or by stealth. These fellows, finding that their prisoner would not escape, resolved to run away from him, which they did. They went with him to a saloon to take a drink before taking him to the guard house of the camp, while he was there they skedaddled. The prisoner made diligent inquiry for his custodians, and remained on the spot where they left him until he became satisfied that they had given him the slip, and then he returned by cars to Canandaigua.

American citizens of the State of New York must hear the Executive of this great State denounced as a traitor and threatened with death by the friends of the National Administration, but if a friend of the Governor, elected by a majority of the people of the State, only a year ago, ventures to express an opinion adverse to the policy and some of the acts of the President, he is liable to summary arrest and punishment without the benefit of trial by jury or the *habeas corpus*. Is not this humiliating, and is there a people anywhere but in this country, who would submit to this humiliation? The fact that our people will bear such indignities—such oppression and injustice—proves that they are capable of self-government, and ought to make every man contend still more for the preservation of the Union and the Republican form of government under our Constitution as it is.—*Sept.* 1863.

THE PRISONERS AT FORT LAFAYETTE.

THE DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERCOURSE.

Lieutenant-Colonel Burke, the efficient commandant of Forts Hamilton and Lafayette, thoroughly understands his duties respecting the strict guardianship of the rebels and traitors under his charge. A day or two since a gentleman of this city went down to Fort Hamilton with a note from an official source, asking the Colonel "if his duties would permit" to allow the bearer to visit Mr. ——, one of the most distinguished guests of the nation at Fort Lafayette.

The Colonel knew his visitor to be as loyal as need be, read the note, and then said:

"My dear sir, I would give twenty dollars to see Mr. —— myself. He was formerly an old and esteemed friend of mine, and I should be delighted to pass an hour with him; but my official position and my orders forbid such an interview. The only communication I have had with him has been through one of my officers. Only yesterday his sister came here with a priest and begged permission to see him. The family is Catholic, and I am a Catholic myself, but I was obliged to refuse their application. *No one*, except the proper officer in charge, can have any intercourse with my prisoners.

Just then the mail from the city was brought

into Colonel Burke's office. There were twenty or thirty letters addressed to the prisoners. Colonel Burke looked them over and picked out one. "There is a letter for Mr.——, and I know the hand which addresses it; the letter is from his sister, but I cannot send it in to him. As you know the family, you may open and read it. I shall be obliged to; as I open all letters which come to or from the prisoners. Their family letters I glance at, and if there is anything important to communicate, the purport of the letter is sent to the person to whom it is addressed. My orders with regard to the prisoners are very strict, and I obey them."

"May I leave my card for Mr. ——?" said the visitor. "Certainly, you may write him a note, if you wish. The visitor wrote a note, merely stating that he had called, &c., and Colonel Burke sent it by a sergeant.

"It must be very much like state prison over there." "Oh, no," said the Colonel, "the prisoners have nothing to do, plenty to eat, plenty of air and exercise. They have the run of the fort at proper hours. Do you see that man leaning against the doorway?" "Yes." "Well, let me get the glass, I think that is Mr. ——." He looked, handed the glass to the visitor, and it was Mr. ——. The visitor returned to the city, with the following consolation from the Colonel: "Well, you came down to see Mr. —— and you have seen him." And the Colonel bade his visitor a courteous farewell.—*Evening Post*, September, 1861.

A GOOD DEAL DEPENDS ON YOUR COLOR.

In the Senate of the United States a few days ago, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, a Democrat, offered a resolution, calling on the Secretary of War to inform the Senate whether Dr. John Lane and Mr. Meredith (*white men*) citizens of Delaware, had been arrested and imprisoned, what charges were made against them, and all the papers relating to their arrest, &c.

This resolution was "LAID OVER," which means it was REJECTED.

On the same day, Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts, a Republican, offered a resolution that the Secretary of War be requested to furnish the Senate with any information which he might possess with reference to the sale into slavery of freemen (*black men*) captured or seized by the rebel forces, and state what steps have been taken to redress this outrage on human rights. This resolution was adopted.—*Dec.* 16, 1862, *Hartford Times.*

LIVING IN FORT LAFAYETTE.

Rats are abundant in Fort Lafayette. It is stated that as the unfortunate prisoners lie in their uncomfortable cribs, at night, they are literally covered with the disgusting vermin. One case is reported, in which the unhappy occupant of one of the cells was aroused by a nightmare, to find six of them revelling upon his breast, and of another who felt something nibbling at his pedal extremities, and, immediately kicking a rat was thrown to the ceiling, and fell with a thud to the floor. This is a part of the punishment inflicted by a paternal government upon those who incur its *suspicion* or the enmity of its subordinates, not a single prisoner of that fortress has been confronted by his accuser, or tried by his peers. Many have languished there al most from the beginning of the war.—*Boston Courier.*

THE PRESIDENT AND LIBERTY.—The *Evening Post* favors the country with the following astounding piece of intelligence, which the "order" of Mr. STANTON, this day published, partially confirms:

"The President is fully convinced that the sense of the country is overwhelmingly against anything savoring of tyranny or of a military despotism."

Is he, indeed! After eighty years of American liberty and independence, a lawyer from Illinois, elevated to the chair of WASHINGTON, has actually learned that "the sense of the country" favors freedom, and is not altogether indifferent to justice and the laws! Had an enemy put this scorn upon us it had been easier to bear. But that an American journal should thus, in the language of a court flunkey, record the shame of the land, is almost too much for mortal patience.

Quite too much for mortal patience, a trial beyond all imagined for JOB, is the same journal's explanation of the process through which this light has reached the presidential mind:

"Some of the arrests made have been unnecessary and unjust, and the Administration has suffered for its mistakes."

The "Administration has suffered," mark you—not the American citizens "unnecessarily and unjustly arrested;" not American liberty indecently outraged; not the American name made a laughing stock and scandal of the world, but the "Administration!" The temporary servants of the people have been made to tremble for their wages; the intriguers of party for the success of their schemes.

Can the force of bland unconscious baseness further go?—*World, Nov.* 24, 1862.

The growth of this monstrous system of despotic power in America has astonished the world. To the disgrace of the American name, Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, boasted to a foreign minister, an Englishman, that he had but to touch his little bell and arrest a man in any part of

America. This boast, from an American to an Englishman, will live in history as an evidence of the debasement to which radicalism can bring a people once proud and strong in throwing off a British yoke to establish free institutions.

We have given the faintest outline of the history of despotism in America. The particulars of hundreds of cases might be given, showing the atrocity of the whole system, men were often called from their beds in the middle of the night, to the front door, dragged into carriages, and taken away, without being allowed to communicate with wife or children, leaving their families in total ignorance of their fate.

During all these years the courts were open, and justice might have been administered according to the Constitution. There was no possible excuse for substituting the will of the President for the arm of the law. However guilty a man was, he could and should have been dealt with according to the Constitution and laws of his land. The fact that of these thousands of men seized and imprisoned, no one was ever indicted, no one ever confronted with the witnesses against him, no one ever tried by a jury, this fact abundantly shows the innocence of the suffers, and the gross violence done the Constitution by one who had sworn to support it. But lest our opinion be called partisan, we quote the letter of a distinguished jurist of New York, a Republican in politics, with which we conclude this tract:

LETTER OF A REPUBLICAN JUDGE.

LETTER FROM JUDGE GOULD, OF NEW YORK.

The letter following sufficiently explains itself. It was sent to the President two days after its date by a friend of his, who afforded the first opportunity that could be relied on to insure the delivery to the President in person, and it was so delivered. It was read, and a verbal reply that the case would be investigated was given. But no pretence was made that the cause for the arrest was not correctly stated in my letter.

Though the claim to "investigate" by means of an arbitrary arrest, personal duress, and whatever secret appliances a Cabinet inquisition might see fit to resort to, was reasserting the right so to arrest for such causes, and thus was a claim as utterly at variance with all law, as would have been the similar arrest of a man who (in New York) had picked the Secretary's pocket, still steps were taken to present the case again to the President and the Secretary, through their personal and political friends (and they in high position), in the hope of obtaining redress without publicity.

But as up to this time (after nearly three weeks) nothing has resulted, except an infamously rigorous imprisonment of Mr. Tracy, forbearance has reached its limit. It is highly important that the people should thus and now have a specific statement, showing the enormity of actual oppression exercised in this case, as a warning to them and to the Administration.

Yours, &c., GEO. GOULD.

TROY, N. Y., *Dec. 4th*, 1862.

JUDGE GOULD TO MR. LINCOLN.

NEW YORK, *Nov. 14th*, 1862.

To his Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States:

SIR:—On my arrival in this city, from my residence in Troy, N. Y., I find that a cousin of mine, G. Golden Tracy, a broker of this city, has been, first, arrested and sent to Fort Lafayette; and secondly, to-day taken as a prisoner to Washington. The newspapers say—and so far as I can learn by all inquiries of authorities, I can hear nothing different—that the cause of the arrest is some dealings he had had in contractors' drafts on government officers for moneys; and, it is said, some frauds were committed in or by the drafts, and he is charged with complicity therewith.

If this be so, it is a crime cognizable by the courts, and only by the courts. And I am amazed at the fatuity of public officers who can take no warning from the distinctly uttered voice of a free people.

I am, and always have been, an unwavering enemy of this rebellion—(cursed in its origin, most accursed in its progress)—and a supporter of the Administration. I am a judge of the highest court of this State. And if no honest voice has yet reached the ears of our Government, I wish to say, and to be heard in saying, that Star Chamber process and Secretary's warrants are dangerous instruments to play with, and that, among us, the true, staunch supporters of the Government, who would crush treason with the iron heel, but who know the law, are compelled to hang their heads in silence at the mention of cases which have occurred in our midst.

Spies are hardly cautioned when they are where they can do infinite harm; but a powerful hand, and an oppressive one, is laid on a person here, who is not in a position for doing mischief if he would, and who is supposed to have no friends.

In this respect, I thank God, there has been a mistake. It is true that he is a young man, of not much means or influence; it is also true that he has a young wife (married not long since); and for no assigned cause, and for no assignable cause that those in power dare to give breath to, he is taken away from home, without giving to his wife an instant's interview or a chance to see him. Is this country the France of a century ago?

The young man is the grandson of that Uriah Tracy, who lived and died a Senator of the United States from Connecticut, who was the first man buried in the Congressional burying ground at Washington, and whose ashes are insulted by this atrocious invasion of the liberties of the people in the person of his descendant.

I am not speaking merely my own opinion of such arrests. I know the opinions and the feelings of many of my brethren of the bench. And if the Government is desirous of so proceeding as to

make it our duty to make public our opinions, they will be heard, not merely in the writ of habeas corpus, but in open declaration to the world.

Had I been a few hours earlier made aware of this case, I should not have troubled you with a word; but I would have seen that the process of the Supreme Court of this State was so executed as to protect is citizens accused of such offences from arrest, other than under the appropriate process of the court.

I beg again to assure you, in all sincerity, that this kind of proceeding has gone too far already, and, that, while to the last of our men and our means we are ready and determined to sustain the law and the Government in enforcing the law over this whole land as one country, we are also determined to be judged by the law, and not by any Secretary or any one who is not commissioned for that purpose. We know and acknowledge the rules of war, where the necessity of the case requires the existence of martial law. But we know, also, the common law of liberty, and the broad, great charter of the Constitution.

I write warmly, zealously, because I cannot bear to think of our cherished government's taking any course to injure itself; at a time, too, when our only hope of escaping the eternal disgrace and humiliation of letting the cause of human liberty perish in our hands, is to sustain this government of this Union, and to have it a government worth sustaining. With great respect, yours, &c.

GEORGE GOULD.

Document No. 15.
SOLD at 13 PARK ROW, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices.

THE HARRISON'S BAR LETTER OF GEN. McCLELLAN.

OPINIONS OF JAMES GUTHRIE, JOHN VAN BUREN, REVERDY JOHNSON, &c.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S VIEWS OF THE WAR AND THE COUNTRY.

THE HARRISON'S BAR LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that ie rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of verwhelming us by attacking our positions, or re-ucing us by blockading our river communications. cannot but regard our condition as critical, and I rnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, to r before your Excellency, for your private considera-n, my general views concerning the existing state the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate the situation of this army, or strictly come within ope of my official duties. These views amount to nvictions, and are deeply impressed upon my mind d heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it the cause of free institutions and self-government. ie Constitution and the Union must be preserved; ntever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood. secession is successful, other dissolutions are clear-to be seen in the future. Let neither military aster, political faction, or foreign war, shake your ttled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the ws of the United States upon the people of every ate.

The time has come when the government must de-rmine upon a civil and military policy covering the vole ground of our national trouble. The responsi-ity of determining, declaring, and supporting such il and military policy, and of directing the whole rse of national affairs in regard to the rebellion ist now be assumed and exercised by you, or our ne will be lost. The Constitution gives you power fficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as ch it should be regarded; and it should be con-cted upon the highest principles known to Chris-n civilization. It should not be a war looking to subjugation of the people of any State in any ent. It should not be at all a war upon population, t against armed forces and political organizations. either confiscation of property, political executions persons, territorial organizations of States, or forci-abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a oment. In prosecuting the war, all private proper-and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, bject only to the necessity of military operations l private property taken for military use should be id or receipted for; pillage and waste should be ated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass stern-prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military wards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests ould not be tolerated, except in places where active stilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments nstitutionally made, should be neither demanded r received. Military government should be con-fined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for suppressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support will soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

SPEECH OF HON. JAMES GUTHRIE.

ADDRESS DELIVERED AT NEW ALBANY, IND., SEPTEMBER 15—THE MEANING OF THE CHICAGO PLATFORM—PEACE ON THE BASIS OF THE UNION.

FELLOW CITIZENS OF INDIANA: Kentucky bids you God speed in this great work of saving the nation. I have been in Chicago. I know the platform there adopted by the assembled Democracy. I assisted in making it. I know what it means. It means peace. It means peace upon the basis of the reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity. Who would give up the mouth of the Mississippi and the grave of Jackson for a peace which divided this Union? Who would give up the glorious Constitution of our fathers for a peace which separates this great Republic? Not the Democratic and conservative masses now arrayed under the standard of that hero-statesman, George B. McClellan. No, fellow citizens; it is another party which would thus disrupt this nation if its hideous dogmas of abolitionism are not accepted by the people of the South. The Chicago platform, and the letter of acceptance of McClellan, mean that the President of the United States, and every official of the Government, either in the civil or military department, shall be as obedient to the Constitution as the humblest citizen or soldier. It is a peace platform on the basis of the Union, the Constitution, and the laws. Who dares be against such a platform? Who dares say we shall not have peace upon the basis of the integrity of the Federal Union? If the South is against such a peace; if she refuses to accept the offer of such a peace; if a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain these objects should fail, then the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union *must* be preserved *at all hazards*. Such is the construction of this Chicago platform, as given by General McClellan, the nominee of the convention. Such is the construction I place upon it. Such is the construction placed upon it by the Democratic and conservative masses of the country. We will never give up the mouth of the Mississippi for Jeff. Davis and all his crew. I know him well. The South are for peace. Offer them peace upon this basis, and they will take it—yes, take it with joy, and return to their allegiance. It is the principle of the Constitution that the majority shall rule. It is not for one man to say that we shall or that we shall not have peace. Who is it that reverses this principle of the Constitution, and says that the majority shall not rule? Abraham Lincoln and his party; he who denied the people the right of free speech and the liberty of the press. This is the first time since Abraham Lincoln was elected—the first time since he violated the Chicago platform of 1860—since he violated the laws of Congress—since he violated the Constitution—that the Democratic party has had a chance to speak. And now it will speak until it saves this great republic—this precious Constitution. It will speak at the ballot box, the great and sacred forum from which every American citizen may speak with power. I have a right, as a Kentuckian, to speak of Jeff. Davis and Abraham Lincoln. They were both born in Kentucky, and both have disgraced that noble commonwealth, and her principles of equal rights and just laws. Both of them take men against their wills to fight their battles. Lincoln is doing this now—forcing men to fight for the abolition of slavery, not for the restoration of the Union—sending men into your houses with bayonets, to hold in awe peaceable, loyal citizens. He has to-day scattered throughout the loyal States of the North soldiers enough to subjugate Jeff. Davis's confederacy, to dominate over a free people. I am for peace—for a peace which will give us back the old Union under the Constitution. I was a member of the Peace Congress in 1861. that congress I was for peace, concession, and r newed guarantees to all the States. I believed the as now, that the great waste of precious blood whi has taken place would not restore the Union. I ask that the seven border free and the seven border sla States might propose a basis for the settlement of difficulties. They could have proposed such a basis would have been a full, final, honorable, and satisfa tory settlement. But the radicals in that Congre would not consent to it. Neither the abolitionists the North, nor the secessionists of the South, won consent to it. They would have nothing but bloo Well, have we not had blood to the heart's content the nation? Even the preachers have preached wi and desolation, and blood; the temples of the me and lowly Jesus have been made the temples fro which war, and rapine, and blood has been preache by ministers with hands dripping in blood. Th must be ended. We will hold out the olive bran like a great, and magnanimous, and powerful peop We will offer to the South their rights in the Uni under the Constitution. We will guarantee the rights, and dispose of conflicting and vexatious que tions, so that never again will the toosin of war sounded which shall arm father against son, a brother against brother. We have a noble leader inaugurate this work of the regeneration of a nati George B. McClellan is a young man—but thirty-eig years old; but he is a good man. He is a statesma an able general, a great commander, a Christian ge tleman. It is by his nobleness of heart that he has tached his soldiers to him, so that they regard hi as a father, rather than as an austere command He is the soldiers' friend. Such is the noble McCl lan, the standard-bearer of the Democratic party. will, no doubt, get the votes of the soldiers and honest Democrats and conservatives; but he will n get the votes of the shoddy contractors and those w are making mints of money off of the adversities their country. I need not tell you to-day, my fello citizens, how we have suffered in Kentucky under t iron rule of this weak, vacillating, and tyrannic A ministration. Our desolated fields—the blood of o sons—the destruction of our property—the almost t tal suspension of our trade, are known throughout t land. If a citizen dares to utter complaint again this wholesale outrage and violation of rights, he spotted by the myrmidons of power, and is incarce ated in the dungeons of the felon. What agonies w told the people of Kentucky have suffered, remain be told by the future historian, when he comes write out the history of this terrible rebellion. B this tyrannic policy of the party in power has be reviewed in our resolutions at Chicago. We will no put a great and a good man into the Presidenti chair, a man who, had he been sustained with t power that Grant has been sustained, would ha given the country peace two years ago. There is upheaving of the masses, and I believe we would less than American citizens if we did not make effort to change the present state of affairs in t country. The ballot box is the great weapon of t American people. It is the weapon of peace. To let us appeal for a redress of grievances. But the da might come when the effort may be made to stifle th voice of the people at the ballot box. Then I will n to-day say what the people should do. I couns united zeal and exertion for the cause of the count and liberty. All the people must work to the sam end. You have only till November to work. Be ea nest, then, and zealous. I speak to you thus, becau I believe that upon the result of this election is su pended the fate of the American republic. Ever man to his post—every man to his duty; then all wi be well, and peace and happiness will be again re stored to the country.

:ON. JOHN VAN BUREN FOR McCLELLAN—HIS LETTER TO THE GREAT MASS MEETING AT ALBANY.

Gentlemen: It will not be in my power to attend
e meeting at Albany on Wednesday, but I hope be-
e the campaign closes to have the privilege of ad-
ssing my old friends at the capital. Without un-
rtaking to dictate to others, I had marked out a
rse which it seemed to me the part of patriotism
pursue. While war was raging, and no presiden-
l canvass was pending, I endeavored to give to the
ad of the Government, a cordial and unreserved
pport. I should have preferred to continue so doing
the 4th of March, when the official term of our
ief magistrate closes. But the President precludes
s course by stepping into the arena, before any can-
date is nominated against him, and demanding,
rough his office-holders and friends, a re-election.
does this against the protest of a respectable body
his former supporters, who present for the offices
President and Vice-President the former Republi-
candidate for President, and the present Republi-
attorney-general of this State. The representa-
es of the Democratic party, with wise forbearance,
d deferred the nomination of candidates until the
of July, some two months later than the usual
ne, and afterwards, in conjunction with conservative
n of other parties, had again postponed the com-
encement of the canvass until the end of August,
as leaving barely time for the delegates from distant
ates, like California and Oregon, to attend the con-
ntion and return home to participate in the elec-
n. Under such circumstances the name of General
cClellan, a tried and able soldier, a cultivated and
complished gentleman, and a thorough patriot,
s been presented in opposition to his own
shes for the chief magistracy. A contest thus
allenged by the President, and deferred till the
test moment by his opponents, is now before us, and
is important at the outset to bear in mind how it
iginated. Although short in duration, it is likely
be severe beyond all previous example. The enor-
ous patronage of the Government will be used with-
t reserve to perpetuate power in the hands that now
old it. A trained band of office-holders constitute
effective political organization. Executive con-
raint of the press, the mail, and the telegraph, puts
e means of communication to a vast extent in the
ower of the President. Against this formidable
mbination, an undisciplined mass of men is to con-
tend. But I have no apprehensions as to the result. Much association with the American people and hourly observation of their intelligence, courage, and sagacity, inspire me with entire faith as to their action now.

They will, as heretofore, pour forth their blood and treasure without stint to put down the rebellion. They will hold up the hands and strengthen the hearts of those gallant soldiers, Grant, Sherman, Meade, Hancock, Smith, Blair, Granger, Thomas, Rosecrans, Sheridan, Kilpatrick, Stoneman, Averill, and their associates; and those enterprising sailors, Farragut, Porter, Winslow, Dupont, Worden, Drayton, and others. They will, thus, I trust, overthrow the organized and armed resistance of the rebel States, despite of all the obstacles to success that have been or may be interposed at Washington. But the discharge of those sacred duties will not interfere with the careful and intelligent selection of a new chief magistrate, who is not only competent to make war but able to make peace.

There are two men who obviously can never make a peace that will receive the sanction of the American people. They are Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. The former has declared the abolition of slavery an indispensable preliminary to a proposition for peace. The latter avows that the confederate States accept no alternative but independence or annihilation. With the former we have to deal at this election. The latter must be left to the fortunes of war, or the fate that the rebel States have in store for him. But unless we are prepared for an eternal war, and the slaughter, debt, taxation and the suspension of the Constitutional liberty that attends it, Abraham Lincoln must be made to retire on the 4th of March next, and a President must be chosen in his stead who will consent to peace on the basis of the Union and the Constitution. Such a man is General McClellan, and I cannot allow myself to doubt that the loyal people of the United States will call him to the discharge of this, as well as all the other grave duties that belong to the chief magistracy. The overthrow of Davis and his associates at Richmond, will soon follow, and peace once more smile on our distracted country.

Truly yours,

J. Van Buren.

Willowbrook, Sept. 12, 1864.

:HE SOUTHERN LEADERS WANT LINCOLN RE-ELECTED.

[From the Richmond Enquirer, September 5th.]

The Democratic nominees in the United States
re McClellan for President and Pendleton for Vice-
President. What concern have the people of
hese Confederate States in the fate of these can-
lidates at the approaching election? In our opin-
on, the interest and hope of peace is not greatly
dvanced by these nominations. From General
cClellan our people can have but little hope of
eace, other than a reconstruction peace. * * *
What hope do his antecedents hold out that should
ncourage our people to believe that he would
rield our nationality any sooner than Mr. Lincoln?
He is by far the more dangerous man for us;
had his policy been persistently followed, and the
war conducted on the principles of civilized warfare,
he might have divided our people and, perhaps, con-
quered our liberties. With consummate abilities,
he clearly foresaw that emancipation might possi-
bly free the negroes, but could not unite the sec-
tions; that confiscation might enrich his soldiers,
but could not reconcile our people; hence, with an
earnest and honest love for the Union, he avoided
those fatal acts, and conducted the war for the res-
toration of the Union, rather than the destruction of the South. His policy was the olive branch in one hand and the sword in the other, to conquer by power and conciliate by kindness. *It was a most dangerous policy for us; for if the ameliorating hand of Federal kindness had softened the rigors of war, our people would not have been subjected to those terrible fires of suffering by which Mr. Lincoln has hardened every heart and steeled every sentiment* against our merciless foes. As a sincere secessionist, preferring war and nationality to peace and the Union, we looked upon the fact of a difference between Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan as to the proper policy of conducting the war, as peculiarly fortunate for our cause. We hailed the proclamations of emancipation and confiscation, and the policy of plunder and devastation as sure pledges of our ultimate triumph; they were terrible ordeals, but they most effectually eradicated every sentiment of Union, and arousing the pride as well as the interest of our people, inflamed the patriotism of the whole, until they would have accepted death as preferable to ultimate defeat.

Now, between McClellan and Lincoln there are many points of difference—the former is a man of talents, of information, of firmness and great mili-

tary experience and ability—the latter is a supple, pliant, easy fool, a good but vulgar joker.

While McClellan has the interest of the Union only at heart, Mr. Lincoln has the fanatical object of freeing negroes for his inspiration. Between "my plan," as General Grant has conducted it, and one by General McClellan, there could not have been the same success that has already attended our arms, *for we lost more men fighting the science of McClellan on the Peninsula than we have in repelling the furious but ill-conducted assaults of General Grant.*

THUS, WHETHER WE LOOK AT THIS NOMINATION IN THE LIGHT OF PEACE OR WAR, WE PREFER LINCOLN TO MCCLELLAN. *We can make better terms of peace with an anti-slavery fanatic than with an earnest Unionist.* We can gain more military success in a war conducted on "my plan" than one of a real soldier like McClellan, and sooner destroy the resources and strength of our enemy where they are managed and manipulated by the light-fingered gentry of Messrs. Chase and Fessenden, than when husbanded and skilfully controlled by such a man as Guthrie. Our best hope is from the honest fanatics of the United States, men who believe in their hearts that slavery is the "sum of all villanies," and who really and sincerely believe it to be their duty to separate their country from this "relic of barbarism." Such men, when they find that their people are tired of the war, will end it by a peace that sacrifices territory to freedom, and will let the South "go," provided she carries slavery with her. These men believe no less that the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed, than "that all men are created free and equal." The two postulates are of like importance to an abolitionist.

Both the Abolitionist and the Democrat is our enemy—the one, because we have slaves, the other, because we are disunionists. Nor does their enmity differ in degree; they both hate us most intense The Chicago platform is that "peace may be restor on the basis of the Federal Union of the States"—t is: reconstruction of the Union as it was—with sl ery protected by nominal laws, but warred upon by real sentiment, aggravated and embittered by the w The reconstructed Union of the Chicago platfo would be the certain destruction—first, of slavery, a next of slaveholders. With Lincoln and the Ba more platform, we of the Confederate States kn where we are—outside of the pale of mercy, devot to ruin and destruction, with no hope save in t justice and protection of God, and the courage a manliness of our soldiers and people. With swor and muskets and cannon we fight Lincoln, and t past affords no reasons of apprehension of the futu But in the reconstructed Union of the Chicago pl form, we would be deprived of our weapons witho being reconciled to our foes.

There is no question that between the two m General McClellan enjoys far more of the respect the people of these States than Lincoln, and t Democratic party far more of our confidence than t Republican, and that *if reconstruction were possible would be more probable under General McClellan a the Democracy than under Lincoln and the Republican* The Northwest inspires one, and New England t other; but as long as New England imposes the do mas of her civilization, and the tenets of her fanat cism upon the mind and people of the Northwes there may be peace and separation, but there neve can be union and harmony. If the Northwest desir the restoration of the Union, let its people shake o the bondage of New England, and *show to the wor that a new era of toleration and fraternal kindness h risen in the place of fanatical Puritanism and selfi ostracism.*

LETTER FROM THE HON. REVERDY JOHNSON, of Maryland

SARATOGA SPRINGS, Sept. 16, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: Your invitation to the meeting to-morrow, of the Democratic and conservative organizations of your city (just received in this place), to ratify the recent Chicago nominations, I would cheerfully accept, if it was in my power.

In the early days of Mr. Lincoln's administration, I lost almost all hope of a successful termination of the rebellion, whilst he was at the head of the government, and this, the merest hope, is now wholly extinguished. His infirmity of purpose, his unsteadiness in any policy, his once expressed dislike to radicalism—his subsequent adoption of its worst features—his ignorant and mischievous interference with our military campaigns—his appointment, often against advice, of high military officers of notorious incompetency—his frequent and nearly fatal changes of commanders, his abandonment of the, before, uniform practice of his predecessors of cabinet consultations, his permission of dishonoring dissensions among its members, displaying itself constantly, to his knowledge, before others, and often, as it is known, in his presence, in personal abuse of each other; his obstinate and reckless disregard of the wishes of his political friends, communicated to him on one occasion in the solemn form of a committee, representing, as he was aware, nine-tenths, if not every friend he had in Congress; and again, and recently, expressed in terms not to be mistaken, in one of the resolutions of the convention which nominated him for reelection; his permitting military interference with elections, virtually subjecting the ballot to the control of the bayonet; his justifying arrests without specifications of charges, though over and over again demanded, and long-continued imprisonment: and, after release, without trial or explanation, his tolerating trial, by military commission, of offences made cognizable exclusively by acts of Congress passed since the rebellion, by the civil courts, and the virtual confiscation of private property, without even a resort to any mode of trial, and other matters of like illegality and outrage, too many to detail in a letter, whilst they demonstrate his utter unfitness for the Presidency, give no promise of a successful result of the contest whilst he is the commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and intrusted, by the power he wields, with the shaping of et peace and war policy. This must be arrested, or, in my opinion, the country will be ruined.

This fatal career can be and would be stopped by th election of almost any loyal man in his stead, and the re sult is certain if Gen. McClellan becomes the successor His perfect devotion to the Union and his expressed de termination to make its restoration the "one condition o peace"—the purity of his character, his demonstrate ability, and his military attainments—furnish guarantees that in his hands the executive power will not be abused but be directed, in strict subordination to the Constitu tion, to the sole end of restoring the Union, which is our inheritance, and causing it again to shed its blessings over a now sorely troubled and bleeding nation. Wild, insane, and reckless partisans may assail him with every opprobrious epithet—men who have tasted of that insane root, the obtaining of high office at home or abroad, may tell us, to the disgust of all patriotic men, that "it is not too much to say, 'that it would be far better that Robert E. Lee should enter Washington at the head of his army, as its conqueror, than that George B. McClellan should enter it as President.'" A ludicrously inconsistent and even illogical premier, the half of whose official papers and speeches answer the other half, may threaten treachery on the part of the Administration, on the happening of Mr. Lincoln's defeat in November, by declaring himself unable in that contingency to "vouch for the safety of the country against the rebels during the interval which must elapse before the new Administration can constitutionally come into power," and the canvass may be continued as, with some honorable exceptions, it has begun, by the billingsgate abuse and calumnious charges against our candidates and their friends; yet, from all these causes we have nothing to fear. Success is in our hands, if we are true to duty. Under the protection of Divine Providence we can achieve for our country a victory, greater in its results than any present military success. We can elect McClellan and Pendleton in spite of office holders, contractors, and administrative influence and power; and that done, in a short time thereafter State after State will be found returning to allegiance, until, at a date not remote, the Union will be restored, fraternal affections revived, and peace, and plenty, and happiness, and national character and power be substituted for division, hatred, war, destitution, wretchedness, national dishonor and comparative weakness. With regard, your obedient servant,

REVERDY JOHNSON.

Document No. 21.

SOLD at 13 PARK ROW, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices.

THE TWO
Letters of Gen. H. M. Naglee about Gen. McClellan.

PHILADELPHIA, Sept. 27, 1864.

MY DEAR SIR: Our acquaintance, and all of he relations that have ever existed between s, are confined to two or three accidental meet-gs, at one of which you were pleased to refer the lasting impression made upon you, when poor boy, by the kindness of my father, who ways took you by the hand, and gave you neering, friendly words of encouragement and dvice. You were pleased to acknowledge to he son the kind and valuable influences re-eived by you from the father, and to proffer our friendly services whenever they would be eceptable.

Under the above circumstances you prepared r me and my friends no ordinary surprise hen you deliberately composed, delivered and ublished in the *Press* of the 23d inst., a volun-ary, unprovoked attack upon me, in the follow-g words:

It got out that the President was determined to ave the army moved, and it was found that General cClellan had no plan; and here I may state that e owe the Peninsular campaign to those distinguished enators, Latham, of California, and Rice, of Minne-ota, and a brigadier in the column of Joseph Hook-r. General McClellan's plan was concocted by thers and put into his hands. It was agreed on in council of war. That plan was submitted to the resident. It was submitted in the presence of Sec-etary Stanton. Stanton put them through a strict ourse of examination. One general (Blenker) owned hat he did not understand the plan, but would sus-ain it, as he thought he had to obey the mandates of is chief. General Naglee was one of those present, nd Stanton observed that he had but one star. Sir," said Mr. Stanton, "you have no right here." I am representing General Hooker," said he. It as afterwards found out that General Naglee was bsent without leave, and that fighting Joe Hooker new nothing of the council." (Applause.)

Now, my dear sir, this statement is simply alse, and on the part of your friend, Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, maliciously false. The Peninsular campaign was not indicated y "Senators Latham, of California, and Rice, f Minnesota, and a brigadier in the column of oseph Hooker," as asserted by you. General Naglee was at Washington with proper leave, nd with the full knowledge of General Hooker, nd was a member of the council of war by irection of General McClellan, to represent he division of the army at Budd's ferry, in the bsence of General Hooker, who was too far emoved from Washington to be present. And nfortunately for the veracity of Mr. Stanton, he impertinent remarks which you ascribe to im could not have been made, for there were o officers of the council of war entitled, at hat time, to more than one star.

Now, Judge, you knew, or should know, that the reputation of Mr. Stanton for truth and veracity is not above suspicion, and that you may well believe anything that may be said regarding his great incivility and rudeness, for not excepting yourself, I have never seen or heard of an officer or civilian who did not condemn him for the utter want of all of the requisites of a gentleman.

This is not the first time Mr. Stanton has been guilty of the most deliberate, malicious misrepresentation, and for your gratification I will relate an instance that occurred upon my arrival in Washington, immediately after the conclusion of "the seven days' fight," in the beginning of July of 1862, and when I was surprised to learn that during the continuance of that desperate struggle, and during the time of dreadful suspense, whilst nothing could be heard of General McClellan and his gallant army, Mr. Stanton had everywhere denounced General McClellan as a traitor to his country, and as incapable of commanding a regiment. I learned this from a number of the members of Congress, who were astonished and confounded, and who, with pain, eagerly sought from me some explanation of such extraordinary conduct. I could render them no satisfaction, but reported the circumstances to General McClellan upon my arrival at his headquarters on the following day, the 8th of July. His surprise, Judge, was greater than mine; without uttering a word, he turned to his portfolio, took from it a letter, which he placed before me, and said: "Read that; I have just received it from Mr. Stanton."

With his consent I made a copy of the letter, and returning to Washington, placed it in the hands of those who had heard the denunciations of Mr. Stanton, and who had advised me of them. They desired to read it to the Senate, and to publish the outrage and the vindication, and they telegraphed to General McClellan for his permission, which he declined to give them. The following is a copy of the letter:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1862.

DEAR GENERAL:—I had a talk with General Marcy, and meant to have written you by him, but am called to the country, where Mrs. Stanton is with her children, to see one of them die. I can, therefore, only say, my dear General, in this brief moment, that there is no cause in my heart or conduct for the cloud that wicked men have raised between us for their own base and selfish purposes. No man had ever a truer friend than I have been to you, and shall continue to be. You are seldom absent from my thoughts, and I am ready to make any sacrifice to aid you. Time allows me to say no more than that

I pray Almighty God to deliver you and your army from all peril, and lead you on to victory.

Yours, truly,

EDWIN M. STANTON.

Now, Judge, what think you of this man, who, made Secretary of War by the request and influence of General McClellan, was vilifying and abusing and uttering falsehoods against him, and who could at the same time sit down and deliberately write such a letter?

You have referred to the council of war held in Washington in March of 1862. Every effort has been made in vain to bring the proceedings of that council before the public. A call was made for them in the House of Representatives and was tabled by the Republican party. A request made by the recorder of that council, of Mr. Stanton, to allow him to have the proceedings made up in proper form, was refused in a most rude and insulting manner, and the papers have never been allowed to leave his possession since.

Now, Judge, for your especial benefit, I will relate the history of that important event, that you may, if you will, do justice to all concerned.

The council of war consisted of Brigadier-Generals Sumner, McDowell, Franklin, F. J. Porter, McCall, Heintzelman, Keyes, A. Porter, W. F. Smith, Barnard, Blenker and Naglee, each entitled to but "one star." It was called together by order of General McClellan on the night of March 7, 1862, to convene at ten A. M. on the following day.

General McClellan came into the council room at the hour appointed, and placing on the table a large map, explained his proposed Peninsular campaign, which, before this time, I believe to have been known to no one present excepting General Franklin and probably Fitz J. Porter. Upon retiring he left upon the table, for the consideration of the council, the following inquiries:

1.—Whether it is advisable that the base of operations shall be changed, the transportation being ready at Annapolis in all of next week?

2.—Whether it is better to make an advance to the front before changing the base, should such a change be determined upon?

3.—Whether a forward movement, with the object of destroying the river batteries, is advisable, and when it can be commenced, and whether the naval force, with the assistance of the Ericsson battery, can alone accomplish that object?

After a session of three hours the council were summoned to appear before the President. He advised them that he was quite unwell and exceedingly nervous; that the pressure had been intense against General McClellan. He expressed himself gratified to have the opportunity to see and know the officers of the army, and to be instructed by them in regard to army matters, which were to him very incomprehensible.

I informed him that, as recorder of the council of war which had held its session by ord of Gen. McClellan, I would advise him of t result of its proceedings, and then read them him. "What, said he, "have the council d cided by a vote of eight to four—two to one in favor of the Peninsular campaign?" then asked many questions in regard to t same, until Mr. Stanton came in, and I pr posed to read the proceedings to him. He r plied, "Give me the papers, I'll read them m self," and, after reading them over and prep ing his notes, he, as you say, "put them (t council) through the strict course of examir tion" which you refer to. This examinati made for the purpose of neutralizing the eff of the decision of the council of war on t mind of the President, and thus carry out t objects of those who had been insisting up the removal of General McClellan, lasted four or five hours, during which time it w only interrupted by an occasional expression the President, indicating his satisfaction a gratification at the many explanations of mi tary movements contemplated, and which had not before been able to comprehend.

It was now getting dark. Mr. Stanto questions indicated approaching exhaustion, a finding there was a silence which called for cessation of hostilities on his part for the nigh Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly gratifi with the interview, said he was impressed wi the earnestness and intelligence of the offic present, and that he had every confidence them. He was now determined not to remo General McClellan, as he had promised to d but that he should make his campaign, as a proved by the council of war, under restrictio which he would make known on the followi morning, at ten o'clock, when he desired t presence of all the officers of the council, a until after which time he desired that none them should leave the city.

Before leaving the President the recorder the council approached the Secretary and sai —"If you please, Mr. Stanton, permit me have the proceedings of the council of wa that they may be copied in a fair hand, a General Sumner, the president of the counc will sign them, the recorder will sign them, a they will then be in proper form." "I'm ju as good a judge of the form as you are," w the reply of your friend.

Other incivilities have been attempted b Mr. Stanton towards me, the manner and r sult of which he has neither forgotten nor fo given, and which he may relate to you whe ever he may feel so disposed.

On the following morning, at the appointe hour, when all of the officers of the council o war had assembled, Mr. Lincoln said:—"I hav slept better than for two weeks. I feel relieve of an immense responsibility. I have dete mined upon the following programme," whic he submitted verbally, and which was substa tially as follows:—

"I will permit General McClellan to carr

t his campaign. He shall leave sufficient ·ce to defend the works before Washington. e shall embark fifty thousand men from An- polis; and then, unless the batteries on the otomac, which you assure me will necessarily abandoned, are withdrawn or silenced, I shall serve my authority to embark other troops." e then said, "I have determined to divide eneral McClellan's army into four corps, and hall appoint the commanders of them." And terwards he promoted the four officers who id opposed General McClellan's campaign, ree of whom he appointed to the command corps, and, with the exception of Generals anklin and Smith, who have been the subjects constant annoyance and indignities since, the hers have all been dismissed from the army. The Peninsular campaign was proposed by eneral McClellan whilst commander-in-chief the armies of the United States, and was in- nded to be made with the forces then under s command in Eastern Virginia, estimated at er two hundred thousand men. It was so cepted by the President, and the movement as commenced upon that basis. General Mc- llellan had scarcely left Washington to take the eld when the Secretary of War relieved him all the armies not under his (General Mc- llellan's) immediate command, and assumed ommand of them himself. The troops left in ortheastern Virginia were placed under the ommand of McDowell, Banks, Fremont and igel, each being independent of the other, and General McClellan, and all subject to the rder of Mr. Stanton. Whilst the above divi- on of our army was taking place, the Confed- rates concentrated theirs until, on the 26th ay of June, General McClellan found himself efore Richmond with eighty-five thousand nen (including McCall's division), and was ttacked by the concentrated Confederate force f one hundred and seventy-five thousand at he very moment when McDowell, under pro- est, withdrew his assistance from McClellan, y the orders of the President and Secretary of War.

The campaign under General Grant did not ommence until the 4th of May, 1864. That f Chancellorsville, in which the casualties of hat army were estimated at thirty thousand nen, and which, but for the providential kill- ng of Stonewall Jackson, would have been nnihilated, was planned by the President and General Hooker, or to use the President's own words, "by Joe and I," of which the Secretary of War and General Halleck were kept pro- foundly ignorant, and was not commenced until May 2, 1863; whilst that of the Peninsula, for the delay of which General McClellan was so much censured, was commenced on the 25th of March, 1862, forty days in advance of either of the others.

Why this bitter enmity and persecution of General McClellan? why, in the beginning of March, was the President pressed to death to remove him, even before he had made his first trial in command of the Army of the Potomac? Why did a distinguished member of the Senate, on the 17th of March, write to me: "The cry against McClellan is increasing; every effort is being made to crush him." What possible chance had General McClellan to succeed, when his own Government did everything in their power to embarrass his movements and break him down? One would think his task sufficiently onerous, laborious and responsible, when, without experience, after the first disastrous rout at Bull Run, he reorganized the armies of the United States and was preparing to fight them without the additional conviction being forced upon him at every step that his own Government were determined "to crush him."

Judge, you and I met within ten days after the dreadful battles before Richmond. You attacked General McClellan with a bitterness and feeling that ill becomes a Christian gentleman. I then begged you not to break down General McClellan until you had given him a fair trial, and until you had found a better man, and challenged you to name a better general. I now do the same thing, and appeal to the record of the past thirty months, and to the rivers of blood that have flown since, to sustain what I then asserted. I refer you to the opinions of foreign officers, and I assure you that among the old officers of the army I shall be fully sustained.

The preference of General McClellan for the Peninsular campaign, and the condemnation of the President's plan, have been fully sustained. The families and friends of the one hundred and thirty thousand men lost south of the Rapidan since the 4th of May last, proclaim it everywhere. Mr. Stanton told the country at that time, he had a hundred thousand men more than he wanted, and now he tells you he wants a hundred thousand more men.

General Grant crossed the Rapidan with an army variously estimated from 118,000 to	120,000
He afterwards added Butler's . . .	40,000
He was reënforced	45,000
Making, exclusive of Sigel's 30,000, .	205,000

On the 1st of September, our forces were estimated, exclusive of Sheridan's 30,000, at 50,000.

General Lee had on the Rapidan, after he had concentrated his army, .	85,000
Beauregard joined him at Richmond with his forces from the South, which, with those near Petersburg, amounted to	30,000
Breckinridge brought	10,000
And Lee was reënforced, probably, .	30,000
Making, in all, ...	155,000

On the 1st of September, his forces were es

timated at Richmond at 45,000, exclusive of Early's command—30,000—showing the discharges and loss from General Grant to be 150,000, and that of Lee to be 85,000.

Judge Kelly, were the records of the council of war, and that of "the strict course of examination" made by Mr. Stanton, indicating the very difficulties and dreadful losses General Grant has lately sustained, ever placed before him? And why not? And who is responsible for the one hundred thousand men unnecessarily and wickedly sacrificed south of the Rapidan, in the experiment made to prove that General McClellan and the council of war were wrong, and that the President's plan was right.

The army of the United States, as you found it at the commencement of this war, was composed of a high-toned, intelligent, honorable, gallant set of men, fully equal to the contest before them. They had always studiously avoided all political connections; many of whom had been thirty years in the service of their country and had never voted. They held their country and the honor and integrity of it before every other consideration. Had a rule been adopted requiring that no political subject should be introduced into the army, but that all political rights should be respected, and had army officers only been held responsible for the conduct of the war, it would have terminated long ago.

Why have McClellan, and Sedgwick, and McPherson, and Bayard, and Franklin, and Buell, and Meade, and Averill, and Porter, and a score of other general officers, with hundreds, if not thousands, of officers of an inferior grade, been offended and held back, and many of them dismissed from the army without a word of explanation—an arbitrary act unknown in Great Britain—while Pope, and Burnside, and Hooker, and Butler, and Hunter, and Banks, and Sigel, and Sickles, and hundreds of others, certainly no better than the former, have been preferred? Why was Gen. Stone, than whom there is not a more loyal man and accomplished gentleman and gallant soldier in the country, confined in prison for fifteen months? And when released by an act of Congress, why was it that neither the President, nor Secretary of War, nor Secretary of State, or other persons at Washington, would assent to any knowledge or any participation in the arrest? Such outrages are calculated to break down the honor and *esprit du corps* of any army, and all have looked on with disgust and horror and pain at the shameful injustice and outrages that have been continually heaped upon so many of their old friends and comrades in arms, whom they know incapable of an ungentlemanly, dishonorable, unsoldierly, or disloyal act.

Why did the Committee on the Conduct of the War investigate and falsify with such nice precision the conduct of McClellan and his friends, and overlook the volumes of charges filed in the War Department against Fremont, and Sigel, and Hunter, and others, and entirely overlook the immense slaughter at Chancellorsville, and Fredericksburg, and south of the Rapidan? Why did a secret political inquisition, with no other pretext than that they suspected him of political ambition, sit over five hundred days, and manufacture over seventeen hundred pages of *ex parte* testimony against a young officer, a Christian gentleman, an honest man, who, Heaven only knows, never had but one purpose, and that, to serve his country and his God?

You know, Judge, that while in Washington General McClellan studiously avoided all political association, and to such an extent that many of his friends of both parties were much offended.

The first knowledge that I ever had of any political ambition on his part, was after he had been retired from active service and sent in disgrace to New Jersey; and this was after his fitness for the succession had been discovered by Mr. Lincoln, and the people had signified their affection for him. His letters and orders have been called political; but they were eminently proper, and refer entirely to the military policy of the country. But, Judge, suppose we admit that General McClellan had an ambition to be President of the United States was it not a laudable ambition, and is there any impropriety in it? Is the field not open to him as well as to Mr. Lincoln, or Mr. Fremont, or Mr. Chase, or the many others infinitely his inferiors? So far as the objections to his military qualifications are concerned, we have only to remind you that, within the last sixty days, a confidential friend of the President was sent to offer him one of the most important commands of the army. But this proposition was coupled with the most dishonorable condition—that he should decline to be a candidate for the Presidency. General McClellan restrained his indignation, and replied to the bearer of the message, "Go back to Washington and say to the President for me that when I receive my official, written orders, he shall have my answer."

Beware, Judge, of the intemperate abuse of your political opponents, as proud and loyal as you are, who would rather see the continent of America sink into the ocean, with all that dwells upon it, than see our nationality destroyed; who will not endure this constant usurpation of authority and encroachment upon their rights, and whom you may drive into a dreadful conflict, in which the abolitionist and the negro may find themselves arrayed against all who will unitedly stand, hand in hand, and shoulder to shoulder, in defence of the Constitution and the fundamental laws of the land. Very respectfully,

HENRY M. NAGLEE.

To Hon. Wm. D. Kelley, Philadelphia.

SECOND CHAPTER

FROM THE

ECRET HISTORY OF THE WAR.

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 6.

MY DEAR SIR: I once went hunting, and
d at a mischievous, chattering chipmonk,
l found, when the smoke had cleared away,
t the chipmonk, although badly wounded,
de a great pretence that he was not hurt at
But, strange to say, when firing at the
ser game, I had hit a fox, and that fox one
the most cunning, destructive animals that
l ever infested the neighborhood. Would
u believe it, I never stopped to listen to the
ipmonk, but loaded again for the fox.
Now, Judge, the moral: Without a word or
act on my part to justify it, you attacked
, and I responded. Although winged, you
clare you are not hurt; but the President
d Secretary, I am informed, are badly hurt,
e latter mortally; the former so much so that
hall let you flutter until I try another load.
ok on, Judge; be quiet, await your time; I
ve ammunition for both the fox and the chip-
nk.

In the *Press*, *North American* and *Inquirer*, d in all of the Republican newspapers of the untry, I have found the following:

GENERAL NAGLEE'S LETTER.

E OF HIS STATEMENTS ABOUT PRESIDENT LINCOLN AUTHORITATIVELY DENIED.

[From the National Republican (Official), Oct 3.]

The copperhead press of the country are giving culation to a letter addressed by General Naglee to n. William D. Kelley, of Philadelphia, in which the thor, speaking of General McClellan, makes the folwing statement:

"So far as the objections to his military qualificans are concerned, I have only to remind you that, thin the last sixty days, a confidential friend of the esident was sent to offer him one of the most imrtant commands of the army. But this proposition as coupled with the most dishonorable condition—at he should decline to be a candidate for the Presiney. General McClellan restrained his indignation, d replied to the bearer of the message, 'Go back to ashington, and say to the President for me, that nen I receive my official written orders, he shall have y answer.'"

We are authorized to say that the President has no recollection of sending any message or messenger to General McClellan, or of receiving any from him, at any time since he was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac, and certainly none such as mentioned in the published letter of General Naglee. If the President sent a message in writing, the writing can be produced; if a messenger, he can be named. Let either be done if it can.

To this I answer, that before the assembling of the Chicago Convention, about the middle of August, the President sent one of his old and confidential friends to propose to McClellan that if he would decline to be a candidate for the Presidency before the Chicago Convention, and would consent to throw the weight of his influence, with the Democratic party, in favor of the Republican nominee, he should have any position, civil or military, in the gift of the President, when reëlected, and that the whole influence of the next Administration should be thrown in his (McClellan's) favor for the succession.

Pardon me, Judge, but hold still just one moment longer, that I may inform you, that prior to this, there was a written correspondence between the son of this confidential old friend of the President, and a prominent Democrat, making substantially the same proposition. Now, in connection with the above, let me call the attention of your friends to the following extract from the published speech of the Hon. Montgomery Blair, made since my letter to you of the 27th of September, was written.

"On his (Vallandigham's) motion, every voice that had been raised to fury against the nomination of McClellan was silenced, and the vote in his favor made unanimous. There was a potent spell in his voice that made 'a cessation of hostilities,' 'a convention of the states,' of course as equals and independent, and a *quondam* chief of the federal army—(one whom to the last I believe to be true to the cause in which his country is embarked, and, I may add, whom the President held to be patriotic, and had concerted with General Grant to bring again into the field as his adjunct, if he turned his back on the proposals of the peace junto at Chicago)—to lead the last assault pressed by the Southern conspirators, countenanced by foreign powers, against the institutions of the country."

Let us rejoice. There is some hope for our country. Let us rejoice that we have found one honest man, one who would not sell himself, and betray his country, and who, amidst the most outrageous persecution that ever a strong government inflicted upon a single, unsupported, inexperienced young officer, had the courage to resent a disgraceful bribe and insult.

You have affirmed and re-affirmed that General McClellan had no plan, and that finally, about the end of February, in your own words, McClellan had exhausted the President's stock of patience; but that he had in the kindness of his heart determined to give General McClellan a chance to redeem himself from utter ridicule, and had given him ten days in which to propose a plausible plan of a campaign. It was then "you said he had no plan, and that when several of the promised ten days had passed he was still without a plan." You further say that General Naglee received a communication from a Democratic senator, Mr. Latham, of California, which let you (General Naglee) know that General McClellan was in danger of removal, because he had stipulated to submit a plan of campaign "within a certain number of days, and would be removed if he did not, and requested you (Naglee) to hasten to Washington." And now, Judge, listen to the truth. No doubt, having indulged so freely in fiction, the truth will be a little distasteful to you, but, as a favor to me, listen to it until I have done, after which, as far as I am concerned, you may resume your natural inclinations.

First, then, for the purpose of falsifying your declarations read the following:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give *satisfactory answers* to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine?

2d. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine?

3d. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine?

4th. In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this: that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

5th. In case of a disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

Yours, truly,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Major General McClellan.

And for the further refutation and falsification of what you have said, I hereby assert what I know to be true. During the month of January, 1862, General McClellan had been very ill. The President became very restive under the outside pressure which demanded, through the Republican press, that the army should "on to Richmond," and was about consent to some movement proposed by Ge eral McDowell. On hearing this, General M Clellan arose from his sick bed and proceed to the presidential mansion, there to join t President and his Cabinet, who had been sembled to meet him. He was asked by t President "*to give his plan of campaign.*" hesitated for a moment, during which he membered that all information furnished to t Cabinet found its way to the confidential frien of some of them, and thence by the multitu of spies that infested the War and other d partments it was forthwith communicated the enemy, and he replied that he would do if the President ordered it, but as the Preside must know how immediately such informati was transmitted to the enemy, he, McClella preferred not to make known his plan of ca paign to the Cabinet unless the President shou order it, and the President declined to mal the order.

Mr. Chase remarked to one present, that Mac persists in thus refusing information, he a ruined man.

These circumstances occurred in January a on February 3d. Do you still intend to r affirm "that McClellan had no plan, until t Democratic senators, Mr. Latham and Mr. Ric and a brigadier from the column of Josep Hooker, concocted one, and packed a counc of war to approve of it?" on the 8th of Marc thereafter.

Now, Judge, you will save yourself and friend much confusion, which you have caused the in following you, if you would read the orde and letters that have been published upon a of these military subjects, and which may a be found in your favorite work of the repo of the committee on the conduct of the war, o in General McClellan's report, which is not s great a favorite with you. You evince, again the most extraordinary confusion when you as sert that the President gave him ten days t find a plan, and confound the orders I have re ferred to with the following order of the Presi dent:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, March 8, 1862.

President's General War Order, No. 3.

* * * * * * * *

That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the Commander-in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th March instant, and the General-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as that day.

A. LINCOLN.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

In which you will observe, he did not order General McClellan to produce a plan within ten days, as you assert, but that his *movement* should commence within ten days.

Shifting from your original nomenclature, you now assert that the council was designated as a "Council of Division Commanders," and

, with the exception of General Naglee, it composed of division generals. Now, as usual, you falsify the record. There e but nine division officers detailed, and it convened by General McClellan as a "coun- f war."

our voluntary, unprovoked attack made n me on the 22d ultimo, needs no denial, the mere fact of my being a member of a ncil of war convened by order of General Clellan, shows of itself that I was on de- ied duty by proper authority, over which ther your friend Mr. Stanton nor General oker had any control. The attack upon me ler such circumstances, as well as your as- tion that General McClellan had no plan il it was prepared for him by Senators ham and Rice, and General Naglee, on the of March, 1862, in face of the letters and ers of the President, of February 8, and rch 8, herein referred to, and long since jects of constant public discussion, exhibits your part a recklessness of assertion and in- ference of proper self-respect, that few of ir friends will comprehend, and none of m attempt to justify.

Judge, if ever a question of veracity comes between you and myself, we alone must tle it, and you must not attempt to shuffle your responsibility and place it upon others, r to protect yourself behind such "well- own individuals" as "Puffer" Moore and eorge Hacker. This may have been your actice heretofore, and you may have so acted th impunity, but rest assured it will not be rmitted by me.

You refer to some great surprise that Gen- al McClellan proposed to make on the rebel ie at Brentsville; and you make out, no ubt to your satisfaction, that the success of e surprise depended entirely upon a certain idge to be constructed of canal boats, that ere to have been passed into the Potomac ar Harper's Ferry, and that it was found, hen the movement was about to be made, at the outlet lock was too narrow for the boats. ow, this surprise of Brentsville may be en- rely clear to you and Senators Wade and ohnson, but to myself and to my military iends, we cannot understand how the rebels the direction of Brentsville could have been irprised by any movement in the direction in- icated by you; but I suppose that that is not nportant with you, your real object being nly to relate the story of that obstinate canal oat, that had passed through all the other ocks upon the canal, but refused, in the face f the enemy, to pass the outer lock. Did it ver occur to you that an empty canal boat, in he hands of thousands of men, could be trans- erred down hill, from the canal to the river, vith but little difficulty, and that there might ave been some other reason than the one as- igned by you? But, admitting all that you laim, did it never occur to you that the entire letail, attending the movement of a large army, is to be superintended by the commander thereof in person? I will even grant you that in theory you are right, and that General McClellan should not have had officers attached to his staff, who neglected to use every precaution to prevent failure. But be charitable. Don't fail to remember the awful disappointment when that pontoon train failed to appear upon the Rappahannock, and when the vials of wrath were poured, not upon the head of the favorite of your party, General Burnside, but upon those of Generals Halleck, Meigs, and Woodbury, and again be charitable, and do not fail to remember how carefully you have secreted that more terrible blunder than ever occurred in the annals of this or any other war, by which we have no less than twenty-three monitors, constructed at an expense of over twelve millions of dollars, and which, by the nice calculations of the naval engineers, brought in after one of them was launched, it was determined that with their armament they would float just five inches under water. Now, Judge, but do not fail to remember, who is responsible for this? Again be charitable, that the President and "Fighting Joe Hooker," carefully concealing their plans from the Commander-in-chief and the Secretary of War, to that extent that, while the battle was going on at Chancellorsville, I was informed directly, by the best authority in the premises, that "neither General Halleck nor the Secretary of War knew more of what was going on than I did," and "that all of the requisitions made during the preparations for the movement, instead of going through the ordinary channels, were ordered directly by the President;" and do you know that, to the present hour, the country has never been informed that, on that occasion, Hooker and the President fought the best army that was ever got together, numbering no less than one hundred and sixty-five thousand men, against General Lee, with an army of fifty-seven thousand—lost thirty-five thousand men —were completely routed, and to such an extent that, as I said before, but for the providential killing of Stonewall Jackson, our army would have been annihilated? Why has not Mr. Stanton told this to the families of the thirty-five thousand so unnecessarily slaughtered, instead of attempting to console them with the pitiful story that "the Eleventh army corps gave way in confusion," and that "but one third of General Hooker's army had been brought into action?"

Why did not your Committee on the Conduct of the War exhaust a few of those five hundred days, and a portion of those seventeen hundred pages, devoted to General McClellan, upon the military successes of that great leader, General Butler, before Petersburg, where six thousand of his men were marched prisoners into Richmond almost without his knowledge—he and Mr. Stanton coolly assuring the country that there had been a great fog, and that it came before breakfast?

Before I leave your friend, Mr. Stanton, I will instance another evidence of his treachery to General McClellan. All know of the disasters caused by the interference of the President and Mr. Stanton with the Army of the Potomac. It was necessary to have a victim, and General McClellan was selected and removed. A short time afterward, Pope, being placed in command, failed most disastrously, and Washington was again threatened. The President and his cabinet were alarmed to that extent that a steamer was prepared and ready to assist in their escape. With earnest entreaty and supplication McClellan was solicited to assume command and save them and Washington. He consented, ignoring the solicitations of his friends, who desired that he should first insist upon the removal of Mr. Stanton, which he utterly refused, replying that he would not permit any personal considerations to influence his conduct when the Capital was in such imminent danger. He then accomplished the greatest military success of the war. He reorganized the demoralized army of Pope while on the march, and gained the glorious victory of Antietam. McClellan's star was again in the ascendant. Mr. Stanton begged forgiveness for the past, and promised his devoted friendship for the future.

Again, General McClellan's trusting nature prevailed over the advice of his friends, and the treacherous conduct of Mr. Stanton was forgiven by General McClellan, only to be again more wickedly betrayed than ever. Washington was no sooner relieved and the President and his Cabinet safe, than, by the influence of Mr. Stanton, General McClellan was again removed from the command of the Army of the Potomac, when upon the verge of battle, and ordered into retirement.

You call up the ghosts of the departed soldiers. Be assured, General McClellan's sleep will not be disturbed by them; but what must be the broken slumbers of those who are responsible for the tens of thousands lost by Pope, and Burnside, and Hooker, in attempting to carry out what the President called his "plan," and the hundred and fifty thousand lost since the 4th of May, south of the Rapidan; and what must be the dreams of the President, who could, amid the groans of the dying that lay upon the gory field of Antietam, call for the singing of a ribald song?

In times like these we want some other than the weak and vacillating President who assi Mr. Crittenden, and the patriots who accon nied him from Kentucky, that they might home and inform their friends that he wo not violate their rights and interests by proclamation of emancipation. Before th assurances could be transmitted to the peo of Kentucky his promises had been broken, just such a proclamation, violating all th pledges, was issued.

If any State has done nobly, and earned tinction for pure patriotism under the most t ing, dreadful sufferings of this war, in whic whole people have been despoiled, families bittered against families, and members of same family against each other to that ext that harmony can never prevail, it is the St of Kentucky; and if there was any one St that should have had influence with the admi tration, it was that State. But her voice, ami the din and blood of battle, has never b heard, or, if heard for the moment, it was s lost under the influence of Massachusetts, ai by the demon yells of radical men, who cr out extermination, and, in the same bres proclaimed a higher law than the Constituti which they only denounce as a covenant w hell.

The people of the South are members of same national family with us; they must brought back by continued force, if they v not come back by consent. But we must r pect their rights, whatever they are. There no more power in the President of the Unit States to control whatever right of prope there may remain to them in the slave on t day on which they lay down their arms, th there is in the sheriff to insist that the poor c prit, who has violated the law in the most o rageous manner, shall be deprived of his food his clothing, prior to his execution. The mi tary authority of the President during the istence of the war, can apply only to perso property in the actual possession of the arm and all military authority ceases the mome peace is restored, and the only authority th can be exercised over the same from the mome hostilities cease, is lodged in the Constitutio and laws of the States, and the United Stat whose mandates he, by the Constitution, bound by his oath to obey.

Very respectfully, &c.,

HENRY M. NAGLEE.

Hon. William D. Kelly, Philadelphia.

Document No. 14.

SOLD at 13 PARK ROW, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices.

ORRUPTIONS AND FRAUDS OF LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION.

When the present Republican Administration as-
ned federal power, it found itself confronted with
nts of the gravest import to the safety, honor,
welfare of the Union. Everything conspired to
ke men serious, unselfish, and patriotic. The
ie which the men of the revolution had erected,
of decaying nationalities, the keen jealousies of
es, and earnest differences in respect to treatment
he great problem of slave labor, was tottering to
fall. In such an hour, it is next to impossible to
ceive that the leaders of the dominant party could
it in their hearts to place personal objects above
siderations of the public good. But so it was.
spectacle of a great nation struggling for life,
y seems to have inspired the motley horde of
ce-seekers, who followed Mr. LINCOLN to Wash-
ton, to confederate together to see how they
ld best rob and plunder the national pocket. The
acity of these Republican leaders presented an
mple of indecent lust for pecuniary gain, amid
agonies of death, which has been only equalled
rebel wretches on a smaller scale, on so many
tle fields.

t would require volumes to give even an outline
the myriad cases of pecuniary fraud and corrup-
n which have marked the track of the present
deral Administration since its advent to power.
it were possible to group together all the mon-
ous frauds, presided over by Mr. LINCOLN, as Chief
ecutive, it would be still impossible for the mind
grasp and realize their enormity. Our faculties
uld be no more equal to the tremendous task,
n they are to take in, and duly appreciate the
ful suffering and agony of a great battle, where
thousand of our kindred, neighbors, and coun-
men are maimed, butchered, or killed by the iron
apon of relentless war. The manly nature, whose
sibilities are overcome by the spectacle of even
human being in the struggle of mortal pain, is
uck dumb by the contemplation of ten thousand
the same frightful state. So with the pecuniary
uds of the present Administration. If presented
a whole, they paralyze the conscience and judg-
nt of honest men. We can only consider them in
tail, and it is the purpose of the present paper to
ll the attention of voters and tax-payers of the
untry to one or two of the wretched schemes of
culation and plunder into which the prominent
rtisans of Mr. LINCOLN have embarked.

We begin with the New York Custom House, and from one case we may learn all.

President LINCOLN, having to select his cabinet advisers, elected upon the doctrines of *Helper's* "*Impending Crisis*," proceeded to select his cabinet advisers, upon much the same theory as a successful pirate chieftain would parcel out plunder among his followers; the Treasury Department fell to the portion of Mr. CHASE, who, in the secondary distribution of opportunities for pecuniary gain, selected HIRAM BARNEY to be collector of the great port of New York, in which is collected the chief part of all revenue of the United States derived from duties on imports. Mr. BARNEY was quite unknown to the country. He had never held Federal office of any kind, elective or executive, and had never received mark of distinction in the public affairs of New York. No large delegations of merchants requested his appointment. The controlling ground of his selection was the personal relation, of money and business, which had existed between himself and the Secretary of the Treasury.

When Mr. BARNEY entered upon his new duties, his first acts developed how little of patriotic devotion to an agonized Union, and how much of purpose to fill their own pockets, entered into the thoughts and purposes of those who were his superiors in office, and his associates in politics, and who were, among other things, looking forward to the time when ill-gotten gains could be used by office holders to perpetuate party power and cover up misdeeds.

It had happened that, under a previous Administration, certain persons had conceived the idea of proposing to do the labor required at the appraisers' stores, the Custom House, and elsewhere, by contract, the price to be estimated upon each case or package. This labor, made necessary by examination of merchandise by the goverment appraisers, to fix the dutiable value of importations, had always been done by laborers, cartmen, and drays, hired by the United States, by the month or year. The Treasury Department, being of opinion that the proposition of doing the work by contract, presented the same class of advantages to the United States that contracts do to private individuals, made an agreement with Messrs. MCINTIRE, BIXBY & Co., to do the work. The contract turned out to be an advantageous one, both to the Government and the contractors.

It was for a term of years, which was unexpired when Mr. BARNEY came into office, and yet could on certain conditions be annulled by the Treasury Department.

This contract was among the earliest of the things for which, while all New York beside was flinging away every thought of self, in one supreme emotion and desire to vindicate the honor of the flag struck down at Sumter, the Republican clique, headed by Messrs. CHASE and BARNEY, made desperate efforts. The rich prize was quickly in their possession, when it was decided to use the power and terror of the Government to deprive the inventors of the contract idea, of that property in their invention and subsequent agreement, which was as clearly their own, as is a man's house or land. It was authoritatively represented to Messrs. MCINTIRE, BIXBY & Co., that unless they sold their contract to certain persons, to be named by Mr. WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER, or those, directly or indirectly, associated with him, the Administration would cause it to be annulled altogether. The result was that the contract was assigned over, and conveyed to LUTHER B. WYMAN (a book-keeper in the house of Charles H. Marshall & Co.) and SIMON STEVENS (a cousin of Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, then a controlling Republican member of the House of Representatives). These were the assignees named in the writings. The original contractors having given bonds to the United States, for due performance of the contract, on their part, a bond of indemnity was given to them, as their sureties, which was signed by CHARLES H. MARSHALL (father-in-law of William Allen Butler, of the law firm of Barney, Butler, and Parsons); JOHN D. SCOTT and SIMON STEVENS, each justifying in the sum of thirty thousand dollars. In the management of the business, under the *new* contractors, Mr. BIXBY, one of the old contractors, was employed, or continued in charge, and *he accounted to* WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER *every week for all money receipts*, and there is good reason to believe that the law firm of BARNEY, BUTLER & PARSONS, was the *real* assignee and owners of all but one fourth of the contract, which one fourth was the property of Messrs. STEVENS and BIXBY.

This subject of the labor contract, as it came to be known, was so full of badness, in its every aspect, that Congress could not, in consequence of Democratic clamor, resist making it a matter of legislative inquiry, and how completely the peculators managed to evade the scrutiny of a congressional committee, can best be seen by the following extract from the report of its chairman, Colonel VAN WYCK, a member of Congress from New York.

Let the witness LUTHER B. WYMAN, one of the assignees, speak first:

Q. Were you, or were you not, interested in what is called the labor contract at the public stores? A. I was. Q. From what time to what time? A. From the 11th of May, 1861, until about the 6th or 7th of September, 1862. Q. Who else was interested in the contract during that time? A. Mr. Luther B. Wyman. Q. Any other person? A. I KNOW OF NO OTHER PERSON DIRECTLY INTERESTED. Q. Any other person indirectly? A. I represented one half of the contract and Luther B. Wyman represented the other half. Q. Be kind enough to tell us whether anybody else had any direct or indirect interest in it? A. I represented one half of it, it was in my name; I bought it and paid for it. Q. Did anybody have any indirect interest in any portion of the contract except what you have represented? A. I have only my suppositions. Q. What do you know about that matter? A. That I was requested to pay one half of the profits, whatever they might be, over and above expenses, to William Allen Butler. Mr. Butler stated that he was the attorney of Mr. Wyman. Payments were so made and receipts therefor given by William Allen Butler, as attorney for the two first payments. Subsequently, receipts were given by him for money paid to him, signed by the initial "W. A. B." Then and from that day forward payments were made to him and receipts given by him, and so signed, with the exception of some few payments which were made to George W. Parsons, who sometimes receipted for them, simply, "G. W. P.," on some occasions, "W. A. B. per G. W. P.," and sometimes "G. W. P. for W. A. B." Q. Who is this William Allen Butler? A. He is of the law firm of Barney, Butler & Parsons. Q. Who is this Mr. Parsons? A. He is of the firm of Barney, Butler & Parsons. Q. Who is the Barney of that firm? A. Hiram Barney, collector of the port of New York. Q. Is the firm now in business here? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you pay any of these proceeds to Mr. Wyman himself? A. No, sir. Q. Did Mr. Wyman himself direct you who to pay those proceeds? A. He did not. Q. Did you have any authority directly from Mr. Wyman to pay them as you did? A. Simply on the day of the execution of the papers, Mr. William Allen Butler said in the presence of Mr. Wyman, this in purport: "I am the attorney for Mr. Wyman, the net proceeds of this contract will be paid to me." Q. Did Mr. Wyman assent to that? A. Mr. Wyman nodded assent. Q. You took no paper to protect you for such payments? A. I did not, nor have any such papers. Q. Do you know, from Mr. Wyman or otherwise, whether Mr. Wyman had any interest in this contract beyond the use of his name? A. MR. WYMAN HAS, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, STATED TO ME THAT HE HAD NO INTEREST, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE CONTRACT, OTHERWISE THAN THE USE OF HIS NAME. Q. Did he tell you who had the interest represented by his name? A. He said he knew of nobody in this matter except William Allen Butler, who claimed to act as attorney for the parties actually in interest.

Mr. WILLIAM ALLEN BUTLER was subsequently sworn, and Col. VAN WYCK comments on his examination in this wise:

On the 3d day of January, Mr. Butler was sworn. I was not present at his examination; I say this in justice to myself, for it seems almost impossible that his examination should have been concluded, and I was not asked who were the real parties in interest which he represented when that was one of the subjects of investigation. Only three questions were put to Mr. Butler. The first, as to his residence and business; the second, "have you read the testimony taken before this committee, touching the transfer of the labor contract?" and the third, "have you any statement to make touching your connexion with that transfer of interest under the so-called labor contract?" Mark the gentleness of the interrogatories. Was it because he was the law partner of Mr. Barney? I know not. Among other things, to the last question he says: "I have whatever information I had on the subject was derived in the course of my professional employment, and not acquired no positive knowledge about it. Funds were placed in my hands by PARTIES IN INTEREST." He evidently did not mean Stevens or Wyman; he nowhere states who were the PARTIES in interest, and, most strange of all, he was not asked.

The connexion of the general orders with this contract shows irresistibly who were behind the scenes, because they were worked in happy unison.

These loyal patriots, not content with thus grasping the labor contract, before described, forthwith set lustful eyes upon the general order business of the Custom House.

When a vessel arrives in the port of New York the captain obtains an order to send all goods on

which are unclaimed at the end of a certain which time is longer in case of sail than steam is, "under general order," as it is called. This s to send them to one of the stores designated he Collector for the reception of "general or- merchandise. The quantity of merchandise sent under "general order" from steamers, is nse, and the profit to the owner of the ware- es is great in proportion. By law and regula- the Collector is bound to send the "general " goods to the warehouses nearest the discharg- hip. The port of New York is divided into two al divisions; one on North River, and the other ast River. It is estimated that "general order" houses on North River are worth not less than undred thousand dollars a year.

hen the present Administration came into power, essful efforts were made to constrain the then rietors of "general order" stores to pay over rtain parties, one third of their receipts, on pain eing deprived of orders altogether. It was de- ped by Col. VAN WYCK'S committee, that fore- among those who thus levied black-mail by Re- ican authority, on the East River division, was firm of BOWEN & LAMBERT; and it is reported BOWEN is brother-in-law of Collector BARNEY. he North River, the "general order" business assed into the hands of BIXBY & Co., in which JAMES HUMPHREY and (so says witness Charles ire, jr.) young MARSHALL, son of Charles H. shall, before alluded to, as bondsman on the labor tract, were partners.

his Mr. JAMES HUMPHREY is a conspicuous Re- lican, was formerly Member of Congress from ooklyn, and partner of Collector BARNEY. And a further curious and suggestive fact, that the ARLES H. MARSHALL, whose book-keeper was ol pigeon of this elaborate contrivance of dis- orable peculation, whose son was partner in the eneral order" stores, and who was also bonds- n for the *ring*, is the same man who was so in- ant at the suggestion of illuminating his house the recent monster Democratic gathering in ion Square in behalf of the Union, and wrote a er expressing his excessive trouble about the icago platform.

So true is it, in the present canvass, that wherever found a man, bitter in denunciation of MCCLEL- N, or loud-mouthed in adulation of LINCOLN, it n be safely predicted of him, that he is either a ntractor, or office-holder, or a man, in some purely vate matter, benefited by Mr. Lincoln.

The conduct of the Republican politicians, headed Mr. BARNEY, in the matter of these "general or- r" stores, can not be better stated than in the ords of the congressional committee:

Whereas, the evidence fully shows that there not ly was favoritism, but the Collector did not make e selection, but gave the general orders to certain rties who had no stores, bonded or otherwise, *and ffered them to go among those having general orders, d compelled them to give a bonus of thirty per cent. or the privilege of retaining it. This was certainly refinement of extortion or corruption upon the prac- ces of former Administrations.* Such a thing was ever known before, and was reserved for the party ho had promised ourselves and the nation that official orruption was to cease, and retrenchment and reform ere to be once more inaugurated. Alas! "like Dead ea fruits, they turned to ashes on the lips."

It does not appear that Mr. Barney received any part f this thirty per cent., but it is clear that he was no- ified of the outrages, committed by the men on whom he had showered this bounty, and he did not condemn or check it.

It was generally believed, by those familiar with the facts, that the firm of BARNEY, BUTLER & PARSONS was a *pool*, into which, on the one hand, went all the earnings of the firm as lawyers, and Republican lobby agents, and on the other, all the money which MR. BARNEY received, directly or indirectly, legally or illegally, as Collector. It was believed that the Collector was thereby directly and pecuniarily interested in the labor contract, which the old contractors had been *compelled*, by threats, to sign over to Republicans. And nobody could well doubt that if al this was true, Secretary CHASE must be more or les cognizant of the facts. The public was confirmed in all this by what happened during the investigation of a subsequent committee of Congress, of which Mr. HULBURD, of New York, was chairman, and which made a report in June last.

This committee was, to be sure, by reason of the conduct of its chairman, HULBURD, one of the most partisan and dishonest that ever disgraced an American Congress. In his conduct of the examination in New York, he surrendered himself entirely to Mr. BARNEY and his clique. The earnest efforts of the only Democrat on the committee, Mr. LE BLOND, could not withstand the partisan dishonesty of HULBURD, who seemed to have no purpose but to shield and protect infamous frauds upon the public treasury; acts so bad as to even excite the denunciation of his Republican colleague, ROLLINS, of New Hampshire. The sacred cause of the Union, for which he professed to be a loyal devotee, the important interests of the tax-payers, among his constituents, whose rights he was bound to maintain, were all pushed aside to screen political associates who were caught with arms in the public crib, up to their shoulders. The report of HULBURD is one mass of deception. Important testimony *is suppressed*, in the interest of political thieves and plunderers. The evidence of more than twenty witnesses examined by him, is kept out of his printed report. Shame on such personal and public infamy on the part of a man pretending to be honest!

But, even with all this apparent purpose of HULBURD, acting under dictation of the Administration at Washington, to cover up the practices of BARNEY and his Republican confederates against the people's money, now more than ever needed to maintain the people's flag, the complicity of BARNEY, with his law partners, to prostitute the office of Collector to unlawfully get money to enrich themselves, and to reelect Mr. LINCOLN, was satisfactorily uncovered.

During the examination of BARNEY, as a witness, the only members of the committee present, were HULBURD, chairman, and LE BLOND, and the former insisted that the witness should have opportunity to consult with his confederates in order to revise and re-write his testimony. Mr. BLOND made effort to probe to the root of the matter of the labor contract in respect to which BARNEY evaded a previous committee, and with the following result:

Q. I will ask you whether you received a part of the income of your law firm? A. I will say that nominally *I do, but I give as much as I receive;* I keep my place. Q. I will ask you, farther, whether your law partners receive any part or parcel of your salary, *or the perquisites of your office?* A. They do not; but I give them a sum that answers their purposes to retain me in, and they not lose anything. They have nothing to do with my accounts. Q. An annual sum, do you wish to be understood, or a sum in the aggregate. A.

It depends somewhat upon my receipts. Q. I confess that the answer which you give me seems to require that I should ask you a still further question, and if it turns out to be a purely personal matter or arrangement in which the receipts of the Custom House do not constitute a part of the business, why it shall be stricken out. About what amount do you annually pay to your co-partners? A. I am unable to answer that question without reference to my books and memoranda. Q. How much money do you receive from the firm of Barney, Butler and Parsons annually, *and how much do you pay said firm out of the emoluments of your office?* (To this Mr. Barney demurred answering, claiming it to be foreign to the purposes of the committee's investigation, and a needless inquiry into his private affairs.) (Thereupon Mr. Le Blond stated that he was informed that the firm of Barney, Butler & Parsons had taken fees in cases against the Government growing out of seizures made by the Custom House authorities; and further, that said firm *had an interest* in what *is known as the labor contract, connected with the Custom House,* and declared if these things were so, his question was pertinent, and ought, as connected with public interest, to be answered.) (There being but two members of the committee present, and they differing as to priority of time in which the questions should be put, and answers required, the further examination of Mr. Barney was deferred, and the committee adjourned.)

It is obvious from this report that if HULBURD had sustained LE BLOND, and compelled the witness to make answer, the whole conspiracy of plunder, the illegal act of having a partner in the salary and perquisites of a revenue office, would have been exposed. Even the questions of LE BLOND permitted by HULBURD to be put, terrified the witness into prevarications which would be mortifying enough to an upright man, or a man not utterly given over to lust of pecuniary gain in the midst of the unspeakable calamities of a civil war, which makes poverty and want stare laboring men in the face. And all this while the *legal* perquisites of the Collectorship are not much less (see p. 23 of Report) than twenty-five thousand dollars a year. One would suppose that even a Black-Republican maw would be satisfied with a sum equal to the salary of the President of the United States! but not so, think loyal leaguers, who shout for the Union, and rob the treasury at the same moment!

If the record of Black-Republican faithlessness to important public trusts, stopped here, the country could, perhaps, endure thus much of disgrace. But there is yet a lower depth of national humiliation to be sounded.

The exigency of a war begun avowedly for the Union, but now carried on *outside* the Union, to secure abandonment of slavery, in obedience to that logic and rhetoric of sectionalism, and hatred of slaveholders, which has, for three years, blotted out or rolled up in blood one half of the map of the Union, compelled Congress, in 1862, to enact that certain restrictions be placed upon commerce, from our northern ports, with foreign ports around the Gulf of Mexico. The object was to prevent supplies of war going to aid rebels in arms, by way of ports in the West India Islands, or in Mexico. The provisions of the law explicitly decared:

That whenever a permit or clearance is granted for either a foreign or domestic port, it shall be lawful for the collector of customs granting the same, if he shall deem it necessary, under the circumstances of the case, to require a bond to be executed by the master or the owner of the vessel in a penalty equal to the value of the cargo, and with sureties to the satisfaction of such collector, that the said shall be delivered at the destination for which it is cleared or ... mitted, and that no part thereof shall be use ... affording aid or comfort to any person or parti ... insurrections against the authority of the Un ... States.

The Treasury Department, therefore, issued ... structions to Collectors as follows:

In all cases where, in your judgment, there ... ground of apprehension that any goods, wares ... merchandise, shipped at your port, will be used ... any way for the aid of the insurgents or the insur ... tion, you will require substantial security to be gi ... that such goods, wares, or merchandise shall not ... transferred to any place under insurrectionary cont ... and shall not in any way be used to give aid or com ... to such insurgents.

It is easy to see that this law, and the instructio ... if executed by an honest Collector, and effici ... subordinates, would effectually stop all illicit tr ... between New York city and the rebels. The m ... who were engaged in the business—a majority ... whom were filling the air with their piercing shri ... of denunciation of all Democrats, and Gen. McClell ... in particular, and filling their pockets with so ... thing else, at the same time—saw, that unless th ... could neutralize the law, by fraud and stealth, th ... business of treason was gone. Let the publish ... record tell how successful for themselves, and th ... republican confederates in office under Mr. LINCOL ... but with what inexpressible humiliation for the E ... pire city and State, the work of giving aid and co ... fort to the enemy was done! The pen of histo ... will pause benumbed, as it records how Collect ... BARNEY permitted, and most prominent Rebublic ... gentlemen in office actively coöperated in th ... scheme to supply the rebels with means to tortu ... our fathers, sons, and brothers who had gone out ... battle on our behalf! Treason and treachery ha ... rarely accomplished a more infamous project! A ... yet, the men who are now the great pillars in M ... LINCOLN'S reëlection temple were uppermost in th ... work! While General MCCLELLAN was riskin ... life at the head of his brave soldiers, men who no ... revile him, were conspiring to send aid to the e ... emy, against which he was contending, and some o ... those men high in office under President LINCOLN ... Of such is a party "based on moral ideas!"

The blockade runners were not long in perceivin ... the now universally accepted fact that *every Black Re ... publican office-holder has his price*, and they bega ... at once to approach Mr. LINCOLN'S appointees. Ther ... were men, in the New York Custom House, quick ... and ready to seize the bait. The scheme of takin ... straw bonds, and straw bail, or of purloining, by ... official aid, bonds once given; or of bribing the in ... spectors of the revenue, who had charge of loading ... suspicious vessels, was immediately matured. The ... pecuniary inducement was ample. The traitors, ... in the Republican ranks, were easily found, and seven ... thousand, nine hundred and thirty-two bonds were ... executed between September, 1861, and May, 1864, ... in the New York Custom House alone.

Among the persons who have been conspicuous in ... the fraudulent practices growing out of Mr. LIN ... COLN'S election, is a man named ALBERT M. PALMER. ... He was examined by Mr. HULBURD'S white-washing ... committee, while a prisoner in Fort Lafayette, and ... stated that he was commended to Mr. BARNEY as a ... man useful for collecting purposes, by Mayor OP ... DYKE, a prominent Republican, who has figured ex ... tensively in a way very undesirable to a man who re ... spected the ten commandments. OPDYKE secured

Palmer's appointment, and in the hands of the lat- Mr. Barney threw almost unlimited power of rol in the Custom House. Mr. Derham, a most lligent witness, examined by the Committee, rs (p. 238) that "Mr. Palmer, everybody nd the Custom House supposed to be principal there, and he, in fact, was said to be the Col- or.'

nother witness, appointed in the Custom House, :

I had a situation in the Custom House, which given me without solicitation. I had been very ve in my party, and had spent between two and e thousand dollars, and was active in getting es for my friends. Mr. Palmer told me that I ht to have some place for myself. I told him I d take no place which required active duty. I appointed a debentured clerk. . . . I was there ar and a quarter. *I think a dozen days will cover I was on duty.*"

he following extracts, from pages 146 and 147 he report, will present a pretty clear idea of the l of men Republicans, high in office, collect nd them :

y Mr. Le Blond: Q. What were Palmer's circum- ces? A. He was a clerk in the Custom House at 00. Q. Was his salary his only source of living, his only means of paying you back again? A. had commissions on the collections *for the party.* y collected so much every year from the Custom se, and I believe he used to receive a percentage the full amount that was collected. I thought n he was collecting last November or December he would pay me back what he owed me; he d me then $600 or $700, but he did not do it.

y Mr. Rollins: Q. You say that some 20 men in 17th ward were appointed to office on your re- mendation and the recommendation of other men he ward; did any one of these 20 men ever pay directly or indirectly, any money or other valu- consideration for your influence in securing their ointment? A. Most of them owed me money; *e poor devils who had no money to pay rents;* they e the best working politicians in my ward.

y Mr. Le Blond: Q. What business did Palmer ow before he went into the Custom House? A. ever knew him before he went to the Custom use. Q. Do you know whether he is a professional n? A. I have understood that he was; that he *sed examination as* a lawyer.

y Mr. Rollins: Where did Palmer live during term of office in the Custom House? A. He lived the 17th ward. Q. Did he board at a hotel? A. hen I first knew him he boarded at private houses, I was afterwards at a private hotel. Q. Was his de of living expensive? A. More expensive than ne. Q. Did he keep horses? A. No, Sir; he used drive mine; I generally kept three; sometimes he uld take his wife out with him, and get my team, d sometimes he would take a single horse; he left ward and lived at the Metropolitan hotel. Q. w long since? A. Probably in August or September t. Q. Upon what terms did he live there? A. He d me he paid $35 a week. Q. What was his salary, you say? A. $1,500 a year, and he used to have s commission, 2½ per cent.

The introduction by Opdyke; the ready promo- n by Barney to the power portrayed by the wit- sses cited; the *small* legal receipts by Palmer as lary, and the *large* expenditure, sufficiently explain hat was the function of the latter, in the scheme peculation and plunder concocted by prominent epublicans. And no one is surprised, when at last, xposure of what has been done lands Mr. Palmer Fort Lafayette, a prisoner of state. He was arrested by Marshal Murray, without a suspicion by Collector Barney that the practises of his young friend had been discovered, and the facts, touching Republican complicity with blockade runners, all laid bare.

Besides Palmer, there was, in the Custom House, another eminent Republican, a most controlling man in that organization which elected Mr. Lincoln on the basis of "moral ideas." He had outrun the swiftest in denunciation of Democrats who did not think it the sum and substance of all philanthropy and patriotism, to "avoid" and "abhor" the people of the slave-labor States, with whom we, of the North, had entered into the most sacred, and tender relations of country. He had addressed wide-awake processions innumerable, in advocacy of the *honesty* and statesmanship of Mr Lincoln, and he was not forgotten when the latter entered into the seats of power, and made up his jewels. Of such was Henry B. Stanton.

It was a part of the Republican plan to make him Deputy Collector, and it was done. Stanton says that Mr. Chase told him that the salary was small, but *his income could be increased.* He was put in charge of the bond bureau of the Custom House, through which shipments to the rebels were made. He prepared the bonds, as he says, by Mr. Barney's request, and with his approval of the form adopted. And here crops out the first step in the iniquity! The law requires the bond not to furnish the goods to rebels to be given by the *master of the ship*, and, will it be believed, it was drawn so as to shelter the master, and substitute the owner of the goods? All the bonds so taken were thus illegal, good for nothing, and so the shipper went free in his work of treason! More than that, it was proved that bonds were cancelled at the Custom House for direct pecuniary consideration. On this point, let a witness, Mr. Alfred T. Conklin, called before the Committee, tell his own story of his experience:

Alfred T. Conklin sworn and examined (commission merchant, No. 42 New street), by the Chairman. Q. How long have you been a commission merchant? A. About 12 years. Q. Are you engaged in importations and exportations? A. I receive flour from the West; ship goods to the West Indies and the British Provinces; also receive goods from England; not a great many, however. Q. You say that you have shipped to the West Indies somewhat. We understand that there have been some new treasury regulations since the Rebellion commenced, differing from what formerly prevailed, and especially requiring bonds that were not formerly given; has your business required you to give any such bonds? A. I have not shipped any such goods myself that required me to give any such bonds, but I have become bondsman for other parties who shipped. Q. Have you done very much business of that kind? A. I have only been bondsman for one firm, with the exception of one other instance, I was bondsman for Middleton & Co., and in one instance for Wm. M. Smith. I think the bonds in that case were for $600 and $1,500. I have been on the bonds of Middleton & Co. for $80,000 or $90,000 on different shipments from $900 probably up to $30,000 on different vessels, from a period commencing last June. Q. The committee have taken some testimony in reference to the nature of these bonds and the parties. I want to ask you whether the bonds that you have signed have all or any of them been cancelled or surrendered afterwards? A. Some six or seven have been surrendered. Q. The committee wish a full history of this transaction just as it took place. A. It occurred in this way: it was the general talk here that these bonds could be

bought up. I was passing through the Custom House one day on business, and I asked one of the brokers, by mere chance, if such things could be done. He said he thought it could be. I asked him if he ever knew it to be done; he said he had. The broker's name was Henry Smith; I think he resides in Jersey City. He is a broker in the Custom House. I told him that I was on some bonds, and if that was the case I would like to buy them up, and I told him to see how it was. He reported what he had done, and the result of it was that we bought up six or seven bonds. Q. What was the price paid? A. The whole amount was about $1,600 that I paid for the bonds. Q. That is the amount you paid Mr. Smith? A. Yes, Sir. Q. How long a time intervened, in your opinion, betwixt Mr. Smith's saying to you that things were arranged, and your entering with Mr. Middleton, Stanton's office? A. Mr. Middleton, previously to the bond being given, asked me if I would have any objections to going on a bond with him. I told him no. He stated that they had got into difficulty with the Custom House, and that was the first occasion that a bond had been required of them. I told him that I had no objections to going on the bond at all. So the next day, or the day after, I think—I will not be certain which—I went up to the Custom House with him to give this bond, and as I said that I had negotiated with Smith in reference to it, I will state how it took place. I happened to be passing along through the Custom House within a few days of the time that this bond was given, and having heard about the getting up of bonds, I asked Smith about it. He said he thought it could be done, and wanted to know why. I told him I understood those things were done, and if other people are doing it, I didn't know why we should not do it. He afterwards told me that it could be done. When I agreed to go on this bond of Middleton, I did not know that the bond was for so large an amount, and that I would have to justify to the amount of $64,000. As soon as I went up there and found that this was the case, I turned to Smith, "You say you can buy up these bonds. What will it cost to get up this bond, the penal sum of which is $64,000? I cannot swear that I am worth $64,000." Says he, "I will see." He goes to Mr. Stanton's room and comes back. There was some little difference about the price, I think he asked $650. He went back and forth two or three times, and finally came down to $600; and when we got as far as that I said to Mr. Smith, "Now, if Mr. Stanton is going to sell this bond, what difference does it make whether I swear I am worth $64,000 or sixty-four cents? I cannot swear that I am worth $64,000. If he has a mind to take me and not swear me, I will go on the bond. It makes no odds to him if he sells his bond." Smith says, "I will go in and see him." He went to see; was gone some time; came back and said, "That will be all right, he will not ask you any questions at all." I said, "Are you sure of that?" and he said, "That is understood." "I want it distinctly understood," says I, "that I will not swear to any amount at all." He went away, came back, and said, "It is all right, you will not be asked any questions at all." When he went into Mr. Stanton's room, Mr. Middleton came up, and Mr. Stanton says, "Is this Mr. Middleton?" "Yes, sir." "Are you worth the amount of that shipment?" Mr. Middleton says, "Yes, sir." He then turns around to me. "Is this the bondsman?" Says I, "Yes, sir." "Will you swear?" (waving his hand) and that was all there was about it. Q. Now, I want to recall your attention to the point about which I was enquiring before this statement. What, in your opinion, was the intervening time between the last interview with Smith and your entering Stanton's room with Mr. Middleton? A. I do not think it was ten minutes, because about that time I stood there waiting for Mr. Middleton to get his papers through. He had sent for me to come up to the Custom House. I went to the Custom House, found Mr. Middleton, and he said, "I will be through in a few minutes." He was standing in a line, and I stood there talking to Mr. Smith while Mr. Middleton was getting his papers through. Q. In your former testimony you stated that for some reason you had occasion to open the door that led into Mr. Stanton's office, you found him leaning on the desk, and talking to Smith? A. That was not upon this occasion, but another time; Smith was then negotiating for some other bonds, and staid a long while. I was in a hurry as it was just before 'change, and I went to the door of the front office, but I could not see him in there, and opened the door, went in, and looked through the other door, and he was leaning on the desk talking with Mr. Stanton. Q. Was that in reference to an arrangement for the surrender of a bond? A. Yes, sir. Q. Do you recollect what one? A. I do not. Q. Was it previous to or after this arrangement about the $64,000 bond? A. It was after the first bond—the $64,000 bond—the course of two or three weeks or a month after that. Q. You do not remember either, I suppose, the specific bond or the amount of it, when you saw Smith leaning on the desk and talking to Stanton? A. No, sir, it was a small bond, I think he asked $150, and I told him that was an exorbitant price, and he went back and forth two or three times; Mr. Stanton would not yield at all. Smith said that Stanton said it was just as much risk to take a small bond as a large one. On another occasion, when he was negotiating for the surrender of a bond, $25 split them, and finally it was settled by his agreeing to pay $100 before three o'clock. Stanton saying that he wanted to use that amount. This was about two o'clock.

MARCH 22, 1864.

Alfred T. Conklin recalled.

By the Chairman:

Question. Do you recollect whether the bonds that came into your hands were surrendered or given without the word "cancelled" being upon them, without Mr. Stanton's name being upon them? Answer. The names were cut out. Q. Who cut them out? I cut them out after they came into my hands. Q. Do you recollect how long it was after the execution of the bonds before you obtained them through Mr. Smith? A. I obtained one of these bonds inside of an hour after it was executed. Q. Can you recollect who the principal of the bond was? A. It was Middleton & Co.; I was the security on it.

By Mr. Rollins:

Question. Did you go in with Middleton when he executed it? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. Did he charge you a surety fee upon it? A. I think a dollar and a half or two dollars; that was paid, and within an hour from that time I had the bond in my possession. Q. Do you know what that bond cost? A. Six hundred dollars. Q. When the bond came back the word "cancelled" was not written across it, it was simply handed to you as you left it? A. Yes, sir, that bond is destroyed; all the rest of the bonds are intact, with the exception of the signatures of Middleton & Co. Q. What was the cause of this bond being destroyed? A. That was the first bond that was ever got up. Q. For what amount was it given? A. About $64,000 was the penal sum. When this bond came up it was a bond of a larger amount than I was willing to swear. I was worth ($64,000). I told Mr. Smith, "These gentlemen want me to go on a bond for $64,000, and I do not feel as if I wanted to swear that I am worth that, and the consequence is that if I do not swear to that I cannot go upon that bond, but as Mr. Stanton is going to give us that bond back immediately, what odds does it make whether I swear I am worth $64,000 or sixty four cents? The bargain was made before the bond was given that the amount to be paid for it was $600. Q. How do you know the bargain was made? A. I made it. Q. With whom? A. Mr. Smith. Q. And he made it with whom? A. I suppose he made it with Mr. Stanton. Q. How was he spoken of generally? what designation was given him? A. Mr. Stanton; I did not know there was a younger Stanton there, I did not know Mr. Stanton nor the boy. I made this agreement, and I will tell you how it proves that it is Mr. Stanton who is concerned. When I told Mr. Smith

I would not swear that I was worth $64,000, says you will go to Mr. Stanton, and get him to agree o swear me, I will become bondsman on the bond. went from me into Mr. Stanton's room; I stood in rotunda; he went in there; was gone from three ve minutes; came back again, and he says it is all t. Within ten minutes afterwards the papers had gressed so far that they went in to Mr. Stanton to e clearance made and the bond taken. We went here before Mr. Stanton; Mr. Stanton turned to Middleton and says, "Is this Mr. Middleton?" es," "Do you swear that you are worth the unt of this shipment (raising his hand)?" "I "Is this the bondsman (turning to me)?" "Yes, "Do you swear (raising his hand)?" "Yes, So we carried out the programme.

When all this infamy was made known to Presi- t LINCOLN, was Mr. STANTON ignominiously ex- ed from office? Not at all! *He was permitted onorably resign.* Why was he not arrested and risoned in Fort Lafayette? Who shall say? her, who shall deny that neither Mr. LINCOLN, or CHASE, or Mr. BARNEY dared touch one hair of NTON'S head? He knew too much! He could who were his accomplices and abettors, in the tched business of furnishing supplies to rebels, ing the day, and making Republican stump eches, in the evening, denouncing GEORGE B. CLELLAN.

During all this time, if Mr. THURLOW WEED is to believed, and reference can be had to his letters blished in his *Albany Journal*, Collector BARNEY

"Fold up his tents like the Arabs,
And quietly *steal* away."

In the meantime, corruption grew apace. An ap- liser was convicted of stealing merchandise, and nothing was done. LINCOLN, for some reason ed not move. The Republican politicians were rloining millions. At last, however, public opin- could be appeased no longer, and Mr. BARNEY s, just as the political canvass was coming on, *per- uded* by his confederates to give up his office and oid exposure, and save LINCOLN.

But who succeeded him? Here is touched another apter of Republican honesty and patriotism!

The facts of the blockade of the ports of the se- ded States by the loyal States, the capture by our vy of many valuable ships and their cargoes, and eir final judicial condemnation and sale as prizes war, are well known. In the early part of the bellion most of the prizes were sent by our gallant val officers into the port of New York for adjudi- tion and sale. This was of great commercial bene- to the city and State. But, at last, when the vy came to get their allotted share of the prizes, was found that a large portion of the proceeds had een pocketed, under one pretence and another, by R. LINCOLN'S loyal (?) office holders in New York. onspicuous among these men, who thus in effect onspired to rob our brave sailors of the just reward f many a night of anxious watching, were DISTRICT TTORNEY SMITH, MARSHAL MURRAY, MR. SIMEON RAPER, and a ring of gentlemen who managed to et themselves appointed appraisers, in almost every ase. The result of all these official practices was hat naval officers sent no more prizes to New York, nd a committee was appointed to investigate the ubject. During this investigation, charges of the ost serious character were made, and *proved* gainst MR. DRAPER, who had been appointed to be uctioneer of the prize vessels and their cargoes. He was accused of extortionate fees, of wrongfully deducting these fees from the proceeds of sales, and of keeping back government funds. His fees were so exorbitant that they excited the astonishment of everybody but those denounced by MR. UPTON as coöperating with him to represent his exactions as proper. The charges against MR. DRAPER cannot be better stated than in the language of MR. UPTON, who was counsel for the naval officers. He says:

Mr. Draper kept no separate bank account of the proceeds of the prize property. It was all mixed in with his own, and might at any time have been seized by his creditors.

The deposit of a fund so large, in his own name, even using the puerile disguise of the words "in trust," was certainly not the act of a cautious business man, if it was that of an honest one. That he did not promptly pay the fund when demanded is fully proved by witnesses and written papers of demand, notwithstanding the statements to the contrary of himself and son and clerk. Day after day and week after week, he retained large amounts of these moneys upon frivolous excuses, in spite of incessant demands for its payment by the marshal; and this was not the act of a faithful man.

That it was his habit to make fictitious bids at auction sales, thereby running an eager purchaser up beyond the fair price of the article sold, and thus committing a fraud upon him, and bringing the government sales into disrepute, is proved by the young man's confessions, as well as by other testimony; and this was not the act of an honest man, or of one whose "skill tended to promote the interests of the government."

In one case, sworn to by O'Donohue, it appears that Mr. Draper allowed a reclamation without the assent or action of any government official whatsoever, solely on his own responsibility; and it appears that he favored and urged with persistent pertinacity the first reclamation which was made in favor of a purchaser of prize property, and this may be regarded as the "*causa sine qua non*" of all the irregularities and frauds in such proceedings which succeeded.

The learned counsel says that Mr. Draper charged for his services the usual and customary commission. This is correct, for this—that the commission paid to auctioneers for the sale of merchandise of ordinary amounts and in the ordinary way, in ordinary times, cannot lay the basis of a custom for a commission on prize sales of enormous amounts in time of war, and where the auctioneer has no care, no custody, no responsibility. It is neither proper nor just to speak of a *customary* commission for such a service.

There has been nothing like a precedent in our community to establish such a custom. *The truth is, he charged and retained an enormous and wholly unwarrantable, unprecedented, and exorbitant commission; a commission so utterly disproportioned to the trifling service performed, that it was, in truth, nothing short of an imposition—a shameless imposition—upon the Navy Pension Fund and the naval captors, of more than three fourths of the large sums retained.* And when we think that the continuance of that imposition operating upon the very large amount of prize property in the district yet unsold, would have increased the sum retained by this auctioneer for his service to an amount not much, if any, short of *one hundred thousand dollars*, we cease to wonder at the *desperate efforts made by him and his friends to coerce all parties into tame submission to his exactions*, and the unworthy means resorted to by him and them to wreak revenge upon all such as could not be induced at his or their bidding to disobey the instructions they had received from their superiors, to violate their official obligations and quietly assent to the perpetration of his extortions.

But this is not all. The learned counsel seems to think that the law has now stepped in and made pro-

vision for the employment of the auctioneer and his compensation, this investigation has nothing now to act upon in the matter of this wrong, so far as Mr. Draper is concerned. Not so. It has been truly said, that one great purpose of this investigation is to ascertain what has become of the proceeds of the prize property. The testimony shows that Mr. Draper now has in his hands a sum amounting to nearly $3,500 belonging to the Navy Pension Fund and the captors, that he has retained this amount as his claimed 2½ per cent. commission out of the proceeds of sales made by him *after the consent for its allowance* no longer existed; that its allowance at any time was based solely upon consent and the taxation of the court; that the consent ceasing, the court *has refused* the taxation; and this sum, although demanded from him by the marshal, he has *refused*, and now *refuses* to return. How, in the face of this, can counsel seriously assert that there is nothing disclosed by this investigation militating against Mr. Draper?

As the counsel representing the interests of the captors in these causes in which the money has been thus retained, the undersigned respectfully asks if it comes within the sphere of the official duty of the Solicitor of the Treasury, that instructions may be given forthwith to the district attorney to take such steps as may be requisite to enforce the return of this money.

The testimony has proved that until the opposition arose to a continued compliance to the exorbitant impositions of Mr. Draper, the auctioneer, no complaints were ever heard of the character of those set forth in the document signed by Moses H. Grinnell as chairman of this committee; that the information upon which these statements were made all came from Draper; that Grinnell procured the employment of Draper as auctioneer; that Grinnell urged the district attorney to take such action as should insure the prize sales toDraper, with a commission of two and one half per cent.: that Grinnell is the personal, intimate friend of Draper; that after Grinnell had been informed that the Secretary of the Navy objected to the allowance of this enormous commission to Draper, and after he had become apprised that the district attorney had been instructed by his official superior, the Solicitor of the Treasury, to oppose the continued allowance of this enormous commission, he went to the district attorney and urged him to violate his official duty, to disregard his instructions and consent to such allowance; that to induce him thus to violate his duty and disregard his instructions, he furnished him with a certificate, signed by himself and others, stating that two and one half per cent. was the customary commission paid to an auctioneer for the sale of merchandise in New York; that one of the gentlemen (Mr. Minturn) who signed this certificate (and probably others) was not aware to what it was designed to apply, nor apprised for what purpose it was obtained; that so far from the truth is the statement of that certificate, that a gentleman of large experience, called as a witness from the insurance office of Mr. Grinnell himself, swears that *one half of one per cent.* would be the extent of a fair, reasonable, and customary commission paid to an auctioneer for performing the precise service performed by Mr. Draper, as detailed to him by the Solicitor; and his evidence is fully corroborated by that of other witnesses; that when the efforts of Mr. Draper and Mr. Grinnell proved unavailing to coerce the further allowance of this extraordinary depletion of the proceeds of prize property, then, and not till then, was heard the outcry of frauds and corruption, of robberies and peculations, and fraudulent reclamations; then, and not till then, were the ears of the Secretary of the Navy assailed with the charges from Draper and Grinnell against the Governme officials connected with adjudications and sales prize property; then, and not till then, were the new papers resorted to to fill the public mind with poiso ous suspicions that the captured property in this di trict was being absorbed by the ravenous spoliatio of a set of hungry vultures and sharks, and robber and then, and not till then, did Mr. Grinnell, und the advice and with the assistance of his friend, M Draper, constitute his committee of merchants (wh never met, and never organized, and never saw t written statement of charges signed by him, as cha man of the committee, to originate, direct, and co trol this organization).

Some idea may be formed of the amount of mone Mr. DRAPER thus withheld as fees, by his statemen (p. 31) that his commissions as auctioneer, from Augus 1861, to December, 1862, were THIRTY THOUSAN EIGHT HUNDRED AND ONE DOLLARS AND THIRTY-FIV CENTS. A pretty little sum, and not a small induce ment for sustaining the extraordinary pretension and assumptions of President LINCOLN!

Mr. JOURDAN, the Solicitor of the Treasury, wh has, within the last three years, earned a most u enviable notoriety, as a willing and most unscru pulous tool of the Administration in covering up th improper practices and frauds of Mr. LINCOLN' friends, vainly attempted, in his report, to palliat the corruptions in prize business, as Mr. HULBUR had made effort in the revenue transactions of BAR NEY, BUTLER, STANTON, and PALMER, but the Navy Department was too weak already, in public estima tion, to bear such a load of obloquy, and Mr. DRA PER, as punishment for his improper conduct an pecuniary greed, was removed from office, and de prived of such further opportunity to withhold th hard earned money of the brave officers and sailor of our gallant Navy, who have so often, in this civi war, borne the naval thunders of the Union in honor and in triumph.

But Mr. DRAPER'S removal, for cause, from one relation to the Government, was only to be followed by promotion to a better position. Comment is unnecessary!

It is not to be argued from all this record of official infidelity, that all members of the Republican organization are rogues, who look upon their country's woes as so many opportunities for enriching themselves. Far from it. The *facts*, however, do show that ABRAHAM LINCOLN cannot, or will not, in his administration of public affairs, call around him the integrity and ability of his party. He travels only in the circle of shameless and polluted partisans, who can be bribed by chances of plunder to abstain from just and loyal rebuke of his untold acts of folly and crime. If a man is known by the company he keeps, Mr. LINCOLN'S real character ought to deter honorable men, of all political parties, from giving countenance and support to his impudent pretensions for a reëlection. If all sense of public honor has not fled from among us, and if a free ballot box be not a thing of the past, a verdict of condemnation of ABRAHAM LINCOLN will be uttered in November which will stand as significant warning to all future Presidents.

ATTENTION, VOTERS!

ADDRESS

OF THE

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE

TO THE

PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: It no longer admits of a doubt that the unscrupulous supporters of the present incumbent of the presidential chair have determined to employ for his reëlection to that high office a system of violence and fraud unknown before in our history.

They thereby admit that his honest, legal reëlection is impossible. Thereby they already confess defeat.

The polling of every Democratic and conservative vote in the loyal States will make his reëlection, even by violence and fraud, impossible. We beseech and exhort you to let nothing whatever prevent your casting that vote.

In the State of Indiana administration majorities have been manufactured by the indecent exhibition of thousands of illegal votes.

In Maryland, military force has been used to silence the Democratic press, and the Federal Government has dictated the institutions of a State.

In Tennessee, the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency, holding, by the appointment and at the pleasure of the President, a pro-consular office unknown to any law, and repudiated by Congress, has assumed the armed control of polls commanded by him to be opened; and the President of the United States, appealed to by the free citizens of that State to right such wrongs, has treated that appeal with coarse contempt.

Last of all, the legal right of the soldiers of the Republic freely to join with their fellow-citizens in the choice of a national Chief Magistrate is menaced and made a mockery. Their camps,

thrown open to the political agents of the Administration, are sought to be closed to the legal representatives of the Democracy, under pretexts which leading organs of the Republican party find themselves compelled to denounce as insulting to the common-sense of the nation. The mails are violated to seize the votes that have been cast against him, and to place his own ballots in their stead; and when it had been discovered that the votes of the armies, which our candidate first organized and led to victory, were cast in great majority for their old commander, a plot was contrived to seize their votes, arrest the agents who had collected them, under pretense of punishing frauds which can only be discovered by inspectors of election with their poll-lists before them, which could only be committed and completed there, and which can justly be punished only under the stringent laws and by the officers of the States themselves.

In the presence of this odious and unexampled spectacle, the Democratic National Committee call upon all, of whatever name or party creed, lovers of liberty and the Union, now more truly than ever before "one and inseparable," to put forth all their strength in one final and triumphant effort for the salvation of both.

Wielding the most gigantic system of official patronage and corruption which the world has ever seen, the Administration, in whatever direction it turns, finds itself confronted by impending defeat.

Its open complicitly in acts of fraud and violence is a full confession that Abraham Lincoln's reëlection can not be accomplished by an honest appeal to the unbought will of a nation of freemen.

By such an appeal the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln can yet be prevented, in spite of fraud and violence. Such an appeal the Democratic National Committee now make to their fellow-citizens in all the States, but more especially to the thousands of true and loyal men who, in Maryland, in Indiana, in Ohio, in Kentucky, and in Missouri, now suffering in their persons, their feelings, and their property, from the reckless usurpations of the Executive and the chartered tyranny of his commissioned agents, have almost despaired of the Republic.

The Democracy never despairs of the Republic!

The party whose successive triumphs have marked the stages of the nation's greatness, triumphant now, can rescue the nation from the ruin wrought by the conspiracy of rebels at the South and fanatics at the North; can restore to her liberty, and order, and law, and plant her feet securely in the paths of republican empire.

The day-star of victory rose with the elections of September, in Maine. The subsiding deluge of fanaticism will once more bare the granite peaks of New-Hampshire to the sunshine of liberty. The State of John Stark and Daniel Webster will give her vote in November to the Union and the Constitution, to McClellan and Pendleton.

Connecticut, the ancestral home of our noble candidate, led by the spirits of a Trumbull, a Sherman, and an Ellsworth, pledges herself, by a clean majority in November, to assist in the salvation of the Republic.

Beyond peradventure is the result in the Empire State, in Pennsylvania, and in New-Jersey. There will be no break in the front of this great triple column in the grand army of the Union. The Keystone State redeemed herself in October; in November she will lead the redemption of the nation. New-Jersey stands where she has ever stood, in war and peace alike, true to the Union, the Constitution, and the Law.

The decisive vote of New-York, at the Chicago Convention, gave to the cause of the Union its candidate. In November, the decisive vote of New-York will herald the proclamation of that candidate as President of the Union, which, "at all hazards," he has sworn to preserve.

Gallant little Delaware—Maryland, tried, tempted, but alike unterrified and unseduced, and Kentucky, are surely with us.

Spurning with an equal scorn the treason and the tyranny which have once more made her rich and rural plains "a dark and bloody ground," the State of Kentucky stamps her proud foot, and swears she will be free.

Missouri, four years ago the garden of the further West, an empire in her teeming future, to-day our Mexico, ravaged in all her length and breadth by invaders and oppressors—what hope has Missouri save in the triumph of a soldier who can guard her borders, and of a statesman who can respect her will? Missouri will give her vote to the Union and the Constitution, to McClellan and Pendleton.

Illinois will stand by her sister of the Mississippi. Her vote is secure for the cause in which so many thousands of her sons have bled on a hundred battle-fields. The "Soldier State" of the West will have no more of Abraham Lincoln.

The fact that Indiana suffers under the rule of a Governor just reëlected to office by the most stupendous combination of political fraud with military force, can not shake our confidence in that noble State, which has carried the banner of Democracy triumphantly through many hard-fought battles.

In the elections of October, nearly forty thousand fraudulent votes given to the Republican candidates turned our legal victory there into an illegal defeat. It is not probable that these frauds can be repeated upon so colossal a scale in November, and if they be not so repeated, Indiana will, beyond a question, go for McClellan and Pendleton.

It is impossible, too, that the States lying around the head-waters of the great river of the continent should not vote to open the needful markets for their crops and their necessary highway to the seas.

Even from the Peninsular State, Michigan, (so strongly runs the patriotic and national tide,) our friends send us words of cheer,

and bid us hope that the home of Lewis Cass, misrepresented so long in the National Congress by a Senator who longed for a "little blood-letting," may set itself right with the Union by a sound majority for McClellan and Pendleton.

The tide will roll to the shores of the Pacific. California and Oregon, bound to all our hearts and hearthstones by "the mystic chords of memory," can have nothing in common with the party whose leaders would fain long since have severed them from the Union. All that we hear from those golden cradles of empire promises us their voice and vote in November for our candidates and our cause.

With such signs and omens of victory, with the glorious recollections of the past, and the promises not less glorious of the future, to cheer us, what true man can now dare to falter or to fail in this crisis of our national fate?

Fellow-citizens, the peaceful remedy of such wrongs as Americans throughout all time to come shall blush to remember could be done in the sacred name of liberty upon American soil, is now within your reach.

The glorious and honorable termination of a war whose victories are all unharvested, since they have not been garnered together with the victories of peace, is now within your reach.

An end to the accumulation of a limitless debt, already mortgaging half the resources and the industries of a great people, is now within your reach.

The triumphant restoration of that magnificent national temple which our fathers reared to freedom and to justice, is now within your reach.

The madness of the men in power is an argument for more than hope. It is the homage of desperate ambitions to the gathering power of the people's will. The dread handwriting which they read upon the wall bids you press forward with decisive energy to the certain triumph now within your reach and grasp.

It is not much that your country asks of you; but all that you hold dear, all that you have or can hope to have of liberty, of peace, of prosperity, depends upon your giving to your country what your country now asks—wisdom to see your duty, courage to do it.

With you, under a benignant Providence, it rests to determine, by your votes on the eighth of November, the death or the life of the noblest Republic ever established among men.

AUGUST BELMONT, *Chairman*

FREDERICK O. PRINCE, *Secretary*.

Campaign Document No. 13.

Address of the National Democratic Committee.

THE PERILS OF THE NATION.

Usurpations of the Administration in Maryland and Tennessee.

THE REMEDY TO BE USED.

To the People of the United States:

The Democratic National Committee of the United States hold it to be their duty to call the attention of their fellow-countrymen, without distinction of party, to certain grave acts of usurpation and wrong now practised upon the citizens of Maryland and of Tennessee, but involving the dearest rights of all the people, in all the States, and the very existence of those constitutional remedies against executive wrong-doing, which have heretofore saved this nation from the convulsions through which popular liberty in other lands has been forced to assert, to maintain, and to extend its guarantees.

In the State of Maryland, on the thirtieth day of September, the *Evening Post*, a journal printed in the city of Baltimore, which had that day for the first time published the electoral ticket of the Democratic party of that State, was suppressed by the following order of Major-General Wallace, commanding the United States troops in that city:

Eighth Army Corps, Baltimore, September 30.
Editors of Evening Post:
As the surest means of preventing your office being made the subject of violence, you will discontinue the publication of your paper, the *Evening Post*.

The sole pretext for this order was the assertion that several soldiers, subject to the command of Major-General Wallace, intended to create a riot in the streets of Baltimore and to destroy the property of the suppressed journal, on account of a statement upon its bulletin-board, announcing as an item of news: "A fearful riot in Cincinnati, during which a Lincoln club procession from Kentucky fired upon the citizens, men, women, and children, several being killed and wounded."

Such a pretext for such an order is so manifestly disgraceful to the military officer who, in issuing it, confessed his inability to restrain soldiers of the national service from acts at once of military insubordination and of civil outrage, that it is impossible to believe he could have been continued, as he since has been in his command, by the President of the United States, had not the suppression of the *Evening Post*, which was the only Democratic journal published in Baltimore, been designed by the Executive, for the express purpose of depriving the political opponents of the existing Administration in that city of their sole means of advocating their opinions, and even of disseminating the information necessary to guide the voters of their party to intelligent action at the polls.

Maryland is a loyal State. To her fidelity President Lincoln, in his message to Congress on the twenty-fifth of December, 1861, bears this emphatic witness: "Her bridges and railroads are repaired and open to the government; she already gives seven regiments to the cause of the Union and none to the enemy; and her people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any candidate on any question."

No enemy now treads her soil. The victorious advance of Sheridan has cleared even her furthest borders of all rebels in arms. Her people are as fully entitled to absolute freedom at the polls and in the discussion of all political questions as the people of Massachusetts or New-York.

To sanction an act by which they are shamelessly deprived of this freedom is a deliberate assumption by the Executive of his intention to perpetuate his authority by any exercise of arbitrary power in contempt of the popular will, and in violation of all the laws by which liberty in America has been hitherto protected.

All doubt as to the meaning of this conduct of the Executive in Maryland is put at an end by the simultaneous occurrence in the State of Tennessee of an act equally lawless, and equally eloquent of a settled purpose to retain the control of the resources and destinies of the people by means foreign to our institutions and fatal to our liberties.

On the thirtieth day of September, Andrew Johnson, a Brigadier-General of volunteers, holding, by appointment of the President, the office, unknown to our laws, of military governor of Tennessee; and, by the nomination of the Republican party, a candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the Union, issued a military order, commanding an election for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency to be held in that State, and prescribing arbitrary qualifications for voters at the election. This order is based on the proceedings of a political meeting which the military governor treats as a free convention of the people, absolutely subjected by the will of Mr. Lincoln to his authority; and in it the following oath is prescribed to be taken at the polls:

"I solemnly swear that I will henceforth support the Constitution of the United States, and defend it against the assaults of its enemies; that I am an active friend of the Government of the United States, and an enemy of the so-called Confederate States; that I ardently desire the suppression of the rebellion against the Government of the United States; that I sincerely rejoice in the triumph of the armies and navies of the United States, and in the defeat and overthrow of the armies, navies, and of all armed combinations in the interest of the so-called Confederate States; *that I will cordially oppose* all armistices or negotiations for peace with rebels in arms, until the Constitution of the United States, and all laws and proclamations made in pursuance thereof, shall be established over all the people of every State and Territory embraced within the national Union, and that I will heartily aid and assist the loyal people in whatever measures may be adapted for the attainment of those ends."

This oath is directly intended to deprive all loyal citizens of Tennessee, who may be constitutionally entitled to vote at all, of their right to support at the polls any policy for the suppres-

sion of the existing rebellion, save that which is advocated by Mr. Lincoln, by Mr. Johnson, and by the party sustaining them. That policy repudiates any issue of the war now waging, save the subjugation of the States in rebellion, and the abolition by the Federal power of the institution of slavery, and utterly forbids all negotiation, not only with the so-called Republic of the Confederate States, but with any single State, while a soldier remains in arms against the Union. The oath prescribed by the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency to the loyal citizens of Tennessee requires of them an absolute adhesion to this policy of his own party as the condition of their exercise of the most sacred right of citizenship. In other words, this oath commands every loyal citizen of Tennessee to vote for the Republican candidate or to abstain from the polls. Under the operation of this oath, any citizen who hold such views of the policy proper to be pursued toward the States in rebellion, as those put forth, for example, by the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, actually minister of the United States in London, would be disfranchised by the bayonets of the Executive in Tennessee.

"For one," said Mr. Adams in the House of Representatives, January 31, 1861, "I am not yet ready to take the responsibility of absolutely closing the door of reconciliation. I cannot persuade myself to forget the warnings that have descended to us from many of the wisest and best statesmen of all time against this rigid and haughty mode of treating great discontents. I cannot overlook the fact that in the days of our fathers the imperious spirit of Chatham did not feel itself as sacrificing any of its proud dignity, by proposing to listen to their grievances, and even to concede every reasonable demand long after they had placed themselves in armed resistance to all the power of Great Britain. Had George III. listened to his words of wisdom, he might have saved the brightest jewel of his crown.

"He took the opposite course. He denied the existence of grievances. He rejected the olive-branch. History records its verdict in favor of Chatham, and against the King."

Hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Union, without distinction of party, animated by a similar spirit, and drawing a like instruction from the lessons of history, believe, with General McClellan, in his letter accepting the presidential nomination, that,

> "So soon as it is clear or even probable that our present adversaries are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace reëstablish the Union and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace; we ask no more."

All such citizens are outlawed in Tennessee by the arbitrary will of the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency, nor will any man be suffered by him to do the highest duty of a freeman unless he is ready to accept a policy which substantially recognizes the republic of the Confederate States, by refusing to the several States, now unhappily leagued together under that name, the right of returning to, and of making peace with their sister States of the Union.

Such is the necessary effect of this unprecedented course of the "military governor" of Tennessee, a course of which, in the words applied by two distinguished members of the Republican party, Senator Wade, of Ohio, and Representative Davis, of Maryland, to the conduct of President Lincoln in unlawfully creating another "military governor" for the State of Louisiana, it may be said is "without authority of law, and therefore void," a "blow at the rights of humanity and at the principles of republican government." This course the President has sanctioned, as he has sanctioned the course of Major-General Wallace in Maryland, therein again forgetting, to use the words of the same distinguished Republicans, his obligation "to confine himself to his executive duties; to obey and execute, not make the laws; to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reörganization to Congress."

"If the supporters of the government," Senator Wade and Representative Davis go on to say, "fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and security committed to their keeping they sacrifice."

To this plain speaking of men eminent in the Republican party, we might well content ourselves with pointing the citizens of the United States, in the presence of these new and atrocious attempts upon the freedom of discussion and the sovereignty of the people. But we cannot forget that the very men who have so earnestly denounced executive usurpation in the past have now become its passive instruments and its silent apologists. This conquest of the last voices of constitutional liberty in the bosom of the Republican party by the seductions of power and of place, makes it imperative upon us to warn the people of America that the perils prefigured by such men as Senator Wade and Representative Davis are upon us to-day, and that they can only be conjured from the future of our country by the united and resolute action, not of the partisan supporters of a partisan government, but of a patriotic people combined for the defence of the Constitution and the laws.

The conduct of President Lincoln in Maryland and in Tennessee distinctly reveals a revolutionary purpose. The electoral votes of those States, eighteen in number, cast at the dictation of arbitrary power, may neutralize the same number of electoral votes freely and lawfully cast in other States of the Union. Upon those votes, therefore, the whole future of America may turn. To control those votes in the way attempted by Mr. Johnson, in Tennessee, and by General Wallace, in Maryland, is to plan a crime against liberty and the republic. We are fully aware of the gravity of this charge; but the rights, the interests, the issues here at stake are not less grave.

Again and again, for the past four years, Mr. Lincoln and his ministers, under one or another plea of military or political "necessity," have transcended the limits of executive authority, have trampled upon the sanctity of communal and individual right. It may well be doubted whether any government in the old world, claiming to hold its authority by Divine right, would have been permitted by any people of modern Europe to pursue its infractions of law and its contempt of liberty, so far as the American

people, in their devotion to the Union, have suffered the administration of Mr. Lincoln to go.

But the patience of the American people has been the fruit of their traditional reliance upon the remedies provided by the Constitution—*the right freely to speak their thoughts, freely to print their thoughts, and, above all, the inalienable right freely to choose and to change the agents of the public will.*

Once before in our history, under the pressure of an imminent national danger, executive recklessness ventured upon infractions of popular right, tame and insignificant enough to-day beside these usurpations in Maryland and in Tennessee.

Then, however, though in the infancy of our constitutional experience, the wise devotion of the people to the principles of our national liberty triumphed over the assumption of power, and the "peaceful revolution" of 1801, under Thomas Jefferson, secured to us sixty years of freedom and of progress.

The ambition of Mr. Lincoln and his supporters now threatens the very remedies through which the "peaceful revolution" of 1801 was accomplished.

This revolutionary ambition has already been met by Senator Wade and Representative Davis in a temper as revolutionary, with a formal summons of the people to extreme and ulterior measures.

"If those voters turn the balance in his favor," they exclaim, "is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce? . . . Let the people consider the remedy for these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it."

The National Democratic Committee do not so far despair of the future of the Republic. They believe that the American people, armed with the majestic authority of the Constitution and the laws, will meet these beginnings of usurpation in the spirit and with the determination of their fathers; nor suffer executive ambition so far to corrupt the constitutional remedies of executive wrong-doing as to condemn this great and free people, in the immediate future, to the condition, and with the condition to the remedies, of the subject populations of the older world. AUGUST BELMONT, *Chairman.*

F. O. PRINCE, *Secretary.*

SPEECH OF A. OAKEY HALL, Esq.,

NEW-HAVEN, CONN.,

October 20th, 1864.

After a few playful introductory remarks pertinent to the locality, Mr. Hall continued in substance as follows:

LINCOLN ARRAIGNED.

I come to arraign for high political crimes and low partisan misdemeanors, the village politician who is Commander-in-Chief of the armies and navy of the United States. At this grave crisis of public affairs, we might lose sight of individuals were it not that in the instance before us it is the individual who originates measures. We might indeed forget the accumulation of his individual treacheries toward the Constitution were he about to retire of his own accord to private life. But being a candidate for reëlection, the country being in danger of yet newer and more astounding treacheries at his hands, it would be the part of mawkish sensibility to refrain from discussing the candidate as he deserves to be discussed. It is, therefore, more the candidate whom I arraign than the President.

HOW LINCOLN ARRAIGNED POLK.

I have high and appropriate precedent for so doing. In 1848, (see *Congressional Globe*, 1848,) Abraham Lincoln, representative from Illinois, in a speech against the Mexican war, used his proper privilege in arraigning President Polk, but in language severer than any I shall this night employ; although General Cass, and not Mr. Polk, was candidate at the time.

JEFF AND OLD ABE JOINT CRIMINALS.

I arraign candidate Lincoln upon a presentment substantially filed in the high electoral court by the grand-juries of the Democratic party, against two political criminals. It is a joint indictment—against Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. The law of bullets under Grant and Sherman are trying Davis; of them and him we have nothing to say to-night. We are content to let those tribunals alone. But the law of ballots under the Constitution is to try the other criminal on the eighth of November. That is the law for us and for our discussion.

VERDICT ASKED FOR AGAINST LINCOLN.

If the jury is not tampered with, I have no fears but the setting sun of that day will record in letters of fire this verdict: "*Abraham Lincoln has been guilty of such high political felonies and low partisan misdemeanors, that he shall be forthwith condemned to be for ever after disqualified from holding any place of public trust or emolument under the Constitution which he has trampled upon and defied!*"

LINCOLN'S CRIMES, FROM TREASON TO THIMBLE-RIGGING.

I shall take the offences of my arraignment by degrees, from the gravest to the meanest. There are, as you will find, sixteen in all, from treason to thimble-rigging.

HIS TREASON.

And first I arraign him for treason. This offence may be defined to be either (1) levying war against one's country, or (2) adhering to the enemies of one's country—giving them aid and comfort. Jeff Davis has committed treason by levying war. His treason is on trial before Grant and Sherman. Abraham Lincoln has adhered, since September, 1862, to the abolitionists, who are the Northern enemies of the United States, and he has daily, since, given them aid and comfort. Shall I be asked for witnesses? Shall I be reminded that overt acts are necessary to be specified? I might answer that as Lincoln has arrested men for paper treason, and condemned them without witnesses, *he* should not complain of like treatment! But he shall have both witnesses and specification. Let us select two overt acts—the Emancipation Proclamation and the "To-whom-it-may-concern" decree. From witnesses, let me select the only statesman left to the Republican party—Thurlow Weed. He thus testified in his celebrated letter taking leave of the Albany *Journal:*

THURLOW WEED TESTIFIES.

"We have been involved for nearly three years in an abolition war. The influence that drove North-Carolina and Tennessee from the Union extorted an emancipation proclamation; practical and effective only in giving union,

strength, and determination to rebellion—a proclamation to which the first slave has not owed his freedom, for it is only operative where our armies go, and without it the armies would have gone faster and further. And let it be remembered that all the while these abolition demagogues and fanatics were aiding both rebellion and slavery. The North, united, (and free of incubus of abolitionism,) would have crushed rebellion, and with it the cursed institution which struck at and sought to divide the Union. If the South avert the punishment due to the great national crime of rebellion, they will owe their escape to the insanity of abolitionists. It is thus that antagonisms work together."

I did not three years ago mistake or magnify the evil of abolition influences; nor, though fiercely denounced, did I shrink from the duty of warning the people. What then was only prophetic is now history. Abolition influences in Congress and in the Cabinet have doubled the millions of dollars, and deepened the rivers of blood, spent and shed in a war *which, so long as such influences and counsels sway the government, promises nothing but an interminable conflict or an inglorious termination.*

SAD EFFECT OF LINCOLN'S TREASON.

When the first overt act of treason was committed, there was destroyed an era of good feeling. From April, 1861, to September, 1862, the Democratic party, subscribing to the Crittenden resolution of a war to defend the integrity of the Union, had laid upon the altar of patriotism ancient traditions and prejudices, and were supporting the government. The great thirty-five thousand Democratic majority city of New-York had poured out, through its Democratic Mayor, and councils, and bankers, treasure and soldiers. The North was united. The South was divided. The fell overt act reversed the position. It divided the North. It united the South. In the abstract, the proclamation was a piece of folly. Of course, slave property, like horse property, changed hands wherever military force captured it. We were all content with that. But the Democracy rightfully said, this is an entering wedge—this proclamation. It is the first act of giving aid and comfort to abolition enemies. It will be followed by others. It was so followed. Davis was exclaiming: "No peace without secession." Lincoln was vociferating: "No peace without abolition." Democracy said: "We are for peace with Union. Let secession and abolition perish together." And so went on the contest, until Lincoln sums up his treason in the "To-whom-it-may-concern," and McClellan summed up his fidelity to his country in his watchword of "Union at all hazards." Time will not permit me to argue this count of the arraignments. You must argue it for yourselves on an hundred other facts.

LINCOLN'S HOMICIDES.

I arraign candidate Lincoln for homicide; the homicide by culpable negligence, as defined by old lawyers—a form of manslaughter, indeed. Every soldier slain in the campaign to vindicate "my plan" of an overland march from the Rapidan to the James; every soldier killed in the Florida campaign to win a State government and a representative to the Baltimore Convention; each soldier who lies buried on the margins of the Red River, where General Banks led his cotton-gathering veterans; all soldiers sacrificed to the blunders of a civilian general who

——"never set a squadron in the field,
Nor the division of a battle knows
More than a spinster;"

and, alas! every brave Union volunteer who has lately been famished or fevered into a grave beside a Southern prison—each and all should have written upon the rude head-stone above him: "Slain by the culpable negligence of Abraham Lincoln." Because what profit even of subjugation, to say nothing of a profit toward restoring the Union, did the "my-plan" march, or the other campaigns, evolve? There was the most profitless slaughter in each. Victories! Ay! the bulletins said so. Accept them! There have, then, been bulletin victories enough; but how worthless is glory without results! The war, as one of desolation, of geographical occupation, of subjugation, of approximate annihilation, has been a dreadful success. But (in the spirit of the Chicago platform, so shamefully perverted by press and pulpit) as a war to restore the Union, it has been an experiment in the hands of Abraham Lincoln, and a diplomatic failure upon the valor of the slain.

"But, what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin;
"Why, that I cannot tell," said he;
"But 'twas a famous victory!"

Yes, we have had victories enough; but where has been, and where save under McClellan will be, the statesmanship to turn them to account?

COLORED FAITH IMMURES AND SLAYS OUR PRISONERS.

Let me dwell for a moment on the homicide of our prisoners by the culpable negligence of Lincoln. Their fathers, sons, and brothers who are voters, will never sustain the homicide if they know the facts. Reduced to a single statement they read thus: "We have enough white confederate prisoners to exchange for all the white Union prisoners at the South, and yet leave an overplus in our hands for negotiation as to the balance." But the rebels have captured many thousand negroes, nearly all former slaves; and Mr. Lincoln refuses to negotiate unless the question of negro equality is first settled. This is the official evidence. I read from the record. [Mr. Hall then read the following extract from the official correspondence between Commissioner Ould, of Richmond, and General Butler and Solicitor Whiting:]

PECKSNIFF BUTLER SHEDS TEARS.

. . The wrongs, indignities, and privations suffered by our white soldiers would move me to consent to any thing to procure their exchange, except to barter away the honor and faith of the Government of the United States, which has been solemnly pledged *to the colored soldiers* (!) in her ranks.

(Signed) BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Major-General and Agent of Exchange.

. . All *other* questions between us may be postponed for future settlement, but the fair exchange of colored soldiers and of their white officers *will be insisted on* by the government before another rebel soldier or officer will be exchanged.

WILLIAM WHITING,
Solicitor of the War Department.

HOW LINCOLN PETS NEGRO SOLDIERS.

The spirit which accompanies this culpable homicide of white prisoners to sustain faith pledged to colored soldiers (!) may be further illustrated by an extract from an order of Adjutant General Thomas:

The incorporation into the army of the United States of colored troops renders it necessary that they should be brought as speedily as possible to the highest state of discipline. Accordingly, the practice which has hitherto prevailed, no doubt from necessity, of requiring these

troops to perform most of the labor on fortifications, and the labor and fatigue duties of permanent stations and camps, will cease; and they will only be required to take their *fair share of fatigue duty with the white troops.* By order of the Secretary of War,

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

HOW LINCOLN BURNS SHIPS—ARSON.

I arraign candidate Lincoln for the offence of arison on the high seas. It is a leading principle in law: "Who does by another does that thing himself." Who has kept the ex-Hartford postmaster in office as Secretary of the Navy, while more than two hundred ships, with cargoes, have been burned on the high seas? True, neither Lincoln nor Welles fired them. But they particularly offered a premium for the arson by neglecting to avail themselves of the fast ships, brave men, and enterprise that abounded. Let every Connecticut voter redeem his State from the disgrace of Gideon Welles!

LINCOLN'S BURGLARIES.

I arraign Lincoln for burglary! When, in the dead of night, armed men broke into and entered the house of Vallandigham — a civilian, resident in a district over which martial law had not been declared—and, without any warrant but an order primarily proceeding from Lincoln, not only kidnapped the householder, but rifled his drawers of papers, then and there burglary was in every sense committed. When the office of Congressman Voorhees was broken into, entered, and rifled of correspondence by primary order of Lincoln, then the crime was repeated. Worse than all, when the mansion of George F. Thompson, a former writer for the *Daily News*, was entered, in my own city, at night, and his papers seized, and he himself carried off secretly to the Old Capitol Prison by the express orders of Lincoln, not only burglary transpired, but the crime of kidnapping.

LINCOLN'S KIDNAPPING.

Kidnapping! Why, in arraigning Mr. Lincoln for that crime, I need scarcely specify times, places, persons, incidents; they are so numerous. Our children require no longer to read the chronicles of the Bastile in search of thrilling annals of this crime. The deeds of French kings and Austrian despots sink into commonplace before the kidnapping successes of Lincoln. *Lettres de cachet* lose all dramatic effect beside the telegrams of the President in the case of Colonel Wolford—that brave Kentucky soldier who put himself into the breach of a war for the Union against even family and friends, to be rewarded by imprisonment of the most arbitrary character for the offence of making a political speech distasteful to Lincoln. In old French and English times, orders of commitment to Bastile and Tower, were at least in writing, and sealed and countersigned and put on record. In Lincoln's day, men have been discovered in forts who knew not their accusers, and who, when released without charge or trial, could discover no scrap of paper in existence touching their apprehension or confinement!

LINCOLN'S FALSE IMPRISONMENTS.

And then, how many offences of trespass to persons and property these kidnappings include! How many assaults! That most accomplished journalist and man of unblemished character, William C. Prime, of the *Journal of Commerce*, has furnished me with a resume of editorial outrages that classify under these offences. He has compiled them with great care, and I myself have verified them with dates and places.

FEARFUL STATISTICS OF PRESS OUTRAGES.

One hundred and fifty-five newspaper offices and editors have been interfered with by Abraham Lincoln! He who rode into power under the hypocritical cries of free press, free speech, free ballot, and resistance to executive usurpations! Cries that were comparative abstractions in 1860; cries now belonging to Democracy, because become dread realities; and not those, as it has turned out they were in Lincoln's mouth, of mere agitation! Of these one hundred and fifty-five, fifty-two offices were mobbed by Lincoln rioters; forty-three papers were suppressed by express orders of Lincoln; to fifteen mail privileges were refused; twenty-two editors were arrested, but graciously released without imprisonment; twenty more were actually confined in military prisons; three editors were banished from the United States, one, the editor of the Ohio *Watchman*, became a maniac through his confinement. No wonder, then, that Owen Lovejoy died about the time the outrages on *The World* and *Journal* culminated. He could observe how was thus desecrated and foresworn the principle of free press for which his brother was slain in 1837 at Alton, Illinois, for which he had earnestly pleaded. Was not Lovejoy an honest and consistent fanatic, and one of moral courage? Did he not move and carry a vote of thanks to McClellan for "accomplishing great results at little expense of human life"?

THREE HISTORICAL PAINTINGS ABOUT LINCOLN.

In the Capitol at Washington are many vacant spaces for historical paintings. Some years hence, when the abolition madness of the hour shall have passed away, and Abraham Lincoln stands revealed in all his political deformity, let some painter fill one of them with a warm and glowing canvas depicting the Baltimore editor vainly waiting in the White House entry-way, with a letter of a United States Senator in his hand as a credential to see the President, and to know why that President had arrested and imprisoned him! Let that artist next also hang by its side another canvas displaying the President's lackey insulting Mrs. Surgeon-General Hammond, by returning, at his master's order, her card, as she vainly endeavored to seek that presence which has been so free to Frederick Douglas and colored clergymen! By all means let the artist add yet a third canvas, depicting Abraham Lincoln—treasoner, homicide, arsoner, burglar, and kidnapper, that we have shown him to be—in the act of saying to the representative of the loyal men of Tennessee, who protested against Andy Johnson's test-oath, "May I inquire how long it took you and the New-York politicians to concoct that paper?" or "I expect to let the friends of George B. McClellan manage their side of this contest in their own way, and I will manage my side of it in my own way." Thus portrayed upon canvas, no man could accuse me of harshness when I style Abraham Lincoln the vulgar village politician disgracing the dignified *rôle* of chief magistrate!

LINCOLN ROBS HAWLEY D. CLAPP.

What is the next offence for arraignment? Robbery in the second degree. The obtaining of value through fear of injury to person, reputation, or family. How many men immured

in military prisons without warrant, written charges, or process of commitment, have, when demoralized in mind by their confinement, signed in favor of Lincoln's administration receipts or orders for transfers of property! I mention out of many one case. From that learn the whole: Hawley D. Clapp, late host of the Everett House, New-York, was arrested, charged with obtaining large sums of money from recruits by undue means. Every formality of arrest omitted in his case, except that he was transferred from the custody of the United States Marshal to Fort Lafayette on the order of an aid-de-camp! He may have been guilty. I do not argue the question. I only know that the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved. In this case there was no trial, nor attempt at it. For several months Clapp languishes in the prison that, so oddly under its recent uses, bears the honored name of him who overthrew bastiles—Lafayette—he who gave the key of the Paris prison of horrors to Washington as a memento sacred to a victory of freedom! Then, as a means of release, he pays over a large sum of money to Lincoln's agents. Why? Under what means? Through the duress of his imprisonment. What became of the money? It did not belong to the Government. *Was* it taken from recruits? Was it ever *repaid* to them? Was it *possible* to know whom it belonged to? Shall it be said the payment was a confession of guilt? What of the rack-confessions, of thumb-screw acknowledgments, of admissions under torture? Can you gauge the effect of imprisonment? Is it alike to every man? The hair of him of Chillon did not turn white of a single night, and yet to him,

> "At last men came to set me free,
> I asked not why and recked not where."

Gentlemen, Hawley D. Clapp, *untried*, is, in the eye of the law, innocent. And the money extorted from him was as plain a case of robbery by the common law as if it had been taken by a Fra Diavolo instead of by the leader of a lawless political party!

LINCOLN'S PERJURY ON INAUGURAL OATH.

How the offences intensify as we proceed with the arraignment! Perjury! When Abraham Lincoln placed military necessity, in districts where courts were open, above the Constitution, did he or not break his official oath? His oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution instead of violating it! How was it with the hand which wrote divers decrees and framed laws—the hand of him who is an executive, and not a legislator? Did that hand in so doing register a perjury? That hand which had on the fourth of March, 1861, touched the sacred volume presented by the lamented Taney in the presence (as it were) of two parties, standing angrily face to face inviting civil war! Perjury! 'Tis a hard word. But what have said Wade and Davis? Are the witnesses under Democratic subpœna? Although they have not written nor spoken that dread word against Lincoln, cannot he who runs read it in their manifesto? What are Lincoln's orders for test-oaths but perjuries against his constitutional obligations affirmed to on inauguration-day? And are there voters confidingly numerous enough to put him next March to the same farce of an oath in front of the Capitol after all these things? And yet you have only selections.

LINCOLN'S BLASPHEMY, PROFANITY, AND OBSCENITY.

He who can commit perjury is capable of blasphemy and profanity. Indeed, these are but steps to that more deliberate crime. I arraign him for those common law offences. I call Horace Greeley's paper as a witness.

GREELEY ON THE WITNESS-STAND.

It is not many weeks since its columns editorially admitted that the President had said of McClellan: "He is hell on a parade." Blasphemies! Whose order tore the aged Roman Catholic Bishop of Natchez from the very altar of God? Abraham Lincoln's.

LINCOLN'S BAYONET RELIGION.

Who made martial law the law of the Episcopal rubric, and exiled clergymen who refused to pray for Lincoln? Was there ever before a king or potentate who forced a form of religious prayer at the point of the bayonet? Or enforced ecclesiastical discipline with a file of swearing soldiers? What answers the field of Antietam, which listened to the singing, amid the fresh solemnities of the battle-field, of a negro song at the express request of President Lincoln when riding over it?

LINCOLN'S RIBALDRY AT ANTIETAM.

One who heard him ask for the song, who shuddered as he heard the request; one who listened to the singing and sorrowed within him as he did so, narrated to me the circumstance. If President Lincoln or Mr. Marshal Lamon will deny it, I pledge myself to produce that eye-and-ear witness. Men of the State of Dwight and Edwards, this is the chosen leader of a party who claims a patent for piety and patriotism! Who demands a special property in the flag! Who claims exclusive proprietary interest in every victory! Who answers alike ugly facts and convincing logic with the parrot-cry of, "Stand off, Copperhead, for we are holier than thou art!" Obscenity is a lower order of the crime under observation.

LINCOLN'S OBSCENITY.

Is Lincoln guilty of that? Join any mess-room of congressmen and ask *them*. Buy the jest-book "fresh from Abraham's bosom," and ask that. If any responsible man denies it in print, witnesses will rise up in the *salons* of Washington, thickly as armed men sprang from the dragon's teeth sowed of old by Cadmus! What else could be expected of one inexperienced in society, and whose daily associates vulgarized natural filthiness of thought; of one whose antecedents were thus portrayed — prophetically so—by a contemporary, the Hon. J. N. Morris, of Illinois, in a speech delivered June 19, 1860, during the first canvass for Lincoln? (See page 462 of part four of *Congressional Globe* of that year.)

A CONGRESSMAN PREDICTED IT ALL.

"Elect Lincoln, and let the fact be announced that a hostile enemy has landed upon our shores, or that States have rebelled against the authority of the general government, and in all probability he would go on telling some anecdote or finishing a game of sport on the public grounds in front of the White House! *Upon the death of a monarch, who ever thought of putting the* KING'S JESTER *on the throne?*"

A MAC AND OLD ABE CONTRAST.

And yet some of the American people are hesitating whether to prefer to keep this jester

on the throne to placing in the Democratic chair of Washington, of Jefferson, and of Jackson, the reticent gentleman and courageous Christian soldier and statesman of foresight, George B. McClellan! And yet such is the man who was forced as a candidate, it is said by many of my old Republican friends, on their party; whom they despise and yet must vote for, because he —this man of blasphemy and obscenity—represents a "principle!"

BRIBERY AND THE BLAIRS.

I arraign him in this connection for bribery. He sent—said the younger Blair—a proposition to Grant to give McClellan a command. I came —said the elder Blair—to see McClellan to offer him a command if he would refuse the presidency. What was this but bribery, the offence of persuading to, or dissuading from duty, by a gift? Lincoln, it is true, has here filed a special plea in bar, as lawyers say. But putting the confessions of the younger (whose "time had come") with the admissions of the elder, (whose time is yet to come,) what sane juror will refuse to say that Lincoln knew of the bribe? And what a dilemma it puts Lincoln in!

LINCOLN'S PARTISAN DILEMMA.

General McClellan is fit to be in the field, or he is not. If he is fit, then shame on Lincoln, who, for two years has kept him out. If he is not fit, then the Blair confessions make Lincoln jeopardize the country by giving command to an unfit soldier in order to promote his own political interests! In other words, that Lincoln stands convicted of preferring party to country. Lincoln always compromises party interests, and can negotiate to procure partisan peace for a bleeding army of office-holders! But he cannot compromise for the good of a bleeding nation!

LINCOLN COMMITTED TO COMPROMISE.

And yet he is the only man who *has* compromised with the South. Did he not try confederate sailors as pirates? (I refer to the Savannah case.) And after a failure to convict, under the leadership for the prisoners of James T. Brady, (who is never so really Brady unless he is against oppression and wrong,) did he not exchange them as prisoners of war under threat of retaliation? The probable Chief-Justice of the United States, William M. Evarts, thought they were pirates. Very humbly, I thought not. Perhaps, however, they were; nevertheless, many who believed them pirates deemed it a wise compromise on the part of the War Department to give them up in exchange. Ah! Lincoln will soon enough compromise, when the Democratic party have fought his placemen and myrmidons out of power and plunder, by its ballots!

LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION EMBEZZLEMENTS.

This word plunder brings me to count the eleventh of the indictment. It is for embezzlements and peculations. Shall I stop to cite cases or call witnesses before an intelligent audience who read newspapers and treasury reports? No! So I pass to the next crime of Lincoln's; the obtaining of money by false pretences.

HOW LINCOLN OBTAINS MONEY BY FALSE PRETENCES.

In 1861 he wanted money and sent Chase to the New-York banks. The loans thus obtained saved Washington and the national credit. The money was given on the faith of a war for the Union. Lincoln not only broke faith in the matter with the moneyed interests, by changing the war into one for abolition, desolation, extermination, and subjugation, but he inaugurated treacherous attacks on these very banks by establishing national pet institutions and annoying the State banks by vexatious taxations. Lincoln, in 1863, levied a tax of three per cent on incomes of that year ending December. Six months after the year had passed, (and the tax had been collected and incomes adjusted, or perhaps surplus spent upon the faith of prior representations,) a retroactive tax of five per cent additional is added for the same time. Was not the three per cent collected under false pretences? Have you ever compared the backs of the two issues of postage currency? Upon the first you find, "Receivable for all dues less than five dollars;" upon the last issue is added the words, "except customs." Well, by true construction of language, the additional words created an exception which did not previously exist. Yet, although the currency first obtained popularity because receivable for fractional custom-house dues, and at first so taken, it was shortly disallowed, and faith broken. I call all these things the obtaining of money and credit by false pretences and tokens!

LINCOLN'S RECORD FORGERIES.

I arraign Lincoln for forgery. One class of forgery is the alteration of figures, accounts, and statistics of a pecuniary nature in order to deceive creditors. Who so great a debtor in the world as these United States? Who has so shamefully taxed upon the credulity of creditors by falsifying, from time to time, the figures of the national debt account, as Abraham Lincoln? Nor will I stop to argue this, because the newspapers and money-articles of the press have anticipated me fully.

HE IS GUILTY OF MAYHEM.

I arraign him for a species of mayhem. This is to be defined, for popular purposes, malicious mutilation of the person. Let me read you this order from a deputy of Commander-in-Chief Lincoln:

PROCESS OF BRANDING SOLDIERS.

PROVOST-MARSHAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., Aug. 19, 1864.

Circular.

DOCTOR: In addition to my suggestion to mark all rejected recruits and substitutes, I would suggest that all accepted recruits and substitutes be marked thus, "I," in the small of the back. This will, I think, prevent, to a great extent, the practice of bounty-jumping.

Yours, etc., J. H. BAXTER, Surgeon.
U. S. V., Chief Medical Officer Provost-Marshal General's Bureau.

How was this marking done? By the use of lunar caustic. Suits are now pending in New-York and New-Jersey for assaults of this kind. There are doubtless others. What an indignity! And from the leader of the party who has waxed eloquent over scars upon the negro's back! I am against all scarring, whether of bond or free. *But, above all, of the citizen, and voter, and soldier.* Just heaven! has citizenship come to this—that we hold not only personal liberty and property, but the very sacredness of person—God's image—at the will of Lincoln and his surgeons? Paul cried, "I am a Roman citizen," and the fasces of the lictor were staid. Time

was, when the call, "I am an American citizen," was heard from the deck of an Austrian frigate, and when Ingraham dared, and Marcy approved, to make the cry of Koszta not in vain. Shall that cry ever be again potent? Then elect McClellan, and to an ignominious electoral outlawry with this brander who occupies the presidential chair!

THE MISDEMEANOR OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.

Abraham Lincoln has committed that heinous common law crime of "obstructing the course of government and justice." He suspended *habeas corpus* before Congress gave him power —conceding, for the brevity of argument, that they possessed it. He has declared martial law over civil districts. He has ordered the process of courts to be contemned. He has interfered with elections. Lincoln meditates, as the signs of the times clearly indicate, yet fresher obstructions of government and justice. Have you ever read Kinglake's exposition of Napoleon's *coup d'état?* If so, you will remember how thrillingly he precedes the main event by an account of Napoleon's defeating, for the presidency, General Cavaignac, the former idol of the soldiery.

LINCOLN AND NAPOLEON III. CONTRASTED.

You will recall the after-process by which, under aid of bayonets, Napoleon strangled the French nation in the night by a proclamation, and became Emperor. He had his Morny and Maupas; Lincoln has his Stanton and Holt. Napoleon had generals, prefets, and sub-prefets to do his bidding. Lincoln has more than these, and as despotic officers. Napoleon placed thirty-two departments under martial law during his election. Lincoln has thirty-two territorial divisions "called" States. O men of Connecticut! do you wish to see how a parallel might be made hereafter (I will not say this year) should Lincoln be reëlected — he, this obstructor of government and justice—then take that volume of Kinglake, and at page 197 read it, and prepare against such usurpations.

THIMBLE-RIGGING.

Time fails me, I perceive, to classify the misdemeanors which I intended to arrange under the word thimble-rigging. But examples will occur to you: those connected with a Chicago Committee and the Pope's bull against the comet; the letters to Fremont and Hunter; the letter to Greeley; the peninsular performances, also, at the expense not only of "Little Mac," but of the country. Alas for the land under the thimble-rigging of this little joker against "Little Mac!" was not that a sorry perfection of thimble-rigging which was done with Blenker's division and with McDowell's corps? How many, many thimbles Lincoln has used in his cunning art! Cameron, Chase, and Blair, Hunter, Fremont, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, Halleck, Hitchcock, Sigel, Butler, Banks—but let your memories complete the list; I do not wish to be too personal. What was the peace negotiation, through the Canadian back-door of the Union, but a game of thimble-rigging. Or that through the cellar-door of the Confederacy at Richmond —Sanders, Jewett, Hay, and Greeley, as the Canadian players with the thimbles—Davis, Benjamin, Jaquess, and Gillmore as the performers beyond the intrenchments of James River. Two historical groups—with Lincoln in each background as the thimble-rigger!

But enough. My aim has been rather to outline these crimes and misdemeanors of candidate Lincoln to the jury of voters, and leave them to the greater filling out with facts and dates, so readily attainable in this newspaper day.

LINCOLN'S CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTION.

No wonder that when wary politicians, like Colfax and Forney, came to survey these crimes, they caused Congress to pass an act which should attempt in advance to *nole pros.* this indictment—almost as bad for its Lincolnian duplicity, repugnancy, and multifariousness. Let me read it. It should have been entitled: "An Act to License Presidential Wrongs:"

SEC. 4, March 3, 1863, Chapter 81, Laws of 37th Congress—"And be it, etc., that *any* order of the President, or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, *shall be* a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done under and by virtue of such order, or under *color* [?] of any law of Congress; and such defence may be made by special plea, or under the general issue."

LINCOLN PERSONALLY DISSECTED.

Were the policies of Mr. Lincoln's party ever so pure and certain, ever so sure of beneficial results, and I approved of them, I would not trust them four years longer in his hands after the experience of the past three years. There has been no such cunning trickster since the days of Burr; and Burr was at least a gentleman and a scholar! Not even Tyler was so inordinately vain of power. He exercises it as recklessly as Bomba did! He is surrounded by more dangerous men than ever haunted the ante-rooms of the imbecile Louis XIII.! I profoundly pity the rebels under the despotism of Davis. Yet that is at least an educated, intelligent, and respectable despotism. It acts within the forms of law and constitutions. The despotism of centralized power which Lincoln is establishing is a vulgar and debasing despotism — one which appeals to the fears of the pocket for its supremacy; and relies upon purse and sword at a usurpation over free ballot and Constitution.

GOOD MEN MAKE GOOD GOVERNMENTS.—McCLELLAN.

Apart, therefore, from any discussion of platforms or principles, I am, on the question of persons, for McClellan and against Lincoln. The author of the Harrison's Bar letter, the man who asked "if he could not lead his army, to be at least allowed to share their fate on the field of battle;" the general who begged his malicious foe to "say a good word for the army, but nothing about himself;" the hero who forgot his grief, to save Washington at South-Mountain and Antietam; the writer of the letter of presidential acceptance—*he* is to Lincoln as Hyperion to Satyr; *he* can be safely trusted with the reins of power; *he* has never yet abused a trust or a confidence; *he* will not now.

All history informs us that—talk as we may about policies, expediencies, platforms, or principles of administration—they made the best rulers who were the bravest and noblest of men. These constitute the State! "Men, high-minded men, who their duties know; who know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain, prevent the long-aimed blow, and crush the tyrants while they rend the chain."

Campaign Document No. 13.

Address of the National Democratic Committee.

THE PERILS OF THE NATION.

Usurpations of the Administration in Maryland and Tennessee.

THE REMEDY TO BE USED.

To the People of the United States:

The Democratic National Committee of the United States hold it to be their duty to call the attention of their fellow-countrymen, without distinction of party, to certain grave acts of usurpation and wrong now practised upon the citizens of Maryland and of Tennessee, but involving the dearest rights of all the people, in all the States, and the very existence of those constitutional remedies against executive wrong-doing, which have heretofore saved this nation from the convulsions through which popular liberty in other lands has been forced to assert, to maintain, and to extend its guarantees.

In the State of Maryland, on the thirtieth day of September, the *Evening Post*, a journal printed in the city of Baltimore, which had that day for the first time published the electoral ticket of the Democratic party of that State, was suppressed by the following order of Major-General Wallace, commanding the United States troops in that city:

Eighth Army Corps, Baltimore, September 30.
Editors of Evening Post:

As the surest means of preventing your office being made the subject of violence, you will discontinue the publication of your paper, the *Evening Post*.

The sole pretext for this order was the assertion that several soldiers, subject to the command of Major-General Wallace, intended to create a riot in the streets of Baltimore and to destroy the property of the suppressed journal, on account of a statement upon its bulletin-board, announcing as an item of news: "A fearful riot in Cincinnati, during which a Lincoln club procession from Kentucky fired upon the citizens, men, women, and children, several being killed and wounded."

Such a pretext for such an order is so manifestly disgraceful to the military officer who, in issuing it, confessed his inability to restrain soldiers of the national service from acts at once of military insubordination and of civil outrage, that it is impossible to believe he could have been continued, as he since has been in his command, by the President of the United States, had not the suppression of the *Evening Post*, which was the only Democratic journal published in Baltimore, been designed by the Executive, for the express purpose of depriving the political opponents of the existing Administration in that city of their sole means of advocating their opinions, and even of disseminating the information necessary to guide the voters of their party to intelligent action at the polls.

Maryland is a loyal State. To her fidelity President Lincoln, in his message to Congress on the twenty-fifth of December, 1861, bears this emphatic witness: "Her bridges and railroads are repaired and open to the government; she already gives seven regiments to the cause people, at a regular election, have sustained the Union by a larger majority and a larger aggregate vote than they ever before gave to any candidate on any question."

No enemy now treads her soil. The victorious advance of Sheridan has cleared even her furthest borders of all rebels in arms. Her people are as fully entitled to absolute freedom at the polls and in the discussion of all political questions as the people of Massachusetts or New-York.

To sanction an act by which they are shamelessly deprived of this freedom is a deliberate assumption by the Executive of his intention to perpetuate his authority by any exercise of arbitrary power in contempt of the popular will, and in violation of all the laws by which liberty in America has been hitherto protected.

All doubt as to the meaning of this conduct of the Executive in Maryland is put at an end by the simultaneous occurrence in the State of Tennessee of an act equally lawless, and equally eloquent of a settled purpose to retain the control of the resources and destinies of the people by means foreign to our institutions and fatal to our liberties.

On the thirtieth day of September, Andrew Johnson, a Brigadier-General of volunteers, holding, by appointment of the President, the office, unknown to our laws, of military governor of Tennessee; and, by the nomination of the Republican party, a candidate for the Vice-Presidency of the Union, issued a military order, commanding an election for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency to be held in that State, and prescribing arbitrary qualifications for voters at the election. This order is based on the proceedings of a political meeting which the military governor treats as a free convention of the people, absolutely subjected by the will of Mr. Lincoln to his authority; and in it the following oath is prescribed to be taken at the polls:

"I solemnly swear that I will henceforth support the Constitution of the United States, and defend it against the assaults of its enemies; that I am an active friend of the Government of the United States, and an enemy of the so-called Confederate States; that I ardently desire the suppression of the rebellion against the Government of the United States; that I sincerely rejoice in the triumph of the armies and navies of the United States, and in the defeat and overthrow of the armies, navies, and of all armed combinations in the interest of the so-called Confederate States; *that I will cordially oppose* all armistices or negotiations for peace with rebels in arms, until the Constitution of the United States, and all laws and proclamations made in pursuance thereof, shall be established over all the people of every State and Territory embraced within the national Union, and that I will heartily aid and assist the loyal people in whatever measures may be adapted for the attainment of those ends."

This oath is directly intended to deprive all loyal citizens of Tennessee, who may be constitutionally entitled to vote at all, of their right to

sion of the existing rebellion, save that which is advocated by Mr. Lincoln, by Mr. Johnson, and by the party sustaining them. That policy repudiates any issue of the war now waging, save the subjugation of the States in rebellion, and the abolition by the Federal power of the institution of slavery, and utterly forbids all negotiation, not only with the so-called Republic of the Confederate States, but with any single State, while a soldier remains in arms against the Union. The oath prescribed by the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency to the loyal citizens of Tennessee requires of them an absolute adhesion to this policy of his own party as the condition of their exercise of, the most sacred right of citizenship. In other words, this oath commands every loyal citizen of Tennessee to vote for the Republican candidate or to abstain from the polls. Under the operation of this oath, any citizen who hold such views of the policy proper to be pursued toward the States in rebellion, as those put forth, for example, by the Hon. Charles Francis Adams, actually minister of the United States in London, would be disfranchised by the bayonets of the Executive in Tennessee.

"For one," said Mr. Adams in the House of Representatives, January 31, 1861, "I am not yet ready to take the responsibility of absolutely closing the door of reconciliation. I cannot persuade myself to forget the warnings that have descended to us from many of the wisest and best statesmen of all time against this rigid and haughty mode of treating great discontents. I cannot overlook the fact that in the days of our fathers the imperious spirit of Chatham did not feel itself as sacrificing any of its proud dignity, by proposing to listen to their grievances, and even to concede every reasonable demand long after they had placed themselves in armed resistance to all the power of Great Britain. Had George III. listened to his words of wisdom, he might have saved the brightest jewel of his crown.

"He took the opposite course. He denied the existence of grievances. He rejected the olive-branch. History records its verdict in favor of Chatham, and against the King."

Hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Union, without distinction of party, animated by a similar spirit, and drawing a like instruction from the lessons of history, believe, with General McClellan, in his letter accepting the presidential nomination, that,

> "So soon as it is clear or even probable that our present adversaries are ready for peace upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace reestablish the Union and gufarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace; we ask no more."

All such citizens are outlawed in Tennessee by the arbitrary will of the Republican candidate for the Vice-Presidency, nor will any man be suffered by him to do the highest duty of a freeman unless he is ready to accept a policy which substantially recognizes the republic of the Confederate States, by refusing to the several States, now unhappily leagued together under that name, the right of returning to, and of making peace with their sister States of the Union.

Such is the necessary effect of this unprecedented course of the "military governor" Tennessee, a course of which, in the words a plied by two distinguished members of the R publican party, Senator Wade, of Ohio, an Representative Davis, of Maryland, to the co duct of President Lincoln in unlawfully creatin another "military governor" for the State Louisiana, it may be said is "without authorit of law, and therefore void," a "blow at th rights of humanity and at the principles of re publican government." This course the Presi dent has sanctioned, as he has sanctioned the course of Major-General Wallace in Maryland therein again forgetting, to use the words of the same distinguished Republicans, his obligation "to confine himself to his executive duties; to obey and execute, not make the laws; to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political reorganization to Congress."

"If the supporters of the government," Senator Wade and Representative Davis go on to say, "fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people whose rights and security committed to their keeping they sacrifice."

To this plain speaking of men eminent in the Republican party, we might well content ourselves with pointing the citizens of the United States, in the presence of these new and atrocious attempts upon the freedom of discussion and the sovereignty of the people. But we cannot forget that the very men who have so earnestly denounced executive usurpation in the past have now become its passive instruments and its silent apologists. This conquest of the last voices of constitutional liberty in the bosom of the Republican party by the seductions of power and of place, makes it imperative upon us to warn the people of America that the perils prefigured by such men as Senator Wade and Representative Davis are upon us to-day, and that they can only be conjured from the future of our country by the united and resolute action, not of the partisan supporters of a partisan government, but of a patriotic people combined for the defence of the Constitution and the laws.

The conduct of President Lincoln in Maryland and in Tennessee distinctly reveals a revolutionary purpose. The electoral votes of those States, eighteen in number, cast at the dictation of arbitrary power, may neutralize the same number of electoral votes freely and lawfully cast in other States of the Union. Upon those votes, therefore, the whole future of America may turn. To control those votes in the way attempted by Mr. Johnson, in Tennessee, and by General Wallace, in Maryland, is to plan a crime against liberty and the republic. We are fully aware of the gravity of this charge; but the rights, the interests, the issues here at stake are not less grave.

Again and again, for the past four years, Mr. Lincoln and his ministers, under one or another plea of military or political "necessity," have transcended the limits of executive authority, have trampled upon the sanctity of communal and individual right. It may well be doubted whether any government in the old world, claiming to hold its authority by Divine right, would have been permitted by any people of modern Europe to pursue its infractions of law and its contempt of liberty, so far as the American

people, in their devotion to the Union, have suffered the administration of Mr. Lincoln to go.

But the patience of the American people has been the fruit of their traditional reliance upon the remedies provided by the Constitution—*the right freely to speak their thoughts, freely to print their thoughts, and, above all, the inalienable right freely to choose and to change the agents of the public will.*

Once before in our history, under the pressure of an imminent national danger, executive recklessness ventured upon infractions of popular right, tame and insignificant enough to-day beside these usurpations in Maryland and in Tennessee.

Then, however, though in the infancy of our constitutional experience, the wise devotion of the people to the principles of our national liberty triumphed over the assumption of power, and the "peaceful revolution" of 1801, under Thomas Jefferson, secured to us sixty years of freedom and of progress.

The ambition of Mr. Lincoln and his supporters now threatens the very remedies through which the "peaceful revolution" of 1801 was accomplished.

This revolutionary ambition has already been met by Senator Wade and Representative Davis in a temper as revolutionary, with a formal summons of the people to extreme and ulterior measures.

"If those voters turn the balance in his favor," they exclaim, "is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce? . . . Let the people consider the remedy for these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it."

The National Democratic Committee do not so far despair of the future of the Republic. They believe that the American people, armed with the majestic authority of the Constitution and the laws, will meet these beginnings of usurpation in the spirit and with the determination of their fathers; nor suffer executive ambition so far to corrupt the constitutional remedies of executive wrong-doing as to condemn this great and free people, in the immediate future, to the condition, and with the condition to the remedies, of the subject populations of the older world. AUGUST BELMONT, *Chairman.*

F. O. PRINCE, *Secretary.*

SPEECH OF A. OAKEY HALL, Esq.,

NEW-HAVEN, CONN.,

October 20th, 1864.

After a few playful introductory remarks pertinent to the locality, Mr. Hall continued in substance as follows:

LINCOLN ARRAIGNED.

I come to arraign for high political crimes and low partisan misdemeanors, the village politician who is Commander-in-Chief of the armies and navy of the United States. At this grave crisis of public affairs, we might lose sight of individuals were it not that in the instance before us it is the individual who originates measures. We might indeed forget the accumulation of his individual treacheries toward the Constitution were he about to retire of his own accord to private life. But being a candidate for reëlection, the country being in danger of yet newer and more astounding treacheries at his hands, it would be the part of mawkish sensibility to refrain from discussing the candidate as he deserves to be discussed. It is, therefore, more the candidate whom I arraign than the President.

HOW LINCOLN ARRAIGNED POLK.

I have high and appropriate precedent for so doing. In 1848, (see *Congressional Globe*, 1848,) Abraham Lincoln, representative from Illinois, in a speech against the Mexican war, used his proper privilege in arraigning President Polk, but in language severer than any I shall this night employ; although General Cass, and not Mr. Polk, was candidate at the time.

JEFF AND OLD ABE JOINT CRIMINALS.

I arraign candidate Lincoln upon a presentment substantially filed in the high electoral court by the grand-juries of the Democratic party, against two political criminals. It is a joint indictment—against Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln. The law of bullets under Grant and Sherman are trying Davis; of them and him we have nothing to say to-night. We are content to let those tribunals alone. But the law of ballots under the Constitution is to try the other criminal on the eighth of November. That is the law for us and for our discussion.

VERDICT ASKED FOR AGAINST LINCOLN.

If the jury is not tampered with, I have no fears but the setting sun of that day will record in letters of fire this verdict: "*Abraham Lincoln has been guilty of such high political felonies and low partisan misdemeanors, that he shall be forthwith condemned to be for ever after disqualified from holding any place of public trust or emolument under the Constitution which he has trampled upon and defied!*"

LINCOLN'S CRIMES, FROM TREASON TO THIMBLE-RIGGING.

I shall take the offences of my arraignment by degrees, from the gravest to the meanest. There are, as you will find, sixteen in all, from treason to thimble-rigging.

HIS TREASON.

And first I arraign him for treason. This offence may be defined to be either (1) levying war against one's country, or (2) adhering to the enemies of one's country—giving them aid and comfort. Jeff Davis has committed treason by levying war. His treason is on trial before Grant and Sherman. Abraham Lincoln has adhered, since September, 1862, to the abolitionists, who are the Northern enemies of the United States, and he has daily, since, given them aid and comfort. Shall I be asked for witnesses? Shall I be reminded that overt acts are necessary to be specified? I might answer that as Lincoln has arrested men for paper treason, and condemned them without witnesses, *he* should not complain of like treatment! But he shall have both witnesses and specification. Let us select two overt acts—the Emancipation Proclamation and the "To-whom-it-may-concern" decree. From witnesses, let me select the only statesman left to the Republican party—Thurlow Weed. He thus testified in his celebrated letter taking leave of the Albany *Journal*:

THURLOW WEED TESTIFIES.

"We have been involved for nearly three years in an abolition war. The influence that drove North-Carolina and Tennessee from the Union extorted an emancipation proclamation; practical and effective only in giving union.

strength, and determination to rebellion—a proclamation to which the first slave has not owed his freedom, for it is only operative where our armies go, and without it the armies would have gone faster and further. And let it be remembered that all the while these abolition demagogues and fanatics were aiding both rebellion and slavery. The North, united, (and free of incubus of abolitionism,) would have crushed rebellion, and with it the cursed institution which struck at and sought to divide the Union. If the South avert the punishment due to the great national crime of rebellion, they will owe their escape to the insanity of abolitionists. It is thus that antagonisms work together."

I did not three years ago mistake or magnify the evil of abolition influences; nor, though fiercely denounced, did I shrink from the duty of warning the people. What then was only prophetic is now history. Abolition influences in Congress and in the Cabinet have doubled the millions of dollars, and deepened the rivers of blood, spent and shed in a war *which, so long as such influences and counsels sway the government, promises nothing but an interminable conflict or an inglorious termination.*

SAD EFFECT OF LINCOLN'S TREASON.

When the first overt act of treason was committed, there was destroyed an era of good feeling. From April, 1861, to September, 1862, the Democratic party, subscribing to the Crittenden resolution of a war to defend the integrity of the Union, had laid upon the altar of patriotism ancient traditions and prejudices, and were supporting the government. The great thirty-five thousand Democratic majority city of New-York had poured out, through its Democratic Mayor, and councils, and bankers, treasure and soldiers. The North was united. The South was divided. The fell overt act reversed the position. It divided the North. It united the South. In the abstract, the proclamation was a piece of folly. Of course, slave property, like horse property, changed hands wherever military force captured it. We were all content with that. But the Democracy rightfully said, this is an entering wedge—this proclamation. It is the first act of giving aid and comfort to abolition enemies. It will be followed by others. It was so followed. Davis was exclaiming: "No peace without secession." Lincoln was vociferating: "No peace without abolition." Democracy said: "We are for peace with Union. Let secession and abolition perish together." And so went on the contest, until Lincoln sums up his treason in the "To-whom-it-may-concern," and McClellan summed up his fidelity to his country in his watchword of "Union at all hazards." Time will not permit me to argue this count of the arraignments. You must argue it for yourselves on an hundred other facts.

LINCOLN'S HOMICIDES.

I arraign candidate Lincoln for homicide; the homicide by culpable negligence, as defined by old lawyers—a form of manslaughter, indeed. Every soldier slain in the campaign to vindicate "my plan" of an overland march from the Rapidan to the James; every soldier killed in the Florida campaign to win a State government and a representative to the Baltimore Convention; each soldier who lies buried on the margins of the Red River, where General Banks led his cotton-gathering veterans; all soldiers sacrificed to the blunders of a civilian general who

> ——"never set a squadron in the field,
> Nor the division of a battle knows
> More than a spinster;"

and, alas! every brave Union volunteer who has lately been famished or fevered into a grave beside a Southern prison—each and all should have written upon the rude head-stone above him: "Slain by the culpable negligence of Abraham Lincoln." Because what profit even of subjugation, to say nothing of a profit toward restoring the Union, did the "my-plan" march, or the other campaigns, evolve? There was the most profitless slaughter in each. Victories! Ay! the bulletins said so. Accept them! There have, then, been bulletin victories enough; but how worthless is glory without results! The war, as one of desolation, of geographical occupation, of subjugation, of approximate annihilation, has been a dreadful success. But (in the spirit of the Chicago platform, so shamefully perverted by press and pulpit) as a war to restore the Union, it has been an experiment in the hands of Abraham Lincoln, and a diplomatic failure upon the valor of the slain.

> "But, what good came of it at last?"
> Quoth little Peterkin;
> "Why, that I cannot tell," said he;
> "But 'twas a famous victory!"

Yes, we have had victories enough; but where has been, and where save under McClellan will be, the statesmanship to turn them to account?

COLORED FAITH IMMURES AND SLAYS OUR PRISONERS.

Let me dwell for a moment on the homicide of our prisoners by the culpable negligence of Lincoln. Their fathers, sons, and brothers who are voters, will never sustain the homicide if they know the facts. Reduced to a single statement they read thus: "We have enough white confederate prisoners to exchange for all the white Union prisoners at the South, and yet leave an overplus in our hands for negotiation as to the balance." But the rebels have captured many thousand negroes, nearly all former slaves; and Mr. Lincoln refuses to negotiate unless the question of negro equality is first settled. This is the official evidence. I read from the record. [Mr. Hall then read the following extract from the official correspondence between Commissioner Ould, of Richmond, and General Butler and Solicitor Whiting:]

PECKSNIFF BUTLER SHEDS TEARS.

. . The wrongs, indignities, and privations suffered by our white soldiers would move me to consent to any thing to procure their exchange, except to barter away the honor and faith of the Government of the United States, which has been solemnly pledged *to the colored soldiers* (!) in her ranks.

(Signed) BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Major-General and Agent of Exchange.

. . All *other* questions between us may be postponed for future settlement, but the fair exchange of colored soldiers and of their white officers *will be insisted on* by the government before another rebel soldier or officer will be exchanged.

WILLIAM WHITING,
Solicitor of the War Department.

HOW LINCOLN PETS NEGRO SOLDIERS.

The spirit which accompanies this culpable homicide of white prisoners to sustain faith pledged to colored soldiers (!) may be further illustrated by an extract from an order of Adjutant General Thomas:

The incorporation into the army of the United States of colored troops renders it necessary that they should be brought as speedily as possible to the highest state of discipline. Accordingly, the practice which has hitherto prevailed, no doubt from necessity, of requiring these

troops to perform most of the labor on fortifications, and the labor and fatigue duties of permanent stations and camps, will cease; and they will only be required to take their *fair share of fatigue duty with the white troops.* By order of the Secretary of War.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

HOW LINCOLN BURNS SHIPS—ARSON.

I arraign candidate Lincoln for the offence of arison on the high seas. It is a leading principle in law: "Who does by another does that thing himself." Who has kept the ex-Hartford postmaster in office as Secretary of the Navy, while more than two hundred ships, with cargoes, have been burned on the high seas? True, neither Lincoln nor Welles fired them. But they particularly offered a premium for the arson by neglecting to avail themselves of the fast ships, brave men, and enterprise that abounded. Let every Connecticut voter redeem his State from the disgrace of Gideon Welles!

LINCOLN'S BURGLARIES.

I arraign Lincoln for burglary! When, in the dead of night, armed men broke into and entered the house of Vallandigham — a civilian, resident in a district over which martial law had not been declared—and, without any warrant but an order primarily proceeding from Lincoln, not only kidnapped the householder, but rifled his drawers of papers, then and there burglary was in every sense committed. When the office of Congressman Voorhees was broken into, entered, and rifled of correspondence by primary order of Lincoln, then the crime was repeated. Worse than all, when the mansion of George F. Thompson, a former writer for the *Daily News*, was entered, in my own city, at night, and his papers seized, and he himself carried off secretly to the Old Capitol Prison by the express orders of Lincoln, not only burglary transpired, but the crime of kidnapping.

LINCOLN'S KIDNAPPING.

Kidnapping! Why, in arraigning Mr. Lincoln for that crime, I need scarcely specify times, places, persons, incidents; they are so numerous. Our children require no longer to read the chronicles of the Bastile in search of thrilling annals of this crime. The deeds of French kings and Austrian despots sink into commonplace before the kidnapping successes of Lincoln. *Lettres de cachet* lose all dramatic effect beside the telegrams of the President in the case of Colonel Wolford—that brave Kentucky soldier who put himself into the breach of a war for the Union against even family and friends, to be rewarded by imprisonment of the most arbitrary character for the offence of making a political speech distasteful to Lincoln. In old French and English times, orders of commitment to Bastile and Tower, were at least in writing, and sealed and countersigned and put on record. In Lincoln's day, men have been discovered in forts who knew not their accusers, and who, when released without charge or trial, could discover no scrap of paper in existence touching their apprehension or confinement!

LINCOLN'S FALSE IMPRISONMENTS.

And then, how many offences of trespass to persons and property these kidnappings include! How many assaults! That most accomplished journalist and man of unblemished character, William C. Prime, of the *Journal of Commerce*, has furnished me with a resume of editorial outrages that classify under these offences. He has compiled them with great care, and I myself have verified them with dates and places.

FEARFUL STATISTICS OF PRESS OUTRAGES.

One hundred and fifty-five newspaper offices and editors have been interfered with by Abraham Lincoln! He who rode into power under the hypocritical cries of free press, free speech, free ballot, and resistance to executive usurpations! Cries that were comparative abstractions in 1860; cries now belonging to Democracy, because become dread realities; and not those, as it has turned out they were in Lincoln's mouth, of mere agitation! Of these one hundred and fifty-five, fifty-two offices were mobbed by Lincoln rioters; forty-three papers were suppressed by express orders of Lincoln; to fifteen mail privileges were refused; twenty-two editors were arrested, but graciously released without imprisonment; twenty more were actually confined in military prisons; three editors were banished from the United States, one, the editor of the Ohio *Watchman*, became a maniac through his confinement. No wonder, then, that Owen Lovejoy died about the time the outrages on *The World* and *Journal* culminated. He could observe how was thus desecrated and foresworn the principle of free press for which his brother was slain in 1837 at Alton, Illinois, for which he had earnestly pleaded. Was not Lovejoy an honest and consistent fanatic, and one of moral courage? Did he not move and carry a vote of thanks to McClellan for "accomplishing great results at little expense of human life"?

THREE HISTORICAL PAINTINGS ABOUT LINCOLN.

In the Capitol at Washington are many vacant spaces for historical paintings. Some years hence, when the abolition madness of the hour shall have passed away, and Abraham Lincoln stands revealed in all his political deformity, let some painter fill one of them with a warm and glowing canvas depicting the Baltimore editor vainly waiting in the White House entry-way, with a letter of a United States Senator in his hand as a credential to see the President, and to know why that President had arrested and imprisoned him! Let that artist next also hang by its side another canvas displaying the President's lackey insulting Mrs. Surgeon-General Hammond, by returning, at his master's order, her card, as she vainly endeavored to seek that presence which has been so free to Frederick Douglas and colored clergymen! By all means let the artist add yet a third canvas, depicting Abraham Lincoln—treasoner, homicide, arsoner, burglar, and kidnapper, that we have shown him to be—in the act of saying to the representative of the loyal men of Tennessee, who protested against Andy Johnson's test-oath, "May I inquire how long it took you and the New-York politicians to concoct that paper?" or "I expect to let the friends of George B. McClellan manage their side of this contest in their own way, and I will manage my side of it in my own way." Thus portrayed upon canvas, no man could accuse me of harshness when I style Abraham Lincoln the vulgar village politician disgracing the dignified *rôle* of chief magistrate!

LINCOLN ROBS HAWLEY D. CLAPP.

What is the next offence for arraignment? Robbery in the second degree. The obtaining of value through fear of injury to person, reputation, or family. How many men immured

in military prisons without warrant, written charges, or process of commitment, have, when demoralized in mind by their confinement, signed in favor of Lincoln's administration receipts or orders for transfers of property! I mention out of many one case. From that learn the whole: Hawley D. Clapp, late host of the Everett House, New-York, was arrested, charged with obtaining large sums of money from recruits by undue means. Every formality of arrest omitted in his case, except that he was transferred from the custody of the United States Marshal to Fort Lafayette on the order of an aid-de-camp! He may have been guilty. I do not argue the question. I only know that the law presumes innocence until guilt is proved. In this case there was no trial, nor attempt at it. For several months Clapp languishes in the prison that, so oddly under its recent uses, bears the honored name of him who overthrew bastiles—Lafayette—he who gave the key of the Paris prison of horrors to Washington as a memento sacred to a victory of freedom! Then, as a means of release, he pays over a large sum of money to Lincoln's agents. Why? Under what means? Through the duress of his imprisonment. What became of the money? It did not belong to the Government. *Was* it taken from recruits? Was it ever *repaid* to them? Was it *possible* to know whom it belonged to? Shall it be said the payment was a confession of guilt? What of the rack-confessions, of thumb-screw acknowledgments, of admissions under torture? Can you gauge the effect of imprisonment? Is it alike to every man? The hair of him of Chillon did not turn white of a single night, and yet to him,

"At last men came to set me free,
I asked not why and recked not where."

Gentlemen, Hawley D. Clapp, *untried*, is, in the eye of the law, innocent. And the money extorted from him was as plain a case of robbery by the common law as if it had been taken by a Fra Djavolo instead of by the leader of a lawless political party!

LINCOLN'S PERJURY ON INAUGURAL OATH.

How the offences intensify as we proceed with the arraignment! Perjury! When Abraham Lincoln placed military necessity, in districts where courts were open, above the Constitution, did he or not break his official oath? His oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution instead of violating it! How was it with the hand which wrote divers decrees and framed laws—the hand of him who is an executive, and not a legislator? Did that hand in so doing register a perjury? That hand which had on the fourth of March, 1861, touched the sacred volume presented by the lamented Taney in the presence (as it were) of two parties, standing angrily face to face inviting civil war! Perjury! 'Tis a hard word. But what have said Wade and Davis? Are the witnesses under Democratic subpœna? Although they have not written nor spoken that dread word against Lincoln, cannot he who runs read it in their manifesto? What are Lincoln's orders for test-oaths but perjuries against his constitutional obligations affirmed to on inauguration-day? And are there voters confidingly numerous enough to put him next March to the same farce of an oath in front of the Capitol after all these things? And yet you have only selections.

LINCOLN'S BLASPHEMY, PROFANITY, AND OBSCENITY.

He who can commit perjury is capable of blasphemy and profanity. Indeed, these are but steps to that more deliberate crime. I arraign him for those common law offences. I call Horace Greeley's paper as a witness.

GREELEY ON THE WITNESS-STAND.

It is not many weeks since its columns editorially admitted that the President had said of McClellan: "He is hell on a parade." Blasphemies! Whose order tore the aged Roman Catholic Bishop of Natchez from the very altar of God? Abraham Lincoln's.

LINCOLN'S BAYONET RELIGION.

Who made martial law the law of the Episcopal rubric, and exiled clergymen who refused to pray for Lincoln? Was there ever before a king or potentate who forced a form of religious prayer at the point of the bayonet? Or enforced ecclesiastical discipline with a file of swearing soldiers? What answers the field of Antietam, which listened to the singing, amid the fresh solemnities of the battle-field, of a negro song at the express request of President Lincoln when riding over it?

LINCOLN'S RIBALDRY AT ANTIETAM.

One who heard him ask for the song, who shuddered as he heard the request; one who listened to the singing and sorrowed within him as he did so, narrated to me the circumstance. If President Lincoln or Mr. Marshal Lamon will deny it, I pledge myself to produce that eye-and-ear witness. Men of the State of Dwight and Edwards, this is the chosen leader of a party who claims a patent for piety and patriotism! Who demands a special property in the flag! Who claims exclusive proprietary interest in every victory! Who answers alike ugly facts and convincing logic with the parrot-cry of, "Stand off, Copperhead, for we are holier than thou art!" Obscenity is a lower order of the crime under observation.

LINCOLN'S OBSCENITY.

Is Lincoln guilty of that? Join any mess-room of congressmen and ask *them*. Buy the jest-book "fresh from Abraham's bosom," and ask that. If any responsible man denies it in print, witnesses will rise up in the *salons* of Washington, thickly as armed men sprang from the dragon's teeth sowed of old by Cadmus! What else could be expected of one inexperienced in society, and whose daily associates vulgarized natural filthiness of thought; of one whose antecedents were thus portrayed—prophetically so—by a contemporary, the Hon. J. N. Morris, of Illinois, in a speech delivered June 19, 1860, during the first canvass for Lincoln? (See page 462 of part four of *Congressional Globe* of that year.)

A CONGRESSMAN PREDICTED IT ALL.

"Elect Lincoln, and let the fact be announced that a hostile enemy has landed upon our shores, or that States have rebelled against the authority of the general government, and in all probability he would go on telling some anecdote or finishing a game of sport on the public grounds in front of the White House! *Upon the death of a monarch, who ever thought of putting the* KING'S JESTER *on the throne?*"

A MAC AND OLD ABE CONTRAST.

And yet some of the American people are hesitating whether to prefer to keep this jester

on the throne to placing in the Democratic chair of Washington, of Jefferson, and of Jackson, the reticent gentleman and courageous Christian soldier and statesman of foresight, George B. McClellan! And yet such is the man who was forced as a candidate, it is said by many of my old Republican friends, on their party; whom they despise and yet must vote for, because he —this man of blasphemy and obscenity—represents a "principle!"

BRIBERY AND THE BLAIRS.

I arraign him in this connection for bribery. He sent—said the younger Blair—a proposition to Grant to give McClellan a command. I came —said the elder Blair—to see McClellan to offer him a command if he would refuse the presidency. What was this but bribery, the offence of persuading to, or dissuading from duty, by a gift? Lincoln, it is true, has here filed a special plea in bar, as lawyers say. But putting the confessions of the younger (whose "time had come") with the admissions of the elder, (whose time is yet to come,) what sane juror will refuse to say that Lincoln knew of the bribe? And what a dilemma it puts Lincoln in!

LINCOLN'S PARTISAN DILEMMA.

General McClellan is fit to be in the field, or he is not. If he is fit, then shame on Lincoln, who, for two years has kept him out. If he is not fit, then the Blair confessions make Lincoln jeopardize the country by giving command to an unfit soldier in order to promote his own political interests! In other words, that Lincoln stands convicted of preferring party to country. Lincoln always compromises party interests, and can negotiate to procure partisan peace for a bleeding army of office-holders! But he cannot compromise for the good of a bleeding nation!

LINCOLN COMMITTED TO COMPROMISE.

And yet he is the only man who *has* compromised with the South. Did he not try confederate sailors as pirates? (I refer to the Savannah case.) And after a failure to convict, under the leadership for the prisoners of James T. Brady, (who is never so really Brady unless he is against oppression and wrong,) did he not exchange them as prisoners of war under threat of retaliation? The probable Chief-Justice of the United States, William M. Evarts, thought they were pirates. Very humbly, I thought not. Perhaps, however, they were; nevertheless, many who believed them pirates deemed it a wise compromise on the part of the War Department to give them up in exchange. Ah! Lincoln will soon enough compromise, when the Democratic party have fought his placemen and myrmidons out of power and plunder, by its ballots!

LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION EMBEZZLEMENTS.

This word plunder brings me to count the eleventh of the indictment. It is for embezzlements and peculations. Shall I stop to cite cases or call witnesses before an intelligent audience who read newspapers and treasury reports? No! So I pass to the next crime of Lincoln's; the obtaining of money by false pretences.

HOW LINCOLN OBTAINS MONEY BY FALSE PRETENCES.

In 1861 he wanted money and sent Chase to the New-York banks. The loans thus obtained saved Washington and the national credit. The money was given on the faith of a war for the Union. Lincoln not only broke faith in the matter with the moneyed interests, by changing the war into one for abolition, desolation, extermination, and subjugation, but he inaugurated treacherous attacks on these very banks by establishing national pet institutions and annoying the State banks by vexatious taxations. Lincoln, in 1863, levied a tax of three per cent on incomes of that year ending December. Six months after the year had passed, (and the tax had been collected and incomes adjusted, or perhaps surplus spent upon the faith of prior representations,) a retroactive tax of five per cent additional is added for the same time. Was not the three per cent collected under false pretences? Have you ever compared the backs of the two issues of postage currency? Upon the first you find, "Receivable for all dues less than five dollars;" upon the last issue is added the words, "except customs." Well, by true construction of language, the additional words created an exception which did not previously exist. Yet, although the currency first obtained popularity because receivable for fractional custom-house dues, and at first so taken, it was shortly disallowed, and faith broken. I call all these things the obtaining of money and credit by false pretences and tokens!

LINCOLN'S RECORD FORGERIES.

I arraign Lincoln for forgery. One class of forgery is the alteration of figures, accounts, and statistics of a pecuniary nature in order to deceive creditors. Who so great a debtor in the world as these United States? Who has so shamefully taxed upon the credulity of creditors by falsifying, from time to time, the figures of the national debt account, as Abraham Lincoln? Nor will I stop to argue this, because the newspapers and money-articles of the press have anticipated me fully.

HE IS GUILTY OF MAYHEM.

I arraign him for a species of mayhem. This is to be defined, for popular purposes, malicious mutilation of the person. Let me read you this order from a deputy of Commander-in-Chief Lincoln:

PROCESS OF BRANDING SOLDIERS.

PROVOST-MARSHAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D. C., Aug. 19, 1864.

Circular.

DOCTOR: In addition to my suggestion to mark all rejected recruits and substitutes, I would suggest that all accepted recruits and substitutes be marked thus, "I," in the small of the back. This will, I think, prevent, to a great extent, the practice of bounty-jumping.

Yours, etc., J. H. BAXTER, Surgeon.
U. S. V., Chief Medical Officer Provost-Marshal General's Bureau.

How was this marking done? By the use of lunar caustic. Suits are now pending in New-York and New-Jersey for assaults of this kind. There are doubtless others. What an indignity! And from the leader of the party who has waxed eloquent over scars upon the negro's back! I am against all scarring, whether of bond or free. *But, above all, of the citizen, and voter, and soldier.* Just heaven! has citizenship come to this—that we hold not only personal liberty and property, but the very sacredness of person—God's image—at the will of Lincoln and his surgeons? Paul cried, "I am a Roman citizen," and the fasces of the lictor were staid. Time

was, when the call, "I am an American citizen," was heard from the deck of an Austrian frigate, and when Ingraham dared, and Marcy approved, to make the cry of Koszta not in vain. Shall that cry ever be again potent? Then elect McClellan, and to an ignominious electoral outlawry with this brander who occupies the presidential chair!

THE MISDEMEANOR OF OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE.

Abraham Lincoln has committed that heinous common law crime of "obstructing the course of government and justice." He suspended *habeas corpus* before Congress gave him power—conceding, for the brevity of argument, that they possessed it. He has declared martial law over civil districts. He has ordered the process of courts to be contemned. He has interfered with elections. Lincoln meditates, as the signs of the times clearly indicate, yet fresher obstructions of government and justice. Have you ever read Kinglake's exposition of Napoleon's *coup d'état?* If so, you will remember how thrillingly he precedes the main event by an account of Napoleon's defeating, for the presidency, General Cavaignac, the former idol of the soldiery.

LINCOLN AND NAPOLEON III. CONTRASTED.

You will recall the after-process by which, under aid of bayonets, Napoleon strangled the French nation in the night by a proclamation, and became Emperor. He had his Morny and Maupas; Lincoln has his Stanton and Holt. Napoleon had generals, prefets, and sub-prefets to do his bidding. Lincoln has more than these, and as despotic officers. Napoleon placed thirty-two departments under martial law during his election. Lincoln has thirty-two territorial divisions "called" States. O men of Connecticut! do you wish to see how a parallel might be made hereafter (I will not say this year) should Lincoln be reëlected—he, this obstructor of government and justice—then take that volume of Kinglake, and at page 197 read it, and prepare against such usurpations.

THIMBLE-RIGGING.

Time fails me, I perceive, to classify the misdemeanors which I intended to arrange under the word thimble-rigging. But examples will occur to you: those connected with a Chicago Committee and the Pope's bull against the comet; the letters to Fremont and Hunter; the letter to Greeley; the peninsular performances, also, at the expense not only of "Little Mac," but of the country. Alas for the land under the thimble-rigging of this little joker against "Little Mac!" was not that a sorry perfection of thimble-rigging which was done with Blenker's division and with McDowell's corps? How many, many thimbles Lincoln has used in his cunning art! Cameron, Chase, and Blair, Hunter, Fremont, Burnside, Hooker, Meade, Halleck, Hitchcock, Sigel, Butler, Banks—but let your memories complete the list; I do not wish to be too personal. What was the peace negotiation, through the Canadian back-door of the Union, but a game of thimble-rigging. Or that through the cellar-door of the Confederacy at Richmond—Sanders, Jewett, Hay, and Greeley, as the Canadian players with the thimbles—Davis, Benjamin, Jaquess, and Gillmore as the performers beyond the intrenchments of James River. Two historical groups—with Lincoln in each background as the thimble-rigger!

But enough. My aim has been rather to outline these crimes and misdemeanors of candidate Lincoln to the jury of voters, and leave them to the greater filling out with facts and dates, so readily attainable in this newspaper day.

LINCOLN'S CONGRESSIONAL ABSOLUTION.

No wonder that when wary politicians, like Colfax and Forney, came to survey these crimes, they caused Congress to pass an act which should attempt in advance to *nole pros.* this indictment—almost as bad for its Lincolnian duplicity, repugnancy, and multifariousness. Let me read it. It should have been entitled: "An Act to License Presidential Wrongs:"

SEC. 4, March 3, 1863, Chapter 81, Laws of 37th Congress—"And be it, etc., that *any* order of the President, or under his authority, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, *shall be* a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or criminal, pending or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done under and by virtue of such order, or under *color* [?] of any law of Congress; and such defence may be made by special plea, or under the general issue."

LINCOLN PERSONALLY DISSECTED.

Were the policies of Mr. Lincoln's party ever so pure and certain, ever so sure of beneficial results, and I approved of them, I would not trust them four years longer in his hands after the experience of the past three years. There has been no such cunning trickster since the days of Burr; and Burr was at least a gentleman and a scholar! Not even Tyler was so inordinately vain of power. He exercises it as recklessly as Bomba did! He is surrounded by more dangerous men than ever haunted the ante-rooms of the imbecile Louis XIII.! I profoundly pity the rebels under the despotism of Davis. Yet that is at least an educated, intelligent, and respectable despotism. It acts within the forms of law and constitutions. The despotism of centralized power which Lincoln is establishing is a vulgar and debasing despotism—one which appeals to the fears of the pocket for its supremacy; and relies upon purse and sword at a usurpation over free ballot and Constitution.

GOOD MEN MAKE GOOD GOVERNMENTS.—McCLELLAN.

Apart, therefore, from any discussion of platforms or principles, I am, on the question of persons, for McClellan and against Lincoln. The author of the Harrison's Bar letter, the man who asked "if he could not lead his army, to be at least allowed to share their fate on the field of battle;" the general who begged his malicious foe to "say a good word for the army, but nothing about himself;" the hero who forgot his grief, to save Washington at South-Mountain and Antietam; the writer of the letter of presidential acceptance—*he* is to Lincoln as Hyperion to Satyr; *he* can be safely trusted with the reins of power; *he* has never yet abused a trust or a confidence; *he* will not now.

All history informs us that—talk as we may about policies, expediencies, platforms, or principles of administration—they made the best rulers who were the bravest and noblest of men. These constitute the State! "Men, high-minded men, who their duties know; who know their rights, and, knowing, dare maintain, prevent the long-aimed blow, and crush the tyrants while they rend the chain."

JOHN VAN BUREN AT HOME.

[S GREAT SPEECH AT HUDSON, OCT. 27, 1864.

Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen: It gives eat pleasure to meet this afternoon so large a ientation of the intelligence, the patriotism, and, add, the beauty and the grace of Old Columbia. e, as you are well aware, associations in this y which make it always a subject of pleasure me to visit Hudson and Columbia. A native, of the county, and almost every blood-relation have residing here, I naturally take a pride in tory, in the names of its distinguished citizens, political action, and in the prosperity of the y and of all its citizens. It was, therefore, to source of unfeigned pleasure—and I looked it as a personal compliment—when I received vitation from some of the gentlemen of this y to visit you, to consult together in reference to itical position of public affairs.

PROPER TIME ARRIVED TO CRITICISE THE ADMINISTRATION.

ake the liberty of referring for a few moments e action of myself in regard to the condition of s that has existed for the last three or four years. ninds are absorbed, all hearts are engaged in ontemplation of the great crisis that is now upon ountry. A rebellion broke out some years since veral of the States of this Union against what I d as the rightful authority of the United States. as in my judgment wholly without a justifiable se, and feeling as I did with regard to it, I could esitate to contribute what little influence I might ss, and every exertion I could make toward ssistance of the government in suppressing this lion. I believed that this was the only thing to nd I felt that we could rely with entire confidence the declarations of the President of the United s in reference to his intended course and on the utions of Congress as to the legitimate objects of ar, and the mode in which it should be prosecuted. l call your attention to the declaration made by President of the United States, in taking his oath, and to the resolution to which I refer. The ident said, when he was inaugurated:

I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indiy, to interfere with the institution of slavery in States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful to do so, and have no inclination to do so."

e goes on to say:

The right of each State to order and control its domestic institutions, according to its own judgt exclusively, is essential to the balance of power hich the perfection and endurance of our politiabric depend."

ongress, on the suggestion of Mr. Crittenden, the war commenced, passed a resolution declarthe object and origin of the war as follows:

That the present deplorable civil war has been ed upon the country by the disunionists of the thern States, now in arms against the constitutionovernment, and in arms around the Capitol; that his national emergency Congress, banishing all ng of mere passion and resentment, will recollect its duty to the whole country; that this war is waged on their part in any spirit of oppression or iny purpose of conquest or subjugation, or purof overthrowing or interfering with the rights or blished institutions of these States, but to defend maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and reserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, rights of the several States unimpaired; and that soon as these objects are accomplished the war ht to cease."

Relying upon these assurances, it seemed to me wise to suspend all differences of opinion until such time as the close of Mr. Lincoln's official term would give us an opportunity to review his conduct; and in the mean time to uphold the government in all its efforts to suppress a rebellion so unjustifiable as I have declared it in my judgment to be. I did so. I declined to criticise the conduct of the President, and I thought it wise on the part of the citizens of the loyal States to give him unhesitating and cordial support. But the time has now arrived when it becomes indispensable to look into his action. (Applause.) He has presented himself as a candidate for reëlection, and it is for the people of the States, that are to take part in the election, to determine whether he shall be continued in office or give place to a successor who is willing to prosecute the war for its original purposes, and willing to receive propositions of peace when they shall be offered by competent authority. (Applause.) In my humble judgment, and I desire to speak with great respect for the feelings of those who differ with that opinion, the President has committed great errors, either operated upon by more powerful and designing men who surround him, or by his own mistaken views has committed errors which have prolonged this war indefinitely, and which have resulted in disaster and defeat to our armies, enormous increase of taxation, and a fearful destruction of human life. (Applause.)

MR. LINCOLN'S POLICY TO PROSTRATE HIS RIVAL FOR THE PRESIDENCY.

I think that in doing so he has been guided by strong political partisanship, and that he has been operated upon in a great degree—either he or those who surround him—by a desire to prostrate one particular man; to give a partisan character to the contest, and to convert the war, legitimate in its objects, into an abolition crusade, which he, in taking his official oath, declared that he had no desire or right to commence, and which Congress had all but unanimously declared was not the purpose of the government. (Applause.) The man whom it has been sought to prostrate in this war was George B. McClellan, (tremendous applause,) and I insist upon it that the most cursory review of the action of the government in regard to him will satisfy every disinterested man that I am correct in this assertion. General McClellan needs no testimony of mine. When he was put in the place he occupied for six months, at the head of the armies of the United States, the President had occasion to communicate with Congress upon the subject, and in doing so stated the truth in regard to General McClellan, and the manner in which he was appointed. In his message to Congress, December 3, 1861, Mr. Lincoln said:

"With the retirement of General Scott came the executive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of General McClellan for the position, and in this the nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. (Loud cheers.) The designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in a considerable degree, the selection of the country, as well as of the executive, and hence there is better reason to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support thus far, by fair implication, promised, and without which he cannot with so full efficiency serve the country."

Now, was that confidence given to him; and if not, why not? No sooner had he started, in command of the army, upon the expedition to the Peninsula, than the force of General Wool and the force of General Blenker—two important divisions of his command—were withdrawn from him. Subsequently, when he was in the act of reaching Richmond—when he had approached nearer to it than Grant is to-day, unless there are later telegrams than I have read—when he was even nearer Richmond than the rebels have been to Washington since that time (laughter)—he was deprived of the assistance of General McDowell's corps, thus uncovering his right wing, and leaving him exposed to those fearful assaults which resulted in the seven days' battles of July, in which he covered his name with imperishable fame, and saved the army under circumstances which, in the opinion of the highest foreign and domestic critics, reflect upon him eternal honor. (Great applause.) As to his conduct in that respect, we are not left without competent testimony. The President telegraphed to him July 5th, after some of the earlier battles:

"A thousand thanks for the relief your two dispatches of twelve and one P.M. yesterday gave me. Be assured the heroism of yourself, officers, and men is, and for ever will be, appreciated. A. Lincoln."

Three days before he telegraphed to him:

"I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. A. Lincoln."

He retired to Harrison's Landing. He wrote to the President that memorable letter which I have no doubt you have read, in which he declared what was the true statesmanship in regard to this war, and by which, in my opinion, he sealed his doom with the abolitionists who control the President. In the latter part of August General Pope was appointed to the command of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan was stripped of his command, stripped of all his men, left at Alexandria with no duty, and refused even the request which he made to take part in any capacity, even as a private soldier, in the battles going on almost within earshot. The bloody second battle of Bull Run followed in the latter part of August. McClellan did not go fast enough in the judgment of the President; Pope did go fast enough, but the wrong way. (Great laughter.) He took the road to Washington, and came back pell mell with a defeated and routed army, with a terrified President and cabinet, with a strong probability that our Capitol would fall into the hands of the enemy, and an absolute certainty that if they had advanced at that time they might have taken possession of Washington and of Lincoln himself, if they wanted him. (Laughter.) But, in my humble judgment, if Mr. Lincoln has any apprehension that he will be taken prisoner by the rebels, he greatly deceives himself. He is entirely too useful to them where he is now to have them ever take him prisoner. (Continued laughter.) In that dismal day for the country the President came to General McClellan and besought him to assume command of the army. What was his answer? Brave, heroic, disinterested, he never stopped to complain of the treatment he had received or to anticipate the same treatment if he was successful afterward, or to say, You have deprived me of my influence in the army—how can you expect me now to do any good to the country? He took command of this routed and disordered corps; he reorganized that army as if by magic, in the testimony of all disinterested men who are acquainted with the facts; he marched these men before they were fully equipped to Antietam. I have heard Mr. Francis P. Blair, who lives on the road to Antietam, at Silver Spring, say that those men, under the command of McClellan them—and that he never saw a set of men mo to go into battle under an ordinary command they were at that time, many barefooted, hatle hardly enough of clothing to cover their nak But there was no time to be lost; it was indisp to move rapidly; McClellan marched them to tam, he fought the great battle of the war, h threw Lee himself, he saved the Capitol of the and covered the armies of the loyalists of the States with imperishable honor. (Loud che But I must not leave this to rest upon my test I refer to the telegrams he received from Mr. H commander-in-chief of the armies, and from Al Lincoln himself. General Halleck wrote to hir tember 30th:

"General: Your report of yesterday, givi results of the battles of South-Mountain and An has been received and submitted to the Pre They were not only hard-fought battles, but earned and decided victories.

"The valor and endurance of your army several conflicts, which terminated in the expul the enemy from the loyal State of Marylan creditable alike to the troops and the officer commanded them.

"A grateful country, while mourning the lan dead, will not be unmindful of the honor due living. H. W. Halleck,

"General-in-Chi

A grateful country will not, in my humble ment. (Great applause.)

Lincoln telegraphed to him Sept. 15th, 1862:

"Your dispatch of to-day received. God bles and all with you."

And then, as Lincoln is never easy without gi plan of campaign, he adds:

"Destroy the rebel army if possible.

"A. Lincol

Such was the conduct of General McClellan at the head of the army of the United States, made himself popular with the country, he made self prominent among its great men, and fron time he was feared to stand in the way of the pr incumbent for a succession of the presidential He had already announced that he could not be a party to any abolition programme of the war his fate was sealed. The politicians set to work through their influence or through Mr. Lincoln's mistaken judgment, in November following, immed ly after the election had taken place in this S resulting in the success of Horatio Seymour for G nor—(great applause)—he was suspended from mand, and was ordered to report himself at Trer and from that day to this, though a thousand doll piece bounty is paid for private soldiers, no duty be found for General McClellan to discharge. court has been ordered upon him, and no explan been made by the President of the reason why he suspended. Things remained in this way until Au when the disasters that had befallen our arms ca a general cry throughout the country for the r ration of McClellan to command. Then, Mr. M gomery Blair, the ex-Postmaster-General, tells u New-York, measures were concerted between the sident and General Grant to restore McClellan to command of the army as an adjunct of Grant. upon what terms? Why, that he should refuse nomination of the Chicago Convention; that he sh turn his back upon the Chicago Convention; an think it might be added further, if Mr. Blair, who since made a publication on the subject, was dispo to communicate all the facts, that it was not only posed to restore him to command, but they very tinctly intimated to him that he should be the President of the United States after Lincoln. (Lau

was incompetent, if it was proper to remove he should have been kept out of the army; but was a competent man, whose services were ne-ry to the country, he should have been restored ut condition and without being asked to sub- to the support of the present incumbent of the dency. He received that proposition, as he re- l many others, in silence, with the simple re- that he is at the call of the country, subject, as -General, to orders issued by the competent au- ies. And Mr. Lincoln having failed in this nego- n, McClellan stands now to be put at the head of rmies by the people of the United States. (Loud use. "They will do it.") I believe they will do Cheers) Such has been the treatment of the who, from the commencement of his career to lay, has never been heard to utter one word of laint, who submits himself to the orders of the ry, and submits his fate to the people, with en- confidence in their wisdom and in their justice. ers.) I have said that a prominent feature in the uct of the war by this Administration has been to oy those men who stood in the way of the Presi- for the succession and to abolitionize the war.

SE AND EXASPERATING ACTS OF THE ADMINIS-TRATION.

e proclamation of the President of the United s, declaring slaves free in certain States in rebel- was, in my judgment, unwise, as well as without onstitutional authority, so far as it had any prac- effect. He made nobody free by any such pro- ation. Those who were free by the overthrow of rebel authority, were free without such a procla- on, and those that were held in slavery under the f the Southern States, remained in slavery after roclamation. But in that way he united and exas- ted the Southern people unnecessarily, and divid- he North.

he same is true to a great extent of many of the sts made by the authority of the President, at asonable times, and unwisely. Every man here vs that the mass of our people in the adhering es are perfectly loyal, and that if a man is fool gh or base enough to entertain disloyal views, safe course is to hold him up to the reprobation scorn of his associates, and trust to the patriot- of the great mass of the country to sustain the ernment. They were made under circumstances ing unnecessary exasperation. So, too, the sup- sion of certain newspapers by the authority of President was most unwise and illegal, and in ost every instance, except in the recent suppres- of the *Post* in Baltimore, the only Democratic er in the State of Maryland, was reversed by the sident, so soon as he ascertained what the public timent was as to the injustice and outrage that had n committed. Nobody, I believe, ever heard of a ublican newspaper being suppressed, no matter how ent it might be against the President. Nobody r heard, I think, of a Republican being arrested political reasons, no matter how violent he might ; but if you can catch a Democrat, and jug him, catch a Democratic newspaper, and stop it even twenty-four hours, it is considered a fair prize war, and the President never neglects to avail iself of the opportunity. So, too, the various pro- ts of confiscation. General and indiscriminating they were, they were calculated to produce the ne unfortunate results to our cause to which I ve referred. I will speak of only one other subject reference to the President's action, and that is the ning of black troops. General Sherman, who has vered himself with honor at Atlanta, (applause,) and er whose victories I most heartily rejoice, has told e President, with that sterling good sense which troops — that, as a general rule, they can most wisely be employed in various departments of labor about the camps and fortifications, and in garrisons, but are not peculiarly suited, as you and I know they are not, for service in the field. They created, to a certain extent, a prejudice in the white troops, and when called into action at critical conjunctures, like the recent springing of the mine in front of Petersburgh, they almost invariably fail. When taken prisoners, the rebels refuse to exchange them for white troops, and the consequence is, that some fifty thousand white prisoners are now lying in the jails and prisons and guard-houses of the South, simply because the President refuses to exchange them until the black troops can be exchanged. Such are some of the measures of this Administration, to which I object.

THE RESULT OF THESE MEASURES.

What has been their consequence? This war has been prosecuted now for some four years. If you will look over the map that has recently been made, showing the parts occupied by us and parts occupied by the rebels, you will see that in the States of Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, the position of those States now held by us is exceedingly small, that it is such part as is actually occupied by our troops, and beyond that not only we have no possession, but it is entirely unsafe, if not fatal, for one of our troops to show himself. The State of Texas is entirely given over, as far as I have been able to observe, to the rebels. I don't think there is a United States soldier in the whole State of Texas, and in Missouri and Kentucky we are worse off to-day than we were two years ago. They are more unsettled, the rebels are more defiant and more powerful than they were two years ago. Now, this necessarily grows out of exasperating the community with which you have to deal, instead of singling out the enemy whom you seek to conquer and fighting him. It is not our business, as I have said on another occasion, to subjugate the South; our business is to subjugate Jeff Davis and the rebel army. (Loud applause.) How do we stand financially? For, whatever any person may think, there is coming a pay-day, and it is extremely important that those who have to pay the taxes of the war, which is the fact in regard to almost all our citizens, for in various ways these taxes reach the poor as well as the rich — those who have to pay the taxes should know something of the extent of the engagements into which they have entered. The debt of the United States is reported by the Secretary of the Treasury to be two thousand millions of dollars, within a fraction; it was sixty-five millions at the time of the breaking out of the war. If the damages that have been committed, and for which the United States are liable, the claims which they are bound to satisfy, and the arrearages for which they are indebted, were taken into account, I entertain no doubt that our debt would be found to be four thousand millions of dollars. But this little county has a county debt now, as I understand, of four hundred thousand dollars in round numbers. It has paid, and is to pay, by the first of November, in assessments, over three hundred and fifty thousand dollars; and, between the first of November and the first of May, some two hundred and odd thousand dollars more. The debt of the towns for bounties, separate from all this, is upward of three hundred thousand dollars; and thus you have a county and town debt of one million two hundred thousand dollars, at least, up to the present time, when the war is about fairly commenced, in the judgment of some of our abolition friends who propose to see it out until slavery is abolished. (Applause.) It is very easy to make an estimate of the taxable property of each town, and see how much you are to pay,

ously entertained by any body. These debts have to be paid, and you and your children have to foot the bill. We have lost something like half a million of men by disease, death, and disability, since the commencement of this war. The war is being prosecuted at the present time at an expense of over three millions or three and a half millions of dollars per day. Well, if the question were to sustain the Government and put down the rebellion, I should say, as I would do, contribute the last penny to uphold the honor and preserve the union of the country. (Applause.) But if I am asked to feed a parcel of bloated contractors, if I am asked to keep in commission some bold brigadiers, who may have no other employment when the war comes to an end, if I am asked to lay out three and a half millions a day, and to extend this debt indefinitely to free the Southern negroes, I ask leave to refuse altogether to participate in such an object.

Fellow-citizens, such are the circumstances of the country. But I may speak with prejudice, though I know no reason why I should. Every man here present has the same interest in the result of this controversy that I have. Those rewards, as they are commonly called, of political contests in the shape of office, never had any charm for me. I believe I never had my name in a nominating convention or before a Governor or President for any office, great or small, since I became qualified. I have been old enough, I am sorry to say, to hold office ever since General Jackson's first term, and I really believe if I had desired it — I dislike exceedingly to say that I have refused office — but if I had desired it, either General Jackson, or his successor, or Mr. Polk, or Mr. Pierce, or Mr. Buchanan, or some other ingenious man, would have found something that I was qualified to do, and appointed me to do it. I say I have, therefore, my property, the liberty and protection of myself and family, like yourselves, involved in this contest, and that is all.

UNPREJUDICED TESTIMONY.

But I might be prejudiced, and therefore I will take the liberty to read the testimony of one who is going to support the President, notwithstanding all he has done, and who has favored us with his views. I allude to John C. Fremont, who was the Republican candidate for President in 1856. In describing the condition of the country, in a lettter written the fourth of June, he says:

"This is not an ordinary election. It is a contest for the right even to have candidates, and not merely, as usual, for the choice among them. Now, for the first time since '76, the question of constitutional liberty has been brought directly before the people for their serious consideration and vote. The ordinary rights secured, under the Constitution, and the laws of the country have been violated, and extraordinary powers have been usurped by the executive. It is directly before the people now to say whether or not the principles established by the Revolution are worth maintaining. . . .

"To-day, we have in the country *the abuses of a military dictation, without its unity of action* and vigor of execution. *An administration marked at home by disregard of constitutional rights, by its violations of personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, as a crowning shame, by its abandonment of the right of asylum, a right especially dear to all free nations abroad. Its course has been characterized by a feebleness and want of principle* which has misled European powers, and driven them to a belief that only commercial interests and personal aims are concerned, and that no great principles are involved in the issue. The admirable conduct of the people, their readiness to make every sacrifice demanded of them, their forbearance and silence under the suspension of every thing and sacrifices were all rendered fruitless by the i city, or, to speak more exactly, by the persona for which the war was managed.

"If Mr. Lincoln should be renominated, as I b it would be fatal to the country to indorse a polic renew a power which has cost us the lives of thou of men, and needlessly put the country on the r bankruptcy, there will remain no alternative l organize against him every element of conscie opposition, with the view to prevent the misfortu his reëlection."

Subsequently, in the communication withdra his name, September 21, he says;

"In respect to Mr. Lincoln I continue to hol actly the sentiments contained in my letter of ac ance. I consider that his administration has politically, militarily, and financially a failure, that its necessary continuance is a cause of regr the country."

It is not necessary, as he will see, when the close in November. (Applause.)

Now, this administration thus described by him for a renewal of its lease of office.

NO ANTI-DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION EVER RE-ELEC

It is a curious fact in the history of our poli contests that no anti-Democratic administration was renewed. John Adams came in in '96, and out in 1800, by pretty general consent. In 1828 son came in, as Mr. Randolph wittily said, to serv the last four years of his father's administration, he went out to give place to Jackson in 1832. heard then nothing of the opposition to the De cratic party until 1840, when General Harrison elected. That party gave rise to Mr. Polk in 1 By division in the Democratic party General Ta was elected, and in 1860, again by division in Democratic party, Mr. Lincoln was elected b minority of votes, to the great calamity of this peo

DEMOCRATS PAY OFF THE DEBTS OF THEIR OPPONE

Now it is another curious fact that though the ponents of the Democrats only remain in power term, they always run up a great debt, which it is duty and pleasure of the Democratic administrati succeeding to discharge. General Jackson paid off national debt. When that illustrious statesman the presidential office we did not owe one dol General Pierce paid or provided for the national d incurred by the preceding administration, and wher left office every dollar of the national debt was eit paid or funds raised sufficient to satisfy it. The publican party is going out of office now, leavin debt that we shall be obliged to hold power a li eternity to pay. (Laughter.) It has got to be pa and to be paid by a system of economy and taxat that may perhaps render odious the party that con into power, but it is still inevitable WE CAN'T CHEATED MUCH IN SWAPPING OFF LINCOLN. Now I one go for a change. (Great applause.) My privi opinion is, that we cannot be any worse off. (Lau ter.) I have always understood and observed that man in pain feels a relief in turning over, even if has to turn back again. (Loud laughter.) Whatev the President may think about swapping horses, don't think we can get cheated much if we swap th one off. (Applause.) He has a very curious id about exchanges. He sees no objection to swappi generals, to exchange McClellan for Pope, Pope f McClellan, McClellan for Burnside, Burnside f Hooker, Hooker for Meade. He sees no objection change in the members of his administration, i trading Mr. Chase for Mr. Fessenden, in trading o Mr. Denison for Mr. Blair; but when it comes t him, he seems to think that a change would be mos disastrous. The President reminds me of a story

ago there was a man who had, or thought he title to some land in this county, and in the portion of it. He went around through the to ascertain who the occupants were of the ory he sought to recover. He found a man to him information as to who lived in certain places, e took minute notes as to boundaries, and so and passed on to the next. At last he saw a ine house on a hill, surrounded by an admirable and inquired who owned that. "Oh!" said the "our Will lives there. You must let him alone." hter.) I think we shall turn Lincoln out this We propose to put in the places of Lincoln Hamlin, George B. McClellan and George H. eton. (Loud and continued cheering.)

VAN BUREN'S PERSONAL OPINION OF MCCLELLAN.

o not stop now to eulogize the character of Gen- McClellan. I have read to you what the President about him in his message, in telegraphic des- es, and when he sends Mr. Blair to recall him to ommand of the army in conjunction with General But it may perhaps be a satisfaction to you to the testimony of one who knows him personally. 've had the pleasure to see much and frequently distinguished soldier. General McClellan possesses g sense, steady judgment, immovable will, quick ption, entire disinterestedness, and thorough pa- sm, to an extent unsurpassed by any man it was my fortune to meet. (Loud applause.) People ou they like him, but they don't like the men ontrol him. Who controls him? Lincoln could t the head of the armies and navies of the United s. When he was General-in-Chief, he freely ob- t to measures that were recommended by the dent, telling him, these lives are intrusted to my tion. I am on the ground, have personal oppor- y to observe. If you know better than I do what army should do, appoint another person to the hand, or take the lead yourself, and show the y your own proper person, (which would, of e, disperse them at a moment's notice.) (Laugh- No man, in my judgment, controls him. I never a man who seemed to me to have more entirely, t all times, the control of himself. (Applause.) le tell me there are peace men who control him. t are the ordinary motives that operate upon le? When the peace-men struggled against his nation, and when they oppose his election, is it osed that they are recommending themselves to in that way? That is not the common course of s. I have no doubt he will do entire justice to e great interests of the country when he is elect- but I am entirely certain you could not select a who would be more inflexible to his purpose, or d be more true to his own declarations than ge B. McClellan. (Loud applause.)

MCCLELLAN'S PLATFORM.

ow a great many gentlemen, who agree to that, me they object to his platform. I will tell you his platform is. It is contained in his letter from ison's Landing. He says, in writing to the Presi- :

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the e of free institutions and self-government. The stitution and the Union must be preserved, what- may be the cost in time, treasure, or blood. eers.) If secession is successful, other dissolutions clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither mili- disaster, political faction, or foreign war, shake r settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of laws of the United States upon the people of every e." (Loud cheers.)

lis platform is contained in his letter of acceptance, which he states distinctly what his views are in re-

"The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth. These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end. The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

. . . . . .

"The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace—we ask no more.

. . . . . .

"If a frank, earnest and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

"I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often perilled our lives."

He goes for the Union, for the integrity of the United States, for asserting the rightful government of the country over every foot of territory that has ever owned its flag; and I trust him to-day to do that in preference to the unfortunate man that now controls the destinies of the country. (Great applause.)

PENDLETON'S PLATFORM.

But I am told a great many persons like McClellan but don't like Mr. Pendleton, and they say General McClellan might die and Pendleton become President of the United States. Such a fatality as the death of General McClellan I trust will not occur. (Applause.) It is another peculiarity of the Democrats not to elect a President to die. (Great applause.) They elect him to live. Our history does not record an instance of a single Democratic President who died in office, although we have had the misfortune to lose two elected by the anti-Democratic party. But Mr. Pendleton in my humble judgment is as devoted to the Union as any man in it, as the letter which he has recently written upon this subject to a friend in New-York shows, dated October 17th. He has of course a natural sense of delicacy in making declarations now while a candidate, and says:

"I make no profession of a new faith, only repeat my reiterated professions of an old one, when I say that there is no one who cherishes a greater regard for the Union, who has a higher sense of its inestimable benefits, who would more earnestly labor for its restoration by all means which will effect that end, than myself. The Union is the guarantee of the peace, the power, the prosperity of this people; and no man would deprecate more heartily, or oppose more persistently, the establishment of another government over any portion of the territory ever within its limits.

"I am in favor of exacting no conditions, insisting upon no terms, not prescribed in the Constitution, and I am opposed to any course of policy which will defeat the reëstablishment of the government upon its old foundations, and in its territorial integrity."

ally, and a young man of higher honor does not live in the United States—utterly incapable of entering into any pledge he would not literally fulfil.

THE CHICAGO PLATFORM.

But some gentlemen say to me, they passed some resolutions at Chicago with which I am not satisfied—they passed resolutions on the subject of the war which were not satisfactory. Well, now, I don't attach much importance to the resolutions of the Convention; do you? ("No, no.") I have looked into my ballot a great many times when I put it in the box, and I never saw a resolution in it. I have noticed the name of a candidate for some particular office, and put great faith in the men; but I never noticed a resolution on a ballot, nor did I suppose I supported any when I supported a candidate acceptable to me. There is but a single resolution passed at Chicago that has any earthly significance, in my judgment, and that is the first. I will read it:

"*Resolved*, That in the future, as in the past, we will adhere with unanswering fidelity to the Union under the Constitution as the only solid foundation of our strength, security, and happiness as a people, and as a framework of government equally conducive to the welfare and prosperity of all the States, both Northern and Southern."

I never read a resolution more strongly committing those who passed it to the support of the Union. But, there is another resolution which seems to have been cooked up by a great variety of hands—though I infer from a recent letter of Mr. Vallandigham that he had the most to do with it—which undertakes to declare, not what the candidates ought to do—not even what the Convention thinks; nor does it declare, as has been stated, that the war has been a failure; but it undertakes to declare what it chooses to term as the sense of the American people, that four years of war have not restored the Union. Well, is that not true? Are we more or less likely to-day now than we were when this war broke out, to have the Union restored, especially under this administration? I think I shall show to you that this administration does not desire it restored, and does not intend that it shall be restored. It further declares that it is the sense of the American people that efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities and a convention of the States. Well, if that is the sense of the American people, including the South, I should be extremely glad to know if there is any man in the United States, or at least any man in the Northern States, who is not prepared for such a result. In my humble judgment there is nothing in the resolutions of this Convention that embarrasses any body who pays any attention to resolutions of party conventions, as to his action in this contest. But I don't care one straw about the resolutions of a Convention. If they nominate two good men in whom I have entire confidence, that is perfectly satisfactory to me, and they may resolve for their own satisfaction whatever seems agreeable to them. (Laughter.) But, gentlemen, it is a great deal more convenient, of course, for the supporters of Lincoln to be assailing the resolution than to be defending their man. (Laughter.) They have spent a great deal more time even than we have, in showing, as they now admit, when you speak to them, that a more incapable, and more blundering, and more unsuitable man in every conceivable particular, for the office of President than their own Abraham don't exist; but they are afraid to change him. (Cheers.) Now, I, as I have said, am not afraid to try a trade this time. (Applause.)

THE INDIANA FRAUDS.

I have met a great many gentlemen who say to me that they think Lincoln is going to be elected. Says some heavy cheating in Indiana, as I presume yo observed. You have had a representative of tha here, Governor Morton, and I only regret that h not time to tell you how, in Indianapolis, the p tion should have been so wonderfully increase that city alone gives several thousand more vo this election than the whole county did in the (Laughter.) I would like to have him explain h Massachusetts soldiers are allowed to vote in Indi regiment at a time, and if that is the law of that I would recommend those soldiers to stay ther not come to New-York, where, in my humble op they would not be permitted to vote. (Great laug

THE DANGER OF CHEATING SOLDIERS WITH MUSKE THEIR HANDS OUT OF THEIR VOTES.

But what other circumstances do we see to ind what is going to be done? Why, efforts are mad only to withhold ballots of the soldiers, but whe are allowed to send agents there, Lincoln's agent at large, and the agents of McClellan are locked Well, that is considered reasonably fair, I believe the supporters of this administration. Let me tell one fact in regard to the soldiers. In my humble j ment—and I cannot imagine that the case can be erwise, though I admit that it is to some extent jecture—the soldiers of the United States will sup their fellow-soldier, General McClellan—(loud che —and if they are cheated out of their ballots, it turn out that it is a hazardous thing to cheat a with a musket in his hands. A man with a mu cannot safely be cheated, because if his ballot d reach Washington, his musket may! (Laughter.) have very strong confidence that in one way or ot their votes will tell at the Presidential election.

ANDREW JOHNSON'S TENNESSEE OUTRAGE.

There has an occurrence recently taken place which I wish to call your attention for a moment, t then pass to other subjects. Andrew Johnson, who the candidate for Vice-President with Mr. Lincoln, prescribed to the people of Tennessee a test-oath which he makes them swear, not exactly to vote Lincoln, but as follows:

"I will cordially oppose all armistices or negot tions for peace with rebels in arms, until the Consti tion of the United States, and all laws and proclan tions made in pursuance thereof, shall be establish over all the people of every State and territory e braced within the National Union, and that I w heartily aid and assist the loyal people in whatev measures may be adopted for the attainment of tho ends; and further, that I take this oath freely a voluntarily, and without mental reservation. So he me God."

Andrew Johnson is Military Governor of Tennesse and this test-oath is proposed by him, and substantiall excludes every man opposed to the administration fro taking a vote.

WADE AND DAVIS'S OPINIONS OF IT.

Recently Congress passed a law organizing Stat governments in the rebel States. You will recolle that that law was neither signed nor vetoed by Mr Lincoln, but that he pocketed it, upon which Mr. Wade an Ohio Senator, and Mr. Davis, a Member of Con gress, the Chairmen respectively of the Committee o the Senate and House of Representatives, to which th subject belonged, came out with a manifesto, charging usurpation of authority and tyrannical conduct upo the President of the United States; and they not only did this, but they undertake to state what would be the effect of allowing the President to assume the govern ment of the territories. They say of these military governors:

"The President's purpose to instruct his military governors to proceed according to the bill" a make-

d—is not merely a grave usurpation, out a trans-
it delusion. He cannot 'proceed according to the
after preventing it from becoming a law.
Whatever is done will be at his will and pleasure
rsons responsible to no law, and more interested
cure the interests and execute the will of the
dent than of the people." . . . .
at is to say, the President persists in recognizing
shadows of governments in Arkansas and Louisi-
which Congress formally declared should not be
nized—whose Representatives and Senators were
led by formal votes of both Houses of Congress—
h it was declared formally should have no electoral
for President and Vice-President.
*ey are the mere creatures of his will. They can-
ve a day without its support. They are mere oli-
ies, imposed on the people by military orders under
forms of election, at which generals, provost-mar-
, soldiers, and camp-followers were the chief actors,
ed by a handful of resident citizens, and urged on
emature action by private letters from the Presi-*
. . . . . .
ch is the free Constitution and government of
siana; and like it is that of Arkansas. *Nothing
he failure of a military expedition deprived us of a
one in the swamps of Florida; and before the
idential election, like ones may be organized in
y rebel State where the United States have a camp.*
he President, by preventing this bill from becom-
k law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel States
e dictation of his personal ambition.
*those votes turn the balance in his favor, is it to be
osed that his competitor, defeated by such means,
acquiesce?*
the rebel majority assert their supremacy in those
es, and send votes which elect an enemy of the
rnment, will we not repel his claims?

ND IS NOT THAT CIVIL WAR FOR THE PRESIDENCY,
GURATED BY THE VOTES OF REBEL STATES?

ow, precisely, this is what Mr. Lincoln has at-
pted to do in the State of Tennessee, and when a
ectable delegation from Tennessee called upon him
represented to him the action of his military gov-
r, what does he say? He said: "Let the friends
eorge B. McClellan manage their side of this con-
to suit themselves, and I will manage my side in
own way." What's to become of the Presidency
he United States, if we are to be considered on one
, and the President with the control of civil and
tary authority is to be left to manage what he calls
side in his own way? This was rather strong even
the supporters of Lincoln, and it was followed by a
er in which he says he has no authority over elec-
s, or over the action of this military governor,
se appointment depends on his mere caprice,
se whole power is in the breath of his nostrils, who
ives appointment by his sign manual. But, he says,
ou are not satisfied with this, stay away from the
s; there is no coërcion on you to vote. Now, sup-
e, for instance, there were half a dozen soldiers at
polls, and when you went up to vote they should
on you. Mr. Lincoln's argument would be: "I
e no power over these soldiers; if you don't choose
rote, stay away." That is precisely the explanation
le by him in the matter of Tennessee. It is a plain
bold usurpation of the authority over elections by
agent, associated with him on the ticket, which no
publican has yet been bold enough to justify, and
ch has been calculated to shock the moral sense
the love of constitutional liberty of every freeman
he United States. Talk to me of a Democrat sus-
ning all these usurpations, these violations of the
nstitution, and of the elementary principles of civil
erty. I submit that no man who has a Democratic
rt in his bosom, and a Democratic intellect in his
power the administration that has been signalized by
acts like these! (Loud cheers.)

THE PROSPECT IF LINCOLN IS ELECTED.

Fellow-citizens, I have already detained you longer than I intended. I submit to you that there is but one remedy for the evils to which I adverted, and that is, to turn out the present incumbent of the presidential chair, and to put in a competent man. (Applause.) Put at the head of the government of the United States a soldier and statesman who knows how to receive propositions of peace. Why, what does the President say when a proposition is made to him for peace? He says in his letter "To whom it may concern," that he will *not* entertain any proposition unless it is coupled with a consent to abolish slavery. Does he mean, then, that the different States are to meet in convention, because it is only by convention that slavery can be abolished? He is in the hands of a set of men who are willing to drive this country to ruin for the quixotic object of interfering with the institutions of other States over which we have no control, as he said in his inaugural. My word for it, if he is allowed to proceed, you will find this government plunged into irretrievable bankruptcy. Long before you can see the end of this war, you will see the debt immeasurably increased, you will see another draft come along here about November, for which I trust you are prepared—a draft, if I am correctly informed, in which no substitutes will be allowed, if Congress can be made to repeal the law allowing them, and in which no fifty days' notice will be given. If another draft were necessary to uphold the government, to put down the rebellion, to prosecute the war for legitimate objects, I should have not one word to say. But if it is another draft of the white men of this country for the purpose of carrying on this abolition crusade, I, and I think you, would like to be heard upon the subject before the order is issued.

INDICATIONS IN THE SOUTH.

Now, before I leave you, I wish to say a word or two in regard to some letters that have recently been published in the South, which, I think, indicate a change of tone on the part of prominent men through the South. A letter has been recently published from Mr. Stephens, one from Mr. Boyce, and another from Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, three prominent men in the Southern Confederacy, who desire hostilities to cease. You are to bear in mind who Mr. Stephens is. He is the Vice-President of the so-called Southern Confederacy; he was one of the warmest friends of the Union up to the moment of the secession of Georgia, of which he is a citizen, that ever lived in the United States, and has presented the advantages of the Union to the South with more eloquence and more ability than any man North or South. He is the ablest man beyond all question, in my judgment, in the Southern country, he was one of the very few men in the Georgia Convention who voted steadily to the end against secession, and he is one who recently was on his way to the President of the United States with some proposition of negotiation, which Mr. Lincoln would not hear and would not let him come through the lines to deliver. Since that time Mr. Stephens has not opened his mouth. When these persons come out for a cessation of hostilities and a convention of the States, it is a call to which attention should be paid. I don't presume to say that it is one in which we should acquiesce, but it is one of the indications that Southern men are prepared to settle this controversy. He says that the questions of Union and the questions of boundaries could furnish no difficulty in the settlement. Now, I submit to you, that his letter and the letter of Mr. Boyce, addressed to Jefferson Davis, and the letter of Herschel V. Johnson, who was the candidate for Vice-President on the ticket with Mr. Douglas, in the last presidential election,

men are prepared to return to the Union and submit to the Constitution and laws, I should be glad to see the blood-thirsty man, or the bloated contractor, or the unemployed general, who would refuse the people of this country the opportunity to enter into negotiation by which the Union might be restored, the war ended, and peace secured. (Great applause.)

Davis has told us that they never will unite; prominent men in the South have insisted that they won't unite, won't consult, won't confer, but the men to whom I refer hold more moderate and rational language, though they may entertain Quixotic ideas in reference to the rights of the States which Mr. Calhoun entertained for thirty or forty years of his life, and until his death, without doing any damage to the United States, because the great mass of the people believed such notions to be utterly irreconcilable with the true theory of the Constitution.

THE REPUBLICANS DO NOT WANT THE UNION RESTORED.

Now, these Republican gentlemen who are supporting Mr. Lincoln do not mean to have the Union restored; they don't want to have it restored, and any man of them who is honest will tell you so. If they intend to go on and abolish slavery in the States, of course they don't intend to restore the old Union. The politicians among them know that if the Southern States return to the Confederacy, they will not return with any very exalted opinions of the fidelity of the Republicans to the Union, or their regard for the rights of those who were formerly their brethren in the Southern States. They know that the return of the Southern States to the Union is their perpetual expulsion from public life, and they don't mean to have it. Those that are honest among them say, as Thad Stevens does, that the Union is played out, that we must subjugate these people, that we must drive them from the territory and populate the Southern country with a new race. That is not a short job. (Laughter.) It is not a cheap job. It was not included in the Crittenden resolutions, or in the objects of the war, as stated by Mr. Lincoln in the beginning. I think it is possible to overthrow the organized armies of the South. I never had a doubt that we were competent to do that; but it is proposed when they overthrow the armies to convert this into a guerrilla warfare, which will be attended by murder, by rapine, by incendiarism. Every mile of Southern territory that we conquer under this policy will require to be held by garrisons larger than the armies now occupied in subjugating it, and will entail upon us an expense fearful to contemplate, and utterly impossible to discharge. If I were a contractor who had government securities, my private impression is, that I would say: "Let us close the account now. You have been sweated about as much as I think you will bear." When this debt comes to be doubled and trebled, a man may consider himself fortunate who is able to give up all that he is possessed of and quit the country to begin again in some other land where he is not overwhelmed with debt. ("That's so.")

AUSPICIOUS SIGNS OF LINCOLN'S DEFEAT.

I see throughout the country great hope of the defeat of Mr. Lincoln. (Applause.) I see it not only in the intelligence and observation of the gentlemen that I meet in different parts of the United States, not only in what I know to be the intrinsic justice of our cause and the propriety of our action, but I see it in the popular elections that have taken place recently where the slightest opportunity has been given for a fair vote. The elections in the towns of Connecticut indicate that beyond a reasonable doubt that State will go for McClellan. (Loud cheers.) So, too, the elec-

recent glorious contest from which the friends
Clellan have emerged in Pennsylvania. (Lou
ing.) I feel very great confidence that that St
vote for McClellan. ("She will"—cheers.) I
rely upon statements made to me, upon what
seen and heard while in that State, upon the e
dinary and sudden gain at the last State electio
was achieved by the supporters of McClell
Pendleton, and what I know to be the feeling
servative men in that State, I ought to say
is no reasonable doubt that such will be the res
attach no importance to the result of the elect
Indiana. I do not believe you can cheat Dem
twice running so quick. (Laughter.) I believ
the men who have learned how they were defi
will rise now to resist it, and to drive from th
those who have committed these frauds. (App
I am not certain but that Governor Morton do
find it more convenient to be here than in India
at this time. (Laughter and applause.) But, f
citizens, we have a little State lying by the side
which, I believe, the Republicans don't ever cl
the little Dutch State of New-Jersey. (Cheers.)
are States in the West where, if our represent
are correct, we have a fair right to expect succe
Kentucky and Missouri, if the President can kee
peace and allow voting, I don't believe he ca
any fair majority. In the gallant State of Ill
if the information I get is correct, we have fai
son to expect the electoral vote will be given fo
Clellan. It is a Democratic State, and I attach
importance to that. It has a Democratic staple
upon. I have generally found that in proporti
the emergency in which the country is, and
trouble which has been brought upon the pe
the democracy of the country are very apt to ris
admit freely that this is no political contest; if it
I think I should take no part in it. Some of
strongest Republicans in the country are the stro
supporters of McClellan. So, too, men like Mi
Fillmore and Washington Hunt, so Judge Coms
and Mr. Brooks, so a great number of the lea
Whigs of the country, and no doubt many of the
publicans in this and other counties, but I think
will bear with me when I say that there is a little di
ence between the Democrats and their opponent
this particular: When you scare the opposition, they
very apt to be beaten, but if you do scare a Demo
he is very sure to go to work, and he works a g
deal harder when you show him the necessity fo
than he would if allowed to go on with the supine
of confidence. (Cheers.) I feel absolute confide
that the State of New-York will vote for McClel
(Great cheering.) I believe that it is aroused from
Atlantic to the lakes, from the St. Lawrence to Pe
sylvania, and that our people are intelligent enough
know what is their duty, and to do it at this presid
tial election, and we cannot be cheated on electi
day. There is a great difference between the con
in a State like Indiana, and one in which the gove
ment is in the hands of men who will protect
purity of the ballot-boxes, and see that no frauds
committed at the election. If I can draw any int
ence from the state of things in and about the city
New-York, from what I see in regard to the feeling
that city, I cannot imagine a Republican major
in the interior of the State which will overcom
the overwhelming vote of the county of Ne
York and the county of Kings. (Great cheering.)
am entirely confident, unless great changes against
occur between now and the presidential election, whi
is not very likely, that the vote given in the city a
county of New-York and the county of Kings w
far exceed any majority that was ever given for a D
mocratic candidate on any previous occasion. (Tr

HEAR Hon. GEO. H. PENDLETON.

Letter to Hon. JOHN B. HASKIN.

CINCINNATI, October 17.

MY DEAR SIR: I have received your friendly letter. Malignant misrepresentations and falsehoods are so frequent in our political struggles, that I have rarely undertaken to correct or refute them.

I make no professions of a new faith, only repeat my reiterated professions of an old one, when I say that there is no one who cherishes a greater regard for the Union, who has a higher sense of its inestimable benefits, who would more earnestly labor for its restoration by all means which will effect that end, than myself. The Union is the guarantee of the peace, the power, the prosperity of this people; and no man would deprecate more heartily, or oppose more persistently, the establishment of another government over any portion of the territory ever within its limits.

I am in favor of exacting no conditions, insisting upon no terms, not prescribed in the Constitution, and I am opposed to any course of policy which will defeat the reëstablishment of the Government upon its old foundations, and in its territorial integrity. I am, very truly yours, etc.,

GEORGE H. PENDLETON.

Hon. JOHN B. HASKIN, N. Y.

Letter to Hon. C. L. WARD.

CINCINNATI, October 18.

MY DEAR SIR: I have received your letter. In the very beginning of this war—in the first days of the extra session of 1861—I said in my place in Congress, that I would vote for all measures necessary to enable the Government to maintain its honor and dignity and prevent disaster to its flag. I have done so.

I thought, by the adoption of such measures, the faith of the Government was pledged to the troops in the field, and must not be forfeited by inadequate supplies. I never gave a vote which was incompatible with this sentiment.

All appropriations, pure and simple, for the support and efficiency of the army and navy, had my cordial concurrence. It was only when they were connected with other, and improper, appropriations; when by reason of their popularity they were loaded down with fraudulent items for the benefit of contractors and speculators, and every attempt to separate them failed; when they were made a stalking-horse for some abolition scheme, that I was constrained reluctantly to vote against the whole bill.

But I repeat that I voted against no bill which was confined simply to the object of supplies for the army and the navy.

I am, very truly yours,

GEORGE H. PENDLETON.

Hon. C. L. WARD, Philadelphia, Pa.

SPEECH AT NEW-YORK HOTEL,

OCTOBER 24th, 1864.

I THANK you for this manifestation of your kind feeling toward myself. I am the more grateful for it as it comes from men who have stood in the fore-front of danger, and periled their lives for their country. (Loud cheers.) I accept it as an evidence of your confidence in and of your sympathy with my devotion to the Union and the Constitution. (Three cheers for Geo. H. Pendleton.)

I have rarely found it necessary to reply to any personal attack. A friend has just handed me a pamphlet, which he tells me has extensive circulation both here and in the army. It professes to be a record of my speeches and votes in Congress, and to prove from them my hostility to the Republic. It professes to be published by the "Union Congressional Committee," and to be compiled from the *Congressional Globe*, to which it appeals for its entire accuracy. On the seventh page of that pamphlet, I am charged with having voted against certain resolutions on the seventh of July, 1864. Now, if any of you gentlemen will examine the *Globe*, or the file of any daily newspaper of your city, or will even tax his recollection, he will find that Congress adjourned on the fourth day of July, 1864. (Great laughter.) From this specimen of fraud and forgery, I leave you to judge of the credibility of the whole fabrication. (Laughter and applause.)

I was born in Ohio. I have lived all my life in the North-West. I know the sentiment of the people. I sympathize entirely with it. They are attached by every tie of affection and interest to this Union. (Loud cheering.)

Unlike New-York, they have never known another Government; they never existed as a political community before this Government was formed, and their hearts cling to this Government with indescribable tenacity. (Great applause.) Unlike you, they are

an inland people chiefly devoted to agriculture. As an integral and controlling portion of the Union, they have prestige and power; they fear from disunion, isolation from the world, and the loss of that prestige and power. (Cheers.) Their interest requires that they should have speedy and easy communication with the ocean, and this they intend to have, both by the Gulf of Mexico and the city of New-York, by conciliation and peace if they can, by all the force and power which a teeming population and a fruitful soil give them if they must. (Loud cheers.) They believe that the first step toward maintaining the Union is the election of General McClellan. (Great cheering.) They believe that the restoration of the Democratic party to power will produce Union. (Cheers.) They believe the policy of this Administration toward both the Southern and Northern States is fatal to the Union. ("That's so.") General McClellan, in his Harrison Landing letter, said: "*Neither confiscation of property, nor political executions of persons, nor territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery, should be for one moment thought of.*"

In his letter of acceptance he said: "*The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, a like spirit must prevail in the councils of the country and in the hearts of the people.*" (Cheers.)

The Democratic party is pledged to an unswerving fidelity to the Union under the Constitution. (Cheers.) It is pledged to "the restoration of peace on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." (Loud applause.)

We believe, nay, we know, that if this party shall be restored to power, if this policy shall prevail, the Union shall be restored; State after State will return to us, and the echoes of our rejoicing will come down to us from the vaults of heaven itself, in token that Deity approves that statesmanship which tempers all its policy with moderation, and justice, and conciliation. (Cheers.)

When next I meet you, I hope we may have already entered on that work. Again, gentlemen, I thank you for your attention, and wish you good-night. (Loud and long cheers followed the speech.)

LINCOLN the REBEL CANDIDATE.

From the Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 5.

THE Democratic nominees in the United States are McClellan for President and Pendleton for Vice-President. What concern have the people of the confederate States in the fate of these candidates at the approaching election? In our opinion, the interest and hope of peace is not greatly advanced by these nominations. From General McClellan our people can have but little hope of peace, other than a reconstruction peace. . . . What hope do his antecedents hold out that should encourage our people to believe that he would yield our nationality any sooner than Mr. Lincoln? *He is by far the more dangerous man for us; had his policy been persistently followed, and the war conducted on the principles of civilized warfare, he might have divided our people and perhaps conquered our liberties.* With consummate abilities, he clearly foresaw that emancipation might possibly free the negroes, but could not unite the sections; that confiscation might enrich his soldiers, but could not reconcile our people; hence, with an earnest and honest love for the Union, he avoided these fatal acts, and conducted the war for the restoration of the Union, rather than the destruction of the South. His policy was the olive-branch in one hand and the sword in the other, to conquer by power and conciliate by kindness. *It was a most dangerous policy for us; for if the ameliorating hand of Federal kindness had softened the rigors of war, our people would not have been subjected to those terrible fires of suffering by which Mr. Lincoln has hardened every heart and steeled every sentiment* against our merciless foes. As a sincere secessionist, preferring war and nationality to peace and the Union, we looked upon the fact of a difference between Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan as to the proper policy of conducting the war, as peculiarly fortunate for our cause. We hailed the proclamations of emancipation and confiscation, and the policy of plunder and devastation, as sure pledges of our ultimate triumph; they were terrible ordeals, but they most effectually eradicated every sentiment of Union, and arousing the pride as well as the interest of our people, inflamed the patriotism of the whole, until they would have accepted death as preferable to ultimate defeat.

Now, between McClellan and Lincoln there are many points of difference; the former is a man of talent, of information, of firmness, and great military

experience and ability; the latter is a supple, pliant, easy fool, a good but vulgar joker. While McClellan has the interest of the Union only at heart, Mr. Lincoln has the fanatical object of freeing negroes for his inspiration. Between "my plan," as General Grant has conducted it, and one by General McClellan, there could not have been the same success that has already attended our arms; *for we lost more men fighting the science of McClellan on the Peninsula, than we have in repelling the furious but ill-conducted assaults of General Grant. Thus, whether we look at this nomination in the light of peace or of war, we prefer Lincoln to McClellan. We can make better terms of peace with anti slavery fanatics than with an earnest Unionist.* We can gain more military success in a war conducted on "my plan" than one of a real soldier like McClellan, and sooner destroy the resources and strength of our enemy where they are managed and manipulated by the light-fingered gentry of Messrs. Chase and Fessenden, than when husbanded and skilfully controlled by such a man as Guthrie. *Our best hope is from the honest fanatics of the United States*, men who believe in their hearts that slavery is the "sum of all villainies," and who really and sincerely believe it to be their duty to separate their country from this "relic of barbarism." *Such men, when they find that their people are tired of the war, will end it by a peace that sacrifices territory to freedom, and will let the South "go," provided she carries slavery with her.* These men believe no less that the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed, than "that all men are created free and equal." The two postulates are of like importance to an abolitionist.

Both the abolitionist and the Democrat is our enemy—the one, because we have slaves, the other, because we are disunionists. Nor does their enmity differ in degree; they both hate us most intensely. The Chicago platform is, that "peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States"—that is, reconstruction of the Union as it was, with slavery protected by the nominal laws, but warred upon by a real sentiment, aggravated and embittered by the war. The reconstructed Union of the Chicago platform would be the certain destruction—first, of slavery, and next of slaveholders. With Lincoln and the Baltimore platform, we of the confederate States know where we are—outside of the pale of mercy, devoted to ruin and destruction, with no hope save in the justice and protection of God, and the courage and manliness of our soldiers. *With swords and muskets and cannon we fight Lincoln, and the past affords no reason of apprehension of the future. But in the reconstructed Union of the Chicago platform we would be deprived of our weapons without being reconciled to our foes.*

The disruption of old political associations is always a hazardous experiment. The great majority of minds in a wealthy and prosperous community are averse to change and revolution, preferring to endure great evils rather than resort to sanguinary measures for redress. No men ever felt the weight of this truth more forcibly than those who inaugurated the movement for secession. The whole danger and risk of the experiment consisted in that conservative aversion to change and convulsion which pos-

sesses the popular masses. On this rock the secession cause might have split, if it *had not been safely piloted past it by the pains of Abraham Lincoln.* The cause was saved in 1862 by the conscription; and Lincoln—not the *Examiner* newspaper—may be said to have been the author of the conscription; because, except for the ferocious policy which he pursued, it could never have been enforced. He has rendered resistance an absolute duty and necessity, and brought that duty and necessity home to every man's door, insomuch, that no man in the South having any self-respect or regard for the opinions of his neighbors, dares to disobey the call of his country to arms.

But for the incentives supplied by Mr. Lincoln, the South, by want of union and energy, might have failed to deserve the respect of mankind; might have been unable to levy great armies; and the forces in the field might have fought with little energy or resolution. The popular majority might have been disposed, at the first soft words from the enemy, to renounce the Southern cause, and return to the enjoyment of repose, prosperity, and dishonor. Mr. Lincoln has prevented such a contingency, and relieved the South of all these dangers by a course of policy which rendered reconciliation impossible. *By driving us to extremity, he has combined every element of our strength, and insured our success.* If the South could be conquered at all, there is but one mode by which it could be done. If the armies of the North were entirely withdrawn, and an invitation proposed for a convention of all the States, for the purpose of devising terms of conciliation, then our independence might be seriously endangered. Such would have been the policy of Pierce or Vallandigham; such, possibly, though not probably, might become the policy of McClellan. But Mr. Lincoln relieves us of this only possible danger by a policy which drives every man to arms, and renders reconstruction an opprobrium throughout the land.

While the South has much for which to thank Mr. Lincoln, the North has still more for which to curse him. His administration has cost the United States half a million of men, eleven States with ten millions of population, embracing many thousands of millions of wealth, and has entailed three thousand millions of public debt. He is the very genius of ruin and destruction to his country, and seems to have endeared himself in its affections by the very loss and woe he has inflicted upon it.

If the people of the United States choose to reëlect him, *they thereby pronounce a decree establishing the independence of the South.* We can bring larger armies into the field to fight Lincoln than any other Northern President, and his continuation in office will inspire every Southern breast with the resolve to win independence as the only alternative to extermination.

There is no question that between the two men General McClellan enjoys far more of the respect of the people of these States than Lincoln, and the Democratic party far more of our confidence than the Republican, and that *if reconstruction were possible, it would be more probable under General McClellan and the Democracy than under Lincoln and the Republicans.* The North-West inspires one, and New-England the other; but as long as

New-England imposes the dogmas of her civilization and the tenets of her fanaticism upon the mind and people of the North-West, there may be peace and separation, but there can never be Union and harmony. If the North-West desires the restoration of the Union, let its people shake off the bondage of New-England, and *show to the world that a new era of toleration and fraternal kindness has risen in the place of fanatical Puritanism and selfish ostracism.*

From the Richmond Examiner, October 17.

Some doubt remains as to the political complexion of Pennsylvania. The press of the United States has become so radically mendacious, that it is impossible to put trust in the first accounts even of an event so public and plain as the result of an election. Some days may yet elapse before certitude is attained. But we entertain strong hopes that the Republicans have done what they seemed at first to have done, and confess a deep desire that the present result may foreshadow the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln. *For Abraham Lincoln is the South's best ally.* This Confederacy had a million and a quarter men capable of bearing arms at the outset of the contest: a force sufficient to meet any invading power and defy the possibility of subjugation. The only danger lay in the difficulty of bringing this force into the field. *Abraham Lincoln removed that difficulty by the character which he imparted to the war.* He made Goths and Vandals of his troops, and proclaimed devastation, confiscation, and extermination as his purpose. It was thus that he invoked into the field those powerful Southern armies which have so successfully resisted his assaults. It is scarcely possible to conceive how a conflict could have been rendered more envenomed than the present one has become through that truculent policy of Mr. Lincoln. Yet this man found a means of intensifying its ferocity. He proclaimed insurrection to the slaves, and armed all the blacks which he could seduce into his service, against the whites who had been their masters. By this policy he effectually succeeded in calling out and combining every element of resistance in the South — a strong element of that resistance is yet to come, as will appear soon after the meeting of the confederate Congress. The enemy talk of the despotism which drags conscripts into the Southern armies, and forces old men and children into the ditches, but the despotism which coërces the South is seated at Washington, and not at Richmond. The Confederacy has proved that it had nerve and resolution to achieve an independent destiny; but it is indebted to Lincoln for forcing these qualities into action.

HEAR Hon. GEO. H. PENDLETON.

Letter to Hon. JOHN B. HASKIN.

CINCINNATI, October 17.

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SPEECH AT NEW-YORK HOTEL,

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When next I meet you, I hope we may have already entered on that work. Again, gentlemen, I thank you for your attention, and wish you good-night. (Loud and long cheers followed the speech.)

LINCOLN the REBEL CANDIDATE.

From the Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 5.

THE Democratic nominees in the United States are McClellan for President and Pendleton for Vice-President. What concern have the people of the confederate States in the fate of these candidates at the approaching election? In our opinion, the interest and hope of peace is not greatly advanced by these nominations. From General McClellan our people can have but little hope of peace, other than a reconstruction peace. . . . What hope do his antecedents hold out that should encourage our people to believe that he would yield our nationality any sooner than Mr. Lincoln? *He is by far the more dangerous man for us; had his policy been persistently followed, and the war conducted on the principles of civilized warfare, he might have divided our people and perhaps conquered our liberties.* With consummate abilities, he clearly foresaw that emancipation might possibly free the negroes, but could not unite the sections; that confiscation might enrich his soldiers, but could not reconcile our people; hence, with an earnest and honest love for the Union, he avoided these fatal acts, and conducted the war for the restoration of the Union, rather than the destruction of the South. His policy was the olive-branch in one hand and the sword in the other, to conquer by power and conciliate by kindness. *It was a most dangerous policy for us; for if the ameliorating hand of Federal kindness had softened the rigors of war, our people would not have been subjected to those terrible fires of suffering by which Mr. Lincoln has hardened every heart and steeled every sentiment* against our merciless foes. As a sincere secessionist, preferring war and nationality to peace and the Union, we looked upon the fact of a difference between Mr. Lincoln and General McClellan as to the proper policy of conducting the war, as peculiarly fortunate for our cause. We hailed the proclamations of emancipation and confiscation, and the policy of plunder and devastation, as sure pledges of our ultimate triumph: they were terrible ordeals, but they most effectually eradicated every sentiment of Union, and arousing the pride as well as the interest of our people, inflamed the patriotism of the whole, until they would have accepted death as preferable to ultimate defeat.

Now, between McClellan and Lincoln there are many points of difference; the former is a man of talent, of information, of firmness, and great military

experience and ability; the latter is a supple, pliant, easy fool, a good but vulgar joker. While McClellan has the interest of the Union only at heart, Mr. Lincoln has the fanatical object of freeing negroes for his inspiration. Between "my plan," as General Grant has conducted it, and one by General McClellan, there could not have been the same success that has already attended our arms; *for we lost more men fighting the science of McClellan on the Peninsula, than we have in repelling the furious but ill-conducted assaults of General Grant. Thus, whether we look at this nomination in the light of peace or of war, we prefer Lincoln to McClellan. We can make better terms of peace with anti slavery fanatics than with an earnest Unionist.* We can gain more military success in a war conducted on "my plan" than one of a real soldier like McClellan, and sooner destroy the resources and strength of our enemy where they are managed and manipulated by the light-fingered gentry of Messrs. Chase and Fessenden, than when husbanded and skilfully controlled by such a man as Guthrie. *Our best hope is from the honest fanatics of the United States*, men who believe in their hearts that slavery is the "sum of all villainies," and who really and sincerely believe it to be their duty to separate their country from this "relic of barbarism." *Such men, when they find that their people are tired of the war, will end it by a peace that sacrifices territory to freedom, and will let the South "go," provided she carries slavery with her.* These men believe no less that the just powers of government are derived from the consent of the governed, than "that all men are created free and equal." The two postulates are of like importance to an abolitionist.

Both the abolitionist and the Democrat is our enemy—the one, because we have slaves, the other, because we are disunionists. Nor does their enmity differ in degree; they both hate us most intensely. The Chicago platform is, that "peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States"—that is, reconstruction of the Union as it was, with slavery protected by the nominal laws, but warred upon by a real sentiment, aggravated and embittered by the war. The reconstructed Union of the Chicago platform would be the certain destruction—first, of slavery, and next of slaveholders. With Lincoln and the Baltimore platform, we of the confederate States know where we are—outside of the pale of mercy, devoted to ruin and destruction, with no hope save in the justice and protection of God, and the courage and manliness of our soldiers. *With swords and muskets and cannon we fight Lincoln, and the past affords no reason of apprehension of the future. But in the reconstructed Union of the Chicago platform we would be deprived of our weapons without being reconciled to our foes.*

The disruption of old political associations is always a hazardous experiment. The great majority of minds in a wealthy and prosperous community are averse to change and revolution, preferring to endure great evils rather than resort to sanguinary measures for redress. No men ever felt the weight of this truth more forcibly than those who inaugurated the movement for secession. The whole danger and risk of the experiment consisted in that conservative aversion to change and convulsion which pos-

sesses the popular masses. On this rock the secession cause might have split, if it *had not been safely piloted past it by the pains of Abraham Lincoln.* The cause was saved in 1862 by the conscription; and Lincoln—not the *Examiner* newspaper—may be said to have been the author of the conscription; because, except for the ferocious policy which he pursued, it could never have been enforced. He has rendered resistance an absolute duty and necessity, and brought that duty and necessity home to every man's door, insomuch, that no man in the South having any self-respect or regard for the opinions of his neighbors, dares to disobey the call of his country to arms.

But for the incentives supplied by Mr. Lincoln, the South, by want of union and energy, might have failed to deserve the respect of mankind; might have been unable to levy great armies; and the forces in the field might have fought with little energy or resolution. The popular majority might have been disposed, at the first soft words from the enemy, to renounce the Southern cause, and return to the enjoyment of repose, prosperity, and dishonor. Mr. Lincoln has prevented such a contingency, and relieved the South of all these dangers by a course of policy which rendered reconciliation impossible. *By driving us to extremity, he has combined every element of our strength, and insured our success.* If the South could be conquered at all, there is but one mode by which it could be done. If the armies of the North were entirely withdrawn, and an invitation proposed for a convention of all the States, for the purpose of devising terms of conciliation, then our independence might be seriously endangered. Such would have been the policy of Pierce or Vallandigham; such, possibly, though not probably, might become the policy of McClellan. But Mr. Lincoln relieves us of this only possible danger by a policy which drives every man to arms, and renders reconstruction an opprobrium throughout the land.

While the South has much for which to thank Mr. Lincoln, the North has still more for which to curse him. His administration has cost the United States half a million of men, eleven States with ten millions of population, embracing many thousands of millions of wealth, and has entailed three thousand millions of public debt. He is the very genius of ruin and destruction to his country, and seems to have endeared himself in its affections by the very loss and woe he has inflicted upon it.

If the people of the United States choose to reëlect him, *they thereby pronounce a decree establishing the independence of the South.* We can bring larger armies into the field to fight Lincoln than any other Northern President, and his continuation in office will inspire every Southern breast with the resolve to win independence as the only alternative to extermination.

There is no question that between the two men General McClellan enjoys far more of the respect of the people of these States than Lincoln, and the Democratic party far more of our confidence than the Republican, and that *if reconstruction were possible, it would be more probable under General McClellan and the Democracy than under Lincoln and the Republicans.* The North-West inspires one, and New-England the other; but as long as

New-England imposes the dogmas of her civilization and the tenets of her fanaticism upon the mind and people of the North-West, there may be peace and separation, but there can never be Union and harmony. If the North-West desires the restoration of the Union, let its people shake off the bondage of New-England, and *show to the world that a new era of toleration and fraternal kindness has risen in the place of fanatical Puritanism and selfish ostracism.*

From the Richmond Examiner, October 17.

Some doubt remains as to the political complexion of Pennsylvania. The press of the United States has become so radically mendacious, that it is impossible to put trust in the first accounts even of an event so public and plain as the result of an election. Some days may yet elapse before certitude is attained. But we entertain strong hopes that the Republicans have done what they seemed at first to have done, and confess a deep desire that the present result may foreshadow the reëlection of Abraham Lincoln. *For Abraham Lincoln is the South's best ally.* This Confederacy had a million and a quarter men capable of bearing arms at the outset of the contest: a force sufficient to meet any invading power and defy the possibility of subjugation. The only danger lay in the difficulty of bringing this force into the field. *Abraham Lincoln removed that difficulty by the character which he imparted to the war.* He made Goths and Vandals of his troops, and proclaimed devastation, confiscation, and extermination as his purpose. It was thus that he invoked into the field those powerful Southern armies which have so successfully resisted his assaults. It is scarcely possible to conceive how a conflict could have been rendered more envenomed than the present one has become through that truculent policy of Mr. Lincoln. Yet this man found a means of intensifying its ferocity. He proclaimed insurrection to the slaves, and armed all the blacks which he could seduce into his service, against the whites who had been their masters. By this policy he effectually succeeded in calling out and combining every element of resistance in the South — a strong element of that resistance is yet to come, as will appear soon after the meeting of the confederate Congress. The enemy talk of the despotism which drags conscripts into the Southern armies, and forces old men and children into the ditches, but the despotism which coërces the South is seated at Washington, and not at Richmond. The Confederacy has proved that it had nerve and resolution to achieve an independent destiny; but it is indebted to Lincoln for forcing these qualities into action.

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 1.

THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate for the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought. I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add what, I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the

permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union.

As to the other subjects presented in the resolutions of the Convention, I need only say that I should seek, in the Constitution of the United States and the laws framed in accordance therewith, the rule of my duty, and the limitations of executive power; endeavor to restore economy in public expenditure, reëstablish the supremacy of law, and, by the assertion of a more vigorous nationality, resume our commanding position among the nations of the earth.

The condition of our finances, the depreciation of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system; while the rights of citizens, and the rights of States, and the binding authority of law over Pr dent, army, and people, are subjects of less vital importance in war than in pea

Believing that the views here expres are those of the Convention and the peo you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibil to be borne should the people ratify y choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I only seek fervently the guidance of Ruler of the universe, and, relying His all-powerful aid, do my best to store union and peace to a suffering peo and to establish and guard their libert and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLA

Hon. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, *and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will received and considered by the Execut Government of the United States*, and w be met by liberal terms on other subst tial and collateral points, and the bea or bearers thereof shall have safe condu both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

DEMOCRATIC LOYALTY.

The World's Campaign Songs, No. 1.

MAC, MY DARLING.

AIR: "*Oh my Nora Creina, Dear.*"

Mac, my darling, proud I am
To hear that you've been nominated;
Last we met at Antietam,
Where you the rebel might abated.
In the seven days' fight I stood
Beside you on the hills and meadows,
And while our brave boys poured their blood,
We knew your heart was throbbing with us!
Oh, my captain, dear and true,
The coward tongues that would ignore you
Are base as false—thank Heaven they're few!
Your soldiers trust you and adore you.

REPUBLICAN LOYALTY.

From the Tribune.

All hail the flaunting lie!
The stars grow pale and dim,
The stripes are bloody scars,
A lie the vaunting hymn.
It shields a pirate's deck,
It binds a man in chains,

(Continued from first column, second page.)

be may crack his jolly jokes,
O'er bloody fields of stricken battle,
hile yet the ebbing life-tide smokes
From men that die like butchered cattle;
le, ere yet the guns grow cold,
To pimps and pets may crack his stories;
our name is of the grander mould,
And linked with all our brightest glories!
Oh, my general, dear and true,
The lying tongues that would defame you,
Are base as false—thank Heaven they're few!
For as our chosen chief we claim you.

hey say—these dogs of currish heart,
Who never heard a bullet whistle—
ou'd let the Union drift apart
Like down-flakes from a shaking thistle;
hey say, oh captain—but the words
Stick in our throats—we can't adjust 'em—
ut lift to Heaven our dinted swords,
And answer only this: "We trust him!"
Yes, oh friend of rights and laws,
Despite the sneers of fool or craven,
Where hearts beat highest for the cause,
You have your home, your shrine and haven!

Vith patient toil and pitying breast
You sought your soldiers' blood to treasure,
for ever tried the cruel test,
How much we could endure to measure.
hey feared you, for they saw our love;
To win success they would not let you—
ut while the white stars shine above,
The boys you led will ne'er forget you!
Yes, oh captain! loved and true,
Desert you—we would perish rather;
Thank Heaven the hearts are not a few
That call you brother, friend, and father!

1ST DIVISION SECOND ARMY CORPS,
IN THE FIELD, September 5.

(Continued from second column, second page.)

It yokes the captive's neck,
And wipes the bloody stains.

Tear down the flaunting lie!—
Half-mast the starry flag!
Insult no sunny sky
With hate's polluted rag!
Destroy it ye who can!
Deep sink it in the waves!
It bears a fellow-man
To groan with fellow-slaves.

Furl the boasted lie!
Till freedom lives again,
To rule once more in truth,
Among untrammelled men.
Roll up the starry sheen,
Conceal its bloody stains;
For in its folds are seen
The stamp of rustling chains!

olitical and Military Policy of the "Democratic Party."

The policy of the Administration having been ently epitomized and promulgated anew by the ghest officer of the government, it has struck us at its character may be best illustrated by con-ast; just as an unskilful architect is best discred-ed by erecting a shapely edifice beside his mis-roportioned structure. After deciding to adopt is method, we were somewhat at a loss, from the ct that no statement of our own would carry that eight of authority which could entitle it to be nsidered as an exposition of Democratic doctrine orthy to be set in contrast with a manifesto from ie President of the United States. Our National onvention has not yet spoken; and of the emi-ent statesmen of the party some, like ex-Presi-ent PIERCE, Mr. GUTHRIE, and Mr. CUSHING, ave made no public utterances since the outbreak f the war; while others, like Governor SEYMOUR nd our ablest members of Congress, have gone ito these subjects with a copiousness of argument nd a force of just invective, which renders it diffi-ult to extract a compendious statement of Demo-ratic policy, without, on the one hand, a compres-ion which would do injustice to their eloquence, r, on the other, a profusion which would exceed ur limits. Besides, among the expounders of the Democratic faith there are some divergencies of

"To whom it may Concern."

It is impossible to overrate the importance of President LINCOLN'S letter to the Niagara commissioners. It is a public announcement by the Chief Magistrate of the nation that he has abandoned, finally, all pretence or appearance of waging a constitutional war for the restoration of the territorial integrity of the Union, and the supremacy of its fundamental laws; and an open declaration that hereafter it shall be waged for the destruction of slavery. His policy has long tended in this direction, but he has concealed its real purport by double-faced acts and specious language. He has looked one way and rowed another. Now he avows his purpose. Now he declares his long-concealed policy. He has been assiduously prostituting the war for the Union into a war for the abolition of slavery. Now he avows this prostitution, and glories in it.

MR. LINCOLN did not write his "To whom it may concern" letter without a purpose. He is a buffoon, but he is no fool. His purpose was a personal one. It was to recover the radical vote and support in time for the next November election. The radicals have distrusted him. The most honest and sincere anti-slavery men among them have long had no confidence in Mr. LINCOLN'S moral integrity, and therefore no confidence in his avowals of anti-slavery sentiments. They have there

(Continued from first column, third page.)

opinion not quite consistent with that harmony of impression which would best contribute to concerted action.

In view of these circumstances, it has seemed to us that a succinct and satisfactory statement of the Democratic policy could be more easily selected from the writings of General McClellan than from any other source not requiring abridgment to bring it within a moderate compass, or a balancing of different authorities to render it acceptable to the whole party. A noted French critic of the last century propounded a theory of beauty, which, whatever its merits, will serve us a good turn for illustration. This critic, who was Secretary to the Academy, held that beauty consisted in the mean or average of all things of the same kind. A beautiful human face, for example, was a face neither too long nor too short, neither too smooth in its outline nor too sharp, neither too fixed nor too mobile; a face, in short, which bore a nearer resemblance to all other human faces than they bear to each other, as if nature, in fashioning the others, had shot all around the mark, and in this alone had exactly hit it. This theory of beauty is like what we call common sense, the rarest and the most readily appreciated of all mental endowments. He who possesses it will always find his opinion agreeing more nearly with that of every man in the company, than the other opinions do with one another. So it has struck us that a collection of the purely political passages in General McClellan's orders, etc., would form an exposition of the Democratic policy which hits it so exactly in the middle as to show to the party the mark at which all other expounders have been aiming; some with nearly equal skill, some with less.

This eminent citizen and soldier having been selected by the Administration for the peculiar object of its hostility and venom, as signalized by more than two years of persistent persecution, the Democratic party naturally recognizes merit deemed by Mr. Lincoln so dangerous to his pretensions. Besides, the relations which General McClellan has, by his profession, held to the war, and his fidelity to Democratic principles, have placed him in a stand-point favorable for judging of the conjoint bearing of political and military considerations, neither of which can be omitted in a just estimate of public affairs when the country is engaged in a great war. Touching upon these subjects only in the way of statement, without argumentative expansion, the soldier-like directness of General McClellan's style secures the brevity we were in quest of when the idea of this selection occurred to us. We begin with the earliest of General McClellan's manifestoes, to show that neither complaisance towards the Administration in the beginning, nor a sense of its subsequent injustice has had the slightest influence on his opinions, which are the evident fruit of a clear head, a magnanimous spirit, and great rectitude of understanding. The following is from his Address to the people of Western Virginia when he crossed into their State, in the spring of 1861: —

The general government has heretofore carefully abstained from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them along its banks, although frequently urged by many of your prominent citizens to do so. *It determined to await the result of the State election, desirous that no one might be able to say that the slightest effort had been made from this side to influence the free expression of your opinions*, although the many agencies brought to bear upon you by the rebels were well known.

(Continued from second column, third page.)

fore deserted the Republican party, nominate candidate, and laid down a platform of their o They threatened to divide the Republican v and so insure the success of the Democratic can date. Mr. Lincoln hoped to recover their co dence and their support in the coming election an avowal which would satisfy the most exacti

Mr. Lincoln, therefore, seized the very first oc sion, a fitting one for his purpose, the first o tures of peace by men high in the confidence employ of the Confederate government, and clared that "the abandonment of slavery" m be the condition *sine qua non* of any peace propo tions from the political and military chiefs of rebellion. He repudiates every public declarati which he has hitherto made regarding the p poses of the war and the means of its conclusi openly and with an utter moral shamelessne He was pledged to other plans and other princip by every official oath, private avowal, and pub declaration which could be framed to constrain conscience or determine the acts of a man, a p tisan, or a magistrate. He has broken his oat and repudiated these avowals with never so mu as a regretful or explanatory or condoling allusio

The Republican Convention at Chicago, whi nominated Mr. Lincoln, passed this resolution:

Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rig of the States, and especially the right of each State order and control its own domestic institutions accor ing to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to th balance of power on which the perfection and endura of our political fabric depend, and we denounce the la less invasion by armed force of the soil of any State territory, no matter under what pretext, as among t gravest of crimes.

In his Niagara letter, Mr. Lincoln declares th the control over the domestic institutions of t States, confirmed to them in our Constitution an in the Confederate Constitution not less explicitl shall be assumed by "an authority that can contr the armies now at war against the United States, and transferred to him who now controls the a mies and navies of the United States, and tha otherwise he will not listen to overtures of peace.

In his inaugural, President Lincoln quoted fro one of his own speeches, and reiterated this decla ration: —

I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfer with the institution of slavery in the States where i exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, an I have no inclination to do so. I now reiterate thes sentiments, and in doing so I only press upon the pub lic attention the most conclusive evidence of which th case is susceptible that the property, peace, and securit of no section are to be in any wise endangered by th now incoming administration.

Mr. Lincoln now justifies the rebels in disbelieving these solemn asseverations, by proving that they were false. He now does what he then declared he had no lawful right to do, and, for the sake of reëlection, confesses the inclination which he then disavowed.

In his first message to Congress, at the extra session in the summer of 1861, Mr. Lincoln said:

Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the government toward the Southern States after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government rela-

(Continued from first column, fourth page.)

ve have now shown under the most adverse circum-
ances, that the great mass of the people of Western
irginia are true and loyal to that beneficent govern-
ent under which we and our forefathers have lived so
ng. As soon as the result of the election was known,
traitors commenced their work of destruction. The
eral government cannot close its ear to the demand
have made for assistance. *I have ordered troops to*
ss the river. They come as your friends and brothers:
enemies only to armed rebels who are preying upon
m. Your homes, your families, and your property are
e under our protection. *All your rights shall be re-*
iously respected, notwithstanding all that has been
d by the traitors to induce you to believe our advent
ong you will be signalized by an interference with
ir slaves. Understand one thing clearly: not only
l we abstain from all such interference, but we will,
the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at
surrection on their part.

It is proper to state that the italics in this and
following extracts are a liberty which we have
ken with the original. We desire, by this means,
fix attention on the idea, so often insisted upon
General McClellan, that the war should be so
nducted as to foster whatever of loyal sentiment
mained in the South, and to interpose no needless obstacles to the resumption of fraternal relations at its close. It stands to common sense that
e Union, even if it could be restored, would be
orthless on any other basis than kindly relations
d mutual good-will. We do not want subjugated and sullen provinces, lying in wait to rise in a
w revolt at the first outbreak of a foreign war.
hen General McClellan was invested with the
ief command, it became his duty to prepare instructions for the commanders of departments.
he political passages in these exhibit the steadiss of purpose with which he carried out his ideas.

To General Halleck:

In regard to the political conduct of affairs you will
ease labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Mis-
uri and the adjacent States, that *we are fighting solely*
r the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of
r national government, and to restore to the nation the
essings of peace and good order.

To General Buell:

And it is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all
e State of Kentucky; not only that, *but that the ma-*
rity of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our
use, it being that which best subserves their interests.
is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in
entucky is more important than that of our military
perations. I certainly cannot overestimate the im-
ortance of the former. You will please constantly bear
mind the precise issue for which we are fighting—
hat issue is the preservation of the Union and the res-
oration of the authority of the general government
ver all portions of our territory. *We shall most readily*
uppress this rebellion, and restore the authority of the
overnment by religiously respecting the constitutional
ights of all. I know that I express the feelings and
pinions of the President when I say that we are fight-
ng only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the
onstitutional authority of the general government.
The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that
heir domestic institutions will in no manner be inter-
fered with, and that they will receive at our hands every
constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that
ou will, in all respects, carefully regard the local in-
stitutions of the region in which you command, allow-
ng nothing but the dictates of military necessity to
ause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions.

To General Buell again:

In regard to political matters, bear in mind that we
are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union,
and to uphold the general government; as far as mil-
itary necessity will permit, religiously respect the con-
stitutional rights of all. Preserve the strictest disci-
pline among the troops, and while employing the utmost
energy in military movements, *be careful so to treat the*
unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the
breach existing between us and the rebels. I mean by
this, that it is the desire of the government to avoid

(Continued from second column, fourth page.)

tively to the rights of the States and the people, under the Constitution, than that expressed in the inaugural address. He desires to preserve the government that it may be administered for all, as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their government, and the government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that, in giving it, there is any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those terms.

Now, avowing that the abandonment of slavery shall precede the acceptance of overtures of peace, Mr. Lincoln's message can be interpreted only as the confession that he is doing what "loyal citizens" have a right to protest against his doing, and what he violates the Constitution and the laws of the United States in doing.

In August, 1862, Mr. Lincoln wrote to Mr. Greeley:—

My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do dot believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help the cause.

Mr. Lincoln's last letter to Mr. Greeley declares two objects of the war, without which it shall not cease, "the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery." He does not base the latter upon the former, as effect upon cause. Each is the coequal and coördinate of the other. His paramount object is not now to "save the Union, and either to save or destroy slavery." He avows openly that slavery must be destroyed as well as the Union saved. The salvation of the Union is not even professed to be the exclusive and paramount object.

In his preliminary "Proclamation of Freedom," issued September, 1862, Mr. Lincoln said:—

That hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

Mr. Lincoln now avows that hereafter the war shall be prosecuted for the object of practically compelling "the abandonment of slavery," even after the integrity of the Union may be restored, for even the Chicago platform declared that in a "constitutional relation," freedom was national and slavery sectional, and even Mr. Lincoln will not pretend that to compel "the abandonment of slavery" is to "restore the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the States and the people thereof."

On December 12, 1862, Mr. Lincoln wrote to the Hon. Fernando Wood:—

Understanding the phrase in the paragraph above quoted, "the Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress," to be substantially the same as that "the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would reinaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, under the Constitution of the United States,"—I say that in such case the war should cease on the part of the United States; and that, if within a reasonable time "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld.

At the very first overture of peace from any people of the Southern States, Mr. Lincoln is now so

(Continued from first column, fifth page.)

unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to believe that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or information to the enemy, it is, of course, necessary to arrest them; but I have always found it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it well to direct that no arrests shall be made except by your order, or that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the propriety of his course. *It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their property, their comfort, and their personal safety, will be best preserved by adhering to the cause of the Union.*

It is apparent in the persistent earnestness of these inculcations, that the ideas with which General McClellan had entered on his brilliant campaign in Western Virginia, were deeply rooted convictions. It is also apparent from intimations in these extracts, that he had (or thought that he had) the concurrence and approval of the President. When he had discovered that the constitutionalism with which Mr. Lincoln had professed to begin his administration was like the morning cloud or the early dew, he sent to him the urgent representations contained in the well-known letter from Harrison's Landing. We insert an extract:

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. *It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States nor forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected,* subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. *Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received.* Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. *Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for suppressing disorder, as in other cases.* Slaves contraband under the act of Congress seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

We will bring these extracts to a conclusion by inserting passages from recent popular addresses on occasions which permitted only incidental allusions to politics.

From the West Point oration: —

It [the Constitution] was accepted as giving us a form of government under which the nation might live happily and prosper, so long as the people should continue to be influenced by the same sentiments which actuated those who formed it; and which would not be liable to destruction from internal causes, so long as the people preserved the recollection of the miseries and calamities which led to its adoption. Under this beneficial Constitution the progress of the nation was unsurpassed in history. The rights and liberties of its citizens were secured at home and abroad; vast territories were rescued from the control of the savage and wild beasts, and added to the domain of the Union and civilization. The arts, the sciences, and commerce grew apace; our flag floated upon every sea, and we took our place among the great nations of the earth. But under this smooth surface of prosperity upon which we glided swiftly, with all the sails set before the common breeze, dangerous reefs were hidden, which now and then caused ripples upon the surface, and made

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far from being inclined to a full and general a nesty that he imposes a new and impossible co dition of peace. An impossible condition, we sa not merely because it is impossible for us with our armies to compel the abandonment of slave but because it is much worse than impossible those who "control the armies now at war" wi us to assume to themselves and then transfer Mr. Lincoln the control of a subject over whi neither of them has the least authority either the federal or rebel constitutions. Instead of th professed approval of an amnesty, he now spur the very first lispings of peace.

A little more than a year ago Mr. Linco seized the occasion of the meeting of the Repub can Convention at Springfield to declare himse still more emphatically than ever, as waging t war exclusively to save the Union. He had be charged with waging it for abolition purposes, a his reply was: —

You say you will not fight to free negroes. Some them seem willing to fight for you. But no matte fight you then exclusively to save the Union. I issue the proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving t Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resis ance to the Union, *if I shall urge you to continue figh ing, it will be an apt time then for you to declare yo will not fight to free negroes.*

President Lincoln has now justified the declara tion that the Northern people will not fight to fre negroes. He makes abolition the yoke-fellow o Union, and does urge the continuance of fightin for other purposes than the only one which i lawful or attainable. He thus falsifies ever pledge, disregards every declaration, and violate his official oath.

Collate this "To whom it may concern" lette with Mr. Lincoln's past declarations and avowals and it will be difficult to restrain within decorou language the sense of moral indignation whic arises in contemplating its unblushing and shame less perjury. Lighter terms do not fit. His firs official act was an oath, a solemn oath, calculated to bind the conscience of an honorable man and restrain the acts of a dishonorable one. Many times has Mr. Lincoln violated his oath. Let the political causists defend him. Now he violates his oath openly and publishes his shame. His own words in past time, denying to himself any such purpose as he is now accomplishing, are all that is necessary to convict him of perjury. Other commentary is needless. Political opponents can afford to be dumb. Out of his own mouth is the President condemned. He has again and again disclaimed that the object of the war was abolition; he has again and again characterized such a prostitution of the war for the Union as lawless and wicked; he has accepted the pledges of his party, whose platform disavowed any such purpose in its creed or hopes as abolition by the Federal Government; to his party, to the public, to Congress, he has reiterated these disavowals, to foreign nations, by the pen of his Secretary of State, he has declared the same thing, branded such a purpose as unconstitutional, and declared its impossibility of accomplishment, even if united in by Congress, the people, and the executive, for the reason that judicial authority would be interposed to prevent it.

Said Mr. Seward, in the well-known Dayton letter: —

It is hardly necessary to add to this incontestable statement [that the rights of the States and the condition of every human being in them would remain the

(Continued from first column, sixth page.)

ious the most careful of pilots. Elated by success, ship swept on, — the crew not heeding the warn- s they received, forgetful of the dangers escaped at beginning of the voyage, and blind to the hideous elstrom which gaped to receive them.

he same elements of discord, sectional prejudices, rests, and institutions which had rendered the nation of the Constitution so difficult, threatened e than once to destroy it. But for a long time the ion was so fortunate as to possess a series of politi- leaders, who to the highest abilities united the e spirit of conciliation which animated the founders this republic, and thus for many years the threat- d evils were averted. Time, and the long continu- e of good fortune, obliterated the recollection of the mities of years preceding the adoption of the Con- ution. *They forget that conciliation, common inter- t, and mutual charity, had been the foundation, and st be the support, of our government and all the rela- ns of life.* At length men appeared with abuse, sec- nal and personal prejudices, and interests outweigh- all considerations of the general good. Extremists one section furnished the occasion, eagerly seized as pretext by equally extreme men in the other, for ndoning the pacific remedies afforded by the Consti- ion. Stripped of all sophistry and side issues, the ect cause of the war, as it presented itself to the nest and patriotic citizens of the North, was simply s: —

Certain States, or rather a portion of the inhabitants certain States, feared, or professed to fear that in- ry would result to their rights and property from the vation of a particular party to power. Although the nstitution and the actual condition of the govern- nt provided them with a peaceable and sure protec- n against the apprehended evil, they prepared to ek security in the destruction of the government hich could protect them, and in the use of force ainst National troops holding a National fortress. efface the insult offered to our flag, to save ourselves om the fate of the divided Republics of Italy and outh America; to preserve our government from de- ruction; to enforce its just power and laws; to main- in our very existence as a nation, — these were the uses which impelled us to draw the sword. *Rebellion ainst a government like ours, which contains within self the means of self-adjustment and a pacific remedy r evils, should never be confounded with a revolution ainst despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs.* ich a rebellion cannot be justified upon ethical grounds, d the only alternative for our choice are its suppres- on or the destruction of our nationality.

From the Lake George speech : —

I am confident that you will never consent willingly be citizens of a divided and degraded nation; but at you will so support the action of your fellow-coun- ymen in the field, that we shall be victorious, *and gain have peace and a re-united country; when the earts of the North and the South shall again beat in nison, as they did in the good old times of the Revolu- ion;* when our Union and Constitution shall be as firm s the mountains which encircle this lovely lake, and he future of the Republic shall be as serene and pure s the waters of Horican when no breeze ripples its urface.

We find that we have only space to add that if here has been made, during this war, any exposi- ion of Democratic doctrine more consistent with tself, more statesmanlike in conception, or more ikely to command the universal assent of conser- ative men, than this which we have now laid be- ore our readers, it has not been our good fortune o meet it.

(Continued from second column, sixth page.)

same, the rebellion succeeding or failing] the further fact that the new President, as well as the citizens through whose suffrage he has come into the administration, has always repudiated all designs whatever and wherever imputed to him and them of disturbing the system of slavery as it is existing under the Constitution and the laws. The case, however, would not be fully presented if I were to omit to say that any such effort on his part would be unconstitutional, and all his actions in that direction would be prevented by the judicial authority, even though they were assented to by Congress and the people.

Could language be more explicit? Yet compare this with Mr. Lincoln's Niagara letter. He does thus interfere with slavery. He persists in keeping thirty millions of people at war rather than listen to an overture of peace in which the abandonment of slavery is not the key-note, and yet has thus publicly and officially avowed, over and over again, his repudiation of purposes now disclosed, and the lawless character of acts now boldly done.

The *coup d'état* does not show a more shocking political immorality. Other Presidents have been inconsistent, contradictory, and illogical. Mr. Lincoln is the first President who has dared to do that which, when charged upon him, he had before repudiated, branded as lawless, as a perjury, and as a crime. Louis Napoleon shed some blood to get power, violated some oaths, broke some pledges. But he broke not half so many as Abraham Lincoln has confessedly broken, and where the present Emperor shed rills of blood the present President will pour rivers, if thirty millions of people are to be kept waging the bloodiest and most gigantic of the world's civil wars until the South surrenders its property, its prejudices, and its local self-government.

The Baltimore Convention, which renominated Mr. Lincoln, resolved, —

That we approve the determination of the government of the United States not to compromise with rebels, or to offer any terms of peace except such as may be based upon an unconditional surrender of their hostility, and a return to their first allegiance to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that we call upon the government to maintain their position and to prosecute the war with the utmost possible vigor to the complete suppression of the rebellion, in full reliance upon the self-sacrificing patriotism, the heroic valor, and the undying devotion of the American people to their country and its free institutions.

Even the Convention "of office-holders and contractors," as they were dubbed by one of his own organs; even the men of corruption and of shoddy who renominated Mr. Lincoln, made but one condition to peace — "the unconditional surrender of hostility," which can only mean the restoration of the authority and integrity of the Union. To this single condition Mr. Lincoln subjoins "the abandonment of slavery." And the *Times*, his own organ, confesses that the people will not sustain him in demanding that ultimatum. Indeed, they will not. What right has the President to plant an insurmountable barrier in the paths of peace?

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and s government. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace a good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we a fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the f authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instru tions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of t government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructio to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, t breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Bue November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatio arrrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to Gener Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to m that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doin my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the co in time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial o ganization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should b strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to th President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilitie exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should b neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

d at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 2.

PEECH OF JUDGE GEO. F. COMSTOCK,

DELIVERED AT THE

BROOKLYN ACADEMY OF MUSIC.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: — I do not love the oors of political discussion. But the crisis of nation has been reached in which no man n be neutral. The differences between po- ical parties are so broad and so fundamental, at there is no middle ground on which hesita- on or doubt can linger. Believing that I ve no right to be silent, I propose now to dress you upon the situation of the country, d the duties of the hour.

And first, let me express my cordial sym- athy in the sentiment of enthusiastic approval hich has universally greeted the name of the outhful patriot, soldier, and statesman selected bear our standard in the great civil contest hich is to decide the fate of the republic. In eorge B. McClellan we find the noblest combi- ation of the qualities demanded by the alarm- ig crisis in which the country is placed. As soldier, I consider him immeasurably first mong those who have led our armies in this nhappy and deplorable civil war. I would ot tarnish a single one of the laurels earned y other commanders in the field. But the blest of them must yield to him in genius for upreme command in military combinations, in he comprehensive survey of great campaigns, nd, above all, in the qualities which endear him to armies, and inspire in them courage, en- ergy, and hope.

If, therefore, a wise conciliation and prudent statesmanship shall fail to accomplish the object supremely desired by every patriotic heart, to whom can we most safely entrust the power of the nation? If after more than three years of desolating and fruitless war; if, after peaceful effort shall be exhausted, it shall be necessary once more for the Government to exert its military power, once more to clothe itself in the thunders and panoply of war, to whom can the nation more wisely entrust the command of its fleets and armies than to the humane and Christian hero who twice saved its capital from destruction, and whose conquering march to the capital of the enemy was only arrested by the political hate and fanatical passions which preferred humiliation and defeat to victory under his banner?

But, fellow-citizens, military glories have in them little which can dazzle my vision. I admit that in great national exigencies wars may be justified, after all the instrumentalities of peace have been tried; but I abhor them in the depths of my soul. And I am thankful to the Great Giver of all mercies that in this terrible struggle, which has caused a shudder throughout the civilized world, there is no stain of blood upon my hands. I am grateful to Him that I can look back at the origin, the commencement, and the progress of this war — which I think is the most shocking in the history of nations — without a sense of personal guilt for the unspeakable desolation it has caused. I would not for an empire, nay, I would not for whatever of felicity and power this world contains, be a sharer in that incredible folly, fanaticism, and wickedness which excited and provoked this fearful contest, and which have prolonged the bloody and desolating struggle by arousing a resistance sustained by the energies of despair, and by every motive which can animate the hearts and nerve the arms of men.

I therefore infinitely prefer to present our candidate for the suffrage of the American people, not as a military hero, but as a statesman who grasps the political not less than the military situation; as a civilian accomplished in knowledge, as a patriot who not only understands but loves the institutions of his country;

as a Christian gentleman of pure and spotless character, upon whose record there is no stain or reproach. So far as the thoughts and wishes of any human being can be known to others, we know it to be his passionate desire to see the laws of this country peacefully obeyed throughout its whole extent, and all the States once more bound together in fraternal Union, based upon the proper sovereignty and equal rights of each one of them. This great purpose of his soul breathes in the varied productions of his pen, with which you are familiar. It shines conspicuously in the fervid burning patriotism of his letter from Harrison's Landing, written in the midst of perils which threatened his destruction. And need I refer to that noble letter of acceptance, that chaste and beautiful exposition of his principles, which has been received by the acclamations of a people, which, like the blast of a trumpet, has awakened the echoes of the hills, the mountains, and the valleys of our country? We proudly present him to you, fellow-citizens, not merely as the able soldier and consummate military commander, but as a patriot of unalterable devotion to the Union which you love. We present him, above all, as the statesman endowed with the exact comprehension of the nature of our government and the political situation of the country, without which the terrible agencies of war are powerless to save the union of the States, or preserve society from the fathomless gulf of anarchy to which it is rapidly tending.

Fellow-citizens: I have no blind devotion to any political party; but wherever free institutions exist, party names and organizations are a necessity of human nature and human society. A nation is now to be saved or lost, and the peace of thirty millions of people is to be restored or forever destroyed by the influence and action of one party or another upon the theories and practices of government in this country. In a crisis of such fearful import, while truth and candor should be observed, the utmost freedom and latitude of discussion are both a duty and a right.

I speak first of the Democratic party. It has proclaimed as the first and fundamental article in its creed the Federal Union of all the States. The great national council at Chicago, speaking in its name, and by its authority, has declared that in all circumstances, and under all conditions in the future, as in the past, we adhere "*with unswerving fidelity*" to the national Union. Such a declaration, coming from the assembled Democracy of the nation, and approved by all the enlightened conservatism of the country, has no doubtful meaning. It means the Union of the States under the limitations of a written constitution or compact, into which the States enter as coequal sovereignties, and with equal dignity and rights. It does not mean the impossible unity and consolidation of the people of this continent, under a single empire or republic, but a constitutional alliance of states or republics, presenting them as one nation to the other powers of the earth, while reserving to each the supreme co over its local affairs and domestic institut Such is the Union established by our fo thers. Such is the Union to which "unsw ing fidelity" is pledged by the Democratic ty, and to which our candidate will devot the future, as in the past, all the faculties o nature and all the energies of his soul.

But I rejoice with unspeakable joy in pledge, now given to the nation by the sec article of our Platform, that first of all, blessed influences of peace and conciliat are to be invoked to reunite the sundered alienated fragments of our once glorious Un For more than three years this terrible fruitless contest of arms has carried mourn and grief, desolation and ruin, over the la The awful waste of human life; the fearful mands upon the country made by the jest and fiddling Nero at Washington for new tims of battle and disease; the smoke of bu ing cities and towns blackening the sky; shrieks of the wounded and dying daily ascen ing from fields of slaughter to the God of pea all these appeal with resistless eloquence a power for a cessation of arms, and for one gr and noble effort to accomplish a peaceful justment of this horrid controversy. To su an effort we are pledged, and it is the nobl pledge which a political convention ever ga to a people. It is the first ray of light which h penetrated the surrounding gloom. I can s in it the rainbow of promisestretched acro the storm, giving to us hopes of future securi and repose.

And why, let me ask, in the name of th peaceful and holy religion which we profess, the name of the Divine Instructor who said his followers, "Blessed are the peace-makers why should we not arrest the devouring flam of war? why should we continue to swell th tide of human slaughter without one effort fo a peaceful arrangement of the strife? Tha we cannot fight always, and that negotiatio in some form must at last terminate the strug gle, is a truth so obvious that no one will call in question. And if this be true, then, in th name of our common humanity, let us negoti ate now, if honorable negotiation is possible Let us now invoke the white-robed angel of peace to descend between the contending hosts and arrest the conflict, and let the still, small voice of reason and conscience be heard, in stead of the roar of arms, the thunder of cannon, and the murderous rattle of musketry.

Fellow-citizens: I propose on this, and on other occasions, before the assemblies of the people, to stand as one of the accusers of the opposing political party, and of the man who, as its candidate for the highest office in the nation, represents its principles and purposes. I impeach them for high crimes and misdemeanors against the Constitution, and against the peace and order of society — crimes and misdemeanors which ought forever to forfeit the confidence of a free, a humane, and a Christian people.

carcely more than eight years ago the
ublican party arose in one section of the
on, and cast its ominous shadow over the
le republic. After little more than four
rs of reckless agitation, of reckless ap-
l to all that is bigoted and fanatical in
an nature, it attained to power by the
es of little more than one third of the peo-
of all the States, and Abraham Lincoln
ame the President of the United States.
at was the saddest day in all our history.
ss than four years' actual possession of
wer have sufficed to accomplish the ruin of
country. If the providence of God had
t upon this nation the calamities of pesti-
ce and famine; if the destroying angel had
ead his wings over it, the desolation could
have been more complete. Among the net
ults of this brief but disastrous domination
a new-born party are nearly a million of
es, sacrificed to the Moloch of abolition phi-
nthropy, not less than three thousand mill-
ns of federal, state, and municipal debt;
d taxation present and prospective, such as
people ever suffered, and which must be
dured from age to age, unless the nation
nks into bankruptcy and repudiation. To
ese may be added the destruction of prop-
ty beyond all the powers and means of cal-
lation, cities and towns consigned to the
mes, vast tracts of the country once inhab-
ed by a prosperous and happy people, deso-
ted and destroyed, and above all the fires of
nplacable hate planted in the bosoms of mill-
ns of American citizens.

With this fearful record, this record of hu-
iliation and calamity, a record which time
annot blot out, which ages of repentance can-
ot wash away, the same political organization,
ow, demands a new lease of power. Its lead-
rs and guides exhibit no change of heart or
urpose. Instead of repenting in dust and
shes for the mischief and desolation they
ave brought upon the country, instead of call-
ng upon the rocks and the mountains to cover
them from the wrath of the people they have be-
rayed, instead of penitential gratitude to heav-
en that they have not been consumed by its
lightnings and blasted by its thunder-bolts, the
leaders of this party, I say, with an incredible
assurance, demand four years longer to revel in
the desolation they have made. And even
Abraham Lincoln, chosen as a constitutional
magistrate, clothed with the highest of all hu-
man trusts, that of protecting and defending
the Constitution, with his solemn oath of office
trampled in the dust, with the Constitution
bleeding under his feet — Abraham Lincoln,
the very architect of ruin, now reaches forth
his hands for the imperial purple. I say the
imperial purple, because I know if many years
of devoted study of the Constitution and laws
of my country have taught me anything, that,
under a baseless and groundless pretence of mil-
itary necessity, he has administered the gov-
ernment of this country upon the theories and
doctrines of a pure and simple despotism, un-
restrained by a single principle of constitutional
liberty and law. And if this people shall now
acquiesce in his vast and stupendous assump-
tion of power; if, in the madness of the hour,
if, struck with worse than judicial blindness,
they shall once more intrust power to his
hands, it will be a deliberate abandonment of
the Constitution, it will be national suicide,
and the throne of Abraham will be more des-
potic than those of the princes or potentates
of the old world.

I arraign the Republican party and its chief
because they did not, and would not, when
they could, save the country from the revolu-
tion which has overwhelmed it. I impeach
them because, in the phrensy of partisan pas-
sion and fanatical hate, *to save a platform*, they
rushed upon the ruin of a nation. I here and
now assert, what is capable of the most exact
and demonstrative proof, that, even before Mr.
Lincoln and his associates were installed in
the actual possession of power before the in-
augural ceremony, the salvation of the country
was in their hands, and it might have been
saved by a moderate and just concession which
did not involve the liberty, the welfare, the
honor, or the happiness of a single human
being. Who does not remember the breath-
less suspense in which the nation stood be-
tween the election and the inauguration of the
new President? Who does not remember that
while the distant storm was gathering and the
thunders were muttering, when the very earth
was trembling with the first throes of revolu-
tion, the compromise of the patriot Crittenden
came with healing on its wings? And let the
truth be now proclaimed to the everlasting
condemnation of those who rejected this heal-
ing measure, that it yielded nothing to South-
ern feeling and rights except a rock-bound ter-
ritory which contained less than fifty slaves.
Nor was this a concession, because it was less
than a constitutional right solemnly affirmed
by the supreme judicial tribunal of the nation.
The evidence is overwhelming, nor is it even
disputed, that if this measure had been adopt-
ed rebellion would not have reared its crest,
the Union would have been preserved, and the
nation saved. In vain were Lincoln and Sew-
ard and Chase and Sumner appealed to by an
anxious people to approve a compromise which
Jefferson Davis and Toombs and Hunter and
Mason were willing to accept. Not a single
Republican vote could it obtain in the Senate
of the United States. History affords no ex-
ample of such reckless disregard of the public
welfare, of such total abnegation of statesman-
ship, as the Republican leaders exhibited in
that great crisis pregnant with the fate of the
nation. Nor has the world ever seen such a
sublime assurance as that which again de-
mands a continuation of power in the blood-
stained hands of men who deliberately chose
the ruin of their country in preference to the
surrender of a senseless and mischievous parti-
san dogma.

I arraign the Republican party, and I

arraign Abraham Lincoln, because, when entrusted by a patriotic people with the control of great armies and boundless resources, they have wielded them, and are now wielding them in violation of solemn pledges made to the whole nation, in violation of the most sacred constitutional obligations, and for the destruction, instead of the salvation, of the Union. I know the full meaning and gravity of this impeachment. But the whole history of the Administration will prove its literal and exact truth.

Let us recall the pledges under which this Administration commenced its inglorious career. On the solemn occasion of the inaugural ceremony, Mr. Lincoln, not wholly insensible to the public danger, and anxious to bring to his support all parties in the North, made the emphatic declaration that he had neither "the intention nor the lawful right" to interfere with the laws and institutions of the States, and that the maintenance of the "right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, was essential to the perfection and endurance of our political fabric." At the period when this declaration was made, seven of the States had passed ordinances of secession. If, by their attempt to withdraw from the Union, State sovereignty and rights were forfeited and lost, the President of the United States had not yet made the discovery. The doctrine thus enunciated by him, founded as it is in the fundamental limitations of the Constitution, was universally acquiesced in and approved by his political opponents.

And we find a pledge not less imposing, given by the legislative branch of the government, which was also under the complete control of the Republican party. In the month of July, 1861, the withdrawal of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas had completed the circle of secession, and we stood in the midst of the realities of war. The disastrous defeat of Bull Run had somewhat humbled the Republican chiefs, and they desired to rally the whole people to the support of the Administration in the contest with the rebellion which they had provoked. Congress, therefore, passed with extraordinary unanimity a resolution which the President approved, declaring in precise and exact terms that the war was prosecuted "with no purpose of disturbing the domestic institutions of the States, but to maintain the Constitution and preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the States unimpaired, and that as soon as these objects should be accomplished the war ought to cease."

Such were the pledges given to the nation by Mr. Lincoln and his party. They were accepted by a united North, and they saved to the Union the powerful States of Kentucky and Missouri, which otherwise were lost. They were received with especial satisfaction by the great army of loyal and conservative men, who had profoundly distrusted the purpose of the Republican party. Throughout the length and breath of the land Democrats rallied to the support of a government administered by men not of their choice. If those pledges were given to deceive the country with a great and desolating war, to be prosecuted for the purpose of subjugating States to the imperial will of the President and his party, and overthrowing their institutions and laws, no language can describe the utter infamy of that deception. If, on the other hand, they were honestly given, then, in the name of our violated Constitution, in the name of Christian civilization and of humanity, I ask why should they not be honestly kept?

The world has never witnessed such an astounding breach of faith as that exhibited in the violation by Mr. Lincoln and his party of those solemn and imposing pledges. Relying upon them, a loyal and patriotic people contributed mighty fleets and armies, poured out their treasure and shed their blood like water. How have they been kept? Solemnly committed to the preservation of the Union under the Constitution, and to the restoration of the States with all their dignity and rights, one of the first lawless acts of the President and Congress was the dismemberment of the great State of Virginia, and the creation of a new State out of her territory. Tell me, you Republican doctors of law, if you have ever read the Constitution, where is your authority for this stupendous usurpation and wrong? Do you not know, and did you not know when the wrong was committed, that by an explicit provision of the Constitution no State shall be divided, nor any new State erected out of its territory without its consent? I wish to speak with all the moderation that becomes me, but I shall be false to my convictions, I do not charge this usurpation as a wicked and deliberate violation of a fundamental provision of the Constitution. And how, let me ask, is Virginia, the mother of States, to be restored to the Union with her original dignity and rights, while her territory is dismembered and her unity destroyed? Suppose, to-day, you ask her rebellious people to lay down their arms and bring back the State to the embraces of the Union, under the Constitution. They must answer, you have dismembered our State in violation of the Constitution, and thrown up an insuperable barrier to the Union you profess to desire. Such is the Republican mode of maintaining the Constitution and restoring the States to their places in the Union.

Passing now to other usurpations, if possible still more revolutionary and alarming. I suppose the humblest mind can comprehend the constitutional *status* and legal consequences of rebellion. Rebellion is simply treason against the government of the Union. Treason is an offence defined by the Constitution, and like all other offences against the government, can be punished only by indictment and trial in the civil courts, and before a jury of the State or district in which the crime is committed. Such

ne letter of the Constitution. Treason can- be the offence of a State or political society. n cannot indict a State. You cannot im- son, banish, or hang it, or subject it to any ceivable punishment or forfeiture. I appeal he bar of this country, I appeal to Republi- lawyers and jurists, to say if I am not it.

Take, for illustration, even the consolidat- government of a single State. If a large nber, a majority, or even all, of the inhab- its of a county should rebel against the te government, each individual would be lty of treason, and subject to trial by jury his crime, nor could be punished in any er manner. The traitors may be dispersed, unded, or slain in battle, if they offer armed l organized resistance. But this is not the stitutional idea of punishment. No one can to see that the county itself remains an in- ral portion of the State, and cannot be pun- ed, forfeited, or lost; certainly not if fixed l established as a political division by the ate constitution or organic law.

The illustration is feeble, because the States e not an emanation from the federal govern- nt. On the contrary, the States created, d, in their union, now compose that govern- nt. The only doctrine, however, which can opposed to the right of secession, is that the ates are unchangeably fixed in the Union by e constitutional compact, as the planets are ed in their orbits around the sun by an irre- rsible law of nature, and can no more depart m the Union than a planet can fly into the undless regions of space. If this is not true, en by secession the States are effectually, to l intents whatever, out of the Union, and one of their citizens can be guilty of treason. hen Jefferson Davis is not a traitor to the overnment of the United States. Then the onstitution is simply a treaty which may be nulled at pleasure. Tell me again, Republi- an judges and lawyers, if this is not so?

Now the States, in a constitutional sense, eing perpetually members of the Union, and he national government having jurisdiction nd sovereignty over all their inhabitants for he special purposes limited and defined in the Constitution, the results are inevitable. First, he contest of this government is not with it- elf, is not with its own component parts, is not vith the States, or their reserved political sov- reignty and rights, but is with the treasonable ersons who, in great numbers, resist the lim- ted and defined sovereignty of the federal overnment, and oppose the execution of its aws. Second, when that opposition ceases the work is done, the mission of government is ac- omplished, unless the judicial power proceeds, by indictment and trial according to constitu- ional forms, to arraign and punish the offend- ng individuals who have been engaged in the nsurrection. I say the work is done. The Union does not need, nor can it possibly have, any other salvation. The States do not need, nor can they possibly have, any other restora- tion. The Union remains, and the States re- main. The noble structure of our government is always constitutionally perfect and complete. It is complete not only in theory, but in prac- tice also, over all the confederacy, the very in- stant that resistance ceases to its just and con- stitutional laws. Every other doctrine beside this imputes imperfection to our government, and inevitably terminates either in revolution or in the lawful and peaceful secession of States.

If these principles are true, — and I appeal to you again, Republican lawyers, to tell me if they are not, they pronounce the utter and ev- erlasting condemnation of Mr. Lincoln and his advisers, and of the party which owns him as its chief and its candidate. I arraign them all because in direct and palpable violation of those principles which underlie the entire fab- ric of liberty and law in this country, they have enacted bills of attainder, confiscation of property, and punishment without the process or trial which the Constitution requires. The entire population of the Southern States are already sentenced without trial by sweeping statutes of Congress, inflicting universal con- fiscation and deprivation of the right of citi- zenship. I cannot pause to enumerate them all. One of them, not more atrocious than others, disqualifies the entire male population of the South forever from holding office under the government unless by test oath unknown to the Constitution, and in direct violation of it, they can show that they have never had any connection with the existing rebellion. Now who does not know that this is an utter disfranchisement of the people of eleven States of this Union? And who is so ignorant as not to understand that this is one of the forms of punishment for crime which can only be in- flicted by the tribunals of justice and the ver- dict of a jury? Who does not know that the united power of the President and Congress can not lawfully touch, in this manner, the rights of a single citizen of this country! How vast, how astonishing, then, is the usurpa ion which sweeps to destruction the property and rights of millions of citizens by presidential and legislative edicts having no foundation in constitutional law, but yet to be enforced by the soldiers and bayonets entrusted by a con- fiding people to the chief magistrate of this nation!

And this is Republican doctrine for restor- ing the Union! Did madness and folly ever reach such astonishing heights? Is a Union of the States possible or conceivable unless you have in them a population clothed with the common rights of citizenship? Can Vir- ginia or Georgia be a member of the Union if inhabited by an alien population, without rights as citizens of the United States? Re- publicans! I ask you to pause and reflect. Can you, by such a policy, restore the States or their people to their allegiance? Let me tell you that battles and sieges and blockades may be persuasive arguments to bring back

an insurgent people to the mild and just authority of the Constitution and the laws; but battles and sieges and blockades will never bring them to you in the dust of humiliation; will never subject to your authority, as abject servants or slaves, a brave and powerful people.

I know that among the horrid delusions propagated by Republican orators and papers, is the astounding fallacy that the people of the South having withdrawn from the Union, are not entitled to the protection of the Constitution. But if we are Union men, we necessarily affirm that they cannot withdraw from the Union nor emancipate themselves from the unchangeable law of the Constitution. Whoever says more or less than this rejects the Union and rejects the Constitution. If we accept the secession postulate that the Union is dissolved and the Constitution abrogated, then we have no cause of war, no motive for its continuance. Then our armies ought to be instantly withdrawn and the tide of human slaughter arrested. If not for the sake of our Constitution, and our whole Constitution, why are we engaged in this desolating strife? Why do we wrap a continent in the devastating flames of war? Why do we enact scenes at which humanity and civilization are compelled to shudder? Republicans! do you not say that rebels ought everywhere to submit themselves to the Constitution? But do you mean less than the *whole Constitution*, with all its authority and all its protection? Will you divide it in two portions, and maintain the one while you destroy the other? Will you demand the submission required, and yet withdraw the protection afforded by the same great instrument? Do you say that rebellion shall yield to the supreme law, and deny to the rebel the citizenship and the rights to which the same law entitles him? I pray you look your doctrine in the face, and let us away with such monstrous. such destructive fallacies.

These vast assumptions of power take their origin in a fanaticism, folly, and hatred to me incomprehensible, or else they flow from deliberate and wicked desire and intention to drive away forever a disfranchised people from the embraces of the Union and the Constitution. But the usurpation by Mr. Lincoln and his administration, of unlimited authority over States, their institutions, constitutions, and laws, are yet more fatal and revolutionary. To these I briefly invite your attention.

I have shown that if the Union is a perpetual government, if secession is not a constitutional right, the States are unalterably fixed as members of the Union, and the mission of our national government is not to subjugate itself, or the States of which it is composed, by simply and solely to quell resistance and execute everywhere its constitutional laws. Now, if there is one principle more than any other which lies at the very foundation of our Union, which is the very corner stone of our noble political structure, which determ the rights of the citizen, and even the cha ter of civilization and society in this cour it is the constitutional partition of power tween the Federal and the State gov ments. It is known to and admitted b persons having the most moderate degre political knowledge, that the States, bein the possession of separate sovereignty rights before the formation of our federal ernment, entered by compact into a nati Union, and transferred to that Union cer specified powers for national purposes, reserved all other sovereignty and right themselves. That compact was the Const tion of the United States, separately agr to by each of the States, and if to-day Constitution is not the national governm then we have no such government, for other national government has ever b established in this country.

These principles, too trite and familiar to disputed, — these principles being admitt it is nothing else than revolution and anar to attempt to overthrow the partition of s ereignty, or obliterate the line which divi the functions and powers of the States fr the functions and powers of the federal g ernment. If the people of the States atte to resume the powers granted to the Union is revolution. If the Union oversteps the l and invades the rights and powers of States, it is also revolution; and I say to y fellow-citizens, this is the very revoluti which is now shaking the pillars of gove ment and society in this country.

If secession is not a constitutional right, th we arraign Jefferson Davis and his Confed ate States for a revolutionary attempt to ov throw the powers granted by those Stat to the government of the Union. If t Union is perfect and all the States which co pose it are equal, as necessarily they are dignity and rights, we arraign Abraham Li coln for the kindred treason of overleapi the sacred line traced by the Constitution i self, which divides the powers of governme and sovereignty, and invading the domain State sovereignty and rights, with the rev lutionary purpose of reorganizing society an overthrowing the constitutions and laws eleven States of this Union. Jefferson Dav is the revolutionist of the South, but Jefferso Davis is not within the reach of my voice o my vote. Abraham Lincoln is the revolution ist and anarchist of the North, and he de mands your suffrages and mine. Both of then must be removed from power before the Unio can be restored and the blessings of peac once more descend upon this unhappy country

In proof of the revolutionary design of Mr Lincoln, I refer to the most authentic and im posing records of his administration. The first great act which signalized his betrayal o the Constitution and of the principles and pledges under which the country had united in his support, was the Proclamation of Eman-

tion, in which, by a single stroke of his suddenly enfranchised four millions of less human beings and overthrew the con- itions and laws of the States under which were held in servitude; and this imperial t was attended by a pledge of the army navy under his command to maintain it ver. It is not material what name we to this proceeding. It may be called a tery order, a political decree, or an impe- release. Its name does not alter its char- r. Nor will its character be changed by of the pretences for its justification. In and all aspects its exact letter and mean- were, and its undoubted effect is, provid- it be a constitutional exercise of power, emancipate every slave in the States to ch it applied, and to abrogate forever laws of those States. But you say it was unconstitutional act, and therefore void of no effect. And precisely this is what ffirm, and this is the very ground of my eachment. It was a vast revolutionary for which the President had no shadow authority in the Constitution. It was a which the revolutionists and radicals who him in their keeping will never permit to revoke, and which in his latest message Congress he has declared he never will re- e. For the enforcement of that decree usurper is now wielding half a million of ronets under the false pretence of a war the Union of the States. It is a war inst the Union of the States, because there o lawful Union except under the Consti- ion, and based on the equal dignity and hts of each one of them.

That I do not misinterpret the design of Mr. ncoln or the meaning of this extraordinary ree, is proved with absolute demonstration his so-called "amnesty," or plan of recon- ucting the seceding States, and restoring m to the Union. Now this "plan" is not a re theory without practical consequence or ult. Under it, two spurious States have ung into being, whose votes are expected to given to the author of their existence. her spurious States are to arise in the track our armies, and take the place on the now isting States of the Union.

This grotesque and crude conception of Mr. ncoln is, therefore, a terrible reality, and not rely a hideous conceit of his brain. He heres to it with such tenacity, that he refused sanction a plan of Congress, equally unconsti- tional, but less absurd than his own. It is a an which proceeds on the monstrous doctrine at the States are in some sense out of the nion, that thei constitutions and laws are for- ited, their State sovereignty gone, and that , the imperial sovereign at Washington, may rce upon them new constitutions and laws. assumes that all the citizens of the rebellious tates are already, without trial or conviction, the situation of convicts and outlaws, to hom a pardon is necessary in order to be stored to the rights of citizenship. This par- don the considerate and merciful dictator extends to so many of them as will take an oath to support his proclamation of emancipa- tion, and all proclamations which he may issue. All other persons are outlawed, although they may be willing to lay down their arms, and return to the true allegiance which they owe to the Union. So soon as one-tenth part of the voting population have taken the oath, a new State may be organized, with a free constitu- tion, to be received by the President into the Union. The existing constitutions of the States are necessarily abrogated, and nine- tenths of the people who will not obey the im- perial behest, and take the degrading oath, are not left in the enjoyment of a single right of citizenship, not even the sacred right of suf- frage.

Time does not permit to me a further discus- sion of the mighty issues now to be determined. We have a noble mission before us — the res- toration of peace, and the salvation of the country. There is revolution, there is war, in- terminable, cruel, and exhausting war, in the policy against which we protest. There are bright pledges of peace and a Union saved and restored in the candidates we present and the principles we profess. Let good men, then, rally to our standard.

We know the enlightened sentiment of the people is with us, and we believe its unrestrain- ed expression will result in the triumph of our cause. But we must be equal to all the duties that may be cast upon us. We know also that the usurper has his armed heel upon the freeman's right of suffrage. Let him be warned in time. If our candidate is fairly chosen, and yet the nation shall be defrauded of its will by the presence and exercise of military power, in whatever place, then, so surely as the throne of justice is established in the heavens, the people will take George B. McClellan in their arms, and will bear him over and through all opposi- tion to the Capitol in Washington, and there inaugurate him as the constitutional President of this republic.

If any one shall say that I have overstated this extraordinary, this revolutionary scheme, I say to him, go to the record and there you will find it. You will find it in the resulting bogus States of Louisiana and Arkansas. You will find it on the blood-stained fields of Flor- ida, where an army was sacrificed to put it in force. So far as we can know, the President adheres to it with a fixed tenacity of purpose, and he has told us that he does not propose to abandon it. Four years more he now asks to carry forward this revolution of States upon which he has entered. For this his mandate issues for five hundred thousand more men. For this the nation is tottering on the verge of bankruptcy and ruin.

And when are we to have peace and re- pose? The country was struck with needless astonishment at Mr. Lincoln's recent mani- festo, "To all whom it may concern," declar- ing not merely the Union, but also "the aban-

donment of slavery," as one of the conditions of peace. What else could he say without revoking his proclamation, which he has told us he never will revoke? What else could he say, without recalling his "amnesty" and annulling the baseless political organizations which he has already called into existence, and which he tells us he cannot abandon?

What less could he say without rejecting the platform of the political convention which has nominated him for re-election, and which he says he "*cordially accepts*," a platform which explicitly declares the abolition of slavery as one of the objects of this desolating and exterminating war?

And now over and against this manifesto of Lincoln, ominous of eternal war, let me place the noble words of McClellan, which may well be written on the sky, "THE UNION IS THE ONE CONDITION OF PEACE; WE ASK NO MORE." And, fellow-citizens, we have no right to ask more. If the States are in the Union under the Constitution, or if we demand their return to the Union under the Constitution, then the great instrument we seek to uphold forbids us to ask more. If they are out of the Union, according to the wild and fantastic theories of some of the most eminent Republican leaders, then the rebellious States are to us a foreign nation, and by the public law of the world, as well as eternal rules of justice, their independ ought to be respected; and whether insi outside of the Constitution, we have no r right to invade their soil, to change their toms and laws than we have to invade Bu to abolish slavery, or the empire of Turke abolish polygamy.

It is time to awaken the slumbering science of the nation to the moral aspects duties of the crisis. Are there no moral t which ought to determine the conduct c Christian people? Have the eternal sta ards of right and wrong perished in the of arms and the whirlwind of revoluti Tell me you ministers of a peaceful relig — tell me, you disciples of Him whose mis on earth was peace and good-will to m where is your commission to make war, cept for the Constitution and laws as t are? Where is your authority to inv other communities and States with desolat and fire in the track of your armies, not to force the laws, but to make new laws for the Such a war, let me say to you, never ought succeed, and it never can succeed, while a gle arm can be raised to defend firesides homes, or repel an invasion which has no sa tion, human or divine.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding t laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national go ernment, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that sue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general go ernment over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, Nov.* 7, 186

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existir between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mer suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, Jan uary* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I hav willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my countr — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with th Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Le ter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization o States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to Pres ident Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

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Campaign Document, No. 3.

COMPLETE REPORT

ON THE

ORGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS

OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

BY MAJOR-GENERAL

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

FIRST PERIOD.

NEW YORK, August 4th, 1863.

BRIG.-GENERAL L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General U. S. Army.*

SIR:—I have the honor to submit herein e Official Report of the operations of the my of the Potomac, while under my charge. companying it are the reports of the corps, ision and subordinate commanders, pertain- to the various engagements, battles, and currences of the campaigns, and important cuments connected with its organization, sup- and movements. These, with list of maps l memoranda submitted, will be found ap- nded, duly arranged and marked for conve- nt reference.

Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the op- tions in the department of the Ohio, which luded the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, l latterly, Western Virginia, it had become duty to counteract the hostile designs of enemy in Western Virginia, which were mediately directed to the destruction of the ltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the possess- n of the Kanawha Valley, with the ultimate ject of gaining Wheeling, and the control of e Ohio River. The successful affairs of Phil- pi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford, etc., had en fought, and I had acquired possession of Western Virginia, north of the Kanawha Val- y, as well as of the lower portion of that val- y.

I had determined to proceed to the relief of e upper Kanawha Valley, as soon as provis- n was made for the permanent defense of the ountain passes leading from the east into the gion under our control, when I received at verly, in Randolph County, on the 21st July, 61, intelligence of the unfortunate result of e battle of Manassas, fought on that day.

On the 22d, I received an order by telegraph, recting me to turn over my command to Brig.- neral Rosecrans, and repair at once to Wash- ton.

I had already caused reconnoissances to be made for intrenchments at the Cheat Mountain Pass; also on the Huntersville road, near Elk- water, and at Red House, near the main road from Romney to Grafton. During the afternoon and the night of the 22d, I gave the final in- structions for the construction of these works, turned over the command to Brig.-Gen. Rose- crans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the 26th. On the 27th, I assumed command of the Division of the Potomac, comprising the troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the river.

With this brief statement of the events which immediately preceded my being called to the command of the troops at Washington, I pro- ceed to an account from such authentic data as are at hand, of my military operations while commander of the Army of the Potomac.

The subjects to be considered, naturally ar- range themselves as follows: The organization of the Army of the Potomac; the military events connected with the defenses of Washington, from July, 1861, to March, 1862; the campaign on the Peninsula, and that in Maryland.

The great resources and capacity for power- ful resistance, of the South, at the breaking out of the rebellion, and the full proportions of the great conflict about to take place, were sought to be carefully measured; and I had also en- deavored, by every means in my power, to im- press upon the authorities the necessity for such immediate and full preparation as alone would enable the government to prosecute the war on a scale commensurate with the re- sistence to be offered.

On the 4th of August, 1861, I addressed to the President, the following memorandum, pre- pared at his request:

MEMORANDUM.—The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are usually engaged, mainly in this: That the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a

treaty on advantageous terms. In this contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistence. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expense of a great effort; now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began with a class; now it is with a people, our military success can alone restore the former issue.

By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private property, and unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. But, in the first instance, the authority of the government must be supported by overwhelming physical force.

Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible.

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resistence there offered us, by movements on other points, both by land and water.

Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri.

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement through that State into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the east.

The possession of those roads by us, in connection with the movement on the Mississippi would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the meantime all the passes into Western Virginia, from the east, should be securely guarded; but I would advise no movement from that quarter toward Richmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders it impossible, or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastern Tennessee, through that State. Every effort should however, be made to organize, equip and arm as mamy troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and re-open the Baltimore and O[hio] Railroad.

Baltimore and Fort Munroe should he oc[cu]pied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession. The importance of Harp[er's] Ferry and the line of the Potomac, in the di[rec]tion of Leesburg, will be very materially di[mi]nished so soon as our force in this vicin[ity] becomes organized, strong and efficient, be[ca]use no capable general will cross the riv[er] north of this city, when we have a strong ar[my] here, ready to cut off his retreat.

To revert to the West, it is probable th[at] no very large additions to the troops now i[n] Missouri, will be necessary to secure th[at] State.

I presume that the force required for t[he] movement down the Mississippi, will be d[e]termined by its commander and the Pre[si]dent. If Kentucky assumes the right positio[n] not more than 20,000 troops will be needed together with those that can be raised in th[e] State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure th[e] latter region and its railroads, as well as ultim[a]tely to occupy Nashville.

The Western Virginia troops, with mo[re] than 5,000 to 10,000 from Ohio and Indiana should, under proper management, suffice f[or] its protection. When we have reorganized our main army here, 10,000 men ought to b[e] enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Rai[l]road and the Potomac. Five thousand wi[ll] garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and no[t] more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the u[t]most, for the defense of Washington.

For the main army of operations, I urge th[e] following composition:

250 Regiments of Infantry, say - - -	225,000	men.
100 Field Batteries, 600 guns - - - -	15,000	"
28 Regiments Cavalry, - - - - - - -	25,500	"
5 " Engineer troops - - -	7,500	"
Total - - - - - - - - - -	273,000.	

The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations, will be the employment of a strong naval force, to protect the movements of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either creating diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach largely from their main body, in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also co-operate with the main army, in its efforts to seize the important sea-board town of the rebels.

It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads, has introduced a new and very

portant element into war, by the great facili-
s thus given for concentrating at particular
sitions, large masses of troops from remote
tions, and by creating new strategic points
l lines of operations. It is intended to over-
ne this difficulty by the partial operations
ggested, and such other as the particular
e may require. We must endeavor to seize
ces on the railways, in the rear of the ene-
's points of concentration, and we must
eaten their sea-board cities, in order that
h State may be forced, by the necessity of
own defense to diminish its contingent to
Confederate army.

The proposed movement down the Missis-
pi, will produce important results in this
nection. That advance, and the progress
the main army at the East, will materially
ist each other by diminishing the resistance
be encountered by each. The tendency of
e Mississippi movement upon all questions
nnected with cotton, is too well understood
the President and Cabinet, to need any illus-
ation from me. There is another independ-
t movement which has often been suggested
d which has always recommended itself to
y judgment. I refer to a movement from
nsas and Nebraska, through the Indian Ter-
ory upon Red River and Western Texas, for
e purpose of protecting and developing the
tent Union and free state sentiment, well
own to predominate in Western Texas, and
hich, like a similar sentiment in Western Vir-
nia, will, if protected, ultimately organize
at section into a free state. How far it will
e possible to support this movement by an
lvance through New Mexico from California,
a matter which I have not sufficiently ex-
mined to be able to express a decided opinion.
at all practicable, it is eminently desirable,
bringing into play the resources and war-
ke qualities of the Pacific States, as well as
lentifying them with our cause, and cement-
g the bond of Union between them and the
eneral Government.

If it is not departing too far from my pro-
ince, I will venture to suggest the policy of
n intimate alliance and cordial understanding
ith Mexico; their sympathies and interests
re with us; their antipathies exclusively
gainst our enemies, and their institutions. I
hink it would not be difficult to obtain from
he Mexican government the right to use, at
east during the present contest, the road from
Guaymas to New Mexico. This concession
would very materially reduce the obstacles of
the column moving from the Pacific. A similar
permission to use their territory for the pas-
sage of troops between the Panuco and the
Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a col-
umn of troops, by a good road from Tampico,
or some of the small harbors north of it, upon
and across the Rio Grande, without risk, and
scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any,
it would be desirable to take into service and
employ Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely
political, on which I do not venture to offer an
opinion.

The force I have recommended is large, the expense is great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view; but I understand it to be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish the power of its government, and to restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. The question to be decided is simply this; shall we crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, or shall we leave it for a legacy to our descendants?

When the extent of the possible line of operations is considered, the force asked for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly large. Every mile we advance carries us further from our base of operations, and renders detatchments necessary to cover our communications, while the enemy will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose with the force which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans; in other words to move into the heart of the enemy's country, and crush out the rebellion in its very heart.

By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps, unnecessary to state, that in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur.

In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such supplies as may there be obtained.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General.

I do not think the events of the war have proved these views, upon the methods and plans of its conduct, altogether incorrect. They certainly have not proved my estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations too large. It is probable that I did under-estimate the time necessary for the completion of arms and equipments. It was not strange, however, that by many civilians intrusted with authority there should have been an exactly opposite opinion held in both these particulars.

The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the morale and organization of our army, and to alarm government and people. The national capital was in danger. It was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build works for its defense, strong and capable of being held by a small force.

It was necessary also to create a new army for active operations, and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the accumulation of the material of war, and to this not inconsid-

erable labor all my energies for the next three months were constantly devoted.

Time is a necessary element in the creation of armies, and I do not therefore think it necessary to more than mention the impatience with which many regarded the delay in the arrival of the new levies, though recruited and pressed forward with unexampled rapidity—the manufacture and supply of arms and equipments, or the vehemence with which an immediate advance upon the enemy's works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic but sanguine people.

The President too was anxious for the speedy employment of our army, and although possessed of my plans through frequent conferences, desired a paper from me upon the condition of the forces under my command, and the immediate measures to be taken to increase their efficiency. Accordingly, in the latter part of October, I addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War:

To the Hon. Simon Cameron,

Secretary of War:

Sir,—In conformity with a personal understanding with the President, yesterday, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of the army under my command, and the measnres required for the preservation of the government and the suppression of the rebellion:

It will be remembered that, in a memorial I had the honor to address to the President soon after my arrival in Washington, and in my communication addressed to Lieut-General Scott, under date of 8th of August; in my letter to the President authorizing him, at his request, to withdraw the letter written by me to General Scott; and in my letter of the 8th of September, answering your note of inquiry of that date, my views on the same snbject are frankly and fully expressed.

In these several communications I have stated the force I regarded as necessary to enable this army to advance with a reasonable certainty of success, at the same time leaving the capital and the line of the Potomac sufficiently guarded not only to secure the retreat of the main army, in the event of disaster, but to render it out of the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Maryland.

So much time has passed, and the winter is approaching so rapidly, that but two courses are left to the government, viz., either to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive with forces greatly inferior in numbers to the army I regarded as desirable and necessary.

If political considerations render the first course unadvisable the second alone remains. While I regret that it has not been deemed expedient, or perhaps possible to concentrate the forces of the nation in this vicinity, (remaining on the defensive elsewhere,) keeping the attention and efforts of the government fixed upon this as the vital point, where the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it may still be that, by introducing unity of action and design among the various armies of the land, by determining the courses to be pursued by the various commanders under one general plan, transferring from the other armies the superfluous strength not required for the purpose in view, and thus re-inforcing this main army, whose destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable prospect of success before the winter is fairly upon us. The nation feels, and I share that feeling, that the army of the Potomac holds the fate of the country in its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect of the next battle will be so important throughout the future, as well as the present, that I continue to urge, as I have ever done since I entered upon the command of this army, upon the government to devote its energies and its available resources towards increasing the numbers and efficiency of the army on which its salvation depends.

A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers and artillery of this army gives as the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifications 33,795 men—say 35,000. The present garrison of Baltimore and its dependencies is about 10,000. I have sent the chief of my staff to make a careful examination into the condition of these troops, and to obtain the information requisite to enable me to decide whether this number can be diminished or the reverse. At least 5,000 men will be required to watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry and its vicinity; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Potomac.

As you are aware, all the information we have from spies, prisoners, &c., agree in showing that the enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched. It is plain, therefore, that to ensure success, or to render it reasonably certain, the active army should not number less than 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, unless some material change occurs in the force in front of us.

The requisite force for an advance movement by the army of the Potomac may be thus estimated:

Column of active operations....	150,000	men,	400 guns,
Garrison of city of Washington	35,000	"	40 "
To guard Poto'c to Hrp's Ferry	5,000	"	12 "
To guard lower Potomac.....	8,000	"	24 "
Garrison for Balt. and Annapolis	10,000	"	12 "
Total effective force required	208,000	men,	488 guns.

Or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men, should the losses by sickness, &c., not rise to a higher per-centage than at present.

Having stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable this army to advance, I now proceed to give the actual strength of the army of the Potomac.

The aggregate strength of the army of the

mac by the official report on the morning e 27th inst. was 168,318 officers and men ll grades and arms. This includes the ps at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the up- and lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. e force present for duty was 147,695. his number 4,268 cavalry were completely med, 3,163 cavalry only partially armed, 0 infantry unequipped, making 13,410 un- r the field, (irrespective of those not yet iently drilled,) and reducing the effective e to 134,285, and the number disposable n advance to 76,285. The infantry regi- ts are, to a considerable extent, armed unserviceable weapons—quite a large ber of good arms, which had been intend- for this army, were ordered elsewhere, ing the army of the Potomac insufficiently in some cases, badly armed.

n the 30th of September there were with army 228 field guns ready for the field, ar as arms and equipments are concerned: e of the batteries are still quite raw, and t to go into action. I have intelligence eight new batteries are en route hither: others are ready for the field. I will still the New York batteries have six guns h) be 112 guns short of the number requir- for the active column, saying nothing for present of those necessary for the garri- s and corps on the Potomac, which would ke a total deficiency of 200 guns.

have thus briefly stated our present condi- n and wants: it remains to suggest the ans of supplying the deficiencies.

First. That *all* the cavalry and infantry ns, as fast as procured, whether manufac- ed in this country or purchased abroad, be nt to this army, until it is fully prepared the field.

Second. That the two companies of the artillery, now understood to be en route m Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered this army, to be mounted at once; also that e companies of the 3d artillery, en route om California, be sent here. Had not the rder for Smead's battery to come here from arrisburgh, to replace the battery I gave eneral Sherman, been so often countermand- d, I would again ask for it.

Third. That a more effective regulation ay be made, authorizing the transfer of men rom the volunteers to the regular batteries, nfantry and cavalry; that we may make the est possible use of the invaluable regular skeletons."

Fourth. I have no official information as to he United States' forces elsewhere; but from he best information I can obtain from the War Department, and other sources, I am led o believe that the United States troops are,

In Western Virginia about	30,000
In Kentucky about	40,000
In Missouri about	80,000
In Fortress Monroe about	11,000
Total,	161,000

Besides these, I am informed that more than 100,000 are in progress of organization in other northern and western states.

I would therefore recommend that, not interfering with Kentucky, there should be retained in Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force for defensive purposes, and that the surplus troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, to enable it to assume the offensive, that the same course be pursued in respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further outside expeditions be attempted until we have fought the great battle in front of us.

Fifth. That every nerve be strained to hasten the enrollment, organization, and armament of new batteries and regiments of infantry.

Sixth. That all the battalions now raised for the new regiments of regular infantry be at once ordered to this army, and that the old infantry and cavalry en route from California, be ordered to this army immediately on their arrival in New York.

I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects to be accomplished, and the means by which we may gain our ends.

A vigorous employment of these means will in my opinion, enable the army of the Potomac to assume successfully this season, the offensive operations which, ever since entering upon the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it.

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action, are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped as a whole, and not in detatched parts.

One plan should be agreed upon and pursued; a single will should direct and carry out these plans.

The great object to be atcomplished—the crushing defeat of the rebel army [now] at Manassas—should never for one instant be lost sight of, but all the intellect and means and men of the government poured upon that point. The loyal States possess ample force to effect all this, and more. The rebels have displayed energy, unanimity, and wisdom worthy of the most desperate days of the French Revolution—should we do less?

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness, with the single object of doing my duty to my country. When the task is accomplished I shall be glad to return to the obscurity from which events have drawn me.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with the army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me.

Permit me to add, that on this occasion as heretofore, it has been my aim neither to ex-

aggerate nor underrate the power of the enemy, nor fail to express clearly the means by which, in my judgment, that power may be broken. Urging the energy of preparation and action, which has ever been my choice, but with the fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose this government to hazard by premature movement, and requesting that this communication may be laid before the President,

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant, G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen.

When I assumed command in Washington on the 27th of July, 1861, the number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thirty pieces.

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theological Seminary.

There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac,—seldom in the best positions for defense, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria.

On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of each other.

There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south.

The camps were located without regard to purposes of defense or instruction; the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into brigades.

In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy either in the positions and numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earthworks in the nature of "tetes-de-pont" looked upon the approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, and Alexandria by the Little River Turnpike and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a single defensive work had been commenced on the Maryland side.

There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights, within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization.

I at once designated an efficient staff, afterwards adding to it, as opportunity offered and necessity required, who zealously co-opera with me in the labor of bringing order out confusion, reassigning troops and comman projecting and throwing up defensive wor receiving and organizing, equipping and p viding for the new levies arriving in the ci

The valuable services of these officers their various departments, during this a throughout the subsequent periods of the h tory of the army of the Potomac, can hardly sufficiently appreciated. Their names and d ties will be given in another part of this r port, and they are commended to the favorab notice of the War Department.

The restoration of order in the city Washington was effected through the appoir ment of a provost marshal, whose authori was supported by the few regular troops wit in my command. These troops were thus i position to act as a reserve, to be sent to an point of attack where their services migh be most wanted.

The energy and ability displayed by Col. A Porter, the provost marshal and his assistant and the strict discharge of their duty by th troops, produced the best results, and Wash ington soon became one of the most quie cities in the Union.

The new levies of infantry, upon arrivin in Washington, were formed into provisiona brigades, and placed in camp in the suburb of the city for equipment, instruction and dis cipline. As soon as regiments were in fit con dition for transfer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades serving there.

Brig.-Gen. F J. Porter was at first assigned to the charge of the provisional brigades. Brig.-Gen. A. E. Burnside was the next officer assigned to this duty, from which, however, he was soon relieved by Brig.-Gen. S. Casey, who continued in charge of the newly arriving regiments until the army of the Potomac departed for the Peninsula, in March, 1862. The newly arriving artillery troops reported to Brig.-Gen. Wm. F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, and the cavalry to Brig.-Gen. Geo. Stoneman, the Chief of Cavalry.

By the 15th of October, the number of troops in and about Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard, and the forces on the Maryland shore of the Potomac, below Washington, and as far as Cumberland above, the troops under the command of Gen. Dix at Baltimore, and its dependencies, was as follows:

Total present for duty	133,261
" sick	9,230
" in confinement	1,156
Aggregate present	143,647
" absent	8,404
Grand aggregate	152,051

The following table exhibits similar data for the periods stated, including the troops in Maryland and Delaware:

	PRESENT.			ABSENT.	PRESENT AND ABSENT.
	For Duty	Sick.	In Confinement.		Grand Aggregate
1861.					
Dec. 1	169,452	15,102	2,189	11,470	198,213
1862.					
Jan. 1	191,480	14,790	2,260	11,707	219,707
Feb. 1	190,806	14,373	2,917	14,110	222,196
March 1	193,142	13,167	2,108	13,570	221,987

For convenience of reference, the strength of the army of the Potomac at subsequent periods is given:

	PRESENT.						ABSENT.		Grand Aggregate present and absent.
	For Duty.		Sick.		In Arrest or Confinement.	Aggregate.	By Authority.	Without Authority	
1862.	Officers	Men.	Officers	Men.	Officers	Men.			
April 30	4,725	104,610	233	5,385	41	356	115 350	11,037	126,387
June 20	4,.65	101,160	496	10,541	44	320	117,226	27,700	887	145,813
July 10	3,834	85,715	685	15,959	60	213	106,466	34,638	3,782	144,886

In organizing the army of the Potomac, and preparing it for the field, the first step taken was to organize the infantry into brigades of four regiments each; retaining the newly arrived regiments on the Maryland side, until their armament and equipment were issued, and they had obtained some little elementary instruction, before assigning them permanently to brigades.

When the organization of the brigades was well established, and the troops somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions of three brigades each were gradually formed.

As is elsewhere stated in this report, although I was always in favor of the organization into army corps as an abstract principle, I did not desire to form them until the army had been for some little time in the field, in order to enable the general officers first to acquire the requisite experience as division commanders in active service, and that I might be able to decide from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise those important commands.

For a similar reason, I carefully abstained from making any recommendations for the promotion of officers to the grade of Major-General.

When new batteries of artillery arrived, they also were retained in Washington until their armament and equipment were completed, and their instruction sufficiently advanced, to justify their being assigned to divisions.

The same course was pursued in regard to the cavalry. I regret that circumstances have delayed the Chief of Cavalry, Gen. Geo. Stoneman, in furnishing his report upon the organization of that arm of service. It will, however, be forwarded as soon as completed, and will, doubtless, show that the difficult and important duties intrusted to him were efficiently performed. He encountered and overcame, as far as it was possible, continual and vexatious obstacles arising from the great deficiency of cavalry arms and equipments, and the entire inefficiency of many of the regimental officers first appointed; this last difficulty was, to a considerable extent, overcome in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and artillery, by the continual and prompt action of courts-martial and boards of examination.

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every cavalry soldier was armed with a sabre and revolver, and at least two squadrons in every regiment with carbines.

It was intended to assign at least one regiment of cavalry to each division of the active army, besides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular regiments, and some picket regiments of volunteer cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control rendered it impossible to carry out this intention fully, and the cavalry force, serving with the army in the field, was never as large as it ought to have been.

It was determined to collect the regular infantry to form the nucleus of a reserve. The advantage of such a body of troops at a critical moment, especially in an army constituted mainly of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been frequently illustrated in military history, and was brought to the attention of the country at the first battle of Manassas. I have not been disappointed in the estimate formed of the value of these troops. I have always found them to be relied on; whenever they have been brought under fire, they have shown the utmost gallantry and tenacity.

The regular infantry, which had been collected from distant posts, and which had been recruited as rapidly as the slow progress of recruiting for the regular service would allow, added to the small battalion with McDowell's army, which I found at Washington, on my arrival, amounted, on the 30th of August, to 1040 men; on the 28th of February, 1862, to 2682, and on the 30th of April, to 4603.

On the 17th of May, 1862, they were assigned to Gen. Porter's corps, for organization as a division with the 5th regiment of New York Volunteers, which joined, May 4th, and the 10th New York Volunteers, which joined subsequently. They remained from the commencement, under the command of Brig.-Gen. Geo. Sykes, Major 14th Infantry, U. S. Army.

ARTILLERY.

The creation of an adequate artillery establishment, for an army of so large proportions, was a formidable undertaking; and had it not been that the country possessed, in the regular service, a body of accomplished and ener-

gular artillery officers, the task would have been almost hopeless.

The charge of organizing this most important army was confided to Major (afterwards Brig.-Gen.) W. M. F. Barry, Chief of Artillery, whose industry and zeal achieved the best results. The report of Gen. B. is appended among the accompanying documents. By referring to it, it will be observed that the following principles were adopted as the basis of organization:

"1st. That the proportion of artillery should be in the ratio of at least 2½ pieces to 1,000 men, to be expanded, if possible, to 3 pieces to 1,000 men.

"2d. That the proportion of rifled guns should be restricted to the system of the U. S. Ordnance Department, and of Parrott, and the smooth bores (with the exception of a few howitzers for special service) to be exclusively the 12-pounder gun, of the model of 1857, variously called the 'gun-howitzer,' the 'light 12-pounder,' or the 'Napoleon.'

"3d. That each field-battery should, if practicable, be composed of 6 guns, and none to be less than 4 guns, and in all cases the guns of each battery should be of uniform calibre.

"4th. That the field-batteries were to be assigned to divisions, and not to brigades, and in the proportion of 4 to each division, of which one was to be a battery of regulars, the remainder of volunteers, the captain of the regular battery to be the commandant of artillery of the division. In the event of several divisions constituting an army corps, at least one-half of the divisional artillery was to constitute the reserve of the corps.

"5th. That the artillery reserve of the whole army, should consist of 100 guns, and should comprise, besides a sufficient number of light 'mounted batteries,' all the guns of position, and until the cavalry was massed, all the horse artillery.

"6th. That the amount of ammunition to accompany the field batteries, was not to be less than 400 rounds per gun.

"7th. A siege train of 50 pieces. This was subsequently expanded—for special service at the siege of Yorktown—to very nearly 100 pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres, and enormously heavy weight of metal of 2 200-pounders; 5 100-pounders, and 10 thirteen-inch sea-coast mortars."

As has been before stated, the Chief of Artillery reports:

"The whole of the field-artillery of the army of the Potomac, July 28th, 1861, was comprised of 9 imperfectly equipped batteries of 36 guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. In March, 1862, when the whole army took the field, it consisted of 92 batteries of 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully equipped, and in readiness for active field service. Of the whole force, 30 batteries were regulars, and 62 batteries volunteers. During the short period of seven months, all of this immense amount of material was issued by the Ordnance Department, and placed in the hands of the artillery troops after their arrival in Washington.

"About one-fourth of all the volunteer batteries brought with them from their respective States a few guns and carriages, but these were nearly all of such peculiar calibre, as to lack uniformity with the more modern and more serviceable ordnance, with which the other batteries were armed, and they, therefore, had to be withdrawn and replaced by more suitable material. While about one-sixth came supplied with horses and harness, less than one-tenth were apparently fully equipped for service when they reported, and every one of these required the supply of many deficiencies of material, and very extensive instruction in the theory and practice of their special arm.

* * * * *

"The operations on the Peninsula by the army of the Potomac, commenced with a full field-artillery force of 52 batteries of 299 guns. To this, must be added the field-artillery of Franklin's division, of McDowell's corps, which joined a few days before the capture of Yorktown, but was not disembarked from its transports for service until after the battle of Williamsburg; and the field-artillery of McCall's division, of McDowell's corps—4 batteries, 22 guns—which joined in June, a few days before the battle of Mechanicsville, (June 26th, 1862), making a grand total of field-artillery, at any time with the army of the Potomac of 60 batteries, of 343 guns. With this large force serving in six corps-d'armee of eleven divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only general and field-officers were 1 brigadier-general, 4 colonels, 3 lieutenant-colonels, and 3 majors; a number obviously insufficient, and which impaired, to a great degree, in consequence of the want of rank and official influence of the commanders of corps and division artillery, the efficiency of the arm. As this faulty organization can be suitably corrected only by legislative action, it is earnestly hoped that the attention of the proper authorities may be at an early day invited to it.

"When there were so many newly organized volunteer field-batteries, many of whom received their first and only instruction in the intrenched camps covering Washington, during the three or four inclement months of the winter of 1861-62, there was, of course, much to be improved. Many of the volunteer batteries, however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, and availed themselves so industriously of the instructions of the regular officers, their commanders and the example of the regular batteries, their associates, that they made rapid progress, and attained a degree of proficiency highly creditable."

The zeal and services of Major A. S. Webb, assistant to General Barry, entitle him to especial praise. At the close of the Peninsula

paign, General Barry assumed the duties hief of artillery of the defenses of Wash-on, and was relieved in his former position ol. H. J. Hunt, who had commanded the lery reserve with marked skill, and brought is duties as chief of artillery the highest ifications. The services of this distin-hed officer in re-organizing and re-fitting batteries prior to and after the battle of letam, and his gallant and and skillful con- on that field, merit the highest enconiums y power to bestow. His assistant, Major ll, deserves high credit for his services gallantry throughout both campaigns.

Detailed statement of the distribution of ous' regiments and batteries, as they ar-d in Washington at this period; and, also, ccount of the composition of the army on 15th of October, 1862, which are given in don's edition of the Report, are omitted in edition.]

ARMY CORPS.

n the 8th of March. 1862, the President di-ed, by the following order, the organization he active portion of the Army of the Poto-, into four army corps, and the formation fifth corps, from the divisions of Banks Shields. The following is the text of the sident's order:

Executive Mansion,
Washington, March 8th, 1862.

sident's General War Order, No. 2.

Ordered 1*st*. That the Major-General com-nding the Army of the Potomac, proceed, hwith, to organize that part of said army igned to enter upon active operations, (in-ling the reserve, but excluding the troops e left in the fortifications about Washing-), into four army corps, to be commanded ording to seniority of rank, as follows:

st Corps. To consist of four divisions, and e commanded by Maj.-Gen. I. McDowell.

d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and e commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner.

d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and e commanded by Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzel-n.

4th Corps. To consist of three divisions, and e commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes.

2d. That the divisions now commanded by officers above assigned to the commands army corps, shall be embraced in and form t of their respective corps.

3d. The forces left for the defense of Wash-ton, will be placed in command of Brig.-n. James Wadsworth, who shall also be litary Governor of the District of Columbia.

4th. That this order be executed with such omptness and dispatch, as not to delay the mmencement of the operations already di-ted to be undertaken by the Army of the tomac.

5th. A fifth army corps to be commanded by aj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, will be formed from his vn, and General Shields', late Gen. Lander's, vision.

A. LINCOLN.

The following order, which was made as soon as circumstances permitted, exhibits the steps taken to carry out the requirements of the Preisdent's War Order, No. 2:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac.
Fairfax Court House, Va., March 13, 1862.

General Orders, No. 101:

In compliance with the President's War Order, No. 2, of March 8th, 1862, the active portion of the army of the Potomac is formed into corps, as follows:

1*st. Corps*, Major-Gen. Irwin McDowell, to consist, for the present, of the divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King.

2*d. Corps*, Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner, divisions, Richardson, Blenker and Sedgwick.

3*d. Corps*, Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, divisions, F. J. Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton.

4*th. Corps*, Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes, divisions, Couch, Smith, and Casey.

5*th. Corps*, Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, divisions, Williams and Shields.

The cavalry regiments attached to divisions, will, for the present remain so; subsequent orders will provide for these regiments, as well as for the reserve artillery, regular infantry, and regular cavalry.

Arrangements will be made to unite the divisions of each army corps, as promptly as possible. The commanders of divisions will at once report in person, or where that is impossible, by letter to the commander of their army corps. By command of

MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN,
A. V. COLBURN, Ass't. Adjt.-Gen'l.

[The details of the organization of the army, April 1, 1862, are omitted in this edition

THE STAFF.

In a staff charged with labors so various and important as that of the army of the Potomac, a chief was indispensible to supervise the various departments, and to relieve the commanding general of details. The office of chief-of-staff, well known in European armies, had not been considered necessary in our small peace establishment. The functions of the office were not defined, and, so far as exercised, had been included in the adjutant-general's department. The small number of officers in this department, and the necessity for their employment in other duties, have obliged commanding generals during this war to resort to other branches of the service to furnish suitable chiefs-of-staff.

On the 4th of September, 1861, I appointed Colonel R. B. Marcy, of the inspector-general's department, chief-of-staff, and he entered upon service immediately, discharging the various and important duties with great fidelity, industry, and ability, from this period until I was removed from command at Rectortown.

Many improvements have been made during the war in our sysnem of staff administration; but much remains to be done.

Our own experience and that of other armies

agree in determining the necessity for an efficient and able staff. To obtain this, our staff establishment should be based on correct principles and extended to be adequate to the necessities of the service, and should include a system of staff and line education.

The affairs of the adjutant-general's department, while I commanded the army of the Potomac, were conducted by Brig.-Gen. S. Williams, assisted by Lieut.-Col. James A. Hardie, A. D. C.

Their management of the department during the organization of the army, in the fall and winter of 1861, and during its subsequent operations in the field, was excellent.

They were, during the entire period, assisted by Capt. Rd. B. Irwin, A. D. C., and during the organization of the army by the following named officers:

Capt. Jos. Kirkland, A. D. C.; Capt. Arthur McClellan, A. D. C.; Capt. M. T. McMahon, A. D. C.; Capt. W. P. Mason, A. D. C.; Capt. W. F. Biddle, A. D. C.

My personal staff, when we embarked for the peninsula, consisted of—

Col. T. M. Key, additional A. D. C.; Col. E. H. Wright, do., and Major 6th U. S. Cavalry; Col. T. T. Gantt, add. A. D. C.; Col. J. J. Astor, Jr., volunteer aid-de-camp; Lieut.-Col. A. V. Colburn, add. A. D. C., and Captain in adjutant-general's department; Lieut.-Col. N. B. Sweitzer, add. A. D. C., and Capt. 1st U. S. Cavalry; Lieut.-Col. E. M. K. Hudson, add. A. D. C. and Capt. 14th U. S. Infantry; Lieut. Col. Paul Von Radowitz, add. A. D. C.; Maj. H. Von Hammerstein, add. A. D. C.; Maj. W. W. Russell, U. S. Marine Corps; Maj. F. Lecompte, of Swiss army, volunteer aid-de-camp; Capt. Jos. Kirkland, add. A. D.C.; Capt. Arthur McClellan, add. A. D. C.; Capt. L. P. D'Orleans, do.; Capt. R. D'Orleans, do.; Capt. M. T. McMahon; do.; Capt. W. P. Mason, Jr., do.; Capt. W. F. Biddle, do.; Catp. E. A. Raymond.

To this number I am tempted to add the Prince de Joinville, who constantly accompanied me through the trying campaign of the peninsula, and frequently rendered important service.

Of these officers, Capt. McMahon was assigned to the personal staff of Brig.-Gen. Franklin, and Capts. Kirkland and Mason to that of Brig.-Gen. F. J. Porter, during the siege of Yorktown: they remained subsequently with those general officers.

Major Le Compte left the army during the siege of Yorktown; Col. Gantt, Col. Astor, Maj. Russell, Capts. L. P. D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond, at the close of the Peninsula campaign.

Before its termination, Capts. W. S. Abert and Chas. R. Lowell, of the 6th U. S. Cavalry, and Capt. G. A. Custer, 1st Lieut. 5th U. S. Cavalry, joined my staff as aids-de-camp, and remained with me until I was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac.

All of these officers served me with great gallantry and devotion; they were ever rea to execute any service, no matter how dang ous, difficult, or fatiguing.

INSPECTOR GENERAL'S DEPARTMEN

The highly important duties of this depa ment were performed by Col. D. B. Sacket a Major N. H. Davis, to my entire satisfactic They introduced many valuable changes the system of inspections and in the forms reports, and so systematized the labors of t inspectors of corps and divisions that excelle results were obtained. The intelligent a energetic performance of their duties by the officers enabled me to keep myself well i formed of the condition of the troops and c rect evils promptly.

ENGINEERS.

When I assumed command of the Army the Potomac, I found Major J. G. Barnard, S. Engineers, subsequently Brig.-Gen. of v unteers, occupying the position of chief e gineer of the army. I continued him in t same office, and at once gave the necessa instructions for the completion of the defenc of the capital, and for the entire reorganiz tion of the department.

Under his direction the entire system defences was carried into execution. Th was completed before the army departed f Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence the skill of the engineers and the diligent l bor of the troops.

For some months after the organization the army of the Potomac was commence there were no engineer troops with it; length, however, three companies were a signed. Under the skillful management Capt. J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineers, these ne companies rapidly became efficient, and, will be seen, rendered most valuable servic during the ensuing campaigns.

The number of engineer troops being entir ly inadequate to the necessities of the army an effort was made to partially remedy th defect, by detailing the 15th and 50th New Yor Volunteers, which contained many sailors an mechanics, as engineer troops. They were firs placed under the immediate superintendenc of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. Engineer by whom they were instructed in the dutie of pontooneers, and became somewhat familia with those of sappers and miners. Previou to the movement of the army for the Penin sula, this brigade was placed under the com mand of Brig.-Gen. D. P. Woodbury, Majo U. S. Engineers.

The labor of preparing the engineer an bridge trains devolved chiefly upon Capt Duane, who was instructed to procure th new model French bridge train, as I was satis fied that the India-rubber pontoon was entirel useless for the general purposes of a cam paign.

The engineer department presented the fol lowing complete organization when the army moved for the Peninsula:

Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer; Lieut. H. L. Abbott, Top. Engineers, A.D.C.; Brigade Vol. Engineers, Brig.-Gen. Woodbury, comm'g.; 15th New York Vols., Col. McLeod Murphy; 50th do., Col. C. B. Stewart; Battalion 3 Cos. U. S. Engineers, Capt. J. C. Duane, comm'g.

Companies respectively commanded by 1st Lieut. C. B. Reese, U. S. Engineers; 1st C. Cross, do.; 1st Lieut. O. E. Babcock, do.

The chief engineer was ably assisted in his duties by Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. Engineers; 1st Lieut. C. R. Comstock, do.; 1st Lieut. M. D. McAlester, do.; 1st Lieut. Merrill, do.

Capt. C. S. Stewart, and 2d Lieut. F. U. Farquhar, U. S. Engineers, joined after the army arrived at Fort Monroe.

The necessary bridge equipage for the operations of a large army had been collected, consisting of batteaux with the anchors and boring material, (French model.) trestles and engineers' tools, with the wagons for their transportation.

The small number of officers of this corps available rendered it impracticable to detail engineers permanently at the headquarters of corps and divisions.

The companies of regular engineers never had their proper number of officers, and it was necessary, as a rule, to follow the principle of detailing engineer officers temporarily where ever their services were required.

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS.

To the corps of Topographical Engineers was intrusted the collection of topographical information and the preparation of campaign maps. Until a short time previous to the departure of the army for Fort Monroe, Lieut.-Col. John W. Macomb, was in charge of this department, and prepared a large amount of valuable material. He was succeeded by Brig.-Gen. A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position throughout the peninsular campaign.

These offiers were assisted by Lieut. H. L. Abbot, Topographical Engineers; Lieut. O. G. Wagner, do.; Lieut. N. Bowen, do.; Lieut. John M. Wilson, do.; Lieut. James H. Wilson, do.

This number, being the greatest available, was so small that much of the duty of the department devolved upon parties furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent of Coast Survey, and other gentlemen from civil life.

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topographical maps, the labors of this corps were difficult and ardous in the extreme. Notwithstanding the energy and ability displayed by General Humphreys, Lieut.-Col. Macomb and their subordinates, who frequently obtained the necessary information under fire, the movements of the army were sometimes unavoidably delayed by the difficulty of obtaining knowledge of the country in advance. The result of their labors has been the preparation of an excellent series of maps, which will be invaluable to any army traversing the same ground.

During the campaign it was impossible to draw a distinct line of demarcation between the duties of the two corps of engineers, so that the labors of reconnoissances of roads, of lines for trenches, of fields for battle, and of the positions of the enemy, as well as the construction of siege and defensive works, were habitually performed by detail from either corps as the convenience of the service demanded.

I desire to express my high appreciation of the skill, gallantry, and devotion displayed by the officers of both corps of engineers under the most trying circumstances.

During the Maryland campaign I united the two corps under Captain J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineers, and found great advantages from this arrangement.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

For the operations of the medical department I refer to the reports transmitted herewith, of Surgeon Chas. S. Tripler, and Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, who, in turn, performed the duties of medical director of the army of the Potomac: the former from August 12, 1861, until July 1, 1862, and the latter after that date.

The difficulties to be overcome, in organizing and making effective the medical department, were very great, arising principally from the inexperience of the regimental medical officers, many of whom were physicians taken suddenly from civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, "had to be instructed in their duties from the very alphabet," and from the ignorance of the line officers as to their relations with the medical officers, which gave rise to confusion and conflict of authority.

Boards of examination were instituted, by which many incompetent officers were removed, and by the successive exertions of Surgeons Tripler and Letterman the medical corps was brought to a very high degree of efficiency.

With regard to the sanitary condition of the army while on the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says, that the records show a constantly increasing immunity from disease. "In October and November, 1861, with an army averaging 130,000 men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of all sorts; of these about 1,000 were reported as cases of typhoid fever. I knew that errors of diagnosis were frequently committed, and therefore this must be considered as the limit of typhoid cases. If any army in the world can show such a record as this, I do not know when or where it was assembled."

From September, 1861, to February, 1862, while the army was increasing, the number of sick decreased from 7 per cent. to 6.18 per cent.; of these, the men sick in the regimental and general hospitals, were less than one-half, the remainder were slight cases under treat-

ment in quarters. "During this time, so far as rumor was concerned, the army was being decimated by disease every month."

Of the sanitary condition of the army during the peninsular campaign, up to its arrival at Harrison's Landing, Dr. Tripler says:

"During this campaign the army was favored with excellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges of modern armies—dysentery, typhus, cholera—were almost unknown. We had some typhoid fever, and more malarial fevers; but even these never prevailed to such an extent as to create any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes larger than we cared to have them, but the great majority of the cases reported were such as did not threaten life, or permanent disability. I regret that I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but have been unsuccessful. My recollection is that the whole sick report never exceeded 8 per cent. of the force, and this included all sorts of cases—the trivial as well as the severe. The army of the Potomac must be considered to have been the most healthy army in the service of the United States."

His remarks at the conclusion of his report upon our system of medical administration, and his suggestions for its improvement, are especially worthy of attention.

The severe labors and privations of the troops during the seven day's battles, had of course a great effect on the health of the army after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing the number of sick to about 20 per cent. of the whole force.

The nature of the military operations had also unavoidably placed the medical department in a very unsatisfactory condition. Supplies had been almost entirely exhausted, or necessarily abandoned; hospital tents abandoned or destroyed; and the medical officers deficient in numbers and broken down by fatigue.

All the remarkable energy and ability of Surgeon Letterman were required to restore the efficiency of his department, but before we left Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in fitting it out throughout with the supplies it required, and the health of the army was vastly improved by the sanitary measures which were enforced at his suggestion.

The great haste with which the army was removed from the Peninsula, made it necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded afterwards, nearly all the baggage and transportation, including medical stores and ambulances, all the vessels being required to transport the troops themselves and their ammunition; and when the army of the Potomac returned to Washington, after General Pope's campaign, and the medical department came once more under Surgeon Letterman's control, he found it in a deplorable condition.

The officers were worn out by the labor they had performed, and the few supplies that had been brought from the Peninsula had been exhausted or abandoned, so that the work of reorganization and resupplying had to be again performed, and this while the army was moving rapidly and almost in the face of the enemy. That it was successfully accomplished is shown by the care and attention which the wounded received after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.

Among the improvements introduced into his department by Surgeon Letterman, the principal are, the organization of an ambulance corps, the system of field-hospitals, and the method of supplying by brigades; all of which were instituted during the Maryland campaign, and have since proved very efficient.

QUARTER-MASTER'S DEPARTMENT.

On assuming command of the troops in and about Washington, I appointed Captain S. Van Vliet, A. Q. M., (afterwards Brigadier General,) Chief Quarter-master to my command and gave him the necessary instructions for organizing his department, and collecting the supplies requisite for the large army then called for.

The disaster at Manassas had but recently occurred, and the army was quite destitute of quarter-masters' stores.

General Van Vliet, with great energy and zeal, set himself about the task of furnishing the supplies immediately necessary, and preparing to obtain the still larger amounts which would be required by the new troops which were moving in large numbers towards the capital.

The principal depot for supplies in the city of Washington was under charge of Col. D. H. Rucker, A. Q. M., who ably performed his duties.

Lieut.-Col. R. Ingalls, A. Q. M., was placed in charge of the department on the south side of the Potomac. I directed a large depot for transportation to be established at Perryville, on the left bank of the Susquehanna, a point equally accessible by rail and water. Capt. C. G. Sawtelle, A. Q. M., had immediate charge of the transportation in and about Washington, as well as of the large number of horses purchased for the use of the artillery and cavalry. The principal difficulties which Gen. Van Vliet had to encounter arose from the inexperience of the majority of the officers of his department in the new regiments and brigades. The necessity of attending personally to minor details rendered his duties arduous and harassing in the extreme. All obstacles, however, were surmounted by the untiring industry of the chief-quarter master and his immediate subordinates, and when the army was prepared to move, the organization of the department was found to be admirable.

When it was determined to move the army to the peninsula, the duties of providing water transportation were devolved, by the Secretary

War, upon his assistant, the Hon. J. Tucker. he vessels were ordered to Alexandria, and ent.-Col. Ingalls was placed in immediate harge of the embarkation of the troops, transortation, and material of every description. perations of this nature on so extensive a ale had no parallel in the history of our ountry.

The arrangements of Lieut.-Col. Ingalls were erfected with remarkable skill and energy, nd the army and its material, were embarked nd transported to Fort Monroe in a very short pace of time, and entirely without loss.

During the operations on the Peninsula, until e arrival of troops at Harrison's Landing, en. Van Vliet retained the position of Chief uartermaster, and maintained the thorough rganization and efficiency of his department.

The principal depots of supplies were under he immediate charge of Lieut.-Col. Ingalls and ewtalle.

On the 10th of July, 1862, Gen. Van Vliet, aving requested to be relieved from duty ith the army of the Potomac, I appointed ieut.-Col. Ingalls Chief Quartermaster, and he ontinued to discharge the duties of that office uring the remainder of the Peninsular and he Maryland campaigns, in a manner which illy sustained the high reputation he had preiously acquired.

The immense amount of labor accomplished, ften under the most difficult circumstances, he admirable system under which the duties f the department were performed, and the ntire success which attended the efforts to upply so large an army, reflect the highest redit upon the officers upon whom these nerous duties devolved. The reports of Gen. an Vliet, and Lieut.-Col. Ingalls, with the accompanying documents, give, in detail, the istory of the department, from its organizaon until I was relieved from the command of he army of the Potomac.

SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT.

On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. larke, C. S., joined my staff, and at once enterd upon his duties as Chief Commissary of the rmy of the Potomac. In order to realize the esponsibilities pertaining to this office, as well s to form a proper estimate of the vast amount f labor which must necessarily devolve upon s occupant, it is only necessary to consider he unprepared state of the country to engage n a war of such magnitude as the present, nd the lack of practical knowledge on the art of our officers, with reference to supplying and subsisting a large, and, at that time, n unorganized army. Yet, notwitstanding he existence of these great obstacles, the manner in which the duties of the commissary department were discharged, was such as to merit, and call forth the commendation of the entire army. During the stay of the army of he Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, prior to the Peninsular campaign, its subsistence was drawn chiefly from the depots which had been established by the commissary department at Washington, Alexandria, Forts Corcoran and Runyon. In the important task of designating and establishing depots of supplies, Colonel Clarke was ably seconded by his assistants, Col. Amos Beckwith, C. S., U. S A., Lieut.-Col. Geo. Bell, C. S., U. S. A., Lieut.-Col. A. P. Porter, C. S., U. S. A., Capt. Thomas Wilson, C. S., U. S. A., Capt Brownell Granger, C.S., U. S. Vols., Capt. W. H. Bell, C. S., U. S. A., Capt.. I H. Woodward, C. S., U. S. Vols., and Captain W. R. Murphy, C. S., U. S. Vols. For a full knowledge of the highly creditabe manner in which each and all of the above mentioned officers discharged their duties, I invite attention to the detailed report of Col. Clarke. The remarks and suggestions contained in this report, are worthy of attention, as affording valuable rules for the future guidance of the subsistence department, in supplying armies in the field. The success of the subsistence department of the army of the Potomac, was, in a great measure, attributable to the fact, that the subsistence department at Washington made ample previous provision for sending supplies to the peninsula, and that it always exercised the most intelligent foresight. It morever gave its advise and countenance to the officers charged with its duties and reputation in the field, and those officers, I am happy to say, worked with it and together, in perfect harmony, for the public good.

During the entire period that I was in command of the army of the Potomac there was no instance within my knowledge, where the troops were without their rations from any fault of the officers of this department.

ORDINANCE DEPARTMENT.

This very important branch of the service was placed under the charge of Capt. C. P. Kingsbury, ordnance corps, Colonel and A. D. C. Great difficulty existed in the proper organization of the department, from the want of a sufficient number of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various headquarters and depots of supply. But far greater obstacles had to be surmounted, from the fact that the supply of small arms was totally inadequate to the demands of a large army, and a vast proportion of those furnished, were of such inferior quality, as to be unsatisfactory to the troops, and condemned by their officers. The supply of artillery was more abundant, but of great variety. Rifled ordnance was just coming into use for the first time in this country, and the description of gnn and kind of projectile, which would prove most effective, and should therefore be adopted, was a mere matter of theory.

To obviate these difficulties, large quantities of small arms of foreign manufacture were contracted for; private enterprise in the construction of arms and ammunition was encouraged; and by the time the army was ordered to move to the peninsula, the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample.

Much, also, had been done to bring the quality both of arms and ammunition, up to the proper standard, Boards of officers were in session continually, during the autumn and winter of 1861, to test the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. The reports of these boards, confirmed by subsequent experience in the field, have done much to establish the respective claims of different inventions and manufactories. During the campaigns of the Peninsula and Maryland, the officers connected with the department, were zealous and energetic, and kept the troops well supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing and arduous nature of their duties. One great source of perplexity, was the fact, that it had been necessary to issue arms of all varieties and calibres giving an equal diversity in the kinds of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness was therefore incumbent upon the officers in charge to prevent confusion and improper distribution of cartridges. Colonel Kingsbnry discharged the duties of his office with great efficiency, until the —— of July, 1862, when his health required that he should be relieved. 1st Lieut. Thomas G. Baylor, ordnance corps, succeeded him, and peformed his duty during the remainder of the Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, with marked ability and success. The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury and Lieut. Baylor, renders it impossible for me to enter, at all, into the details of the organization of the department.

PROVOST-MARSHAL'S DEPARTMENT.

Immediately after I was placed in command of the "Division of the Potomac" I appointed Col. Andrew Porter, 16th U. S. Infantry, Provost-Marshal of Washington. All the available regular infantry, a battery, and a squadron of cavalry, were placed under his command; and by his energetic action, he soon corrected the serious evils which existed, and restored order in the city.

When the army was about to take the field, General Porter was appointed Provost-Marshal General of the army of the Potomac, and held that most important position until the end of the Peninsular campaign, when sickness, contracted in the untiring discharge of his duties compelled him to ask to be relieved from the position he had so ably and energetically filled. The provost-marshal general's department had the charge of a class of duties, which had not before, in our service, been defined and grouped under the management of a special department. The following subjects indicate the sphere of this department:

Suppression of marauding and depredations and of all brawls and disturbances.

Preservation of good order and suppression of drunkenness beyond the limits of the camps.

Prevention of straggling on the march.

Suppression of gamb'ing-houses, drinking-houses, or bar-rooms and brothels.

Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public amusement.

Searches, seizures and arrests.

Execution of sentences of general cou martial, involving imprisonment or cap punishment.

Enforcement of orders prohibiting the s of intoxicating liquors, whether by tradesm or sutlers, and of orders respecting passes.

Deserters from the army.

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy.

Countersigning safe-guards.

Passes to citizens, within the lines and purposes of trade.

Complaints of cititizens as to the conduct the soldiers.

General Porter was assisted by the follo ing named officers:

Major W. H. Wood, 17th U. S. Infantr Capt. James McMillan, A. A. A. G., U. S. Inf try; Capt. W. T. Gontry, 17th U. S. Infantr Capt. J. W. Forsyth, 18th U. S. Infantry; Lie J. W. Jones, 12th U. S. Infantry; Lieut. C. Trowbridge, 16th U. S. Infantry; Lieut. C. Mehaffey, 1st U. S. Infantry.

The provost guard was composed of the U. S. Cavalry, Major Pleasonton, and a ba talion of the 8th and 17th U. S. Infantry, Maj Willard.

After General Porter was relieved, Maj Wood was in charge of this department, un after the battle of Antietam, when Brigadie General Patrick was appointed Provost Ma shal General.

COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS.

When the army took the field, for the pu pose of securing order and regularity in th camp of headquarters, and for facilitating it movements, the office of commandant of ge eral headquarters was created, and assigned t Major G. O. Haller, 7th U. S. Infantry. Si companies of infantry were placed under hi orders for guard and police duty. Among th orders appended to this report, is the one de fining his duties, which were always satisfac torily performed.

JUDGE-ADVOCATE.

From August, 1861, the position of judge advocate was held by Col Thos. Gantt, A. D. C. until compelled by ill health to retire, at Har rison's Landing, in August, 1862. His reviews of the decisions of courts-martial during this period, were of great utility in correcting the practice in military courts, diffusing true notions of discipline and subordination, and setting before the army a high standard of soldierly honor.

Upon the retirement of Colonel Gantt, the duties of judge-advocate were ably performed by Col. Thomas M. Key, A. D. C.

SIGNAL CORPS.

The method of conveying intelligence and orders, invented and introduced into the service by Maj. Albert J. Myer, signal officer, U. S. A., was first practically tested in large operations, during the organization of the army of the Potomac.

Under the direction of Major Myer, a signal orps was formed by detailing officers and en from the different regiments of volun- ers, and instructing them in the use of the gs by day, and torches by night.

The chief signal officer was indefatigable in s exertions to render his corps effective, and soon became available for service, in every vision of the army.

In addition to the flags and torches, Major yer introduced a portable insulated tele- aph wire, which could be readily laid from oint to point, and which could be used under e same general system.

In front of Washington, and on the lower otomac, at any point within our lines not ached by the military telegraph, the great efulness of this system of signals was made anifest. But it was not until after the ar- val of the army upon the Peninsula, and uring the siege and battles of that, and the aryland campaign, that the great benefits to e derived from it on the field, and under fire, ere fully appreciated.

There was scarcely an action or skirmish which the signal corps did not render im- ortant services. Often, under heavy fire of rtillery, and not unfrequently while exposed musketry, the officers and men of this corps ave information of the movements of the nemy, and transmitted directions for the evo- utions of our own troops.

The report of the chief signal officer, with ccompanying documents, will give the details f the services of this corps, and call attention o those members of it who were particularly istinguished.

TELEGRAPHIC.

The telegraphic operations of the army of he Potomac were superintended by Major Thos. J. Eckert, and under the immediate di- ection of Mr. —— Caldwell, who was with he corps of operatives attached to my head- uarters during the entire campaigns upon he peninsula and in Maryland.

The services of this corps were arduous nd efficient. Under the admirable arrange- nents of Major Eckert they were constantly rovided with all the material for construct- ng new lines, which were rapidly estab- ished whenever the army changed position; nd it was not unfrequently the case that he operatives worked under fire from the nemy's guns, yet they invarialy performed ll the duties required of them with great lacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom that I was without the means of direct tele- graphic communication with the War Depart- ment, and with the corps commanders.

From the organization of the army of the Potomac, up to Nov. 1, 1862, including the Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, upwards of 1,200 miles of military telegraph lines had been constructed in connection with the operations of the army, and the number of peratives and builders employed was about 200.

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and en- terprising aeronant, who had the management of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for the valuable information obtained during his ascensions.

I have more than once taken occasion to re- commend the members of my staff, both ge- neral and personal, for promotion and reward. I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, and to record their names in the history of the army of the Potomac as gallant soldiers, to whom their country owes a debt of gratitude, still unpaid, for the courage, ability and un- tiring zeal they displayed during the eventful campaigns in which they bore so prominent a part.

POSITION OF THE ARMY, OCT., 1862.

On the 15th of October, the main body of the army of the Potomac was in the immedi- ate vicinity of Washington, with detachments on the left bank of the Potomac as far down as Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williams- port and its vicinity. The different divisions were posted as follows:

Hooker, at Budd's Ferry, lower Potomac; Heintzelman, at Fort Lyon and vicinity; Frank- lin, near the Theological Seminary; Blenker, near Hunter's Chapel; McDowell, at Upton's Hill and Arlington; F. J. Porter, at Hall's and Miner's Hills; Smith, at Mckall's Hill; McCall, at Langley; Buell, at Tenallytown, Meridian Hill, Emory's Chapel, &c., on the left bank of the river; Casey at Washington; Hunt's Ar- tillery, do.; Banks, at Darnstown, with De- tachments at Point of Rocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, &c.; Stone at Poolesville; Dix, at Baltimore, with detachments on the eastern shore.

THE AFFAIR AT BALL'S BLUFF.

On the 19th of October, 1861, Gen. McCall marched to Drainesville with his division, in order to cover reconnoissances to be made in all directions the next day, for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of covering the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of that region.

On the 20th, acting in concert with Gen. McCall, Gen. Smith pushed strong parties to Freedom Hill, Vienna, Flint Hill, Peacock Hill, &c., to accomplish the same purpose in that part of the front.

These reconnoissances were successful.

On the morning of the 20th I received the following telegram from Gen. Banks' head- quarters:

DARNESTOWN, Oct. 20, 1861.

GEN. MARCY.

SIR,—The signal station at Sugar Loaf tele- graphs that the enemy have moved away from Leesburg. All quiet here.

R. M. COPELAND, A. A. G.

Whereupon I sent to Gen. Stone, at Poles- ville, the following telegram:

CAMP GRIFFIN, Oct. 20, 1861.

Brig.-Gen. C. P. STONE, Poolesville:

Gen. McClellan desires me to inform you

that Gen. McCall occupied Drainesville, yesterday, and is still there. Will send out heavy reconoissances to-day in all directions from that point. The general desires that you keep a good lookout on Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect to move them.

A. V. COLBURN, Ass'-Adj.-Gen.

Deeming it possible that Gen. McCall's movement to Drainesville, together with the subsequent reconnoissances, might have the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, and the dispatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to confirm this view, I wished Gen. Stone, who had only a line of pickets on the river, the mass of his troops being out of, and beyond range from the Virginia bank, to make some display of intention to cross, and also to watch the enemy more closely than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend that he should cross the river in force for the purpose of fighting.

The above dispatch was sent on the 20th, and reached Gen. Stone as early as 11 A. M. of that day. I expected him to accomplish all that was intended on the same day; and this he did, as will be seen from the following dispatch received at my headquarters in Washington, from Poolesville, on the evening of October 20th.

To MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN:

Made a feint of crossing at this place this afternoon, and at the same time started a reconnoitring party towards Leesburg from Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets retired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet received. I have means of crossing 125 men once in ten minutes at each of two points. River falling slowly.

C. P. STONE, Brig. Gen.

As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen. McCall would be needed to co-operate with Gen. Stone in any attack, he was directed to fall back from Drainsville to his original camp near Prospect Hill, as soon as the required reconnoissances were completed. Accordingly he left Drainesville on his return at about 8 1-2 A. M. of the 21st, reaching his old camp at about 1 P. M.

In the meantime I was surprised to hear from Gen. Stone that a portion of his troops were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at once sent instructions to Gen. McCall to remain at Drainesville if he had not left before the order reached him.

The order did not reach him until his return to his camp at Langley. He was then ordered to rest his men, and hold his division in readiness to return to Drainesville at a moments notice, should it become necessary.

Similar instructions were given to other divisions during the afternoon.

The first intimation I received from Gen. Stone of the real nature of his movements was in a telegram as follows:

Edward's Ferry, 11.10 A. M. Oct. 2

Maj.-Gen. McClellan,—

The enemy have been engaged opposi Harrison's Island. Our men are behaving a mirably.

C. P. STONE, Brigadier-Gen.

At 2 P. M. Gen. Banks' adjutant-gener sent the following:

Darnstown, Oct. 21, 1861, 2 P.

Gen. R. B. Marcy,—

Gen. Stone safely crossed the river th morning. Some engagements have taken plac on the other side of the river; how importa is not known.

R. M. COPELAND, A. A. A. G.

Gen. Stone sent the following dispatches o the same day at the hours indicated:

Edwards' Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861, 2. P

Maj.-Gen. McClellan,—

There has been sharp firing on the right our line, and our troops appear to be advanc ing there under Baker. The left under Go man, has advanced its skirmishers nearly on mile, and if the movement continues successfu will turn the enemy's right.

C. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.

Edward' Ferry, Oct. 21st. 1861, 4 P. M.

Gen. McClellan,—

Nearly all my force is across the river. Ba ker on the right, Gorman on the left, righ sharply engaged.

C. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.

Edward's Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861, 9.30 P. M

Maj.-Gen. McClellan,—

I am occupied in preventing further disas ter, and trying to get into position to redeem We have lost some of our best commanders— Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner, or secreted The wounded are being carefully and rapidly removed, and Gorman's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. Any advance from Drainesville must be made cautiously. All was reported going well up to Baker's death, but in the confusion following that, the right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless a night attack is made, be in the same position as last night, save the loss of many good men.

C. P. STONE, Brigadier-General.

Although no more fully informed of the state of affairs, I had, during the afternoon, as a precautionary measure, ordered Gen. Banks to send one Brigade to the support of the troops at Harrison's Island, and to move with the other two to Seneca Mills, ready to support Gen. Stone if necessary. The 9.30 P. M dispatch of Gen. Stone did not give me an entire understanding of the state of the case. Aware of the difficulties, and perhaps fatal consequences of recrossing such a river as the Potomac after a repulse, and from these telegrams supposing his whole force to be on the Virginia side, I directed Gen. Stone to intrench himself, and hold the Virginia side at all hazards until re-enforcements could arrive, when he could safely withdraw to the Maryland side or hold his position on the Virginia side, should that prove advisable.

Gen. Banks was instructed to move the rest of his division to Edward's Ferry, and to send over as many men as possible before daylight, to re-enforce Stone. He did not arrive in time to effect this, and was instructed to collect all the canal boats he could find, and use them for crossing at Edwards' Ferry in sufficient force to enable the troops already there to hold the opposite side.

On the 22d I went to the ground in person, and reaching Poolesville learned for the first time the full details of the affair.

The following extracts from the evidence of Gen. Stone before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," on the 5th of January, 1862, will throw further light on this occurrence.

Gen. Stone says he received the orders from my headquarters, to make a slight demonstration, at about 11 o'clock A.M of the 20th, and that in obedience to that order he made the demonstration on the evening of the same day.

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, which resulted in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he was asked the following questions:

"*Question.* Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had you orders from the General-in-Chief to make it?"

To which he replied: "It originated with myself—the reconnoissance."

"*Question.* The order did not proceed from General McClellan?"

"*Answer.* I was directed, the day before, to make a demonstration. *That demonstration was made the day previous.*"

"*Question.* Did you receive an order from the General-in-Chief to make the reconnoissance?"

"*Answer.* No, sir."

Making a personal examination on the 22d I found that the position on the Virginia side at Edward's Ferry was not a tenable one, but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops by daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to be placed in position on the Maryland side, to cover the approaches to the ground held by us, and crossed the few additional troops that the high wind permitted us to get over, so as to be as secure as possible against any attack during the day. Before night-fall, all the precautions were taken to secure an orderly and quiet passage of the troops and guns. The movement was commenced soon after dark, under the general supervision of Gen. Stone, who received the order for the withdrawal at 7.15 P.M. By 4 A.M. of the 24th every thing had reached the Maryland shore in safety.

A few days afterwards I received information, which seems to be authentic, to the effect that large bodies of the enemy had been ordered from Manassas to Leesburg, to cut off our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had probably prevented a still more serious disaster. I refer to Gen. Stone's Report of this battle furnished to the War Department, and his published testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War" for further details.

THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITION.

The records of the War Department show my anxiety and efforts to assume active offensive operations in the fall and early winter. It is only just to say, however, that the unprecedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil would have delayed an advance till February had the discipline, organization and equipment of the army been as complete at the close of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired and labored, against every impediment, to make them. While still in command only of the army of the Potomac, namely, in early September, I proposed the formation of a corps of New Englanders for coast service in the bays and inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac to co-operate with my own command, from which most of its material was drawn.

On the 1st of November, however, I was called to relieve Lieut.-Gen. Scott in the chief and general command of the armies of the Union. The direction and nature of this coast expedition, therefore, were somewhat changed, as will soon appear in the original plan submitted to the Secretary of War, and the letter of instructions later issued to Gen. Burnside, its commander. The whole country indeed had now become the theatre of military operations from the Potomac to and beyond the Mississippi, and to assist the Navy in perfecting and sustaining the blockade, it became necessary to extend those operations to points on the sea-coast, Roanoke Island, Savannah, and New Orleans. It remained also to equip and organize the armies of the West, whose condition was little better than that of the army of the Potomac had been.

The direction of the campaigns in the West, and of the operations upon the sea-board enabled me to enter upon larger combinations, and to accomplish results the necessity and advantage of which had not been unforeseen, but which had been beyond the ability of the single army formerly under my command, to effect.

The following letters and a subsequent paper addressed to the Secretary of War sufficiently indicate the nature of those combinations to minds accustomed to reason upon military operations.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
WASHINGTON, Sept. 6, 1861.

Hon. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War.*

SIR: I have the honor to suggest the following proposition, with the request that the necessary authority be at once given me to carry it out; to organize a force of two brigades of five regiments each of New England men, for the general service—but particularly adapted to coast service. The officers and men to be sufficiently conversant with boat service to manage steamers, sailing vessels, launches, barges, surf boats, floating batteries, &c. To charter or buy for the command a sufficient number of propellers or tug-boats for transportation of men and supplies, the machinery

of which should be amply protected by timber: the vessels to have permanent experienced officers from the merchant service, but to be manned by details from the command. A naval officer to be attached to the staff of the commanding officer. The flank companies of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren boat-guns, and carbines with water-proof cartridges; the other companies to have such arms as I may hereafter designate, to be uniformed and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments are. Launches and floating batteries, with timber parapets of sufficient capacity to land or bring into action the entire force.

The entire management and organization of the force to be under my control, and to form an integral part of the army of the Potomac.

The immediate object of this force is for operations in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac: by enabling me thus to land troops at points where they are needed—this force can also be used in conjunction with a naval force operating against points on the sea-coast. This coast division to be commanded by a general officer of my selection. The regiments to be organized as other land forces. The disbursements for vessels, &c., to be made by the proper department of the army, upon the requisitions of the general commanding the division, with my approval.

I think the entire force can be organized in thirty days, and by no means the least of the advantages of this proposition is the fact, that it will call into the service a class of men who would not otherwise enter the army.

You will immediately perceive that the object of this force is to follow along the coast, and up the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main army when it advances.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comdg.

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the requisite vessels, and adapting them to the special purposes contemplated, this expedition was not ready for service until January, 1862.

Then in the chief command I deemed it best to send it to North Carolina with the design indicated in the following letter:

Head-quarters of the army, Washington, Jan. 7, 1862. Brig.-Gen. A. E. Burnside, *Commanding Expedition.*

General:—In accordance with verbal instructions heretofore given you—you will, after uniting with flag-officer Goldsborough, at Fort Monroe, proceed under his convey to Hatteras Inlet, where you will in connection with him, take the most prompt measures for crossing the fleet over the bulkhead into the waters of the sound. Under the accompanying general order constituting the Department of North Carolina, you will assume command of the garrison at Hatteras Inlet, and make such dispositions in regard to that place, as your ulterior operations may render necessary—always being careful to provide for the safety of that very important station in any co[n]tingency.

Your first point of attack will be Roanok[e] Island and its dependencies.

It is presumed that the navy can reduce th[e] batteries on the marshes, and cover the land[ing] of your troops on the main island b[y] which, in connection with a rapid movemen[t] of the gun-boats to the northern extremity—as soon as the marsh battery is reduced—may be hoped to capture the entire garriso[n] of the place. Having occupied the island an[d] its dependencies, you will at once proceed t[o] the erection of the batteries and defenses n[e]cessary to hold the position with a small forc[e] should the flag-officer require any assistanc[e] in seizing or holding the debouches of th[e] canal from Norfolk—you will please afford [it] to him.

The commodore and yourself having com[-]pleted your arrangments in regard to Roanok[e] Island, and the waters north of it; you wi[ll] please at once make a descent on Newbern[,] having gained possession of which, and th[e] railroad passing through it you will at onc[e] throw a sufficient force upon Beaufort, an[d] take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Maco[n] and open that port. When you seize New[-]bern, you will endeavor to seize the railroa[d] as far west as Goldsborough—should circum[-]stances favor such a movement. The tempe[r] of the people, the rebel force at hand, &c., wi[ll] go far towards determining the question as t[o] how far west the railroad can be occupied an[d] held. Should circumstances render it advis[a]ble to seize and hold Raleigh—the main nort[h] and south line of railroad passing throug[h] Goldsborough, should be so effectually de[-]troyed for considerable distances north an[d] south of that point, as to render it impossibl[e] for the rebels to use it to your disadvan[-]tage. A great point would be gained in an[y] event, by the effectual destruction of the Wi[l]mington and Weldon Railroad.

I would advise great caution in moving s[o] far into the interior as upon Raleigh. Hav[-]ing accomplished the objects mentioned—th[e] next point of interest would probably be Wi[l]mington, the reduction of which may requir[e] that additional means shall be afforded you[.] I would urge great caution in regard to pro[-]clamations. In no case would I go beyond [a] moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as pos[-]sible about politics or the negro, merely stat[e] that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union, and uphold[-]ing the laws of the general government, and stating that all who conduct themselves pro[-]perly, will as far as possible be protected in their persons and property.

You will please report your operations as often as an opportunity offers itself

With my best wishes for your success.

I am, &c., &c., G. B. McClellan,
Maj. Gen. Com'g. in Chief.

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTH.

The following letters of instructions were ent to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman and Butler; and I also communicated verbally to hese officers my views in full, regarding the ield of operations assigned to each, and gave hem their instructions as much in detail as vas necessary at that time.

Head-Quarters of the Army.
Washington, D. C., November 11, 1861.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, U. S. A.
Comd'g. Dept. of Missouri.

GEEERAL:—In assigning you to the command of the Department of Missouri, it is probably necessary for me to state that I have entrusted to you a duty which requires the utmost tact and decision.

You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military commander to perform; but the far more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of changing probably the majority of the personnel of the staff of the department, and of reducing to a point of economy consistent with the interests and necessities of the state, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world.

You will find in your department many general and staff-officers holding illegal commissions and appointments not recognized or approved by the President or Secretary of War, you will please at once inform these gentlemen of the nulity of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are issued to them until such time as commissions may be authorized by the President, or Secretary of War.

If any of them give the slightest trouble you will at once arrest him and send him under guard, out of the limits of your department, informing them that if they return they will be placed in close confinement. You will please examine into the legality of the organization of the troops serving in the department. When you find any illegal, unusual, or improper organizations you will give to the officers and men an opportunity to enter the legal military establishment under general laws and orders from the War Department; reporting in full to these head-quarters any officer or organization that may decline.

You will please cause competent and reliable staff officers to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them until you receive the report in each case. Where there is the slightest doubt as to the propriety of the contract, you will be good enough to refer the matter with full explanation to these head-quarters, stating in each case what would be a fair compensation for the services or materials rendered under the contract. Discontinue at once the reception of material or services under any doubtful contract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all officers who have in any way violated their duty to the government. In regard to the political conduct of affairs, you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adjacent States, that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order.

With respect to military operations, it is probable, from the best information in my possession, that the interests of the government will be best served by fortifying and holding in considerable strength, Rolla, Sedalia and other interior points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal stations, and concentrating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand.

I would be glad to have you make, as soon as possible, a personal inspection of all the important points in your department and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly impress upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, together with all facts that will enable me to maintain that general direction of the armies of the United States which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain thorough organization, discipline and economy throughout your department. Please inform me, as soon as possible, of everything relating to the gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed.

The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its defence, will be under your orders. I am, General, &., &c.,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, M. G. Com. U. S.

Headquarters of the Army, Washington,
BRIG.-GEN. D. C. BUELL: Nov. 7, 1861.

General,—In giving you instructions for your guidance, in command of the department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to express plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of operations there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River is, by its position, so closely related to the States of Illinois and Missouri that it has seemed best to attach it to the Department of Missouri. Your operations, then, in Kentucky will be confined to that portion of the State east of the Cumberland River. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard the importance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by the army under my immediate command. And it is absolutely necessary that we shall hold all the State of Kentucky; not only that, but that the majority of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our cause, it being that which best subserves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. I certainly cannot over estimate the importance of the former. You will please constantly bear in mind the precise issue for

which we are fighting—that issue is the preservation of the Union, and the restoration of the authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings and opinions of the President when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the general government.

The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it, that their domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in all respects, carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions.

So much in regard to political considerations. The military problem would be a simple one, could it be entirely separated from political influences; such is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate, wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee, are in favor of the Union; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of Eastern Tennessee to use, while you at the same time cut off, the railway communication between eastern Virginia and the Mississippi.

It will be prudent to fortify the pass, before leaving it in your rear. I am, &c.,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, M. G. Com., U. S. A.

Headq's of the Arm y, Washington, Nov. 12, '61.

Brig.-Gen. D. C. BUELL, Com. Dep. of the Ohio:

General,—Upon assuming command of the department, I will be glad to have you make, as soon as possible, a careful report of the condition of your command. The main point to which I desire to call your attention, is the necessity of entering eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable chances of success, and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding, at the same time, the main avenues by which the rebels might invade Kentucky. Our conversations on the subject of military operations have been so full, and my confidence in your judgment is so great, that I will not dwell further on the subject, except to urge upon you the necessity of keeping me fully informed as to the state of affairs, both military and political, and your movements.

In regard to political matters, bear in mi that we are fighting only to preserve the tegrity of the Union, and to uphold the ge ral government; as far as military necessi will permit, religiously respect the consti tional rights of all. Preserve the stricte discipline among the troops, and while e ploying the utmost energy in military mov ments, be careful so to treat the unarmed habitants as to contract, not widen, the brea existing between us and the rebels. I me by this, that it is the desire of the governme to avoid unnecessary irritation by causele arrests and persecution of individuals. Whe there is good reason to believe that perso are actually giving aid, comfort, or inform tion to the enemy, it is, of course, necessa to arrest them; but I have always found it the tendency of subordinates to make vex tious arrests on mere suspicion. You w find it well to direct that no arrest shall l made except by your order, or that of yo generals, unless in extraordinary cases, alwa holding the party making the arrest respo sible for the propriety of his course. It shou be our constant aim to make it apparent to a that their property, their comfort, and the personal safety, will be best preserved by a hering to the cause of the Union.

If the military suggestions I have made this letter prove to have been founded erroneous data, you are, of course, perfect free to change the plan of operations. I a &c., &c., G. B. McCLELLAN, M. G. Com., U. S. Headq's of the Army, Washington, Feb. 14, '6 B.-Gen. P. W. SHERMAN, C'g. at Port Royal, &c

General,—Your dispatches, in regard to t occupation of Dafuskie Island, &c., were r ceived to-day. I saw also to-day, for the fir time, your requisition for a siege train for S vannah.

After giving the subject all the consider tion in my power, I am forced to the concl sion that, under present circumstances, t siege and capture of Savannah do not promi results comensurate with the sacrifices nece sary. When I learned that it was possible f the gun-boats to reach the Savannah Riv above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggeste themselves to my mind, as its immediate r sults.

First. The capture of Savannah by a 'cou de main,' the result of an instantaneous a vance and attack by the army and navy.

The time for this has passed, and your le ter indicates that you are not accountable fo the failure to seize the propitious momen but that, on the contrary, you perceived it advantages.

Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut off it supplies, and at least facilitate its reductio by a bombardment.

Although we have a long delay to deplore, th second course still remains open to us; and strongly advise the close blockade of Pulask and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inc

mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confident you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essential; you obtain complete control of the harbor, you relieve the blockading fleet, and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations.

I do not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege, after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance. The expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours.

But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the reduction of Charleston and its defences. There the rebellion had its birth; there the unnatural hatred of our government is most intense; there is the centre of the boasted power and courage of the rebels. To gain Fort Sumter, and hold Charleston, is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route, and armies in motion, which have certain preliminary objects to accomplish before we are ready to take Charleston in hand. But the time will before long arrive when I shall be prepared to make that movement. In the mean time, it is my advice and wish that no attempt be made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried with certainty by a coup de main.

Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski, and Fernandina. St. Augustine might as well be takeh by way of interlude, while awaiting the preparations for Charleston. Success attends us everywhere at present. Very truly yours, G. B. McC,, Maj. G. C. U. S. A.

Head-Qnarters of the Army, Washington, Feb. 23, 1862. Maj.-General B. F. Butler, *U. S. Volunteers.*—

GENERAL:—You are assigned to the command of the land forces destined to co-operate with the navy, in the attack upon New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, with the exception of your chief of staff, and Lieut. Weitzel, of the engineers. The force at your disposal, will consist of the first 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, (old and good regiments from Baltimore.)

The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, will await your orders at Fort Monroe.

Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well drilled as heavy artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, will be sufficient for your purposes.

After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in which it is proposed to operaie, I have arrived at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped, and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary.

This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 680 artillery; total 15 255 men.

The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments; Fort Pickens can probably give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000.

The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered, (perhaps the only one), is in the resistance offered by Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these works; in that case, you will, after their capture leave a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure; and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few heavy guns, and some troops, be left at the Pilot Station, (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event ot a disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured.

Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault.

The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, also, the eastern bank of the river above the city, it may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may be best for purposes of discipline, to keep your men out of the city.

After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim yonr attention.

A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need not call your attention to the neceesity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, Mississippi, as soon as you can safely

do so, either after, or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway terminus at the city.

In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as ths operations of the northern column develop themselves.

I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are: *First*, The reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches; then Mobile and its defenses; then Pensacola, Galveston, &c. It is probable that by the time New Orleans is reduced it will be in the power of the government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects; in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans. I am, &c., G. B. McC. M. G. C. U. S. A.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope the operations of all the armies in the Union—the army of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in co-operatian along our whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the army of the Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work.

But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration.

A change had just been made in the War Department, and I was soon urged by the New Secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and to free the banks of the lower Potomac from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels.

Very soon after his entrance upon office, I laid before him, verbally, my designs as to the part of the plan of campaign to be executed by the army of the Potomac, which was to attack Richmond by the lower Chesapeake.

He instructed me to develop it to the President, which I did. The result was, that the President disapproved it, and by an order of January 31, 1862 substituted one of his own.

On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was issued without consultation with me.

Executive Mansion, Washingtoc, Jan. 27, 1862. President's General War Order, No. 1.

Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement the land and naval forces of the United Sta against the insurgent forces. That, especia the army at and about Fortress Monroe, army of the Potomac, the army of West Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, K tucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and nav with their respective commanders, obey exi ing orders for the time, and be ready to ob additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and espe ally the Secretaries of War and of the Nav with all their subordinates, and the General-i Chief, with all other commanders and subo dinates of land and naval forces, will several be held to their strict and full responsibilitie for prompt execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The order of January 31, 1862, is as follows

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 186

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDERS, No. 1.

Ordered: That all the disposable force of th army of the Potomac, after providing safely fo the defense of Washington, be formed into a expedition for the immediate object of seizin and occupying a point upon the railroad south westward of what is known as Manassas Junc tion, all details to be in the discretion of th Commander-in-Chief, and the expedition to mov before or on the 22d day of February next.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I asked his excellency whether this order wa to be regarded as final, or whether I could b permitted to submit, in writing, my objection to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared the letter to the Secretary of Wa which is given below. Before this had been submitted to the President, he addressed the following note:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, FEB. 3, 1862.

MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN—My Dear Sir: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York River: mine to move directly to a point on the railraad southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of *time* and *money* than mine? 2d. Wherein is a victory *more certain* by your plan than mine? 3d. Wherein is a victory *more valuable* by your plan than mine? 4th. In fact, would it not be *less* valuable in this; that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? 5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine? Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.

These questions were substantially answered by the following letter of the same date to the Secretary of War.

Headquarters of the Army, Washington, Feb. 3, 1862. Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Sec'y of War*: Sir,—I ask your indulgence for the following paper rendered necessary by circumstances.

I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27, 1861, six days after the Battle of Bull Run. I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments, cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works—nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited; they were not even placed in military positions—the city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry.

Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task assigned to me; that task the Hon. Secretary knows was given to me without my solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I have accomplished it will best be shown by the past and the present. The capital is secure against attack; the extensive fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous army; the enemy have been held in check; the State of Maryland is securely in our possession; the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of our laws—and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end: the enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July; more than all this, I have now under my command a well drilled and reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed: this army is young and untried in battle—but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable of great deeds. That so much has been accomplished and such an army created, in so short a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration and the nation. Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack; but there is a vast difference between that and the efficiency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied and fortified. In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked for an effective and movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of the Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. Even when in a subordinate position, I always looked beyond the operations of the army of the Potomac: I was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory—but looked to combined and decisive operations. When I was placed in command of the armies of the United States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only *one*, while the most important, of the masses under my command. I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan, which had before existed—nor did I know that utter disorganization and want of preparation pervaded the Western armies. I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to move toward the fulfillment of my plans; I acknowledge that I made a great mistake. I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri — their instructions looked to prompt movements—I soon found that the labor of creation and organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery discipline, all were wanting: these things required time to procure them. The generals in command have done their work most creditably—but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the good weather of December; I was mistaken. My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee Railroad as a preliminary movement—then to follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles—but I prefer to strike at the heart. Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the army of the Potomac. 1st. That of Washington, its present position, involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions: or a combination of the two plans. The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left. Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river and near his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre (we might destroy the former), we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway communication.

The fords of Occoquan, below the mouth of Bull Run, are watched by the rebels; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in rear, (concealed by the woods,) and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has just been received, to the effect that the enemy

are intrenching a line of heights, extending from the vicinity of Sangsters, (Union Mills), towards Evansport. Early in January Sprigg's Ford was occupied by Gen. Rhodes, with 3,600 men and eight guns. There are strong reasons for believing that Davis's Ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate, or prove that the enemy anticipates the movement in question, and is prepared to resist it. Assuming, for the present, that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our columns (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least five or six,) can reach the Accotink without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills: this danger must be met by occupying, in some force, either the two first-named places, or, better, the point of junction of the roads leading to the village of Occoquan. This occupation must be sustained so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, or until a battle is won.

The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's Run to the mouth, the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force we must, with what assistance the flottilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in flank himself.

Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a column, by the the shortest route, to Dumfries, partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the Potomac, partly to cover our left flank against an attack from the direction of Acquia; and, lastly, to establish our communication with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy would by this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in the force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat further to the south-west.

Our next step would be to prevent the enemy from crossing the Occoquan between Bull Run and the Broad Run, to fall upon our right flank, while moving on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race Church and the cross-roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more effectually, by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from debouching on our side.

These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require some time to effect them. As nearly, at the same time, as possible, we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes above Broad Run. Having secured our right flank, it would become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could not leave it between our right flank and the main body. The final movement on the railroad must be determined by circumstance existing at the time.

This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he occupies with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong line of defence, enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action.

Should we place a portion of our force in front of Centreville, while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check.

I should, perhaps, have dwelt more decidedly on the fact that the force left near Sangsters must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occoquan, until the decisive battle is over, so as to cover our retreat, in the event of disaster; unless it should be decided to select and intrench a new base somewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding involving much time.

After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force could be drawn in to a more central and less exposed position, say Brimstone Hill, or nearer the Occoquan.

In this latitude the weather will, for a considerable period, be very uncertain, and a movement commenced in force on roads in tolerably firm condition, will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will, therefore, be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a disadvantage by rapid manœuvres. Our slow progress will enable him to divine our purposes, and take his measures accordingly. The probability is, from the best information we possess, that the enemy has improved the roads leading to his line of defence, while we will have to work as we advance.

Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present unprecedented and impassable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the movement on this line. Nor can its duration be closely calculated; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse, before it is possible to commence the march. Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question at once arises, as to the importance of the results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possession of the field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory; important results, it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could fall back upon other positions and fight us again and again, should the condition of the troops

permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of range of the intrenchments at Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow him up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges, and otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would probably find ourselves forced, at last, to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces, and perfect his measures at the very point where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared.

II. The second base of operations available for the army of the Potomac, is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east.

The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.

The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington, (which is *very* unfavorable,) much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the asssilant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would be in our power; and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves; disperse or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.

Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our flank is covered by the water, our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet in full play.

After a successful battle, our position would be, Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee and Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and Memphis.

The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia, to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia, to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans.

We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure, all the southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication, to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to re-establish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead of that of the rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I ever had in view; this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish.

For many long months, I have labored to prepare the army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme; from the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition, that they too could perform their allotted duties.

Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant results, is Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught, it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy, it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana, would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank of the river.

Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay—or the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.

To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a large amount of cheap water transportation must be collected, consisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very different character from those required for all previous expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within thirty days from the time the order is given. I propose as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing-place for the first detatchments. To transport by water four divisions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of embarkation for as many as possible. To move the regular cavalry and reserve artillery

the remaining bridge trains and wagons to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means of North River ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the movement by an infantry force near Heathsville) and to cross the Rappahannock in a similar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will thus be very much diminished (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 horses) and the result none the less certain.

The concentration of the cavalry, &c., in the lower counties of Maryland, can be effected without exci ing suspicion, and the movement made without delay from that cause.

This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington to danger.

The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to circumstances, from 110 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valuable consideration. It is my decided opinion, that in that point of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay highly probable, that the weather and state of the roads, may be such as to delay the direct movement from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great risks—far beyond the time required to complete the second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse—nothing like their present condition has ever been known here before; they are impassible at present, we are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line, I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense results.

My judgment as a general, is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fort Monroe as a basè—as a certain though less brilliant movement, than that from Urbana—to an attack upon Manassas.

I knew that his Excellency the President, you and I, all agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are to bring the war to a close, as promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us. I am sure of it. Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished, and disregard everything else. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. B. McC., M. G. C.

This letter must have produced some effect upon the mind of the President, since the execution of his order was not required, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been issued. Many verbal conferences ensued, in which among other things, it was determined to collect as many canal-boats as possible, with a view to employ them largely in the transportation of the army to the lower Chesapeake. The idea was at one time entertained by the President to use them in forming a bridge across the Potomac, near Liverpool Point, in order to throw the army over at that point, but this was subsequently abandoned. It was also found by experience, that it would require much time to prepare the canal-boats for use in transportation to the extent that had been anticipated.

Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, the Secretary of War, by the authority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport the army of the Potomac to its new field of operations.

The following extracts from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated April 5th, will show the nature and progress of this well-executed service:

* * * * *

"I was called to Washington by telegraph on 17th January last, by Assistant-Secretary of War Thomas A Scott. I was informed that Maj.-Gen. McClellan wished to see me. From him I learned that he desired to know if transportation on smooth water could be obtained, to move at one time, for a short distance, about 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such an army. He frankly stated to me, that he had always supposed such a movement entirely feasible until two experienced quarter-masters had recently reported it impracticable, in their judgment. A few days afterwards, I reported to Gen. McClellan that I was entirely confident the transports could be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object could be accomplished. A week or more afterwards, I had the honor af an interview with the President and Gen. McClellan, when the subject was further discussed, and especially as to the time required.

I expressed the opinion, that as the movement of the horses and wagons would have to be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that as each schooner would require to be properly fitted for the protection of the horses, and furnished with a supply ot water and forage, and each transport for the troops provided with water, I did not deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could start within thirty days from the time the order was given.

The President and Gen. McClellan both urgently stated the vast importance of an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds prevailed, and there was great dispatch in loading, the time might be materially diminished.

On the 14th of February, [Secretary of War] advertised for transports of various descriptions, inviting bids. On the 27th February I was informed that the proposed movement by water was decided upon. That evening the quarter-master-general was informed of the decision. Directions were given to secure the transportation, and my assistance was tendered.

"He promptly detailed to this duty two most efficient assistants in his department: Col. Rufus Ingalls was stationed at Annapolis, where it was then proposed to embark the troops, and Capt. Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With these arrangements, I left Washington on the 28th February.

* * * * * * *

"I beg to hand herewith a statement, prepared by Capt. Hodges, of the vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, and the parties from whom they were taken, viz.:

"113 Steamers, at an average price per day $215 10
188 Schooners " " . . 24 45
88 Barges " " . . 14 27

"In thirty-seven days from the time I received the order in Washington, (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days,) these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and Washington, to Fort Monroe—(the place of departure having been changed, which caused delay)—121,500 men; 14,592 animals; 1,150 wagons; 44 batteries; 74 ambulances; besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for an army of such magnitude. The only loss of which I have heard, is eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident has occurred, to my knowledge.

"I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record.

"John Tucker, Ass't-Sec. of War."

THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES ON THE POTOMAC.

In the meantime the destruction of the batteries on the lower Potomac, by crossing our troops opposite them, was considered, and preparations were even made for throwing Hooker's division accross the river to carry them by assault. Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, given below, who made a reconnoissance of the positions; and in view of the fact that it was still out of the power of the navy department to furnish suitable vessels to co-operate with the land troops, this plan was abandoned as impracticable. A close examination of the enemy's works and their approaches, made after they were evacuated, showed that the decision was a wise one. The only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these works, so much desired by the President, was by a movement by land, from the left of our lines, on the right, bank of the Potomac, a movement obviously unwise.

The attention of the Navy Department, as early as Aug. 12, 1861, had been called to the necessity of maintaining a strong force of efficient war vessels on the Potomac.

Headq's, Div'n. Potomac, Wash., Aug. 12, 1861.
Hon. Gid. Welles, Sec. U. S. Navy:

Sir,—I have, to-day, received additional information which convinces me that it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw a respectable force from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Maryland. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection of batteries at Mathias and White House Points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others probably designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Acquia Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, so as to render such passage of the river, absolutely impossible.

I recommend that the Minnesota, and any other vessels available from Hampton Roads, be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should be kept at Alexandria; and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force in the Potomac without delay.

If the naval department will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased.

I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't,
G. B. McClellan, M.-G. Com'g.

It was on the 27th Sept'r., 1861, that Gen. Barnard, chief engineer, in company with Capt. Wyman, of the Potomac Flotilla, had been instructed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as far as Mathias Point. In his report of his observations, he says:—"Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawampsic, *cannot* be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on *certain* points, but along here, somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What is the remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be anticipated nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack of a peculiar battery. To suppose that we can capture *all*, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own

front can prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington and Alexandria, by capturing them one and all as fast as they are built."

In another communication upon the subject of crossing troops for the purpose of destroying the batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, Gen. Barnard says:

"The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defence of the enemy, and all that we would have to do, if we were really opening a campaign against them there. "It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by landing on Freestone Point.

"With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied that it involves a risk of failure.

"Should we then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not.

"Will not the Erricson, assisted by one other gun-boat, capable of keeping along side these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation sufficiently free as long as we require it? Capt. Wyman says yes."

It was the opinion of competent naval officers, and I concur with them, that had an adequate force of strong and well armed vessels been acting upon the Potomac from the beginning of August, it would have been next to impossible for the rebels to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of the river. The enemy never occupied Mathias Point, nor any other point on the river, which was out of supporting distance from their main army.

When the enemy commenced the construction of these batteries, the army of the Potomac was not in condition to prevent it; their destruction by our army would have afforded but a temporary relief, unless we had been strong enough to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be done either by driving the enemy from Manassas and Aquia Creek by main force, or by manœuvring to compel them to evacuate their positions. The latter course was finally pursued, and with success.

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD.

About the 20th of Feb., 1862, additional measures were taken to secure the re-opening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The preliminary operations of Gen. Lander for this object are elsewhere described.

I had often observed to the President, and to members of the Cabinet, that the reconstruction of this railway could not be undertaken, until we were in a condition to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester and Strasburg as necessary to cover the railway in rear, and it was not until the month of February, that I felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable, but not vital purpose.

The whole of Bank's division, and two brigades of Sedgwick's division, were thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy. A sufficient number of troops of all arms, were held in readiness in the vicinity of Washington, either to march via Leesburg, or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, should this become necessary in carrying out the objects in view. The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently addressed to the War Department, will sufficiently explain the conduct of these operations.

NOTES:—"When I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly stated to the President and Secretary of War, that the chief object of the operation would be to open the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, by crossing the river in force at Harper's Ferry; that I had collected the material for making a permanent bridge by means of canal-boats; that from the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether such a bridge could be constructed; that if it could not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the railroad bridge, and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure, move on Winchester.

When I arrived at the place, I found the batteau bridge nearly completed; the holding ground proved better than had been anticipated, the weather was favorable, there being no wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades which had arrived, and took steps to hurry up the other two, belonging respectively to Bank's and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing supplies had not then become apparent. That night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four batteries of heavy artillery, to come up the next day (Thursday) besides directing Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up on Friday.

Next morning the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the lift lock, in order to commence at once the construction of a permanent bridge; it was then found for the first time that the lock was too small to permit the passage of the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on the Shenandoah Canal, and too narrow by some four or six inches for the canal-boats. The lift locks above and below are all large enough for the ordinary boats. I had seen them at Edward's Ferry thus used: it had always been represented to the engineers by the military railroad employees and others, that the lock was large enough, and the difference being too small to be detected by the eye, no one had thought of measuring it, or suspected any difficulty. I thus suddenly found myself unable to build the permament bridge. A violent gale had arisen, which threatened the safety of our only means of communication; the narrow approach to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with wagons, that it was very clear that under existing circumstances nothing more could be done than to cross over the

baggage and supplies of the two brigades: of these, instead of being able to cross both during the morning, the last arrived only in time to go over just before dark. It was evident that the troops under orders, would only be in the way, should they arrive, and that it would not be possible to subsist them for a rapid march for Winchester. It was therefore deemed necessary to countermand the order, content ourselves with covering the reopening of the railroad for the present, and in the mean time use every exertion to establish, as promptly as possible, depots of forage and subsistence on the Virginia side, to supply the troops and enable them to move on Winchester, independently of the bridge. The next day (Friday) I sent a strong reconnoissance to Charleston, and under its protection went there myself. I then determined to hold that place, and to move the troops composing Lander's and Williams' commands at once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus effectually covering the reconstruction of the railroad.

"Having done this, and taken all the steps in my power to ensure the rapid transmission of supplies over the river, I returned to this city, well satisfied with what had been accomplished. While up the river I learned that the President was dissatisfied with the state of affairs—but on my return here, understood from the Sec. of War, that, upon learning the whole state of the case, the President was fully satisfied. I contented myself, therefore, with giving to the Secretary a brief statement about as I have written it here."

The design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the first of April, the date of my departure for the Peninsula, the railroad was in running order. As a demonstration upon the left flank of the enemy, this movement no doubt assisted in determining the evacuation of his lines on the eighth and ninth of March.

PREPARATIONS TO MOVE FROM WASHINGTON.

Upon my return from Harper's Ferry, on the 28th of Feb., the preparations necessary to carry out the wishes of the President and Sec. of War. in regard to destroying the batteries on the lower Potomac, were at once undertaken. Mature reflection convinced me that this operation would require the movement of the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy would resist it with his whole strength. I undertook it with great reluctance, both on account of the extremely unfavorable condition of the roads, and my firm conviction that the proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it subsequently did, force the enemy to abandon all his positions in front of Washington. Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign to precipitate this evacuation by any direct attack, nor to subject the army to needless loss of life and material, by a battle near Washington, which could produce no decisive results. The preparations for a movement towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were, however, advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I had invited the commanders of divisions to meet at headquarters on the 8th of March, for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their advice and opinions in regard to their commands, when an interview with the President indicated to me the possibility of a change in my orders.

His Excellency sent for me at a very early hour on the morning of the 8th, and renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction with the affairs at Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of the same facts which had before given satisfaction to his Excellency, again produced, as I supposed, the same result. The views which I expressed to the President were reinforced by the results of a meeting of my general officers at headquarters. At that meeting, my plans were laid before the division commanders, and were approved by a majority of those present. Nevertheless, on the same day, two important orders were issued by the President, without consultation with me. The first of these was the General War Order No. 2, directing the formation of army corps, and assigning their commanders.

I had always been in favor of the principle of an organization into army corps, but preferred deferring its practical execution, until some little experience in campaign, and on the field of battle, should show what general officers were most competent to exercise these high commands; for it must be remembered, that we then had no officers whose experience in war, on a large scale, was sufficient to prove that they possessed the necessary qualifications. An incompetent commander of an army corps, might cause irreparable damage, while it was not probable that an incompetent division commander could cause any very serious mischief. These views had frequently been expressed by me to the President and members of the Cabinet; it was, therefore, with as much regret as surprise, that I learned the existence of this order.

The first order has been given above, the second order was as follows:

Executive Mansion, Washington, March 8, '62.
President's General War Order, No. 3.

Ordered: That no change of the base of operations of the army of the Potomac, shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, and the commanders of army corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said army of the Potomac, shall be moved en route for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from enemy's batteries, and

other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March inst., and the Gen.-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day.

Ordered: That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

L. Thomas, Adj't. Gen. AB. LINCOLN.

After what has been said already in regard to the effect of a movement to the lower Chesapeake, it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, further than to say, that the time of beginning the movement, depended upon the state of readiness of the transports, the entire control of which had been placed, by the Secretary of War, in the hands of one of the assistant secretaries, and not under the Quartermaster General; so that, even if the movement were not impeded by the condition imposed in regard to the batteries on the Potomac, it could not have been in my power to begin it before the 18th of March, unless the Ass't. Sec'y. of War had completed his arrangements by that time.

Meanwhile important events were occurring, which materially modified the designs for the subsequent campaign. The appearance of the Merrimac off Old Point Comfort, and the encounter with the U. S. Squadron on the 8th of March, threatened serious darangement of the plan for the Penisular movement. But the engagement between the Monitor and the Merrimac, on the 9th of March, demonstrated so satisfactorily the power of the former, and the other naval preparations were so extensive and formidable, that the security of Fort Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt; and, although the James River was closed to us, the York River, with its tributaries, was still open as a line of water communication with the Fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained undisturbed, although less promising in its details than when the James River was in our control.

On Sunday, the 9th of March, information from various sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his positions at Centreville and Manassas, as well as on the upper and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of War were present when the most positive information reached me, and I expressed to them my intention to cross the river immediately, and there gain the most authentic information, prior to determining what course to pursue.

The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected, as the natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula; but their adoption of this course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it relieved me from the result of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions and theirs, deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage, usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary.

The retirement of the enemy, and the occupation of the abandoned positions, which necessarily followed, presented an opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on the march and bivouac, preparatory to the campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other "impediments," which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality.

A march to Manassas and back could produce no delay in embarking for the lower Chesapeake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, besides accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harrass their rear.

I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of March for a general movement of the army the next morning towards Centreville and Manassas, sending in advance two regiments of cavalry under Col. Averil, with orders to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, and do whatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy, if really in retreat. At the same time, I telegraphed to the Secretary of War, that it would be necessary to defer the organization of army corps until the completion of the projected advance upon Manassas, as the divisions could not be brought together in time. The Secretary replied, requiring immediate compliance with the President's order; but on my again representing that this would compel the abandonment or postponement of the movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its postponement. At noon, on the 10th of March, the cavalry advance, reached the enemy's lines at Centreville, passing through his recently occupied camps and works, and finding still burning heaps of military stores and much valuable property.

SECRET SERVICE.

Immediately after being assigned to the command of the troops around Washington, I organized a secret service force under Mr. Allen Pinkerton, whose assumed name was E. J. Allen, a very experienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was continually occupied in procuring, from all possible sources, information regarding the strength, positions and movements of the enemy. All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war,

coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined—first, by the outpost and division commanders, and then by my chief-of-staff and the provost-marshal-general. Their statements, taken in writing, and in many cases under oath, from day to day, for a long period previous to the evacuation of Manassas, comprised a mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, enabled me to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength of the enemy before us. Summaries, showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service force, accompany this report, and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time, and persons in high office, unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude the country with Quaker-gun stories of the defenses, and gross understatements of the numbers, of the enemy.

The following orders were issued for the examination of persons coming from the direction of the enemy:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Washington, Dec. 16, 1861.—*Circular*: The Major-General commanding directs, That all deserters, prisoners, spies, "contrabands," and all other persons whatever, coming or brought within our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the commander of the division within whose lines they may come or be brought, without previous examination by any one, except so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding the advanced guard, to elicit information regarding his particular post; That the division commander examine all such persons himself, or delegate such duty to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no other persons to hold any communication with them: That he then immediately send them, with a sufficient guard, to the provost marshal in this city for further examination and safe keeping; and that stringent orders be given to all guards having such persons in charge not to hold any communication with them whatever; and further, that the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately communicated to the major-general commanding, or to the chief-of-staff, and to no other person whatever.

The major-general commanding further directs that a sufficient guard be placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such guards be instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, general officers, and such staff officers as may be authorized by their chief, to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraphic instruments.

By command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan, S. Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Washington, Feb. 26, 1862.

General Orders, No. 27.

* * * * *

All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within our lines will be taken at once to the provost marshal of the nearest division, who will examine them in presence of the division commander, or an officer of his staff designated for the purpose. This examination will only refer to such information as may affect the division and those near it; especially those remote from general headquarters. As soon as this examination is completed, and it must be made as rapidly as possible, the person will be sent under proper guard to the provost-marshal-general, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. Upon receiving him the provost-marshal-general will at once send him with this statement to the chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, who will cause the necessary examination to be made. The provost-marshal-general will have the custody of all such persons. Division commanders will at once communicate to other division commanders all information thus obtained which affects them. . . . .

By command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan,
S. Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen.

In addition to the foregoing orders, the division commanders were instructed whenever they desired to send out scouts towards the enemy, to make known the object at headquarters, in order that I might determine whether we had the information it was proposed to obtain, and that I might give the necessary orders to other commanders so that the scouts should not be molested by the guards.

It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, dated March 8th, that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac at that date were as follows:

At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, and vicinity, 80,000 men; at Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicinity, 18,000 men; at Leesburg and vicinity, 4,500 men; in the Shenandoah Valley, 13,000 men; Total number, 115,500.

About three hundred field-guns, and from twenty-six to thirty siege-guns were with the rebel army in front of Washington.

The report made on the 17th of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville corroborates the statements contained in the repoort of the 8th, and is fortified by the affidavits of several railroad engineers, conductors, baggage-masters, &c., whose opportunities for forming correct estimates were unusually good. These affidavits will be found in the accompanying reports of the chief of the secret-service corps.

ENEMY'S WORKS AT AND NEAR MANASSAS.—A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville made by Lieut. McAlester, U. S. Engineers, on March 14th, 1862, and a survey of those at Manassas made by a party of the U. S. Coast Survey in April, 1862, confirmed also my conclusions as to the strength of the enemy's defenses.

Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east, and the other north. The for-

mer consisted of seven works, viz.: one bastion-fort, two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries: all containing embrasures for forty guns, and connected by infantry parapets and double caponnieres. It extended along the crest of the ridge about one mile and three-quarters from its junction with the northern front, to ground thickly wooded, and impassable to an attacking column. The northern front extended about one mile and a quarter to Great Rocky Run, and thence three-quarters of a mile further, to thickly wooded impassable ground in the valley of Cub Run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries, with embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of a cremalliere line with redans.

At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt with ten embrasures.

Manassas Station was defended in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, and connected by infantry parapets. This system was rendered complete by a very large work with sixteen embrasures, which commanded the highest of the other works by about fifty feet.

Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the maps appended to this report.

From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impassable streams and broken ground, affording ample protection to their flanks, and that strong lines of intrenchments swept all the available approaches.

Although the history of every former war has conclusively shown the great advantages which are possessed by an enemy acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions defended by heavy earthworks, yet, at the commencement of this war but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact.

New levies that have never been in battle, cannot be expected to advance without cover under the murderous fire from such defenses, and carry them by assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently falter, and are repulsed with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions, in front of Washington, with the new troops composing the army of the Potomac, during the winter of 1861–2, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same army, though enured to war in many battles hardly fought and bravely won, has thrice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid.

My letter to the Secretary of War, dated February 3d, 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement to the Peninsula, would compel the enemy to retire from his position at Manassas, and free Washington from danger.

When the enemy first learned of that plan they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula campaign, as at no former period northern Virginia was completely in our possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for an evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left free to advance northward, and menace the national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defense of Washington, is a Peninsula attack on Richmond.

THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER RELIEVING GEN'L McCLELLAN OF THE COMMAND-IN-CHIEF.—My order for the organization of the army corps, was issued on the 13th of March. It has been given above.

While at Fairfax Court House, on March 12th, I was informed through the telegraph, by a member of my staff, that the following document had appeared in the "National Intelligencer," of that morning.

Exec. Mansion, Washington, March 11, 1862. President's War Order, No. 3.

Maj.-Gen. McClellan, having personally taken the field at the head of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the department of the Potomac.

Ordered further, That the departments now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under Gen. Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Koxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that, until otherwise ordered, Major.-Gen. Halleck have command of said department.

Ordered also, That the country west of the Department of the Potomac, and east of the Department of the Mississippi, be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Maj.-Gen. Fremont.

That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respectively report, severally and directly, to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports, will be expected of all and each of them. AB. LINCOLN.

Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position of general-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he saw fit to make of my services, and so informed him in a note, on the 12th of March, in which occur these words:

"I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection with some Western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition, should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity

t prove it, and you will find that, under pre-
s t circumstances, I shall work just as cheer-
f y as before, and that no consideration of
f will, in any manner, interfere with the
c charge of my public duties. Again thank-
f you for official and personal kindness you
l e so often evinced towards me, I am, &c."

A RECONNOISSANCE.

On the 14th of March, a reconnoissance of
arge body of cavalry, with some infantry,
ler command of Gen. Stoneman, was sent
ng the Orange and Alexandria railroad, to
ermine the position of the enemy, and, if
ssible, force his rear across the Rappahan-
k; but the roads were in such condition,
t, finding it impossible to subsist his men,
n. Stoneman was forced to return, after
aching Cedar Run. The following dispatch
m him recites the result of this expedition:

Headq's., Union Mills, March 16, 1862.

Col. Colburn:—We arrived here last even-
g about dark; we got corn for horses; no
ovisions for men; Bull Run too high to
oss; had we stayed an hour longer, we
uld not have got here to-day, owing to the
gh water in the streams; felt the enemy
ntiously, and found him in force at Warren-
n Junction; saw two regiments of cavalry,
d three bodies of infantry, on the other side
Cedar Run; had we crossed, should not
ve been able to get back for high water;
d three men of 5th Cavalry hit driving in
emy's pickets; one slightly wounded in the
ad.

Enemy acted confidently, and followed us
me way back on the road, but did not mo-
st us in any way. Enemy's force consisted
Stewart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of
tillery, and some infantry; railroad bridges
burnt down up to Warrenton Junction;
ill entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn
a moment's warning, having dry wood piled
on them; heard cars running during the
ght before last, probably bringing up troops
om Rappahannock; heard of two regiments
infantry at Warrenton, engaged in impress-
g the militia and securing forage; heard of
large force of infantry this side of Rappa-
annock River, having come up to Warrenton
unction from Acquia Creek day before yes-
rday; bridges all destroyed this side of
road Run. The aids who take this will give
ou further particulars. Very respectfully, &c.

Geo. Stoneman, Brig.-Gen. Com'g.

DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON.

The main body of the army was, on the 11th
f March, moved back to the vicinity of Alex-
ndria to be embarked, leaving a part of Gen.
umner's corps at Manassas, until other troops
ould be sent to relieve it.

Before it was withdrawn, a strong recon-
oissance under Gen. Howard was sent to-
vards the Rappahannock, the result of which
ppears in the following dispatch:

Warrenton Junction, March 29, 1862.

Gen. S. Williams:—Express just received from Gen. Howard. He drove the enemy across the Rappahannock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the Rappahannock River. The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. Gen. Howard will return to this camp to-morrow morning.

E. V. Sumner, Brig.-Gen.

The line of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap railroad was thus reasonably secure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy.

On the 13th of March, a council of war was assembled at the Fairfax Court House, to discuss the military status. The President's Order No. 3, of March 8th, was considered. The following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fairfax Court House, March 13, 1862.

A council of the Generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the army of the Potomac, were of the opinion:

I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers.

Provided—

1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutralized.

2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria, to move down the Potomac, and,

3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries on the York River.

4th. The force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.—(Unanimous.)

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the means of reconstruting bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Richmond railroads.—(Unanimous.)

N. B. That, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice.—(Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.)

A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice.—(Sumner.)

This was assented to by myself, and immediately communicated to the War Department. The following reply was received the same day:

War Department, March 13, 1862.

To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,—

The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the army corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

2d. Leave Washington entirely secure.

3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac—choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Sec. of War.

My preparations were at once begun in accordance with these directions, and on the 16th of March the following instructions were sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth.

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, March 16, '62.

Sir,—You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas; intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front.

Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to Manassas, and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the Valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as Manassas Gap Railway is in running order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Valley, as well as through Chester Gap, which might, perhaps, be advantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry well intrenched. Block houses should be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction, or Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the Orange and Alexandria Railway, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired.

Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, and probably a fourth towards Leesburg.

To recapitulate: The most important points which should engage your attention are as follows:

1st. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even Centerville, and another force, (a brigade), also well intrenched, near Strasburg.

2d. Block houses at the Railway bridges.

3d. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front.

4th. Grand Guards at Warrenton Junction, and in advance as far as the Rappahannock, if possible.

5th. Great care to be exercised to ob full and early information as to the enemy.

6th. The general object is to cover the of the Potomac and Washington.

The foregoing is communicated by comm of Maj.-Gen. McClellan.

S. WILLIAMS, Assistant-Adjt.-Ge

To Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks,

Comd'g. 5th Corps Army of the Potomac.

Headq's Army of the Potomac, March 16,

Sir,—The command to which you have b assigned by instructions of the President Military Governor of the District of Colum embraces the geographical limits of the trict, and will also include the city of Alex dria, the defensive works south of the tomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult Cre and the post of Fort Washington.

I enclose a list of the troops, and of defenses embraced in these limits.

General Banks will command at Manas Junction, with the divisions of Williams Shields, composing the 5th Corps, but should, nevertheless, exercise vigilance your front—carefully guard the approache that quarter, and maintain the duties of vanced guards. You will use the same cautions on either flank.

All troops not actually needed for the pol of Washington and Georgetown, for the ga sons north of the Potomac, and for other in cated special duties, should be moved to south side of the river.

In the centre of your front you should p the main body of your troops, and pro proportions at suitable distances towards y right and left flanks. Careful patrols will made, in order thoroughly to scour the co try in front from right to left.

It is specially enjoined upon you to ma tain the forts and their armaments in the b possible order, to look carefully to the instr tion and discipline of their garrisons, as w as all other troops under your command, a by frequent and rigid inspections to insu the attainment of these ends.

The care of the railways, canals, depo bridges and ferries, within the above-nam limits, will devolve upon you, and you are insure their security and provide for th protection by every means in your pow You will also protect the depots of the pu lic stores, and transmit the stores to troops active service.

By means of patrols you will thorough scour the neighboring country, south of t eastern branch, and also on your right, a you will use every possible precaution to i tercept mails, goods, and persons passing u authorized to the enemy's lines. The necessi of maintaining good order within your limit and especially in the capital of the natio cannot be too strongly enforced.

You will forward and facilitate the mov ment of all troops destined for the active pa of the army of the Potomac, and especially t

sit of detachments to their proper regiits and corps.

he charge of the new troops arriving in shington, and all troops temporarily there, devolve upon you. You will form them provisional brigades, promote their inction and discipline, and facilitate their ipment.

eport all arrivals of troops—their strength, position and equipment—by every opportity.

esides the regular reports and returns, ch you will be required to render to the tant-general of the army, you will make hese headquarters a consolidated report your command every Sunday morning, and thly returns on the first day of each month.

he foregoing instructions are communid by command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan.

S. Williams, Assistant Adgt.-Gen.

Brig.-Gen. J. S. Wadsworth,
Military Gov. of the District of Columbia.

HE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862.

n. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

ir,—I have the honor to submit the follownotes on the proposed operations of the ve portion of the army of the Potomac.

he proposed plan of campaign is to assume t Monroe as the first base of operations, ng the line by Yorktown and West Point n Richmond as the line of operations, mond being the objective point. It is med that the fall of Richmond involves of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; that we shall fight a decisive battle been West Point and Richmond, to give ch battle the rebels will concentrate all r available forces, understanding, as they , that it involves the fate of their cause.

herefore follows:

st. That we should collect all our available es and operate upon adjacent lines, maining perfect communication between our s.

d. That no time should be lost in reaching field of battle.

he advantages of the Peninsula between York and James Rivers are too obvious eed explanation. It is also clear that West nt should as soon as possible be reached be our main depot, that we may have the rtest line of land transportation for our plies and the use of the York River.

here are two methods of reaching this nt.

st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe base, and trusting to the roads for our plies, at the same time landing a strong ps as near Yorktown as possible, in order turn the rebel lines of defense south of rktown, then to reduce Yorktown and loucester, by a siege in all probability, involving a delay of weeks perhaps.

2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown, the first object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this the navy should at once concentrate upon the York River all their available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should not, in that case, require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly upon West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James.

It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the co-operation of the navy, as a part of this programme; without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which, by their aid, could be turned without serious loss of either time or men.

It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact already alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the prompt fall of Norfolk; while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they could well know from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe that Richmond must be its ultimate object.

It may be summed up in few words, that, for the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most important point—there the knot to be cut. An immediate decison upon the subject matter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occasion.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't serv't.

Geo. B. McClellan, Major General.

A REDUCTION OF FORCE.

In the meantime the troops destined to form the active army were collected in camps convenient to the points of embarkation, and every preparation made to embark them as rapidly as possibie, when the transports were ready.

A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alexandria, I met the President by appointment, on a steamer. He then informed me that he had been strongly pressed to take General Blenker's division

from my command and give it to General Fremont. His Excellency was good enough to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was, therefore, with surprise that I received on the 31st the following note;

Exec. Mansion, Washington, March 31, '62.
Maj.-Gen. McClellan,

My Dear Sir:—This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I will write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I am confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgement, that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases.

Yours very truly, A. Lincoln

To this, I replied in substance, that I regretted the order, and could ill-afford to lose 10,000 troops, which had been counted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there was no remedy I would yield and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterwards, I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given to Fremont, from any "pressure" other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might leave, confident that no more troops beyond these 10,000 should, in any event, be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command.

OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at Winchester, our forces occupying Charlestown, and Shield's reaching Bunker Hill on the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, a brigade of Gen. Bank's troops, under Gen. Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our advance entered the place. The enemy having made his preparations for evacuation some days before, it was not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th, the mass of Banks' corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. On the 19th Gen. Shields occupied Strasburg, driving the enemy twenty miles south, to Mount Jackson.

On the 20th the first division of Banks' corps, commenced its movement towards Manassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the 16th.

Jackson probably received information of this movement, and supposed that no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Winchester, and upon the falling back of Shields to that place on the 20th, for the pose of enticing Jackson in pursuit, the la promptly followed, whereupon ensued a s mish on the 22d, in which Gen. Shields wounded, and an affair at Winchester on 23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, was pursued as rapidly as the exhaustion our troops, and the difficulty of obtaining s plies, permitted. It is presumed that the reports of the battle of Winchester, were warded direct to the War Department Gen. Banks.

It being now clear that the enemy had intention of returning by the Manassas ro the following letter of April 1st, was wri to Gen. Banks.

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, Board the Commodore, April 1, 1862.
Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, Com'ng Fifth Corp

General:—The change in affairs in valley of the Shenandoah, has rendered ne sary a corresponding departure, tempora at least, from the plan we some days si agreed upon.

In my arrangements, I assume you have you a force amply sufficient to drive Jack before you, provided he is not reinfor largely. I also assume, that you may fin impossible to detach anything towards Ma sas for some days, probably not until the rations of the main army have drawn all rebel force toward Richmond.

You are aware that General Sumner has some days been at Manassas Junction, two divisions of infantry, six batteries, two regiments of cavalry, and that a re noissance to the Rappahannock, forced enemy to desiroy the railroad bridge at F pahannock Station, on the Orange and Ale dria Railroad. Since that time our cav have found nothing on this side of the Ra hannock in that direction, and it seems that we have no reason to fear any retur the rebels in that quarter. Their movem near Fredericksburg, also indicate a final a donment of that neighborhood. I doubt wh er Johnson will now reinforce Jackson, wi view of offensive operations. The time is bably passed when he could have gained thing by doing so. I have ordered in on Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarkation, B ker's has been detached from the Army of Potomac, and ordered to report to General mont.

Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Ju tion to-day; Geary is at White Plains.

Two regiments of cavalry have been orde out, and are now on their way to relieve two regiments of Sumner.

Four thousand infantry, and one batt leave Washington at once for Manassas. S 3,000 more will move in one or two days, soon after some 3,000 additional.

I will order Blenker to march on Strasb and to report to you for temporary duty

t, should you find a large force in your nt, you can avail yourself of his aid. As n as possible, please direct him on Win-ster, thence to report to the adjutant-gen-l of the army for orders, but keep him until u are sure what you have in front.

n regard to your own movements, the most portant thing at present is to throw Jackson ll back, and then to assume such a position to enable you to prevent his return. As n as the railway communications are re-es-lished, it will be, probably, important and isable to move on Staunton, but this would uire secure communications, and a force of m 25,000 to 30,000 for active operations. should also be nearly coincident with my n move on Richmond; at all events, not so g before it as to enable the rebels to con-trate on you, and then return on me. I that you cannot be ready in time, although ay come in very well with a force less than t I have mentioned, after the main battle r Richmond. When General Sumner leaves rrenton Junction, General Abercrombie will placed in immediate command of Manassas Warrenton Junction, under your general ers. Please inform me frequently, by tele-ph, and otherwise, as to the state of things our front. I am very truly yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

P. S.—From what I have just learned it uld seem that the two regiments of cavalry nded for Warrenton Junction have gone Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional reg-nts placed under your orders, two should, promptly as possible, move by the shortest te on Warrenton Junction. I am, sir, very pectfully, Your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

This letter needs no further explanation than ay that it was my intention, had the opera-ns in that quarter remained under my charge, ier to have resumed the defensive positions ked out in the letter of March 16, or to re advanced General Banks upon Staunton, night in the progress of events seem advis-e. It is to be remembered that when I te the preceding and following letters of ril 1, I had no expectation of being relieved m the charge of the operations in the She-ndoah Valley and in front of Washington, President's War Order No. 3 giving no in-ation of such an intention; and that, so far reference was made to final operations after ving Jackson back and taking such a posi-n as to prevent his return, no positive ders were given in the letter—the matter ng left for future consideration, when the per time arrived for a decision.

TROOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASHINGTON.

From the following letter to the adjutant-neral, dated April 1, 1862, it will be seen t I left for the defense of the national capi-l and its approaches, when I sailed for the Peninsula, 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, including the 32 pieces in Washington alluded to, but not enumerated in my letter to the adjutant-general. It will also be seen that I recommended other available troops in New York (more than 4,000) to be at once ordered forward to reinforce them.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, Adjutant-General U. S. A.

GENERAL:—I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War.

The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac is as follows:—

Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,000 for the defense of Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men.

The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men, other disposable troops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about 11,400 men.

The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send forward to Manassas.

Gen. Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which including Col. Geary at White Plains and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery.

I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Gov. Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of Gen. Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men.

It is my design to push Gen. Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination.

The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus be, including Blenker s division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery, Banks' 5th Corps, which embraces the command of Gen. Shields, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns—to some 3,652 disposable cavalry and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men—amount to about 35,467 men.

It is designed to relieve Gen. Hooker by one regiment, say 850 men, being, with some 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. To recapitulate:—

At Warrenton there is to be,	7,780	men.
At Manassas, say,	10,859	"
In the valley of the Shenandoah,	35,467	"
On the lower Potomac,	1,350	"
In all,	55,456	"

There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington under Gen. Wadsworth some 18,000 men, inclusive of the batteries under instruction.

The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where their services may be most required. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

The following letter from Gen. Barry shows that thirty-two (32) field-guns with men, horses and equipments, were also left in Washington City when the army sailed. These were the batteries under instruction referred to above.

Headquarters, Inspector of Artillery,
Washington, Dec. 16, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McClellan, U. S. A.

General:—It having been stated in various public prints, and in a speech of Senator Chandler, of Michigan, in his place in the U. S. Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Brig.-Gen. Wadsworth, military governor of Washington, before the Joint Senate and House Committee, on the subject of the war, that Maj.-Gen. McClellan had left an insufficient force for the defence of Washington, and "*not a gun on wheels.*"

I have to contradict this charge as follows:

From official reports made at the time to me (the chief of artillery of the army of the Potomac) and now in my possession, by the commanding officer of the light artillery troops left in camp in the city of Washington by your order, it appears that the following named field-officers were left;

Battery "C" 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. Barnes, 2 guns; battery "K" 1st N.Y. Artillery, Capt. Crounse, 6 guns; battery "L" 2d N. Y. Artillery, Capt. Robinson, 6 guns; 9th N. Y. independant battery, Capt. Morozowi, 6 guns; 16th N. Y. independent battery, Capt. Locke; battery "A" 2d battery N. Y. Artillery, Capt. Hogan, 6 guns; battery "B" 2d battery, N. Y. Artillery, Capt. McMahon, 6 guns; total of batteries, 32 guns.

With the exception of a few horses, which could have been obtained from the quartermaster's department in a few hours, the batteries were all fit for immediate service, excepting the 16th N. Y. battery, which, having been previously ordered on Gen. Wadsworth's application, to report to him for special service, was unequipped with either guns or horses.

I am, gen., very respectfully, your ob't sev't, WM. F. BARRY, B.-G. Inspec. of Art., U.S. Army.

It is true that Blenker's division, which is included in the forces enumerated by me, under orders to reinforce Gen. Fremont, the following dispatch from the Secretar War, dated March 31, 1862, will show th was authorized to detain him at Strast until matters assumed a definite form in region before proceeding to his ultimate tination; in other words, until Jackson disposed of, and had he been detained th instead of moving on to Harper's Ferry Franklin, with other orders, it is prob that Gen. Banks would have defeated Jack instead of being himself obliged subsequ to retreat to Williamsport.

War Dept., Washington, D. C., March 31, Maj.-Gen. McClellan:

The order in respect to Blenker is not signed to hinder or delay the movement Richardson or any other force. He can main wherever you desire him so long required, for your movements, and in any sition you desire. The order is simply place him in position for reinforcing Frem as soon as your dispositions will permit, he may go to Harper's Ferry, by such ro and at such time, as you shall direct—st your own wishes as to the movement—wh and how it shall be made.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War

Without including Gen. Blenker's divisi there were left 67,428 men, and 85 pieces light artillery, which, under existing circ stances, I deemed more than adequate to sure the perfect security of Washington agai any force the enemy could bring against for the following reasons:

The light troops I had thrown forward der Gen. Stoneman, in pursuit of the rel army, after the evacuation of Manassas a Centreville, had driven their rear guard acr Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions fr Sumner's corps had forced them beyond t Rappahannock; they had destroyed all t railway bridges behind them, thereby in cating that they did not intend to return ov that route. Indeed, if they had attempt such a movement, their progress must ha been slow and difficult, as it would have i volved the reconstruction of the bridges, a if my orders for keeping numerous caval patrols well out to the front, to give time notice of any approach of the enemy, had be strictly enforced, (and I left seven regimen of cavalry for this express purpose,) th could not, by any possibility, have reache Washington before there would have bee ample time to concentrate the entire forc left for its defense, as well as those at Balt more, at any necessary point.

It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated t the authorities, that the movement of the arm to the Peninsula, would have the effect to dra off the rebel army from Manassas to the d fense of their capital, and thus free Washing ton from menace. This opinion was confirme the moment the movement commenced

ther as soon as the enemy became aware of our tentions; for, with the exception of Jackson's rce of some 15,000, which his instructions show have been intended to operate in such away as prevent McDowell's corps from being sent to inforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude ade its appearance in front of Washington du- ng the progress of our operations on the Pe- nsula; nor until the order was given for my turn from Harrison's Landing was Washington gain threatened.

Surrounded as Washington was with numerous d strong fortifications well garrisoned, it was anifest that the enemy could not afford to de- ch from his main army a force sufficient to as- il them.

It is proper to remark, that just previous to y departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief- -staff to Gen. Hitchcock, who at that time held aff relations with his excellency the President d the Secretary of War, to submit to him a st of the troops I proposed to leave for the de- nse of Washington, and the positions in which designed posting them. Gen. Hitchcock, after ancing his eye over the list, observed that he as not the judge of what was required for de- nding the capital, that Gen. McClellan's position as such as to enable him to understand the bject much better than he did, and he pre- med that if the force designated was in his dgment sufficient, nothing more would be quired. He was then told by the chief-of- aff that I would be glad to have his opinion, s an old and experienced officer. To this he re- lied, that as I had the entire control of the de- nses for a long time, I was the best judge of hat was needed, and he declined to give any ther expression of opinion at that time.

On the 2d of April, the day following my de- arture for Fort Monroe, Generals Hitchcock and homas were directed by the Secretary of War o examine and report whether the President's nstructions to me of March 8th and 13th had een complied with. On the same day their re- ort was submitted and their decision was,

"That the requirements of the President, that his city (Washington) shall be left entirely se- u e, has not been fully complied with."

The President, in his letter to me on tho 6th f April, says:

"And now allow me to ask, do you really think should permit the line from Richmond, via. Ma- assas Junction, to this city to be entirely open, xcept what resistance could be presented by ess than 20,000 unorganized troops?"

In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowledged that there was do danger of an attack from the direction of Manassas in these words:

"In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they have no intention of returning for the re-occupation of their late position, and therefore no large force would be necessary to hold that position."

That as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of it, and this was enforced by the subsequent movements of the enemy.

In another paragraph of the report, it is stated that 55,000 men was the number considered adequate for the defense of the capital. That Gen. McClellan, in his enumeration of the forces left, had included Banks' army corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, but whether this corps should be regarded as available for the protection of Washington, they decline to express an opinion.

At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any approach to Washington, was Jackson's force, in front of Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Railroad leading from this valley to Washington, and it will be admitted, I presume, that Banks occupying the Shenandoah Valley, was in the best position to defend, not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. The numbers of troops left by me for the defenses of Washington, as given in my letter to the adjutant-general, were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and these, of course, constitute the most trustworthy and authentic source, from which such information could be obtained.

Another statement made by General Hitchcock, before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," in reference to this same order, should be noticed. He was asked the following question:

"Do you understand now that the movement made by Gen. McClellan to Fort Monroe, and up the York River, was in compliance with the recommendation of the council of generals commanding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House, on the 13th of March last, or in violation of it?"

To which he replied as follows:

"I have considered, and do now consider that, it was in violation of the recommendation of that council, in two important particulars; one particular, being that portion of this report which represents the council as agreeing to the expedition by way of the Peninsula, *provided*, the rebel steamer Merrimac could first be neutralized. That important provision Gen. McClellan disregarded."

* * * * *

The second particular alluded to by General Hitchcock, was in reference to the troops left for the defense of Washington, which has been disposed of above.

In regard to the steamer Merrimac, I have also stated, that so far as our operations on York River were concerned, the power of this vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that conclusion.

Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe, to consult with Flag Officer Goldsborough upon this subject. The result of that consultation is contained in the following extract from the evidence of Admiral Goldsborough before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War" viz.: "I told Mr.

Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac going up York River, that she could never get there, for I had ample means to prevent that."

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the Committee as follows:

"Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised that it should be done."

Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th Army Corps, testifies as follows before the Committee:

"During the time that the subject of the change of base was discussed, I had refused to consent to the Peninsula line of operations, until I had sent word to the Navy Department and asked two questions. 1*st*. Whether the Merrimac was certainly neutralized or not? 2*d*. Whether the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently with the army, to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester Point? To both of these questions answers were returned in the affirmative, that is, the Merrimac was neutralized, and the navy was in a condition to co-operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester Point."

ORDERS FOR THE FORTIFICATION OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.

Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, of the U. S. corps of engineers to visit Manassas Junction and its vicinity, for the purpose of determining upon the defensive works necessary to enable us to hold that place with a small force. The accompanying letters from Col. Alexander will show what steps were taken by him to carry into effect this important order.

I regret to say that those who succeeded me in command of the region in front of Washington, whatever were the fears for its safety, did not deem it necessary to carry out my plans and instructions to him.

Had Manassas been placed in condition for a strong defense, and its communications secured as recommended by Col Alexander, the result of Gen. Pope's campaign would probably have been different.

Washington, D. C., April, 2, 1862.

Sir,—You will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment as practicable, and mark on the ground the works for the defense of that place, on the positions which I indicated to you yesterday. You will find two carpenters experienced in this kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. Dougherty, the master carpenter of the Treasury Extension.

The general idea of the defense of this position, is to occupy the fringe of elevations, which lies about half-way between Manassas depot and the junction of the railroad, with a series of works, open to the rear, so that they may be commanded by the work hereafter to be described.

There will be at least four of these works, three of them being on the left of the railroad leading from Alexandria, at the positions occupied by the enemy's works. The other on the right of this road, on the position we examined yesterday. The works of the enemy to the no of this latter position, numbered Nos. 1 and 2 Lieut. Comstock's sketch, may also form part the front line of our defenses; but the sides these works, looking towards Manassas stat should be leveled, so that the interior of the wo may be seen from the latter position.

Embrasures should be arranged in all th works for *field* artillery. The approaches sho be such, that a battery can drive into the wor The number of embrasures in each battery w depend upon its size and the ground to be co manded. It is supposed that there will be fr four to eight embrasures in each battery.

The other works of the enemy looking towar the east and south, may be strengthened so as afford sufficient defense in these directions. T work, No. 3, on Lieut. Comstock's sketch may also strengthened and arranged for field artille when time will permit. This work is in a go position to cover a retreat, which would be ma down the valley in which the railroad runs wards Bull Run.

At Manassas station there should be a fo constructed. The railroad will pass throu this fort, and the depot, if one should be bui should be placed in its rear. This latter wo should be regarded as the key of the positio It should be as large as the nature of the grou will permit.

By going down the slopes, which are n steep, it may be made large enough to accomm date 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the positi need not be cut away, it will be better to thro up the earth into a large traverse which m also be a bomb proof. Its profile should l strong, and its ditches should be flanked. should receive a heavy armament of 24 or pounders, with some rifled (Parrot) 20 or pounders. Its guns should command all th exterior works, so that these works could be no use to the enemy, should he take them. accommodating the fort to the ground, this co sideration should not be lost sight of.

After tracing these works on the ground, yo will make a sketch embracing the whole of them showing their relative positions and size. Th sketch should embrace the junction of the rai roads and the ground for some distance aroun the mainwork. It need not be made with ex treme accuracy. The distances may be paced o measured with a tape-line. The bearings ma be taken by compass.

Having located the works and prepared you sketch, you will report to Capt. Frederick E Prime of the corps of engineers, who will furnish you the means of construction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. S. Alexander, Lt.-Col. A. D. C

To Capt. Fred. E. Munther. *Present.*

Washington, D. C., April 6, 1862.

Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard,

Chief Engineer army of the Potomac.

Sir,—I enclose you herewith a copy of th

ructions which I gave to Capt. Munther, in erence to the defenses of Manassas.

s there has been a new department created t of the Rappahannock) it is possible that and I, as well as Gen. McClellan, are relieved n the further consideration of this subject at present time.

will, however, state for your information, uld the subject ever come before you again, t in my opinion the communication with nassas by land should be secured.

o effect this in the best manner, so far as my ervations extended, I think the bridge over l Run, near Union Mills and just above the road bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly aired, and that a small work, or perhaps two hree open batteries, should be erected on the acent heights, to protect it as well as the rail- d bridge.

he communication by land would then be ough or near Centreville, over the road used the enemy.

write this for fear something should detain here, but I hope to leave here to join you norrow. My health is much improved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. S. Alexander, Lt.-Col, A.D.C.

may be permitted also to mention that the us also (unexecuted by my successor) indi- ed by my letter of instructions to General ks dated March 16, 1862, for intrenching ster Gap and the point where the Manassas o Railroad crosses the Shenandoah, were for purpose of preventing even the attempt at h a raid as that of Jackson in the month of y following.

MILITARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD.

Before taking up the history of the embar- ion and the Peninsular campaign, I should ark that during the fall and winter of 1861-2, ile the army of the Potomac was in position front of Washington, reconnoissances were de from time to time, and skirmishes fre- ently occurred, which were of great impor- ce in the education of the troops, accustom- them te the presence of the enemy, and giv- them confidence under fire. There were ny instances of individual gallantry displayed these affairs: the reports of most of them l be found among the documents which accom- y this report.

One of the most brilliant of these affairs was t which took place at Drainsville on Dec. 20, 1, when the 3d brigade of McCall's Division, der Brig.-Gen. E. O. C. Ord, with Easton's ttery, routed and pursued four regiments of fantry, and a battery of six pieces.

The operations of Brig.-Gen. F. W. Lander on e Upper Potomac during the months of Janua- and February, 1862, frustrated the attempts of neral Jackson against the Ohio Railroad, Cum- rland, &c., and obliged him to fall back to inchester. His constitution was impaired by e hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d March the fearless General Lander expired, a tim to the excessive fatigues of the campaign.

SECOND PERIOD

PART I.

THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA.

The council, composed of four corps command- ers, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopt- ed Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the army of the Potomac upon Rich- mond.

For the prompt and successful execution of the projected operation, it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe: that position and its dependencies being regarded as amply pro- tected by the naval force in its neighborhood, and the advance of the main army up the Penin- sula, so that it could be safely left with a small garrison.

In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the navy was desired in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and James Riv- ers for the protection of our flanks, and the use of transports, bringing supplies to the army. With these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my original plan of mov- ing by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the line with Fortress Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the transpor- tation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the vessels were originally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis, but upon the evacuation of Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the enemy, it became more convenient to em- bark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once given.

In making the preliminary arrangements for the movement, it was determined that the First Corps (Gen. McDowell's) should move as a unit, first, and effect a landing either at the *Sand-Box*, some four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, How- ard's Bridge, Big Bethel, etc., or else, should ex- isting circumstances render it preferable, land on the Gloucester side of York River, and move on West Point.

The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army by divi- sions as transports arrived, keeping army corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops at Fortress Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation, convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the First Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might then be determined.

On the 17th of March, Hamilton's division of the 3d corps embarked at Alexandria, and pro- ceeded to Eort Monroe, with the following or- ders:

Washington, D. C., March 17, 1862.

Gen. C. S. Hamilton, Comd'g Division:

You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, re-

port to Gen. Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, you will please obey his orders, and use every effort to carry out his views.

R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff.

On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, Gen. Fitz John Porter's division of the same corps embarked. Gen. Heintzelman was ordered to accompany it, under the following instructions:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Seminary, March 22, 1862.

Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, Com'g 3d Corps:

General:—Upon the disembarkation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe, I have to request that you will move your two divisions (Porter's and Hamilton's) some three or four miles out from the fort, to find good camping places where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your position will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport News, the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe.

If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication and mutual support between the two divisions, it will be best to place one on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnoissances well to the front, to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, reinforce you by the 3d division of your corps, and it is poobable that a part or the whole of the 4th corps will also move from Fort Monroe: this will probably be determined before your disembarkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly.

My desire would be to make no important move in advance until you are fully prepared to follow it up, and give the enemy no time to recover.

The quartermasters of your corps will receive detailed instructions, in regard to land transportation, from Gen. Van Vliet.

It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, ammunition, etc., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be supplied without delay.

Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the new field of operations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy.

Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out spies. I am very truly yours, Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be supplied.

On the 1st of April I embarked, with the headquarters on the steamer Commodore, and reac Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d.

In consequence of the delay in the arriv the horse transports at Alexandria, but a s portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the a lery reserve had not yet completed its disemb ation.

I found there the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, the 5th Regular Cavalry; the 2d Regular Cav and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not embarked: so few wagons had arrived tha was not possible to move Casey's division a for several days, while the other divisions w obliged to move with scant supplies.

As to the force and position of the enemy, information then in our possession was va and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtai from the staff officers of General Wool, and simply to the effect that Yorktown was surro ed by a continuous line of earthworks, w strong water batteries on the York River, garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, un the command of Gen. J. B. Magruder. M which had been prepared by the Topograph Engineers under Gen. Wool's command were nished me, in which, the Warwick River represented as flowing parallel to, but not cr ing the road from Newport News to Willia burg, making the so-called Mulberry Island a island; and we had no information as to the course of the Warwick *across* the Penins nor of the formidable line of works which it c ered.

Information which I had collected during winter placed Gen. Magruder's command at fr 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of Gen Huger's force at Norfolk estimated at about 000. It was also known that there were str defensive works at or near Williamsburg.

Knowing that Gen. Huger could easily sp some troops to reinforce Yorktown, that he indeed done so, and that Johnston's army Manassas could be brought rapidly by the Jam and York rivers to the same point, I proceed to invest that town without delay.

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U ted States Topographical Engineers, attached Gen. Wool's staff, given to me as the result several months' labors, indicated the feasibil of the design. It was also an object of prim importance to reach the vicinity of Yorkto before the enemy was reinforced sufficiently enable him to hold in force his works at Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, etc., on t road from Newport News. This was the m urgent as it was now evident that some da must elapse before the 1st corps could arrive.

Everything possible was done to hasten t disembarkation of the cavalry, artillery and w ons in the harbor, and on the 3d the orders march were given for the following day

There were at Fort Monroe and its vicinity the 3d, ready to move, two divisions of the corps two divisions of the 4th corps, one div ion of the 2d corps, and Syke's brigade of reg lar infantry, together with Hunt's artillery

rve, and the regiments of cavalry before nam-
, in all about 58,000 men and 100 guns. Rich-
dson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and
corps had not yet arrived, and Casey's divis-
n of the 4th corps was unable to move for
ant of wagons.

ANOTHER REDUCTION OF FORCE.

Before I left Washington an order had been
ued by the War Department, placing Fort
onroe and its dependencies under my control,
d authorizing me to draw from the troops un-
r General Wool, a division of about 10,000
en, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps.
uring the night of the 3d I received a telegram
om the adjutant-general of the army, stating
at, by the President's order, I was deprived of
control over Gen. Wool and the troops under
s command, and forbidden to detach any of
s troops without his sanction.

This order left me without any base of opera-
ons under my own control, and to this day I
n ignorant of the causes which led to it.

CO-OPERATION OF THE NAVY.

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River
as declared, by the naval authorities, closed to
e operations of their vessels, by the combined
fluence of the enemy's batteries on its banks
d the confederate steamers Merrimac, York-
wn, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-officer
oldsborough, then in command of the United
ates squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it
nd, no doubt, justly) as his highest and most
perative duty to watch and neutralize the
errimac, and as he designed using his most
owerful vessels in a contest with her, he did
ot feel able to detach, for the assistance of the
my, a suitable force to attack the water batter-
s at Yorktown and Gloucester. All this was
ntrary to what had been previously stated to
e, and materially affected my plans. At no
me during the operations against Yorktown was
e navy prepared to lend us any material assis-
nce in its reduction, until after our land batter-
s had partially silenced the works.

ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE.

I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements,
drive before me or capture the enemy on the
eninsula, open the James River, and press on
Richmond before he should be materially re-
nforced from other portions of his territory.
s the narrative proceeds, the causes will be
eveloped which frustrated these apparently well-
rounded expectations.

I determined, then, to move the two divisions
f the 4th corps by the Newport News and
Villiamsburg road, to take up a position between
'orktown and Williamsburgh, while the two
ivisions of the 3d corps moved direct from
'ort Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves mov-
ng so as to support either corps, as might prove
ecessary. I designed, should the works at
'orktown and Williamsburg offer a serious re-
istance, to land the 1st corps, reinforced, if ne-
essary, on the left bank of the York, or on the
levern, to move it on Gloucester and West Point,
n order to take in reverse whatever force the
enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel
him to abandon his positions.

In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information as to the country in advance.

Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, though known in its general features, we found to be inaccurately described, in essential particulars, in the only maps and geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had; erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate, very little accurate and no comprehensive topographical information.

On the 3d the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th:

"Porter's and Hamilton's divisions, and Averill's cavalry of the 3d corps, and Sedgwick's division of the 2d corps, under Brig.-Gen. Heintzelman, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: Porter's division, with Averill's cavalry at 6 A.M., over the New Market and New Bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. The division will send forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main Yorktown road, a sufficient force to hold that point, and cut off the garrison of the Ship Point batteries; the whole division may be used for this purpose, if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will encamp at Howard's Bridge.

"Hamilton's division will march at 7 A.M., by the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's Creek.

"Sedgwick's division will march at 8 A.M., by the New Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Howard's Bridge.

"Brig.-Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th Corps, will move with Smith's and Couch's divisions at 5 A.M., (Smith's division in advance), by the James River road; the 5th Regular Cavalry, temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's Mills, throwing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick; Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's Creek.

"The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 8.30 A.M, by the New Market Bridge to Big Bethel, where it will encamp; on the march it will keep in the rear of Sedgwick's division."

The following is an extract from the orders issued on the 4th for the march of the 5th:

"The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th):

"Gen. Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 A.M., *via.* Warwick Court House, and the road leading near the Old Ship Yard, to the Half Way House on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road.

"Gen. Couch's division will march at 6 A.M., to close up on Gen. Smith's division at the Half Way House.

"Gen. Keyes' command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing ridge near the Half Way House so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent reinforcements being thrown in.

"Gen. Heintzelman will move forward Gen. Porter's two brigades at 6 A.M., upon the advanced guard, when the entire division will advance to a point about two and three quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly to the north, and where a road comes in from Warwick Court House. Gen. Hamilton's division will move at 6 A.M., and follow Gen. Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. Gen. Sedgwick's division will march at 5 A.M., as far as the Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. Power's house, and will await further orders.

The reserves will march at 6 A.M., upon the main Yorktown road, halting for further orders at Dr. Power's house; the infantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in rear.

"Gen. Sedgwick's division will, for the present, act with the reserve, and he will receive orders from head-quarters."

In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d Corps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's Mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in our possession, together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the expectation.

During the afternoon of the 4th, Gen. Keyes obtained information of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy, in a strong position at Lee's Mills: the nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, I instructed Gen. Keyes to attack and carry this position on coming in front of it.

Early in the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of each column was brought to a halt: that of Heintzelman (Porter's division) in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge: that of Keyes (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's Mills, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses Warwick River. The progress of each column had been retarded by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keye's column and impracticable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while ammunition, provision, and forage could not brought up at all.

When Gen. Keyes's approached Lee's Mills left flank was exposed to a sharp artillery from the further bank of the Warwick, upon reaching the vicinity of the mill, he fou it altogether stronger than was expected, un proachable by reason of the Warwick River, a incapable of being carried by assault.

The troops composing the advance of ea column were, during the afternoon under a wa artillery fire—the sharpshooters even of t right column being engaged, when covering connoissances.

THE FIRST CORPS WITHDRAWN BY ORDI OF THE PRESIDENT.

It was at this stage and moment of the ca paign that the following telegram was sent me:

Adjutant General's Office, April 4th, 1862.

GEN. MCCLELLAN,—

By direction of the President Gen. McDowel army corps has been detached from the force u der your immediate command; and the gener is to report to the Secretary of War; letter l mail.

L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.

The President having promised in our int view following his order of March 31st, wit drawing Blenker's division of 10,00 men fro my command, that nothing of the sort should l repeated, that I might rest assured that the cai paign should proceed with no further deductio from the force upon which its operations ha been planned, I may confess to having bee shocked at this order, which, with that of th 31st ult., removed nearly 60,000 men from m command, and reduced my force by more tha one-third after its task had been assigned, its op erations planned, its fighting begun. To me th blow was most discouraging. It frustrated a my plans for impending operations. It fell whe I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It lef me incapable of continuing operations whic had been begun. It compelled the adoption o another, a different, and a less effective plan o campaign. It made rapid and brilliant opera tions impossible. It was a fatal error.

It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point; I had, therefore, n choice left, but to attack it directly in front, as best could with the force at my command. Re connoissances made under fire on that and the following day, determined that the sources o the Warwick River were near Yorktown, com manded by its guns, while that stream for some distance from its mouth on the James River was controlled by the confederate gun-boats; that the fords had been destroyed by dams, the ap proaches to which were generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by ex tensive and formidable works; that timber felled for defensive purposes, and the flooding of the roads caused by the dams had made these works apparently inaccessible and impossible to

n; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, ied and garrisoned, and connected with the enses of the Warwick by forts and intrench- nts, the ground in front of which was swept the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascer- ied that the garrisons had been and were ly being reinforced by troops from Norfolk, l the army under Gen. J. E. Johnston.

Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe passable and delayed the arrival of troops, munition and supplies, while storms prevented, several days, the sailing of transports from mpton Roads, and the establishment of de- fs on the creeks of York River near the army, The ground bordering the Warwick River is vered by very dense and extensive forests, clearings being small and few. This, with comparative flatness of the country, and the rtness of the enemy, everywhere in force, dered thorough reconnoissances slow, danger- s and difficult; yet, it was impossible other- se to determine whether any assault was any- here practicable, or whether the more tedious, t sure operations of a siege must be resorted

I made on the 6th and 7th, close personal re- nnoissances of the right and left of the ene- y's positions; which, with information acquired eady, convinced me that it was best to pre- re for an assault by a preliminary employment heavy guns, and some siege operations. In- ant assault would have been simple folly.

On the 7th, I telegraphed to the President as llows:

ead-quarters Army of Potomac, April 7th, 1862.

To the President, Washington, D. C.,—

Your telegram of yesterday received. In re- y I have the honor to state that my entire force r duty, amounts to only about (85,000) eighty- ve thousand men. Gen. Wool's command, as ou will observe from the accompanying order, as been taken out of my control, although he as most cheerfully co-operated with me. The nly use that can be made of his command, is to rotect my communications in rear of this point. t this time only fifty-three thousand men have oined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as y means of transportation will permit.

Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War of to-night, for the details of our present ituation.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-General.

On the same day I sent the following:

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, in front of Yorktown, April 7, 1862, 7 P.M.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War,—

Your telegram of yesterday, arrived here while I was absent examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely.

The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts, and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or at most, two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, before we can assault. All the prisoners state that Gen. J. E. Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong reinforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably not less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and possibly more. In consequence of the loss of Blenker's division, and the 1st corps, my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of positions.

I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force and material of the government, will be as fully and speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created.

Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least (50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my command.

Since my dispatch of the 5th instant, five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins, I shall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a large force must be taken for guards, escorts, etc. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them; but were I in possession of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should have no fears as to the result.

Under the circumstances that have been developed since my arrival here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction, that here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power to carry the enemy's works; but to do this with a reasonable degree of certainty, requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have at least, the whole of the 1st Corps to land upon the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in the rear. My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag-officer Goldsborough, thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter, and one of the commander of the gunboats here

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen.

THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN.

I had provided a small siege train, and moderate supplies of intrenching tools, for such a contingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions.

While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining the character and strength of all the defenses, and the configuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to determine the point of attack, and to develop the approaches, the troops were occupied in opening roads to the depots established at the nearest available points on branches of York River. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows: Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hook-

er's and Hamilton's division, in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named from the mouth of Wormley's Creek to the Warwick road opposite Winn's Mills; Sumner's corps, Sedgwick's division only having arrived, on the left of Hamilton, extending down the Warwick and opposite the Winn's Mills works; Keyes's corps, (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's Mills, etc., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of his own and Keyes's corps.

Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of Yorktown, I kept the corps under Gen. Keyes, and afterwards the left wing under Gen. Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched on the right bank, with the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of defense, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut off Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under Gen. Heintzelman were engaged in similar efforts upon the works between Winn's Mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's report of the 16th of April, enclosing reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, "that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his) line, as far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life." Reconnoissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact that the Warwick was not passable in that direction except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which were swept by several batteries and intrenchments, which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immediately in rear.

Gen. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, whose position entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, expressed the judgment that those formidable works could not, with any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried by assault. Gen. Keyes, commanding the 4th army corps, after the examination of the enemy's defenses on the left, before alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly official, it describes the situation at that time in some respects so well that I have taken the liberty of introducing it here.

Headquarters 4th Corps,
Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862.

My Dear Senator:—The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that *four* army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James River.

To-day I have learned that the 1st corps, which, by the President's order, was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations, and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has not the means to attack Yorktown, is afraid to send gunboats up James River fear of the Merrimac.

The above plan of campaign was ado unanimously by Gen. McDowell and Brig.-G Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes, and was curred in by Maj.-Gen. McClellan, who first posed Urbana as our base.

This army being reduced by forty-five thous troops, some of them the best in the service, without the support of the navy, the plan which we are reduced bears scarcely any res blance to the one I voted for.

I command the James River column, and I my camp, near Newport News, the morning the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting artillery ashore the afternoon of the day bef and one of my divisions had not all arrive camp the day I left, and, for the want of tra portation, has not yet joined me. So you observe that not a day was lost in the advan and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapi that many of our animals were twenty-four forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, are stopped by a line of defense nine or ten mi long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erec nearly the whole distance, behind a stream succession of ponds no where fordable, one minus being Yorktown and the other ending the James River, which is commanded by enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified around with bastioned works, and on the wa side, it and Gloucester are so strong that navy are afraid to attack either.

The approaches on our side are genera through low, swampy, or thickly-wooded grou over roads which we are obliged to repair or make, before we can get forward our carriag The enemy is in great force, and is constant receiving reinforcements from the two rive The line in front of us is therefore one of t strongest ever opposed to an invading force any country.

You will then ask, why I advocated such a li for our operations? My reasons are few, but, think, good.

With proper assistance from the navy, w could take Yorktown, and then, with gunboa on both rivers, we could beat any force oppose to us on Warwick River, because the shot an shells from the gunboats would nearly overla across the Peninsula, so that, if the enemy shoul retreat, and retreat he must, he would have long way to go without rail or steam transport tion, and every soul of his army must fall int our hands or be destroyed.

Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this line, it was expect ed, would furnish water transportation nearly t Richmond.

Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we d next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James River, and we do no first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible

us to subsist this army three marches beyond ere it is now. As the roads are at present, it with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist the position it now occupies.

You will see, therefore, by what I have said, t the force originally intended for the capture Richmond should be all sent forward. If I ught the four army corps necessary when I posed the navy would co-operate, and when dged of the obstacles to be encountered by at I learned from maps and the opinions of cers stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all er sources, how much more should I think full complement of troops requisite, now that navy cannot co-operate, and now that the my's lines and the number of his guns and n prove to be immeasurably greater than I been supposed to expect!

The line in front of us, in the opinion of all military men here who are at all competent judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and force of the enemy capable of being increased ond the numbers we now have to oppose to . Independently of the strength of the lines ront of us, and of the force of the enemy be- d them, we cannot advance until we get com- nd of York River or James River. The effi- nt co-operation of the navy is, therefore, olutely essential, and so I considered it when oted to change our base from the Potomac to t Monroe.

An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown, and several strong gunboats could be sent up nes River also, our success will be certain and nplete, and the rebellion will soon be put wn.

On the other hand, we must butt against the my's works with heavy artillery and a great ste of time, life and material.

f we break through and advance, both our nks will be assailed from two great water- rses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies uld give out, and the enemy, equal, if not perior, in numbers, would, with other advan- es, beat and destroy this army.

The greatest master of the art of war has said t "if you would invade a country successfully, u must have *one* line of operations and one ny, under one general." But what is our con- ion? The State of Virginia is made to con- tute the command, in part or wholly, of some generals, viz.: Fremont, Banks, McDowell, ol, Burnside, and McClellan, besides the scrap, r the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix.

The great battle of the war is to come off. If win it, the rebellion will be crushed. If we e it, the consequences will be more horrible n I care to foretell. The plan of campaign I ted for, if carried out with the means pro- sed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the ans proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem ue to myself to say that our success will be certain.

It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of 1st corps to have a separate department; and, this letter advocates his return to Gen. McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by personal remark or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to Gen. McDowell and nothing to Gen. McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last July to the present day, supported Gen. McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so to the last, and so long as he is my commander; and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and, without modification, the enterprise was certain of success. But, with the reduction of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, with means insufficient for certain success.

Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. I never despond; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working *now*, to my utmost.

Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect,

Your obedient servant,

E. D. Keyes, Brig.-Gen. Comd'g 4th Army Corps.

Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate.

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals Hooker, Richardson and Casey, I received the following dispatches from the President and Secretary of War:

Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 p.m.

Gen. G. B. McClellan.—Yours of 11 a.m. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's Brigade, under your orders, is not and will not be interfered with. You have over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of Gen. Wool's command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

A. Lincoln, President.

Washington, April 6, 1862. 2 p.m.

Gen. G. B. McClellan.—The President directs me to say that your dispatch to him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time to be of service to you in your present operations. Telegraph frequently, and all in the power of the government shall be done to sustain you as occasion requires.

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty

good knowledge of the enemy's works and the obstacles to be overcome.

On that day I received the following letter from the President.

Washington, April 9th, 1862.

Major-General McClellan:—

My Dear Sir,—Your dispatches, complaining that you are not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much.

Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced in it, certainly without reluctance.

After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand unorganized men, without a single battery, were all you designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manassas Junction; and part of this even was to go to Gen. Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks' old corps, once designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Potomac, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone) a great temptation to the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. My explicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of *all* the commanders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell.

I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was broken up and *nothing* was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, "Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond *via.* Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by twenty thousand unorganized troops?" This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade.

There is a curious mystery about the *numbers* of the troops now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and *en route* to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all *en route* to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 be accounted for?

As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do, if that command was away.

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster, by *fortifications* and *reinforcements*, than you can by reinforcements alone.

And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to *you* that you strike a blow. *I* am powerless to help this. You will do me justice to remember. I always insisted that go down the bay in search of a field, instead fighting at or near Manassas, was only shif and not surmounting a difficulty; that we wo find the same enemy, and the same or equal trenchments, at either place. The country not fail to note—is now noting—that the sent hesitation to move upon an intrenched my, is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never writ you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose sustain you, so far as in my most anxious ju ment I consistently can. But you must act.

Yours, very truly, A. Lincoln

With great deference to the opinions wishes of His Excellency the President, I m respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts wh I have presented, and those contained in the companying letter of General Keyes, with reports of General Barnard and other officers furnishing a reply to the above letter. His cellency could not judge of the formidable cl acter of the works before us as well as if he l been upon the ground, and whatever might h been his desire for prompt action (certainly greater than mine), I feel confident, if he co have made a personal inspection of the enem defenses, he would have forbidden me from ri ing the safety of the army and the possible s cesses of the campaign on a sanguinary assa of an advantageous and formidable positi which, even if successful, could not have b followed up to any other or better result t would have been reached by the regular ope tions of a siege. Still less could I forego conclusions of my most instructed judgment the mere sake of avoiding the personal co quences intimated in the President's dispatch.

The following extracts from the report of t chief engineer—Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard,—c body the result of our reconnoissances, and gi with some degree of detail, the character a strength of the defenses of Yorktown and t Warwick, and some of the obstacles which army contended against and overcome.

EXTRACTS FROM GEN. BARNARD'S R PORT.

"The accompanying drawing—Map No. 2 gives with accuracy the outline and armament the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with t detached works immediately connected with i

"The three bastioned fronts looking towar our approaches appear to have been earli built, and have about 15 feet thickness of pa pet, and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch; t width varying much, but never leaving less, top of the scrap, than 15 feet: I think, general much more.

"The works extending around the town, fr the western salient of fronts just mention appear to have been finished during the la winter and spring. They have formidable p files, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and general 10 feet depth of ditch.

The water-batteries had, generally, 18 feet
rapet, the guns in barbette.
They were—as well as the works mentioned
refully constructed with well made sod-re-
ents.
There were numerous traverses between the
, and ample magazines; how sufficient in
b-proof qualities, I am unable to say.
The two first guns of the works on the
hts, bear upon the water as well as the land,
were of heavy calibre.
The list herewith, gives all the guns in posi-
or for which there were emplacements.
vacant emplacements were all occupied be-
the evacuation by siege-guns, rifled 4½ inch,
ounders and 18-pounders.
In Fort Magruder—the first exterior work—
e were found 1 8-inch Columbiad, 1 42-
nder, and 1 8-inch siege-howitzer, the two
ber 'en barbettee.' The sketch will show
emplacements for guns on field and siege-
riages, making, I think, with the foregoing, 22.
of these were placed behind traverses with
rasures covered by bridges.
The two external redoubts, with the connect-
parapets, formed a re-entrant with the fronts
ttack, and all the guns bore on our ap-
aches.
It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches
e swept by the fire of at least 49 guns, nearly
f which were heavy, and many of them the
st formidable guns known; besides that, two-
ds of the guns of the water-batteries, and all
guns of Gloucester, bore on our right bat-
es, though under disadvantageous circum-
nces.
The ravine, behind which the left of the
rktown fronts of attack was placed, was not
y difficult, as the heads formed depressions
front of their left imperfectly seen by their
, and from which access could be had to the
ches, but we could not be sure of this fact
ore the evacuation. The enemy held, by
ans of a slight breastwork, and rifle trenches,
osition in advance of the heads of their ra-
es, as far forward as the Brunt House.
The ravines, which head between the York-
wn fortifications and the exterior works, are
ep and intricate. They were tolerably well
en, however, by the works which run west-
rdly from the Yorktown works, and which
re too numerous and complicated to be traced
paper.
"Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left,
pears to have been built at an early period.
"The external connection between this work,
is first a rifle trench, probably afterwards en-
ged into a parapet, with external ditch, and an
nplacement for four guns in or near the small
dan in the centre.
"Behind this they had constructed numerous
aulments with connecting boyans not fully
ranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended,
obably, to protect their camps and reserves
gainst the destructive effects of our artillery.
"From the 'red redoubt,' these trenches and
aulments, ran to the woods and rivulet which
rms a head of the Warwick, and continue al-
most without break to connect with the works at Winn's Mills This stream just mentioned, (whatever be its name, the term 'Warwick,' according to some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James River, up as high as Lees's Mill), was inundated by a number of dams, from near where its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned, down to Lee's Mill.

"Below Lee's Mill, the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt marshes of 200 or 300 yards in width, from which the land rises up boldly to a height of 40 or 50 feet.

"The first group of works is at Winn's Mill, where there is a dam and bridge. The next is, to guard another dam between Winn's and Lee's Mills, (this is the point attacked by General Smith, on the 16th ultimo, and where Lieut. Merrill was wounded; the object of the attack was -merely to prevent the further construction of works, and feel the strength of the position.) A work, of what extent is not now known, was at the sharp angle of the stream, just above Lee's Mill, and a formidable group of works was at Lee's Mill, where there was also a dam and bridge.

"From Lee's Mill a line of works extends across Mulberry Island (or it is supposed to do so).

"At Southall's Landing is another formidable group of works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across the James.

"These groups of field works were connected by rifle trenches or parapets, for nearly the whole distance.

"They are far more extensive than may be supposed, from the mention of them I make; and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times.

"The country on both sides the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own labors have corduroyed them.

"If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus, we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen into our hands.

"It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line, and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to do so.

"If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault."

The plan of the approaches and their defenses, as determined upon and finally executed, is exhibited in the accompanying map. It was, in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the enemy, and under its protection to establish, almost simultaneously, batteries along the whole front, extending from York River, on the right, to the Warwick, on the left —a chord of about one mile in length. The principal approaches were directed against the east

end of the main work (which was most heavily armed, and bore both on the water and land), and lay between Wormley's Creek and York River. There, also, were placed the most of the batteries designed to act against the land front, to enfilade the water batteries, and to act upon Gloucester. I designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land between Wormley's Creek and the Warwick, were crippled, and their fire kept down, to push the trenches as far forward as necessary, and to assault Yorktown and the adjacent works.

The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to the depots, had been vigorously pushed to completion, by the troops under Gens. Heintzelman and Sumner, and were available for infantry, and in some instances for artillery, on the 17th of April, when the batteries and their connections were commenced, and labor upon them kept up, night and day, until finished.

Some of the batteries, on easy ground and concealed from the view of the enemy, were early completed and armed, and held ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more important works. The completion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1st, Battery No. 1 was opened with effect upon the wharf and town.

On the 22d of April, Gen. Franklin, with his division from Gen. McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Gloucester Point had been reinforced and the works strengthened; but as this division was too small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it on the north bank of the York River, under the protection of the gunboats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were made for landing them, and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account of this labor, I refer to the report of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, detailed for this expedition.

While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roads on the left wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and corduroyed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive him from his works at Winn's and Lee's Mills, preparatory to the general attack, active reconnoissances were continually going on, and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks.

The result of various reconnoissances made under the immediate direction of Gen. W. F. Smith, commanding 2d division, 4th corps, led to the belief that the weakest poin. of that part of the enemy's lines, was opposite a field, where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by a battery known to contain at least one gun. It was determined to push a strong reconnoissance on this point, to silence the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position, b prepared to sustain the reconnoitering party real attack, if found expedient.

Gen. W. F. Smith was directed to under the operation on the 16th of April. He silen the enemy's guns, discovered the existence other works, previously concealed and unkno and sent a strong party across the stream, wh was finally forced to retire with some loss; Gen. Smith intrenched himself in a position mediately overlooking the dam and the enem works, so as to keep them under control, prevent the enemy using the dam as a means crossing the Warwick to annoy us.

Many times towards the end of the month, enemy attempted to drive in our pickets and t our rifle-pits near Yorktown, but always with success. As the siege progressd it was w great difficulty that the rifle-pits on the ri could be excavated and held, so little cover could be made against the hot fire of the enem artillery and infantry. Their guns continued to a late hour of the night of the 3d of May.

Our batteries would have been ready to op on the morning of the 6th of May at latest, on the morning of the 4th it was discovered t the enemy had already been compelled to eva ate his position during the night, leaving beh him all his heavy guns uninjured, and a la amount of ammunition and supplies.

For the details of the labors of this siege, I fer to the accompanying reports and journals Brig-Gen. J. G. Barnard, chief engineer, charg with the selection and laying out, and con tion of the approaches and batteries; of Br Gen. W. F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged w arming and supplying with ammunition all siege and field batteries; and of Brig.-Gen. F John Porter, director of the siege, to whom w assigned the guaading of the trenches, the asse bling and distribution of the working parties, & &c.

THE PURSUIT TO WILLIAMSBURG

Early in the morning of the 4th, upon the en my's abandoning his lines at Yorktown, I order all the available cavalry force, with four batteri of horse artillery, under Brig.-Gen. Stoneman, chi of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the Yorktow and Williamsburg road, with orders to hara the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of h forces as had taken the Lee's Mill and William burg road.

Gen. Heintzelman was directed to send Hoo er's division forward on the Yorktown and W liamsburg road to support Gen. Stoneman; an Gen Smith was ordered to proceed with his div sion on the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road f the same purpose; afterwards the divisions Gens. Kearney, Couch and Casey were put route, the first on the Yorktown road, and th others on the Lee's Mill road. These roads uni about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magrude, and are connected by cross-roads at sever points between Yorktown and Williamsbur After these directions had been given, Gen. Sum ner, (the officer second in rank in the Army the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the fro

d take immediate charge of operations until
r arrival.

en. Stoneman moved forward promptly with
command (consisting of four batteries of horse-
llery under Lieut.-Col. Hays, the 1st and 6th
S. cavalry, the 3d Pennsylvania, and 8th Illi-
s and Barker's squadron.) meeting with but
e opposition until he arrived in front of the
my's works, about two miles east of Williams-
g. At a point about eight miles from York-
n, in accordance with my instructions he de-
ed Gen. Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d
nsylvania cavalry (Col. Averell) and Barker's
adron, to gain the Lee's Mill road, and endea-
, with the assistance of Gen. Smith, to cut off
portion of the enemy's rear-guard, which had
en that route. Gen. Emory had some sharp
rmishes with a regiment of cavalry, and a bat-
r under Gen. Stuart, and drove them in the di-
tion of Lee's Mill. Gen. Smith having met
h obstructions in his front, had transferred his
umn by a cross-road to the Yorktown and Wil-
msburg road, so that Gen. Emory finding no
ce to co-operate with him was unable to cut
the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escap-
by a circuitous route, along the bank of the
nes River.

The position in which Gen. Stoneman encoun-
ed the enemy is about four miles in extent, the
t resting on College Creek, and the left on
een's Creek, nearly three-fourths of its front
ng covered by tributaries of those two creeks,
on which there are ponds. The ground be-
en the heads of the tributary streams is a
tivated plain, across which a line of detached
rks had been constructed, consisting of Fort
gruder, a large work in the centre with a bas-
n front, and twelve other redoubts and epaul-
nts for field-guns.

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six
t high and nine feet thick, the ditch nine feet
de and nine feet deep, filled with water. The
gth of the interior crest is about 600 yards.
e redoubts have strong profiles, but are of
all dimensions, having faces of about forty
rds. The woods in front of the position were
ed, and the open ground in front of the works
s dotted with numerous rifle pits.

The roads leading from the lower part of the
ninsula towards Williamsburg, one along the
rk River—the Yorktown road—and the other
ng the James,—the Lee's Mill road—unite be-
een the heads of the tributary streams a short
stance in front of Fort Magruder, by which
ey are commanded, and debouch from the
oods just before uniting. A branch from the
nes River road leaves it about one and three
arter miles below Fort Magruder, and unites
ith the road from Allen's Landing to Williams-
rg, which crosses the tributary of College
reek over a dam at the outlet of a pond, and
sses just in rear of the line of works, being
mmanded by the three redoubts on the right of
e line.

At about the same distance from Fort Magru-
er a branch leaves the York River road, and
rosses the tributary of Queen's Creek on a dam,
d passing over the position and through the woods in its rear, finally enters Williamsburg. This road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of works.

Gen. Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard—consisting of a part of the 1st U. S. Cavalry and one section of Gibson's battery, under the command of Gen. Cook—and the enemy immediately opened on him with several field-pieces from Fort Magruder, having the correct range and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit, and returned the fire, while the 6th U. S. Cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down upon it; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The rear squadron, under command of Captain Saunders, repelled a charge of the enemy's cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the meantime the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, and the artillery fire becoming very hot, Gen. Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of one piece which could not be extricated from the mud. The enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by the 1st U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut.-Colonel Grier, and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. Gen. Stoneman then took up a defensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry. The advance of General Smith's column reached Skiff's Creek about 11½ o'clock, and found the bridge over the stream in flames, and the road impassable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and reached Gen. Stoneman's position about 5½ o'clock. General Sumner arriving with it, assumed command.

Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived during the afternoon near the Half-Way House. The head of General Hooker's column encountered Smith's division, filing into the road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours, until it had passed Gen. Hooker then followed on, and at Checcecahe Church turned off, by Gen. Heintzelman's direction, taking a cross-road, and moved out on the Lee's Mill road, thus changing places with Gen. Smith. Marching part of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th.

General Smith's division, having been deployed General Sumner ordered an attack on the works, in his front, but the lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through the dense forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt, for that night, was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued until the morning of the 6th, making the roads, already in a very bad condition, almost impassable.

THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

During the morning of the 5th, General Sumner reconnoitered the position in his front,

and at 11 o'clock, ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, which had been found to be unoccupied. The remainder of Smith's division occupied the woods in front, without being actually engaged. The divisions of Couch and Casey, had received orders during the night to march at daylight, but on account of the terrible condition of the roads, and other impediments, were not able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock, p.m., at which time the first brigade of Couch's division arrived, and was posted in the centre, on Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up during the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. In the meantime, General Hooker having reconnoitered the enemy's position, began the attack at 7½ o clock, a.m., and for a while silenced the guns of Fort Magruder, and cleared the ground in his front. But the enemy being continually reinforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left. For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o'clock, his ammunition began to give out. The loss had been heavy and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. At this time the division of General Kearney came up, who, at 9 a.m., had received orders to reinforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by the greatest exertion, in passing Casey's troops, and pushing on the front through the deep mud. General Kearney at once gallantly attacked, and thereby prevented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, enabling Gen. Hooker to extricate himself from his position, and withdraw his wearied troops.

Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been mentioned before, was immediately on its arrival, ordered by Gen. Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were repulsed. Gen. Peck, held his position until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigade's of Couch's division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground when night closed the contest.

The vigorous action of these troops relieved Gen. Hooker considerably. Gen. Emory, had been left with his command, on the night of the 4th, to guard the branch of the Lee's Mill road, which leads to Allen's Farm, and on the morning of the 5th, it was ascertained that by this route the enemy's right could be turned. A request for infantry for this purpose, was made to Gen. Heintzelman, who, late in the afternoon, sent four regiments and two batteries of Kearney's division, the first disposable troops he had, and directed Gen. Emory to make the attack. With these reinforcements, his force amounted to about 3,000 men, and 3 batteries. Gen. Emory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground, and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved some risks, but if successful, might have produced important results. At 11 a.m., as before mentioned, Gen. Smith received orders from General Sumner, to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy redoubt on the left of the enemy's line; Ha cock's brigade was selected for this purpo He crossed the dam, took possession of the fi redoubt, and afterwards finding the second o vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for rei forcements to enable him to advance further, a take the next redoubt, which commanded t plain between his position and Fort Magrud and would have enabled him to take in rever and cut the communication of the troops e gaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney. T enemy soon began to show himself in streng before him, and, as his rear and right flank we somewhat exposed, he repeated his request f reinforcements. Gen. Smith was twice order to join him with the rest of his division, b each time the order was countermanded at t moment of execution; Gen. Sumner not bei willing to weaken the centre. At length, reply to Gen. Hancock's repeated messages f more troops, Gen. Sumner sent him an order fall back to his first position; the execution which, Gen. Hancock deferred as long as pos ble, being unwilling to give up the advanta already gained, and fearing to expose his co mand by such a movement.

During the progress of these events I had r mained at Yorktown, to complete the prepar tions for the departure of Gen. Franklin's a other troops to West Point by water, and make the necessary arrangements with the nav commander, for his co-operation.

By pushing Gen. Franklin, well supported, l water to the right bank of the Pamunkey opp site West Point, it was hoped to force the enem to abandon whatever works he might have c the Peninsula below that point, or be cut off. was of paramount importance that the arrang ments to this end should be promptly made.

At an early hour of the morning, I had se two of my aids (Lieut.-Col. Sweitzer and Ma Hammerstein) to observe the operations in fron with instructions to report to me everything importance that might occur. I received no i formation from them leading me to suppose th there was anything occurring of more impor ance than a simple affair of a rear guard, unt about 1 o'clock, p.m., when a dispatch arrive from one of them that everything was not pr gressing favorably; this was confirmed a fe minutes later by the reports of Governor Spragu and Major Hammerstein, who came directly fro the scene of action.

Completing the necessary arrangements, I r turned to my camp without delay, rode rapidly t the front, a distance of some fourteen mile through roads much obstructed by troops an wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 p.m., in time to take a rapid survey of th ground. I soon learned that there was no direc communication between our centre and the le under Gen. Heintzelman. The centre was chiefl in the nearer edge of the woods situated betwee us and the enemy. As heavy firing was heard i the direction of Gen. Hancock's command, I im mediately ordered Gen. Smith to proceed wit his two remaining brigades to support that par

the line. Gen. Naglee, with his brigade re-ved similar orders. I then directed our cen- to advance to the further edge of the woods, ntioned above, which was done; and attempt- to open direct communication with Gen. intzelman, but was prevented by the marshy te of the ground in the direction in which the empt was made. Before Generals Smith and glee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's erations, although they moved with great ra-lity, he had been confronted by a superior ce. Feigning to retreat slowly, he awaited ir onset, and then turned upon them: after ne terrific volleys of musketry he charged m with the bayonet, routing and dispersing ir whole force; killing, wounding and cap-ing from 500 to 600 men, he, himself losing y thirty-one men.

This was one of the most brilliant engagements the war, and Gen. Hancock merits the highest aise for the soldierly qualities displayed, and perfect appreciation of the vital importance his position.

Night put an end to all the operations here, d all the troops who had been engaged in this ntest slept on the muddy field without shelter, d many without food.

Notwithstanding the report I received from n. Heintzelman during the night, that Gen. ooker's division had suffered so much that it uld not be relied upon next day, and that arney's could not do more than hold its own, thout reinforcements—being satisfied that the sult of Hancock's engagement was to give us ssession of the decisive point of the battle-ld—during the night I countermanded the der for the advance of the divisions of Sedg-ck and Richardson, and directed them to turn to Yorktown, to proceed to West Point water.

Our loss during the day, the greater part of hich was sustained by Hooker's division, was follows: killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; missing, 2 Total, 2,228.

On the next morning we found the enemy s osition abandoned, and occupied fort Magruder d the town of Williamsburg, which was filled ith the enemy's wounded, to whose assistance ghteen of their surgeons were sent by Gen. J. Johnston, the officer in command. Several ms and caissons which the enemy could not rry off on account of the mud were secured.

Col. Averill was sent forward at once with a rong cavalry force, to endeavor to overtake the nemy's rear guard. He found several guns bandoned and picked up a large number of tragglers, but the conditions of the road and the tate of his supplies forced him to return after dvancing a few miles.

It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us ere with only a portion of his army. When s cavalry first appeared, there was nothing but he enemy's rear guard in Williamsburg: al-hough troops were brought back during the ight and the next day, to hold the works as ong as possible, in order to gain time for the rains, etc., already well on their way to Rich-ond, to make their escape.

Our troops were greatly exhausted by the laborious march through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown, and by the protracted battle through which they had just passed; many of them were out of rations and ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to make a prompt movement, had marched with empty haversacks. The supply trains had been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th, to allow the troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such a state, that it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. Gen. Hooker's division had suffered so bad that it was in no condition to follow the enemy even if the roads had been good; under these circumstances, an immediate pursuit was impossible.

Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the wounded, and to bring up provisions, ammunition and forage. The condition of the roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impossible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown; a temporary depot was therefore promptly established on Queen's Creek, and supplies drawn, and the wounded shipped from that point.

ADVANCE TO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

The Divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West Point. The remaining divisions, the train, and the reserve artillery moved subsequently by land.

Early on the morning of the 7th, Gen. Franklin had completed the disembarkation of his division, and had placed it in a good position to cover the landing place, both his flanks and a large portion of the front being protected by water.

Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived during the morning.

At about 9, a.m., a large force of the enemy appeared, consisting of Whiting's division and other troops, and between 10 and 11, they attacked the part of the line held by Newton's brigade.

The action continued until 3 p.m., when the enemy retired, all his attacks having been repulsed. This affair, the most important in which the division had been engaged, was highly creditable to Gen. Franklin and his command. For the details I refer to this report, which is herewith submitted. Our loss was 40 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total 194, which includes a large proportion of officers.

Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from Williamsburg on the 6th and 7th, and on the 8th Gen. Stoneman moved, with an advance guard of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to open communication with Gen. Franklin.

As soon as our supplies had been received, and the condition of the roads had become a little better, though still very bad, the advance of the remaining troops was begun, Smith's division moving on the 8th.

On the 10th, headquarters were at Roper's Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg. All the divisions which had moved by land (except Hooker's) being in the vicinity of that place. We

were no in direct communication with the portion of the army which had gone by water, and we began to draw supplies from Eltham. On account of the small number and narrowness of the roads in this neighborhood, movements were difficult and slow.

On the 13th, headquarters, and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes and Smith, reached Cumberland, which was made a temporary depot. Couch and Casey were then near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham.

On the 14th and 15th much rain fell.

On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith and Porter were with great difficulty moved to White House, five miles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this short distance.

Gen. Stoneman had occupied this place some days before, after several successful skirmishes, in which our cavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affairs are appended.

About this time, with the consent of the President, two additional corps were organized, viz.: the 5th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the Reserve Artillery, under the command of F. J. Porter; and the 6th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Franklin and Smith, under the command of Gen. W. B. Franklin.

Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot was at once organized there.

On the 19th, headquarters, and the corps of Porter and Franklin, moved to Tunstall's Station, five miles from White House.

On the 20th more rain fell.

On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows:—

Stoneman's Advance Guard, one mile from New Bridge.

Franklin's Corps, three miles from New Bridge, with .

Porter's Corps, at supporting distance in its rear.

Sumner's Corps, on the railroad, about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left.

Keyes's Corps, on New Kent Road, near Bottom's Bridge, with

Heintzelman's Corps, at supporting distance in its rear.

The ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our possession, and the re-building of the bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy, was commenced.

On the 22d headquarters moved to Coal Harbor.

On the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chickahominy, and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly completed.

SECOND PERIOD.

PART II.

OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND.

When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy River, at Bottom's Bridge, they found that the as well as the railroad bridge, about a mile al had been destroyed by the enemy.

The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about ty feet wide, fringed with a dense growth heavy forest trees, and bordered by low, ma bottom-lands, varying from half a mile to a in width.

Our operations embraced that part of the r between Bottom's and Meadow Bridges, wh covered the principal approaches to Richm from the east.

Within these limits the firm ground, lying ab high-water mark, seldom approaches near river on either bank, and no locality was fo within this section, where the high ground ca near the stream on both sides. It was subject frequent, sudden and great variations in the ume of water, and a rise of a few feet overflow the bottom-lands on both sides.

At low wate it could be forded at almost a point, but during high water it rose above a fo ing stage, and could then be crossed only at few points where bridges had been construct These bridges had all been destroyed by the e my on our approach, and it was necessary only to reconstruct these, but to build seve others.

The west bank of the river, opposite the N and Mechanicsville bridges, was bordered by e vated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commar ing positions to fortify, establish his batteri enfilading the approaches upon the two princi roads to Richmond, in one night, and resist t reconstruction of the important bridges. Th obliged us to select other less exposed points f our crossings.

As the enemy was not in great force opposi Bottom's Bridge, on the arrival of our left at th point, and as it was important to secure a lod ment upon the right bank before he should hav time to concentrate his forces and contest th passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division t ford the river and occupy the opposite height This was promptly done on the 20th, and reco noissances were at once pushed out in advance.

These troops were directed to throw up de fenses in an advantageous position to secure on left flank. Gen. Heintzelman's corps was throwi forward in support, and Bottom's Bridge immedi ately rebuilt.

In the meantime our centre and right were ad vanced to the river above, and on the 24th we carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the enemy out with our artillery, and forcing them across the bridge which they destroyed. Gen. Naglee on the same day dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of the "Seven Pines." on the Bottom's Bridge road, and our advance on the left secured a strong position near that place.

All the information obtained from deserters, negroes and spies, indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy, and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior to ours

numbers did not admit of a doubt. Strong de-
ses had been constructed around Richmond.
mpressed by these facts with the necessity of
engthening the army for the struggle, I did
fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the
portance of reinforcing the Army of the Poto-
c with every disposable man, in order to in-
e the success of an attack upon the rebel cap-
l.

On the 10th of May I telegraphed as follows:—

Camp at Ewell's Farm, three miles beyond
Williamsburg, May 10, 1862, 5 A. M.

n. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

From the information reaching me from every
rce, I regard it as certain that the enemy will
et us with all his force, on or near the Chickа-
miny. They can concentrate many more men
an I have, and are collecting troops from all
arters, especially well-disciplined troops from
e South. Casualties, sickness, garrisons and
ards, have much reduced my numbers, and will
ntinue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army
th whatever force I may have; but duty re-
ires me to urge that every effort be made to
nforce me without delay with all the disposa-
le troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we
ncentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to
ht the great battle now impending, and to make
decisive.

It is possible that the enemy may abandon
chmond without a serious struggle; but I do
t believe he will—and it would be unwise to
unt on anything but a stubborn and desperate
fense, a life and death contest. I see no other
pe for him than to fight this battle, and we
ust win it. I shall fight them whatever their
rce may be; but I ask for every man that the
epartment can send me. No troops should now
e left unemployed. Those who entertain the
inion that the rebels will abandon Richmond
ithout a struggle, are in my judgment badly ad-
sed, and do not comprehend their situation,
hich is one requiring desperate measures.

I beg that the President and Secretary will ma-
rely weigh what I say, and leave nothing un-
one to comply with my request. If I am not re-
forced, it is probable that I will be obliged to
ght nearly double my numbers, strongly intrench-
d. I do not think it will be at all possible for
e to bring more than (70,000) seventy thou-
nd men upon the field of battle.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

On the 14th of May I sent the following tele-
ram to the President:

Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 1862.

His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of
he U. S.:

I have more than twice telegraphed to the
ecretary of War, stating, that in my opinion
he enemy were concentrating all their available
orce to fight this army in front of Richmond,
nd that such ought to be their policy. I have
eceived no reply whatever to any of these tele-
graphs.

I beg leave to repeat their substance to your
Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration
which you have ever accorded to my representa-
ions and views. All my information from every
source accessible to me, establishes the fixed pur-
pose of the rebels to defend Richmond against
this army by offering us battle with all the troops
they can collect from east, west, and south, and
my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my
commanders whom I have been able to consult.

Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have
much weakened my force, and will continue to
do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against
the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the
utmost, and with them I must attack in position,
probably intrenched, a much larger force—per-
haps double my numbers. It is possible that
Richmond may be abandoned without a serious
struggle, but the enemy are actually in great
strength between here and there, and it would be
unwise, and even insane for me to calculate upon
anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance.
If they should abandon Richmond, it may well be
that it is done with the purpose of making the
stand at some place in Virginia south or west of
there, and and we should be in condition to press
them without delay. The confederate leaders
must employ their utmost efforts against this
army in Virginia, and they will be supported by
the whole body of their military officers, among
whom there may be said to be no Union feeling,
as there is also very little among the higher class
of citizens in the seceding States.

I have found no fighting men in this Peninsula
—all are in the ranks of the opposing foe.

Even if more troops than I now have should
prove unnecessary for purposes of military occu-
pation, our greatest display of imposing force in
the capital of the rebel government will have the
best moral effect. I most respectfully and earn-
estly urge upon your Excellency that the oppor-
tunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the
enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you
will cause this army to be reinforced without de-
lay by all the disposable troops of the govern-
ment. I ask for every man that the government
can send me. Any commander of the reinforce-
ments, whom your Excellency may designate,
will be acceptable to me, whatever expression
I may have heretofore addressed to you on that
subject.

I will fight the enemy, whatever their force
may be, and whatever force I may have, and I
firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our
triumph should be made decisive and complete.
The soldiers of this army love their government,
and will fight well in its support: you may rely
upon them. They have confidence in me as their
general, and in you as their President. Strong
reinforcements will at least save the lives of
many of them. The greater our force, the more
perfect will be our combinations, and the less
our loss.

For obvious reasons, I beg you to give imme-
diate consideration to this communication, and to
inform me fully at the earliest moment of your
final determination.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com.

To which, on the 18th of May, I received this
reply:

Hd.-Qu'rs, Dep'rt Potomac, May 18th, 1862.

To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,

Comd'g Army of Potomac before Richmond.

General,—Your dispatch to the President, asking reinforcements, has been received and carefully considered.

The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, and it is believed that even if this were prudent it would require more time to effect a junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock, by way of the Potomac and York River, than by a land march. In order therefore to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, Gen. McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communication as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Richmond.

It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north or south of the Pamunkey River.

In any event you will be able to prevent the enemy's forces from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force upon Gen. McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five and forty thousand men.

A copy of the instructions to Gen. McDowell is with this. The specific task assigned to his command, has been to provide against any danger to the capital of the nation.

At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for sufficient co-operation. When Gen. McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff-officers to be prepared to supply him by that route.

The President desires that Gen. McDowell retain the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward.

By order of the President,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

From Washington, May 18, 2 P.M.

It will be observed, this order rendered it impossible for me to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north.

I had advised, and preferred, that reinforcements should be sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army on the James River, whenever the navigation of that stream should be opened. The land movement obliged me to expose my right in order to secure the junction, and as the order for Gen. McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and frustrated the plan of campaign. Had Gen. McDowell joined me by water, I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy and would have had the army massed in a body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream.

The following is a copy of the instructions to Gen. McDowell.

War Dep't., Wash'n., D.C., May 17, 1862.

To Gen. McDowell,

Com'g. Dep't. of Rappahannock,—

General :—Upon being joined by General Shield's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the force under Gen. McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York Rivers.

While seeking to establish, as soon as possible a communication between your left wing, and the right wing of Gen. McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position, as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of the rebel forces.

Gen. McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness, to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond, and throwing itself upon your column before the junction of the two armies is effected.

A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is annexed.

By order of the President,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Having some doubts from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of Gen. McDowell, and as to the time when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this despatch :

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp near Tunstall's Station, Va. May 21, 1862, 11 P.M.

His Excellency Abraham Lincoln,

President of the United States,—

Your dispatch of yesterday respecting our situation and the batteries at Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with advance, where I have been all this day. I have communicated personally with Capt. Goldsborough, and by letter with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-operation on land, which I will not be in a condition to afford, for several days. Circumstances must determine the propriety of and attack.

It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy to-day, at Bottom's Bridge Ford, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank, guarding the rebuilding of the bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New Kent Road near Bottom's Bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with advanced guard, is within one

e of New Bridge. Franklin, with two divi-
is, is about two miles this side of Stoneman.
ter's division, with the reserves of infantry
artillery, is within supporting distance.
dquarters will probably be at Coal Head to-
row, one mile this side of Franklin. All the
ges over the Chickahominy are destroyed.
e enemy are in force on every road leading to
lmond, within a mile or two west of the
am. Their main body is on the road from
w Bridge, encamped along it for four or five
es, spreading over the open ground on both
s. Johnston's head-quarters are about two
es beyond the bridge.
ll accounts report their numbers as greatly
eeding our own. The position of the rebel
es, the declaration of the rebel authorities,
resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the
on of the city government, the conduct of the
zens, and all other sources of information ac-
ible to me, give positive assurance that our
roach to Richmond involves a desperate
le between the opposing armies.
ll our divisions are moving towards the foe.
all advance steadily and carefully, and attack
n according to my best judgment, and in such
ner as to employ my greatest force.
regret the state of things as to Gen. McDow-
command. One division added to this army
that effort would do more to protect Wash-
on than his whole force can possibly do any-
re else in the field. The rebels are concen-
ng from all points for the two battles at
mond and Corinth. I would still most res-
fully suggest the policy of your concentrat-
here by movements on water. I have heard
ing as to the probabilities of the contem-
ed junction of McDowell's force with mine.
ve no idea when he can start, what are his
ns of transportation, or when he may be ex-
ed to reach this vicinity. I fear there is
hope that he can join me overland, in time
the coming battle; delays, on my part, will
langerous. I fear sickness and demoraliza-
This region is unhealthy for northern men,
unless kept moving I fear that our soldiers
become discouraged. At present our num-
are weakening from disease, but our men
in in good heart.
regret, also, the configuration of the Depart-
t of the Rappahannock. It includes a por-
even of the city of Richmond. I think that
wn department should embrace the entire
of military operations designed for the cap-
and occupation of that city.
gain I agree with your Excellency, that one
d general is better than two bad ones.
am not sure that I fully comprehend your
rs of the 17th inst., addressed to myself and
McDowell. If a junction is effected before
ccupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east
e railroad to Fredericksburg, and within my
artment. This fact, my superior rank, and
express language of the 62d article of war,
place his command under my orders, unless
otherwise specially directed by your Excel-
y, and I consider that he will be under my
mand, except that I am not to detach any
portion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to say—anxious as I am for an increase of force—that the march of McDowell's force upon Richmond, by the shortest route, will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington.

Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against by explicitly placing Gen. McDowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions would be observed in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal feelings which could influence me to disregard them in any particular.

I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, caution and determiuation that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government, or that it may close my career.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

On the 24th I received the following reply:

May 24, 1862. From Washington. 24th.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—I left Gen. McDowell's camp at dark last evening. Shields' command is there, but is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the 26th. We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of one regiment infantry, two companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some peril.

The enemy's forces under Gen. Anderson, now opposing Gen. McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond.

If, in conjunction with McDowell's movements against Anderson, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pomunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from receiving an accession of numbers of nearly 15,000 men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of roalroad for supplies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges? McDowell and Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely.

You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, precisely as your indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 21st.

A. LINCOLN, President.

This information that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericksburg on the following Monday (the 26th), and that he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confident that he would, on his arrival, be sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting us.

At an hour later on the same day I received the following:

May 24, 1862. From Washington, 4 p.m., '62.
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—

In consequence of Gen. Banks' critical position, I have been compelled to suspend Gen. McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw Gen. Fremont's force and part of Gen. McDowell's in their rear. A. LINCOLN, President.

From which it will be seen that I could not expect Gen. McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate operations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied to the President that I would make my calculations accordingly.

It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my disposal, and to avail myself, of all artificial auxiliaries, to compensate as much as possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my limited force to move "cautiously and safely." In view of the peculiar character of the Chickahominy and the liability of the bottom-lands to sudden inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge and Mechanicsville eleven new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive log-way approaches.

The entire army could probably have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications, or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage; the army would have been paralyzed.

It is true, I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward to Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city, for a renewal of supplies; but the approaches were fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dispensed with rations.

Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed.

It will be remembered that the order for co-operation of Gen. McDowell was simply pended, not revoked, and therefore I was n liberty to abandon the northern approach.

A very dashing and successful reconnoiss was made near New Bridge on the 24th of by Lieut. Bowen, Topographical Engineers corted by the 4th Michigan Volunteers a squadron of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, comma respectively by Col, Woodbury and Capt. don.

Our troops encountered a Louisiana regim and, with little loss, drove it back upon brigade, killing a large number and captu several prisoners. Great credit is due to staff officers, as well as to Col. Woodbury, Gordon, and their commands, for their con on this occasion.

The work upon the bridges was commence once, and pushed forward with great vigor; the rains which from day today continue fall, flooded the valley, and raised the water greater height than had been known for tw years. This demolished a great amount of labor; and our first bridges with their approa which were not made with reference to extreme high water, were carried off or rend impassable. We were obliged, with imm labor, to construct others much longer, elevated, and stable. Our men worked in water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the posite bank.

On the 25th May I received the following gram.

Washington, May 23, 18

Maj.-Gen. McClellan,—

Your dispatch received. General Banks at Strasburg with about 6,000 men—Shi having been taken from him to swell a col for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and rest of his force scattered at various places, the 23d a rebel force of seven to ten thous fell upon one regiment and two companies gu ing the bridges at Front Royal, destroyi entirely—crossed the Shenandoah, and on 24th, yesterday, pushed on to get north of B to Winchester. Gen. Banks ran a race them, beating them into Winchester yester evening. This morning a battle ensued betw the two forces, in which Gen. Banks was be back in full retreat towards Martinsburg, probably is broken up into a total rout. G on the Manassas Gap railroad, just now rep that Jackson is now near Front Royal with 10 following up and supporting, as I underst the force now pursuing Banks. Also that other force of 10,000 is near Orleans, follow on in the same direction. Stripped bare as are here, I will do all that we can do to prev them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferr above. McDowell has about 20,000 of his fo moving back to the vicinity of Front Royal, Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to P risonburg, both these movements intended to in the enemy's rear.

One more of McDowell's brigades is orde through here to Harper's Ferry; the rest of forces remain for the present at Fredericksb

y are sending such regiments and dribs from
e and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's
ry, supplying their places in some sort by
ing in militia from adjacent States. We have
o eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's
ry, of which arm there is not a single one at
t point.

his is now our situation. If McDowell's force
s now beyond our reach we should be entirely
oless. Apprehensions of something like this,
no unwillingness to sustain you has always
n my reason for withholding McDowell's forces
n you.

lease understand this, and do the best you
with the forces you have.

A. Lincoln, President.

n the 25th, the following was also received:

Washington, May 25, 1862, 2 P. M.

j.-Gen. McClellan:

he enemy is moving north in sufficient force
drive Gen. Banks before him; precisely in
t force we cannot tell. He is also threaten-
Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap
lroad from both north and south—in precisely
t force we cannot tell. I think the movement
general and a concerted one, such as could
be if he was acting upon the purpose of a
y desperate defense of Richmond. I think the
e is near when you must either attack Rich-
d or give up the job, and come back to the
ense of Washington. Let me hear from you
antly.

A. Lincoln, President.

o which I replied as follows:

Coal Harbor, May 25, 1862.

elegram received. Independently of it, the
e is very near when I shall attack Richmond.
object of the movement is probably to pre-
t reinforcements being sent to me. All the
rmation obtained from balloons, deserters,
soners, and contrabands, agrees in the state-
t that the mass of the rebel troops are still
he immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to
end it.

have no knowledge of Banks' position and
e, nor what there is at Manassas, therefore
not form a definite opinion as to the force
inst him.

have two corps across Chickahominy, within
miles of Richmond, the others on this side at
er crossings, within same distance, and ready
cross when bridges are completed.

G. B. McClellan Maj. Gen. Com'g.

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President.

On the 26th, I received the following:

Washington May 26, 1862, 12.40 A. M.

j.-Gen. McClellan:

We have Gen. Banks' official report. He has
ed his army and baggage, and has made a safe
reat to the river, and is probably safe at Wil-
nsport. He reports the attacking force at fif-
n thousand.

A. Lincoln, President.

On the 26th, I received the following:

Washington, May 26, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan:

Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad,
o what impression have you as to intrenched
orks for you to contend with in front of Rich-
ond. Can you get near enough to throw shells
o the city?

A. Lincoln, President.

On the same day I sent the following:

Coal Harbor, May 26, 1862

Have cut the Virginia Central road in three places between Hanover C. H. and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable, but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to-night. Nothing of interest to-day.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

His Excellency A. Lincoln, President.

The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected by the command of Brig.-Gen. Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route, or from sending reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson.

At 10 A. M. I also sent the following dispatch:

"Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly call your attention to my instructions to Gen. Banks, of March 16th, to Gen. Wadsworth of same date, and to my letter of April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a prompt return to the principles there laid down would relieve all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen.

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President.

Late on the 20th I sent the following:

Camp near New Bridge,
May 26, 1862, 7.30 P. M.

Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am I feel forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements for to-morrow are very important, and if successful, will leave me free to strike on the return of the force detached.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen

His Excellency, A. Lincoln, President.

BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE.

On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to reinforce Jackson, or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to unite with us.

On the same day I also received information from Gen. McDowell, through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Fredericksburg towards Richmond, and that Gen. McDowell's advance was eight miles south of the Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this force, independently even of the wishes of the President, as expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to Brig.-Gen. Fitz John Porter, commanding the 5th corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 27th.

Through a heavy rain and over bad roads, that officer moved his command as follows:

Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with

the 5th and 6th regiments U. S. cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 2d U. S. artillery taking the road from New Bridge via Mechanicsville to Hanover Court House.

Gen. Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield, and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, and three batteries under Capt. Charles Griffin, 5th U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road.

Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade composed of the 5th and 13th New York, the 1st Connecticut Artillery acting as infantry; the 5th Pennsylvania Cavalry and Weeden's Rhode Island battery moved from his station at Old Church, by a road running to Hanover Court House, parallel to the Pamunkey. After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud and rain, Gen. Emory at noon reached a point about two miles from Hanover Court House where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in line across the Hanover Court House road.

Gen. Emory had before this been joined by the 25th New York (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's sharpshooters; these regiments were deployed with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly towards the enemy until reinforced by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of his brigade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being captured by the 17th New York under Col. Lansing, after having been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, followed by Morell's infantry, and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed by repairing bridges &c. now arrived too late to participate in this affair; a portion of this command was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges and captured quite a number of prisoners; the remainder followed Morell's division. In the meantime, Gen. Martindale, with the few remaining regiments of his brigade, and a section of artillery advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry, and artillery in position near Peake's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad: he soon forced them to retire towards Ashland.

The 25th New York having been ordered to rejoin him, Gen. Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover Court House.

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main column.

The enemy soon returned to attack Gen. Martindale, who at once formed the 2d Maine, 25th New York and a portion of of the 44th New Jersey, with one section of Martin's battery, on the New Baidge Road, facing his own position of the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds until reinforced.

General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near the head of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large f He at once faced the whole column abou called the cavalry sent in pursuit towards land, moved the 13th ond 14th New York Griffin's battery direct to Martindale's assist pushed the 9th Massachusetts, and 52d Pen vania of McQuade's brigade through the w on the right (our original left) and attacked flank of the enemy, while Butterfield with 83d Pennsylvania, and 16th Michigan, hast towards the scene of action by the railroad through the woods further to the right, and pleted the rout of the enemy. During th mainder of this and the following day our cav was active in the pursuit, taking a numbe prisoners. Captain Harrison of the U. S. valry with a single company, brought in as oners two entire companies of iufantry, their arms and ammunition A part of R Lancers also captured an entire company thier arms.

The immediate results of these affairs some two hnndred of the enemy's dead, bu by our troops, seven hundred and thirty pri ers sent to the rear, one 12-pounder howi one caisson, a large number of small arms, two railroad trains captured.

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 woun and missing.

The force encountered and defeated was Branch's division of North Caroliua and Geo troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 str Their camp at Hanover Court House was ta and destroyed.

Having reason to believe that Gen. Ande with a strong force, was still at Ashland, I dered Gen. Syke's division of regulars to m on the 28th, from New Bridge to Hanover Co House, and remained there until the evening the 20th, when they reterned to their orig camp.

On the 28th, Gen. Stoneman's command cavalry, horse artillery, and two regiments of fantry, were also placed under General Port orders.

On the same day I visited Hanover Court Hou whence I sent the following dispatch.

Hanover Court House, May 28. 2 P. M.

Porter's action oi yesterday was truly a gl ous victory—too much credit cannot be given his magnificent division and its accomplish leader. The rout of the rebels was complete, a defeat but a complete rout. Prisoners are c stantly coming in, two companies have this m ment arrived, with excellent arms.

There is no doubt that the enemy are conc trating everything on Richmond. I will do best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful wheth I can.

It is the policy and duty of the governme to send me by water all the well drilled troo available. I am confident that Washington is no danger. Engines and cars in large numbe have been sent up to bring down Jaokson's co mand.

I may not be able to cut them off, but will tr we have cut all but the F. & R. R. R. The r

's in the battle about to be fought in front Rhmond. All our available troops should be ed here, not raw regiments, but well drill- oops. It cannot be ignored that a desper- ttle is before us; if any regiment of good remain unemployed it will be an irrepara- lt committed.

G. B. McClellan, Major-General.

E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War.

ing ascertained the state of affairs, instruc- were given for the operations of the fol- g day.

the 28th a party under Major Williams, 6th Cavalry, destroyed the common road bridges the Pamunkey and the Virginia Central ad bridge over the South Anna.

the 29th, he destroyed the Frederiksburg ichmond bridge over the South Anna, and rnpike bridge over the same stream.

the same day, and mainly to cover the nent of Maj. Williams, Gen. Emory moved mn of cavalry toward Ashland, from Han- Court House, the advance of this column, Capt. Chambliss, 5th U. S. Cavalry, entered nd, driving out a party of the enemy, yed the railroad bridge over Stoney Creek, roke up the railroad bridge and telegraph.

other column, of all arms, under Col. War- as sent on the same day, in the direct road hland, and entered it shortly after General y's column had retired, capturing a small there.

. Stoneman, on the same day, moved to nd by Leach's Station, covering well the ments of the other column.

e objects of the expedition having been ac- lished, and it being certain that the 1st would not join us at once, General Porter drew his command to their camps with the army, on the evening of the 29th.

the night of the 27th and 28th, I sent the ving dispatch to the Secretary of War.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac.

near New Bridge, May 28, 1862. 12.30 a.m.

rter has gained two complete victories over rior forces, yet I feel obliged to move there e morning with reinforcements, to secure the lete destruction of the rebels in that quar- In doing so, I run some risk here, but I ot help it. The enemy are even in greater than I had supposed. I will do all that c movements can accomplish, but you must me all the troops you can, and leave to me latitude as to choice of commanders. It is lutely necessary to destroy the rebels near over Court House before I can avvance.

Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General.

. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War.

reply to which, I received the following the President:

Washington, May 28, 1862.

or-General McClellan,—

am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory; if it was a total rout of the enemy, I am zled to know why the Richmond and Fred- ksburg Railroad was not seized again, as you you have all the railroads but the Richmond Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point; the scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanover without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Perry, informs us that a large force, supposed to be Jackson's and McEwell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. Gen. King telegraphed us from Fredericksburg, that contrabands give certain information, that fifteen thousand left Hanover Junction Monday morning to reinforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.

A. Lincoln.

At 6 P.M. of the 29th, I sent the Secretary of War the following dispatch.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
May 29, 1862, 6 P.M.

Gen. Porter has gained information, that Gen. Anderson left his position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg, at 4 A.M., Sunday, with the following troops:—1st S. C., Col. Hamilton, 1 battalion S. C. Rifles, 34th and 38th N. C., 45th Georgia, 12th, 13th and 14th S. C., 3d Louisiana, 2 batteries of 4 guns each, namely, Letcher's Va., and McIntosh's S. C. batteries. General Anderson and his command, passed Ashland yesterday evening, en route for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy bridges over the telegraph road, which they traveled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain, that Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone.

It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force between Fredericksburg and Junction.

G. B. McClellan, Major-Gen.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

The following was also sent on the same day:

Headquarters. Army of the Potomac,
May 29, 1862.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War,

A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, 6th Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna railroad bridge, at about 9 A.M. to-day. A large quantity of confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this morning. R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff.

In reply to which the following was received:

Washington, May 29, 1862.

Gen. R. B. Marcy:

Your dispatch, as to South Anna and Ashland being seized by our forces this morning, is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan and his army for the seizure.

A. Lincoln.

On the 30th I sent the following:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
May 30, 1862.

From tone of your dispatches and President's, I do not think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously

threatened, routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces, taken over seven hundred and fifty prisoners, killed and wounded large numbers; one gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell—(Fredericksburg). I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least important result of Porter's movements.

G. B. McClellan, Major-Gen.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

The results of the brilliant operation of Gen. Porter were the dispersal of Gen. Branch's division, and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jackson *via* Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous route of Lynchburg, and the road was left entirely open for the advance of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the army of the Potomac.

His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error; he could do no good in that direction; while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate intrenchments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, and probably would have gained possession of that place. I respectfully refer to the reports of General Porter and his subordinate commanders, for the names of the officers who deserve especial mention for the parts they took in these affairs. But I cannot omit here my testimony to the energy and ability displayed by Gen. Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly due the successes there gained.

OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND.

On the 20th of May a reconnoissance was ordered on the south side of the Chickahominy, towards James River. This was accomplished by Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed forward to within two miles of James River, without serious resistance, or finding the enemy in force.

The rest of the 4th Corps, commanded by Gen. E. D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May.

On the 24th, 25th and 26th, a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 4th Corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed; a strong line of rifle-pits opened, and an abattis constructed a little in the rear of the point where the Nine Mile road comes into the Williamsburgh road.

On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps (the 3d), and take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's Bridge, watching the crossings of White Oak Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side the river, he was placed in command of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp unless in an emergency.

On the 28th Gen. Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's division to "Fair Oaks" on the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six guns were commenced, and considerable of the timber in front of the line was felled on the days following. The picket line was established reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp.

On the 30th Gen. Heintzelman, represented that the advance had met with sharp opposition in taking up their position, and that he considered the point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such disposition of the troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately advanced two brigades of Kearney's division about three-fourths of a mile in front of Savage's Station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Casey's division, which was the advance of the 4th Corps.

BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.

On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were in position as follows:

Casey's division on the right of the Williamsburg road, at right angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks; Couch's division at Seven Pines; Kearney's division on the railroad, from Savage's Station towards the bridge; Hooker's division on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy, while the lines were being taken up and strengthened. Large bodies of Confederate troops were moved immediately to the front and right of Casey's position.

During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges over the Chickahominy.

The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off from the main body by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force (grand divisions of Gens. D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet and G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division.

It appears, from the official reports of Gen. Keyes and his subordinate commanders, that at 10 o'clock A. M., on the 31st of May, an aide-de-camp of Gen. J. E. Johnston was captured by Gen. Naglee's pickets. But little information as to the movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by Gen. Keyes to be under arms at 11 o'clock.

Between 11 and 12 it was reported to Gen. Casey that the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At this

Casey's division was disposed of as follows : aglee's brigade, extending from the Williams- road to the Garnett field, having one regi- t across the railroad. Gen. Wessels's brig- in the rifle-pits, and Gen. Palmer's in the rear Gen. Wessels; one battery of artillery in ad- e, with Gen. Naglee, one battery in rear of -pits, to the riget of the redoubt; one battery ear of the redoubt, and another battery un- essed in the redoubt.

en. Couch's division, holding the second line, Gen. Abercrombie's brigade on the right, g the Nine Mile road, with two regiments and battery across the railroad, near Fair Oaks ion; Gen. Peck's brigade on the right, and . Devin's in the centre.

n the approach of the enemy. Gen. Casey sent ard one of Gen. Palmer's regiments to sup- the picket line ; but this regiment gave way, out making much, if any, resistance.

eavy firing at once commenced, and the pick- were driven in. Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. ch to move Gen. Peck's brigade to occupy the nd on the left of the Williamsburg road, ch had not before been occupied by our es, and thus to support Gen. Casey's left, re the first attack was the most severe.

enemy now came on in heavy force, attack- Gen. Casey simultaneously in front and on flanks.

en. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman for rein- ements, but the messenger was delayed, so orders were not sent to Gens. Kearney and ker until near 3 o'clock, and it was nearly 5 . when Gen. Jamison's and Barry's brigades, Gen. Kearney's division, arrived on the field. . Birney was ordered up the railroad, but, by . Kearney's order, halted his brigade before ving at the scene of action. Orders were also patched for Gen. Hooker to move up from ite Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at age's Station.

s soon as the firing was heard at headquar- , orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his mand under arma, and be ready to move at a ment's warning. His corps, consisting of Gens. hardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, was en- ped on the north side of the Chickahominy, e six miles above Bottom's Bridge. Each di- on had thrown a bridge over the stream oppo- to its own position.

t 1 o'clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divi- s to their respective bridges, with instruc- s to halt and await further orders.

t 2 o'clock orders were sent from headquar- s to cross these divisions without delay, and h them rapidly to Gen. Heintzelman's sup- t. This order was received and communicat- at half-past two, and the passage was immedi- ly commenced.

n the meantime Gen. Naglee's brigade, with batteries of Gen. Casey's division, which Gen. glee directed, strnggled gallantly to maintain redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelm- masses of the enemy. They were reinforced a regiment from Gen. Peck's brigade.

The artillery under the command of Col. G. D. iley, 1st New York Artillery, and afterwards under Gen. Naglee, did good execution on the advancing columns. The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened upon the gunners and the men in the rifle-pits. Col. Bailey, Maj. Van Valkenburg, and Adj't Ramsey, of the same regiment, were killed. Some of the guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the position occupied by Gen. Couch. The brigades of Gens. Wessels and Palmer, with the reinforcements which had been sent them from Gen. Couch, had also beeu driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by Gen. Casey's division was taken by the enemy.

Previous to this time, Gen. Keyes ordered Gen. Couch to advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon Gen. Casey's right flank. In making this movement Gen. Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our right and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which had been held in reserve, and which was now making its way towards Fair Oaks Station. Gen. Couch at once engaged this column with these two regiments. but, though reinforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his division. With these four regiments and one battery Gen. Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grape-Vine Bridge, where, hearing that Gen. Sumner had crossed. he formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and prepared to hold the position.

Gens. Berry's and Jamison's brigades had by this time arrived in front of the Seven Pines. Gen. Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods on the left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This movement was executed brilliantly ; Gen. Berry pusning his regiment forward through the woods, until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and works occupied by Gen. Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these woods against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, and, by a circuit, brought his men into our lines in good order.

Gen. Jamison, with two regiments—the other two of his brigade having been detached, one to Gen. Peck and one to Gen. Birney—moved rapidly to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping the abattis clear of the enemy. but large numbers of the enemy pressing past the right of his line, he too was forced to retreat through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night.

Brig.-Gen. Devins, who had held the centre of Gen. Couch's division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to regain portions of the ground lost in front, hut each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle pits near Seven Pines.

Meantime, Gen. Sumner had arrived with the advance of his corps, Gen. Sedgwick's division,

at the point held by Gen. Couch with four regiments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge, were so miry, that it was only by the greatest exertion, Gen. Sedgwick had been able to get one of his batteries to the front.

The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Col. Sully) was immediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank, and the rest of the division formed in line of battle. Kirby's battery near the centre in an angle of the woods. One of Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open communicatson with Gen. Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made, than the enemy came in strong force, and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made several charges, but was repulsed with great loss, by the steady fire of the infantry, and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's fire for a considerable time, Gen Sumner ordered five regiments (the 34th New York, Col. Smith, 82d New York, Lieut.-Col. Hudson, 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Kimball, 20th Mass., Col. Lee, 7th Michigan, Maj. Richardson, the three former, of Gen. Gorman's brigade, the two latter, of Gen. Dana's brigade) to advance and charge with bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his lines and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. Darkness now ended the battle for that day.

During the night, dispositions were made for its early renewal. Gen. Couch's division, and so much of Gen. Casey's as could be collected together, with Gen. Kearney's, occupied the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. Gen. Peck in falling back on the left, had succeeded, late in the afternoon, in rallying a considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, when he was ordered back into the intrenched camp by Gen. Kearney. Gen. Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heaviness of the roads, and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom, the Colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports, he "was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night, in rear of the right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of the railroad. Gen. Richardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far destroyed, that he was forced to move Gen. Howard's and Meagher's brigades, with all his artillery, around by Gen. Sedgwick's bridge, while Gen. French's brigade, with the utmost difficulty, crossed by the other. Gen. Sedgwick's division, with the regiments under Gen. Couch, held about the same position as when the fight ceased; and Gen. Richardson, on his arrival, was ordered to place his division on the left, to connect with Gen. Kearney. Gen. French's brigade was posted along the railroad, and Gens. Howard's and Meagher's brigades, in second and third lines. All his artillery had been left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud, as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward the field, but during the night, the three batteries of the division were brought to the front.

About five o'clock in the morning of the 1st June, skirmishers, and some cavalry of the enemy, were discovered in front of Gen. Richardson's division. Capt. Pettit's battery (B, 1st U. S. A.) having come upon the ground, threw a few shells among them, when they dispersed. There was a wide interval between Gen. Richardson and Gen. Kearney. To close this, Gen. Richardson's line was extended to the left, and his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had this gained this position, when the enemy appeared in large force, from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range, along the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of attack, formed on two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry in line of battle on each side, cutting Gen. French's line. He threw out skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an hour the first line of Gen. Richardson's division, stood and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being reinforced and relieved, time after time, until finally Gen. Howard was ordered, with his brigade, to go to Gen. French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes the fire of the enemy ceased, and the whole line fell back on that part of the field.

On the opening of the firing in the morning, Gen. Hooker pushed forward on the railroad with two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey) followed by Gen. Sickles' brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division from its position, on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, which were held by the enemy in force, Gen. Hooker found Gen. Birney's brigade, Col. J. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten Gen. Sickles' brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to the left by Gen. Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direction. He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon Col. Ward to support him with Gen. Birney's brigade. This was well done, our troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by Gen. Hooker, with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine and 38th and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down arms and even clothing in his flight. Gen. Sickles having been ordered to the right, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road, and advanced under a sharp fire from the enemy deployed in the woods in front of him. After a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy to flight.

On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, which was promptly responded to by Gen. Richardson's division. Again the most vigorous efforts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steadiness courage of our troops. In about an hour Gen. Richardson's whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of

enemy back in some confusion. This was wed up by a bayonet charge, led by Gen. ich in person, with the 57th and 66th New k, supported by two regiments sent by Gen. ntzelman, the 71st and 73d New York, which ed the confusion of the enemy into precipi- flight. One gun captured the previous day retaken.

ur troops pushed forward as far as the lines by them on the 31st, before the attack. On battle field there were found many of our and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais-, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, ndoned by the enemy in his rout. The state ne roads, and the impossibility of his manœu- g artillery, prevented further pursuit.

n the next morning a reconnoissance was forward, which pressed back the pickets of enemy to within five miles of Richmond, but n the impossibility of forcing even a few eries forward, precluded our holding perma- ly this position. The lines held previous to battle were therefore resumed.

. J. E. Johnston reports loss of the iemy in Longstreet's and G. W. Smith's visions at 4,283

. D. H. Hill, who had taken the ad- nce in the attack, estimates his loss at 2,500

ich would give enemy's loss . . 6,783

loss in Gen. Sumner's corps 1,223
" Gen. Heintzelman's corps 1,394
" Gen. Keyes' corps 3,120

Total 5,737

revious to the arrival of Gen. Sumner upon field of battle on the 31st of May, Gen. Heint- nan, the senior corps commander present, was ne immediate command of the forces engaged. first information I received that the battle in progress, was a dispatch from him ing that Casey's division had given way. ing the night of the 31st I received a dis- ch from him dated 8.45 P.M., in which he s: "I am just in—when I got to the front, the t of Gen. Casey's division had dispersed." *

* "The rout of Gen. Casey's men had a t dispiriting effect on the troops as they e up. I saw no reason why we should have n driven back."

his official statement, together with other ounts, received previous to my arrival upon battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division given way without making a proper resist- e, caused me to state in a telegram to the retary of War on the 1st, that this division ave way unaccountably and discreditably." bsequent investigations, however, greatly mo- ed the impressions first received, and I accord- ly advised the Secretary of War of this in a patch on the 5th of June.

The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey l Neglee, show that a very considerable por- n of this division fought well, and that brigade of Gen Naglee is entitled to credit its gallantry. This division, among the regi- nts of which were eight of comparatively new ops, was attacked by superior numbers; yet, according to the reports alluded to, it "stood the attack for three hours before it was reinforced." A portion of the division was thrown into great confusion by the first onslaught of the enemy, but the personal efforts of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey and others, who boldly went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example at this critical juncture, rallied a great part of the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part in this severely contested battle. It therefore affords me great satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained in my first dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, "that those parts of his command which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases."

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our bridges nearly completed, but the rising waters floated the log-way approaches and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts that Gen. Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent plan were commenced.

On my way to head-quarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to cross the bridge where Gen. Sumner had taken over his corps on the day previous. At the time Gen. Sumner crossed, this was the only available bridge above Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's Bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing.

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries, established upon commanding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a passage could have been secured

The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within his entrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a

moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the army of the Potomac. An advance involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossings as rapidly as possible.

In the meantime the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their positions by a strong line of intrenchments, which protected them while the bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a large fighting force, and offered a safe retreat in the event of disaster.

On the second of June I sent the following dispatch :—

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
New Bridge, June 2d, 1862, 10.30 A.M.

Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied before the battle.

I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible time with our communications; bridges and causeways built with great care, having been washed away with the freshet, leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose.

Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of Chickahominy as confidential, as it would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. I do not yet know our loss; it has been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desperate; our victory complete. I expect still more fighting before we reach Richmond.

G. B. McCLELLAN, Major.-Gen.

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

On the same day I received the following from the Secretary of War :—

Washington, June 3, 1862.

Maj.-Gen, McC.—Your telegram has been received, and we are greatly rejoiced at your success, not only in itself, but because of the dauntless spirit of the troops. You have received, of course, the order made yesterday in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to place at your command the disposable force of that department. The indications are that Fremont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large body of troops will be at your service. The intelligence from Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and pursued in force from Corinth. All interest now centres in your operations, and full confidence is entertained of your brilliant and glorious success.

E. M. S., Sec. of War.

OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND.

On the 3rd I received the following from the President :

Washington, June 3, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McC. :—With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the Chickahominy, so close in your rear and crossing your line of communication. Please look well to it.

A. L., President.

To which I replied as follows :—

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac. New Bridge, June 3d, 1862. Your dispatch of 5 p. m. just received. As the Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days, your Excellency may be assured that it has been made, and will continue to be, to protect the communications across it. Nothing of importance, except that it is again raining.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

A. L., President, Washington.

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are explained in the following dispatch to the President :—

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New Bridge, June 4th, 1862.—Terrible rain storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared. Chickahominy flooded; bridges in bad condition and still hard at work at them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot reinforce them from here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed 5,000. I have not yet returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you will regard this information as confidential for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably greater; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to show you that the army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no child's play is before it.

You must make your calculations on the position that I have been correct from the beginning, in asserting that the serious opposition was to be made here.

Geo. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

A. L., President, Washington.

And in the following to the Secretary of War the same day :

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New Bridge, June 4th, 1862.—Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st ult. 1st will amount to 7,000. Regard this as confidential for the present.

If I can have five new regiments for Fort Monroe and its dependencies, I can draw three more old regiments from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can well dispose of fifteen to twenty well-drilled regiments among the old brigades, in bringing them up to their original effective strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular and volunteer batteries of artillery, as well as for the regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our last battle, I trust that I will be no longer regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at least one more desperate battle to fight.

GEO. B. McC. Maj.-Gen.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec. of War.

Also my dispatch to the Secretary of War of the 5th :

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, New

Bridge June 5, 1862.—Rained most of the night—as now ceased, but it is not clear. The river till very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our brigades near here this morning: our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in statu quo. With great difficulty a division of infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops on the other side should the enemy renew the attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Hon. E. M. S. Sec. of War.

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows:—

Washington, June 5, 1862, 8.30, p.m.

Maj.-Gen. McC.,—I will send you five new regiments as fast as transportation can take them: the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend sending you part of McDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Royal, probably as many as you want. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort Monroe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the Fort. Please advise me of this as you desire. E. M. S., Sec. of War.

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
June, 7, 1862, 4 40 p.m.

Hon. E. M. S.,—In reply to your dispatch of 4 p.m., to-day, I have the honor to state that the Chickahominy River has risen so as to flood the entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are working night and day, up to their waists in water, to complete them.

The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general movement either of this or the rebel army utterly out of the question, until we have more favorable weather.

I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reinforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets, and securing a very advantageous position.

The rebels have several batteries established, commanding the debouches from two of our bridges, and fire upon our working parties continually, but as yet they have killed but very few of our men. G. B. McC., Maj.-General.

As I did not think it probable that any more reinforcements would be sent to me in time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing dispatch that I should be ready to move when Gen. McCall's Division joined me; but I did not intend to be understood by this, that no more reinforcements were wanted, as will be seen from the following dispatch:

June 10, 1862, 3 30 P.M.—I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reinforcement, perhaps none whatever, can be attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy.

I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are literally impassable for artillery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state; we have another rain storm on our hands.

I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can forsee, for the season is altogether abnormal.

In view of these circumstances, I present for your consideration the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this; for it would seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we have.

If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better conform to military principles to strengthen this army; and even although the reinforcements might not arrive in season to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements.

I wish to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results.

I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry.

If Gen. Prim returns via Washington, please converse with him as to the condition of affair here. G. B. McC., Major-Gen.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec.-of-War.

Our work upon the bridges continued to b pushed forward vigorously until the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sickness.

On the 11th the following was received from the Secretary of War.

Washington, June 11, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—Your dispatch of three thirty (3.30) yesterday has been received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned and which no art nor skill can avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power of the Government.

Your suggestions will be immediately communicated to Gen. Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. At last advice he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchell against Chattanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a critical condition demanding immediate attention. Halleck says the main body of Beauregard's force is with him at Okalona. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked on its way to join you. It is intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as possible. Fremont had a hard fight day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but

was pretty badly handled; it is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging as fast as possible the new levies.

Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind and strength since the hour we first met; and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had and never can have any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support, or more joyful than I shall be at the success, which I have no doubt, will soon be achieved by your arms. E. M. S., Sec. of War.

On the 12th and 13th Gen. McCall's division arrived.

On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th U. S. Cavalry, under the command of Capt. Royal, stationed near Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about 15,000 men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued, very cleverly made the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long Bridge.

The burning of two schooners laden with forage and fourteen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *eclat*, were the precise results of this expedition.

On the 14th I sent the following to the Sec'y. of War :—Headq's., Army of the Potomac, Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1862, midnight :

All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit for artillery to move, at the same time I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control.

I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival.

That request does not breathe the proper spirit; whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McD. should wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible or the results.

The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me, but Gen. McD. and all his troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal considerations to be entertained. You know that I have none. The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissances, and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec'y. of War.

On the 20th, the following was communicated to the President :—Hdq's. Army of the Potomac, Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862, 2 P. M. :

Your Excellency's dispatch of (11) A. M. received, also that of Gen. Sigel.

I have no doubt that Jackson has been reinforced from here. There is reason to believe that Gen. R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy intends evacuating Richmond; he is daily increasing his defenses. I find him everywhere in force, and every reconnoissance costs many valuable lives. Yet I am obliged to feel my way foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties of the country. By to-morrow night the defensive works covering our position on this side of the Chickahominy should be completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action, and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before your Excellency by letter or telegraph, my views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. In the meantime I would be pleased to learn the disposition, as to number and position, of the troops not under my command, in Virginia and elsewhere.

His Ex'y. A. L., Pres't. G. B. McC., M.-G. Com.

To which I received this reply :

Washington, June 21, 1862, 6 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—Your dispatch of yesterday, two P. M., was received this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of secresy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave here.

A. L., President.

To which I sent the following reply :

Camp Lincoln, June 22, 1 P. M.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of 8 P. M, yesterday.

Under the circumstances as stated in your dispatch, I perceive that it will be better, at least to defer, for the present, the communication I desired to make. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com'g.

His Excellency, the President.

All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding the movements of Gen. Jackson, led to the belief that he was at

p donsville, where he was receiving reinforce-ents from Richmond, via. Lynchburg and Staun-n; but what his purposes were did not appear til the date specified, when a young man, very telligent, but of suspicious appearance, was ought in by our scouts from the direction of anover Court House. He at first stated that he as an escaped prisoner from Col Kenly's Mary-nd regiment, captured at Front Royal, but finally nfessed himself to be a deserter from Jackson's ommand, which he left near Gordonsville on the st. Jackson's troops were then, as he said, oving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia Cen-al Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my ear on the 28th. I immediately dispatched two usty negroes to proceed along the railroad, and scertain the truth of the statement. They were nable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court ouse, where they encountered the enemy's pick-ts, and were forced to turn back without obtain-g the desired information. On that day I sent he following dispatch:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, June 24. 2 P. M., 1862.—A very peculiar case of desertion as just occurred from the enemy. The party tates he left Jackson, Whiting and Ewell, fifteen rigades, at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that they ere moving to Frederickshall, and that it was ntended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would e glad to learn, at your earliest convenience, the nost exact information you have as to the posi-ion and movements of Jackson, as well as the ources from which your information is derived, hat I may the better compare it with what I have.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Hon. E. M. S., Secretary of War.

The following is his reply:

Washington, June 25, 2.35.

Maj.-Gen. McC.—We have no definite informa-ion as to the numbers or position of Jackson's orce. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels under Jackson at Gordonsville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrison-burg and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, and G Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont had his depots. The last telegram fiom Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evi-dence is strong that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in va-rious directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate know-ledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th inst., stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked Richmond; but that the report was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mis-lead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on this subject that may be received here. E. M. S., Sec. of War.

On the 25th our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement.

Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the Williamsburg road was a large open field; beyond that a swampy belt of timber five hundred yards wide, which had been dis puted ground for many days. Further in advance was an open field crossed by the Willamsburg road and the railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the enemy. It was decided to push our lines to the other side of these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of the ground, and to place Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in position to support the attack intended to be made on the old Tavern on the 26th or 27th by Gen. Franklin, by assault-ing that position in the rear.

Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of the 25th the advance was begun by Gen. Heintzel-man's corps. The enemy were found to be in strong force along the line, and contested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was accomplished. The troops engaged in this affair were the whole of Heintzelman's corps, Palmer's brigade of Couch's division of Keyes's corps, and a part of Richardson's division of Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to the report of Gen Heintzelman.

The casualties, (not including those in Palmer's brigade, which have not been reported,) were as follows:—Officers killed 1, wounded 14, missing 1; Enlisted men killed 50, wounded 387, missing 63: Total 516.

The following telegrams were sent to the Se-cretary of War during the day from the field of operations:

Redoubt, No. 3, June 25, 1862, 1.30 p.m.

Hon. E. M. S.,—We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. Some firing still continues. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862, 3.15 p.m.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec. of War,—The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance of our picket lines. Kearney's and one half of Hooker's are where I want them.

I have this moment re-inforced Hooker's right with a brigade and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the work intended for the day. Our men are behaving splendidly. The enemy are fighting well also.

This is not a battle, merely an affair of Heint-zelman's corps, supported by Keye's, and thus far all goes well. We hold every foot we have gained. If we succeed in what we have under taken, it will be a very important advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting

up to this time has been done by Gen. Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual, that is most splendidly.

On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862, 5 p.m.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec. of War,—The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could be desired. The affair was partly decided by two guns that Capt. De Russy brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The enemy was driven from the camp in front of this place, and is now quiet. G. B. McC., Maj.Gen. Com'g.

Also, on the same day, the following:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862, 6.15 p.m.—I have just returned from the field, and found your dispatch in regard to Jackson.

Several contrabands just in, give information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reinforcements, in Richmond yesterday.

I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men, to hold their position and repulse any attack.

I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent, repeatedly, the necessity of reinforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government, should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do, with the splendid army that I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate.

But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders, it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go on the other side of the Chickahominy, to arrange for the defence of that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements G. B. McC., Maj.-General.

E. M S., Sec. of war.

NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY.

The report of the Chief of the "Secret Service Corps," herewith forwarded, and dated 26th inst, shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report puts his numbers on the 26th of June, at about 180,000, and the specific information obtained regarding their organization, warrants the belief that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength.

It will be observed that the evidence contained in the report, shows the following organizations, viz.:—two hundred regiments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jackson and Ewell, just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops; five battalions of artillery; twelve companies o infantry and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies of artillery; amounting in all to from forty to fifty brigades. There were, undoubtedly, many others whose designations we did not learn. The report also shows that numerous and heavy earth-works have been completed for the defence of Richmond, and, that in thirty-six of these, were mounted some two hundred guns.

THE SEVEN DAYS.

On the 26th. the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depots of supply.

The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment, which had been reiterated to my superiors from the inception, and through the progress of the Peninsular campaign.

I notified the Secretary of war in the folllowing dispatch:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862, 12 m.—I have just heard that our cavalry pickets, on the left Bank of the Chickahominy, are being driven in; it is, probably, Jackson's advanced guard. If this be true you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will probably be cut off. The case is, perhaps, a difficult one, but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best to out-manœuvre, outwit, and out-fight the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged, if you learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me.

G. B. McC., Maj.-General.

E. M. S., Secretary of War.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862. 2.30 p.m.—Your dispatch and that of President received. Jackson is driving in my pickets, &c., on other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and thence according to state of affairs when they arrive.

It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than an hour or two longer. G. B. McC., Major-General.

Hon. E. M. S., Sec. of War.

On the same day I received the following dispatch from the Secretary of War:

Washington, June 25, 1862, 11.20 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the government to send you any more reinforcements than has been done, have been so distinctly stated to you, by the President, that it is needless for me to repeat them.

Every effort has been made by the President

myself to strengthen you. King's division is reached Falmouth. Shield's division and Rickett's division are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as speedily as it can be done.

E. M. S., Sec'y. of War.

Washington, June 26, 1862, 6 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.:—Arrangements are being made rapidly as possible to send 5,000 men, as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria, and embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your condition.

E. M. S., Sec'y of War.

But 5,000 of the reinforcements spoken of in these communications came to the army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's Bar after the seven days. In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contingency of our communications with the depot at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our operations to James River, if circumstances should render it advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of provisions and forage, under a convoy o gunboats, sent up James River. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be available for the army on its arrival at this point. Events soon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course.

In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps on the 19th of June, Gen. Reynolds and Gen. Seymour's brigades, of Gen. McCall's division (Pennsylvania Reserves), were moved from Gaines's Farm to a position on the Beaver Dam Creek; Gen. Meade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's Farm. One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking Mechanicsville, a line of pickets extended along the Chickahominy River, between the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges.

As has already been stated, I received, while engaged on the 25th, in directing the operations of Heintzelman's corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear. On this day, Gen. Casey, at the White House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the 25th, Gen. Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitering parties towards Hanover Court House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolopotamy as far as possible.

Up to the 26th of June, the operations against Richmond had been conducted along the roads leading to it from the east and north-east. The reasons which compelled the choice of this line of approach and our continuance upon it have been alluded to above.

The superiority of the James River route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of co-operation by land of Gen. McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the defense of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent. Such a base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war, but I was confident in the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether retreating from victories, or marching through defeats; and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James, and get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the next seven days justified my faith.

On the same day (26th), Gen. Van. Vliet, chief quartermaster of the army of the Potomac, by my orders telegraphed to Col. Ingalls, quartermaster at the White House, as follows: "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, and send them to Savage Station by way of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must throw all our supplies up the James River as soon as possible, and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to establish our depots on James River without delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that, you must exercise your own judgment."

All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of the different officers in command of the troops, depots and gun-boats, and so timely the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and but a small amount of stores destroyed, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy.

Gen. Stoneman's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell back upon the White House, and thence to Yorktown when the White House was evacuated.

On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send as many troops as they could spare on the following day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen from the appended telegrams. Gen. Franklin received instructions to hold Gen. Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of Gen. Porter, to move it at once to his assistance without further orders.

BEAVER DAM CREEK.

At noon, on the 26th, the approach of the ene

my, who had crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 12:30 P. M. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn.

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved forward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove Church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the action.

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's Mills. Seymour's brigade held the left of the line, from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, partly in woods and partly in cleared ground, and Reynolds the right, principally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek.

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult along our whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except by the two roads, where the main efforts of the enemy were directed.

At 3 P. M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the upper road, which was successfully resisted by Gen. Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire, with very heavy loss.

A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was maintained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower road, about two hours later, which was likewise repulsed by Gen. Seymour, with heavy slaughter. The firing ceased and the enemy retired about 9 P. M., the action having lasted six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops were engaged on this day; the portion of the enemy encountered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. The information in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, and was too far from the main body to make it advisable to retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chickahominy during the night, with as many of the wagons of the 5th Corps as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be reasonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of the main army. Gen. Porter carried out my orders to that effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been practicable, to withdraw the 5th Corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed the rear of the army, placed us between two fires, and enabled Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James River by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones Bridge before we could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I determined, then, to resist Jackson with the 5th Corps, reinforced by all our disposable troops, in the new position near the brigade heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James River, as our line of supplies in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons having been moved to the right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before daylight, and successfully executed.

Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the ground. Seymour's brigade covered the rear with the horse batteries of Captains Robertson and Tidball; but the withdrawal was so skillful and so gradual, and the repulse of the preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat closely, and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 27th, when we were prepared to receive him.

About this time Gen. Porter, believing that Gen. Stoneman would be cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as best he could.

GAINES'S MILL.

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal of his troops to Mechanicsville to the selected position already mentioned, Gen. Porter telegraphed as follows;

"I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin or some other command be held ready to reinforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new line."

This shows how closely Porter's retreat was followed.

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege guns were still in position at Gaines's House after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of the 5th Corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of the river.

Morell's division held the left line, in a strip of woods on the left bank of the Gaines's Mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into open ground on the right towards New Coal

ar[r]. In this line Gen. Butterfield's brigade [h]e extreme left, Gen. Martindale's joined [r]ght, and Gen. Griffin still further to the [l]joined the left of Gen. Sykes' division, [p]partly in woods and partly in open [g]l, extended in rear of Coal Harbor.

[A] brigade had in reserve two of its own [r]nts; McCall's division, having been engaged [t]day before, was formed in a second line in [r] the first; Meade's brigade on the left, near [C]ickahominy; Reynolds' brigade on the right, [c]ng the approaches from Coal Harbor and [S]ch Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Sey[m]in reserve to the second line still further [r]. Gen. P. St. G. Cooke, with five companies [o]5th Regular Cavalry, two squadrons of the [R]gular Cavalry, and three squadrons of the [P]nsylvania Cavalry (lancers), were posted [o]a hill in rear of the position, and near the [C]hominy, to aid in watching the left flank [d]fending the slope to the river.

[T]troops were all in position by noon, with [a]illery on the commanding ground, and in [i]ervals between the divisions and brigades. [A]s the division batteries, there were Robert[s]nd Tidball's horse batteries from the artil[r]eserve; the latter posted on the right of [t] division, and the former on the extreme [l] the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. [E]rly after noon the enemy were discovered [m]ching in force, and it soon became evident [t]e entire position was to be attacked. His [s]shers advanced rapidly, and soon the fire [w]e heavy along our whole front. At 2 P.M. [P]orter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's [o]n of the 6th corps was ordered to cross to [t]t bank of the river by Alexander's Bridge, [p]roceed to his support.

[G]eral Porter's first call for reinforcements, [w]h Gen. Barnard, did not reach me, nor his [s]d for more axes through the same officer. [A]t 3 P.M. the engagement had become so severe, [t]e enemy were so greatly superior in num[b]hat the entire second line and reserves had [m]oved forward to sustain the first line against [p]ed and desperate assaults along the whole [l]. At 3.30 Slocum's division reached the field, [a]as immediately brought into action at the [t]points of our line. On the left the contest [f]r the strip of woods running almost at right [a] to the Chickahominy in front of Adam's [h], or between that and Gaines's House. The [y] several times charged up to this wood, but [e]ach time driven back with heavy loss. The [t]rs of Sykes' division on the right also re[p]l several strong attacks. But our own loss, [o] the tremendous fire of such greatly supe[r]umbers, was very severe, and the troops, [m]of whom had been under arms more than [t]lays, were rapidly becoming exhausted by [t]asses of fresh men constantly brought against [t]

When Gen. Slocum's division arrived on [t]round, it increased Gen. Porter's force to [a]35,000, who were, probably, contending [a]st about 70,000 of the enemy. The line was [v]ely pressed in several points, and, as its be[c]erced at any one would have been fatal, it [w]navoidable for Gen. Porter, who was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened. About 5 P.M., Gen. Porter having reported his position as critical, French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division (2d corps), were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy attacked again, in great force, at 6 P.M., but failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy. About 7 P.M. they threw fresh troops against Gen. Porter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 5th Cavalry, and followed, as it was, by more determined assaults on the remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retreat from our position, to the hill in rear, overlooking the bridge. French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the stragglers, who were thronging toward the bridge.

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reanimated our own troops, and warned the enemy that reinforcements had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy already repulsed several times, with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Gen. French and Meagher, and they again marched up the hill, ready to repulse another attack. During the night our thinned and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock, on the morning of the 28th, crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them.

Our loss in this battle, in killed, wounded and missing, was very heavy, especially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, while gallantly leading on their men, or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engagement, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succession, and in which the whole army was engaged. No general returns were made, until after we had arrived at Harrison's Landing, when the losses for the whole seven days were estimated together.

Although we were finally forced from our first line, after the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been attained. The enemy was held at bay, our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army.

The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was 22. Three of which were lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal.

Great credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy, that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces, or struck down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Knieriem's, and Grimmis's batteries, took position

during the engagement in the front of General Smith's line on the right bank of the stream, and with a battery of siege-guns, served by the First Connecticut Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of Gen. Porter.

So threatening were the movements of the enemy, on both banks of the Chickahominy, that it was impossible to decide, until the afternoon, where the real attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day, near the Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were frequently made along the entire line, on this side of the river, which rendered it necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them.

On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders on the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to reinforce Gen. Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours.

To this the following replies were received:

Headq's. 3d Corps, June 26, 4 P. M.

Gen. R. B. Marcy:—I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable for service on the other side of the river; but the men are so tired and worn out, that I fear they would not be in a condition to fight after making a march of any distance. . . .

S. P. Heintzelman, Brig.-Gen.

Telegrams from Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of Gen's. Hooker and Kearney, and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, Hill and Huger), and Gen. Heintzelman expressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not hold his advanced position without reinforcements.

Gen. Keyes telegraphed:

"As to how many men will be able to hold this position for 24 hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small enough."

On the morning of the 27th, the following dispatch was set to Gen. Sumner:

Headq's. Army of the Potomac, June 27, 8.45 A.M.

Gen. E. V. Sumner:—Gen. Smith just reports that "six or eight regiments have moved down to the woods in front of Gen. Sumner."

R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-Staff.

At 11 o'clock A.M., Gen. Sumner telegraphed as follows:—"The enemy threatens an attack on my right, near Smith." At 12.30 P.M. he telegraphed: "Sharp shelling on both sides." At 2.45 P.M.: "Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns. We are replying with artillery and infantry. The man on the look-out reports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite my right and Smith's left; the number cannot be made out."

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, Gen. Slocum's division commenced crossing the river to support Gen. Porter, soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but, as the firing in front of Gen. Porter ceased, the movement was suspended. At 2 P.M. Gen. Porter called for reinforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3.25 P.M. sent him the following:

"Slocum is now crossing at Alexander's [illegible] with his whole command. Enemy has [illegible] menced an infantry attack on Smith's left. [illegible] ordered down Sumner's and Heintzelman's [illegible] serves, and you can count on the whole [illegible] cum's. Go on as you have begun."

During the day the following dispatches [illegible] received, which will show the condition of [illegible] on the right bank of the Chickahominy:

June 27, 1 [illegible]

To Col. A. V. Colburn, Ass't.-Adj.-Gen.:

Gen. Smith thinks the enemy are massing [illegible] columns to the right of James Garnett's [illegible] and on the other side of the river oppos[illegible] Three regiments are reported to be moving [illegible] Sumner's to Smith's front. The arrangemen[illegible] very good—made by Smith.

W. B. Franklin, Brig.-[illegible]

Afterwards he telegraphed: "The enem[illegible] begun an attack on Smith's left with infant[illegible] know no details."

Afterwards the following: "The enem[illegible] opened on Smith from a battery of three [illegible] to the right of the White House. Our she[illegible] bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner wil[illegible] have a cross fire upon them that will s[illegible] them."

Afterwards, at 5.50 P.M., the following wa[illegible] to Gen. Keyes: "Please send one briga[illegible] Couch's division to these headquarters wit[illegible] moment's delay. A staff officer will be h[illegible] direct the brigade where to go."

Subsequently the following was sent to [illegible] Sumner and Franklin:

"Is there any sign of the enemy being in [illegible] in your front? Can you spare any more fo[illegible] be sent to Gen. Porter? Answer at once."

At 5.15 P.M. the following was received [illegible] Gen. Franklin:

"I do not think it prudent to take any [illegible] troops from here at present."

Gen. Sumner replied as follows:

"If the general desires to trust the defen[illegible] my position to the front line alone, I can [illegible] French with three regiments, and Meagher [illegible] his brigade to the right; everything is so [illegible] tain, that I think it would be hazardous to [illegible]

These two brigades were sent to rein[illegible] Gen. Porter, as has been observed.

At 5.25 I sent the following to Gen. Frank[illegible]

"Porter is hard pressed, it is not a quest[illegible] prudence, but of possibilities. Can you po[illegible] maintain your position until dark with tw[illegible] gades? I have ordered eight regiments of [illegible] ner's to support Porter, one brigade of Cou[illegible] this place; Heintzelman's brigade to go i[illegible] of Sumner. If possible send a brigade t[illegible] port Porter; it should follow the regimen[illegible] dered from Sumner."

"If it is possible send another brigade to [illegible] force Gen. Smith. It is said three heavy col[illegible] of infantry are moving on him."

From the foregoing dispatches it will be [illegible] that all disposable troops were sent from [illegible] right bank of the river to reinforce Gen P[illegible] and that the corps commanders were left [illegible] smaller forces to hold their positions than [illegible] deemed adequate.

have done more, even though Porter's re- had been prevented, would have had the ore disastrous result of imperilling the movement across the Peninsula.

CHANGE OF BASE.

operations of this day proved the numer- periority of the enemy, and made it evi- hat while he had a large army on the nk of the Chickahominy, which had al- turned our right, and was in position to pt the communications with our depots at ite House; he was also in large force be- our army and Richmond. I therefore et- a junction of our forces.

might probably have been executed on side of the Chickahominy, and if the con- ion had been effected on the left bank, it is e we might, with our entire force have de- the enemy there; but at that time they held ds leading to the White House, so that it ave been impossible to have sent forward trains in advance of the army in that di- , and the guarding of these trains would eriously embarrassed our operations in the We would have been compelled to fight entrated on that bank of the river. More- e would at once have been followed by my's forces upon the Richmond side of er operating upon our rear, and if in the s of war, we had been ourselves defeated effort, we would have been forced to fall the White House, and probably to Fort ; and as both our flanks and rear would ve been entirely exposed, our entire sup- in, if not the greater part of the army ight have been lost.

movements of the enemy showed that they ed this, and as they themselves ackow- they were prepared to cut off our retreat t direction. I therefore concentrated all ces on the right bank of the river during ght of the 26th and the morning of the ll our wagons, heavy guns, &c., were ga- there.

y be asked why, after the concentration of ces on the right bank of the Chickahominy, large part of the enemy drawn away from ond, upon the opposite side, I did not, in- t striking for James River, fifteen miles that place, at once march directly on Rich-

ill be remembered, that at this juncture the was on our rear, and there was every rea- believe that he would sever our communi- with our supply depot at the White .

had on hand a limited supply of rations, we had advanced directly on Richmond it have required considerable time to carry ong works around that place, during which n would have been destitute of food; and Richmond had fallen before our arms, the could still have occupied our supply com- ations between that place and the gun- and turned their disaster into victory. If, other hand, the enemy had concentrated forces at Richmond during the progress of tack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our trains before reaching the flotilla.

The battles which continued day after day, in the progress of our flank movement to the James, with the exception of the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive of all.

On the evening of the 27th of June, I assembled the corps commanders at my headquarters, and informed them of the plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of execution.

Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains.

This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I went to Savage's Station, and remained there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army.

Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with ammunition and provisions and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property which could not be transported with the army. Orders were also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who could not be transported, a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores.

The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by the chief commissary, Col. Clarke, transferred to the James River without loss.

On the morning of the 28th, while Gen. Franklin was withdrawing his command from Golding Farm, the enemy opened upon Gen. Smith's division, from Garnett's Hill, from the valley above, and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of the Chickahominy, and shortly afterwards two Georgia regiments attempted to carry the works about to be evacuated, but this attack was repulsed by the 23d New York, and the 49th Pennsylvania Volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's battery.

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during the day and night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 28th, to move across the Swamp and take a proper position to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During the same night the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and the division of Smith, were ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's old intrenchments, and curving to the right so as to cover Savage's Station. Gen. Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve. They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then to fall back across the Swamp and unite with the remainder of the army.

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Savage's Station, June 28, 1862. 12.20 A. M.

I now know the whole history of the day. On

this side of the river, the right bank, we repulsed several strong attacks: on the left bank our men did all that men could do—all that soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers soon after I had brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men—those battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best order. My regulars were superb; and I count upon what are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the material and personnel of the army.

If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle, because my force was too small.

I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general, who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this, the government must view the matter in the same earnest light that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once.

I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those the best we have.

In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous, when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth, which to-day has been too plainly proved. If at this instant, I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow.

I know that a few thousand more men, would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory; as it is, the government must not, and cannot, hold me responsible for the result.

I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades, to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington.

You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen., to Hon. E. M. Stanton, Sec. of War.

The headquarter's camp at Savage's Station, was broken up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across White Oak Swamp.

As the essential part of this day's operations was the passage of the trains across the Swamp, their protection against attack from the direction of New Market and Richmond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications with the gun-boats, I passed the day in examining the ground, directing the posting of the troops, and assuring the uninterrupted movement of the trains.

In the afternoon I instructed Gen. Keyes to move during the night to James River, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill to cure our extreme left flank.

Gen. F. J. Porter was ordered to follow Keyes, prolong the line towards the right. The troops were to be pushed on towards James River in rear of these corps, and placed under the direction of the gun-boats as they arrived.

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry early this day on the Quaker Road, showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary.

ALLENS' FIELD.

Gen. Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29th, at day-light, and marched his command to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's Farm, between Orchard and Savage's Stations.

The division of Richardson and Sedgwick was formed on the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond, Richardson holding the right and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps.

The first line of Richardson's division was held by Gen. French, Gen. Caldwell supporting the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division, was held by Col. Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania Volunteers,) with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground a little in rear of Col. Brook's command.

At 9 A. M., the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of Gen. Sedgwick, but was repulsed. The left of Gen. Richardson was then attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to turn the position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard's battery, and Capt. Pettit's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the 53d Pennsylvania kept up a destructive fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

SAVAGE'S STATION.

Gen. Slocum arrived at Savage's Station in the early hour on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp and relieve Gen. Keyes' corps. As soon as Gen. Keyes was thus relieved he removed towards James River, which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, and on the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey Creek Bridge.

During the morning Gen. Franklin heard that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force and advancing toward Savage's Station. He communicated this information to Gen. Sumner at Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's Station.

A little after noon Gen. Sumner united his forces with those of Gen. Franklin, and assumed command.

I had ordered Gen. Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg road until at a point where were several field works, in the skirt of timber between these works and the White road; but he fell back before night, and crossed White Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford.

Gen. Sumner in his report of the battle

station, says: "When the enemy appeared Williamsburg road, I could not imagine Heintzelman did not attack him, and some time afterwards did I learn, to my amazement, that Gen. Heintzelman had left and retreated with his whole corps (5,000 men) before the action commenced. direction might have been attended with disastrous consequences, and although the enemy signally and drove him from we should certainly have given him a crushing blow if Gen. Heintzelman had been with his corps."

Heintzelman, in the report of the operations his corps, says:

"The night of the 28th of June I received order to withdraw the troops of my corps from advanced position they had taken on the 25th and to occupy the intrenched lines about in rear. A map was sent me showing me stations Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Franklin's would occupy. About sunrise the next troops slowly fell back to the new position cautiously followed by the enemy taking on of our camps as soon as we left them. some misapprehension, Gen. Sumner held advanced position than was indicated on furnished me, thus leaving a space of three-fourths of a mile between the right corps and Gen. Smith's division of Gen. 's corps. . . . .

"A. M., on the 29th, the enemy commenced attack on Gen. Sumner's troops, a few shells within my lines. Late in the afternoon reached me that the rebels were in possession Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a half Savage's Station. I sent several cavalry reconnoissances, and finally was satisfied of the Gen. Franklin came to my headquarters, learned of the interval between his left Gen. Sumner's right, in which space Dr. house is. Also that the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across the Chickahominy were advancing.

"I rode forward to see Gen. Sumner, and met troops falling back on the Williamsburg road, in my lines. Gen. Sumner informed me that intended to make a stand at Savage's Station, for me to join him to determine upon the action. This movement of Gen. Sumner's uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me once to withdraw my troops. . . . .

"I rode back to find Gen. Sumner; after some from the mass of troops in the field, I found and learned that the course of action had determined on; so returned to my command give the necessary orders for the destruction the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still remaining on the ground. . . . .

"The whole open space near Savage's Station crowded with troops, more than I supposed to be brought into action judiciously. An from the commanding general had in the morning reported to me, to point out a road across White Oak Swamp, starting from the left of Kearney's position, and leading by Brackett's Ford. . . . . The advance of the column reached the Charles City Road at 6 1-2 P. M., and near at 10 P. M without accident.

The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin, were to hold the positions assigned them until dark. As stated by Gen. Heintzelman, Gen. Sumner did not occupy the designated position, but as he was the senior officer present on that side of the White Oak Swamp, he may have thought that the movements of the enemy justified a deviation from the letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of all the troops near Savage's Station, and determined to resist the enemy there, and that he gave Gen. Heintzelman orders to hold the same position as I had assigned him.

The aide sent by me to Gen. Heintzelman, to point out the road across the swamp, was to guide him in retiring after dark.

On reaching Savage's Station Sumner's and Franklin's commands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the woods, and the right extending down to the railroad.

Gen. Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, but retaining his command.

Gen. Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front.

At 4 P. M. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by Gen. Burns' brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in reserve, and finally by the New York 69th, Hazzard's and Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborne's and Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, which was continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and 9 P. M., when the enemy were driven from the field.

MOVEMENTS TOWARDS JAMES RIVER.

Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which was accomplished during the night, in good order.

By midnight all the troops were on the road to White Oak Swamp Bridge, Gen. French, with his brigade, acting as rear guard, and at 5 A. M., on the 30th all had crossed, and the bridge was destroyed.

On the afternoon and night of the 29th, I gave the corps commanders their instructions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porter's corps was to move forward to James River, and with the corps of Gen. Keyes, to occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication with the gun-boats, and covering the passage of the supply trains, which were pushed forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond as well as the crossing of the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed.

Gen. Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White-Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, with Gen.

Richardson's division and Gen. Naglee's brigade placed under his orders for the occasion.

Gen. Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles City road.

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion.

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre the roads, had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides.

Gens. Keyes and Porter had been delayed, one by losing the road, and the other in repairing an old road, and had not been able to send me any information. We then knew of but one road for the movement of troops and our immense trains.

It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road, as well as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movements of the trains in rear.

I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the obstruction of the roads towards Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken up near James River.

Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White-Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy below the swamp. Moreover the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in a more secure position.

I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I perceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was thus enabled to expedite very considerably the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops.

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and, having made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern by signals, went on board of Capt. Rodgers's gun-boat, lying near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our supply vessels, and the state of things on the river.

It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible to bring up the transports should the enemy occupy it. Harrison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. Upon the termination of this interview, I returned to Malvern Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner was ordered to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale ("Nelson's Farm").

Gen. McCall's division (Pennsylvania Res was halted during the morning on the New ket road, just in advance of the point w road turns off to Quaker Church. His li formed perpendicularly to the New Marke with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymou the left, and Reynold's brigade, command Col. S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Pennsylva reserve. Randall's regular battery on the Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite th tre, and Deitrich's and Kanerhem's batte the artillery reserve, on the left—all in fr the artillery line. The country in Gen. M front was open, intersected toward the rig the New Market road, and a small strip of parallel to it. The open front was abou yards, its depth about 1,000 yards.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Heintz ordered the bridge at Brackett's Ford to stroyed, and trees to be felled across tha and the Charles City road.

Gen. Slocum's division was to extend Charles City road.

Gen. Kearney's right to connect with Ge cum's left.

Gen. McCall's position was to the left Long Bridge road, in connection with Gen. ney's left. Gen. Hooker was on the left o McCall.

WHITE-OAK SWAMP BRIDGE.

Between 12 and 1 o'clk the enemy ope fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smi Richardson and Naglee's brigade at Whi Swamp Bridge. This artillery fire was cont by the enemy through the day, and he c some infantry below our position. Richar division suffered severely. Captain Ayr rected our artillery with great effect. Capt zard's battery, after losing many cannoneer Capt. Hazzard being mortally wounded, was pelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit tery, which partially silenced the enemy's g

Gen. Franklin held his position until after repeatedly driving back the enemy in the tempts to cross the White-Oak Swamp.

CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS, &c

At 2 o'clock in the day the enemy were rep advancing in force by the Charles City roa at half-past 2 o'clock the attack was made the road on Gen. Slocum's left, but was ch by his artillery. After this the enemy, in foree, comprising the divisions of Longstree A. P. Hill, attacked Gen. McCall, whose div after severe fighting, was compelled to reti

General McCall, in his report says: . . . .

"About half-past two my pickets were d in by a strong advance, after some skirmi without loss on our part. At 3 o'clock th my sent forward a regiment on the left centr another on the right centre, to feel for a point. They were under cover of a show shells, and boldly advanced but were both d back, on the left by the 12th regiment, and o right by the 7th regiment. . . . . For nea hours the battle raged hotly here. . . . . .

"At last the enemy was compelled to reti fore the well-directed musketry fire of the rese The German batteries were driven to the

de up and sent them back. It was, how-
f little avail, and they were soon after
ded by the cannoneers. * * *
teries in front of the centre were boldly
upon, but the enemy was speedily forced
* * *
n after this a most determined charge was
n Randall's battery by a full brigade ad-
in wedge-shape, without order, but in
recklessness.
ewhat similar charges had, I have stated,
eviously made on Cooper's and Kern's bat-
y single regiments without success, they
recoiled before the storm of canister hurled
them.
ke result was anticipated by Randall's bat-
d the 4th regiment was requested not to
til the battery had done with them. Its
commander did not doubt his ability to
he attack, and his guns did indeed mow
he advancing host, but still the gaps were
and the enemy came in upon a run to the
uzzle of his guns.
was a perfet torrent of men, and they were
battery before the guns could be removed.
uns that were indeed successfully limbered
eir horses killed and wounded, and were
ned on the spot, and the enemy dashing
ove the greater part of the 4th regiment
them. The left company (B) nevertheless
its ground, with its captain, Fred. A. Con-
did likewise certain men of other compa-
I had ridden into the regiment and endeav.
check them, but with only partial success-
e was no running; but my division, re-
by the previous battles to less than 6,000,
contend with the divisions of Longstreet
P. Hill, considered two of the strongest
st among many of the Confederate army,
ring that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it
eluctantly compelled to give way before
r force accumulated upon them."

Heintzelman states, that about 5 P.M. Gen.
l's division was attacked in large force,
tly the principal attack; that in less than
r the division gave way, and adds:

n. Hooker, being on his left, by moving to
ht, repulsed the rebels in the handsomest
r, with great slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who
with Gen. Sedgwick in McCall's rear, also
y aided with his artillery and infantry in
g back the enemy. They now renewed
attack with vigor on Gen. Kearney's left,
ere again repulsed with heavy loss.
is attack commenced about 4 P.M., and was
d by heavy masses with the utmost deter-
ion and vigor. Capt. Thompson's battery,
ted with great precision, firing double
es, swept them back. The whole open
, 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy;
repulse brought fresh troops. The third
was only repulsed by the rapid volleys
determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania,
Hays, and half of the 37th New York Volun-
."

n. McCall's troops soon began to emerge
the woods into the open field. Several bat-
s were in position and began to fire into the
ls over the heads of our men in front. Cap-

tain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of Gen. Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. Gen. Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from the White Oak Swamp.

Later in the day, at the call of Gen. Kearney, Gen. Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent to occupy a portion of Gen. McCall's deserted position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night Gen. Heintzelman commenced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both of his divisions, with Gen. Slocum's division, and a portion of Gen. Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill.

On the morning of the 30th Gen. Sumner, in obedience to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from Gen. Franklin for reinforcements, sent him two brigades, which returned in time to participate and render good service in the battle near Glendale. Gen. Sumner says of this battle:

"The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock P.M. the action commenced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field."

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about 4 P.M. At about this time the enemy began to appear in Gen. Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns were brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Col. Warren.

The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night before my aides returned to give me the result of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While waiting to hear from Gen. Franklin before sending orders to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that Gen. Franklin was falling back; whereupon I sent Col. Coburn of my staff with orders to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers from Gen. Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders were then sent to Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and definite instructions were given as to the movement, which was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to Gen. Franklin as to the route he was to follow.

General Barnard then received full instructions

for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak, accompanied by several general officers. I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity.

MALVERN HILL.

The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our lines resting on "Maivern Hill," while the right curved backwards through a wooded country toward a point below Haxall's on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile area, well cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Toward the northwest the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine which exeends to James River. From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the directions of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops, and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line (Sykes' division on the left, Morell's on the right) with the artillery of his two divisions advantageontly posted ; and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion succeededin getting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill.

Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter, next came Kearney and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson, next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes' corps, extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in reserve and stationed behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on the low ground, to protect the flank from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau; but from thence to the extreme right, the troops were more deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would probably be made on our left.

The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gun-boats so as to protect our flanks, and to command the approaches from Richmond.

Between 9 and 10 A. M. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division.

About two o'clock a column of the enem observed moving towards our right, withi skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's but beyond the range of our artillery. Ar ments were at once made to meet the antic attack in that quarter: but though the c was long, occupying more than two hours i ing, it disappeared, and was not again hea The presumption is, that it retired by the and participated in the attack afterwards m our left.

About 3 P. M. a heavy fire of artillery o on Kearney's left, and Couch's division, sp followed up by a brisk attack of infanti Couch's front. The artillery was replied to good effect by our own, and the infant Couch's division remained lying on the g until the advancing column was within short ketry range, when they sprang to their feet poured in a deadly volley, which entirely the attacking force, and drove them in dis back over their own ground. This adva was followed up until we had advanced the of our line some seven or eight hundred and rested upon a thick clump of trees, givi a stronger position, and a better fire.

Shortly after four o'clock the firing c along the whole front; but no disposition evinced on the part of the enemy to with from the field.

Caldwell's brigade, having been detached Richardson's division, was stationed upon Co right, by Gen. Porter, to whom he had be dered to report. The whole line was surve the generals, and everything held in read to meet the coming attack. At 6 o'clock th my suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter the whole strength of his artillery, and at began pushing forward his columns of atta carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, fo under cover of the woods, started at a r cross the open space, and charge our batte but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool steady volleys of our infantry, in every case, them reeling back to shelter, and covered ground with their dead and wounded. In eral instances our infantry withheld their until the attacking columns, which rushed thr the storm of canister and shell from our artil had reached within a few yards of our l They then poured in a single volley, and da forward with the bayonet, capturing priso and colors, and driving the routed column confusion from the field.

About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were cumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Mea and Sickles were sent with their brigades as as it was considered prudent to withdraw portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troop reinforce that part of the line, and hold the p tion. These brigades relieved such regiment Porter's corps and Couch's division, as had pended their ammunition, and batteries from reserve were pushed forward to replace th whose boxes were empty. Until dark the ene persisted in his efforts to take position so t ciously defended: but despite his vastly supe numbers his repeated and desperate attacks, w

sed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the of Malvern Hill, though it was not until 9 o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire.

ring the whole battle Com. Rodgers added ly to the discomfiture of the enemy, by ing shells among his reserves and advacing ns.

the army in its movement from the Chickay to Harrison's Landing, was continually ied in marching by night and fighting by ts commanders found no time or opportuni- collecting data, which would enable them e exact return of casualties in each engage-

The aggregate of our entire losses, from 3th of June to the first of July, inclusive, was tained, after arriving at Harrison's Landing, as follows:—

of the killed, wounded and missing, in the ny of the Potomac, from the 26th June, 1862, he 1st of July, 1862, inclusive.

Corps.	Killed	Wou'd.	Miss'g.	Aggr.
McCall's Penn. Reserves	253	1,240	1,581	3,074
Sumner's	187	1,076	848	2,111
Heintzelman's	189	1,051	833	2,073
Keyes's	69	507	201	777
Porter's	620	2,460	1,198	4,278
Franklin's	245	4,313	1,179	2,737
Engineers		2	21	23
Cavalry	19	60	97	17
Total	1,582	7,709	5,958	15,249

OVEMENT TO HARRISON'S LANDING.

though the result of the battle of Malvern a complete victory, it was nevertheless ne- ry to fall back still further, in order to reach nt where our supplies could be brought to ith certainty. As before stated, in the on of Capt. Rodgers, commanding the gun- flotilla, this could only be done below City . Concurring in his opinion, I selected Har- 's Bar as the new position of our supplies of forage, and ammunition, made it imperative ach the transports immediately.

e greater portion of the transportation of the having been started for Harrison's Landing g the night of the 30th of June and 1st of , the order for the movement of the troops at once issued upon the final repulse of the y at Malvern Hill.

e order prescribed a movement by the left rear—Gen. Keyes' corps to cover the manœ- r. It was not carried out in detail as regards divisions on the left, the roads being some- t blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter Couch were not able to move out as early as been anticipated, and Porter found it neces- to place a rear-guard between his command the enemy. Col. Averill, of the 3d Pennsyl- ia Cavalry, was entrusted with this delicate y. He had under his command his own regi- t and Lieut.-Col. Buchanan's brigade of regu- infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use the resources at his command, he deceived the my so as to cover the withdrawal of the left g without being attacked, remaining himself the previous day's battle-field until about 7 lock of the 2d July. Meantime, Gen. Keyes ing received his orders, commenced vigorous parations for covering the movement of the re army, and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity along a single road, Gen. Keyes took advantage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues, and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge, on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could march on each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, to use his own words: "I do not think more vehicles or more public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, instead of away from him; and when it is understood that the carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the presence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated."

The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's Bar, until after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp until everything was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by our batteries, and the fire of the gun-boats.

Great credit must be awarded to Gen. Keyes, for the skill and energy which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge.

High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 1st Connecticut Artillery, Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind.

THIRD PERIOD.

CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

On the 1st of July, I received the following from the President:

Washington, July 1, 1862. 3.30 P. M. Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,—

It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. If we had a million of men, we could not get them to give you in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security and wait, rest and repair.

Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. A. LINCOLN.

In a dispatch from the President to me on the 2d of July, he says:

"If you think you are not strong enough to

take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can.

"The governors of eighteen states offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept."

On the 3d of July, the following kind despatch was received from the President:

(*Extract.*)

Washington, July 3, 1862. 3 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—Yours of 5.30 yesterday is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it A. LINCOLN.

To G. B. McC.

On the 4th, I sent the following to the President:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862.

To the President;—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant.

I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much reqnire.

After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ult. in a daily series of engagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides.

The mutual loss in killed and wounded, is enormous. That of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday evening the 1st., our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point. Our line of defence there, being too extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 A. M. on the 2d, a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day, and until the forenoon of yesterday.

The road became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons, moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make.

We now occupy a line of heights about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about three miles long. These heights command onr whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can render valuable support on both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front, we must hold our ground as best we may, and at whatever cost.

Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiery exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast n bers, and if so our front will be the scene desperate battle which if lost, will be deci Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wo ed, and prisoners. I cannot now approxima any statement of our losses, but we are not l en in any conflict. The enemy were unabl their utmost efforts to drive us from any Never did such a change of base, involvir retrogade movement, and under incessant att from a most determined and vastly more n rous foe, partake so little of disorder. We lost no guns except 25 on the field of battle of which were lost hy the giving way of McC division under the onset of superior number

Our communications by the James River not secure. There are points where the en can establish themselves with cannon or mu ry and command the river, and where it is certain that our gunboats can drive them ou case of this, or in case our front is broken, I still make every effort to preserve at least personnel of the army, and the events of the few days leave no question that the troops do all that their country can ask. Send suc forcements as you can. I will do what I We are shipping our wounded and sick, and ing supplies. The navy department should operate with us to the extent of its resou Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in kindest and most efficient manner.

When all the circumstances of the case known, it will be acknowledged by all compe judges that the movement just completed this army is unparalleled in the annals of Under the most difficult circumstances, we preserved our trains, our guns, our material, above all, our honor. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

To which I received the following reply:

Washington, July 5, 1862. 9 A.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC,. Commanding army o Potomac.

A thousand thanks for the relief your two patches of 12 and 1 P. M. yesterday, gave Be assured, the heroism and skill of yourself ficers, and men, is and forever will be appre ted.

If you can hold your present position, we hive the enemy yet. A. LINCOL

The following letters were received from Excellency the President.

War Department, Washington City, D. C. 4th, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McC.—I understand your posit as stated in your letter, and by Gen. Marcy. reinforce you so as to enable you to resume offensive within a month, or even six weeks impossible. In addition to that arrived and arriving from the Potomac (about ten thousan suppose), and about ten thousand I hope you have from Burnside very soon, and about thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not how I can send you another man within a mo Under these circumstances, the defensive, the present, must be your only care. Save army first, where you are, if you can, and ondly, by removal, if you must. You, on ground, must be the judge as to which you

ipt, and of the means for effecting it. I but
it as my opinion, that with the aid of the
oats and the reinforcements mentioned above
an hold your present position, provided,
o long as, you can keep the James River
below you. If you are not tolerably confi-
you can keep the James River open, you
etter remove as soon as possible. I do not
mber that you have expressed any appre-
on as to the danger of having your commu-
on cut on the river below you, yet I do not
ose it can have escaped your attention,

Yours very truly, A. L.

.—If at any time you feel able to take the
ive, you are not restrained from doing so.

A. L.

following telegram was sent on the 7th:
dquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley,
, 1862, 8.30 P.M.—As boat is starting, I have
ime to acknowledge receipt of dispatch by
Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My po-
is very strong, and daily becoming more
f not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them.
e been anxious about my communications.
ong consultation about it with Flag-officer
borough last night; he is confident he can
river open. He should have all gun-boats
ble. Will see him again this morning. My
in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it

rm yourself as little as possible about me,
on't lose confidence in this army.
L., President. G. B. McC.

hile General-in-Chief, and directing the oper-
of all our armies in the field, I had become
y impressed with the importance of adopt-
d carrying out certain views regarding the
ct of the war, which, in my judgment, were
ial to its objects and its success. During
ive campaign of three months in the ene-
country these were so fully confirmed that
eived it a duty, in the critical position we
occupied, not to withhold a candid expres-
f the more important of these views from
ommander-in-chief whom the constitution
s at the head of the armies and navies, as
is of the government of the nation. The
ing is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.
, President,—You have been fully informed
he rebel army is in our front, with the pur-
of overwhelming us by attacking our posi-
or reducing us by blocking our river com-
ations. I can not but regard our condition
tical, and I earnestly desire, in view of pos-
contingencies, to lay before your Excellency,
our private consideration, my general views
rning the existing state of the rebellion,
gh they do not strictly relate to the situa-
of this army, or strictly come within scope
y official duties. These views amount to
ctions, and are deeply impressed upon my
and heart. Our cause must never be aban-
l; it is the cause of free institutions and
government. The Constitution and the
must be preserved, whatever may be the
n time treasure or blood. If secession is
successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, or foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for suppressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future con-

duct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you, and from love of my country. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

His Excellency A. L., President.

I telegraphed the President on the 11th as follows:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, July 11, 1862. 3 P.M.

We are very strong here now so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine spirits. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

A. L., President.

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th and 18th, to his Excellency the President.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, July 12, 1862, 7.15 P.M.—Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent County via Long Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but will know shortly.

Nothing else of interest since last dispatch, rain ceased and everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight.

I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here: but promptly reinforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we have a little more than half a chance we can take it. I dread the effects of any retreat upon the morale of the men.

G. B. McC. to A. L., President.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, July 18, 1862, 8 A.M.—I have consulted fully with Gen. Burnside, and would commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing seven additional regiments from North Carolina, by leaving Newbern to the care of the gunboats. It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in

dom. Nothing should be left to chance he would recommend that Gen. Burnside, wi his troops, be ordered to this army, to ena to assume the offensive as soon as possible.

G. B. McC. to A. L.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Ber July 18, 1862, 8 A.M.—No change worth rep in the state of affairs. Some twenty to tw five thousand of enemy at Petersburg, and thence to Richmond. Those at Petersbur they are part of Beauregard's army. New arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious to determination of government, that no time be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very cious now, and perfect unity of action neces

G. B. McC. to A. L.

The following was telegraphed to Gen. H on the 28th:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berk July 28, 1862, 8 A.M.—Nothing especially except corroboration of reports that reinf ments reaching Richmond from South. It confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are yet My opinion is more and more firm, that hero defense of Washington, and that I should once reinforced by all available troops, to e me to advance. Retreat would be disastro the army and the cause. I am confident of

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd' S. Army.

On the 30th I sent the following to the ge in-chief:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, erk July 30, 1862,

I hope that it may soon be decided what be done by his army; and that the decision be to reinforce it at once. We are losing valuable time, and that at a moment when en and decision are sadly needed.

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S

About half an hour after midnight, on morning of August 1st, the enemy brought light batteries to Coggin's Point and the House on the right bank of James River, dir opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a h fire upon our shipping and encampments. I continued rapidly for about thirty minutes, they were driven back by the fire of our g This affair was reported in the following patch: Headq's. Army of the Potomac, Berk Aug. 2, 1862, 8 A.

Firing of night before last killed some 10 and wounded about 15. No harm of the sl est consequence done to the shipping, altho several struck. Sent party across river ye day to the Coles House; destroyed it and down the timber; will complete work to- and also send party to Coggin's Point, whi will probably occupy. I will attend to your graph about pressing, at once, will send Ho out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir t people up. I need more cavalry, have only 3 for duty in cavalry division.

Adj.-General's office forgot to send Sy commission, as maj.-gen., with those of other manders. Do me the favor to hurry it on.

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. H

revent another demonstration of this cha-
and to secure a debouche on the south
the James, it became necessary to occupy
's Point, which was done on the 3d, and
emy, as will be seen from the following
h, driven back towards Petersburg :

Headq's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley,
Aug. 3, 1862, 10 P. M.

in's Point was occupied to-day, and tim-
ed so as to make it quite defensible. I
ver the ground myself, and found that Du-
l, as usual, selected an admirable position,
an be intrenched with a small amount of
o as to make it a formidable tete-de-pont,
g the landing of a large force. I shall be-
enching it by the labor of contrabands to-
. The position covers the Coles House,
s directly in front of Westover. We have
afe debouche on the south bank, and are
against midnight cannonading. A few
ds more men would place us in condition
to annoy and disconcert the enemy very

t Col. Averell this morning with 300 cav-
examine the country south side of the
and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore
which is on the main road from Peters-
Suffolk, and some five miles from Coles

ound a cavalry force of 550 men, attacked
once, drove in their advanced guard to
mp, where he had a sharp skirmish, and
hem off in disorder.
urned their entire camp, with their com-
and quarter-master's stores, and then re-
and recrossed the river. He took but two
rs, had one man wounded by a ball, and
a sabre cut. Capt. McIntosh made a
ne charge. The troops engaged were of
regulars, and the Third Pennsylvania cav-

Averell conducted this affair, as he does
ing he undertakes, to my entire satisfac-

McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Com'g. U. S. A.
ne 1st of August, I received the following
hes :

Washington, July 30, 1862. 8 P.M.
Gen. G. B. McC.—A dispatch just received
en. Pope, says that deserters report that
my is moving south of James River, and
e force in Richmond is very small. I sug-
at he be pressed in that direction, so as to
in the facts of the case.

H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

hington, July 30, 1862. 8 P.M.—Maj.-Gen.
McC.—In order to enable you to move in
rection, it is necessary to relieve you of
ick. The surgeon-general has therefore
irected to make arrangements for them at
places, and the quarter-master-general to
e transportation. I hope you will send
way as quickly as possible, and advise me
r removal. H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

s clear that the general-in-chief attached
weight to the report received from Gen.
and I was justified in supposing that the
in regard to removing the sick, contem-
plated an offensive movement, rather than a re-
treat, as I had no other data than the telegrams
just given, from which to form an opinion as to
the intentions of the government. The following
telegram strengthened me in that belief.

Washington, July 31, 162. 10 A.M.
Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—General Pope again tele-
graphs that the enemy is reported to be evacua-
ting Richmond, and falling back on Danville and
Lynchburg. H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

In occupying Coggin's Point, as already de-
scribed, I was influenced by the necessity of pos-
sessing a secure debouche on the south of the
James, in order to enable me to move on the com-
munications of Richmond in that direction, as well
as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonan-
ades.

To carry out Gen. Halleck's first order of July
30th, it was necessary first to gain possession of
Malvern Hill, which was occupied by the enemy,
apparently in some little force, and controlled the
direct approach to Richmond. Its temporary oc-
cupation, at least, was equally necessary in the
event of a movement upon Petersburg, or even
the abandonment of the Peninsula. Gen. Hooker,
with his own division and Pleasonton's cavalry,
was therefore directed to gain possession of Mal-
vern Hill on the night of the 2d August. He
failed to do so, as the following dispatch recites:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkley,
August 9, 1862. 10.20 P.M.

The movement undertaken up the river last
night failed, on account of the incompetency of
guides. The proper steps have been taken to-
day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be ready
to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as
to pressing ; at least, to accomplish the first in-
dispensable step. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Comd'g U. S. Army.

On the 4th Gen. Hooker was reinforded by Gen.
Sedgwick's division, and, having obtained a knowl-
edge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Mal-
vern Hill, and driving the enemy back towards
Richmond. The following is my report of this
affair at the time :

Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862. 1 P.M.
Maj.-Gen. H. W. Hallock, Comd'g. U. S. Army
General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a
very considerable force of infantry and artillery
stationed at this place, and carried it handsomely
driving the enemy towards New Market, which
is four miles distant, and where it is said they
have a large force. We have captured 100 pris-
oners, killed and wounded several, with a loss on
our part of only three killed and eleven wounded
—among the latter two officers.

I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to
act as circumstances may require, after the re-
turn of my cavalry reconnoissances.

The mass of the enemy escaped under the
cover of a dense fog, but our cavalry are still in
pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing
many more.

This is a very advantageous position to cover
an advance on Richmond, and only 14¾ miles
distant, and I feel confident that, with reinforce-
ments, I could march this army there in five
days.

I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are four miles from here, on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them.

Gen. Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and his officers and men displayed their usual gallantry. G. B. McC., Major-Gen.

On the same day the following telegram was sent:

Malvern Hill, Aug 5, 1862, 8 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Commanding U. S. Army. —Since my last dispatch Colonel Averell has returned from a reconnoissance in the direction of Savage's Station, towards Richmond. He encountered the 10th Virginia cavalry near White Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove them some distance towards Richmond, capturing 28 men and horses, and killing and wounding several.

Our troops have advanced twelve miles in one direction, and seventeen in another, towards Richmond, to-day.

We have secured a strong position on Coggin's Point, opposite our quartermaster's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps.

I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the river, what their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp look out on their movements.

I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders, to push reconnoisances towards the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports regarding the abandonment of that place are true.

G. B. McC., Major-Gen.

To the dispatch of 1 P.M., August 5, the following answer was received:

Washington, August 6, 1862, 3 A.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.—I have no reinforcements to send you. H. W. H. Maj.-Gen.

And soon after the following:

Washington, August 6, 1862.

Maj,-Gen. G. B. McC.—You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia Creek. It is reported that Jackson is moving north with a very large force.

H. W. H, Major-General.

On the 4th I had received Gen. Halleck's order of the 3d (which appears below), directing me to withdraw the army to Acquia, and on the same day sent an earnest protest against it.

A few hours before this, Gen. Hooker had informed me that his cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing and driving them in, and that he would probably be attacked at daybreak. Under these circumstances I had determined to support him, but as I could not get the whole army in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon the receipt of the above telegram from the general-in-chief, to withdraw Gen. Hooker, that there might be the least possible delay in conforming to Gen. Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to Gen. Hooker the following letter:

Headquarters, Army of the Poto
Berkeley, August 6, 1862. 10 P

My dear General:—I find it will not be
ble to get the whole army in position befor
time to-morrow afternoon, which will be t
to support you and hold the entire po
should the enemy attack in large force a
break, which there is strong reason to su
he intends doing.

Should we fight a general battle at Malv
will be necessary to abandon the whole
works here, and run the aisk of getting
here.

Under advices I have received from Wa
ton, I think it necessary for you to abando
position to-night, getting everything away
daylight.

Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern
orders to destroy the Turkey Creek Bridge
they are forced back.

The roads leading into Haxalls from the
should be strongly watched, and Haxalls a
held by strong cavalry force and some ligh
teries, as long as possible.

I leave the manner of the withdrawal en
to your discretion.

Please signal to the fleet when the withd
is about completed.

Report frequently to these headquarters.
Sumner was ordered up to support you, bu
halt where this passes him, and will inform
where he is. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g
Gen. J. H., Comd'g at Malvern Hill.

And the following reply was sent to
Halleck:

Headquarters, Army of the Poton
Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1862, 11.30 P.
Dispath of to-day received. I have not
four thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry
sion, so that I cannot possibly spare any mo
really need many more than I now have, to
out your instructions.

The enemy are moving a large force
Malvern Hill. In view of your dispatches
the fact that I can not place the whole ar
position before daybreak, I have ordered H
to withdraw during the night, if it is pos
If he can not do so, I must support him.
this matter is developed, I can not send an
teries. I hope I can do so to-morrow, if
portation is on hand.

I will obey the order as soon as circumst
will admit. My artillery is none too num
now. I have only been able to send off
twelve hundred sick; no transportation.
shall be no delay that I can avoid. G. B.
Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. Army.

Five batteries, with their horses and e
ments complete, were embarked on the 7th
8th. Simultaneously with Gen. Hooker's o
tions upon Malvern, I despatched a cavalry
under Col. Averell towards Savage's Static
ascertain if the enemy were making any m
ments towards our left flank. He found a
cavalry regiment near the White-Oak Sw
Bridge, and completely routed it, pursuing
towards Savage's Station.

ese important preliminary operations assisted reparations for the removal of the army to ia Creek, and the sending off our sick and lies was pushed both day and night as ra- as the means of transportation permitted.

the subject of the withdrawal of the army Harrison's Landing, the following corres- ence passed between the General-in-chief myself while the reconnoissances towards mond were in progress:

the 2d of August I received the following:

Washington, Aug. 1, 1862, 3.45 P. M.

j.-Gen. G. B. McC-:—You have not answered elegram [of July 30, 8 P.M.] about the re- l of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as ible, and telegraph me when they will be out our way. The President wishes an answer rly as possible.

which this reply was sent: Headq's, Army e Potomac, Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862, 11 P. M.

ur telegram of 2d is received. The answer ispatch of July 30] was sent this morning. have about 12,500 sick, of whom perhaps might make easy marches. We have here eans to transport 1,200, and will embark to- ow that number of the worst cases. With e means at the disposal of the medical di- r, the remainder could be shipped in from 7 days. It is impossible for me to decide t cases to send off, unless I know what is to one with this army.

ere the disastrous measures of a retreat ted, all the sick who can not march and fight ld be despatched by water. Should the y advance, many of the sick could be of ser- at the depots. If it is to remain here any th of time, the question assumes still a differ- phase.

ntil I am informed what is to be done, I can- act understandingly, or for the good of the ice. If I am kept longer in ignorance of t is to be effected, I cannot be expected to mplish the object in view. In the meantime ill do all in my power to carry out what I con- e to be your wishes.

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A.

he moment I received the instructions for re- ving the sick, I at once gave the necessary di- tions for carrying them out. With the small unt of transportation at hand, the removal of severe cases alone would necessarily take eral days, and in the meantime I desired in- mation to determine what I should do with ers.

The order required me to send them away "as ickly as possible, and to notify the Gen.-in-Chief *en they were removed.*"

Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the of August, not having been advised of what army under my command was expected to do, which way it was to move, if it moved at all, I t the following dispatch:

Headq's., Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862.

I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe: are they r removing my sick? If so, to what extent am required to go in sending them off?

There are not many who need go

As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the government in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for specific orders.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H.

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be unincumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all interfere with its mobility; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond from the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which would speedily be cured, and the patients returned to duty. As the service of every man would be important in the event of a forward offensive movement, I conceived it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the dispatch of 11 P. M. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram:

Washington, Aug. 3, 1862. 7.45 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McC.—I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance towards Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my telegram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own officers. Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and apply to the naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judgment. You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places which we must occupy.

H. W. H., Maj-Gen. Comd'g U. S. A.

I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, where its communications had, by the co-operation of the gun-boats, been rendered perfectly secure, would at the time have the most disastrous effect upon our cause. I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities, as in the following telegram.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkely, Aug. 4, 1862. 12 M.

Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause.

I fear it will be a fatal blow.

Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements.

This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks

of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction, and with the assistance of the gun-boats I consider our communications as now secure. We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle, until we have marched fifteen to eighteen miles, which brings us practically within ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty-five miles: but with the aid of the gun-boats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within twelve miles of Richmond.

At Acquia Creek we would be seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

From here to Fort Monroe, is a march of about seventy miles, for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land.

The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and there appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army it be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force, to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry, to those portions of the army of the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here—a decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed—it matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defense of Washington; it is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided

Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded.

If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess.

Whatever the result may be, and God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster t my country. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. A.

Soon after sending this telegram, I received following in reply to mine of 11 P. M. of the

Washington, Aug. 4, 1862, 12.45 P.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. Mc. C.:—My telegram to yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future rations. It was expected that you would h sent off your sick as directed, without waitin know what were or would be the intention the government respecting future moveme The President expects that the instructions wh were sent to you yesterday, with his appro will be carried out with all possible dispatch caution. The quarter-master-general is send to Fort Monroe all the transportation he can lect. H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

To which the following is my reply:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac

Berkeley, August 5, 1862, 7 A. M.

Your telegram of yesterday received, and being carried out as promptly as possible. W the means at my command, no human pow could have moved the sick in the time you you expected them to be moved. G. B. Mc Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. W. H. H., Comd g U. S. A.

My efforts for bringing about a change policy were unsuccessful, as will be seen fr the following telegram and letter received by in reply to mine of 12 M. of the 4th:

Washington, August 5, 1862, 12 M

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.:—You cannot regret order of withdrawal more than I did the nec sity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, a you will be expected to execute it with all pos ble promptness. It is believed that it can done now without serious danger. This m not be so if there should be any delay.

I will write you my views more fully by m H. W. H., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g U. S. A.

The letter was as follows:

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, Aug. 6, 18

Maj.-Gen. McC., Comd'g. &c., Berkeley, Va.

General,—Your telegram of yesterday was ceived this morning, and I immediately telegrap ed a brief reply, promising to write you mo fully by mail.

You, General, certainly could not have be more pained at receiving my order, than I was the necessity of issuing it. I was advised b high officers, in whose judgment I had great co fidence, to make the order immediately on m arrival here, but I determined not to do so un I could learn your wishes from a personal inte view: and even after that interview I tried eve means in my power to avoid withdrawing yo army, and delayed my decision as long as I dare to delay it.

I assure you, General, it was not a hasty an unconsidered act, but one that caused me mo anxious thought than any other of my life. B after full and mature consideration of all the *pr and cons*, I was reluctantly forced to the conclu sion that the order must be issued. There wa to my mind, no alternative.

Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in th

You and your officers, at our interview, nated the enemy's forces in and around mond at two hundred thousand men. Since , you and others report that they have re- ed and are receiving large reinforcements the South.

n. Pope's army, now covering Washington, nly about forty thousand. Your effective is only about ninety thousand. You are t thirty miles from Richmond, and Gen. Pope ty or ninety, with the enemy directly be- n you, ready to fall with his superior num- upon one or the other, as he may elect. her can reinforce the other in case of such tack. If Gen. Pope s army be diminished to force you, Washington, Maryland, and Penn- nia would be left uncovered and exposed. ur force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you ld be too weak to even hold the position you occupy, should the enemy turn round and k you in full force. In other words, the old of the Potomac is split into two parts, with ntire force of the enemy directly between . They can not be united by land without sing both to destruction, and yet they must nited. To send Pope's forces by water to Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a ary impossibility. The only alternative is to the forces on the Peninsula to some point water, say Fredericksburg, where the two es can be united.

et me now allude to some of the objections ch you have urged. You say that the with- val from the present position will cause the ain demoralization of the army, "which is in excellent discipline and condition." I not understand why a simple change of posi- to a new and by no means distant base, will oralize an army in excellent discipline, unless officers themselves assist in that demoraliza- , which I am satisfied they will not. Your ge of front from your extreme right at Han- r Court House to your present position was r thirty miles, but I have not heard that it oralized your troops, notwithstanding the re losses they sustained in effecting it.

new base on the Rappahannock at Freder- sburg brings you within about sixty miles of hmond, and secures a reinforcement of forty fifty thousand fresh and disciplined troops. reover, you yourself suggested that a junction ht be effected at Yorktown; but that a flank ch across the Isthmus would be more hazar- us than to retire to Fort Monroe. You will member that Yorktown is two or three miles ther from Richmond than Fredericksburg is. ides the latter is between Richmond and shington, and covers Washington from any ack by the enemy.

The political effect of the withdrawal may at t be unfavorable; but I think the public are ginning to understand its necessity, and that y will have much more confidence in a united y, than in its separated fragments.

But you will reply, why not reinforce me here, that I can strike Richmond from my present sition? To do this you said at our interview, t you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impossible to give you so many. You finally thought you would have "some chance" of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely reinforced. If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly reasonable; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks.

To keep your army in its present position until it could be so reinforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on that part of James River, and even after you receive the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries, before you could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the meantime Gen. Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you.

In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, indeed, a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandonment.

I have not inquired, and do not wish to know by whose advice, or for what reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy between them. I must take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans require reinforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to *ask* for reinforcements; but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command.

I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have arrived at very different conlusions from your own.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief.

On the 7th I received the following telegram:

Washington, Aug. 7, 1862, 10 A.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.:—You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since you received my order; the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at your disposal; that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels which by my order you were authorized to control.

H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

To which I made this reply:

Headq's., Army of the Pot'c., Aug. 7, '62, 10.40 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A.:—In reply to

your despatch of 10 A. M. to-day I report the number of sick sent off since I received your order, as follows: 3,740, including some that are embarked to-night, and will leave to-morrow morning. The number still to be shipped, is, as nearly as can be ascertained, 5,700.

The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, horses, wagons, etc., required most of our available boats except the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to this place, have been ordered up, they will be here to-morrow evening. Col. Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as they can be obtained, I shall send off the 1st New York cavalry.

After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot come to this point, we can transport 25,000 men at a time. We have some propellers here, but they are laden with commissary supplies, and are not available. The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded, will carry 12,000 well infantry soldiers, Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest steamers have been used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only been available for the sick to-day.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Office of chief Quartermaster, Harrison's Landing, Aug. 7, 1862.

GENERAL:—I have the honor to return the papers herewith, which you sent me, with the following remarks:

We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, etc., which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry-boats.

The medical departmen has 10 or 12 of our largest transport vessels which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry.

I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we cannot transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry.

There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In two or three days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required.

If you wait and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe, after the sick and wounded transports are at my disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be transported, is contingent on circumstances referred to.

Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary, or other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft, also laden with supplies.

I am very respectfully, your most obedient servant, RUFUS INGALLS, Chief Quartermaster.

Gen. R. B. Marcy, Chief of Staff.

On the 9th I received this despatch:

Washington, Aug. 9, 1862. 12.45 P.

MAJ.-GEN. G. B. McC.—I am of opinion that enemy is massing his forces in front of Gene Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to cr them, and move forward to the Potomac. must send reinforcements instantly to Acc Creek.

Considering the amount of transportatior your disposal, your delay is not satisfact you must move with all possible celerity.

H. W. H. Maj-Ger

To which I sent the following reply:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berke Aug. 10, 1862. 8 A. M.

Telegram of yesterday received. The bat ies sent to Burnside, took the last available tr port yesterday morning. Enough have since rived to ship one regiment of cavalry to-day.

The sick are being embarked as rapidly as p sible. There has been no unnecessary delay you assert, not an hour, but everything has be and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to c ry out your orders.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen, H. W. H., Comd'g S. Army.

The following report, made on the same by the officer then in charge of the transpo exposes the injustice of the remark in the patch of the general-in-chief, that, "consider the amount of transportation at your dispo your delay is not satisfactory."

Assistant Quartermaster's office, Army of Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 10, 18

GEN. M. C. MEIGS, Quartermaster General U. Army, Washington:—Col. Ingalls being hims ill, has requested me to telegraph to you conce ing the state and capacity of the transports n here.

On the night of the 8th I despatched elev steamers, principally small ones, and six scho ers, with five batteries of heavy horse artille none of which have yet returned.

Requisition is made this morning for transpo ation of one thousand cavalry to Acquia Cre All the schooners that had been chartered carrying horses, have been long since discharg or changed into freight vessels.

A large proportion of the steamers now he are still loaded with stores, or are in the floati hospital service, engaged in removing the sic To transport the one thousand cavalry to-day w take all the available steamers now here not e gaged in the service of the harbor. These steam ers could take a large number of infantry; b are not well adapted to the carrying of horse and much space is thus lost.

Several steamers are expected here to-day, a we are unloading schooers rapidly. Most of the are not chartered, but are being taken for t service required at same rates of pay as oth chartered schooners.

If you could cause a more speedy return the steamers sent away from here, it would facil tate matters.

C. G. SAWTELLE, Capt. and A. Q. M. Comd'g Depo

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing wer very limited, admitting but few vessels at on time. These were continually in use as long a

re were disposable vessels, and the officers of
medical and quartermaster's departments,
h all their available forces, were incessantly
upied, day and night, in embarking and send-
off the sick men, troops and material.

Notwithstanding the repeated representations
ade to the general-in-chief that such were the
ts, on the 10th I received the following:

Washington, Aug. 10, 1862, 12 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.:—The enemy is crossing
Rapidan in large foree. They are fighting
n. Pope to-day; there must be no further delay
your movements. That which has already oc-
red was entirely unexpected, and must be
isfactorily explained. Let not a moment's time
lost, and telegraph me daily what progress
u have made in executing the order to transfer
ur troops. H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

To which I sent this reply:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Berkeley, Aug. 10, 1862, 12.30 P. M.

Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure
u again that there has not been any unneces-
ry delay in carrying out your orders. You are
obably laboring under some great mistake as
the amount of transportation available here. I
ve pushed matters to the utmost in getting off
r sick, and the troops you ordered to Burnside.
Col. Ingalls has more than once informed the
uartermaster General of the condition of our
ater transportation. From the fact that you
rected me to keep the order secret, I took it
r granted that you would take the steps neces-
ry to provide the requisite transportation. A
rge number of transports for all arms of ser-
ce, and for wagons, should at once be sent to
orktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready to
ove the whole army by land, the moment the
ck are disposed of. You may be sure that not
hour's delay will occur that can be avoided. I
ar you do not realize the difficulty of the ope-
tion proposed. The regiment of cavalry for
rnside has been in course of embarkation to-
ay and to-night. Ten steamers were required
r the purpose. Twelve hundred and fifty-eight
ck loaded to-day and to-night. Our means ex-
austed, except one vessel returning to Fort
onroe in the morning, which will take some
ve hundred cases of slight sickness.

The present moment is probably not the proper
ne for me to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and
njust tone of your telegrams of late. It will,
owever, make no difference in my official action.

G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H. Comd'g U. S.
rmy.

On the 11th this report was made:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkely,
ug. 11, 1862. 11.40 P. M.

The embarkation of eight hundred and fifty
avalry and one brigade of infantry will be com-
leted by two o'clock in the morning, five hun-
red sick were embarked to-day; another vessel
rrived to-night, and six hundred more sick are
ow being embarked. I still have some four
housand sick to dispose of. You have been
grossly misled as to the amount of transporta-
ion at my disposal. Vessels loaded to their ut-
most capacity with stores and others indispensa-
ble for service here, have been reported to you as
available for carrying sick and well. I am send-
ing off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe,
to have them return here. I repeat that I have
lost no time in carrying out your orders.

G. B. McC., Maj-Gen. Comd'g to Maj-Gen H. W.
H. Comd'g U. S. Army.

On the same day I received the following from
the quartermaster in charge of the depot:

Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the
Potomac, Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 11, 1862.

Colonel:—In reply to the communication from
Gen. Marcy, which was referred to me by you, I
have to state that there are now in this harbor
no disposable transports not already detailed
either for the use of the hospital department, or
the transportation of the N. Y. cavalry, or for the
necessary service of the harbor. I think the
steamers loading, and to be loaded with cavalry
could take in addition, *three thousand infantry;*
these boats are however directed to leave as fast
as they are loaded; some have already started.
The embarkation of this cavalry regiment is going
on very slowly, and it is not in my power to hur-
ry the matter, although I have had several agents
of the department, and one commissioned officer
at the wharf to render all the assistance possi-
ble. The entire army is this morning turning in
to be stored on vessels, knapsacks, officer's bag-
gage and other surplus property, and with our
limited wharf facilities, it is impossible, unless
the regular issues of forage, &c. are suspended,
to avoid great confusion and delay with what is
already ordered to be done; of course, if any in-
fantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry
transports, the confusion and difficulties will be
increased.

I know of no boats that may be expected here
to-day, except the "South America" and "Fanny
Cadwallader" (a propeller) which were ordered
to be sent back from Fort Monroe.

The transports with the artillery left for Acquia
Creek on the night of the 8th and the morning of
the 9th. They were ordered to return immedi
ately. I am, very respectfully, your obedient
servant, C. G. SAWTELLE.

Capt. and A. Q. M. Comd'g Depot.

Lieut.-Col. Rufus Ingalls, A. D. C. and chief Q. M.
Army of the Potomac.

On the 12th I received the following:

Washington, Aug. 12. 1862. 12 M.

Maj-Gen. G. B. McClellan —The quartermaster
general iuforms me that nearly every available
steam vessel in the country is now under your
control. To send more from Philadelphia, Balti-
more, and New York, would interfere with the
transportation of army supplies, and break up
the channels of travel by which we are to bring
forward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly
thirteen thousand troops to Acquia Creek, in less
than two days, and his transports were immedi-
ately sent back to you. All vessels in the James
River and Chesapeake Bay were placed, at your
disposal, and it was supposed that eight or ten
thousand of your men could be transported dai-
ly. In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet
of sailing vessels which could be used as trans-
ports. The bulk of your material on shore, it

was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe covered by that part of the army which could not get water transportation. Such were the views of the government here; perhaps we were misinformed as to the facts; if so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust; but the delay was so unexpected, that an explanation was required. There has been and is the most urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. H. W. H. Maj-Gen.

I telegraphed the following reply: Headq's., Army of the Pot'c., Berkeley, Aug. 12, '62, 11 P.M.

Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no more men could have embarked hence than have gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders received, Col. Ingalls directed all available vessels to come from Monroe. Officers have been sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet. There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side New York. Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. In this way can probably get off the 3,400 sick still on hand by day after to-morrow night. I am sure that you have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. We cannot use heavy loaded supply vessels for troops or animals, and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to you as capable of transporting this army. I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and marerial at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of facilities for embarkation. At least two additional wharves should be built at each place. I ordered two at the latter some two weeks ago, but you countermanded the order.

I learn that wharf accommodations at Acquia are altogether inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost in remedying this. Great delays will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a large deficiency in horse transports; we had nearly 200 when we came here. I learn of only 20 provided now; they carry about 50 horses each. More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, six weeks about were occupied in embarking this army and its material.

Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarkation. All his means were in hand—his outfit specially prepared for that purpose, and his men habituated to the movement.

There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we have been lately working at cross purposes, because you have not been properly informed by those around you who ought to know the inherent difficulties of such an undertaking.

It is not possible for any one to place this army where you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save it; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Acquia. Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments, the result might be the loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office tomorrow morning to talk with you.

G. B. McC. to H. W. H., Washington, D. C.

To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch to show why Gen. Burnside's movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our operations, the following may be added:

He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men.

He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons or teams. His force consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' horses.

His baggage was already on the transports where it had remained since his arrival from North Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on board.

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my dispatches of the 7th, 10th and 11th were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms.

I may also repeat that the vessels used by Gen. Burnside had not returned from Acquia when the army left Harrison's Bar.

It will be seen from the concluding paragraph of the foregoing dispach, that in order to have a more direct, speedy and full explanation of the condition of affairs in the army than I could by sending a single dispatch by steamer to the nearest telegraph office at Jamestown Island some seventy miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. On my arrival at Jamestown Island there was an interruption in the electric current, which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe, and cross the Chesapeake Bay to Cherry Stone Inlet on the "Eastern Shore," where I arrived late in the evening and immediately sent the annexed dispatches.

Cherry Stone, Aug. 13, 1862, 11.30 P.M.—Please come to office: wish to talk to you. What news from Pope? G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington.

Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862, 12.30 A.M.—Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you; found cable broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram. [See above dispatch of Aug. 12, 11 P.M.] All quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel pickets within eight miles of Coggin's Point yesterday. Richmond prisoners state that large force, with guns, left Richmond, northward, Sunday.

G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Wash.

To which the following reply was received:

Washington, August 14, 1862, 1.40 A.M.—I have read your dispatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so with all possible rapidity.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC. H. W. H., Maj.-Gen.

Before I had time to decipher and reply to this dispatch, the telegraph operator in Washington informed me that Gen. Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing this dispatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for me or waiting for any information as to the object of my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication with him at that time, I sent the following dispatch, and returned to Harrison's Landing.

Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862, 1.40 A. M.

Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you, after traveling so far for the purpose. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. W. H. H., Washington, D. C.

On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed despatch:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Berkeley, Aug. 16, 1862, 11 P. M.

Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to-morrow night. Everything being done to carry out your orders. I can't like Jackson's movements, he will suddenly appear where least expected. Will telegraph fully and understandingly in the morning. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. H., Washington, D. C.

The phrase "movement has commenced," it need not be remarked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army, after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the sick, &c., etc.

The perversion of the term to which the general-in-chief saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been rendered impossible by the dispatches which precede this of the 14th, which show that the movement really began immediately after the receipt of the order of August 4th.

The progress made in the movement on the 15th was reported in the following dispatches:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
August 15, 1862, 12 M.

Maj.-Gen. H, W. H., Comd'g U. S. A.:—Col. Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining brigade of McCall's division, with the sick which are constantly accumulating, the transports now disposable will be consumed.

Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning en route for Yorktown, one via Jones's Bridge, and the other via Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire army in motion.

A report has just been received from my pickets that the enemy in force is advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it—we shall know soon. Should any more transports arrive here before my departure, and the enemy do not show such a force in our front as to require all the troops I have remaining to insure the safety of the land movement with its immense train, I shall send every man by water that the transports will carry. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Berkeley, Aug. 15, 1862, 1.30 P. M.

The advance corps and the trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in relation to reported advance of rebels via Jones's Bridge. Shall push the movement as rapidly as possible. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Berkeley, August 15, 1862. 10 P.M.

Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of McCall's division, with its artillery, is now en route for Burnside. We have not yet transportation sufficient for our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow. Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its mouth, with his wagons and the reserve artillery.

Heintzelman at Jones's Bridge, with a portion of his corps. They will all be up by morning.

Averell's cavalry on the other side. All quiet thus far. I cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court-house before some time to-morrow afternoon. I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons will move all night. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C.

After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with the utmost rapidity, until all the troops and material were en route, both by land and water, on the morning of the 16th.

Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand army of the Potomac, bidding farewell to the scene still covered with the marks of its presence, and to be forever memorable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant exploits.

THE RETURN TO THE POTOMAC.

Previous to the departure of the troops, I had directed Capt. Duane, of the Engineer Corps, to proceed to Barrett's Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across the river at that point a pontoon bridge. This was executed promptly and satisfactorily, under the cover of gun-boats, and an excellent bridge of about two thousand feet in length was ready for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the army with its artillery, wagon trains, etc., crossed it rapidly, and in perfect order and safety, so that on the night of the 17th, everything was across the Chickahominy, except the rear-guard, which crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon bridge was immediately removed.

Gen. Porter's corps, which was the first to march from Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Williamsburg, where I had directed him to halt until the army was across the Chickahominy.

On his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he received an intercepted letter, which led to the belief that Gen. Pope would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his front. Gen Porter, therefore, very properly took the responsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport News, which place he reached on the morning of the 18th of August, having marched his corps sixty miles in the short period of three days and one night, halting one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy.

The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, and on the 20th it had all sailed for Acquia Creek. I made the following report from Barrett s Ferry:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Barrett's Ferry, Chickahominy,
August 17, 1862, 11 A. M.

Everything is removed from our camp at Harrison's Bar—no property nor men left behind. The Fifth Corps is at Williamsburg, with all its wagons and the reserve artillery. The Third Corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to Williamsburg, via Diascund Bridge, and has probably passed the latter before this hour. Averell's cavalry watches everything in that direction.

The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge here, and are parked on the other side. Peck's wagons are now crossing; his division will soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside; otherwise should have remained with the rear-guard. Thus far all is quiet, and not a shot fired that I know of since we began the march. I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyond the Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as transportation permits. G. B McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maj.-Gen. W. H. H., Comd'g U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and Newport News. The movement of the main body of the army on this march was covered by Gen. Pleasonton, with his cavalry and horse-artillery. That officer remained at Haxall's until the army had passed Charles City Court House, when he gradually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy after the main body had marched towards Williamsburg. His troops were the last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great credit for the manner in which he performed his duty. Gen. Averell did a similar service in the same satisfactory way, in covering the march of the 3d Corps.

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this part of my report without giving an expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men I had the honor to command.

From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign, the army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it.

The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c., was enormous; yet all the work was performed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the service.

During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary battles had been fought, besides numerous small engagements, in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusiasm a bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickne and even death without a murmur. Indeed th had become veterans in their country's cau and richly deserved the warm commendation the government.

It was in view of these facts that this seem to me an appropriate occasion for the general-chief to give, in general orders, some apprec tive expression of the services of the army wh upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th sent him the following dispatch:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Augu 18, 1862, 11 P.M.—Please say a kind word to t army, that I can repeat to them in general orde in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, W liamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court Hou and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard the seven days, and the recent retreat.

No one has ever said anything to cheer the but myself. Say nothing about me, merely gi my men and officers credit for what they ha done. It will do you much good, and strengthe you much with them if you issue a handson order to them in regard to what they have a complished. They deserve it.

G. B. McC., Major-Gen.

Major-Gen. H., Comd'g. U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.

As no reply was received to this communic tion, and no order was issued by the general-i chief, I conclude that my suggestion did n meet with his approbation.

All the personnel and material of the army ha been transferred from Harrison's Landing to th different points of embarkation in the very bri period of five days, without the slightest loss damage. Porter's Corps sailed from Newpo News on the 19th and 20th; Heintzelman's corp sailed from Yorktown on the 21st. On that da I received the following telegram from the gen ral-in-chief:

Washington, Aug. 21, 1862, 6 P.M.

Gen. McC.:—Leave such garrisons in For Monroe, Yorktown, &c., as you may deem pro per. They will be replaced by new troops as soo as possible. The forces of Burnside and Pope ar hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as yo can send it. Come yourself as soon as you can By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time here to supply them. oreover they Mmay have to fight as soo as they land. H. W. H., M.-Gen Com.

To which the following are replies:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe
August 21, 1862, 7.30 P.M.

Your dispatch of 6 P.M. received. I have no lost an hour in sending troops, nor will I. Frank lin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops on board to-night. I had already ordered all the ammunition forward. I will put headquarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I can leave at a moment's notice. I hope that I can get off to-morrow. Shall I go in person to Acquia, or do you wish to see me first in Washington? If you wish it, I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this army.

G B. McC. to Maj -Gen. H., Washington.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, Aug. 21, 1862, 10.25 P.M.

I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficieneies that may exist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand here. The forage is the only question for you to attend to. Please have vessels ready for me at Acquia. I want many more contraband for cavalry horses. They should have forage on board when they come here.

If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully the state of affairs and your plans. I will then be enabled to arrange my plans understandingly.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H., Washington.

Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for strengthening the defenses of Yorktown, to resist an attack from the direction of Richmond, and left Gen. Keyes, with his corps, to perform the work, and temporarily garrison Yorktown. I telegraphed as follows on the 22d:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862, 2.15 P.M.

Your dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps commencing disembarking as rapidly as possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as soon as transportation arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. I think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and artillery horses.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Wash'n.

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862, 3.40 P.M.

Two good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defenses are arranged and commenced. I recommend that 5,000 new troops be sent immediately to garrison York and Gloucester. They should be commanded by an experienced general-officer, who can discipline and instruct them. About 90 should be artillery. I recommend that a new regiment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. A similar regiment is absolutely necessary here.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Com. U. S. A.

On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the following despatch:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Fort Monroe, Aug. 23, 1862. 1.30 P. M.

Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Acquia in about half an hour. No transports yet for Sumner's corps.

G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. Army.

THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE.

On that evening I sailed with my staff for Acquia Creek, where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Acquia Creek, Aug. 24, 1861.

I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders,

G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. Maj-Gen. H. Comd'g U. S. Army.

I also telegraphed as follows:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Acquia Creek, August 24, 1862. 2 P. M.

Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahannock Station burned and abandoned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes: This was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens, are supposed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and Sykes are near Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappahannock, with no troops between them and Rappahannock Station, which is reported abandoned by Pope. Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing; until I know that, I cannot regulate Porter's movements; he is much exposed now, and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my command and position are to be, and whether you still intend to place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me, and orally through Gen, Burnside at the Chickahominy, I cannot decide where I can be of most use. If your determination is unchanged, I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please define my position and duties.

G. B. McC. Maj-Gen. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H., comd'g U. S. Army.

To which I received the following reply:

Washington, Aug. 24, 1862.

Maj-Gen. McC.—You ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either where General Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most anxious to ascertain.

H. W. H., General-in-chief.

On the 26th, I received the following:

Washington, Aug. 26th, 1862. 11 A. M.

Maj-Gen. G. B. McC.—There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. Reconnoissances will soon determine. Gen. Heintzelman's corps was ordered to report to Gen. Pope, and Kearney's will probably be sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present. We shall probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave Gen. Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there Gen. Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportation.

H. W. H., General-in-Chief.

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as follows:

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 8 A.M.—I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascertain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull Run was burnt last night. G. B. McC. Major-Gen

Major-Gen. H., Comd'g U. S. A.

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 9.40 A.M.—The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers who are said to be chiefly convalescents. The affairs of the quartermaster's department are reported as going on well. It is said that the Bull Run bridge will be repaired by to-morrow. The disembarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at

Acquia yesterday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappahannock Station earlier that way than from here. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen.

Major-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. A.

On the same day I received the following:

Washington, August 27, 1862.

Major-Gen. McC.—Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside just received, says that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts near Warrenton, Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction to reinforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just telegraphed about sending out troops, &c. Please see him and give him your directions. There has been some serious neglect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately remedied.

H. W. H., General-in-Chief.

I replied as follows:

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 10.20 A.M.—Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here in person to inform me as to his means of transportation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock Station. Porter at Bealton, Kelly's Darnell's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to day. Williams's Massachusetts Cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaned Burnside my personal escort, 1st squadron Fourth Regulars, to scout down Rappahannock. I have sent for Couch's division to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I will forward it, although you may already have it. G. B. McC., Major-Gen.

Major-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C.

I also received the following telegrams:

Washington, August 27, 1862.

Major-Gen. McC.—Direct General Casey to furnish you about five thousand of the new troops under his command. Take entire direction of the sending out of the troops from Alexandria. Determine questions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall occupy. Pope's headquarters are near Warrenton Junction, but I can not ascertain the present position of his troops.

H. W. H., General-in-Chie.f

Washington, Aug. 27, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. Mc.C.:—I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or our troops. There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's corps should march in that direction as soon as possible. A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of affairs in that vicinity.

H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief.

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter:

Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862.

Where are you, and what is state of affairs? What troops in your front, right and left? Sumner is now landing at Acquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy? Enemy burned Run bridge last night with cavalry force.

G. B. McC., Maj.-G

M.-G. Heintz'n, Warrenton, M.-G. Porter, Beal

P. S. If these general officers are not a places named, nearest operator will please message forwarded.

I also telegraphed the General-in-Chief as laws:

Alexandria, Aug. 27, '62, 10.50 I

I have sent all the information I posses Burnside, instructing him to look out well fo right flank between the Rappahannock and I mac, and to send no trains to Porter withou escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at Run last night may trouble Burnside a little have sent to communicate with Porter and H zelman via Falmouth, and hope to give you s definite information in a few hours. I shall the next cavalry I get hold of here, and sen out to keep open the communication betw Pope and Porter, also to watch vicinity of M assas. Please send me a number of copies of best maps of present field of operations. I use 50 to advantage.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H., Com

Alexandria, Aug. 27, '62, 11.20 A.

In view of Burnside's dispatch, just recei would it not be advisable to throw the mass Sumner's corps here, to move out with Fran to Centreville or vicinity? If a decisive ba fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave troops on lower Rappahannock in a danger position. They would do better service in fr of Washington.

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H., Washingtor

Alexandria, Aug. 27, '62, 12.5 P.M

My aid has just returned from Gen. Frankl camp. Reports that Gen's. Franklin, Smith, Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the der to next in rank to place the corps in readin to move at once. I learn that heavy firing been heard this morning at Centreville, and ha sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cava to send out on the roads. Are the works g risoned and ready for defense?

G. B. McC. to M.-Gen. H., Washington

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 12.20 P. M.

What bridges exist over Bull Run? Ha steps been taken to construct bridges for the a vance of troops to reinforce Pope, or to enal him to retreat if in trouble? There should two gun-boats at Acquia Creek at once. Shall push the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Po so strong as to be reasonably certain of succes I have sent to inspect the works near here, a their garrisons. As soon as I can find Gen. C sey, or some other commanding officer, I w see to the railway, etc. It would be well to ha them report to me, as I do not know where the are. I am trying to find them, and will lose t time in carrying out your orders. Would like t see Burnside. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. W. H., Washington.

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 1.15 P. M.

Franklin's artillery have no horses, except fo four guns without caissons; I can pick up n cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not b

to push Sumner's corps here by water as ly as possible; to make immediate arrange- s for placing the works in front of Wash- n in an efficient condition of defense. I no means of knowing the enemy's force be- n Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, with- his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful ose in front? Should not Burnside at once steps to evacuate Falmouth and Acquia, at same time covering the retreat of any of 's troops who may fall back in that direc- I do not see that we have force enough in to form a connection with Pope, whose ex- position we do not know. Are we safe in direction of the valley? G. B. McC., Major-

aj.-Gen. H., Washington.

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 1.35 P. M.

earn that Taylor's brigade sent this morning ull Run bridge, is either cut to pieces or ured. That the force against them had guns, and about five thousand infantry, re- ng reinforcements every moment. Also, Gainsville is in possession of the enemy. se send some cavalry out towards Draines- via Chain Bridge, to watch Lewinsville and nesville, and go as far as they can. If you give me even one squadron of good cavalry , I will ascertain the state of the case. I our policy now is to make these works ectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as as possible; but not to advance them until can have their artillery and cavalry. I have for Col. Tyler to place his artillerymen in works. Is Fort Marcy securely held? McC. en. H.

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 P. M.

aj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. Army:—

ner has been ordered to send here all of his s that are within reach. Orders have been to Couch to come here from Yorktown with least possible delay. But one squadron of avalry has arrived; that will be disembarked nce, and sent to the front. If there is any lry in Washington it should be ordered to rt to me at once.

still think that we should first provide for immediate defense of Washington on both s of the Potomac. I am not responsible for past, and can not be for the future, unless I ive authority to dispose of the available ps according to my judgment. Please inform at once what my position is. I do not wish ct in the dark. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Alexandria, August 27, 1862, 2.30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Comd'g U. S. A.:—I have received the copy of a dispatch from Gen. e to you, dated 10 A. M. this morning, in which says: "All forces now sent forward should be to my right at Gainsville."

now have at my disposal here about ten thousand men of Franklin's corps, about twenty- ht hundred of Gen. Tyler's brigade and Col. er's 1st Connecticut artillery, which I recom- nd should be held in hand for the defense of Washington. If you wish me to order any part this force to the front, it is in readiness to ch at a moment's notice to any point you may icate.

In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best to order Gen. Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move: but not to send them off till further orders. G. B. McC., Maj-Gen.

On the 28th I telegraphed as follows:

Headquarters, Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 28, 1862. 4.10 P. M.

Gen. Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not yet in condition to move, may be by to-morrow morning. Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a corps of good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously menaced as long as it is held.

G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H., Washington, D. C.

I received the following from the general-in chief.

Washington, Aug. 28, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McC.—I think you had better place Snmner's corps, as it arrives, near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially in the night-time. Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. Porter writes to Burnside from Bristol, 9.30 A. M. yesterday, that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. Gen. Cullum has gone to Harper's Ferry, and I have only a single regular officer for duty in the office. Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is taken at the forts against a raid; also at the bridge. Please answer. H. W. H., General in Chief.

On the 29th the following dispatch was telegraphed:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 10.20 A. M.—Franklin's corps is in motion. Started about 6 A. M. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving Gen. Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point, with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna via Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has two squadrons cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your approval. I have directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments to vicinity of Forts "Ethan Allen" and "Marcy." Meagher's brigade is still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington, yet Franklin is too weak alone. What shall be done? No more cavalry arrived have but three squadrons. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance.

I should not have moved him but for your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainesville?

Geo. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H., Washington.

To which the following is a reply:

Washington, August 29, 1862, 12 M.

Major-Gen. McC.—Upton's Hill arrangement is all right. We must send wagons and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing from Drainesville. H. W. H., Gen.-in Chief.

On the same day the following was received from his Excellency the President:

Washington, August 29, 1862, 2.30 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. McC.—What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, generally? A. L.

To which I replied as follows:

Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 2.45 P.M.—The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers. to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoro'fare Gap. This by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: 1st. To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. 2d. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer.

Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay any longer. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen.

A. L., President.

and copy to Gen. Halleck.

To which the following is a reply:

Washington. August 29, 1862, 4.10 P.M.

Major-Gen. McC.—Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: "To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels. A. L.

It had been officially reported to me from Washington, that the enemy in strong force was moving through Vienna, in the direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force at Vienna. This report, in connection with the dispatch of the general-in-chief on the 28th, before noted, induced me to direct Franklin to halt his command near Annadale, until it could be determined by reconnoissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's Hill towards Vienna and Drainesville in one direction, and towards Fairfax Court House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons towards Lewinsville, it would have been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Annadale. It must be remembered that at this time we were cut off from direct communication with General Pope; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in strong force; and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,00 men, with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery.

In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the general-in-chief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegra ed as follows:

Camp near Alexandria, August 29, 1862, 1 —Have ordered most of the 12th Pennsylva Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scou duty towards Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If apprehend a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better send a brigade or two of S ner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two three old regiments in Forts Allen and Ma they can watch Chain Bridge and Tenallyto Would it meet your views to post rest of S ner's corps between Arlington and Fort Co ran, whence they can either support Cox, Fra lin, or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytov Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,00 duty. How far do you wish this force to vance? G. B. McC

Major-Gen. H., Washington.

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 1 P.M

I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch regard to Sumner. Wish to give the order once. Please authorize me to attach new r ments permanently to my old brigades. I can much good to new and old troops in that way. shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Fo Allen and Marcy, at least with strong advan guards. I wish to hold the line through Prosp Hill, Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's Hills. T will give us timely warning. Shall I do as see best to me with all the troops in the vicinity, cluding Franklin, who, I really think, ought r under present circumstances, to advance beye Annandale? G. B. McC. to Gen. H

On the same day I received a dispatch fr the general-in-chief, in which he asks me wh halted Franklin at Annandale, to which I repli as follows:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 8 P.M.

By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 A.M., M., and 1 P.M., together with your reply of 2 P.M., you will see why Franklin's corps halted Annandale. His small cavalry force—all I had give him—was ordered to push on as far as p sible towards Manassas. It was not safe t Franklin to move beyond Annandale under t circumstances, until we knew what was at Vien Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 P. endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his co mand. I am responsible for both these circu stances, and do not see that either was in d obedience to your orders. Please give distin orders in reference to Franklin's movements t morrow. I have sent to Col. Haupt to push o construction and supply trains as soon as pc sible. General Tyler to furnish the necessa guards. I have directed Gen. Banks's supp trains to start out to-night at least as far as A nandale, with an escort from Gen. Tyler. In r gard to to-morrow's movements, I desire defini instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be a cused of disobeying orders, when I have simp exercised the discretion you committed to me.

G. B. McC. to M-Gen. H., Wash'n., D. C.

On the same evening I sent the following di patches:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, '62, 10 P.M.

Not hearing from you, I have sent orders

Ge Franklin to place himself in communication wit Gen. Pope as soon as possible, and at the sam time cover the transit of Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and wagon trans to move to Pope, with least possible delay. I a having inspections made of all the forts and city by members of my staff, with instructio to give all requisite orders. I inspected Wch and Ward myself this evening; found the in good order. Reports, so far as heard fro, are favorable as to condition of works.

G. B. McC. to Maj.-Gen. H., Washington.

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862, 10 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., General-in-Chief U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:—Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments here, with two batteries of artillery. Men of seven regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. Morgan's brigade of three new regiments, but little armed, is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all, except Franklin's, to await further orders. If you wish any of them to move towards Manassas, please inform me.

Col. Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just come in from the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court House; reports rumors, from various sources, that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are at Manassas. That the enemy with one hundred and twenty thousand men, intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore. Gen. Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of fortifications on this side the Potomac, requires two thousand additional artillery men, and additional troops to defend inlets, according to circumstances. At all events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a few regiments distributed along the lines, to give confidence to the new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper part of the line, on this side the river, very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate attack upon those works.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11.30 A. M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., General-in-Chief:—Your telegram of 9 A. M. received. Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his troops, he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply train. Gen. Sumner endeavored, by application on the quartermaster's department, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march with what could carry in his cartridge-boxes. I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are landed, be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency.

Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m., with an escort, via Annandale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The great difficulty seems to consist in the fact, that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington, has been needed for current supplies at the garrisons. Such is the state of the case, as represented to me by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

On the morning of the 30th, heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Fairfax Court House, which I reported to the general-in-chief. At 11 a. m. the following telegram was sent:

Camp near Alexadria, Aug. 30, 1862, 11 A. M.

Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Columbia pike on Annandale and Fairfax Court House. Is this the route you wish them to take? He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? G. B. Mc., Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. H., Washington.

On the same day I received the following:

Washington, Aug. 30, 1862, 1.45 A. M.

Maj-Gen. McC,—Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward to Centreville for Gen. Pope. It must be done with all possible dispatch.

H. W. H., General in Chief.

To which the following reply was made:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug 30, 1662. 2.10 P M.

I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct my ordnance officer, to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my headquarters wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain Bridge and Tenallytown should go from your headquarters, to save time. I understand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with Gen. Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of the army of the Potomac who is within my reach.

G. B. McC. to Maj.Gen. H. W. H.

At 10.30 P. M. the following telegram was sent:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 10.30 P. M.—I have sent to the front all my troops, with the exception of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aides, who will give authentic news from the field of battle.

I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day in listening to the

distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that if there is a probability of the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff merely to be with my own men; they will fight none the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this to-night.

I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I can to make arrangements tor the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed.

As I have sent my escort to the front, I would be glad to take some or Gregg's cavalry with me if allowed to go.

G. B. McC. to Maj-Gen. H. W. H. Comd'g U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

To which on the following day I received this answer:

Washington, Aug. 31, 1862. 9,18 A. M.

Maj-Gen. McC.—I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately, I cannot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, by his orders, of the department.

I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as possible, and find the battle-field.

H. W. H., General in Chief.

On the same day the following was received:

Washington Aug. 31, 1862. 12.45 P. M.

Maj-Gen. McC.—The subsistence department are making Fairfax Station their principal depot. It should be well guarded. The officer in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abattis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent in the vicinity of Chain Bridge.

H. W. H., General in Chief.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC REMOVED FROM GEN. McCLELLAN'S COMMAND.

At 2.30 P.M. the following dispatch was telegraphed.

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 2.30 P.M. —Major Haller is at Fairfax Station, with my provost and headquarters guard and other troops. I have requested four more companies to be sent at once, and the precautions you direct to be taken.

I have no control over the new regiments; do not know where they are or anything about them, except those near here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. Where I have seen evils existing under my own eye I have corrected them. I think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the field, and a matter between him and General Barnard to order others to vicinity of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the War Department order I have no right to give them orders.

Gen. H., Washington. G. B. McC.

To which the following is an answer:

Washington, August 31, 1862, 10.7 P.M.

Major-Gen. McC.—Since receiving your dispatch, relating to command, I have not been to answer any not of absolute necessity. I not seen the order as published, but will to you in the morning. You will retain the mand of everything in this vicinity not temp rily to be Pope's army in the field.

I beg of you to assist me in this crisis your ability and experience. I am entirely t out. H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chie

The order referred to in the preceding patches was as follows:

War Department, August 30, 1862.—The lowing are the commanders of the armies ope ing in Virginia:

General Burnside commands his own co except those that have been temporarily detac and assigned to General Pope.

General McClellan commands that portion the Army of the Potomac that has not been s forward to Gen. Pope's command.

General Pope commands the Army of Virgi and all the forces temporarily attached to it.

All the forces are under command of Ma Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief.

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant-Adj.-Gen

I was informed by Col. Townsend that a oove was published by order of the Secret of War.

At 11.30 P.M I telegraphed the following:

Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862, 11 P.M.—The squadron of the 2d Regular Cavalry t I sent with Gen. Sumner was captured to-d about 2 P.M., some three miles from Fair Court House, beyond it on the Little River Pi by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and th light batteries. I have conversed with the sergeant, who says that when he last saw th they were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope h no troops on that road, this squadron getti there by mistake. There is nothing of ours the right of Centreville but Sumner's cor There was much artillery firing during the d A rebel major told the sergeant that the reb had driven in our entire left to-day. He says t road is filled with wagons and stragglers comi towards Alexandria. It is clear, from the s geant's account, that we were badly beaten y terday, and that Pope's right is entirely expos

I recommend that no more of Couch's divisi be sent to the front, that Burnside be broug here as soon as practicable, and that everythi available this side of Fairfax be drawn in at on including the mass of the troops on the railroa I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by t time, occupied Fairfax Court-House, and cut Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night v Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think these o ders should be sent at once. I have no con dence in the dispositions made, as I gather the To speak frankly, and the occasion requires there appears to be a total absence of brains, a I fear the total destruction of the army. I ha some cavalry here that can carry out any orde you may have to send. The occasion is grav and demands grave measures. The question the salvation of the country. I learn that o loss yesterday amounted to 15,000. We cann afford such losses without an object. It is n deliberate opinion that the interests of the r

demand that Pope should fall back to-night ossible, and not one moment is to be lost. I use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. se answer at once. I feel confident you can upon the information I give you. I shall be ull night, and ready to obey any orders you me.

B. McC., M.-G., to M.-Gen. H., Washington.

which this reply was received:

Washington, Sept. 1, '62, 1.30 P.M.

aj.Gen. McC.:—Burnside was ordered up early yesterday morning. Retain remainder ouch's forces, and make arrangements to stop letreating troops in line of works, or where can best establish an outer line of defense. ews from Pope was up to 4 P.M., he was then light. I must wait for more definite informa- before I can order a retreat, as the falling on the line of the works must necessarily irected, in case of a serious disaster.

ive me all news that is reliable. I shall be ll night, and ready to act as circumstances require. I am fully aware of the gravity of risis, and have been for weeks.

H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief.

will be seen from what has preceded that I no time that could be avoided in moving the y of the Potomac from the Peninsula to the port of the army of Virginia; that I spared ffort to hasten the embarkation of the troops ort Monroe, Newport News and Yorktown, aining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass he army had sailed; and that after my arrival lexandria I left nothing in my power undone rward supplies and reinforcements to Gen. e. I sent with the troops that moved all the dry I could get hold of, even my personal rt was sent out upon the line of the railway guard, with the provost and camp guard at quarters, retaining less than 100 men, many whom were orderlies, invalids, members of ds, etc.; all the headquarter teams that ar- d were sent out with supplies and ammuni- , none being retained even to move the head- ters camps. The squadron that habitually ed as my personal escort was left at Falmouth Gen. Burnside, as he was deficient in cav- .

FOURTH PERIOD.

n the 1st of September I went into Washing- where I had an interview with the general- hief, who instructed me verbally to take mand of its defences, expressly limiting my sdiction to the works and their garrisons, and hibiting me from exercising any control over troops actively engaged in front under Gen. e. During this interview, I suggested to the eral-in-chief the necessity of his going in son, or sending one of his personal staff, to army under Gen. Pope, for the purpose of ertaining the exact condition of affairs. He t Col. Kelton, his assistant adjutant-general.

During the afternoon of the same day, I re- ved a message from the general-in-chief, to effect that he desired me to go at once to his se to see the President The President in- med me that he had reason to believe that the y of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-ope- rating with and supporting Gen. Pope, that he had "always been a friend of mine," and now asked me, as a special favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed, that I was sure, whatever sentiment the army of the Potomac might entertain towards Gen. Pope, that they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their whole duty. The President, who was much moved, again asked me to telegraph to "Fitz John Porter or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any feeling that might exist, adding that I could rectify the evil, and that no one else could. I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to Gen. Porter, or do anything else in my power, to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety, upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in the matter, etc., and left.

I then wrote the following telegram to Gen. Porter, which was sent to him by the general-in-chief:

Washington, Sept. 1, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. Porter:—I ask of you for my sake, and that of the country, and the old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends, will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to Gen. Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our army, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is, that for their country's sake they will extend to Gen. Pope the same support they ever have to me.

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary. G. B. McC.

To which he sent the following reply:

Fairfax Court House, 10 A. M., Sept. 3, 1862.

"You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to Gen. Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support, in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty." F. J. Porter, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Gen. G. B. McC., Washington.

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other time, did I think for one moment that Gen. Porter had been, or would be in any manner, derelict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an impression never entered my mind. The dispatch in question was written purely at the request of the President.

On the morning of the 2d, the President and Gen. Halleck came to my house, when the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned from the front; that our affairs were in bad condition; that the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington; the roads filled with stragglers, &c. He instruoted me to take steps at once to stop and collect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of defense, and to go out to meet and take command of the ar-

my when it approached the victnity of the works; then to put the troops in the best position for defense; committing everything to my hands.*

I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and I sent an aide to General Pope with the following letter:

Headquarters, Washington, Sept 2, 1862.
Maj.-Gen. J. Pope, Com'g. A. V.:

General,—Gen. Halleck instructed me to repeat to you the order he sent this morning to Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double precaution.

In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, etc.; McDowell's to Upton's Hill; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most convenient.

In haste, General, very truly yours,

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's Hill met the advance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few aids at my disposal to the left, to give instructions to the troops approaching in the direction of Alexandria; and hearing artillery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by which the corps of Sumner, Porter and Sigel were returning, and learning from Gen. Pope that Sumner was probably engaged, I went with a singe aide and three orderlies by the shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to reach its intended position without any serious molestation. I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to occupy, sent instructions to Gen. Sumner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington.

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary supplies, etc. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac.

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs and enlarged the sphere of operations, for a crossing in force, an active campaign would necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the i sion of Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland.

I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and Corps to Tennallytown, and the 9th Corps point on the 7th Street Road near Washing and sent such cavalry as was available to fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinit

On the 5th the 2d and 12th Corps were mc to Rockville, and Couch's division (the only of the 4th Corps that had been brought from Peninsula) to Offut's Cross Roads.

On the 6th the 1st and 9th Corps were ord to Leesboro, the 6th Corps and Syke's divisic the 5th Corps to Tennallytown.

On the 7th the 6th Corps was advance Rockville, to which place my headquarters v moved on the same day.

All the necessary arrangements for the defe of the city, under the new condition of thi had been made, and General Banks was lef command, having received his instructions f me.

I left Washington on the 7th of Septem At this time it was known that the mass of rebel army had passed up to the south side the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed Maryland; but whether it was their intentio cross their whole force, with a view to Washington by a flank movement down the n bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore to invade Pennsylvania, were questions wl at that time we had no means of determin This uncertainty as to the intentions of the en obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to ma cautiously, and to advance the army in s order as to continually keep Washington Baltimore covered, and at the same time to l the troops well in hand, so as to be able to centrate and follow rapidly if the enemy t the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to defence of Washington, if, as was greatly fea by the authorities, the enemy should be mei making a feint with a small force to draw off army, while with their main forces they st ready to seize the first favorable opportunity attack the capital.

In the meantime the process of reorganiza rendered necessary after the demoralizing eff of the disastrous campaign upon the other s of the Potomac, was rapidly progressing, troops were regaining confidence, and their mer soldierly appearance and discipline was returning. My cavalry was pushed out conti ally in all directions, and all possible steps ta to learn the positions and movements of enemy.

The following table shows the movements the army from day to day, up to the 14th of Se ember.

[See next page.]

The right wing, consisting of the 1st and Corps, under the command of Major-Gene Burnside, moved on Frederick, the 1st Corps Brookville, Cooksville and Ridgeville, and 9th Corps via Damascus and New Market.

The 2d and 12th Corps, forming the cen

* The following, which was the only order issue upon the subject, was published on the 2d September. It was accidentally omitted in preparing the report.

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, Sept. 2, 1862.

Major-General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital. By order of

Maj.-Gen. Halleck,

E. D. Townsend, Ass't Adj't General.

	September.	4th	6th	9th	10th	11th	12th	13th	14th
BURNSIDE	9th Corps, *Reno*	7th St. Road	Leesboro	Brookeville		New Market	Frederick Ridgeville Newmarket and on the Monocacy	Middleton	South Mountain
SUMNER	1st Corps, *Hooker*	Upton's Hill	Leesboro	Brookville				Frederick	South Mountain
	12th Corps, *Williams*	Tenallytown	Rockville	Middleburg	Damascus	Damascus	Ijamsville Cross Roads	Frederick	South Mountain
	2d Corps, *Sumner*	Tenallytown	Rockville	Middleburg	Clarksburg	Clarksburg	Urbana	Frederick	South Mountain
FRANKLIN	6th Corps, *Franklin*	Alex. Semin'y	Tenallytown	Darnestown	Barnsville	Barnsville	Licksville Cross Roads	Buckeystown	Burkettsville
	Couch's Division	Tennallytown	Offuts Cross Roads	Mouth of Seneca	Poolesville	Poolesville	Barnville	Licksville	Burkettsville
	Sykes's Division	Tenallytown	Rockville	Rockville	Rockville	Middleburg	Urbana	Frederick	Middleton

under the command of General Sumner, moved on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and Urbana, and the 12th Corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frederick to Washington.

The 6th Corps under the command of General Franklin, moved to Buckeystown via Darnestown, Dawsonville, and Barnville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and support the centre should it have been necessary (as supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. Couch's division moved by the "River Road," covering that approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the 6th Corps.

The following extracts from telegrams received by me after my departure from Washington will show how little was known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital.

"On the 9th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

"Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drainsville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping too much our forces on the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think of this."

"Again on the 11th of Sept., Gen. Halleck telegraphed me as follows:

"Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel? I think the main force of the enemy is in your front; more troops can be spared from here."

"This dispatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and furnished by the General-in-chief, reads as follows: "Why not order forward Porter's or Sigel's? *If the main force of the enemy* is in your front, more troops can be spared from here."

I remark that the original dispatch as received by me from the telegraph operator, is in the words quoted above: "*I think the main force of the enemy, &c.*"

"In accordance with this suggestion, I asked, on the same day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be sent to reinforce me; but none came.

"On the the 12th I received the following telegram from his Excellency the President:

"'Governor Curtin telegraphs me: 'I have advices that Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.'" The President adds: "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling, that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off without being hurt."

"On the 13th Gen. Halleck telegraphed as follows;

"Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion

that the enemy will send a small column towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over."

Again, on the 14th, Gen. Halleck telegraphed me that "scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear."

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's army was in front of us, I received the following:

War Department, Sept. 16, 1862, 12.30 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. McC.:—Yours of 7 a. m. is this moment received. As you give me no information in regard to the position of your forces, except those at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. I think, however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the subject. A heavy rain might prevent it. H. W. H., General-in-Chief.

The importance of moving with all due caution, so as not to uncover the national capital, until the enemy's position and plans were developed, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing telegrams that the general-in-chief was of a different opinion, and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precipitate, not only for the safety of Washington, but also for the security of my left and rear.

The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance may now be perceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," says: "In respect to Gen. McClellan's going too fast, or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him; he has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving Gen. Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought Gen. McClellan should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry."

As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted; and had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my left. from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and that my centre was continually in position to reinforce the left or right as occasion might require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly than the o columns marched upon the roads to the rig should have thrown that flank out of suppor distance of the other troops, and greatly exp it. And if I had marched the entire army in column along the banks of the river, instea upon five different parallel roads, the colu with its trains, would have extended about miles, and the enemy might have defeated advance before the rear could have reached scene of action. Moreover, such a moven would have uncovered the communications Baltimore and Washington on our right, and posed our left and rear.

I presume it will be admitted by every mil ry man that it was necessary to move the a in such order that it could at any time be c centrated for battle, and I am of opinion that object could not have been accomplished in other way than the one employed. Any ot disposition of our forces would have subjec them to defeat in detached fragments.

On the 10th of December, I received from scouts information which rendered it quite p bable that Gen. Lee's army was in the vicinity Frederick, b t whether his intention was to m towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not t known.

On the 11th I ordered Gen. Burnside to push strong reconnoissance across the National Ro and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad towa New Market, and if he learned that the ene had moved towards Hagerstown, to press rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops consta ly ready to meet the enemy in force. A corr ponding movement of all the troops in the cen and on the left was ordered in the direction Urbana and Poolesville.

On the 12th a portion of the right wing enter Frederick, after a brisk skirmish at the outski of the city and in the streets. On the 13th t main bodies of the right wing and centre pass through Frederick.

It was soon ascertained that the main body the enemy's forces had marched out of the ci on the two previous days, taking the roads Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby renderi it necessary to force the passes through the Cat tin and South Mountain ridges, and gain posse sion of Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before a relief could be extended to Col. Miles at Harpe Ferry.

On the 13th an order fell into my hands issu by Gen. Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, a I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigo ous forward movement.

The following is a copy of the order referr to:

Headq's, Army of North'n Virginia, Sept. 9, '62.

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 191.

The army will resume its march to-morro taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson command will form the advance, and after passi Middletown, with such portions as he may selec will take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross th Po omac at the most convenient point, and b Friday night take possession of the Baltimor and Ohio Railroad, capture such of the enemy a

at Martinsburg, and intercept such as tempt to escape from Harper's Ferry.

Longstreet's command will pursue the oad as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt he reserve, supply, and baggage trains of ay.

McLaws, with his own division and that R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen. Long- On reaching Middletown, he will take ute to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morn- ssess himself of the Maryland Heights, and or to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry cinity.

Walker, with his division, after accom- g the object in which he is now engaged, oss the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, ascend its ank to Lovettsville, take possession of n Heights if practicable, by Friday morn- yes' ford on his left, and the road between d of the mountain and the Potomac on his He will, as far as practicable, co-operate en. McLaws and Gen. Jackson, in inter- g the retreat of the enemy.

D. H. Hill's division will form the rear of the army, pursuing the road taken by ain body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, pply trains, &c., will precede Gen. Hill.

Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry ompany the commands of Gen's. Longstreet, on, and McLaws, and with the main body of valry will cover the route of the army, and up all stragglers that may have been left d.

commands of Gen. Jackson, McLaws, and er, after accomplishing the objects for which ave been detached, will join the main body army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown.

h regiment on the march, will habitually its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons, e of the men at their encampments to pro- wood, &c.

command of Gen. R. E. Lee, R. H. Chilton, G., to Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, C. D.

HARPER'S FERRY.

the report of a military commission, of Maj.-Gen. D. Hunter was President, which ened at Washington, for the purpose of in- gating the conduct of certain officers in con- on with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I he following:

he commission has remarked freely on Col. , an old officer, who has been killed in the ce of his country, and it can not, from any ves of delicacy, refrain from censuring those igh command, when it thinks such censnre rved.

The general-in-chief has testified that Gen. , after having received orders to repel the ay invading the State of Maryland, marched six miles per day, on an average, when pur- g this invading enemy.

The general-in chief also testifies that, in his ion, he could and should have relieved and rected Harper's Ferry; and in this opinion commission fully concur."

have been greatly surprised that this com- sion, in its investigations, never called upon nor upon any officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer of the army of the Potomac, able to give an intelligent statement of the movements of that army. But another paragraph in the same report makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows:

"By a reference to the evidence, it will be seen that at the very moment Col. Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Gen. Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of his position."

The corps of Gens. Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army which I at that time had the honor to command, and they were acting under my orders at Crampton's Gap, and elsewhere, and if, as the commission states, Col. Ford's "little army was in reality relieved" by those officers, it was relieved by me.

I had, on the morning of the 10th, sent the following dispatch in relation to the command at Harper's Ferry:

Camp near Rockville, Sept. 10, 1862, 9.45 A M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington, D. C.:—Col. Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thousand troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route. G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen.

To this I received the following reply:

"There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at present; his only chance is to defend his works till you can open communication with him. H. W. H."

It seems necessary for a distinct understanding of this matter, to state that I was directed on the 12th to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, as soon as I should open communication with that place, and that when I received this order all communication from the direction in which I was approaching was cut off. Up to that time, however, Col. Miles could, in my judgment, have marched his command into Pennsylvania, by crossing the Potomac at Williamsport or above, and this opinion was confirmed by the fact that Col. Davis marched the cavalry part of Col. Miles' command from Harper's Ferry on the 14th, taking the main road to Hagerstown, and he encountered no enemy excepting a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam.

Before I left Washington, and when there, there certainly could have been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Col. Miles. I recommended to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn via Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley, or that, taking up the pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should fall back to the Maryland Heights, and there hold out to the last. In this position it ought to have maintained itself many days. It was not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but endeavor to relieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our advance, at frequent intervals, as a signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and as I af-

terwards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Col. Miles would hold out until we had carried the mountain passes, and were in condition to send a detachment to his relief. The left was therefore ordered to move through Crampton's Pass in front of Burkettsville, while the centre and right marched upon Turner's Pass in front of Middletown.

It may be asked by those who are not acquainted with the topography of the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, instead of marching his column over the circuitous road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and Brownsville, and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for the reason that I had received information that the enemy were anticipating our approach in that direction, and had established batteries on the south side of the Potomac which commanded all the approaches to Knoxville; moreover the road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no opportunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of the river to enfilade our narrow approaching columns. The approach through Crampton's Pass which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of Maryland Heights, was the only one which offered any reasonable prospect of carrying that formidable position. At the same time the troops upon the road were in better relation to the main body of our forces.

On the morning of the 14th a verbal message reached me from Col. Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence I had received as to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the preceding afternoon Maryland Heights had been abandoned by our troops after repelling an attack of the rebels and that Col. Miles's entire force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry: the Maryland, Loudon, and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by him, and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the Maryland Heights, and that Col. Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out with certainty two days longer. I directed him to make his way back, if possible, with the information, that I was approaching rapidly, and felt confident I could relieve the place.

On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Col. Miles, and dispatched three copies by three different couriers, on different routes. I did not, however, learn that any of these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry.

Middletown, Sept. 14, 1862.

Col. D. S. Miles.—Colonel . The army is being rapidly concentrated here. We are now attacking the pass on the Hagerstown road, over the Blue Ridge, A column is about attacking the Burkestsville and Boonsboro' Pass. You may count on our making every effort to relieve you · you may rely upon my speedily accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. If it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights with your whole force. If you can do that, I will certainly be able to relieve you. As the Catoctin Valley is in our possession you can
cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so
opposition on this side of the river is conce
Hold out to the last.

G. B. McC., Maj-Gen. Com

On the previous day I had sent Gen. Fra
the following instructions:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac
Camp near Frederick, Sept. 13, 1862, 6.2
Major-Gen. W. B. Franklin, Com'g 6th Corps

General,—I have now full information
movements and intentions of the enemy. Ja
has crossed the Upper Potomac to capture
garrison at Martinsburg, and cut off Miles
treat toward the west. A division on the s
side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon Hei
and cut off his retreat in that direction. McL
with his own command and the division of
Anderson was to move by Boonsboro' and H
ersville to carry the Maryland Heights.
signal officers inform me that he is now in P
ant valley. The firing shows that Miles still h
out. Longstreet was to move by Boonsb
and there halt with the reserve trains, D. H.
to form the rear guard, Stuart's cavalry to b
up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all
cavalry this side the mountains, and north o
The last I heard from Pleasonton he occu
Middletown after several sharp skirmishes.
division of Burnside's started several hours
to support him. The whole of Burnside's c
mand, including Hooker's corps, march this e
ing and early to-morrow morning, followed by
corps of Sumner, and Banks's and Sykes's c
sion upon Boonsboro', to carry that posit
Couch has been ordered to concentrate his d
sion and join you as rapidly as possible. With
waiting for the whole of that division to
you, you will move at day-break in the morn
by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the roa
Rohrersville; I have reliable information t
the mountain pass by this road is practicable
artillery and wagons. If this pass is not oc
pied by the enemy in force, seize it as soon
practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville
order to cut off the retreat of or destroy McLa
command. If you find this pass held by the e
my in large force, make all your dispositions
the attack, and commence it about half an h
after you hear severe firing at the pass on
Hagerstown pike, where the main body w
attack. Having gained the pass, your duty w
be first to cut off, destroy, or capture McLa
command, and relieve Colonel Miles. If y
effect this you will order him to join you at or
with all his disposable troops, first destroyi
the bridges over the Potomac, if not alrea
done, and leaving a sufficient garrison to preve
the enemy from passing the ford; you will th
return by Rohrersville on the direct road
Boonsboro' if the main column has not succeed
in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the ro
from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Willian
port, in order either to cut off the retreat of H
and Longstreet towards the Potomac, or to pr
vent the repassage of Jackson. My general id
is to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in deta
I believe I have sufficiently explained my into

I ask of you at this important moment all ntellect, and the utmost activity that a gen- an exercise. G. B. McC. Maj.-Gen. Com.

ain on the 14th I sent him the following :

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac,
Frederick, Sept. 14, 1862. 2 P. M.

j.-Gen. Franklin :—Your dispatch of 12.30 received. Send back to hurry up Couch your troops and carry Burkettsville at any We shall have strong opposition at both s. As fast as the troops come up, I will a reserve in readiness to support you. If nd the enemy in very great force at the let me know at once, and amuse them as ou can, so as to retain them there. In that I will probably throw the mass of the army e pass in front of here. If I carry that, it lear the way for you, and you must then fol- ne enemy as rapidly as possible.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com.

SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

neral Franklin pushed his corps rapidly for- towards Crampton's Pass. and at about 12 k on the 14th arrived at Burkettsville, im- tely in rear of which he found the enemy's try posted in force on both sides of the road, artillery in strong positions to defend the aches to the pass.

cum's division was formed upon the right e road leading through the gap, and Smith's the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and et's brigades, supported by Newton, whose ity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon nemy at a charge on the right. The enemy driven from their position at the base of the tain, where they were protected by a stone and steadily forced back up the slope until reached the position of their battery on the well up the mountain. Here they made a l. They were, however, driven back, retiring artillery in echelon, until, after an action of hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy ly fled down the mountain on the other side. the left of the road Brooks's and Irwin's ades of Smith's division, formed for the pro- on of Slocum's flank, charged up the moun- in the same steady manner, driving the ene- before them until the crest was carried. 400 oners from seventeen different organizations, stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three rs, were captured by our troops in this bril- action. It was conducted by Gen. Franklin l its details. These details are given in the rt of Gen. Franklin, herewith submitted, and credit awarded to the gallant officers and engaged. The loss in Gen. Franklin's corps 115 killed, 416 wounded, and 2 missing. The ny's loss was about the same. The enemy's tion was such that our artillery could not be with any effect.

he close of the action found Gen. Franklin's ance in Pleasant Valley on the night of the n, within three and a half miles of the point Maryland Heights, (where he might on the e night, or on the morning of the 15th, have ned a junction with the garrison of Harper's ry. had it not been previously withdrawn m Maryland Heights,) and within six miles of per's Ferry.

On the night of the 14th the following dispatch was sent to Gen. Franklin :

Bolivar, Sept. 15, 1 A.M.

General,—. . . . The commanding general directs that you occupy with your command the road from Rohrersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that position, in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boonsboro'. Endeavor to open communication with Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in opening communication with Col. Miles, direct him to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be destroyed ; the rest of the public property will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonsboro', which place the commanding general intends to attack to-morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place. Should you find, however, that the enemy has retreated from Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburgh, you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat.

By command of Maj.-Gen. McClellan.

G. D. R., Col. & A. D. C., to Gen. F.

On the 15th the following were received from Gen. Franklin :

At the foot of the Mountain in Pleasant Valley, 3 m's. from Rohrersville, Sept. 15, 8.50 A.M.

General,—My command started at daylight this morning, and I am waiting to have it closed up here. Gen. Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrersville, or to the strongest points in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two miles to our front, —one brigade in sight. As soon as I am sure that Rohrersville is occupied, I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry is fallen, and the cessation of firing makes me fear that it has, it is my opinion that I should be strongly reinforced. . . .

W. B. F., M.-Gen. Com. 6th C., to Gen. G. B. McC.
Sept. 15, 11 A. M.

General :—I have received your despatch by Capt. O'Keefe. The enemy is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, and a large column of artillery and infantry on the right of the valley, looking towards Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It of course will not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In the meantime I shall wait here until I learn what is the prospect of reinforcement. I have not the force to justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close view of it, and its position is very strong. Respectfully, W. B. Franklin, Maj.-Gen.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC., Comd'g.

Col. Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a. m. on the 15th, as the cessation of the firing indicated, and Gen. Franklin was ordered to remain where he was, to watch the large force in front of him, and protect our left and rear until the night of the 16th, when he was ordered to join

the main body of the army at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to Maryland Heights.

While the events which have just been described were taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and right wing, which had united at Frederick on the 13th, were engaged in the contest for the possession of Turner's Gap.

On the morning of the 13th, Gen. Pleasonton was ordered to send McReynolds's brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettysburg, and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson, to communicate with Franklin, to whom the 6th U. S. Cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been sent, and to proceed with the remainder of the force in the direction of Middletown in pursuit of the enemy.

After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning and driving them from several strong positions, he reached Turner's Gap of the South Mountain in the afternoon, and found the enemy in force, and apparently determined to defend the pass. He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to support him, and proceeded to make reconnoissance of the position.

The South Mountain is at this point about 1000 feet in height, and its general direction is from north-east to south-west. The National Road from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles from Turner's Gap, a depression which is some 400 feet in depth. The mountain on the north side of the turnpike is divided into two crests or ridges by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the turnpike, and the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one to the left, called the "old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to, and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left.

The other road, called the "old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountain, about a mile from the turnpike, and, bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass.

On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps were as follows:

Reno's corps, at Middletown, except Rodman's division at Frederick.

Hooker's corps, on the Monocacy, two miles from Frederick.

Sumner's Corps, near Frederick; Banks' Corps, ditto; Sykes's Division, ditto; Franklin's Corps, at Buckeystown; Couch's Division, at Licksville.

The orders from headquarters, for the march on the 14th, were as follows:

13th, 11.20 P M.—Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown.

13th, 11.30 P. M.—Sykes to move at 6 A. M., after Hooker, on the Middletown and Hagerstown roae.

14th, 1 A. M.,—Artillery Reserve to follow Sykes closely.

13th, 8.45 P. M—Sumner to move at 7 A. M.

14th, 9 A. M.—Sumner ordered to take Shookstown road to Middletown.

13th, 6.46 P. M.—Couch ordered to mov Jefferson with his whole division.

On the 14th, Gen. Pleasanton continued hi connoissance. Gibson's battery, and afterw Benjamin's battery, (of Reno's corps), were pl on high ground io the left of the turnpike, obtained a direct fire on the enemy's positio the gap.

General Cox's division, which had been dered up to support Gen. Pleasonton, left its onac near Middletown, at 6 A. M. The first ade reached the scene of action at 9 A. M., was sent up the old Sharpsburg road by Pleasonton, to feel the enemy and ascertain i held the crest on that side in strong force. was soon found to be the case, and Gen. Cox ing arrived with the other brigade, and in mation having been received from Gen. R that the column would be supporfed by whole corps, the division was ordered to ass the position.

Two 20-pound Parrotts of Simmons's batt and two sections of McMullin's battery were in the rear, in position near the turnpike, wh they did good service during the day against enemy's batteries in the gap.

Col. Scammon's brigade was deployed, a well covered by skirmishers, moved up the sl to the left of the road, with the object of turn the enemy's right, if possible. It snceeeded gaining the crest and establishing itself there spite of the vigorous resistance of the ene who was posted behind stone walls and in edges of timber, and the fire of a battery wh poured in canister and case-shot on the regim on the right of the brigade.

Col. Crooke's brigade marched in column, supporting distance. A section of McMulli battery, under Lieutenant Croome (killed wh serving one of his guns), was moved up w great difficulty, and opened with canister at ve short range on the enemy's infantry, by wh (after having done considerable execution) was soon silenced and forced to withdraw.

One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now ployed on Scammon's left, and the other two his rear, and they several times entered the fi line and relieved the regiment in front of the when hard pressed. A section of Simmon's b tery was brought up and placed in an open spa in the woods, where it did good service duri the rest of the day. The enemy several tim attempted to retake the crest, advancing wi boldness, but were each time repulsed. Th then withdrew their battery to a point more the right, and formed columns on both our flank

It was now about noon, and a lull occurred the contest, which lasted about two hours, du ing which the rest of the corps was coming u Gen. Wilcox's division was the first to arriv When he reached the base of the mountain, Ge Cox advised him to consult Gen. Pleasonton as a position. The latter indicated that on the righ afterwards taken up by Gen. Hooker. Gen. Wi cox was in the act of moving to occupy th

when he received an order from Gen. move up the old Sharpsburg road, and position to its right, overlooking the turn- Two regiments were detached to support x, at his request. One section of Cook's was placed in position near the turn of d (on the crest), and opened fire on my's batteries across the gap. The divi- s proceeding to deploy to the right of the hen the enemy suddenly opened (at 150 with a battery, which enfiladed the road point, drove off Cook's cannoneers with bers, and causing a temporary panic, in he guns were nearly lost. But the 79th rk and 17th Michigan promptly rallied, front under a heavy fire, and moved out ect the guns, with which Capt. Cook had ed. Order was soon restored, and the di- ormed in line on the right of Cox, and was ncealed as much as possible under the until the whole line advanced. It was d not only to the fire of the battery in ut also to that of the batteries on the ide of the turnpike, and lost heavily.

tly before this time Generals Burnside and rrived at the base of the mountain; and mer directed the latter to move up the di- of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the eld by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon emy's position with his whole force as soon as informed that Gen. Hooker (who had en directed to attack on the right) was ed up the mountain. Gen. Reno then o the front and assumed the direction of the positions having been explained to Gen. Pleasonton.

tly before this time I arrived at the point ed by Gen. Burnside, and my headquar- ere located there until the conclusion of tion.

. Sturgis had left his camp at 1 P.M., and d the scene of action about half past three Clark's battery of his division was sent to Cox's left, by order of Gen. Reno, and two nts (2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) detached by Gen. Reno and sent forward distance on the left of the turnpike. His on was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rod- division was divided, Col. Fairchild's brig- ing placed on the extreme left, and Col. nd's under Gen. Rodman's personal super- on the right.

order to move the whole line forward, and or silence the enemy's batteries in front was ted with enthusiasm. The enemy made a rate resistance, charging our advancing with fierceness, but they were everywhere d, and fled. Our chief loss fell on Wilcox's on. The enemy's battery was found to be s a gorge and beyond the reach of our in- , but its position was untenable, and it was y removed and not again put in position us. But the batteries across the gap still a fire of shot and shell.

n. Wilcox praises very highly the conduct e 17th Michigan in this advance—a regiment h had been organized scarcely a month, but h charged the advancing enemy in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops; and also that of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front.

Cook's battery now reopened fire; Sturgis's division was moved to the flank of Wilcox's, occupying the new ground gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an effort to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchild's brigade and Clark's battery.

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another effort to regain the best ground, attacking along Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly nine o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, and we finally occupied the highest part of the mountain. Gen. Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a reconnoissance to the front, and the command of the corps devolved upon Gen. Cox.

In Gen. Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave and honest man.

There was no firing after ten o'clock, and the troops slept on their arms, ready to renew the fight at daylight; but the enemy quietly retired from the front during the night, abandoning their wounded and leaving their dead in large numbers scattered on the field.

While these operations were progressing on the left of the main column, the right, under Gen. Hooker, was actively engaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, and its advance reached the Catoctin Creek about 1 P. M. Gen. Hooker then went forward to examine the ground.

At about 1 o'clock Gen. Meade's division was ordered to make a diversion in favor of Reno. The following is the order sent:

September 14. 1 P. M.

Maj.-Gen. Hooker,

General,—General Reno requests that a division of yours may move up on the right (north) of the main road. General McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the movement, and taking charge of it yourself. Sumner's and Banks's corps have commenced arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement.

Geo. D. Ruggles, Col., A.-A.-G & A.-D.-C.

Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about 2 o'clock, and turned off to the right from the main road on the old Hagerstown road to Mount Taber Church, where Gen Hooker was, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about one and a half miles from the turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's Battery "B," 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, was placed in position on high ground at about half-past three o'clock, and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased by order of Gen. Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The 1st Massachusetts Cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe

the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and one regiment of Meade's Division, posted to watch a road coming in in the same direction. The other divisions were deployed as they came up. General Hatch's on the left, and General Ricketts', which arrived about 5 P. M., in the rear.

General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre up the main road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed.

The 1st Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Seymour's brigade, were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was in force. Meade was then directed to advance his division to the right of the road, so as to outflank them if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was directed to take, with his division, the crest on the left of the old Hagerstown road, Rickett's division being held in reserve.

Seymour's brigade was sent up to the top of the slope on the right of the ravine, through which the road runs, and then move along the summit parallel to the road, while Col. Gallagher's and Col. Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the slope and in the ravine. The ground was of the most difficult character for the movements of troops, the hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls, fences, and timber. The enemy was soon encountered, and in a short time the action became general along the whole front of the division. The line advanced steadily up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance Col. Gallagher, commanding 3d brigade, was severely wounded, and the command devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Robt. Anderson.

General Meade, having reason to believe that the enemy were attempting to outflank him on his right, applied to Gen. Hooker for reinforcements. General Duryea's brigade, of Rickett's division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive until the close of the action. It was advanced on Seymour's left, but only one regiment could open fire before the enemy retired, and darkness intervened. General Meade speaks highly of General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade on the extreme right, securing by his manœuvres the great object of the movement, the outflanking of the enemy.

While Gen. Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right, General Hatch's division was engaged in a severe contest for the possession of the crest on the left of the ravine. It moved up the mountain in the following order: two regiments of General Patrick's brigade deployed as skirmishers, with the other two regiments of the same brigade supporting them: Col. Phelps's brigade in line of battalions in mass at deploying distance: General Doubleday's brigade, in the same order, bringing up the rear. The 21st New York having gone straight up the slope, instead of around to the right, as directed, the 2d United States Sharpshooters was sent out in its place.

Phelps's and Doubleday's brigades were deployed in turn as they reached the woods, v
began about half way up the mountain;
Patrick, with his skirmishers, soon drew th
of the enemy, and found him strongly poste
hind a fence which bounded the cleared spa
the top of the ridge, having in his front
woods, through which our line was advan
and in his rear a cornfield, full of rocky le
which afforded good cover to fall back if
lodged.

Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced under
fire, to close quarters, and after ten or fi
minutes of heavy firing on both sides, (in w
Gen. Hatch was wounded while urging on
men), the fence was carried by a charge, and
line advanced a few yards beyond it, somev
sheltered by the slope of the hill. Doublec
brigade, now under the command of Lieut.
Hoffman, (Col. Wainwright having been wo
ed), relieved Phelps's, and continued firing fo
hour and-a-half, the enemy, behind ledges of r
some thirty or forty paces in our front, maki
stubborn resistance, and attempttng to charg
the least cessation of our fire. About dusk
onel Christian's brigade, of Rickett's divis
came up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, wl
fell back into line behind Phelps. Christi
brigade continued the action for thirty or f
minutes, when the enemy retired, after ha
made an attempt to flank us on the left, wl
was repulsed by the 76th New York, and
Indiana.

The remaining brigade of Rickett's divis
(General Hartsuff's), was moved up in the cer
and connected Meade's left with Doubled
right. We now had possession of the summi
the first ridge, which commanded the turnp
on both sides of the mountain, and the tro
were ordered to hold their positions until furt
orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the
ternoon, General Gibbon, with his brigade,
one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th U. S.
tillery), was ordered to move up the main r
on the enemy's centre. He advanced a regim
on each side of the road, preceded by skirmi
ers, and followed by the other two regiments
double column; the artillery moving on the r
until within range of the enemy's guns, wh
were firing on the column from the gorge.
brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy
fore it from his positions in the woods and beh
stone walls, until it reached a point well
towards the top of the pass; when the ene
having been reinforced by three regiments, op
ed a heavy fire on the front, and on both flan
The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the ene
being entirely repulsed; and the brigade, af
having suffered severely, and having expend
all its ammunition, including even the cartrid
of the dead and wounded, continued to hold t
ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'clo
when it was relieved by General Gorman's b
gade, of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's cor
(except the 6th Wisconsin, which remained
the field all night.) Gen. Gibbon, in his delica
movement, handled his brigade with as mu
precision and coolness, as if upon parade, and t
bravery of his troops could not be excelled.

The 2d Corps, (Sumner's), and the 12th Cor

lins), reached their final positions shortly
rk. General Richardson's division was
near Mount Tabor Church, in a position
port our right if necessary; the 12th Corps,
Sigwick's division, bivoucked near Bolivar,
sition to support our centre and left.
Sykes's division of regulars, and the artil-
rserve, halted for the night at Middletown,
on the night of the 14th, the whole army
ssed in the vicinity of the field of battle,
ness to renew the action the next day, or
in pursuit of the enemy. At daylight
rmishers were advanced, and it was found
had retreated during the night, leaving
d on the field, and his wounded uncared
bout fifteen hundred prisoners were taken
uring the battle, and the loss to the enemy
ll, was much greater than our own, and
ly also in wounded. It is believed that
e opposed to us at Turner's Gap, con-
of D. H. Hill's corps, (15,500), and a part,
he whole of Longstreet's and perhaps a
of Jackson's; probably some 30,000 in
e went into action with about 30,000 men,
losses amounted to 1,568, aggregate; (312
1,234 wounded, 22 missing.)

ne next day I had the honor to receive the
g very kind dispatch from his Excellency
sident:

ep't, Washington, Sept. 15, '62, 2.45 P.M.
dispatch of to-day received. God bless
d all with you. Destroy the rebel army
ible. A. LINCOLN.

Maj.-Gen. McC.

ANTIETAM.

he night of the battle of South Mountain,
were given to the corps commanders to
orward their pickets at early dawn. This
e revealed the fact that the enemy had
positions, and an immediate pursuit was
d; the cavalry under Gen. Pleasonton, and
ree corps under Gen's. Sumner, Hooker and
eld, (the latter of whom had arrived that
g and assumed command of the 12th [Wil-
] corps,) by the national turnpike and
boro'; the corps of Gen's. Burnside and
(the latter command at that time consist-
but one weak division, Sykes's) by the old
sburg road; and Gen. Franklin to move
leasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a
ment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's

's. Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the
rom Boonsboro' to Rohrersville, were to re-
e Franklin or to move on Sharpsburg, ac-
g to circumstances.

Franklin moved towards Brownsville, and
there a force of the enemy much superior
nbers to his own, drawn up in a strong po-
to receive him.

At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's
indicated the surrender of that place.

The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in
sboro, made a dashing charge, killing and
nding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners
two guns.

Gen. Richardson's division, of the 2d Corps,
ing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor,
passed Boonsboro and Keadysville, and came up
on the main body of the enemy, occupying in
large force a strong position a few miles beyond
the latter place.

It had been hoped to engage the enemy on the
15th, accordingly instructions were given that if
the enemy were overtaken on the march, they
should be attacked at once; if found in heavy
force and in position, the corps in advance should
be placed in position for attack, and await my
arrival. On reaching the advance position of our
troops, I found but two divisions, Richardson's
and Sykes's, in position, the other troops were
halted in the road, the head of the column some
distance in rear of Richardson.

The enemy occupied a strong position on the
heights, on the West side of Antietam Creek, dis
playing a large force of infantry and cavalry, with
numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on
our columns as they appeared in sight on the
Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, which fire
was returned by Captain Tidball's light battery,
2d United States Artillery, and Pettit's battery,
1st New York Artillery.

The division of General Richardson, following
close on the heels of the retreating foe, halted
and deployed near Antietam River, on the right
of the Sharpsburg road. Gen. Sykes, leading on
the division of regulars on the old Sharpsburg
road, came up and deployed to the left of Gen.
Richardson, on the left of the road.

Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by
four stone bridges, the upper one on the Keadys-
ville and Williamsport road; the 2d on the
Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two
and a half miles below; the third about a mile
below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharps-
burg road; and the fourth near the mouth of
Antietam Creek, on the road leading from Har-
per's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles be-
low the third. The stream is sluggish, with few
and difficult fords.

After a rapid examination of the position, I
found that it was too late to attack that day, and
at once directed the placing of the batteries of
position of the centre, and indicated the bivouacs
for the different corps, massing them near and on
both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps
were not all in their positions until the next morn-
ing after sunrise

On the morning of the 16th it was discovered
that the enemy had changed the position of his
batteries. The masses of his troops were, how-
ever, still concealed behind the opposite heights.
Their left and centre were upon and in front of
the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden
by woods and irregularities of the ground; their
extreme left resting upon a wooded eminence
near the cross roads to the north of J. Miller's
farm, their left resting upon the Potomac. Their
line extended south, the right resting upon the
hills to the south of Sharpsburg, near Snavcley's
farm.

The bridge over the Antietam, described as
No. 3, near this point, was strongly covered by
riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, &c.,
and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in front
of this line consisted of undulating hills, their

crests in turn commanded by others in their rear. On all favorable points the enemy's artillery was posted, and their reserves, hidden from view by the hills on which their line of battle was formed, could manœuvre unobserved by our army, and from the shortness of their line, could rapidly reinforce any point threatened by our attack. Their position stretching across the angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and rear proteced by these streams, was one of the strongest to be found in this region of country, which is well adapted to defensive warfare.

On the right near Keadysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike were Sumner's and Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the turnpike, and near the Antietam river, Gen. Richardson's division of Gen. Sumner's corps was posted. Gen. Sykes' division of Gen. Porter's corps was on the left of the turnpike, and in line with Gen. Richardson, protecting the bridge, No. 2, over the Antietam. The left of the line opposite to, and some distance from bridge No. 3, was occupied by Gen. Burnside's corps. Before giving Gen. Hooker his orders to make the movement which will presently be described, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy myself that the troops were properly posted there to secure our left flank from any attack made along the left bank of the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry bridge No. 3.

I found it necessary to make considerable changes in the position of Gen. Burnside's corps, and directed him to advance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge carefully.

In rear of Gens. Sumner's and Hooker's corps, near Keadysville, Gen. Mansfield's corps was massed; the cavalry on the turnpike in rear of Keadysville. On the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between the turnpike and Fry's house, on the right of the road, were placed Capts. Taft's, Languer's, Von Kleizer's, and Lieut. Weaver's batteries of 20-pounder Parrot guns. On the crest of the hill, in the rear and right of bridge No. 3. Capt. Weed's 3-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder batteries. Gen. Franklin's corps, and Gen. Couch's division held a position in Pleasant Valley, in front of Brownsville, with a strong force of the enemy in their front. Gen. Morell's division of Porter's corps was en route from Boonsboro', and Gen. Humphrey's division of new troops, en route from Frederick, Md. About daylight on the 16th the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns in position which was promptly returned. Their fire was silenced for the time, but was frequently renewed during the day. In the heavy fire of the morning, Major Arndt, commanding 1st battalion 1st New York Artillery was mortally wounded, while directing the operations of his batteries.

It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, examining the ground, finding fords and clearing their approaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, which had been delayed by the rapid march of the troops over the few practicable approaches from Frederick. These had become crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery, pressing on with the hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to resist an attack; many of the troops were out of rations from the previous day, and a good deal of their ammunition had been expended in the severe actions of the 14th.

My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if necessary, Franklin's, and as soon as the latter looked favorably there to move the corps of Gen. Burnside against the enemy's extreme right upon the ridges running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position, press along the crest towards our right; for whenever either of these flank movements should be successful to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable.

About 2 P.M. Gen. Hooker, with his corps assisting of Gen. Rickett's, Meade's and Doubleday's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1 a short distance above, to attack, and if possible turn the enemy's left. Gen. Sumner was ordered to follow the corps of Gen. Mansfield (the 12th) during the night, and hold his own (the 2d) corps ready to cross early the next morning. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy's left, a sharp contest commenced with the Pennsylvania Reserves, the advance of Gen. Hooker's corps, near the house of Dr Miller. The enemy was driven from the edge of woods where he was first met, the firing lasting until after dark, when Gen. Hooker's corps rested on their arms, on ground won from the enemy.

During the night Gen. Mansfield's corps, assisting of Gen's. Williams's and Green's divisions crossed the Antietam at the same ford and bridge that Gen. Hooker's corps had passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J. Poffenberger, about a mile in rear of Gen. Hooker's position. At early light, on the 17th, the action was commenced by the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The whole of Gen. Hooker's corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy from the open field in front of the first line of woods, into a second line of woods beyond, which runs to the eastward of and nearly parallel to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike.

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced the opposition became more determined, and the numbers of the enemy greater. General Hooker then ordered up the corps of Gen. Mansfield, which moved promptly towards the scene of action. The 1st division, Gen. Williams, was deployed to the right on approaching the enemy, Gen. Crawford's brigade on the right, its right resting on the Hagerstown turnpike, on his left Gen. Gordon's brigade. The 2d division, Gen. Green's, joining the left of Gordon's, extended as far as the burnt buildings to the north and east of the white church on the turnpike. During the deployment that gallant veteran, General Mansfield, fell mortally wounded while examining the ground in front of his troops. General Hartsuff

ker's corps, was severely wounded while
y pressing forward his troops, and was
from the field.
command of the 12th corps fell upon Gen.
ms. Five regiments of the 1st division of
rps were new troops. One brigade of the
vision was sent to support Gen. Double-
The 124th Pennsylvania Volunteers were
l across the turnpike into the woods be-
J. Miller's house, with orders to hold the
n as long as possible.
line of battle of this corps was formed, and
ame engaged at about 7 A.M., the attack
opened by Knapp's Pennsylvania, Cothran's
York and Hampton's Pittsburg batteries.
et this attack the enemy had pushed a
column of troops into the open fields in
of the turnpike, while he occupied the
on the west of the turnpike in strong force.
oods (as was found by subsequent observa-
were traversed by the out-cropping ledges
k. Several hundred yards to the right and
as a line which commanded the debouche
e woods, and in the fields between was a
line of stone fences, continued by breast-
s of rails, which covered the enemy's in-
from our musketry. The same woods
d a screen, behind which his movements
concealed, and his batteries on the hill and
fle works covered from the fire of our ar-
in front.
about two hours the battle raged with
d success, the enemy endeavoring to drive
roops into the second line of wood, and ours
rn to get possession of the line in front.
troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the
y back into the woods near the turnpike,
Green, with his two brigades, crossing into
woods to the left of the Dunker church.
g this conflict Gen. Crawford, commanding
ivision after Gen. Williams took command of
corps, was wounded, and left the field. Gen.
n, being much exposed and applying for re-
cements, the 13th New York and 27th Indi-
and the 3d Maryland, were sent to his sup-
with a section of Knapp's battery.
about 9 o'clock A.M., Gen. Sedgwick's divi-
of Gen. Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing the
previously mentioned, this division marched
ree columns to the support of the attack on
enemy's left. On nearing the scene of action
columns were halted, faced to the front, and
olished by Gen. Sumner in three parallel lines
rigade, facing towards the south and west;
Gorman's brigade in front, Gen. Dana's se-
l, and Gen. Howard's third, with a distance
ween the lines of some seventy paces.
he division was then put in motion, and
ed upon the field of battle under fire from
enemy's concealed batteries on the hill be-
d the woods, passing diagonally to the front
ss the open space, and to the front of the
division of Gen. William's corps—this latter
ision withdrew.
Entering the woods on the west of the turn-
e, and driving the enemy before them, the
t line was met by a heavy fire of musketry and
ll from the enemy's breastworks and the bat-
teries on the hill commanding the exit from the woods. Meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in crowding back the troops of Gen. Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By command of Gen. Sumner, Gen. Howard faced the third line to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet the column advancing on the left, but this line now suffering from a destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to return, gave way towards the right and rear in considerable confusion, and was soon followed by the first and second lines.

Gen. Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of Gen. Dana's, soon rallied and checked the advance of the enemy on the right. The second and third lines now formed on the left of Gen. Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive fire upon the enemy.

During Gen. Sumner's attack, he ordered Gen. Williams to support him. Brig.-Gen. Gordon, with a portion of his brigade, moved forward, but when he reached the woods the left of Gen. Sedgwick's division had given way, and finding himself, as the smoke cleared up, opposed to the enemy in force, with his small command, he withdrew to the rear of the batteries at the second line of woods. As Gen. Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on the left, they opened with canister, the batteries of Capt. Cothran, 1st New York, and "I," 1st U. S. Artillery, commanded by Lieut. Woodruff, doing good service. Unable to stand this deadly fire in front and the musketry fire from the right, the enemy again sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond the turnpike.

During this assault Gen's. Sedgwick and Dana were seriously wounded and taken from the field. Gen. Sedgwick, though twice wounded and faint from loss of blood, retained command of his division for more than an hour after his first wound, animating his command by his presence. Gen. Howard assumed command after Gen. Sedgwick retired.

At the time of Gen. Sedgwick's advance, Gen. Hooker, while urging on his command, was seriously wounded in the foot and taken from the field. The repulse of the enemy offered opportunity to re-arrange the lines and re-organize the commands on the right, now more or less in confusion. The batteries of the Pennsylvania Reserve, on high ground near I. Poffenburger's house, opened fire and checked several attempts of the enemy to establish batteries in front of our right, to turn that flank and enfilade the lines.

While this conflict was so obstinately raging on the right, Gen. French was pushing his division against the enemy still further to the left. This division crossed the Antietam at the same ford as Gen. Sedgwick, and immediately in his rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, the division marched about a mile from the ford, then facing to the left, moved in three lines towards the enemy, Gen. Max Weber's brigade in front, Col. Dwight Morris's brigade of raw troops, undrilled and moving for the first time under fire, in the second, and Gen. Kimball's brigade in the third. The division was first assailed by a fire of

artillery, but steadily advanced, driving the enemy's skirmishers, and encountered the infantry in some force at the group of houses on Roulette's farm. Gen. Weber's brigade gallantly advanced with an unwavering front, and drove the enemy from their position about the houses.

While Gen. Weber was hotly engaged with the first line of the enemy, Gen. French received orders from Gen. Sumner, his corps commander, to push on with renewed vigor to make a diversion in favor of the attack on the right. Leaving the new troops who had been thrown into some confusion from their march through corn-fiels, over fences, &c., to form as a reserve, he ordered the brigade of Gen. Kimball to the front, passing to the left of Gen. Weber. The enemy was pressed back to near the crest of the hill, where he was encountered in greater strength, posted in a sunken road running in a north-westerly direction and forming a natural rifle-pit. In a corn-field in rear of this road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill, a gallant fire was opened on it from the sunken road and corn-field. Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from both lines, and the battle raged along the whole line with great slaughter. The enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, but were met by the 7th Virginia and 132d Pennsylvania Volunteers, and repulsed.

Foiled in this, the enemy made a dermined assault on the front, but was met by a charge from our lines, which drove him back with severe loss, leaving in our hands some 300 prisoners, and several stands of colors. The enemy having been repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries and the musketry fire on the extreme right, now attempted to assist the attack on Gen. French's division, by assaultiug him on his right, and endeavoring to turn his flank, but this attack was met and checked by the 14th Indiana and 8th Ohio volunteers, and by canister from Capt. Tomkins's battery, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Having been under an almost continuous fire for nearly four hours, and their ammunition being nearly exhausted, the division now took position immediately below the crest of the heights on which they had so gallantly fought, the enmy making no attempt to regain their lost ground.

On the left of Gen. French, Gen Richardson's division was hotly engaged. Having crossed the Antietam about 9.30 A.M., at the ford crossed by the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the high grounds overlooking Roulette's house. The 3d (Irish) brigade, commanded by Gen. Meagher, on the right, the 2d brigade, commanded by Gen. Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade commanded by Col. Brooks, 53d Pennsylvania Volunteers, in support. As the division moved forward to take its position on the field, the enemy directed a fire of artillery against it, but owing to the irregularities of the ground, did but little damage.

Meagher's brigade advancing steadily, soon became engaged with the enemy posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house. It continued to advance under a heavy fire nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy being posted in the continuation of sunken road and corn-field, before referr Here the brave Irish brigade opened upo enemy a terrific musketry fire. All of Gen ner's corps was now engaged, Gen. Sedg on the right, Gen. French in the centre, an Richardson on the left. The Irish brigad tained its well earned reputation. After ing terribly in officers and men, and strewi ground with their enemies as they drove back, their ammunition nearly expended, and commander, Gen. Meagher, disabled by th of his horse, shot under him, this brigad ordered to give place to Gen. Caldwell's br which advanced to a short distance in its The lines were passed by the Irish brigade, ing by company to the rear, and Gen. Cald by company to the front, as steadily as on Colonel Brook's brigade now became the s line.

The ground over which Gen's. Richar and French's divisions were fighting was irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, covered with growing corn, enclosed by walls, behind which the enemy could ad unobserved upon any exposed point of our l Taking advantage of this, the enemy atte to gain the right of Richardson's positio corn-field, near Roulette's house, where the sion had become separated from that of Ge French. A change of front by the 52d York and 2d Delaware Volunteers, of Co Brook's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and attack made by the 52d Pennsylvania Volunt sent further to right by Col. Brooks to close gap in the line, and the movement of the Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia Volunteers, of French's division, before referred to, drove enemy from the corn-field, and restored the l

The brigade of General Caldwell, with d mined gallantry, pushed the enemy back posite the left and centre of this division, sheltered in the sunken road they still held forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Barlow, commanding the 61st and 64th York regiments, of Caldwell's brigade, seein favorable opportunity, advanced these regim on the left, taking the line on the sunken roa flank, and compelled them to surrender, cap ing over three hundred prisoners, and t stands of colors.

The whole of the brigade, with the 57th 66th New York regiments of Col. Brooks's gade, who had moved these regiments into first line, now advanced with gallantry, driv the enemy before them in confusion into corn-field beyond the sunken road. The left the division was now well advanced, when enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, deavored to turn its left and rear. Col. Cr 5th N. H., by a change of front to the left rear, brought his regiment facing the advanc line. Here a spirited contest arose to gain a c manding height—the two opposing forces, m ing parallel to each other, giving and receiv fire. The 5th, gaining the advantage, faced the right and delivered its volley. The ene staggered, but rallied and advanced desperat

t charge. Being reinforced by the 81st Pennsylvania regiment, these regiments met the ance by a counter charge. The enemy fled, ering many killed, wounded, and prisoners, and th colors of the 4th North Carolina in our hands. nother column of the enemy, advancing under lter of a stone wall and corn-field, pressed n on the right of the division; but Col. Barlo again advanced the 61st and 64th New York inst these troops, and, with the attack of Kim-'s brigade on the right, drove them from this ition.

ur troops on the left of this part of the line, ing driven the enemy far back, they, with nforced numbers, made a determined attack ctly in front. To meet this, Col. Barlow ught his two regiments to their position in line, drove the enemy through the cornfield into orchard beyond, under a heavy fire of musry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of llery in the orchard and a battery further to right, throwing shell and case-shot. This ance gave us possession of Piper's house, the ng point contended for by the enemy at this t of the line, it being a defensible building, eral hundred yards in advance of the sunken d.

he musketry fire at this point of the line now sed. Holding Piper's house, General Richard- withdrew the line a little way to the crest of ill, a more advantageous position. Up to this e this division was without artillery, and in new position suffered severely from artillery , which could not be replied to. A section Robertson's horse battery, commanded by ut. Vincent, 2d U. S. Artillery, now arrived the ground, and did excellent service. Subuently a battery of brass guns, commanded by t. Graham, 1st U. S. Artillery, arrived, and s posted on the crest of the hill, and soon nced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy soon ensued between the battery further to ht and our own. Captain Graham's battery s bravely and skillfully served, but, unable to ch the enemy, who had rifled guns of greater ge than our smooth bores, retired by order of n. Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice men and horses. The brave general was himself mortally wounded while personally directing fire.

Gen. Hancock was placed in command of the ision after the fall of General Richardson. n. Meagher's brigade, now commanded by Col. rke of the 63d New York, having refilled their rtridge boxes, was again ordered forward, and k position in the centre of the line. The diion now occupied one line in close proximity the enemy, who had taken up a position in the ar of Piper's house.

Col. Dwight Morris, with the 14th Connecticut d a detachment of the 108th New York, of Gen. ench's division, was sent by Gen. French to e support of Richardson's division. This comand was now placed in an interval in the line etween Gen. Caldwell's and the Irish Brigade. he requirements of the extended line of battle d so engaged the artillery that the application General Hancock for artillery for his division could not be complied with immediately by the chief of artillery, or the corps commanders in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the troops, Gen. Hancock felt confident that he could hold his position, although suffering from the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, as the great length of the line he was obliged to hold prevented him from forming more than one line of battle; and, from his advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by the batteries of the enemy on the right, which were protected from our batteries opposite them by the woods at the Dunker church.

Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some of our troops to the left of his position, General Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from Gen. Franklin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. It also assisted the attack of the 7th Maine of Franklin's corps, which, without other aid, made an attack against the enemy's line and drove in skirmishers who were annoying our artillery and troops on the right. Lieut. Woodruff, with battery "I," 2d U. S. Artillery, relieved Capt. Hexamer, whose ammunition was expended. The enemy seemed at one time to be about making an attack in force upon this part of the line, and advancing a long column of infantry towards this division, but, on nearing the position, Gen. Pleasonton opening on them with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, closing the operations on this portion of the field.

To return to the incidents occurring still further to the right.

Between 12 and 1 P. M., Gen. Franklin's corps arrived on the field of battle, having left their camp near Crampton's Pass at 6 A. M., leaving Gen. Couch with orders to move with his division to occupy Maryland heights.

Gen. Smith's division led the column, followed by General Slocum's.

It was first intended to keep this corps in reserve on the east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might require. But, on nearing Keadysville, the strong opposition on the right, developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary to send this corps at once to the assistance of the right wing. On nearing the field, hearing that one of our batteries ("A," 4th U. S. Artillery), commanded by Lieut. Thomas, who occupied the same position as Lieut. Woodruff's battery in the morning, was hotly engaged, without supports, Gen. Smith sent two regiments to its relief from Gen. Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the ground, General Smith ordered the other regiment of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and Cowen's batteries, 1st New York Artillery, to the threatened position; Lieut. Thomas and Capt. Cothran, commanding batteries, bravely held their positions against the advancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill.

Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d brigade of Smith's division, commanded by Colonel Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania Volunteers, was ordered up, and, passing through Lieut. Thomas's battery, charged upon the enemy and drove back the advance until abreast of the Dunker Church. As the right of the brigade came opposite the

woods, it received a destructive fire which checked the advance and threw the brigade somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries. General French having reported to General Franklin that his ammunition was nearly expended, that officer ordered General Brooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. Gen. Brooks formed his brigade on the right of General French, where they remained during the remainder of the day and night, frequently under the fire of the enemy's artillery. It was soon after the brigade of Col. Irwin had fallen behind the rise of ground that the 7th Maine, by order of Col. Irwin, made the gallant attack already referred to.

The advance of General Franklin's corps was opportune. The attack of the enemy on the position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, must have been disastrous, had it succeeded in piercing the line between Gen. Sedgwick's and French's divisions.

Gen. Franklin ordered two brigades of Gen. Slocum's division, Gen. Newton's and Col. Torbert's, to form in column to assault the woods that had been so hotly contested before, by Gen's. Sumner and Hooker; Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a reserve; at this time Gen. Sumner having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the safety of the whole army.

Gen. Porter's corps, consisting of Gen. Sykes's division of regulars and volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam Creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. This corps filled the interval between the right wing and Gen. Burnside's command, and guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supplies.

It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to push upon us a vigorous assault for the purpose of piercing our centre and turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to reinforce or close up the gap.

Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our centre, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to reinforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes's regulars had been thrown across toe Antietam bridge on the main road, to attack and drive back the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasonton's horse batteries in advance of the bridge. Warren's brigade of Porter's corps was detached to hold a position on Burnside's right and rear, so that Porter was left at one time with only a portion of Sykes's divi and one small brigade of Morell's division little over three thousand men) to hold his portant position.

Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided o ion against another attempt during that da assault the enemy's position in front, as porti of our troops were so much scattered and de ralized. In view of these circumstances, a making changes in the positions of some of troops, I directed the different commanders hold their positions, and, being satisfied that could be done without the assistance of the brigades from the centre, I countermanded order which was in course of execution.

Gen. Slocum's division replaced a portion Gen. Sumner's troops, and positions were selec for batteries in front of the woods. The ene opened several heavy fires of artillery on the sition of our troops after this, but our batte soon silenced them.

On the morning of the 17th Gen. Pleasont with his cavalry division, and the horse batteri under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lie Haines, of the 2d U. S. artillery, was ordered advance on the turnpike towards Sharpsbu across bridge No. 2, and support the left of Su ner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmish were thrown out, and Capt. Tidball's battery vanced by piece, and drove off the sharpshoot with canister sufficiently to establish the batt ies above mentioned, which opened on the ener with effect. The firing was kept up for abo two hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, t batteries were relieved by Randall's and V Reed's batteries, U. S. Artillery. About 3 o'clo Tidball, Robertson and Haines returned to the positions on the west of Antietam, Capt. Gibs having been placed in position on the east side guard the approaches to the bridge. These b teries did good service, concentrating their fi on the column about to attack Gen. Hancock position, and compelling it to find shelter behin the hills in rear.

Gen. Sykes's division had been in position sinc the 16th, exposed to the enemy's artillery an sharpshooters.

Gen. Morell had come up on the 16th, and r lieved Gen. Richardson on the right of Ge Sykes, and, continually under the vigilant watc of the enemy, this corps guarded a vital poin

The position of the batteries under Gen. Pleas anton being one of great exposure, the battalio of the 2d and 10th United States Infantry, unde Capt. Dwyer, 4th U. S. Infantry were sent acros to assist in driving off the sharpshooters of th enemy.

The battalion of the 2d and 10th U. S. Infantr advancing far beyond the batteries, compelled th cannoneers of a battery of the enemy to abando their guns. Few in number and unsupported they were unable to bring them off. The heav loss of this small body of men attests their gal lantry.

The troops of Gen. Burnside held the left o the line opposite bridge No. 3. The attack of the right was to have been supported by an at

on the left. Preparatory to this attack, on evening of the 16th, Gen. Burnside's corps moved forward and to the left, and took up position nearer the bridge.

I visited Gen. Burnside's position on the 16th, after pointing out to him the proper disposition to be made of his troops during the day night, informed him that he would probably required to attack the enemy's right on the following morning, and directed him to make careful reconnoissances.

Gen. Burnside's corps, consisting of the divisions of Gens. Cox, Wilcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, was posted as follows: Col. Brooks's brigade, 3 division, on the right, Gen. Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On the left was Gen. Scammon's division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade, 's division in support.

Gen. Wilcox's division was held in reserve.

The corps bivouacked in position on the right the 16th.

Early on the morning of the 17th, I ordered Burnside to form his troops, and hold them readiness to assault the bridge in his front, to await further orders.

At eight o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, Topographical Eengineers to the bridge, then to gain possession of the hts beyond, and to advance along their crest Sharpsburg and its rear.

After some time had elapsed, not hearing from I despatched an aid to ascertain what had done. The aid returned with the information that but little progress had been made. I sent him back with an order to Gen. Burnside, to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at hazards. The aide returned to me a second e, with the report that the bridge was still the possession of the enemy. Whereupon I ected Col. Sackett, Inspector General, to deliver to Gen. Burnside my positive order to push ward his troops without a moment's delay, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point the bayonet, and I ordered Col. Sackett to remain with Gen. Burnside and see that the order executed promptly.

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was ried at 1 o'clock by a brilliant charge of the t New York and 51st Pennsylvania Volunteers. er troops were then thrown over and the opite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to the ghts beyond.

A halt was then made by Gen. Burnside's adnce until 3 P.M., upon hearing which I directed of my aides—Col. Key—to inform Gen. Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops th the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's poion on the heights; that the movement was al to our success; that this was a time when must not stop for loss of life if a great object uld be thereby accomplished. That if, in his lgment, his attack would fail, to inform me so once, that his troops might be withdrawn and ed elsewhere on the field. He replied that he uld soon advance, and would go up the hill as as a battery of the enemy on the left would rmit. Upon this report I again immediately nt Col. Key to Gen. Burnside, with orders to advance at once, if possible, to flank the battery or storm it and carry the heights, repeating that if he considered the movement impracticable to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The advance was then gallantly resumed, the enemy driven from their guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforcements just then reaching the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked Gen. Burnside's troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge.

If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the heights from which our batteries might have enfiladed the greater part of the enemy s line, and turned their right and rear. Our victory might have been much more decisive.

The following is the substance of Gen. Burnside's operations, as given in his report:

Col. Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This bridge, No. 3, is a stone structure of three arches, with stone parapets. The banks of the stream on the opposite side are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches to the bridge. On the hill side immediately by the bridge was a stone fence running parallel to the stream, the turns of the roadway as it wound up the hill were covered by rifle pits and breastworks of rails, &c. These works and the woods that covered the slopes were filled with the enemy's riflemen, and batteries were in position to enfilade the bridge and its approaches.

Gen. Rodman was ordered to cross the ford below the bridge. From Col. Crook's position it was found impossible to carry the bridge.

Gen. Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that purpose. He sent forward the 2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. These regiments made several successive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back.

The artillery of the left were ordered to concentrate their fire on the woods above the bridge. Col. Crook brought a section of Capt. Simmon's battery to a position to command the bridge. The 51st New York, and 51st Pennsylvania, were then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a small spur of the hills which ran parallel to the river, they moved towards the bridge. From the crest of this spur they rushed, with bayonet fixed, and cleared the bridge.

The division followed the storming party, also the brigade of Col. Crook, as support. The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some five or six hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new positions on the crest of the hill above the bridge.

Gen. Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford, after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis; Scammon's brigade crossing as support. Gen. Wilcox's division was ordered across to take position on Gen. Sturgis's right.

These dispositions being completed about 3 o'clock, the command moved forward, except Sturgis's division left in reserve. Clark's and Darrell's batteries accompanied Rodman's division; Cook's

battery with Wilcox's division, and a section of Simmons's battery with Crook's brigade. A section of Simmon's battery, and Mullenburgh's and McMullin's batteries were in position. The order for the advance was obeyed by the troops with alacrity. Gen. Wilcox's division, with Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading from the bridge to Sharpsburg. Gen. Rodman's division, supported by Scammon's brigade, on the left of Gen. Wilcox. The enemy retreated before the advance of the troops. The 9th New York, of Gen. Rodman's division, captured one of the enemy's batteries, and held it for some time. As the command was driving the enemy to the main heights on the left of the town, the light division of Gen. A. P. Hill arrived upon the field of battle, from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a strong attack on the extreme left. To meet this attack, the left division diverged from the line of march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. To fill up this, it was necessary to order the troops from the second line. During these movements, Gen. Rodman was mortally wounded. Col. Harland's brigade, of Gen. Rodman's division, was driven back. Col. Scammon's brigade, by a change of front to rear on his right flank, saved the left from being driven completely in. The fresh troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artillery against this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accomplish any thing more.

It was now nearly dark. Gen. Sturgis was ordered forward to support the left. Notwithstanding the hard work in the early part of the day, his division moved forward with spirit. With its assistance, the enemy were checked and held at bay.

The command was ordered to fall back by Gen. Cox, who commanded, on the field, the troops engaged in this attack beyond the Antietam. The artillery had been well served during the day. Night closed the long and desperately contested battle of the 17th. Nearly 209,000 men, and 500 pieces of artillery, were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. The army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our soldiers slept that night, conquerors, on a field won by their valor, and covered with the dead and wounded of the enemy.

CONDITION OF THE ARMY AFTER ANTIETAM.

The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th, or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question befors me. After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full and careful survey of the situation and condition of our army, and the strength and position of the enemy, I concluded that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I am aware of the fact, that under ordinary circumstances, a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success; but at this critical juncture I should have had a narrow view of the condition of the country, had I been willing to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that moment—Virginia and Washington menaced, Maryland invaded—the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched and pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia or New York. It could have levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country; exacted tribute from wealthy and populous cities; and was nowhere east of the Alleghanies, was there any other organized force able to arrest its march.

The following are among the considerations which led me to doubt the certainty of success in attacking before the 19th.

The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant upon the long continued and severely contested battle of the 17th, together with the long day and night marches to which they had been subjected during the previous three days.

The supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from hunger. They required rest and refreshment.

One division of Sumner's, and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and much scattered; so that they were for the time somewhat demoralized.

In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by Gen. Meade, commanding, there were but 6729 men present on the 18th: whereas, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 men present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous to, and during the battle, 6364 men were separated from their command.

Gen. Meade, in an official communication upon this subject, dated Sept. 18, 1862, says: "I enclose a field return of the corps made this afternoon which I desire you will lay before the commanding-general. I am satisfied the great reduction in the corps since the recent engagements, is not due solely to the casualties of battle, and that a considerable number of men are still in the rear some having dropped out on the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes good. To resist an attack in our present strong position, I think they may be depended on; and I hope they will perform duty in case we make an attack, though I do not think their morale is as good for an offensive as a defensive movement."

One division of Sumner's Corps had also been overpowered, and was a good deal scattered and demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps commander, in proper condition to attack the enemy vigorously the next day.

Some of the new troops on the left, although many of them fought well during a part of the battle, and are entitled to great credit, were, at

ose of the action, driven back, and their ord impaired.

Of he morning of the 18th, Gen. Burnside re- osed me to send him another division to assist olding his position on the other side of the ntiam, and to enable him to withdraw his rp if he should be attacked by a superior force. e gve me the impression that if he were at- ck again that morning, he would not be able ke a very vigorous resistance. I visited his sion early, determined to send General Mo- ll's division to his aid, and directed that it should pced on this side of the Antietam, in order ht might cover the retreat of his own corps m the other side of the Antietam, should that cce necessary, at the same time it was in po- to reinforce our centre or right, if that were ed. Late in the afternoon, I found that al- ou he had not been attacked, General Burn- de ad withdrawn his own corps to this side of e Antietam, and sent over Morell's division alone ld the opposite side.

A rge number of our heaviest and most effi- batteries had consumed all their ammuni- n h the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible supply them until late on the following day. Supplies of provision and forage had to be un up and issued, and infantry ammunition buted.

Fully, reinforcements to the number of 14,000 o say nothing of troops from Pennsylvania, ot arrived, but were expected during the

The 18th was therefore spent in collecting the p sed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing ounded, burying the dead, and the necessary rations for a renewal of the battle.

The reinforcements, Couch's division, march- ith commendable rapidity, came up into position at a late hour in the morning. Hnmphrey's division of new troops, in their anxiety to participate in the battle, which was raging when they received the order to march from Frederick, at about half past 3 P. M. on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire night, and the mass of the diviston reached the army on the following morning. Having marched more than twenty-three miles after 4 1-2 o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they were of course greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refreshment. Large reinforcements expected from Pennsylvania never arrived.

During the 18th, orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th.

On the night of the 18th, the enemy, after passing troops in the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore, to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their position aud retreating across the river.

As their line was but a short distance from the river, the evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was effected before daylight.

About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction of Major Davis, assistant-inspector-general, counted and buried upon the battle-field of Antietam. A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy. This is conclusive evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we.

Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam.

Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles.

Tabular Report of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac in the Battle of Antietam, on the 16th and 17th of September, 1862.

	General Officers		Other Officers		Enlisted Men			Aggregate			Gr Agg
	Killed.	Woun'd.	Killed	Woun'd.	Killed	Woun'd.	Missing	Killed	Woun'd.	Missing	
1st Corps. MAJ.-GEN. HOOKER.											
1st Division								98	669	95	8
2d Division								153	898	137	11
3d Division								97	449	23	5
Total								348	2016	255	26
2d Corps, MAJ.-GEN. SUMNER.											
1st Division		1	20	39	192	860	24	212	900	24	11
2d Division		2			355	1577	321	355	1579	321	22
3d Division		1	21	50	272	1271	203	293	1322	203	18
Total		4	41	89	819	3708	548	860	3801	548	52
5th Corps. MAJ.-GEN. F. J. PORTER.											
1st Division											
2d Division											
3d Division				2	13	92	1	13	94	1	1
Artillery Reserve			1		7	13	1	8	13	1	2
Total			1	2	20	105	2	21	107	2	13
5th Corps. MAJ.-GEN. FRANKLIN.											
1st Division								5	58	2	6
2d Division								65	277	31	37
Total								70	335	33	43
9th Corps. MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE.											
1st Division			2	20	44	264	7	46	284	7	33
2d Division			7	29	121	493	20	128	522	20	67
3d Division			8	40	212	743	70	220	783	70	107
4th Division			5	7	33	145	23	38	152	23	21
Total			22		410	1645	120	432	1741	120	229
12th Corps. (GEN. BANKS.) BRIG.-GEN. WILLIAMS, Com'g.											
1st Division			9	35	151	827	54	160	862	54	107
2d Division			6	26	107	481	30	113	507	30	65
Artillery					1	15	1	1	15	1	1
Total			15	61	259	1323	85	274	1384	85	174
MAJ.-GEN. COUCH'S Division				1		8			9		
BRIG.-GEN. PLEASONTON'S Cavalry Division								5	23		28
Grand Total								2010	9416	1043	12469

Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Sharpsburg, Sept. 29, 1862.

Special. S. W., Assistant Adj't Gen.

Estimate of the forces under the confederate General Lee, made up by direction of Gen. from information obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows:

T. J. Jackson's Corps,	24,778 Men
James Longstreeet's Corps,	23,342 "
D. H. Hill's 2 Divisions,	15,525 "
J. E. B. Stuart's Cavalry,	6,400 "
Ransom's and Jenkins's Brigades,	3,000 "
Forty-six Reg'ts not includ'd in above,	18,400 "
Artillery, estimated at 400 guns,	6,000 "
Total,	97,445 "

These estimates give the actual numbers of present and fit for duty.

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows:

1st Corps,	14,856 Men
2d Corps,	18,813 "
3d Corps, (one division not ar'd,)	12,930 "
5th Corps,	12,300 "
6th Corps,	13,819 "
9th Corps,	10,126 "
Cavalry Division,	4,320 "
Total in action,	87,164 "

OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM.

When our cavalry advance reached the river on the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that nearly all the enemy's forces had crossed into Virginia during the night, their rear escaping under the cover of eight batteries, placed in strong positions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite bank.

General Porter, commanding the 5th Corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes's brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river and clark and carry the enemy's batteries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. Several guns, caissons, etc., were taken, and their supports driven back half a mile.

The information obtained during the progress of this affair, indicated that the mass of the enemy had retreated on the Charlestown and Martinsburg roads towards Winchester. To verify this, and to ascertain how far the enemy had retreated, General Porter was authorized to detach from his corps. on the morning of the 20th, a reconnoitering party in greater force. This detachment crossed the river, and advanced about a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the river with considerable loss. This reconnoisance showed that the enemy was still in force on the Virginia bank of the Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance.

It was reported to me on the 19th that General Stuart had made his appearance at Williamsport with some four thousand cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand infantry were marching on the same point from the direction of Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with his division, and a part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Frankiin's corps within supporting distance, for the purpose of endeavoring to capture this force. General Couch made a prompt and rapid march to Williamsport, and attacked the enemy vigorously, but they made their escape across the river.

I dispatched the following telegraphic report to the general-in-chief:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Sharpsburg, Sept. 19, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Comd'g. U. S. Army,—. have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry.

G. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

On the following day I received this telegram:

Washington, Sept. 20, 1862. 2 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC,—We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of both, so far as you know them. H. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief.

To which I answered as follows:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, near Sharpsburg, Sept. 20, 1862. 8 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington. Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland Heights at 1 P.M. to-day. The rest of the army is near here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged with the enemy in front of Williamsport. The enemy is retiring via Charlestown and Martinsburg on Winchester. He last night re-occupied Williamsport by a small force, but will be out of it by morning. I think he has a force of infantry near Sharpstown.

I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them.

I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement.

G. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

On the same day I telegraphed as follows:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Sept. 20, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Comd'g U. S. Army. As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must in a great measure be dependent for supplies of ammunition and provisions upon Richmond, I would respectfully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a cavalry force to cut their supply communications opposite Washington. This would seriously embarass their operations, and will aid this army materially.

G. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Maryland Heights were occupied by Gen. Williams's corps on this day, and on the 22d Gen. Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry.

It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the forces for the de-

fense of the national capital, on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the available troops were suffering under the disheartening influences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers were greatly reduced by casualities—their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of that *esprit-du-corps* which is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. Moreover they had left behind, lost, or worn out the greater part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required renewal before they could be in proper condition to take the field again.

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland, was received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the Army of the Potomac was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day—so that but a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize, or procure supplies.

The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam, fought by this Army a few days afterwards, with the reconnoissances immediately following, resulted in a loss to us of ten general officers, many regimental and company officers, and a large number of enlisted men; amounting in the aggregate to 15,220. Two army corps had been badly cut up, scattered and somewhat demoralized in the action of the 17th.

In Gen. Sumner's corps alone, 41 commissioned officers and 819 enlisted men had been killed; 4 general officers, 89 other commissioned officers, and 3,708 enlisted men had been wounded; besides 548 missing; making the aggregate loss of this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 5,209.

In Gen. Hooker's corps the casualities of the same engagement amounted to 2619.

The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to the last battle.

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance.

Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, but the morale of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely contested actions, and they required time to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary drill and discipline.

Under these circumstances, I did not feel authorized to cross the river with the main army, over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to be in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army and its base of supply.

I teleg aphed on the 22d to the General-in-chief as follows:

"As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary to secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are commanding regiments, companies are without a single commissioned cer."

On the 23d, the following was telegraphed the General-in-chief:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Near Shepher town, Sept. 23, 1862. 9.30 A.M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief, Wasl

From several different sources, I learn that G R. E. Lee is still opposite to my position at Le town, between Shepherdstown and Martinsbu and that Gen. Jackson is on the Opequan Cre about three miles from its mouth, both with la force. There are also indications of heavy re forcements moving towards them from Winch ter and Charlestown. I have therefore orde Gen. Franklin to take position with his corps the cross roads, about one mile northwest of kersville, on the Bakersville and Williamport ro and Gen. Couch to establish his division n Downsville, leaving sufficient force at Willian port to watch and guard the ford at that pla The fact of the enemy remaining so long in o front, and the indications of an advance of re forcements, seem to indicate that he will give another battle with all his available force.

As I mentioned to you before, our army h been very much reduced by casualities in the cent battles, and in my judgment all the reinforc ments of old troops that can possibly be dispens with around Washington and other places, shou be instantly pushed forward by rail to this arm A defeat at this juncture would be ruinous to o cause. I cannot think it possible that the enem will bring any forces to bear upon Washingt till after the question is decided here, but if th should, troops can soon be sent back from th army by rail to reinforce the garrison there.

The evidence that I have that reinforcemen are coming to the rebel army, consists in the fact that long columns of dust extending from Wi chester to Charlestown, and from Charlestown i this direction, and also troops moving this wa were seen last evening. This is corroborated b citizens. Gen. Sumner, with his corps and Wi liams's (Banks's), occupies Harper's Ferry, and th surrounding heights. I think he will be able t hold his position until reinforcements arrive.

G. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen.

On the 27th I made the following report:

Headq's, Army of the Potomac, Sept. 27, 1862 10 A.M.

Maj.-Gen. Halleck, Gen.-in-Chief, Washington—

All the information in my possession, goes t prove that the main body of the enemy is concen trated not far from Martinsburg, with some troop at Charlestown, not many in Winchester. Thei movements of late, have been an extension toward our right, and beyond it. They are receiving re inforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, o conscripts, perhaps entirely so.

This army is not now in condition to undertak another campaign, nor to bring on another battle unless great advantages are offered by some mis take of the enemy, or pressing military exigencie render it necessary. We are greatly deficient i officers. Many of the old regiments are reduce to mere skeletons; the new regiments need

uct n. Not a day should be lost in filling the
re ments—our main dependence; and in sup-
ing vacancies among the officers by promotion.
My present purpose is to hold the army about
it now, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and
to g the river closely, intending to attack the
my should he attempt to cross to this side.
Do possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the
ad vantage of a secure debouche, but we
ma avail ourselves of it until the railroad
dg is finished, because we cannot otherwise
pp a greater number of troops than we now
ve the Virginia side at that point. When
r rises so that the enemy cannot cross in
co purpose concentrating the army some-
ne near Harper's Ferry and there acting ac-
di te oircumstances, viz; moving on Win-
es, if from the position and attitude of the
en we are likely to gain a great advantage by
ng o, or else devoting a reasonable time to
o anization of the army instruetion of the
v oops, preparatory to an advance on what-
r e may be determined. In any event I re-
d as absoluteiy necessary to send new regi-
it t once to the old corps, for purposes of in-
on, and that the old regiments be filled at
e. I have no fears as to an attack on Wash-
to by the line of Manassas. Holding Harp-
ry as I do, they will not run the risk of
ck on their flank and rear, while they have
g rison of Washington in their front.
ner apprehend a renewal of the attempt
yland, should the rfver remain low for a
ength of time, and should they receive
rable addttion to their force.
uld be glad to have Peck's division as soon
ible. I am surprised that Sigel's men
have been sent to Western Virginia, with-
knowledge. The last I oeard from you
subjecr, was, that they were at my dispo-
In the last battles, the enemy was un-
dly greatly superior to us in number, and
only by very hare fighting that we gained
antages we did. As it was the result at
riod was very doubtful, and we had all we
o win the day. If the enemy receives con-
le reinforcements, and we none, it is possi-
t I may have too mnch on my hands in the
ttle.
own view of the proper policy to be pur-
s, to retain in Washington merely the force
ary to garrison it, and to send everything
ailable to reinforce this army. The rail-
ive us the means of promptly reinforcing
ngton, shonld it become necessary, If I
nforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my
ourse, I will hold myself responsible for
y of Washington. Several persons, recent-
n Richmond, say that there are no troops
except conscripts, and they few in number.
pe to be able to give you details as to late
s by this evening. I am about starting
for Harper's Ferry,

G. B. McClellan, Maj-Gen. Comd'g.

REORGANIZATION AND SUPPLIES.

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and sup-
ing the army I began at the earliest moment.
The different corps were stationed aloug the riv-
er in the best positions to cover and guard the
fords. The great extent of the river front, from
near Washington to Cumberland, (some one hun-
dred and fifty miles), together with the line of
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was to be care-
fully watched and guarded, to prevent, if possi-
ble, tho enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon
the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of
learning the enemy's positions and movements,
were made frequently, so that our cavalry, which,
from the time we left Washington, had perform-
ed the most laborious service, and had from the
commencement been deficient in numbers, was
found totally fnadequate to tne requirements of
the army.

This overwork had broken down the greater
part of the horses, disease had appeared among
them, and but a very small portion of our origi-
nal cavalry force was fit for service.

To such an extent had this arm become reduced
that when Gsn. Stuart made his raid into Pennsyl-
vania, on the 12th of October with 2,000 men, I
could only mount 800 men to follow him.

Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and
in order to prevent a catastrophe similar to the
one which had happened to Col. Miles, I immedi-
ately ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and London
Heights to be strongly fortified. This was done
as far as the time and means at our disposal per-
mitted.

The main army of the enemy during this time
remained in the vicinity of Martinsburg and
Bunker Hill, and occupied itself in drafting and
coercing every able-bodied citizen into the ranks,
forcibly taking their property where it was not
voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroy-
ing railroads.

On the first day of October, His Excellency the
President, honored the army of the Potomac with
a visit, and remained several days, during which
he went through the different encampments, re-
viewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields
of South Mountaiu and Antietam. I had the op-
portunity during this visit to describe to him the
operations of the army since the time it left
Washington, and gave him my reasons for not
following the enemy after he crossed the Potomac.

On the 5th of October the division of General
Cox (about 5,000 men,) was ordered from my
command to Western Virginia.

On the 7th of October I received the following
telegram:

Washington, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862.

Maj.-Gen. McClellan:—I am instructed to tele-
graph you as follows: The President directs that
you cross the Potomac and give battle to the
enemy, or drive him south. Your army must
move now, while the roads are good. If you
cross the river between the enemy and Washing-
ton, and cover the latter by your operations, you
can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move
up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than
12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The Presi-
dent advises the interior line between Washington
and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very
desirous that your army move as soon as possible.
You will immediately report what line you adopt,
and when you intend to cross the river. Also, to

what point the reinforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the General-in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions.

H. W. H., General-in-Chief.

At this time Gen. Averell, with the greater part of our efficient cavalry, was in the vicinity of Cumberland, and Gen. Kelly, the commanding officer, had that day reported that a large force of the enemy was advancing on Col. Campbell at St. John's Run. This obliged me to order Gen. Averill to proceed with his force to the support of Col. Campbell, which delayed his return to the army for several days.

On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Ferry, with 2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all our cavalry against him. This exhausting service completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and rendered a remount absolutely indispensable, before we conld advance on the enemy.

The following were the dispositions of troops made by me to defeat the purposes of this raid.

Gen. Averell, then at Green Spring, on the Upper Potomac, was ordered to move rapidly down upon the north side of the river, with all his disposable cavalry, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up vigorously.

Gen. Pleasonton, with the remaining cavalry force, was ordered to take the road by Cavetown, Harmon's Gap, and Mechanicsville, and cut off the retreat of the enemy, should he make for any of the fords below the position of the main army. His orders were to pursue them with the utmost rapidity, not to spare his men or horses, and to destroy or capture them if possible.

Gen. Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division at Hancock, *en route* for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, and remain in readiness to move to any point above, should the enemy return in that direction, keeping his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direction of Chambersburg to the Upper Potomac.

The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to prevent the escape of the rebels within these limits.

Gen. Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy crossing, there to remain in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any point on the railroad to which Stuart might be aiming. While Col. Rush, at Frederick, was directed to keep his lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice to the commander of the two brigades at the Monocacy crossing.

Gen. Soneman, whose head-quarters were then at Poolesville, occupying with his division the different fords on the river below the mouth of the Monocacy was directed to keep his cavalry well out on the approaches from the direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was informed of Gen. Pleasonton's movements.

After the orders were given for covering the fords upon the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and I believed that the capture or destruction of his entire force was perfectly certain, but owing to the fact that my orders were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his escape into Virginia without much loss.

The troops sent by Gen. Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad crossing as I directed marched four miles into Frederick, and there remained until after Stuart had passed the railroad only six miles below, near which point it is said he halted for breakfast.

Gen. Pleasonton ascertained, after his arrival at Mechanicstown, that the enemy were then about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat towards the mouth of the Monocacy, and pushed on vigorously, and near to its mouth overtook them with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles in twenty-four hours, having left many of his horses broken down upon the road. He at once attacked with his artillery and the firing continued for several hours, during which time, he states that he received the support of a small portion of Gen. Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material damage upon the enemy.

Gen. Stoneman reports, that in accordance with his instructions, he gave all necessary orders for intercepting the return of the rebels, and that Staples, commanding one of the brigades, stated that he sent two regiments of infantry to the mouth of the Monocacy, and one regiment to White's Ford. That on the morning of the 12th about 10 o'clock he, by Gen. Stoneman's order, marched the remaining three regiments of his command from Poolesville towards the mouth of the Monocacy; that before getting into action he was relieved by Gen. Ward, who states that he reported to Gen. Pleasonton with his command while the enemy was crossing the river, and was informed by him (Gen. Pleasonton) that he was too late, and that nothing could be done then.

Gen. Pleasonton, in his report of this affair says:

"It was at this time that Col. Ward reported to me from Gen. Stoneman's division, with a brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him that his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the river. These are the only troops that I know of, that were in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation that I received that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in capturing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from crossing at the mouth of the Monocacy, and drove him to White's Ford, three miles below. Had White's Ford been occupied by any force of ours previous to the time of the occupation by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force would

ve been certain and inevitable; but with my all force, which did not exceed one-fourth of e emy's it was not practicable for me to ci that ford, while the enemy was in front." It ould seem from the report of Gen. Stone- an at the disposition he made of his troops e vis to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. e tioned two regiments at the mouth of the on acy, and two regiments at White's Ford, e ter in the very place where the crossing e ade, and the former only three miles off, th reserve of three regiments at Poolesville, me x miles distant. Gen. Pleasonton's report ow that from the time the firing commened, th e enemy were across the river, was about n d a-half hours. Gen. Stoneman states, that ted the reserve from Poolesville at about 'l k; but it appears from the report of Gen. n ton, that it did not reach him till half-past

A e time I received the order of October 6th c s the river and attack the enemy, the ar- s wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large t our troops were in want of shoes, blank- l other indispensable articles of clothing, w standing all the efforts that had been made s e battle of Antietam, and even prior to t te, to refit the army with clothing as well e es. I at once consulted with Col. Ingalls, ef quartermaster, who believed that the a ry articles could be supplied in about e ays. Orders were immediately issued to f erent commanders who had not already t their requisitions, to do so at once, and all n essary steps were forthwith taken by me r e a prompt delivery of the supplies. The u tions were forwarded to the proper de- t nt at Washington, and I expected that the s would reach our depots during the three p ecified; but day after day elapsed, and on- l all portion of the clothing arrived. Corps n nders, upon receiving notice from the r masters that they might expect to receive r upplies at certain dates. sent their trains t m, which after waiting, were compelled to u empty. Several instances occurred where t rains went back and forth, from the camp h depots, as often as four or five different e without receiving their supplies; and I i formed by one corps commander, that his t train had travelled over 150 miles, to and h he depots, before he succeeded in obtain- s clothing.

I corps of Gen. Franklin did not get its l g until after it had crossed the Potomac, a as moving into Virginia.

. Reynold's corps was delayed a day at Ber- t complete its supplies, and Gen. Porter only e ted his on reaching the vicinity of Harp- f erry.

a de every exertion in my power, and my q rmaster did the same, to have these sup- h urried forward rapidly, and I was repeat- t old that they had filled the requisitions at i ington, and that the supplies had been for- w d. But they did not come to us, and of e were inaccessible to the army. I did not make frequent representations of this condition of things to the General-in chief, and it appears that he referred the matter to the quartermaster-general, who constantly replied that the supplies had been promptly ordered: notwithstanding this they did not reach our depots.

The following extracts are from telegrams upon this subject.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, October 11, 1862.

Maj-Gen. Halleck, General-in-Chief, Washington:

. . . "We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, and Col. Ingalls has received advices that it has been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated, to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies more rapidly." G. B. McC. Maj-Gen.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac, October 11, 1862.

Maj-Gen. H. W. H.—"I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exist in some of the corps of this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculations upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes.

"Every thing has been done that can be done at these headquarters, to accomplish the desired results." Geo. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac.
October 15, 7.30 P. M., 1862.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief: "I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible.'

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac.
October 15, 1862, 7.30 P. M.

Col. R. Ingalls, care Col. Rucker, Quarter-Master, Washington: "Gen. Franklin reports that there is by no means as much clothing as was called for, at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had better have additional supplies, especially of shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible." R. B. M., Chief-of-Staff.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac.
October 16, 1862.

Col. R. Ingalls, Care Col. Rucker, Quarter-Master, Washington: Gen. J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows: "My quarter-master reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks, at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes."

McClellan 1,200

Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fast as possible.

R. B. M., Chief-of-Staff.

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862

Col. C. G. Sawtelle, Depot Quarter-Master, Washington: You did right in sending clothing to Harper's Ferry. You will not be able to send too much or too quickly. We want blankets, shoes, canteens, &c., very much.

R. Ingalls, Lt.-Col. & A. D. C., C. Q. M.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862.

Capt. Augustus Boyd, Quarter-Master, Philadelphia: Shipments to Hagerstown must be made direct through, to avoid the contemptible delays at Harrisburg. If Col. Crossman was ordered to send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suffering and impatience are excessive.

R. I., Lt. Col. & A. D. C., Chief Qr.-Master.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac.
Camp near Knoxville, Oct. 13, 1862.

Capt. Geo. H. Weeks, Depot Quarter-Master, Hagerstown: Has the clothing arrived yet? if not, do you know where it is? What clothing was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg? Did they capture any property that was en route to you? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send an agent over the road to obtain information, and hurry up the supplies. Reply at once.

R. I., Lt.-Col. & A. D. C. Chief Qr.-Master.

Sharpsburg, Oct. 10, 1862.

Gen, Ingalls,—I have just returned from Hagerstown where I have been for the clothing for this corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts or shelter tents. Will you please tell me where and when the balance can be had? Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown.

Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry?

Fielding Lowry, Capt. and Quartermaster.

Hagerstown, Oct. 15, 1862.

Col. Ingalls, Quartermaster,—I want at least ten thousand suits of clothing, in addition to what I have received. It should be here now.

G. W. Weeks, Acting Quartermaster.

Harper's Ferry, Oct. 22-1862.

Gen. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, &c.—We have bootees 12,000: great coats, 4,000; drawers and shirts are gone; blankets and stockings nearly so. 15,000 each of these four articles are wanted. Alex. Bliss,

Captain and Acting Quartermaster.

McClellan's Headquarters, Oct. 24, 11 A. M. '62.

Captain D. G. Thomas, Military Storekeeper, Washington,—Please send to Capt. Bliss at Harper's Ferry 10,000 blankets; 12,000 caps; 5,000 overcoats; 10,000 pairs bootees; 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots; 15,000 pairs stockings; 15,000 pairs drawers; 15,000 pairs pants.

The clothing arrives slowly; can it not be hurried along faster. May I ask you to obtain authority for this shipment. Rufus Ingalls.

Lt.-Col. and A. D. C., Chief Quartermaster.

Hagerstown, Oct

Col. Ingalls,—Clothing has arrived this ing. None taken by rebels. Shall I Franklin, and retain portions for Porter an nolds until called for. G, W. V

Capt. and Ass't Quarterma

The following statement taken from a re the chief quartermaster with the army show what progress was made in supplyi army with clothing, from the 1st of Sept to the date of crossing the Potomac on th of October, and that the greater part of the ing did not reach our depots until after th of October.

[*See next page.*]

Col. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, in his upon this subject says:

"There was great delay in receiving our iug. The orders were promptly given by n approved by General Meigs, but the roads slow to transport, particularly the Cumb Valley Road.

"For instance, clothing ordered to Hage on the 7th October for the corps of Fr Porter, and Reynolds, did not arrive there about the 18th, and by that time, of course were increased wants, and changes in the p of troops.

"The clothing of Sumner arrived in quantities near the last ot October, almost t for issue, as the army was crossing into Vi

"We finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's, *partly on the cars just arrived,* and par store."

The causes of the reduction of our c force have already been recited. The diffi in getting new supplies from the usual s led me to apply for and obtain authority f cavalry and artillery officers to purchase own horses. The following are the tele and letters on this subject:

Headquarters, Army of the Pot
Oct. 12, 1862, 12.45

Maj.-Gen. H., Gen.-in-Chief:

It is absolutely necessary that some ene means be taken to supply the cavalry of th my with remount horses. The present r supply is 4050 per week for the entire army and in front of Washington. From this nu the artillery draw for their batteries.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com

The general-in-chief, in a letter to me, Washington, D. C., Oct. 14th, 1862, replies t dispatch in the following language:

"I have caused the matters complained your telegrams of the 11th and 12th to be i tigated." . . . .

. "In regard to horses, you say that the pr rate of supply is only 150 per week for the e army here and in front of Washington. I from the records that the issues for the las weeks has been 8,754, making an average week of 1459."

1050 is the number stated in the original patch now in my possession, and as not figures were used, but the number was wri out in full, I can hardly see how it is possibl

ement of Clothing and Equipage received at e different Depots of the Army of the Potomac, from the 1st of September, 1862, to the 31st of October, 1862.

Received at the Depots.	Drawers	Forage Caps	Stockings	Sack Coats	Cav'y. Jackets	Canteens	Flannel Shirts	Haversacks	Trowsers (Mounted)	Boots	Shelter Tents	Camp Kettles	Mess Pans	Overcoats (Foot)	Artillery Jackets	Blankets	Overcoats (Mounted)	Felt Hats	Infantry Coats	Trowsers (Foot)	Bootees	Knit Shirts
From Sept. 1st to Oct. 6th.....	10700	4000	6200	4190	3000	6000	6200	6000	4200	4200	11100	799	2030	3500	1200	20	1200	2200	2000	2000	2000	
From Oct. 6th to Oct. 15th.....	17000	11000	22025		500	10221	18325	12989	1000	6000	30000	1302	2100	12000	500		875	7000	12060	9500	7000	2655
From Oct. 15th to Oct. 25th..	40000	19000	65200		1250	9000	18876	5000	2500	3600	9000	1894	4500	14770	1750	6500	3500		22500	39620	52900	2424
From Oct. 25th to Oct. 31st..	30000		3000		1500	3008	2200	9900	5000	20040					1000	4384	2015		7500	25000		11595

the telegraphic operator to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message.

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,
October 14, 1862. 7 P. M.

Major.-Gen. H. W. H., Commander-in-Chief: With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watch the line of the Potomac properly, or even make the reconnoissances that are necessary for our movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much, by extending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, as I urged this morning, should be largely and immediately increased under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river or advance on the enemy, or both.

Geo. B. McC., Major-General.

The following is an extract from the official report of Col. Ingalls:

"Immediately after the battle of Antietam, efforts were made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses.

"Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when they left Washington.

"A most violent and destuctive disease made its appearance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses reported perfectly well one day, would be dead lame the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at *rest* would recover in time, but *could not be worked.* I made application to send West and purchase horses at once, but it was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided for enough; *but they were not delivered sufficiently fast,* nor in sufficient numbers, until late in October and early in November. I was authorised to buy 2,500 late in October but the delivery was not completed until late in November, after we had reached Warrenton."

In a letter from Gen. Meigs, written on the 14th of October, and addressed to the general-in-chief, it is stated, "There have been issued, therefore, to the army of the Potomac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 9,254."

What number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Washington, I have no means of determining, but the following statements, made upon my order by the chief quartermaster with the army, and who had means for gaining accurate information, forces upon my mind the conclusion that the quarter-master-general was in error:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
C. Q. M., Office, October 31, 1862.

Horses.

Horses purchased since 6th Sept. 1862, by Col. Ingalls, Chief Quarter-master, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of Major-General Geo. B. McClellan - - - - - - - - - - 1,200

Issued and turned out to the above force by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter-master (in Washington) - - - - -	2,261
Issued to forces at and near Washington, which have since joined this command	352
Total purchased by Col. Ingalls, and issued and turned over by Capt. Dana to the forces in this immediate command - -	3,813
Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter-master, to the forces in the vicinity of Washington - - - - - - - -	3,363
Grand total purchased by Col. R. Ingalls, Chief Quarter-master, and issued and turned over by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter-master, to the entire army of the Potomac and the forces around Washington - - - - - - - - - -	7,176

About 3,000 horses have been turned over to the quarter-master department by officers, as unfit for service. Nearly 1,500 should now be turned over also, being worn out and diseased.

Respectfully submitted,

F. M., Lt.-Col. & Quarter-master.

This official statement made up from the reports of the quarter-masters who received and distributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the case, and gives the total number of horses received by the army of the Potomac and the troops around Washington, during a period of eight weeks, as 7,176, or 2,078 less than the number stated by the quarter-master-general.

Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred were issued to the army under Gen. Pope previous to its return to Washington, as Gen. Meigs states, there would still remain (578) five hundred and seventy-eight horses which he does not account for.

The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secretary of War, on the 28th of October, and the letter of Gen. Meigs to the general-in-chief, on the 14th of October, convey the impression that, upon my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I had received a much greater number than was really the case.

It will be seen, from Col. Myers' report, that all of the horses alluded to by Gen. Meigs, only (3,813) three thousand eight hundred and thirteen came to the army, with which I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of course the remainder did not in the slightest degree contribute to the efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of this army, with which I was to cross the river, neither did they in the least facilitate any preparations for carrying out the order to advance upon the enemy, as the general-in-chief's letter might seem to imply.

During the same period that we were receiving the horses alluded to, about (3,000) three thousand of our old stock were turned into the quarter-master's department, and 1,500 more reported as in such condition that they ought to be turned in as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army some 700 short of the number required to make good existing deficiencies, to say nothing of providing remounts for men whose horses had died or been killed during the campaign, and those previously dismounted.

Notwithstanding all the efforts made to ob a remount, there were, after deducting the f engaged in picketing the river, but about a t sand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st of October.

In a letter, dated October 14th, 1862, the g ral-in-chief says: "It is also reported to me the number of animals with your army in the is about 31,000. It is believed that your pre proportion of cavalry and of animals is m larger than that of any other of our armies."

What number of animals our other armies I am not prepared to say, but military me European armies have been of the opinion an army to be efficient, while carrying on ac operations in the field, should have a cav force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to fourth of the infantry force. My cavalry did amount to one-twentieth part of the army, hence the necessity of giving every one of cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse.

Cavalry may be said to constitute the ante of an army. It scouts all the roads in fron the flanks, and in the rear of the advan columns, and constantly feels the enemy. amount of labor falling upon this arm during Maryland campaign was excessive. To per not familiar with the movements of troops, the amount of transportation required for a l army marching away from water or railroad munications, the number of animals menti by the general-in-chief may have appeared u cessarily large, but to a military man who t the trouble to enter into an accurate and det computation of the number of pounds of sub ance and forage required for such an arm that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 31 animals were considerably less than was a lutely necessary to an advance. As we wer quired to move through a country which c not be depended upon for any of our supplie became necessary to transport every thin wagons, and to be prepared for all emergen I did not consider it safe to leave the river w out subsistence and forage for ten days.

The official returns of that date show the ag gate strength of the army for duty to have about 110,000 men of all arms. This did no clude teamsters, citizen employees, officers' vants, &c., amounting to some 12,000 men, w gives a total of 122,000 men. The subsist alone of this army, for ten days, required fo transportation 1,830 wagons at 2,000 pound the wagon, and 10,980 animals.

Our cavalry horses, at that time, amounte 5,046, and our artillery horses to 6,836.

To transport full forage for these 22 862 mals for ten days required 17,832 additional mals, and this forage would only supply the tire number, (40,694) of animals with a s fraction over half allowance for the time sp fied.

It will be observed that this estimate does embrace the animals necessary to transport q termaster's supplies, baggage, camp-equip ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage for cer's horses, etc. etc., which would grearly ment the necessary transportation.

may very truly be said that we did make the h with the means at our disposal, but it will membered that we met with no serious op- ion from the enemy, neither did we encoun- elays from any other cause. The roads were cellent condition, and the troops marched the most commendable order and celerity. we had met with a determined resistance the enemy, and our progress had been very a retarded thereby, we would have consumed supplies before they could have been renewed. roper estimate of my responsibilities as the nander of that army did not justify me in g my preparations for the exhibition upon supposition that I was to have an uninterrupt- arch. On the contrary it was my duty to repared for all emergencies, and not the least ortant of my responsibilities was the duty of ing ample provision for supplying men and als with rations and forage.

nowing the solicitude of the President for an movement, and sharing with him fully his ety for prompt action, on the 21st of Octo- telegraphed to the General-in-chief as fol- :

eadquarters, Army of the Potomac, October 862.

aj-Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, shington.—Since the receipt of the President's r to move on the enemy, I have been making y exertion to get this army supplied with hing absolutely necessary for marching. This happy to say, is now nearly accomplished; ve also, during the same time repeatedly urged n you the importance of supplying cavalry artillery horses, to replace those broken down hard service, and steps have been taken to in- a prompt delivery. Our cavalry, even when l supplied with horses, is much inferior in bers to that of the enemy; but in efficiency proved itself superior. So forcibly has this impressed upon our old regiments by repeat- successes, that the men are fully persuaded they are equal to twice their number of reb- avalry.

Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in keting the river, I have not at present over ut one thousand horses for service. Officers e been sent in various directions to purchase rses, and I expect them soon. Without more valry horses our communications, from the mo- nt we march, would be at the mercy of the ge cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would t be possible for us to cover our flanks proper- or to obtain the necessary information of the sition and movements of the enemy in such a y as to insure success. My experience has own the necessity of a large and efficient cav- y force. Under the foregoing circumstances I g leave to ask whether the President desires to march on the enemy at once, or to await e reception of the new horses, every possible ep having been taken to insure their prompt rival. G. B. McClellan, Maj-Gen. Comd'g.

On the same day Gen. Halleck replied as fol- ws :

Washington, Oct. 21, 1862. 3 P. M.

Your telegraph of 12 M. has been submitted to the President. He directs me to say, that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th inst. If you have not been, and are not now in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities; but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity.

Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to march.

H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief.

Maj-Gen. G. B. McClellan.

From the tenor of this dispatch I conceived that it was left for my judgment to decide whether or not it was possible to move with safety to the army at that time, and this responsibility I exercised with the more confidence in view of the strong assurances of his trust in me as commander of that army, with which the President had seen fit to honor me during his last visit.

The cavalry requirements without which an advance would have been in the highest degree injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting.

The country before us was an enemy's country, where the inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible assistance, providing food for men and forage for animals, giving all information concerning our movements, and rendering every aid in their power to the enemy's cause.

It was manifest that we should find it, as we subsequently did, a hostile district, where we could derive no aid from the inhabitants that would justify dispensing with the active co-operation of an efficient cavalry force. Accordingly, I fixed upon the 1st of November as the earliest date at which the forward movement could well be commenced.

The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 28th of October, says: "In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan, as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy."

Notwithstanding this opinion expressed by such high authority, I am compelled to say again that the delay in the reception of necessary supplies up to that date, had left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance against the enemy; that an advance under the existing circumstances would, in my judgment, have been attended with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering and sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of being cut off from our supplies by the superior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no reasonable prospect of gaining any advantage over him.

I dismiss this subject with the remark, that I have found it impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the commander of an army, who, from the time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service in the field, and who has exercised this command in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance on the enemy or not; and he

must necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants of his men, and the condition of his supplies, than the general-in-chief in his office at Washington City.

ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA.

The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the invasion of the enemy's territory, and an attack upon his capital, but was defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its character, and would be technically called a "defensive-offensive campaign."

It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These purposes were fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam, which brought the army of the Potomac into what might be termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac.

Having gained the immediate object of the campaign, the first thing to be done was to insure Maryland from a return of the enemy; the second, to prepare our own army, exhausted by a series of severe battles, destitute to a great extent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cavalry horses, for a definite offensive movement, and to determine upon the line of operations for a further advance.

At the time of the battle of Antietam the Potomac was very low, and presented a comparatively weak line of defense, unless watched by large masses of troops. The re-occupation of Harper's Ferry, and the disposition of troops above that point, rendered the line of the Potomac secure against everything except cavalry raids. No time was lost in placing the army in proper condition for an advance, and the circumstances which caused the delay after the battle of Antietam have been fully enumerated elsewhere.

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity as a proper base of operations for a movement upon Richmond. I still considered the line of the Peninsula as the true approach, but, for obvious reasons, did not make any proposal to return to it.

On the 6th of October, as stated above, I was ordered by the President, through the general-in-chief, to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Two lines were presented for my choice: 1st. Up the valley of the Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 to 15,000 additional troops: 2d. To cross between the enemy and Washington, that is, east of the Blue Ridge, in which event I was to be reinforced with 30,000 men.

At first I determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah, for these reasons: The Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad, and the various turnpikes converging upon Winchester, afforded superior facilities for supplies.

Our cavalry being weak, this line of communication could be more easily protected. There was no advantage in interposing, at that time, the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah between the enemy and myself.

At the period in question the Potomac wa very low, and I apprehended that if I crosse river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy promptly check the movement by recrossing Maryland, at the same time covering his rear cupying in strong force the passes leading thr the Blue Ridge from the southest into the nandoah Valley.

I anticipated, as the result of the first co that Lee would fight me near Winchester, could do so under favorable circumstance else that he would abandon the lower Sh doah and leave the army of the Potomac fr act upon some other line of operations. abandoned the Shenandoah, he would nat fall back upon his railway communicatio have since been confirmed in the belief, tha had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Fe the early part of October, General Lee would recrossed into Maryland.

As above explained, the army was not in c tion to move until late in October, and in the t time circumstances had changed.

The period had arrived when a sudden great rise of the Potomac might be looked f any time; the season of bad roads and dil movements was approaching, which would rally deter the enemy from exposing himself far from his base, and his movements all app to indicate a falling back from the river tow his supplies. Under these circumstances I f liberty to disregard the posibility of the en recrossing the Potomac, and determined to s the line east of the Blue Ridge, feeling convi that it would secure me the largest accessio force, and the most cordial support of the I dent, whose views from the beginning we favor of that line.

The subject of the defense of the line o upper Potomac, after the advance of the army, had long occupied my attention; I de to place Harper's Ferry and its dependencies strong state of defense, and frequently addre the general-in-chief upon the subject of the tion of field-works and permanent bridges t asking for the funds necessary to accomplish purpose. Although I did my best to explai clearly as I was able that I did not wish to permanent works of masonry, and that neithe works nor the permanent bridges had any r ence to the advance of the army, but solely to permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry, I c never make the General-in-chief understand wishes, but was refused the funds necessar erect the field-works, on the ground that t was no appropriation for the erection of pe nent fortifications; and was not allowed to b the permanent bridge on the ground that the r army could not be delayed in its movements u its completion. Of course I never thought of laying the advance of the army for that purp end so stated repeatedly.

On the 25th of October I sent the Genera chief the following telegram;

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Octo 25, 1862. 10.45 P. M.

Maj-Gen. Halleck, General in chief, Wash ton,—As the moment is at hand for the adva

e army, a question arises for the decision of neral in chief; which although perhaps im- y decided by the President in his letter of th, should be clearly presented by me, as I t regard it as in my province to determine his question is the extent to which the line Potomac should be guarded, after the ar- ves, in order to cover Maryland and Penn- ia, from invasion by large or small parties enemy. It will always be somewhat difficult rd the immediate line of the river, owing great extent and the numerous passages exist. It has long appeared to me that the ay of covering this line would be by occu- Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville and elds, at the debouches of the several val- which they are situated. These points, able places in their vicinity, should be ly intrenched and permanently held; and advantage of this arrangement would be overing the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, essential part of the system would be the uction of the link of railway from Win- r to Strasburg, and the rebuilding of the sas Gap Railway bridge over the Shenan-

intrenchment of Manassas Junction would ete the system for the defense of the ap- nes to Washington and the Upper Potomac. months ago I recommended this arrange- n fact gave orders for it to be carried into I still regard it as essential under all cir- ances.

views of the chief engineer of this army ard to the defenses and garrison of Harp- erry and its dependencies are in your pos- n.

only troops under my command outside of ganization of the army of the Potomac, are aryland Brigade, under Gen. Kenly, the ennsylvania, Col. Voss; 12th Illinois Cav- nd Col. Davis's 8th New York cavalry; to- 94 infantry, one battery, and about 900 y men. There are also two of my regi- of cavalry, (about 650 men) guarding the ore and Ohio Railroad, between Hancock mberland.

have no department, and command simply ve army in the field, my responsibility for fety of the line of the Potomac and the north of it, must terminate the moment I e so far beyond that line as to adopt anoth- my base of operations. The question for neral in chief to decide, and which I re- s beyond my province, is this:

Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry, and the the Potomac, be regarded as assured by vance of the army south of the Blue Ridge e line left to take care of itself?

If it is deemed necessary to hold the line t hereinbefore indicated in advance of it, any troops shall be p aced there, at what , and in what numbers, and of what compo- at each, and whence shall they be supplied, om this aamy or from other sources?

itting the detached troops mentioned above, e small garrisons of Boonsboro and Fred- the last returns show the strength of this army for duty, to be about one hundred and six- teen thousand officers and men. This includes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does not include Heintzelman, Sigel and Bayard.

If Harper's Ferry and the river above are ren- dered fully secure, it is possible that the active army, if it spplies the garrisons, may be reduced so much as to be inadequate to the purposes con- templated; if is is preserved intact, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road may be unduly exposed.

I leave the decision of these grave questions to the general in chief. I know notning of the num- ber of troops in Baltimore, &c.

An important element in the solution of this problem, is the fact that a great portion of Bragg's army is probably now at liberty to unite itself with Lee's command.

I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the morning, and must ask a prompt decision of the questions proposed herein.

G. B. McC., Maj.-Gen. Com.

To which I received the following reply:

Washington, Oct. 26, '62, 1.35 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McC.:

In addition to the command which you had when I came here, you also have the greater part of that of Maj.-Gen. Pope. Moreover, you have been authorized to use any troops within your reach in Gen. Wool's department, and in Western Virginia. Gen. Banks's command is also under your direction, with the single restriction, that he is not to remove troops from Washington, un- til he has notified me of his orders. Since you left Washington, I have advised and suggested in relation to your movements, but I have given you no orders. I do not give you any now. The government has intrusted you with defeating and driving back the rebel army in your front. I shall not attempt to control you in the measures you may adopt for that purpose; you are inform- ed of my views, but the President has left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you may deem best. You will also exercise your own discretion in regard to what points on the Potomac, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied or fortified. I will only add that there is no ap propriation for permanent intrenchments on that line. Moreover, I think it will be time enough to decide upon fortifying Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardenville and Morefield, when the enemy is driven south of them, and they come into our possession. I do not think that we need have any immediate fear of Bragg's army. You are within 20 miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant about 400 miles.

H. W. H., Gen.-in-Chief.

And on the 29th I sent the following:

Headquarters, Army of the Potomac,
Oct. 29, '62, 1.15 P.M.

Maj.-Gen. H. W. H., Washington:

On the 25th instant, I sent you a dispatch, re- questing you to decide what steps should be taken to guard the line of the Potomac, when the army leaves here. To this I received your reply, that I had been intrusted by the President, with defeating and driving away the rebel army, that you had given me no orders heretofore, did

not give me any then, etc. Under these circumstances, I have only to make such arrangements for guarding this extended line as the means at my disposal will permit, at the same time keeping in view the extreme necessity of maintaining the moving army in adequate force to meet the rebel army before us.

The dispositions I have ordered are as follows, viz.: 10,000 men to be left at Harper's Ferry, one brigade of infantry in front of Sharpsburg; Kenly's brigade of infantry at Williamsport; Kelly's brigade, including Col. Cambell's 54th Pennsylvania Infantry, at Cumberland; and between that point and Hancock I have also left four small cavalry regiments, to patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from Cumberland down to Harper's Ferry.

I do not regard this force as sufficient to cover securely this great extent of line, but I do not feel justified in detaching any more troops from my moving columns. I would therefore recommend that some new regiments of infantry and cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by me.

There should be a brigade of infantry and section of artillery in the vicinity of Cherry Run; another brigade at Hancock, an additional brigade at Williamsport, one regiment at Hagerstown, and one at Chambersburg, with a section of artillery at each place if possible. This is on the supposition that the enemy retain a considerable cavalry force west of the Blue Ridge. If they go east of it, the occupation of the points named in my dispatch of the 25th inst., will obviate the necessity of of keeping many of these troops on the river.

There are now several hundred of our wounded, including Gen. Richardson, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cannot possibly be moved at present.

I repeat that I do not look upon the forces I have been able to leave from this army, as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only description of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as you are aware, deficient in this arm.

Geo. B. McClellan, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g.

To which I received, on the 30th, this reply:

Washington, Oct. 30, 1862. 11.30 A.M.

Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,—Your telegram of yesterday was received late last evening. The troops proposed for Thoroughfare Gap will be sent to that place whenever you are in position for their coperation, as previously stated; but no new regiments can be sent from here to the Upper Potomac. The guarding of that line is left to your own discretion, with the troops now under your command.

H. W. H. Gen.-in-Chief

I accordingly left the 12th Corps at Harper's Ferry, detatching one brigade to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. Gen. Morell was placed in command of the line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, Gen. Slocum in command of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the Antietam.

The orders given to these officers were as follows:

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potoma
Oct. 29, 1862. 1 P.M.

Gen. H. W. Slocum, Comd'g Army Corp
per's Ferry,—The general commanding
that you send one brigade of your corps, to
at once to the position now occupied by (
J. Porter's corps in front of Sharpsburg, to
and guard the line of the river from the for
the mouth of the Antietam Creek to the m
the Opequan Creek. The officer in comma
also take steps to afford proper protection
sick and wounded in the hospitals in the v
of Sharpsburg and Boonsboro. The re
now at Boonsboro' will be placed under
ders. Gen. Kenly, at Williamsport, will gu
river from the mouth of the Opequan abo
cluding the ford at the mouth of the Opeq

The commanding general also directs th
take immediate steps to establish the rem
of your corps as follows, viz., one brigade or
land Heights, one brigade on Loudon Height
the remainder on Bolivar Heights and at H
Ferry. These dispositions should be m
once, so that Gen. Couch can move with his
Please acknowledge receipt of this.

R. B. Marcy, Chief-of-S

Head-Quarters, Army of the Potom
October 31, 1862.

Gen. G. W. Morell, Comd'g Upper Po
General,—I am instructed by the comm
general to say to you, that he has selected
perform the highly important and resp
duty of taking charge of, and commandi
troops left for the defence of the line of
tomac River, from the mouth of the Antie
Cumberland, as well as any other troops th
hereafter be sent for the protection of the
land and Pennsylvania frontier, within the
of the line herein specified. The force whi
been left to guard the line, is not deem
quate to prevent cavalry raids, but it is
the commanding general feels authorized
tach from the army of the Potomac at the
time, and it devolves upon you to make th
use of this force in your power. You wil
four cavalry regiments under your con
which should be distributed along the ri
to watch all the available fords, and give
notice to the infantry of the approach of an
of rebels.

You will afford all the protection in your
to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

You will endeavor to prevent any cavalr
into Maryland and Pennsylvania.

You will take steps to have all the sic
wounded of our army, as well as of the
army, within your lines, properly taken c
until they can be sent to general hospit
discharged or paroled.

You will make your headquarters at H
town, and occasionally visit the different p
your line.

You will please report promptly to
headquarters, everything of importance th
curs within the limits of your command
three brigades now at Cumberland, William
and Sharpsburgh, including the 54th Pennsy
Volunteers near Cumberland, will be under

nd. They are commanded by Gens. Kelly, and Gordon.

respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. W., Ass't-Adj't-General.

he 25th of October the pontoon bridge at was constructed, there being already one the Potomac, and another across the doah at Harper's Ferry.

he 26th two divisions of the 9th Corps and ton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at Ber- occupied Lovettsville.

1st, 6th, and 9th Corps, the cavalry and artillery, crossed at Berlin, between the October and the 2d of November.

2d and 5th Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry n the 29th of October and 1st of Novem-

y rains delayed the movement consider- the beginning, and the 1st, 5th, and 6th were obliged to halt at least one day at the gs, to complete, as far as possible, the ry supplies that could not be procured at er period.

plan of campaign I adopted during the e, was to move the army well in hand to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as nt of direction for the main body seizing ss in the Blue Ridge by detachments, as roached it, and guarding them after we ssed, as long as they would enable the to trouble our communications with the c. It was expected that we would unite e 11th Corps and Sickles's division near ghfare Gap. We depended upon Harper's nd Berlin for supplies, until the Manassas ilway was reached; when that occurred ses in our rear were to be abandoned, and ay massed ready for actfon or movement direction.

as my intention, if upon reaching Ashby's, other pass, I found that the enemy were e between it and the Potomac, in the valley Shenandoah, to move into the valley and or to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to blish this, but did not expect that by strik- between Culpepper Court House and Little ngton, I could either separate their army at them in detail, or else force them to con- e as far back as Gordonsville, and thus he army of the Potomac in position either pt the Fredericksburgh line of advance Richmond, or to be removed to the Penin-, as I apprehended, it were found impossi- supply it by the Orange and Alexandria d beyond Culpepper.

he 27th of October, the remaining divisions 9th Corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleason- avalry advanced to Purcellville. The con- ion of the 6th Corps, delayed somewhat by ence as to the movements of the enemy edgesville, &c., was commenced on this nd the 1st Corps was already in motion rlin.

he 28th the 1st Corps and the general arters reached Berlin.

he 29th the reserve artillery crossed and ped near Lovettsville; the 2d Corps com- the passage of the Shenandoah; the 5th Corps commenced its march from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry.

On the 31st the 2d Corps moved to the vicinity of Hillsborough; the 6th Corps reached Boonsboro'; the 5th Corps reached Harper's Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah.

On the 1st of November the 1st Corps moved to Purcellville and Hamilton; the 2d Corps to Woodgrove; the 5th Corps to Hillsborough; the 6th Corps reached Berlin, one division crossing. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philemont, having a sharp skirmish there, and at Bloomfield.

On November 2d the 2d Corps occupied Snicker's Gap; the 5th Corps Snickersville; the 6th Corps crossed the Potomac, and encamped near Wheatland; the 9th Corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philemont. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Union; Averell was ordered to join Pleasonton. The enemy offered no serious resistance to the occupation of Snicker's Gap, but advanced to gain possession of it with a column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, who were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled guns.

On the 3d the 1st Corps moved to Philemont-Union, Blomfield, &c.; the 2d Corps to the vicinity of Upperville; the 5th Corps remained at Snicker's Gap; the 6th Corps moved to Purcellville; the 9th Corps moved towards Upperville, Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Upperville after a severe fight.

On the 4th the 2d Corps took possession of Ashley's Gap; the 6th Corps reached Union; the 9th Corps Upperville; the cavalry occupied Piedmont.

On the 5th the 1st Corps moved to Rectortown and White Plains; one division of the 2d Corps to the intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's road; the 6th Corps to the Aldie turnpike, east of Upperville; the 9th Corps beyond the Manassas Road, between Piedmont and Salem, with a bridge at Manassas Gap; the cavalry under Averell had a skirmish at Manassas Gap, and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory over superior numbers at Barber's cross-roads; Bayard's cavalry had some sharp skirmishing in front of Salem.

On the 6th the 1st Corps advanced to Warrenton; the 2d to Rectortown; the 5th Corps commenced its movement from Snicker's Gap to White Plains; the 9th Corps to Waterloo and vicinity, on the Rappahannock; the 11th Corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hopewell's Gaps; Sickles' division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas Junction, towards Warrenton Junction; the cavalry near Flint Hill; Bayard to cut off what there might be in Warrenton, and to proceed to the Rappahannock Station.

November 7, Gen. Pleasonton was ordered to move towards Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards Culpepper Court House.

November 8th, the 2d Corps moved half way to Warrenton; the 5th Corps to New Baltimore.

November 9th, the 2d and 5th Corps reached Warrenton; the 6th Corps New Baltimore.

Late on the night of the 7th, I received an order relieving me from my command of the army

of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over to Gen. Burnside, which I at once did.

I had already given the orders for the movements of the 8th and 9th; these orders were carried into effect without change.

The position in which I left the army, as the result of the orders I had given, was as follows:

The 1st, 2d and 5th Corps, reserve artillery and general head-quarters at Warrenton; the 9th Corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo; the 6th Corps at New Baltimore; the 11th Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap; Sickles's division of the 3d Corps on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock, at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with his pickets on Hazel River, facing Longstreet's, six miles from Culpepper Court House; Bayard near Rappahannock Station.

The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the army of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle.

When I gave up the command to Gen. Burnside, the best information in our possession indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpepper; Jackson with one, perhaps both, of the Hills near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, with the mass of their forces west of the Blue Ridge. The reports from General Pleasonton in the advance, indicated the possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to fall back, at least, upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with the rest of the army.

The following is from the report of General Pleasonton:

"At this time, and from the 7th inst., my advance pickets were on Hazel river, within six miles of Culpepper, besides having my flank pickets towards Chester and Thornton's Gaps, extended to Gaines's Cross Roads, and Newby's Cross Roads, with numerous patrols in the directions of Woodville, Little Washington, and Sperryville. The information gained by these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet with his command being at Culpepper, while Jackson with D. H. Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenandoah Valley, on the Western side of the Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expecting us to attempt to pass through and attack them. As late as the 17th of November, a contraband just from Strasburg came into my camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was two miles beyond that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up the road and destroying the bridges, under the impression that we intended to follow into that valley, and was en route for Staunton. Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with Jackson.

Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide the enemy, as suggested, and could he have been brough battle within reach of my supplies, I cannot that the result would have been a brilliant cy for our army.

On the 10th of November Gen. Pleasonto attacked by Longstreet, with one division infantry, and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed tack.

This indicates the relative position of o my and that of the enemy at the time I w lieved from the command.

ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL CON OF MILITARY OPERATIONS.

It would be impossible to participate in rations such as those described in the fore pages, without forming fixed opinions upon jects connected with the organization of o mies and the general conduct of military tions.

This report would be incomplete with brief allusion to some general considerations have been firmly impressed upon me by the which have occurred.

To my mind the most glaring defect in ou mies is the absence of system in the ap ment and promotion of general and other o and the want of means for the theoretical in tion of the mass of officers.

The expansion of the army was so great a rapid at the commencement of the existing that it was perhaps impossible, in the great city of instructed officers, to have adopte other course than that which was pursued the time has arrived when measures may l itiated to remedy existing defects and pr against their recurrence.

I think that the army should be regarded permanent one, that is to say, its affairs shou administered precisely as if all who belong it had made it their profession for life: and rules for promotion &c., which have been necessary in the best foreign armies to honorable emulation, produce an *esprit du* and secure efficiency, should be followed by

All officers and soldiers should be made t that merit, that is to say, courage, good con the knowledge and performance of the duti their grade, and fitness to exercise those of perior grade, will ensure to them advanceme their profession, and can alone secure it for

Measures should be adopted to secure the oretical instruction of staff officers at least, should as far as possible be selected from offi having a military education, or who have actual service in the field.

The number of cadets at the military aca should he at once increased to the greatest tent permitted by the capacity of the institu

The regular army should be increased maintained complete in numbers and efficien

A well organized system of recruiting an depots for instruction should be adopted, in tc keep the ranks of the regiment full, and ply promptly losses arising from battle or dis This is especially necessary for the artiller cavalry arms of the service, which, from th ginning of the war, have rendered great ser

hich have never been fully appreciated by
ut their comrades. We need also large bod-
well instructed engineer troops.

the arrangement and conduct of campaigns,
irections should be left to professional sol-
: a statesman may, perhaps, be more com-
t than a soldier to determine political ob-
and direction of a campaign, but those once
cd upon, everything should be left to the
nsible military head, without interference
civilians. In no other manner is success
ble. The meddling of individual members
nmittees of Congress with subjects which,
lack of experience, they are of course inca-
of comprehending, and which they are too
view through the distorted medium of
an or personal prejudice, can do no good,
certain to produce incalculable mischief.

annot omit the expression of my thanks to
resident for the constant evidence given me
sincere personal regard, and his desire to
in the military plans which my judgment
e to urge for adoption and execution. I
t attribute his failure to adopt some of those
, and to give that support to others which
ecessary to their success, to any want or
lence in me, and it only remains for me to
t that other counsels came between the con-
ional commander in chief and the general
n he had placed at the head of his armies,
sels which resulted in the failure of grear
aigns.

the nation possesses no generals in service,
etent to direct its military affairs without
id or supervision of politicians, the sooner
ls them and places them in position the bet-
'ill it be for its fortunes.

ay be pardoned for calling attention to the
orandum submitted by me to the President
e 4th of August, 1861, my letter to him of
7th' 1862, and other similar communications
m and to the Secretary of War, contained in
report. I have seen no reason to change in
naterial regard the views there expressed.
ter a calm, impartial and patient considera-
of the subject, a subject which demands the
st thought on the part of every true lover
s country, I am convinced that by the prop-
nployment of our resources, it is entirely pos-
to bring this war to a successful military
. I believe that a necessary preliminary to
re-establishment of the Union, is the entire
at or virtual destruction of the organized
ary power of the Confederates, and that such
ult should be accompanied and followed by
iliatory measures ; and that by pursuing the
tical course I have always advised, it is pos-
to bring about a permanent restoration of
Union ; a reunion by which the rights of
sections shall be preserved, and by which
parties shall preserve their self-respect
e they respect each other.

CONCLUSION.

this report I have confined myself to a plain
ative of such facts as are necessary for the
oses of history. Where it was possible I
preferred to give these facts in the lan-
ge of dispatches, written at the time of their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation.

The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, recite what time and space would fail me to mention here, those individual instances of conspicuous bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To them I must especially refer, for without them, this narrative would be incomplete, and justice fail to be done. But I omit to tender to my corps commanders and to the general officers under them, such ample recognition of their cordial co-operation and their devoted services, as those reports abundantly vouch.

I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife.

It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and truthful narrative, to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters involved.

This report is, in fact, the history of the army of the Potomac. During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the fortification of the capital was in progress, and under the discipline which it then received it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterward to sustain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to the realities of war.

The army grew into shape but slowly, and the delays which attended on the obtaining of arms, continued late into the winter of 1861-2, were no less trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization of the Peninsular campaign, some of the finest regiments were without rifles, nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service.

When at length the army was in condition to take the field, the Peninsular campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, and the permanent restoration of the power of the government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not throughout the revolting States. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to abandon one, and originate another new campaign, which might and would have been successful if supported with appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because of the repeated failure of promised support, at the most critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments.

That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm reflection, when the nation

shall be looking back to the past from the midst of peaceful days.

For me, now, it is sufficient to say, that my comrades were victors on every field save one, and there the endurance of a single corps accomplished the object of its fighting, and by securing to the army its transit to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory.

The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my command of the division of Gen. Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain Department, under Gen. Fremont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula, when it was further reduced by a dispatch, revoking a previous order giving me command of Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to take ten thousand men from that point, to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire before the defences of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of Gen. McDowell's corps, of about 35,000 men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire army, (five divisions of out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being little larger than a brigade), was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York River, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, and when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, surrounded with fortifications and guarded by an army larger than our own; but the prospect did not shake the courage of the brave men who composed my command. Relying still on the support which the vastness of our undertaking, and the grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather was stormy beyond precedent, the deep soil of the Peninsula was at times one vast morass. The Chickahominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hanover Court House was fought, which opened the way for the first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming disappointment, than the army of the Potomac then did. Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance, when they hurled back again and again the vastly superior forces of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish the miracles that seem to have been expected of them. But one course was left; a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy, to another and better base, one of the most hzardous movements in war. The army of the Potomac holding its own safety, and almost the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. The Seven Days are classical in American history; those days in w the noble soldiers of the Union and the Cons tion fought an overwhelming enemy by day, retreated from successive victories by ni through a week of battle, closing the ter scenes of conflict with the ever memorable tory at Malvern, where they drove back, be and shattered, the entire eastern army of the federacy, and thus secured for themselves a p of rest, and a point for a new advance upon capital from the banks of the James.

Richmond was still within our grasp, had army of the Potomac been reinforced and per ted to advance. But counsels, which I ca but think subsequent events proved unwise, vailed in Washington, and we were ordere abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers ter deserve the thanks of a nation than the a of the Potomac for the deeds of the Penins campaign, and although that meed was withl from them by the authorities, I am persua they have received the applause of the Amer people. The army of the Potomac was reca from within sight of Richmond, and incorpor with the army of Virginia. The disappointm of the campaign on the Peninsula, had not da ened their ardor or diminished their patriot They fought well, faithfully, gallantly under Pope; yet were compelled to fall back on W ington, defeated and almost demoralized enemy no longer occupied in guarding his capital, poured his troops northward, entered ryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even W ington itself. Elated by his recent victories, assured that our troops were disorganized dispirited, he was confident that the seat of was now permanently transferred to the l States, and that his own exhausted soil was t relieved from the burden of supporting two tile armies. But he did not understand the s it which animated the soldiers of the Union shall not, nor can I living forget that, when I ordered to the command of the troops for the fense of the capital, the soldiers with whom I shared so much of the anxiery and pain and fering of the war, had not lost their confidenc me as their commander. They sprang to my with all their ancient vigor, discipline and c age. I led them into Maryland. Fifteen d after they had fallen back defeated, before W ington, they vanquished the enemy on the rug heights of South Mountain, pursued him to hard fought field of Antietam, and drove l broken and disappointed, across the Potomac i Virginia.

The army had need of rest. After the terri experiences of battles and marches, with scarc an interval of repose, which they had g through from the time of leaving for the Pe sula, the return to Washington, the defeat in ginia, the victory at South Mountain, and ag at Antietam, it was not surprising that they w in a large degree, destitute of the absolute cessaries to effective duty. Shoes were worn blankets were lost, clothing was in rags; in sh the army was unfit for active service, and an terval for rest and equipment was necessary.

When the slowly forwarded supplies c

led the army across the river renovated and shed, in good order and discipline, and fol- l the retreating foe to a position where I onfident of decisive victory, when in the t of the movement, while my advanced guard actually in contact with the enemy, I was ved from the command.

m devoutly grateful to God that my last cam- n with this brave army was crowned with a ry which saved the nation from the greatest it had then undergone.

have not accomplished my purpose, if, by report, the army of the Potomac is not placed on the roll of the historic armies of the d.

s deeds ennoble the nation to which it be- s. Always ready for battle, always firm, lfast and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, as under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.

No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States government, and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation's reverence than the survivors to the justice of a nation's gratitude.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Maj-Gen. U. S. A.

APPENDIX A.

ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION.

he designations of the different Batteries of Artillery, both Regular and Volunteer, follow within w pages.

he following distribution of Regiments and Batteries was made as a preliminary organization of forces at hand, shortly after my arrival at Washington.

he Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry, as fast as collected and brought into primary organization, e assigned to Brigades and Divisions as indicated in the subjoined statements.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DIVISION OF THE POTOMAC.

August 4th, 1861.

IGADIER-GENERAL HUNTER'S BRIGADE.
3d Regiment New York Volunteers.
5th " " "
5th " " "
7th " " "

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HEINTZELMAN'S BRIGADE.
5th Regiment Maine Volunteers.
16th " New York "
26th " " "
27th " " "
Tidball's Battery (" A") 2d U. S. Artillery.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN'S BRIGADE.
14th Regiment New York Volunteers.
9th " Massachusetts "
De Kalb " New York "
4th " Michigan "
Hamilton's Battery (" E") 3d U. S. Artillery.
Company " I" 2d " Cavalry.

BRIG.-GENERAL KEARNEY'S BRIGADE.
1st Regiment New Jersey Volunteers.
2d " " "
3d " " "
Green's Battery (" G") 2d U. S. Artillery.
Company " G" 2d " Cavalry.

RIGADIER-GENERAL HOOKER'S BRIGADE.
1st Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.
11th " " "
2d Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers.
26th " Pennsylvania "

COLONEL KEYES'S BRIGADE.
22d Regiment New York Volunteers.
24th " " "
30th " " "
14th " " State Militia.

BRIG.-GENERAL FRANKLIN'S BRIGADE.
15th Regiment New York Volunteers.
18th " " "
31st " " "
32d " " "
Platt's Battery (" M") 2d U. S. Artillery.
Comp'y "C" New York (Lincoln) Cavalry.

COLONEL BLENKER'S BRIGADE.
8th Regiment New York Volunteers.
27th " " "
27th " Pennsylvania "
Garibaldi Guard, New York "

COLONEL RICHARDSON'S BRIGADE.
12th Regiment New York Volunteers.
2d " Michigan "
3d " " "

BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONE'S BRIGADE.
34th Regiment New York Volunteers.
Tammany " "
1st " " "
2d " New York State Militia.

COLONEL WM. F. SMITH'S BRIGADE.

3d Regiment Vermont Volunteers.
6th " Maine "
2d " Vermont "
33d " New York "
Company "H" 2d U. S. Cavalry.
Captain Mott's New York Battery.

COLONEL COUCH'S BRIGADE.

2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers.
7th " Massachusetts "
10th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.
36th " New York "
The 2d Regiment Maine Volunteers,
2d " Wisconsin " and th
13th " New York " station
at *Fort Corcoran.*
The 21st Regiment New York Volunteers,
stationed at *Fort Runyon.*
The 17th Regiment New York Volunteers,
stationed at *Fort Ellsworth.*

By October the new levies had arrived in sufficient numbers, and the process of organization so far carried on, that the construction of Divisions had been effected.
The following statement exhibits the composition of the Army, October 15th, 1861.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

October 15*th*, 1861.

I.

BRIG.-GENERAL STONEMAN'S CAVALRY COMMAND.

6th U. S. Cavalry.
4th Pennsylvania Cavalry.
Oneida Cavalry (1 Company).
11th Pennsylvania Cavalry (Harlans).
Barker's Illinois Cavalry (1 Company).

II.

COL. H. J. HUNT'S ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Battery "L' 2d U. S. Artillery.
" "A" " " "
" "B" " " "
" "K" 3d " "
" "F" " " "
" "K" 4th " "
" "H" 1st " " (Lieut. Hall)
" "A" 5th " "

III.

CITY GUARD, RRIG.-GENERAL ANDREW PORTER.

Cavalry.
Companies "A" and "E" 4th U. S. Cavalry.
Artillery.
Battery "K" 5th U. S. Artillery.
Infantry.
Battalion 2d U. S. Infantry.
" 3d " "
Company 8th " "
" 1st " "
" Sturgis Rifles (Illinois Volunteers.)

IV.

BANKS' DIVISION.

Cavalry.
3d Reg't. N. Y. Cavalry (Van Alen) 4 Companies.
Artillery.
Best's Battery "I" 4th U. S. Artillery.
Detachment 9th N. Y. Artillery.
Matthew's Battery "F" 1st Pennsylvania Artillery.
Tompkins' Battery "A" 1st Rhode Island.
Infantry.

Abercrombie's Brig.	*Stiles's Brig.*	*Gordon's Brig.*
12th Mass. Vols.	3d Wis. Vols.	2d Mass. Vols.
12th Ind. "	9th N. Y. S. M.	28th N. Y.
16th " "	29th Penn. Vol.	19th "
30th Penn. "	13th Mass. "	5th Conn.
		46th Penn.
		28th "
		1st Md.

MCDOWELL'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.
2d New York Cavalry (Harris' Light) Col. Dav
Artillery,
Battery "M" 2d U. S. Artillery.
" "G" 1st " "
Infantry.

Keyes's Brig.	*Wadsworth's Brig.*	*King's Br*
14th N. Y. S. M,	12th N. Y. Vols.	2d Wis. V
22d " Vols.	21st " "	6th "
24th " "	23d " "	7th "
30th " "	35th " "	19th Ind.

HEINTZELMAN'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.
1st New Jersey. Col. Halstead.
Artillery.
Thompson's Battery "G" 2d U. S. Artillery.
Infantry.

Richardson's B.	*Sedgwick's B.*	*Jameson's B*
2nd Mich. Vols.	3rd Maine Vols.	32d Penn. Vo
2rd " "	4th " "	63rd " "
5th " "	38th N. Y. "	61st " "
37th N. Y "	40th " "	45th " "

Penn. Vols. (Wild Cat Reg'

F. J. PORTER'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.
3rd Penn. Cav. [Kentucky Cav.] Col. Averell.
8th " " Col. Gregg.
Artillery.
Bat'y "E" 2nd U. S. Artillery.
" "E" 3rd " " NOTE.—Transferred Sherman's Expe
Infantry.

Morell's B.	*Martindale's B.*	*Butterfield's*
14th N. Y. Vols.	13th N. Y. Vols.	50th N. Y. Vo
33rd Penn. "	2nd Maine "	Stockton's I M
4th Mich. "	—N. Y De K R	83 Penn. Vols
9th Mass. "	18th Mass. Vol.	17th N. Y. Vo
		25th " "

FRANKLIN'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.

st New York Cavalry. Col. McReynolds.

Artillery.

'y "D" 2nd U. S. Art'y. Hexamer's B. N. Y. V.
"G" " " "

Infantry.

arney's B.	*Slocum's B.*	*Newton's B.*
N. J. Vols.	16th N. Y. Vols.	15th N. J. Vols.
" "	26th " "	18th " "
" "	27th " "	31st " "
" "	6th Maine "	32d " "

STONE'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.

Companies 3rd N. Y. (Van Alen) Cavalry.

Artillery.

by's Bat. "I" 1st U. S. Bunting's 6th N. Y. I. B.
ughn's " "B" 1st R. I.

Infantry.

Gorman's Brigade.	*Lauder's Brigade.*
1 N. Y. S. M.	19th Mass. Vols.
Minn. Vols.	20th " "
N. Y. Vol. (Tam. R.)	7th Mich. "
h Mass "	Com. Mass. Sharpshooters
h N. Y. "	

BAKER'S BRIGADE.

——— Penn. Vols. [1st California.]
——— " " [2nd California.]
——— " " [3rd California.]

BUELL'S DIVISION

Artillery.

Battery "D" 1st Penn. Artillery.
" "H" " " "

Infantry.

ouch's Brig.	*Graham's Brig.*	*Peck's Brig.*
d R. I. Vols.	23rd Penn. Vols.	13th Penn. Vol.
h Mass. "	31st " "	21st " "
th Mass. "	67th N. Y. [1st L. I.] Vols.	
	62d N. Y. V. Anderson Zou.	
th N. Y. Vols.	65th N. Y. V (1st U. S. Chass.)	
	55th N. Y. Vol.	

McCALL'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.

1st Penn. Reserve Cavalry. Col. Bayard.

Artillery.

Easton's Battery "A" 1st Penn. Artillery.
Cooper's " "B" 1st " "
Kein's " "G" 1st " "

Infantry.

Meade's Brig.	*——Brig.*	*——Brig.*
st Rifles Penn. Res.	5th P. R. Inf.	10th P. R. Inf.
th Penn. Res. Inf.	1st " "	6th " "
rd " " "	8th " "	9th " "
th " " "		12th " "
1th " " "		
nd " " "		

HOOKER'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.

3rd Ind. Cav. [8 Companies]. Lieut.-Col. Carter.

Artillery.

Elder's Battery "E" 1st U. S. Artillery.

Infantry.

—— *Brigade.*	*Sickles' Brigade.*
1st Mass. Vols.	1st Reg't Ex. Brig. N. Y. Vols.
11th " "	2nd " " " "
2nd N. H "	3rd " " " "
26th Penn. "	4th " " " "
1st Mich. "	5th " " " "

SMITH'S DIVISION.

Cavalry.

5th Penn. Cav. (Cameron Drags). Col. Friedman.

Artillery.

Ayre's Battery "F" 5th U. S. Artillery.
Mott's 2nd New York Independent Battery.
Barr's Battery "E" 1st Penn. Artillery.

Infantry.

Brigade.	*Steven's Brig.*	*Hancocks Brig.*
2nd Verm't Vols.	33d N. Y. Vols.	47th Penn. Vols.
3rd " "	79th " S. M.	49th " "
4th " "	6th Maine Vols	43rd N. Y. "
5th " "	49th N. Y. "	5th Wis. "

Cos. "B" and "E" Berdan's Shrpshooters.

NOTE.—The 47th Penn. Vols. and the 79th N Y. S. M. transferred to Gen. Sherman's Expedition.

CASEY'S PROVISIONAL BRIGADE.

5th N. J. Vols.	— Penn. Vols. (R. H. Reg't.)
6th " "	Battalion D. C. Vols.
7th " "	40th Penn. "
8th " "	4th N. H. "

NOTE.—Round Head Regiment transferred to Gen. Sherman's Enpedition.

V.

GARRISON OF ALEXANDRIA. BRIG-GEN. MONTGOMERY.

Military Governor.

——— Penn. Volunteers, (Cameron Guards).

GARRISON OF FORT ALBANY.

14th Mass. Volunteers.

GARRISON OF FORT RICHARDSON.

4th Connecticut Volunteers.

GARRISON OF FORT WASHINGTON.

Company "D" 1st U. S. Artillery.
" "H" 37th N. Y. Volunteers.
" "I" " " "
" U. S. Recruits unassigned.

VI.

DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE.

Cavalry.

Company Penn. Cavalry.

Artillery.

Bat'y "I" 2nd U. S. Art'y. 2nd Mass. Battery.
" — N. Y. Art'y.

Infantry.

3rd New York Volunteers.
4th " "
5th " "
17th Mass. "
25th " "
21st Indiana "
6th Michigan "
4th Wisconsin "
7th Maine "
2nd Maryland Battalion.
Reading City Guards.

APPENDIX B.

I add a Statement of the Organization and Composition of the Troops on April 1st, commenci with the portion of the Army of the Potomac, which went to the Peninsula; giving afterwards t Regiments and Batteries left on the Potomac and in Maryland and Virginia after April 1st, 1862.

TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC SENT TO THE PENIN-SULA IN MARCH AND EARLY IN APRIL, 1862.

I.

CAVALRY RESERVE. BRIG.-GEN. P. ST. G. COOKE.

Emory's Brigade.	*Blake's Brigade.*
5th U. S. Cavalry.	1st U. S. Cavalry.
6th " "	8th Penn. "
6th Penn. "	Barker's Squadron Ill. Cav'y.

II.

ARTILLERY RESERVE. COL. H. J. HUNT.

Graham's Bat'y	"K" & "G"	1st U. S.	6 Napoleon guns.
Randal's "	"E"	1st "	6 "
Carlisle's "	"E"	2d "	6 20-pds. Parrott guns.
Robertson's "		2d	6 3-in. ordnance
Benson's "	"M"	2d "	6 3-in. ordnance guns.
Tidball's "	"A"	2d "	6 3-in ord. "
Edward's "	"L" & "M"	3d "	6 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Gibson's "	"C" & "G"	3d "	6 3-in. ord. "
Livingston's "	"F" & "K"	3d "	4 10-pds Parrott guns.
Howe's "	"G"	4th "	6 Napoleon "
De Russy's "	"K"	4th "	6 " "
Weed's "	"I"	5th "	6 3-in. ord. "
Smead's "	"K"	5th "	4 Napoleon "
Ames's "	"A"	5th "	4 10-pds. Parrotts 2 Napo'n guns

ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Diederick's Bat'y	"A"	N. Y. Art. Btl.	6 20-pd. Parrott guns
Voegelie's "	"B"	" "	4 " "
Knieriem's "	"C"	" "	4 " "
Grimm's "	"D"	" "	6 32-pd How

100 guns.

III.

VOLUNTEER ENGINEER TROOPS. GEN. WOODBURY.

15th New York Volunteers.
50th " "

REGULAR ENGINEER TROOPS. CAPT. DUANE.

Companies "A," "B," and "C," U. S. Engineers.

ARTILLERY TROOPS WITH SIEGE TRAIN.

1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery. *Col. Tyler.*

INFANTRY RESERVE (Regular Brigade).

Gen. Sykes.

9 Co's 2nd U. S. Infantry.
7 " 3rd " "
10 " 4th " "
5th Regt. N. Y. Vols. *Col. G. K. Warren.*
8 Co's 10th and 17th U. S. Infantry.
6 Co's. 11th U. S. Infantry.
8 " 12th " "
9 " 14th " "

SECOND CORPS. GEN. SUMNER.

Cavalry.

8th Illinois Cavalry. *Col. Farnsworth.*
One Squadron 6th New York Cavalry.

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Clark's Bat'y	"A" & "C"	4th U. S.	6 Napoleon guns
Frank's "	"G"	1st N. Y.	6 10-pds Parrott guns
Pettit's "	"B"	1st "	6 " "
Hogan's "	"A"	2d "	6 " "

Infantry.

Howard's Brig.	*Meagher's Brig.*	*French's Brig.*
5th N. H. Vols.	69th N. Y. Vols.	52d N. Y. Vols
81st Penn. "	63rd " "	57th " "
61st N. Y. "	88th " "	66th " "
64th " "		53rd Penn. "

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Kirby's Bat'y	"I"	1st U. S.	6 Napoleon guns.
Tompkin's "	"A"	1st R. I.	4 10-pd. Par. 2 12-pd. Hoz guns
Bartlett's "	"B"	1st "	4 10-pd. Par. 2 12-pd. Hoz guns
Owen's "	"G"	———	6 3-in. ordnance guns

Infantry.

Gorman's Brig.	*Burn's Brig.*	*Dana's Brig.*
2d N. Y. S. M.	69th Penn. Vols.	19th Mass Vols
15th Mass. Vol.	71st " "	7th Mich. "
34 N. Y. "	72nd " "	42nd N. Y. "
1st Minn. "	106th " "	20th Mass. "

NOTE.—*Blenker's Division* detached and assigned to the *Mountain Department.*

THIRD CORPS. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN.

Cavalry.

3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry. *Col. Averell*

PORTER'S DIVISION

Artillery.

Griffin's Bat'y	"K"	5th U. S.	6 10-pds. Parrott guns.
Weden's "	"C"	R. I.	— —
Martin's "	"C"	Mass.	7 Napoleon Guns.
Allen's "	"E"	"	6 3-in ordn. guns.

Infantry.

Martindales Brig.	*Monell's Brig.*	*Butterfields Brig.*
2d Maine Vols.	14th N. Y. Vols.	17th N. Y. Vols.
18th Mass. "	4th Mich. "	63rd Penn. "
22nd " "	9th Mass. "	44th N. Y. "
25th N. Y. "	82nd Penn. "	Stockton's Mich.
13th N. Y. "		12th N. Y. Vols.
1st Berdan Sharpshooters		

HOOKER'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

l's Bat'y.	"H" 1st U. S.	6	4 10-pd. Parrott 2 12-pd. How.	gns
th's "	4th N. Y. Bat'y.	6	10-pds. Parrott	"
mhall's	6th " "	6	3-in ordnance	"
orn's	"D" 1st N. Y. A	4	" "	"

Infantry.

le's Brig.	*Naglee's Brig.*	*Col. Starr's Brig.*
Excelsior (N.Y.)	1st Mass. Vols.	5th N.J. Vols.
" "	11th " "	6th " "
" "	26th Penn. "	7th " "
" "	2nd N. H. "	8th " "
" "		

HAMILTON'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

ompson's Bat'y	"G" 2d US	6	Napoleon guns.	
m's "	"B" N. J.	6	4 10-pd. Par. 2 Napoleon	gns.
ndolph's "	"E" R. I.	6	4 10-pd. Par. 2 Napoleon.	gns.

Infantry.

meson's Brig.	*Birney's Brig.*	*—— Brig.*
5th Pe. Vols.	38th N. Y. Vols.	2d Mich. Vols.
rd " "	40th " "	3rd " "
th " "	3rd Maine "	5th " "
th N. Y. "	4th " "	37th N. Y. "

FOURTH CORPS. GENERAL KEYES.

Cavalry.

COUCH'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

cCarthy's Bat'y.	"C" 1st Penn.	4	10-pd Par.	gns.
ood's "	"D" 1st "	6	" "	"
iller's "	"E" 1st "	4	Napoleon	"
eady's "	"F" 1st "	4	10-pd. Parrott.	

Infantry.

raham's Brig.	*Peck's Brig.*	*—— Brig.*
7th N.Y. Vls. (1 L.I.)	98th Pe. Vls.	2d R.I. Vls.
5th " "(1 U.S. C)	102d " "	7th Mass.
3rd Penn. "	93rd " "	10th " "
1st " "	62d N.Y. "	36th N.Y. "
1st " "	55th " "	

SMITH'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Lyres' Bat'y.	"F" 5th U.S.	6	4 10-pd. Par. 2 Napoleon	gns.
Mott's "	3d N.Y. Bat'y.	6	4 10-pd. Par. 2 Napoleon.	gns.
Wheeler's	"E" 1st N.Y.	4	3-in. ordnance.	
Kennedy's	1st N.Y. Battery	6	" "	"

Infantry.

Hancock's Brig.	*Brook's Brig.*	*Davidson's Brig.*
5th Wis. Vols.	2d Verm't Vol.	33d N. Y. Vols.
49th Penn. "	3d " "	77th " "
43d N. Y. "	4th " "	49th " "
6th Maine "	5th " "	7th Maine "
	6th " "	

CASEY'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Regan's Bat'y.	7th N. Y. Bat'y.	6	3-in ordn.	guns.
Fitch's "	8th " "	6	" "	"
Bates' "	"A" 1st N.Y. Art.	6	Napoleon	"
Spratt's "	"H" 1st " "	4	3-in. ordn.	"

Infantry.

Keim's Brig.	*Palmer's Brig.*	*—— Brig.*
85th Penn. Vol.	85th N. Y. Vol.	104th Penn. Vol.
101st " "	98th " "	52d " "
103d Penn Vols.	92d N. Y. Vols.	56th N. Y. "
96th N. Y. "	81st " "	100th " "
	93d " "	11th Maine "

V.

PROVOST GUARD.

2nd U. S. Cavalry.

Battalion 8th and 17th U. S. Infantry.

AT GENERAL HEADQUARTERS.

2 Cos. 4th U. S. Cav. 1 Co. Oneida Cav. (N.Y. Vol.)

The following troops of the army of the Potomac were left behind, or detached, on and in front of the Potomac for the defence of that line, April 1st, 1862. Franklin's and McCall's divisions at subsequent and different dates joined the active portion of the army on the Peninsula. Two Brigades of Shield's division joined at Harrison's Landing.

FIRST CORPS. GENERAL McDOWELL.

Cavalry.

1st New York Cavalry.		4th New York Cavalry.	
2d "	"	1st Penn.	"

Sharpshooters.

2d Regiment Berdan's Sharpshooters.

FRANKLIN'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Platt's Bat'y	"D" 2d U.S.	6	Napoleon guns.	
Porter's "	"A" Mass.	6	4 10 pd Parrott 2 12 pd Howit's	gns
Hexamer's	"A" N. J.	6	4 10 pd Parrott 2 12 pd Howit's	gns
Wilson's	"F" 1st N. Y. Art'y	4	3-in. ordnance.	

Infantry.

Kearney's Brig	*Slocum's Brig.*	*Newton's Brig.*
1st N. J Vols.	16th N. Y. Vols.	18th N. Y. Vols.
2d " "	27th " "	31st " "
3d " "	5th Maine "	32d " "
4th " "	96th Penn. "	95th Penn. "

McCALL'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Seymour's Bat'y	"C" 5th U.S.	6	Napoleon guns.	
Eaton's "	"A" 1st Penn.	4	" "	
Cooper's "	"B" 1st "	6	10-pd Parrott	gns.
Kein's "	"C" 1st "	6	2 10-pd Parrott 4 12-pd Howits	g'ns.

Infantry.

Reynold's Brig.	*Meade's Brig.*	*Ord's Brig.*
1 Penn Res. Rgt.	3d Penn Res. Rgt.	6th Penn Rgt.
2 " " "	4th " " "	9th " "
5 " " "	7th " " "	10th " "
8 " " "	11th " " "	12th " "

1 Penn. Reserve Rifles.

KING'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Gibbon's Bat'y	"B" 4th U.S.	6	Napoleon guns.
Monroe's "	"D" 1st R. I.	6	10-pd Parrott guns.
Gerrish's "	"A" N. H.	6	Napoleon "
Durrell's "	Penn.	6	10-pd Parrott guns.

Infantry.

—— Brigade.	*Patrick's Brig.*	*Augur's Brig.*
2d Wis. Vols.	20th N. Y. S. M.	14th N. Y. S. M.
6th " "	21st " Vols.	22d " Vols.
7th " "	23d " "	24th " "
19th Ind. "	25th " "	30th " "

FIFTH CORPS. GENERAL BANKS.

Cavalry.

1st Maine Cavalry.	5th New York Cavalry.
1st Vermont "	8th " "
1st Michigan "	Keyes's Bat. Penn. Cav'y.

1st R. I. Cavalry. 18 Cos. Maryland Cavalry.
1 Squadron Virginia "

Unattached.

28th Pa. Vols. 4th Reg. Potomac H. G. (Md. Vols.)

WILLIAMS' DIVISION.

Artillery.

Best's Battery	"F" 4th U. S.	6	Napoleon guns.
Hampton's "	Maryland	4	10-pds. Parrott guns.
Thompson's "	"	4	" " "
Mathew's "	"F" Penn.	6	3-in. ordnance "
Cothran's "	"M' 1 N. Y.	6	10-pds. Parrott "
Knapp's "	Penn.	6	" " "
McMahon's "	N. Y.	6	3-in. ordnance "

Infantry.

Abercrombie's Brig.	*— Brig.*	*— Brig.*
12th Mass. Vols.	9 N. Y. S. M	28 N. Y. Vs.
2d " "	29 Pa. Vols.	5 Conn. "
16th Ind. "	27 Ind. "	46 Pa. "
1 Pot. H. Brig. (Md. Vol.)	3 Wis. "	1 Md. "
1 Co. Zou. d'Af. (Pa. Vol.)		12 Ind. "
		13 Mass. "

SHIELD'S DIVISION.

Artillery.

Clark's Bat. "E" 4th U. S. 6 10-pds. Parrott guns.

Jenk's " "A" 1st Va. 6 { 4 10-pds. Parrott, 2 6-pds. " } guns

Davy's " "B" 1st Va. 2 10-pds. Parrott guns.

Huntington's "A" 1 Ohio 6 13-pds. James "

Robinson's ""L" 1 " 6 { 2 12-p. How'r, 4 6-p. guns. } guns.

4 Ohio Inf. 1 6-p. gun.

Infantry.

Brigade.	*Brigade.*	*Brigade.*
14th Ind. Vols.	5th Ohio Vols.	7th Ohio Vols.
4th Ohio "	62d " "	29th " "
8th " "	66th " "	7th " "
7th Va. "	13th Ind. "	1st Va. "
67th Ohio "	39th Ill. "	11th Penn."
84th Penn. "		Andrew Sharp's.

GENERAL WADSWORTH'S COMMAND.

Cavalry.

1st New Jersey Cavalry, At Alexandria.
4th Pennsylvania " East of the Capitol.

Artillery and Infantry.

10th New Jersey Vols.	Bladensburg Road.
104th N. Y. Vols.	Kalorama Heights.
1st Wis. Heavy Art'y.	Fort "Cass," Va.
3 Batteries N. Y. "	Forts "Ethan Allen" and "Marcy."
Depot N.Y. Light Art'y.	Camp "Barry."
2d D. C. Vols.	Washington City.
26th Pa. "	"G" St. Wharf.
26th N. Y. "	Fort Lyon.
95th " "	Camp "Thomas."
94th " "	Alexandria.
88th Pa. " (Detachm't.)	"
91st " "	Franklin Sq. Barracks.
4th N. Y. Art'y.	Forts "Carroll" and "Greble."
112th Pa. Vols.	Fort "Saratoga."
76th N.Y. Vols.	Fort "Massachusetts"
59th " "	" "Pennsylvania."
88th Pa. " (Detachm't.)	" "Good Hope."
99th " "	" "Mahan."
3d N. Y. Light Art'y.	Forts "Ward," "Woo and "Blenker."
107th Pa. Vols.	Kendall Green.
54th " "	" "
Dickerson's Light Art'y.	East of the Capitol.
86th N. Y. Vols.	" " "
88th Pa. " (Detach't.)	" " "
14 Mass. "Heavy Art'y	Forts "Albany," "Gallinghast," "Richardson," "Runyon," "Jackson," "Barnard," "Craig," "Scott."
56 Penn. "	
4th U. S. Art'y (Detachment)	Fort "Wash't'n
37th N.Y. Vol (Detachment)	" "
97th " "	Fort "Corcoran"
101st " "	
12th Va. "	
91st N. Y. "	

IN CAMP NEAR WASHINGTON.

6th New York Cavalry.		Dismounted.
10th "	"	"
Swaim's "	"	"
2d Pennsylvania "	"	"

(These troops, 3,359 men, were ordered to port to Col. Miles, commanding Rail Road Gua to relieve 3,306 older troops, ordered to be se to Manassas to report to Gen. Abercrombie.)

GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND. (BALTIMORE)

Cavalry.

1st Maryland Cavalry. Detachment of Cavalry
Purnell Legion.

Artillery.

Battery "I" 2d U. S. Artillery.
" — Maryland Artillery.
" "L" 1st New York Artillery.
2 Independent Batteries, Penn. Artillery.

Infantry.

3d New York Volunteers.	
4th " "	
11th Pennsylvania "	
87th " "	
111th " "	
21st Massachusetts "	(Detachment.)
2d Delaware "	
2d Maryland "	
1st Eastern Shore Home Guards	(Maryland Vols.
2d " " "	"
Purnell Legion	
2 Battalions	

Note.—Mr. Allen Pinkerton was the trustworthy and efficient chief of the Secret Service Corps. He is mentioned under his assumed name Mr. E. J. Allen.

Capt. G. A. Custar, additional A. D. C. and Lieutenant U. S. Cavalry, was added to the Staff of the Commanding General when on the Chickahominy.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

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THE

LIFE AND SERVICES

OF

GEN. GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Campaign Document, No. 4.

George Brinton McClellan was born in the city of Philadelphia, the birthplace of American Independence and of American Union, on the 3d day of December, 1826.

His father was a physician, eminent among the eminent, "praised by the praised," conspicuous by his abilities and his character even in that galaxy of accomplished men by whom the fame of Philadelphia, as the metropolis of physical science and the healing art in America, was made respectable in Edinburgh and in Paris, in London and in Leyden. No man's ancestry is a matter of indifference when we desire to study his nature and ascertain the true measure of his worth. In monarchical countries, where the voice of the people has little or no weight in determining the selection of those who are to administer the government, it matters little to the masses of mankind whether those by whom they are ruled come of a sound or an unsound stock, of an honest and vigorous, or of a corrupt and weakly race. The will or the whim of a prince makes such inquiries superfluous. Once invested by his sovereign with the insignia of office, the vilest caitiff silences all questions into his origin with the splendors of his rank and the terrors of his authority. But in a republic which rests for its permanence and its power upon the virtue of the people and of their public servants, it can never be an insignificant recommendation of a public man to that confidence of his fellow-citizens in which alone his hope of distinction and of influence lies, that his fathers in their time were citizens of credit, men who knew their rights and maintained them, knew their duties and fulfilled them.

The ancestors of George Brinton McClellan were men of this stamp, coming of that pure and hardy Scottish blood which has so long been a trouble to tyrants, which has throbbed in the veins of so many sturdy champions of justice and order, and which has been poured out so freely on the most heroic battle-fields of history. Through one of those mysterious affiliations which the Scotch, like all other Celtic tribes, delight to trace out, and hold above all things sacred, a kinsmanship has been established for the American McClellans with that noble old soldier, Sir Colin Campbell, who fought his way honestly up from a shepherd's plaid on the Caledonian moors to a Field Marshal's baton in the army of England, and a baron's coronet among her peers.

Into these refinements of consanguinity, however, it is scarcely worth while to enter. Had Colin Campbell lived and died, the just and God-fearing man he was, as a shepherd on banks of Clyde, no man in whose veins blood ran would have been the less e bled by its wholesome life; and so far as antecedents go of George Brinton McC lan's birth, it is enough for us to know he comes of a people renowned the world for justice, fidelity, valor, and truth.

As a boy of thirteen, his father sent into the Freshman Class at the Universit Pennsylvania. He pursued the Univer course, for nearly two years, patiently and cessfully; but, like Washington, he had "inward longing" for the life of an engi and a soldier, and, in 1842, a Cadet war having been obtained for him, he was remo to the Military Academy at West Point.

In the congenial atmosphere of the e studies to which he here found himself call the young Cadet very soon distinguished h self, and rewarded the judicious confidenc his friends. He was graduated, with h honors, in the Class of 1846; assigned duty with a company of the engineers, ordered, before the close of the year, into ac service on the line of the Rio Grande Riv The war with Mexico was then fairly beg and Lieutenant McClellan reached his just after the battle of Monterey.

After some time spend in active service the Rio Grande, Lieutenant McClellan ordered to Tampico in January, 1847, take part in the concentration of troops t going on for the grand expedition which preparing, under Gen. Scott, to end the war, a dictate terms of peace in the capital of Mexi What jealousies and intrigues; and, to the veteran's own well-known phrase, what "fire in the rear" attended the organizati of this expedition no one familiar with t recent history of the country can need to reminded.

The young Lieutenant was thus made witness, at the very beginning of his caree of the political difficulties and the person spites which so often confound and hamp the action of the most earnest and devot military leaders.

In the beginning of the month of Mar the assembled army disembarked from i transports to the west of the island of Sac ficios, and the memorable siege of Vera Cr and San Juan de Ulloa began.

It is not our purpose minutely to pursu the fortunes of Lieutenant McClellan throug the wonderful campaign of which this sie was the initial chapter.

Who, indeed, can now find the heart to r write or even to re-peruse the annals of th

ign in which, as the lamentable history
last four years too sternly bids us fear,
ican soldiers of the North and of the
, of the East and of the West, for the
me, marched side by side to death and
y?
e Executive Documents of the Thir-
Congress, in which the story of that
us campaign lies embalmed and awaits
storian's skilful hand, can be read now
ut overmastering emotion only by the
c or the fool, by him who is indifferent
country's fate, or by him who rejoices
ruin.
those formal and official pages the course
bsequent events has given the painful in-
of a tragedy. In them we read how,
ng with an equal zeal to serve one com-
cause, Lieutenants Beauregard and
ellan earned the commendation of their
ander in the trenches before Vera
; in them we read how the escort of
in Robert E. Lee, engaging the skir-
rs of Valencia in the Pedregal, opened
stern unswerving march which led the
and Stripes, through storm and stress of
and victory, up to their station of tri-
on the heights of Chapultepec and the
s of the city of Montezuma. Heintzel-
and Magruder, Kearney and Pillow,
us here, marching, manœuvring, fighting
ully together for the one old flag. One
Lieutenant T. J. Jackson — "the horses
s guns nearly all killed or disabled, his
rs and cannoneers cut up" — gets one of
ieces from under the direct fire of Cha-
pec, opens upon the enemy, and holds
attle till the Castle is carried. Another
Lieutenant Reno, "in the advance with
ountain howitzers," maintains, against the
rior artillery of the enemy, so fierce a fire
aves the bold advance of "Lieutenant
nel Albert Sidney Johnstone" with his
geurs. Now we have "Captain Hooker"
g gallantly down alone to reconnoitre the
nd for Lieutenant Colonel Hébert, of
isiana; anon, "Lieutenant Grant," of
Fourth Infantry, "pushed forward with a
y" to aid in securing advantages won by
troops of Tennessee and South Carolina.
Between these once fraternal names how
a gulf has since been dug by passion, by
ness, and by folly, — a gulf which, in the
idence of God, nothing surely but reason
justice can ever bridge again!
he peculiar importance of that arm of the
ice to which, in virtue of his distinction
at the academy, Lieutenant McClellan
attached naturally, gave him a prominence
in the operations of General Scott's advance, to which his years and his rank would not otherwise have entitled him. He won his promotion to the rank of 2d Lieutenant early in the campaign, and received his brevet as 1st Lieutenant for gallant and meritorious conduct at the battle of Contreras, on the 19th of August of the same year. The service of the engineers and the staff officers at Contreras was of the most arduous kind, testing in the highest degree the coolness, the personal bravery, and the powers of physical endurance, as well as the professional skill, of those engaged in it. General Valencia's position was infinitely more formidable from the broken, rough, and impracticable character of the country, than from the skill with which that pompous and wordy personage had selected and entrenched his camp; and the reconnoissance which determined the route taken by our troops to assault and overwhelm their enemy had to be executed on a moonless night, over rocky and precipitous mule paths, through a region of wild ravines and tangled forests.

Deserted in disgust by Santa Anna, whose advice he had scorned and whom he hoped, by a decisive victory over the American invaders, to oust from power, Valencia was utterly bewildered by the attack to which this dangerous night reconnoissance opened the way; his troops, finding themselves inextricably involved, were stricken with a panic, and one of the most complete victories of the war rewarded the skill of our commanders and the valor of our troops.

When compared with the scale on which war has since been waged by American armies, the battles through which our soldiers fought their way to the city of Mexico may seem, indeed, but petty and insignificant combats. But the campaign of 1847 was, in truth, a most instructive school for the officers who passed through it. Not less by the mistakes and failures of the enemy than by our own successes were the capable and the thoughtful among those officers taught rightly to estimate the tremendous difficulties which attend a war of invasion, and the formidable advantages enjoyed by an army acting on the defensive in a country sparsely populated, broken, rugged, and densely wooded; nor is it easy to imagine the extent of the disasters which must have befallen the cause of the Union had the absolute conduct in the field of our vast and undisciplined armies been assumed, in the outset of the existing war by the arrogant and inexperienced civilians whose influence has been since so lamentably felt in the disturbance of

well-considered plans of campaign and the waste of well-organized resources.

The hard-fought action of Molino del Rey, on the 8th of September, 1847, afforded Lieutenant McClellan an occasion to prove that his rapid promotion in his profession had not disturbed that well-balanced sense of justice which is one of the rooted qualities of his nature.

The conduct of the attack upon the Mexican positions at Molino del Rey had been confided, by General Scott, to General Worth. The ostensible object of this attack was the destruction of a cannon-foundry which the Mexicans were believed to have established at that point; but as General Worth found reason to anticipate such a resistance as might lead to a general action for the possession of the heights and fortress of Chapultepec, it was of the first importance for him to be thoroughly informed of the true nature of the defences thrown up by Santa Anna at Molino del Rey, and of the true proportions of the force which the Mexican President would there array against him.

Two serious reconnoissances were accordingly ordered by General Worth before the attack was made, and in these reconnoissances Lieutenant McClellan bore a distinguished part.

The conflict which followed assumed the character of a battle, — the most fiercely-contested battle indeed of the whole war, in which, after hours of desperate onslaught, an aggregate American force about 3,500 strong assailed and drove from their formidable intrenchments a Mexican army numbering at least 10,000 men, with a loss to the enemy of four pieces of artillery and nearly a thousand prisoners. Lieutenant McClellan was offered the brevet rank of Captain for his share in this victory, but declined to receive it on the ground that he was not fully entitled to it, having been concerned in the preliminary operations alone, and not in the actual assault and capture of the enemy's works.

The maxim, *Palmam qui meruit ferat*, is not often thus rigorously applied to his own case by a young and ambitious man actively engaged in the most exciting of professions! Within a week, however, the storming of Chapultepec and the consequent occupation of the Mexican capital gave the magnanimous young soldier a fresh opportunity of winning, by actual service and exposure in the stricken field, the rank which he disdained otherwise to wear. He was breveted a Captain for these crowning operations of the campaign on the 14th September, 1847.

As Captain McClellan, he remained with the army in Mexico till the signing o treaty of peace with that republic. Th ministration of a conquered city neces afforded to a soldier of his character and ing many valuable opportunities of ob tion and reflection upon the true relati the military with the civil authority. impotence of mere force to maintain o store a solid tranquillity in the social or never so apparent to a clear and vigorous as when force is clothed with a temporar nipotence; the beauty and the majesty o are never so apparent as when the calm constant operation of the law is, for a suspended in favor of the sword. A Duke of Wellington learned, during his military mastery of the Peninsula and brief practical dictatorship of Paris, tha found dislike of all unnecessary milita terference with civil affairs which, at a day, when England was convulsed with commotion, made the veteran of a hu victories the calmest, most forbearing most conciliatory of English statesmen, may be sure that his experience of con and of military rule in Mexico contri mainly to fix in the mind of Captain Clellan those sound and moderate prin of policy which were afterwards to de themselves so fully and so firmly in the lamations and in the conduct of the vic West Virginia and the leader of the Pe lar campaign.

In June, 1848, Captain McClellan turned to the United States, and was a immediately ordered to the post at Point, where, for three years, he remain command of the company of sappers miners.

In June, 1851, he was removed to Delaware to superintend the constructi the works; and early in the next year h filled the common destiny of the officers o regular army of the Union by joining a pedition for the exploration of the far we territory of the Red River, under the comm of Colonel Marcy, whose daughter has become his wife.

From the Red River he passed into T upon the staff of General Persifer F. Sm and until March, 1853, was occupied in survey of the Texan coast. From the breezes of the Gulf and the lowlands of T he was suddenly transferred to the neigh hood of the Rocky Mountains, going to W ington Territory in the spring of 1853, remaining there until May, 1854, in ch of the western division of the survey for northern route to the Pacific Ocean.

e vast extent, the magnificent possibil-
the grand unity in a variety as grand of
ational dominion, which are but sounding
of words on the lips of so many a
it orator, become simple realities to the
gent American officer whose routine of
thus leads him from one extremity to
er of the imperial republic; and the sen-
it of continental patriotism, so vague and
nate in the minds of most men, is thus
to him a substantial and controlling im-
of his nature.

it Captain McClellan's love and rever-
of American nationality were to be in-
ied by a wider and even more impres-
xperience. In March, 1855, he was pro-
d to a full captaincy in the 1st Cavalry, and,
Major Delafield and Major Mordecai, was
ed to proceed to Europe, there to study
perations of the great war then raging
een the Western Allies and the Russian
ire. War on a scale which had become
tional in our time — war waged upon the
iples of the Napoleonic era, but with all
appliances of modern progress — was
to pass under his inspection.

Then Captain McClellan and his compan-
reached the Crimea, in the early part of
summer of 1855, the most trying period
he great Allied invasion had already been
passed. The battle of the Alma had
fought and won, Sebastopol had been
sted so far as its investment was practica-
victory had been snatched by the troops
France and England from the very jaws of
on the heights of Inkermann. But the
tacle, which now met the eyes of the
erican commissioners, was far more in-
ctive than any shock of battle could have
n.

n the course of his investigations into the
anization and establishment of the Allied
es before the Russian stronghold, Captain
Clellan learned to estimate aright the tre-
ndous hazards which, even in modern times,
with all the advantages given by a com-
te command alike of the sea and of all the
inews of war," attend what may be prop-
y called, as Mr. Kinglake has called it,
olossal "adventure of invasion."

A brief extract from this author's bitter,
brilliant, history of the "Invasion of the
imea" will show the precise nature of
great military lesson set before the Amer-
n observers, and will enable the reader to
imate for himself the grave and manifold
arings of that lesson upon the vast enter-
se which it was written in the book of des-
y that but a few years afterwards the most
conspicuous of these observers should be called to undertake: —

"There were now upon the coast of the Crimea some 37,000 French and Turks,[1] with sixty-eight pieces of artillery, all under the orders of Marshal St. Arnaud; and we saw that 27,000 English, including a full thousand of cavalry, and together with sixty guns, had been landed by Lord Raglan. Altogether, then, the allies numbered 63,000 men and 128 guns. These forces, partly by means of the draught animals at their command, and partly by the aid of the soldier himself, could carry by land the ammunition necessary for perhaps two battles, and the means of subsistence for three days. Their provisions beyond those limits were to be replenished from the ships. It was intended, therefore, that the fleets should follow the march of the armies, and that the invaders, without attempting to dart upon the inland route which connected the enemy with St. Petersburg, should move straight upon the north side of Sebastopol by following the line of the coast.

"The whole body of the Allied armies was to operate as a 'movable column.'[2]

"Between an armed body engaged in regular operations, and that description of force which the French call a 'movable column,' the difference is broad; and there is need to mark it, because the way in which regular operations are conducted is not even similar to that in which a 'movable column' is wielded. It is, of course, from the history of continental wars that the principle of regular operations in the field is best deduced. A prince intending to invade his neighbor's territory takes care to have near his own frontier, or in states already under his control, not only the army with which he intends to begin the invasion, but also that sustained gathering of fresh troops, and that vast accumulation of stores, arms, and munitions which will suffice, as he hopes, to feed the war. The territory on which these resources are spread is called the 'base of operations.'[3] When the invading general has set out from this his strategic home to achieve the object he has in view, the neck of country by which he keeps up his communications with the base is called the 'line of operations;' and the maintenance

[1] 30,204 Frenchmen and 7000 Turks, according to the French accounts. Lord Raglan, I believe, thought that the French force was less, and put it at 27,600.

[2] I make this endeavor to elucidate the true character of the operation for the purpose of causing the reader to understand the kind of hazard which was involved in the march along the coast, and also in order to lay the ground for explaining (in a future volume) the causes which afterwards brought upon the army cruel sufferings and privations.

[3] This is generally, but not invariably, the same line as the one by which he has advanced.

of this line of operations is the one object which must never be absent from his mind. The farther he goes, the more he needs to keep up an incessant communication with his 'base;' and yet, since the line is lengthening as he advances, it is constantly becoming more and more liable to be cut. Such a disaster as that he looks upon as nearly equal to ruin, and there is hardly anything that he will refuse to sacrifice for the defence of the dusty or mud-deep cart-roads, which give him his means of living and fighting.

"On the other hand, the commander of a 'movable column' begins his campaign by wilfully placing himself in those very circumstances which would bring ruin upon an army carrying on regular operations. He does not profess nor attempt to hold fast any 'line of operations' connecting him with his resources. He says to his enemy, 'Surround me if you will; gather upon my front; hover round me on flank and rear. Do not affront me too closely, unless you want to see something of my cavalry and my horse-artillery; but, keeping at a courteous distance, you may freely occupy the whole country through which I pass. I care nothing for the roads by which I have come. What I need whilst my task is doing, I carry along with me. I have an enterprise in hand. That achieved, I shall march toward the resources which my countrymen have prepared for me. Those resources I will reach or else perish.' If an army engaged in regular operations were likened to an engine drawing its supplies by means of long pipes from a river, the principle of the 'movable column' would be well enough tokened by that skinful of water which, carried on the back of a camel, is the life of men passing a desert.

"Each of the two systems has its advantages and its drawbacks. The advantages enjoyed by an army undertaking regular operations are:—the lasting character of its power, and its comparative security against great disasters. The general conducting an army in regular operations is constantly replenishing his strength by drawing from his 'base' fresh troops and supplies to compensate the havoc which time and the enemy, or even time alone, will always be working in his army; and if he meets with a check, he retires upon a line already occupied by portions of his force, already strewed with his magazines. He retires, in short, upon a road prepared for his reception, and the farther he retreats, the nearer he is to his great resources. The drawbacks attending this system are the great quantity of means of land transp required for keeping up the communicat and the eternal necessity of having to be re with a sufficient force to defend every mil the 'line of operations' against the en prises of the enemy.

"The advantages of the 'movable colu are:—that its means of land transport be comparatively small,—may, in fact, proportioned to the limited duration of service which it undertakes; and that, being clogged with the duty of maintainin 'line of operations,' it has, in truth, noth to defend except itself. But grave drawba limit the power of a 'movable column.' the first place, it is an instrument fitted o for temporary use, because, during the ser in which it is engaged, it has no resource rely upon, except what it carries along with Another drawback is the hazard it incurs, of mere defeat, but of total exterminati for it is a force which has left no dominion its wake, and if it falls back, it falls into midst of enemies having hold of the cou around, and emboldened by seeing it retr

"Then, also, a movable column, e though it be never defeated in any pitc battle, is liable to be brought to ruin by be well harassed; and very inferior troops, even armed peasants, if they have spirit enterprise, may put it in peril; for, having command of the country all round it, they easily prepare their measures for vexing column by day and by night. Again, 'movable column' can not send its sick wounded to the rear. It must either aban the sufferers, or else find means of carry them wherever it marches, and this, course, is a task which is rendered m and more difficult by every succeeding c bat. Again, if the 'movable column' brought to frequent halts by the necessity self-defence, there is danger that the operat in which it is engaged will last to a time yond the narrow limit of the supplies wh it is able to carry along with it.

"In Algeria the French had brought system of using small 'movable columns' a high state of perfection; and there might see a force complete in all arms, ca ing with it the bread and the cartridges, driving betwixt its battalions the little herd cattle, which would enable it to live and fight; one might see it bidding farewell perhaps several weeks to all its commun tions, and boldly venturing into the midst a wilderness alive with angry foes; but Arabs and Kabyles, though not without so of the warlike virtues, were, upon the whc

) unintelligent and too feeble to be able to t the system of the 'movable column' to est sufficing to prove that the contrivance uld hold good in Europe.

"Upon the whole, it may be acknowledged at, for operating in a country where the emy is looked upon as at all formidable, the ployment of a 'movable column' is a asure which will be likely to win more vor from those who love an adventure than m those who are acquainted with the art war.

"But whichever of the two methods be osen, it is of great moment to choose deci-ely, taking care that the operations are car-d on in a way consistent with the principle the system on which they proceed. A neral conducting regular operations must wary, circumspect, and resolutely patient. he leader of a 'movable column' must be ift, and, even for very safety's sake, he ay have to be venturesome, for what would rashness in another may in him be rigid udence. The two systems are so opposite, at to confuse the two, or to import into the ractice of one of them the practice applica-le to the other, is to run into grave troubles nd dangers. Yet this is what the Allies did. When the English Government committed to is enterprise a large proportion of their nall, brilliant army, and appointed to the ommand of it a general mature in years and hooled by his long subordination to Wel-ngton, they acted as though they meant that ie army should engage with all due pru-ence in regular operations. When they rdered that this force should make a descent pon the Crimea without intending to prepare r it a base of operations at the landing-lace, they caused it to act as a 'movable olumn.' It will be seen hereafter that from his ambiguity of purpose, or rather from this imness of sight, the events of the campaign ook their shape.

"Again, it is right to see how far it be pos-ible to change with the same force from one f the two systems to the other. Upon this, t can be said that an army engaged in regu-ar operations may well enough be able to urnish forth a 'movable column;' but to ope that a 'movable column' will be able to ather to itself all at once the lasting strength f an army prepared for regular operations is o hope for what cannot be. It is true, as ve shall see hereafter, that by dint of great ffort, and the full command of the sea, the wo mighty nations of the West were able in ime to convert the remains of their 'movable olumn' into an army fitted for regular opera-tions, but we shall have to remember that be-fore the one system could be effectually re-placed by the other, the soldiery underwent cruel sufferings."

All that it was the rare privilege of Capt. McClellan to see and learn of the relations between politics and the military art, and of the practical operations of war conducted upon the grandest scale during his visit to Se-bastopol might however, let us here observe, have produced but an imperfect and inade-quate effect upon his mind, had not his own pre-vious and priceless, though comparatively lim-ited experience in Mexico prepared him intel-ligently to receive it, and fitted him to deduce from it the most solid instruction and the most durable convictions.

The immediate fruit of his sojourn in Eu-rope, at this time, was an elaborate and ex-haustive "Report upon the Constitution of the Greater European Armies," which was pub-lished under the authority of Congress in the early part of the year 1857, and which bears irrefragable witness to the pains and zeal with which the young officer had devoted himself to mastering the minutest details, as well as the broadest principles of military organiza-tion.

But of infinitely greater pith and moment to himself and to his country were the larger and deeper results of this military tour upon his mental constitution and his habits of thought.

The officers of the Regular Army of the United States, although most carefully trained in the principles of mathematical science and of the military art during the four years of their academic course, have enjoyed for the most part, in later life, but few and limited opportunities of military experience. With the exception of the Mexican war, the lives of most of them now living had been passed, when the great rebellion broke upon us, in a routine of post and garrison duty alternating between the peaceful seaboard of the Atlantic and the frontier forts of the far West. A harassing but contemptible warfare with the roving In-dian tribes of the trans-Mississippi educated them to practical skill in the handling of small detachments, but could do nothing, of course, towards familiarizing them with the spirit and the necessities of war on a grand scale. Many of them, inspired with a genuine zeal and love for their profession, were at great pains to master all that text-books could teach upon this subject; but as the most scientific and thoughtful of military authorities, Baron Jo-mini, has well observed, "War, practical war, is not an affair of mathematical dem-

onstration, — it is a *passionate drama*," — and no study of military literature, however judicious and faithful, can teach in years so much available military truth as a soldier like McClellan must imbibe from a few weeks of actual living contact with the realities of war as he came upon and mingled with them in the Crimea.

After the publication of his Report of the Armies of Europe, in January, 1857, Capt. McClellan resigned his commission in the army and went into civil life.

He was appointed Chief Engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad, and upon the completion of that great enterprise was elected Vice-President of the company, which post he continued to fill, residing at Chicago, until the month of August, 1860, when, having been chosen President of the Eastern Division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, he removed to Cincinnati.

He was busily engaged in the duties of this office, an office which with his previous experience as a "railroad man" in Illinois, naturally introduced him to a wide and accurate familiarity with the people and the resources of the Central West, as well as to a practical acquaintance with the details of the modern system of transportation by steam, when, in April, 1861, he was suddenly summoned from the pursuits of peace by the roar of the cannon fired at Sumter and the crash of impending civil war.

Governor Dennison, of Ohio, in response to the first call of the President of the United States for volunteers to aid in the suppression of the rebellion and in maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution, appointed Geo. Brinton McClellan Major-General, to command the contingent of the State, being thirteen regiments of infantry. This commission was offered and accepted on the 23d of April, 1861.

There was no difficulty in filling the ranks of these regiments. Throughout the great State of Ohio, as throughout the entire North and West, the call of the President for seventy-five thousand volunteers, to be enlisted for a service of three months, was answered by such a general uprising of the people as, in the words of General McClellan himself, made it "a struggle as to who should be received, and not as to who should avoid the call."

Throughout the long political conflict which had preceded the assertion by force of arms at Fort Sumter of the right of secession, the free States had been greatly divided in opinion concerning the issues so hotly debated between numbers of their own citizens on the one side, and the citizens of the slaveholding States on the other.

While the sentiment of hostility to slavery as an institution discreditable to the republ and in itself both criminal and dangerou had greatly grown in fire and in force throug out the North during the thirty years whi followed the emancipation of the slaves in t West Indian colonies of Great Britain, a while this sentiment had in some places ma itself, and in others had been manipulat into becoming a powerful engine of partiz action, an overwhelming majority of the pe ple of the North and the West still firmly a hered to the conviction that the Constitutio in no wise authorized any interference on t part either of the non-slaveholding States, of their citizens, or of the Federal Gover ment, with the institution of slavery in t States. It was the dominant feeling of ho orable and enlightened men, that it would l dishonest and disgraceful for an anti-slaver North to take advantage of a power conferre upon its numerical majority solely in virtue the Union and the Constitution, to accon plish purposes, no matter how laudable the might be in the eyes of philanthropists an philosophers, which, had they been avowe when the original compacts between the State were framed, would have made the Union i self impossible, and put a final stop to th formation of the Constitution.

It was plainly and painfully true, indeed that the leaders of the political party by whic Mr. Lincoln had been lifted into powe neither shared this feeling nor were disposed t respect it in their policy. But so long as th refusal of many of the Southern States t submit to the authority of the newly-elected President was expressed in the form of polit ical action alone, the great majority of th Northern people were indisposed to draw th sword against those whom they regarded a their fellow-citizens, and whom they believed to be governed by an honest, even if a mistaken fear that their rights, their property, and their liberties were really in peril.

It was well known throughout the North that the "right of secession" was not more generally accepted, as inherent in the Constitution of the Union, at the South than it was at the North.

Before the formation of the Union, indeed, a disposition had been manifested by the Eastern States, upon the invitation of the Legislature of Massachusetts, to separate themselves in respect to many of the most important elements of the public weal from the rest of the country, by forming a conven-

with the State of New York for "regulating matters of common concern." This was in April, 1783; and, a debate arising on the subject in the Congress of the Confederation, Mr. Bland, of Virginia, had denounced such projects as tending directly to break up the Union, and to form what he described as "young Congresses." Alexander Hamilton's proposition that the Federal Government should assume the debts of the States, gave occasion, soon after the adoption of the Constitution, to a similar, though a more formidable manifestation. That proposition was supported by the Northern and opposed by the Southern States with so much acrimony on either side, that when the proposition was finally rejected, Congress adjourned from day to day without transacting any business, and some members from the Eastern States openly threatened the secession of those States from the Union, and the formation of an Eastern Confederacy. A compromise was finally effected by the concession to the South of the site for the National Capital, on the banks of the Potomac, in return for the reconsideration by the South of the vote which had defeated the "Assumption Bill." Under the Presidency of the elder Adams, in 1788, a new menace of separation came upon the country, at this time from the South, the States of Virginia and Kentucky passing resolutions in opposition to the policy of Mr. Adams, which clearly indicated by their tone, if not by their express phraseology, a determination to break under, in a certain contingency, the bonds which united the Confederacy.

The annexation of Louisiana, under Mr. Adams's successor, changed the whole sweep and scope of the future of the Republic; and again in the East the old propositions for the establishment of an Eastern Confederacy were revived, and discussed by men of the highest standing and in the most serious temper.

President John Adams, in December, 1828, gave Mr. Harrison Gray Otis and others, of Boston, the following account of this matter: —

"This design had been formed in the winter of 1803–4, immediately after and as a consequence of the acquisition of Louisiana. . . . The plan was so far matured that the proposal had been made to an individual (this was Alexander Hamilton) to permit himself, at the proper time, to be placed at the head of the military movements, which it was foreseen would be necessary for carrying it into execution." In a subsequent letter to Governor Plumer, of New Hampshire, an avowed Disunionist, President Adams states that "three projects of boundary" for the New England Confederacy had been prepared. These were: "1. If possible, the Potomac. 2. The Susquehanna. 3. The Hudson River." Of the truth of these statements Governor Plumer himself was well aware. He had written to New Hampshire from his seat in Congress, on the 19th of January, 1804, "What do you wish your Senators and Representatives to do here? We have no part in Jefferson and no inheritance in Virginia. Shall we return to our own homes, sit under our own vines and fig-trees, and be separated from the slaveholders?"

The admission of Louisiana as a State into the Union, seven years later, led to a sectional debate in Congress, in the course of which the Hon. Josiah Quincy, of Massachusetts, declared (Jan. 14, 1811) that the admission of Louisiana would "free the States from their moral obligations, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some to prepare for separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must."

Without pursuing the subsequent history of this theoretical "right of secession" through the successive collisions of sectional interests and sectional passions, which again and again elicited the assertion of it, now from States of the South and now from States of the North, during the period which intervened between the admission of Louisiana and the first formal attempt of an American State to act upon the right in December, 1861, it must be evident to all reflecting minds that an impetuous and passionate determination to meet this attempt at once by the "last argument of kings" would have implied, on the part of the people of the Northern States, not only a discreditable ignorance of the precedents of American history, but a lamentable incapacity of appreciating the importance of time and argument in calming the effervescence of popular excitement, and dissipating the delusions which so often seize upon the mind of a whole community. No such impetuous and passionate determination we have said was, however, manifested by the people of the North. The secession of one after another of the States of the South Atlantic and the Gulf was received by the people at large with a kind of incredulous amazement, which was gradually giving place to a wide-spread conviction that the whole matter must eventually be referred for settlement to such a convention of the States as had already twice rescued the Republic from the danger of

disintegration, when the commencement of actual hostilities in Charleston harbor, and the call of the President for troops to repel an assault made upon the national forces and to avenge an insult offered to the national flag, put an entirely new face upon the state of things.

The most powerful of the Southern States were still, at this time, standing out against the movement of secession. The feeling was almost universal at the North that the attack upon Fort Sumter could not possibly be sustained by the deliberate judgment of these unseceded Southern States. The existence of State Rights, it was felt, necessarily implied the existence of State Duties; and when the President appealed to the nation for seventy-five thousand troops to maintain the national authority, the people of the North and West took up arms, not for the purpose of annihilating the rights even of the seceded States, but for the purpose of compelling those States to fulfil their duties.

Had it then been understood that the force called into the field was but the advance guard of an army of millions of men, to be employed for an indefinite term of years, not merely in enforcing the authority of the Constitution and repressing a violent assault upon the established order of things, but in coercing the popular will throughout one half of the territory of the Republic, and in overwhelming the domestic institutions of thirteen States of the Federal Union, it cannot be doubted, by any candid man, that the popular voice of the North would have called a peremptory "halt!" and that the whole course of subsequent events would have been materially changed.

There are not wanting injudicious and inconsiderate friends of the Union, particularly upon the other side of the Atlantic, who delight to represent the "uprising of the North" as the initial movement of a magnificent moral crusade destined, in the providence of God, to deliver America from the sin and the shame of slavery.

Such representations give an indecently Jesuitical cast to the designs of "providence," do grave injustice to the spirit, the character, and the intelligence of the Northern people, and might almost seem to be made in the direct interest of that originally small and fanatical party of Disunion at the South, which, by insisting upon the imminence of such a crusade, and lashing therewith the fears and doubts and passions of the body of the Southern people into frenzy, precipitated the movement of secession, and enlisted whole commonwealths in the service of their own designs. And no one thing assured will bear more heavily upon the administ tion of Mr. Lincoln, at the bar of histor than the fact that the most conspicuous a visers of the President, in the outset of th great struggle, were men who, both by the antecedent and their subsequent course politics, have given color to such represent tions.

Nowhere is that blind and fanatical passi which would precipitate one whole communit or section of a community of human bein against another, upon a mission of mor chastisement and correction, so odious and u pardonable as in the high places of authorit "The whole modern mind," it has been a mirably said, "is in the sovereignty of re son, the rational organization of society by r flection;" and of those who are charged wi the duty of administering the affairs of great nation in modern times, it is above a required that they should be capable of refle tion and governed by reason.

Reason shows us that in the long course ages past there is no one movement of a who community which can be wholly condemn or wholly approved; reason convinces u therefore, that the future will judge ourselv as we judge the past, and will no more pa take our passions than we partake those of th past. Absent as it would seem to have bee where most its presence was required, in th inner councils of the Administration, th wholesome faculty of reason was not lackin to the people in general.

Among the volunteers who thronged th front of war at the Presidential summons April, 1861, there may have been, and doub less were men who were governed solely b their passions; who thought only of chastisin southern insolence; of abolishing southe slavery, and of settling by force the future r lations of the States. But the vast majorit of these volunteers were men of a very diffe ent stamp, — men who could discriminate b tween wrongs to be redressed and rights to b respected.

Of these was the young major-general calle to the command of the contingent of Ohio His first duty obviously was the organizatio of the force put under his orders; and to thi duty he addressed himself immediately wit all the energy of his character. Believin that the army of the Union had a single an definite work to do, he perceived the suprem importance of putting the army into such condition as should make the doing of tha work the certain immediate consequence o the attempt to do it.

The Western States, as General McClellan once found upon commencing his labors, ere "totally unprepared for the impending ruggle." The Government of the Union as entirely unable to assist the States in the ganization and equipment of the troops which had called upon them to furnish. Lieutenat-General Scott, commanding-in-chief the hole army, at once recognized the dangerous ndition of affairs, recommended the appointent of General McClellan to the rank of ajor-General in the Army of the United ates, and uniting the three great States of hio, Illinois, and Indiana into one "Departent of the Ohio," confided this department to s care. General McClellan instantly called e governors of these States into council ith himself, and laid before them the true ate of matters in the West. All that could ossibly be done, with the earnest coöperation these State authorities, was done, and the ork of preparing their contingents for the eld was pushed forward as rapidly as the circumstances of a population, quite unused to ar and not yet in the least aware of the ext of the conflict upon which it was entering, would permit.

While busily engaged in this exhausting nd harassing duty, General McClellan found ime to scan, with the practised and untroubled ye of a skilful soldier, the whole field over hich the clouds of war were swiftly rolling p.

The President's proclamation had produced ot only in the seceded States, but throughout he South, an effect wholly at variance with he general expectations of the Northern peole, if not with the intimate hopes and purposes of those who were most busy and influntial in the Presidential councils. Instead f intimidating the seceded States, it had inen-ified their rage against the Government nd the Union; instead of rallying the unseeded States of the South to the support of rder and the castigation of insults offered to he flag, it had been made the instrument of driving the great States of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Virginia themselves into secession, and had excited a most formidable ferment of public feeling in Kentucky and Missouri.

Within a month from the date of that proclamation it had become evident to experienced military men that an extensive collision between the troops and people of the States actually armed and arming at the South, and the hastily-organized and imperfectly-equipped though brave and enthusiastic volunteers of the North, might more than probably result in such a practical humiliation of the Government as must give an enormous impulse to the now gigantic movement of rebellion.

General Scott, at Washington, urged this consideration upon the Government with all the weight of his large experience and all the earnestness of his already historical patriotism. General McClellan, from his position upon the Ohio, reinforced the representations of the General-in-Chief, pressed most strongly for the utmost possible activity in arming and equipping the Western contingents, recommending the largest possible increase of the whole force to be employed, and proposed such a flank movement up the valley of southwestern Virginia upon Richmond as would insure the possession of Tennessee to the Union, guarantee the tranquillity of Kentucky, and, above all, secure decisive results to the great military operations preparing in the East against Virginia.

But in the temper, at once frivolous and fanatical, which then prevailed at Washington, the counsels of military experience were unheard or unheeded.

It was natural enough, perhaps, that the people of the North in general should have been insensible to the gravity of the events now before them. The great majority of the Northern people having neither desired nor labored for the disruption of the Union, could not possibly bring themselves to believe that the Union was really in danger of disruption. They looked upon the South as maddened and misguided, and fully expected that a brief campaign resulting in the overthrow of the extemporized "government" at Richmond and in the dispersion of the extemporized army of the rebellion, would be followed by the immediate return of the States to their allegiance, and to such a general revision of the political sins and follies of both sections as should insure their deserts to the fanatics and disorganizers of both.

With the smaller, but for the moment, unfortunately, influential party at the North, which really preferred the disunion of the States to the permanence of a constitution which recognized and protected the right of the Southern States to regulate their own domestic institutions, it was an article of faith that the South was incapable of a vigorous effort at independence. It was said of old that "a fool is never completely a fool until he knows Latin;" and it may be said, with equal truth, that a fanatic is never completely a fanatic till he has taken to statistics. Studying the South in the tables of the census, the political Abolitionists of the North had satis-

fied themselves, and were ready to crucify all the rest of the world into believing, that the South was bankrupt as to its finances, and emasculated as to its population; that it existed as a social fact, indeed, simply by virtue of its connection with the North, and must tumble hopelessly to pieces at the moment when it should attempt to stand alone.

Controlled by the spirit of those who thus believed, the Administration listened impatiently to such counsels as those of General Scott and General McClellan. To question, indeed, the certainty of an immediate collapse of the rebellion upon the first advance of the National forces was considered by the more enthusiastic supporters of the Administration in Congress and in the press at the outset of the war, as proof positive of a secret sympathy with secession. And there can be no doubt that much of the strange personal animosity with which General McClellan has been assailed by this class of persons, must be attributed to the intolerable vindication by subsequent events of the estimates which he originally made of the strength of the South, and of the force which would be needed to make a prompt and profitable demonstration of the national power. There is nothing which most men are so slow to forgive in those with whom they quarrel as the crime of being proved to be in the right.

"On the 21st of May," says General McClellan, "the total number of small arms in the State of Ohio was twenty-five thousand one hundred and seventy-nine, of which twenty-two thousand and seventy-five were smooth-bores, mostly very inferior specimens of the altered flint-locks. Infantry equipments were still more difficult to obtain."

With this miserable provision for the armament of the Ohio contingent to be made the best of, improved and increased only by personal unremitting efforts; and with the knowledge that no force equal to the vast enterprise before the country had yet been summoned by the President into the field, General McClellan did not hesitate to plan and to urge upon the Government such comprehensive and decisive schemes of action as we have already alluded to.

But these schemes of action were schemes of policy, as well of war. The young general of the Ohio troops, whose life had been passed in the study of the art of war, had less faith in the virtue of mere brute force to bring American citizens to reason, than many a new-fledged captain who had just left his law-books and his red tape to don the "harness of battle."

The following passage will show how anxiously at this time General McClellan sought to combine a wise abstinence from military interference, where such interference was not absolutely essential to the main tenance of the national authority, with large conceptions of the work to be done by the army and with adequate preparation for doing it: —

"During the month of May the political aspect of affairs in Kentucky and Western Virginia was uncertain and threatening. In the latter a convention had been called to assemble at Wheeling, on the 13th of May, to decide upon the question of separation from the eastern portion of the State, while the election upon the question of ratifying the Richmond ordinance of secession from the United States, was fixed for the 23d of the same month. Excitement ran high, and honest men differed widely as to the policy that should be pursued by the military authorities of the general government.

"I received a multitude of letters from a large number of sincere Union men who entertained widely divergent views as to the measures adequate to the emergency. Many urged, as early as the beginning of May, that troops should immediately be sent into Virginia, to encourage the Union men and prevent the secessionists from gaining a foothold. At least an equal number insisted, with equal force, that the arrival of troops from other States would merely arouse State pride, throw many wavering men into the rebel ranks, and at once kindle the flames of civil war.

"In Kentucky the struggle was much more bitter than in Western Virginia. The State government, the arms, and the military organization, were to a great extent in the hands of men who favored the secession of the State; but so able and determined was the course of the Union leaders, and so marked did the majority of the people soon become in their support, that the secessionist leaders were compelled to content themselves with the avowal of the position of neutrality, while awaiting the results of the elections to be held on the 26th June for congressmen, and on the 4th August for members of the legislature.

"The policy of the leaders of the Union party was, 'To remain in the Union without a revolution, under all the forms of law, and by their own action.' The words of Garret Davis were, 'We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we will call on the general government to aid us.'

"It was the desire of these true and able men that no extraneous elements of excite-

nent should be introduced in the State until he elections were over; they felt sure of carrying these elections if left to themselves. I fully coincided with them in their expectations and opinions, and, so far as was in my power, ent them every assistance in carrying out heir views, among which were the organization of Home Guards and the distribution of arms to Union men. In Missouri, hostilities had already broken out, and it was evident that that State was destined to become the seat of serious fighting; nor was it then supposed that our tenure of St. Louis was entirely secure.

"Collections of Southern troops at Memphis and Union City threatened Columbus, Ky., and Cairo, and made it necessary to keep a vigilant watch in that direction. It should also be remembered that in the early part of May the National Capital was by no means secure, and it was not at that time an improbable contingency that Western regiments might yet be needed to protect or regain Washington. As bearing upon this point, it may be stated that in a letter addressed to the General-in-chief on the 21st May, I informed him that from the information in my possession the indications were that the disposable troops in the regular Confederate service, from Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana had gone to the east, via Lynchburg; leaving in Tennessee the State militia, who were badly armed and under no discipline. On the 26th April, when my command was confined to the limits of the State of Ohio, I submitted to the General-in-chief certain suggestions, the substance of which was: That, for the purposes of defence, Cairo should be occupied by two battalions, strongly intrenched, and provided with heavy guns and a gun-boat to control the river; that some eight battalions should be stationed at Sandoval in Illinois to observe St. Louis, sustain the garrison of Cairo, and, if necessary, reinforce Cincinnati; that a few companies should observe the lower Wabash; that some four thousand men should be posted at Seymour in Indiana to observe Louisville, and be ready to support either Cincinnati or Cairo; that there should be five thousand men at or near Cincinnati, and two battalions at Chillicothe, Ohio. With the troops disposable for active operations, it was proposed to move up the valley of the Great Kanawha upon Richmond; this movement to be made with the greatest promptness, that it might not fail to relieve Washington, or to insure the destruction of the enemy in eastern Virginia, if aided by a prompt advance on the eastern line of operations. Should Kentucky assume a hostile attitude, it was recommended to cross the Ohio with eighty thousand men, and move straight on Nashville, acting thence in concert with a vigorous defensive on the eastern line. It was strongly urged that everything possible should be done to hasten the equipment and armament of the Western troops, as the nation would be entirely deprived of their powerful aid until this should be accomplished.

"It was not until the 13th May that the order, forming the Department of the Ohio and assigning me to the command, was received. In the mean time, as much excitement existed at Cincinnati, which city was regarded as a tempting object to the enemy in the uncertain condition of Kentucky, I took steps to concentrate the greater part of the Ohio troops at Camp Dennison, on the Little Miami Railroad, seventeen miles from Cincinnati; a favorable position for instruction, and presenting peculiar facilities for movement in any direction. As soon as the new department was placed under my command I took steps for the immediate erection of heavy batteries at Cairo. In the letter of May 21st, already referred to, after giving the information obtained in regard to the position of the enemy on the Mississippi River, it was stated that I was convinced of the necessity of having, without a day's delay, a few efficient gunboats to operate from Cairo as a base; that if they were rendered shot-proof, they would enable us at least to annoy seriously the rebel camps on the Mississippi, and interfere with their river communications — their main dependence; that I requested authority to make the necessary expenditures to procure gunboats, and that I regarded them as an indispensable element in any system of operations, whether offensive or defensive. In the same letter the necessity for light batteries was strongly set forth."

While General McClellan was thus reflecting and acting at the West, members of the cabinet in Washington were expressing to foreigners their "willingness to let the South have its way and go in peace," and radical journalists, ostensibly of the same party with these statesmen, were clamoring for the coercion of Kentucky into "active loyalty." All was chaotic, indefinite, passionate, and extravagant in the language, the policy, and the purposes of the Administration.

The Southern Government had been audaciously removed from Montgomery to Richmond, with an open threat uttered by the Southern Secretary of War, that the "Confederate flag" should soon wave in triumph

over Washington city. Mr. Davis, availing himself of his past military experience, had secured the early organization of his army by inducing the "Confederate Congress" to pass a law enlisting all volunteers for the period of the war; and although many dissensions existed at Richmond and in the Southern camp, of which a calm and thoughtful mind at the head of the affairs of the Union might have taken signal advantage, the military preparations of the South were going on with a general consistency of purpose and harmony of action unknown upon our side of the Potomac.

General Scott, forgetting his many infirmities, labored resolutely to perfect the arrangements necessary to put an army into the field with any fair prospect of success; but he was daily insulted by the self-constituted captains of the nation in the columns of the Administration press, and he soon found that he could not safely count upon that quiet and vigorous support from the Administration itself, without which all his efforts must necessarily be vain. He could find but little time to bestow upon the state of matters west of the Alleghanies; and General McClellan was, accordingly, left very much to himself. The responsibility thus thrown upon him was very great and solemn; but he did not shrink from the burden.

Having made up his mind towards the end of May that the State troops of Virginia, then acting independently of the Confederate forces, and commanded by General Robert Lee, were bent upon invading Western Virginia, reducing the Union sentiment of that section, and destroying as far as possible the communications between Washington and the Central West, General McClellan, though he had under his orders at that time no more than nine available regiments of infantry, resolved to advance into and occupy Western Virginia.

General McClellan felt that this was a serious and momentous step to take. His mind was too deeply imbued with the spirit of the patriots who labored together at the building up of our national edifice, to regard the invasion of one American commonwealth by the armed citizens of another as a light or indifferent thing. He recognized his obligation to make a full explanation of the feelings and purposes with which such a step was taken to the people of the invaded State, and to impress upon the troops under his command in the clearest manner the strict limitations of the painful duty which they were about to perform.

And he accordingly issued to the inhabitants of Western Virginia, and to the soldiers of the Department the following proclamation and address: —

PROCLAMATION.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
May 26, 1861.

To the Union Men of Western Virginia:

VIRGINIANS! — The general government has long enough endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter you from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having failed in this infamous attempt to deprive you of the exercise of your dearest rights, they now seek to inaugurate a reign of terror, and thus force you to yield to their schemes, and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy, dignified by the name of the Southern Confederacy. They are destroying the property of citizens of your State, and ruining your magnificent railways. The general government has heretofore carefully abstained from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them along its banks, although frequently urged to do so by many of your prominent citizens. It determined to await the result of the late election, desirous that no one might be able to say that the slightest effort had been made from this side to influence the free expression of your opinions, although the many agencies brought to bear upon you by the rebels were well known. You have now shown, under the most adverse circumstances, that the great mass of the people of Western Virginia are true and loyal to that beneficent government under which we and our fathers have lived so long. As soon as the result of the election was known, the traitors commenced their work of destruction. The general government cannot close its ears to the demand you have made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio River. They come as your friends and brothers, — as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families, and your property are safe under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected, notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves. Understand one thing clearly. Not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part. Now, that we are in your midst, I call upon you to fly to arms and support the general government. Sever the connection that binds you to traitors; proclaim to the world that the faith and loyalty, so long boasted by the Old Dominion, are still pre-

ered in Western Virginia, and that you re-
n true to the stars and stripes.

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General U. S. A., Comd'g Dep't.

ADDRESS.

HEAD-QUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
CINCINNATI, *May* 26, 1861.

SOLDIERS! — You are ordered to cross the
ntier, and enter upon the soil of Virginia.
ur mission is to restore peace and confidence,
protect the majesty of the law, and to res-
e our brethren from the grasp of armed
itors. You are to act in concert with Vir-
ia troops, and to support their advance. I
ce under the safeguard of your honor the
sons and property of the Virginians. I
ow that you will respect their feelings and
their rights.

Preserve the strictest discipline; — remem-
r that each one of you holds in his keeping
e honor of Ohio and the Union. If you
e called upon to overcome armed opposition,
know that your courage is equal to the task;
but remember, that your only foes are the
med traitors, — and show mercy even to
em when they are in your power, for many
them are misguided. When, under your
otection, the loyal men of Western Virginia
ve been enabled to organize and arm, they
n protect themselves, and you can then return
your homes, with the proud satisfaction of
ving saved a gallant people from destruc-
on.

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General U. S. A., Comd'g.

Left entirely to himself, as we have seen
at he was in the conduct as well as in the
nception of this campaign upon which he
d now entered, General McClellan could
ve no reason to suppose that the Adminis-
ation desired or intended to wage war
gainst the seceded States otherwise than as
fractory members of the national community.
e knew for himself what limits the Consti-
tion had plainly put upon the interference
the Federal authority with the internal af-
irs of the States, and in his Proclamation
nd Address he wisely reiterated, with all the
lemnity of a man whose words were so
on to be tested by his acts, the language
ed by President Lincoln in his Inaugural
ddress, delivered less than three months
efore: —

"I declare that I have no purpose, *directly or indirectly*, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have *no lawful right to do so*, and have *no inclination to do so*. . . . The *right* of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment *exclusively*, is *essential* to the balance of power on which the perfection and *endurance* of our political fabric depend."

Little could the young general have dreamed that, ere two years had passed over his head, the author of this Inaugural Address would tacitly suffer it to be imputed to him as a crime that he had thus honestly interpreted these solemn professions of loyalty to the letter of the Constitution and to the spirit of the Union.

General McClellan soon found that his military instincts had guided him aright, and that he had not entered Western Virginia a day too soon. The enemy were gathering in the mountains of that noble and picturesque country, and having already occupied two strong positions at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain under an able commander, General Garnett, of Virginia, were preparing themselves to take the offensive.

From Washington, General McClellan, although he regularly forwarded intelligence of his movements, acts, and operations, received *no* orders or instructions whatever. He knew nothing of the campaign in the East save that Richmond was its object, and he had no reason to suppose that the slightest attention had been bestowed upon his repeated suggestions for the invasion and occupation of Eastern Tennessee, a movement which, had it been made at the time when he wished it, must almost irresistibly have been crowned with success; the Confederate army, such as it then was, being concentrated in Virginia and Tennessee, the latter State full of ill-suppressed Union feeling. How much in time, in expense, and in the inestimable waste of precious blood would have been saved to us, had those to whom these suggestions were thus early and thus clearly made, had ears to hear or hearts to understand!

By the end of June the columns of General McClellan were in such a position as to promise a speedy and decisive engagement with the troops of General Garnett. Once more the young commander thought it right to preface the actual shock of war with a frank appeal to his army. On the 25th of June, 1861, he issued, from his head-quarters at Grafton, in Virginia, the following address: —

"To the Soldiers of the Army of the West: —

"You are here to support the goverment of your country and to protect the lives and liberties of your brethren, threatened by a rebellious and traitorous foe. No higher and nobler duty could devolve upon you, and I expect you to bring to its performance the highest and noblest qualities of soldiers — discipline, courage, and mercy. I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce the strictest discipline, and I know that those of all grades, privates and officers, will display in battle cool, heroic courage, and will know how to show mercy to a disarmed enemy.

"Bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies; that you are here to protect, not to destroy. Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do so by your general officers. Remember that I have pledged my word to the people of Western Virginia, that their rights in person and property shall be respected. I ask every one of you to make good this promise in its broadest sense. We come here to save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear of punishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of the cause in which we are engaged. Carry with you into battle the conviction that you are right, and that God is on your side.

"Your enemies have violated every moral law — neither God nor man can sustain them. They have without cause rebelled against a mild and paternal government; they have seized upon public and private property; they have outraged the persons of Northern men merely because they came from the North, and of Southern Union men merely because they loved the Union; they have placed themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve some honor on the field of battle. You will pursue a different course. You will be honest, brave, and merciful; you will respect the right of private opinion; you will punish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the world that you differ from our enemies in the points of honor, honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that we inaugurate no reign of terror where we go.

"Soldiers! I have heard that there was danger here. I have come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. I fear now but one thing — that you will not find foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you.

"Geo. B. McClellan,
Major-General Comd'g."

This address was issued at Grafto where, hampered at every turn by the wa of competent staff officers, General McCl lan was rapidly organizing his new and ine perienced troops into a movable column, t service in a country singularly broken a difficult against an enemy familiar with the intricacies and defiles of its vast fores and its almost trackless mountain range This work was accomplished with a rapidi and a success which enabled General McCl lan to assail the enemy in their formidab positions before the arrival of the hea reinforcements which General Garnett w expecting from Richmond.

The Mexican experience of the youn commander now came into play. Ri Mountain, near the foot of which Colon Pegram, of Garnett's command, had rough but strongly entrenched himself, was turn by the manœuvre which had given Gener Scott the victory of Cerro Gordo. Und the command of Brigadier-General Ros crans, a force of about two thousand me chiefly troops of Ohio and Indiana, and s of them perfectly new to battle, passed in heavy rain through the dense forests, climbe a steep and difficult mountain, and formi gallantly upon the crest of the ascent, storme and carried the works of the enemy at th point. In the mean time General McClella had got the rest of his troops in position attack the position of Pegram in the fron But General Rosecrans, after carrying th enemy's works on the mountain, failed t complete his part of the programme, an move upon Pegram from the rear. Th misfortune disconcerted the plan of the com manding general, and gave the enemy th opportunity of which he availed himsel during the night, of evacuating his work and endeavoring to join the main body o General Garnett's force. General Rose crans did not succeed in communicating wit General McClellan until nearly noon of th next day, but such was the skilful dispo sition which the latter had made of his arm that the greater part of the fugitives fro Rich Mountain were ultimately forced t surrender themselves prisoners of war.

Garnett, on learning the fate of the battl at Rich Mountain, at once began his retrea from his own position of Laurel Hill. Hi was promptly pursued, and in an actio between his own rear-guard and the advanc of one of General McClellan's divisions under General Morris, at Carrick's Ford, fell, while gallantly striving to rally his troops. He was the first officer of conspicuous rank and

erit who perished in actual conflict in this reat war.

General Hill, with about twenty-five hunred men, came up with the remnants of eneral Garnett's army on the 14th of July, ree days after the battle of Rich Mountain, t a point beyond the Red House, on the altimore and Ohio Railroad, but for some et unexplained cause, into which no inves gation was ever ordered, the great events f Bull Run and Manassas Plains sweeping ie matter swiftly into oblivion, failed to ttack them.

Notwithstanding these short-comings of is subordinates, however, General McClelin's successes in Western Virginia were oth brilliant and substantial. They cheered ie whole country with their evidences of ie work that might be expected from our olunteers when organized and led by a ommander worthy of his post. They eared Northwestern Virginia of the Conderate troops, and the population of that egion having been satisfied by the proclaations and by the conduct of the victorious eneral that their rights would really be proected and their institutions respected under he flag of the Union, Northwestern Virnia at once became, and has ever since emained, a staunch and loyal supporter of he Union cause.

Receiving no orders from the East, and aving satisfied himself that no danger was ft to threaten Patterson, at Winchester, from he quarter which he had just so thoroughly eared of enemies, General McClellan urned his attention at once to Southwestn Virginia, where General Cox was strugling against a superior force in the Kanwha Valley. He resolved to repair thither person.

His preparations were rapidly making, is troops in motion, and General Cox nformed of his general intentions, when the hole aspect of affairs was suddenly changed. n the 21st of July the army of the Union urled on the enemy at Manassas Plains by he clamor of the radical press and poliicians, was utterly and disastrously defeated.

On the 22d the Administration teleraphed to General McClellan, summoning im at once to the defence of the country nd the protection of the government.

Before leaving Western Virginia in obedince to the summons of the Government, for Washington, General McClellan released on arole the prisoners taken by him from Genral Garnett's command. This measure produced the happiest effects for the cause of the Union, in that part of the country Taken in connection with the calm and conciliatory tone of the Federal General's proclamations, it served to confound the passionate representations of the Southern press in respect to the purposes of the Federal invasion; and many months afterwards the Richmond papers bitterly complained of the "demoralizing" influence exerted upon the Confederate forces and upon the popular sentiment in Western Virginia, by the clemency and forbearance which had marked these first victories of the Union army.

It was of the first importance to the success of the revolutionary movement at the South that the worst impressions of the Northern temper, and of the purposes of the Administration elevated to power by an exclusively Northern majority, which had been propagated throughout the Southern States during the contest which preceded the Presidential election of 1860, should be confirmed and reinforced by the conduct of the armies of the Union, and by the tone of the Government. This General McClellan perfectly well understood. He saw that the battle for the Union was neither to be fought nor to be won in the field alone, but that military victories which might be decisive in the case of a foreign war, would be little more profitable than defeats, in the case of a civil war, unless they were made the opportunity of such appeals to the better reason of the defeated party, as an honest devotion to the avowed object of the war must dictate to every sincere and patriotic mind. It was above all things essential, he held, that nothing should be done either to countenance the idea that the war was to be waged for the abolition of slavery, or to justify the notion that the Northern people were actuated by a spirit of vengeful hostility towards their alienated fellow-citizens of the South.

Such had been the condition of the Southern States under the Union, such their prosperity, and so great the general welfare of their people, that it was impossible for any well-informed and intelligent mind to believe that anything less than a wide-spread conviction of danger immediately imminent over their peace and happiness, could have driven the inhabitants of those States into acquiescing in the violent rupture of the ties which bound them to their confederates of the North and West. The whole past history of the world unfortunately proves that a conviction need by no means be reasonable or well-founded, in order to drive

whole communities into taking the most serious measures.

In our own country, and in the year 1832, Henry Clay had not hesitated to declare in his place in the Senate of the United States, while urging the claims of that protective tariff which was styled the "American system," "let New England and the West, and the Middle States all feel that they are the victims of a mistaken policy, and let those vast portions of our common country despair of any favorable change, and then, indeed, might we tremble for the continuance and safety of this Union." If a statesman so cordially and intensely patriotic as the "Sage of Ashland," could thus recognize the power which might reside in a wide-spread popular feeling in respect to a point of economical interest mainly, to break up the bonds of the Union, it was surely imperative upon all those whose duty called them to deal with an actual disruption of the Union under the influence of a wide-spread popular feeling, in respect to a point of vital social, as well as economical importance, that they should bear that feeling in mind in all their measures, and devote themselves sedulously to allaying and dissipating its force by all proper and possible means.

Thus, at least, Major-General McClellan construed the obligations of his position as a commander of the forces charged to maintain the authority of the Federal laws. That this construction of his obligations was as politic as it was honest and manly, and his conduct in obedience to this construction of his obligations, as wise as it was honorable, would seem to be abundantly established by the simple fact that out of all the region embraced within the scope of the movement of secession, the territory of West Virginia alone can, even now, be truly said to have been restored to its allegiance to the Union. It may well be questioned whether the measure by which that territory has since been severed from the State of Virginia, and erected into a separate sovereignty was any more politic than constitutional; but of West Virginia alone in the South, can it be with accuracy affirmed, that its inhabitants, as a body, have been reclaimed to the support of the Federal authority; nor can there be any doubt in the minds of candid men that this result was brought about by that brief but brilliant campaign of July, 1861, in which General McClellan, at once unassisted and unhampered by any communications with the administration at Washington, was wise and fortunate enough to be able to "superadd to the exercise of force the polic of conciliation," in dealing with this sectic of the "Old Dominion."

On the 27th of July, 1861, General M Clellan assumed the command in the city c Washington, of the "Division of the Pot mac."

Six days before, the greater part of tl troops comprising this division had suffere an overwhelming defeat from the army of tl rebellion on the plains of Manassas. Tl moral effects of this defeat had been portentous as the popular confidence of vi tory by which the army of the Union w driven into the field had been absolute an unquestioning.

The cabinet of Mr. Lincoln contained r one man possessed of the slightest militar experience. The President indeed, in h early youth, had made a brief campaig against the Indians of the Northwest in tl capacity of a captain of militia, but tl experience he had gained in this campaig was not of a nature greatly to serve him the administration of a great civil war to l waged against the whole force of elev proud and powerful American States. I a singular fatality, too, neither he nor a one of his ministers had ever enjoyed a opportunities of familiarity even with tl civil administration of the federal power. I the earlier times of the republic a certa education in one or another department e the cabinet was regarded almost as a co dition precedent to the elevation of any ma to the Presidency; but Mr. Lincoln ha passed at once from the practice of the la in the interior of a great Western Stat and from the "caucuses" of an oppositio party into the first administrative office o the land. Nor had one of the Secretari whom he called around him ever filled position of any importance in the administr tion of federal affairs.

From this condition of things at Washingto it resulted that the Government was equall unskilled to control and to direct the popula enthusiasm. When the President and h advisers saw themselves surrounded in th capital by a force of armed men vastl larger than had ever before been arraye under the flag of the Union they believe themselves to be looking upon an army read for and equal to any enterprise, howeve arduous. It was in vain that Lieutenan General Scott urged upon them the utte worthlessness for all purposes of invasio of such a force, unorganized, undisciplined imperfectly equipped, and still more impe

ctly officered as it was. The partisan urnals of the Administration daily clamored r the advance of the "irresistible host," nich by the sheer force of its numbers, its thusiasm, and its holy cause, was destined, they said and shouted, to sweep secession to the Gulf of Mexico like chaff before the nd. All this appeared eminently reasonble to the general masses of the public haply unfamiliar with the realities of war, and uzzled by the patriotic arithmetic of the ess. For years, too, it had been the custom the Anti-Slavery leaders, orators, and riters, to represent the Southern States as iolated and emaciated by the fatal influences slavery. Upon the strength of economial and statistical returns, dating back beyond e census of 1850, the population and the ealth of the South had been steadily and stematically underrated. While the South ad, in truth, been growing rapidly stronger nd richer during the period of thirteen years hich had elapsed since the great gold disoveries in California and Australia, coinciding point of time with the first development of ne modern free-trade policy of England, nd began to treble and quadruple the world's emand for the great Southern staples, it was belief almost universal throughout the North nat the resources of the South had, during all his period, been wasting away and decaying.

Unbounded, therefore, were the expectaions of victory which everywhere throughout he North, from Maine to Minnesota, had ttended the "advanced guard of the grand rmy of the Union," when it passed at midight across the Long Bridge at Washington, nd invaded the "sacred soil of Virginia."

Over the story of the fatal day on which hese expectations came so cruelly to naught, mid the thunders of the rebel artillery, it is ot necessary for us now to linger. But it s important for us to bear clearly in mind he real condition of the army which General McClellan was called from his victories to ommand, at the time when it passed under is hands.

The strength of the army of General McDowell, defeated by the Confederates under Beauregard and Johnston, on the 21st July, is estimated by well-informed officers, as for example by Brigadier-General Barnard, at about 30,000 men. In artillery it was miserably deficient, having, says an experienced eye-witness, "not more than five complete batteries, or six batteries including scratch guns, and these of different calibre, badly horsed, miserably equipped, and provided with the worst set of gunners and drivers which I, who have seen the Turkish field-guns, ever beheld." It had no cavalry of any value, save a few regulars from the frontiers; no carriages for reserve ammunition; no adequate transportation service; no organized commissariat; and, above all, scarcely any staff-officers at all. So pitiably deficient was the army in this vital element of efficiency, that General McDowell himself was seen by Mr. Russell in Washington, looking after the arrival of some guns which he expected; and in the hottest and most important moments of the action on the 21st July, Colonel Burnside, then in command of a brigade, was forced to carry his own orders, having no aide-de-camp at his command! The troops had never been paraded or put through their evolutions by brigades; the line and company officers were, for the most part, totally inexperienced; and the great bulk of the troops were men enlisted for but three months, that being the limit set to the possible resistance of the South, by the heads of the Administration. Such was the evil influence exerted upon the temper of the troops by the tone of the Government in regard to the war, that the movement of General Patterson on the Upper Potomac, to prevent Johnston, at Winchester, from forming a junction with Beauregard at Manassas, was paralyzed by the point blank refusal of his troops to serve even for ten days beyond the expiration of their term of enlistment; while it is well known that certain Pennsylvania regiments were met on the day of the critical battle of the 21st, absolutely marching off the field, to the sound of the cannon, "because their time had expired."

And it was an army in this condition which the Administration and its friends in Congress, pliant to the impatient pressure of the ignorant public, literally compelled General Scott to launch against the enemy.

Who can properly describe the condition of this army when it had hurried and huddled itself back into Washington, beaten, broken up, "demoralized," and despairing? Had the Southern army been composed of veteran, disciplined troops, or had the Southern leaders been equal to the crisis of the tremendous revolution which they had begun, there can be little question that the army of the Union, notwithstanding the brief and creditable stand made by the reserve at Centreville, might have been speedily dispersed, and the cities of Washington and Baltimore captured by the victorious Confederates.

"If they had immediately advanced on Washington," says General Barnard, in his

sketch of the battle of Bull Run, "and immediately crossed the Potomac, and seized Baltimore (and they could command any number of troops, flushed with success, while all our three months' men were leaving us, and we had to organize a new army), they would have placed the Government in a situation from which it could with difficulty have extricated itself."

The work which Major-General McClellan found himself called upon to do when he reached Washington, cannot be more completely set before the mind of the reader than it is in these words of an officer by no means friendly to him, and upon whose systematically prepared evidence the Congressional Committee of Inquiry into the Conduct of the War lay great stress, as vindicating the subsequent course of the Administration towards the man on whom it had called in the extremity of the nation, for counsel and for safety.

General McClellan was indeed charged with the "organization of a new army," and this army was to be organized in the face of a success on the part of the enemy, which was sure to enable them to "command any number of men," and to put their active forces in the field on a footing of the highest efficiency, under an act of the rebel Congress which had sagaciously secured the enlistment of all troops for "three years or during the war," and under the administration of a President whose past experience as a graduate of West Point, as a soldier in Mexico, and as Secretary of War of the United States, had given him everything in the way of military knowledge and administrative skill, which the President of the Union lacked.

The first thing to be done obviously was, to provide for the safety of Washington. While ignorance and inexperience were noisily insisting all over the North upon the necessity of an immediate levy *en masse* of the Northern people, and upon the feasibility of "sweeping the rebellion into the Gulf" by a kind of Peter the Hermit's crusade, all intelligent soldiers at Washington saw that the immediate conditions of the problem had been profoundly modified by the disaster of July 21st. It was known to them that the advance of the Confederates upon the Capital was restrained by political influences and considerations, which might at any moment be overruled in favor of the obvious military feasibility and advantages of such a step. The maxim of Napoleon that "all capitals should be fortified," had a peculiar and peremptory application to the case of Washington; and however eager the country might be for a campaign in the field, and for the "crushing of the rebellion," General McClellan had the military sense to see and the moral courage to insist that months of incessant labor must pass away before we could possibly hope to resume active hostilities with any rational prospect of success, and that unless we gave precedence over all other considerations to the proper fortification of Washington, no amount of patriotic enthusiasm, or senatorial thunder, or of popular sacrifice would save us from the most dangerous blow which could possibly be struck at our domestic organization and at our consideration abroad.

But General McClellan was also perfectly calm and self-possessed in his estimate of the measures necessary to be taken to secure this object. It was not difficult for him to inoculate the President and the Cabinet with a decent concern for the safety of the Capital in which it was their duty personally to reside. But it was much more difficult for him to impress upon them a due sense of the proportion which ought to be borne by the measures immediately taken for the security of Washington to the general plans of campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. Napoleon has laid it down that a force of 50,000 men, with 3,000 artillerists, should suffice for the defence of a properly fortified capital against the attack of an army of 300,000 men, being about in the proportion of about one defender to six assailants. Assuming it to be altogether improbable that the Confederates would be able to attack the Federal city with an army of more than 100,000 men, General McClellan set down the numbers of the force necessary for the defence of Washington after its fortifications should have been completed, at 20,000 men, being in the proportion of one defender to five assailants. This estimate, though based on the soundest military principles, excited great uneasiness at the time when it was made in the minds of many eminent persons condemned by their station in life to inhabit Washington, and the influence of this uneasiness may be traced throughout all the subsequent relations of General McClellan with the Federal authorities.

General Barnard, in his capacity of chief engineer of the defences of Washington, bears the fullest testimony in his report to the promptitude and energy with which General McClellan, on his assumption of the command in July, 1861, set about developing and completing the fortifications of the Capi-

. Of the condition of these fortifications, d of the army at that moment, General cClellan himself thus speaks: —

"When I assumed command in Washing- n on the 27th of July, 1861, the number troops in and around the city was about ,000 infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 0 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field- tteries of thirty pieces.

"On the Virginia bank of the Potomac e brigade organization of General McDowell ll existed, and the troops were stationed at d in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and rt Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach's Mills, dle's Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ells- rth, with a detachment at the Theological minary.

"There were no troops south of Hunting eek, and many of the regiments were en- nped on the low grounds bordering the tomac, — seldom in the best positions for fence, and entirely inadequate in numbers d condition to defend the long line from rt Corcoran to Alexandria.

"On the Maryland side of the river, upon e heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, o regiments were stationed, whose com- nders were independent of each other.

"There were no troops on the important nallytown road, or on the roads entering the y from the south.

"The camps were located without regard to rposes of defence or instruction; the roads re not picketed, and there was no attempt an organization into brigades.

"In no quarter were the dispositions for fence such as to offer a vigorous resistance a respectable body of the enemy either in e positions and numbers of the troops, or e number and character of the defensive rks. Earthworks in the nature of 'tetes- pont' looked upon the approaches to the eorgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long idge, and Alexandria by the Little River rnpike, and some simple defensive arrange- nts were made at the Chain Bridge. With e latter exception, not a single defensive rk had been commenced on the Maryland le.

"There was nothing to prevent the enemy elling the city from heights, within easy nge, which could be occupied by a hostile lumn almost without resistance. Many ldiers had deserted, and the streets of ashington were crowded with straggling offi- rs and men, absent from their stations with- t authority, whose behavior indicated the neral want of discipline and organization."

The task of educing order and safety from this chaos of perils was, indeed, as a foreign observer styles it, "one of Herculean magnitude." But this task, great as it was, was but a part of the duty imposed upon the young commander of the Potomac army. Although Lieutenant-General Scott still retained the command of the armies of the Union, the President applied to General McClellan, almost immediately upon his arrival in Washington, to draw up a memorandum of a general programme of operations by land and sea, to cover the whole field of conflict.[1] This memorandum was handed by General McClellan to the President on the 4th of August, 1861. When it is remembered that this paper was written amid the diversified excitements of that fortnight of passion and fear, which followed upon the defeat at Bull Run; that it was written by a young commander, suddenly invested with the highest rank in the army, from which he had retired but three years before as a modest subaltern, and hailed as a hero of the Napoleonic order by the universal voice of press and people, in a country to which his very name had, six months before, been scarcely known; and that it was written for the eye of a President who looked upon the civil war as an evanescent absurdity, which must sooner or later disappear before the blast of the political trumpet, it is difficult to speak too highly of the modesty of tone, the sagacity of political insight, the just and patriotic temper, and the far-reaching military forecast which mark it.

One quality of General McClellan's nature shines conspicuously throughout this remarkable document: a quality admirable in itself, but which will appear still more admirable to the future student of our times when he shall contrast it with the spirit which colored and controlled the utterances and the policy of the leading partizans of the Administration when this paper was laid before the President. There is nothing here of those vehement and vulgar fulminations against "rebels and traitors," which weak and silly or malignant and designing men were then everywhere imposing upon the public sense, as evidences of loyalty and love of country. The general who lays before the President such a comprehensive and vigorous plan for the employment of the military forces of the nation, that all our subsequent successes have been achieved by acting in harmony with its conceptions, and

[1] It is a striking illustration of the spirit in which General McClellan is attacked by the organs of the Administration, that this obedience to the suggestion is charged upon him by Mr. Lincoln's authorized biographer as a proof of his "ambition and presumption!" *H. J. Raymond's Life of Lincoln*, p. 221.

our most lamentable subsequent reverses incurred by departing from their scope and tenor, exhibits throughout his formidable programme the most anxious desire for the mitigation of the horrors of war to all his countrymen, whether arrayed for or against the cause of their country — refuses utterly to look upon the angry and misguided populations of the South, otherwise than as citizens to be coerced into obedience to laws as truly designed for their own welfare as for that of their fellow-citizens from whom they have wrenched themselves away, and earnestly pleads for such a complete preparation of the national arms to strike, as shall make a single blow decisive, and terminate the war in one thorough and victorious campaign: and this not merely because a long war involves a fearful waste of human life and happiness and wealth; but because a long war must inevitably bequeath to future ages a fearful legacy of passion and vengeance and mutual hate.

As has been excellently said, by one who had himself passed through the terrors of a great revolution and the fiery furnace of a civil war: — "The most frightful feature of a civil war is not the blood which flows on every side, or the dead who strew the streets and roads, or the shattered walls of once happy homes — it is the passions which ferment in men's souls. Nothing is so terrible as the mutual hatred of those who were born to love one another. The sombre legend which begins the story of the world — the legend of Cain and Abel — seems to hover over these fratricidal conflicts, and to stamp them with a seal of infernal rage. In ordinary war men hate each other like enemies: in civil war they hate each other like brothers."

It is told of one of the noblest of the French Republicans of our own time, Jean Reynaud, that on the third day of that hideous battle of Paris, known as the "days of June, 1848," he was on his way to the National Assembly, when his attention was arrested by a terrible scene in the Place de la Concorde. The fiercest fighting of the day was just over. It was about four o'clock in the afternoon; a workman in his blouse, unarmed and inoffensive, was traversing the place, then occupied by a battalion of the National Guards from one of the provinces. At the sight of the blouse the rural soldiery cried out, "An insurgent! an insurgent!" and rushed upon the unfortunate man, bayonet in hand. Their officers vainly sought to restrain them. The wretched workman took to flight, and was distancing his pursuers, when some cuirassiers stationed near by, seeing him run at full speed, made up the minds that he had escaped from some captured barricade, and dashed directly athwart his path. In a moment the helpless fugitive was surrounded; sabres gleamed above his head, bayonets were thrust at him; his blood had already begun to flow, when suddenly, at the risk of his own life, a citizen forced his way through the excited throng, seized the unhappy workman, and, with the quickness of thought, threw over him the tri-colored scarf of a Representative of the French people.

At the sight of this scarf, the emblem not of a party nor of a passion, but of France herself, of the nation and of the people, the lifted weapons were dropped, and the destined victim was safe.

In the mind of General McClellan the banner of the Union was meant, like the tricolor of Jean Reynaud, to speak to all classes and sections of his countrymen, — in the midst of their passion, in the moment of battle, of victory, or of vengeance, — not for classes nor of sections, but of the republic of the nation, of liberty protected by law and of force consecrated by justice.

Read in the light of its author's spirit and with the eloquent commentary of subsequent events, how instructive a contribution is this memorandum to the right understanding of that "history" which Mr. Lincoln and his administration have for now four years been "making," and suffering to be made, for the people.

"MEMORANDUM.

"The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are usually engaged mainly in this: That the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on advantageous terms. In this contest it has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been spared the labor and expense of a great effort; now we have no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force and courage, and

mand all their resources. The contest gan with a class; now it is with a people, r military success can alone restore the for- r issue.

"By thoroughly defeating their armies, tak- g their strong places, and pursuing a rig- y protective policy as to private property d unarmed persons, and a lenient course to private soldiers, we may well hope for permanent restoration of a peaceful Union. it, in the first instance, the authority of the overnment must be supported by overwhelm- g physical force.

"Our foreign relations and financial credit so imperatively demand that the military tion of the Government should be prompt d irresistible.

"The rebels have chosen Virginia as their ttle-field, and it seems proper for us to make e first great struggle there. But while us directing our main efforts, it is necessary diminish the resistance there offered us, by ovements on other points, both by land and ater.

"Without entering at present into details, I ould advise that a strong movement be made the Mississippi, and that the rebels be riven out of Missouri.

"As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that entucky is cordially united with us, I would dvise a movement through that State into astern Tennessee, for the purpose of assist- g the Union men of that region, and of izing the railroads leading from Memphis the east.

"The possession of those roads by us, in onnection with the movement on the Missis- ppi, would go far towards determining the vacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the ean time, all the passes into Western Virgin- a, from the east, should be securely guarded, ut I would advise no movement from that uarter towards Richmond, unless the politi- al condition of Kentucky renders it impos- ible or inexpedient for us to make the move- nent upon Eastern Tennessee, through that State. Every effort should, however, be nade to organize, equip, and arm as many roops as possible in Western Virginia, in rder to render the Ohio and Indiana regi- nents available for other operations. At as arly a day as practicable it would be well to protect and re-open the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.

"Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be oc- cupied by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession. The importance of Har- per's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be very mate- rially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong, and effi- cient, because no capable general will cross the river, north of this city, when we have a strong army here, ready to cut off his retreat.

"To revert to the West, it is probable that no very large additions to the troops now in Missouri, will be necessary to secure that State.

"I presume that the force required for the movement down the Mississippi will be deter- mined by its commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more than 20,000 troops will be needed, to- gether with those that can be raised in that State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ulti- mately to occupy Nashville.

"The Western Virginia troops, with not more than 5,000 to 10,000 from Ohio and Indiana, should, under, proper management, suffice for its protection. When we have re- organized our main army here, 10,000 men ought to be enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac. Five thousand will garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and not more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the utmost, for the defence of Washington.

"For the main army of operations, I urge the following composition: —

250	regiments of Infantry, say	225,000	men
100	Field Batteries, 600 guns	15,000	"
28	regiments Cavalry	25,500	"
5	" Engineer troops	7,500	"
	Total,	273,000	

"The force must be supplied with the ne- cessary engineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of operations should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of, from point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong naval force, to pro- tect the movements of a fleet of transports in- tended to convey a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus, either creating diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach largely from their main body, in order to protect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval force should also coöperate with the main army, in its efforts to seize the im- portant sea-board towns of the rebels.

"It cannot be ignored that the construction

of railroads has introduced a new and very important element into war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular positions, large masses of troops from remote sections, and by creating new strategic points and lines of operation. It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, and such other, as the particular case may require. We must endeavor to seize places on the railways, in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten their sea-board cities, in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Confederate army.

"The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce important results in this connection. That advance, and the progress of the main army at the East, will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be encountered by each. The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions connected with cotton, is too well understood by the President and Cabinet, to need any illustration from me. There is another independent movement which has often been suggested, and which has always recommended itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian Territory upon Red River and Western Texas, for the purpose of protecting and developing the latent Union and free-state sentiment, well known to predominate in Western Texas, and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a free State. How far it will be possible to support this movement by an advance through New Mexico from California, is a matter which I have not sufficently examined to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identifying them with our cause, and cementing the bond of Union between them and the general government.

"If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to suggest the policy of an intimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico; their sympathies and interests are with us; their antipathies exclusively against our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to obtain from the Mexican government the right to use, at least during the present contest, the road from Guyamas to New Mexico. This concession would very materially reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific. A similar permission to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and th Rio Grande, would enable us to throw a co umn of troops, by a good road from Tampic or some of the small harbors north of it, upo and across the Rio Grande, without risk, an scarcely firing a shot. To what extent, if any it would be desirable to take into service an employ Mexican soldiers, is a question en tirely political, on which I do not venture t offer an opinion.

"The force I have recommended is large the expense is great. It is possible that smaller force might accomplish the object i view; but I understand it to be the purpos of this great nation to reëstablish the powe of its government, and to restore peace to it citizens in the shortest possible time. Th question to be decided is smply this: shall w crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate th war in one campaign, or shall we leave it fo a legacy to our descendants?

"When the extent of the possible line o operations is considered, the force asked fo the main army under my command cannot b regarded as unduly large. Every mile w advance carries us farther from our base o operations, and renders detachments neces sary to cover our communications, while th enemy will be constantly concentrating as h falls back. I propose, with the force which have requested, not only to drive the enem out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but t occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans; i other words, to move into the heart of th enemy's country, and crush out the rebellio in its very heart.

"By seizing and repairing the railroads a we advance, the difficulties of transportatio will be materially diminished. It is, perhaps unnecessary to state, that, in addition to th forces named in this memorandum, strong re serves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur.

"In conclusion, I would submit that the exigences of the treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such supplies as may there be obtained.

"Geo. B. McClellan,
"*Major-General.*"

While the organization of the Army of the Potomac was going on, to use the words of the Prince de Joinville, a most competent and candid witness of the mighty enterprise, "with a rapidity and a success which are extraordinary, when we think that the whole thing had

be accomplished without any assistance
the past; the whole fabric of the West-
armies had also to be constructed. The
stern States, though abounding in men and
patriotic fervor, were still more destitute of
he materials of war than the Eastern; and,
ough General McClellan was not formally
sted with the rank of commander-in-chief
il the month of November, he performed
greater part of the then inconceivably oner-
duties of that office almost from the first
nent of his taking command in Washing-
His suggestions were not always adopted,
plans were subjected to revision and mod-
tion at the hands of the President, and of
those whom the President chose to take
his military confidence. But the solid
k of organization, — the creation, we may
y say, — of the commissariat service, the
nsportation service, the ordnance service,
artillery reserves, the engineer corps, the
toon corps, the telegraph corps, the topo-
phical brigade, the coast reserves, the hos-
l corps of such armies as no American had
r dreamed he should live to see assembled
American soil, — all this was put upon the
ulders of the young general. And to do this
k it was, that through good report and evil
ort while inquisitive senators frowned and
ted at his reticence, and arrogant journalists
nounced his imbecile inactivity, he labored
essantly through the long months of the
umn. A "Herculean task," truly, and
Herculean task of such a nature, too, that
popular eye, greedy of whatsoever is glitter-
g, sudden, and electrical, is slow to rest
h just approval and true appreciation upon
n who achieves it.

Whatever measures seemed really likely to
celerate the moment when the troops of the
nion could once more take the field with
id force enough to overcome the vast increase
momentum given to the rebellion by the
ak and ill-advised measures which brought
out the defeat of July 21, received a cor-
l support from General McClellan, no mat-
from what quarter they came to him.

Thus he urged upon the Secretary of War
appeal to the States for a draft such as the
onstitution had empowered the State authori-
es to make in case of need, and had the ap-
al been wisely heeded and answered, it is
ore than probable that such a law as the
onscription Act, passed by the Congress of
863, would never have been so much as
eard of among us.

Again, in September, 1861, the President
nd the Secretaries of War and of State be-
ame convinced that a project existed in Maryland for forcing an act of secession upon the legislature of that State, then about to meet at the city of Frederick. The evidences of such a project were collected under the authority of Mr. Cameron, the Secretary of War, and Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State; and having been laid by them before the President, it was judged expedient to order the arrest of certain members of the legislature more particularly implicated in the alleged conspiracy.

On the eleventh of September, Mr. Cameron sent the following letter to Major-General Banks, commanding our forces in Maryland:

"General: The passage of any act of secession by the Legislature of Maryland must be prevented. If necessary, all, or any part of the members must be arrested. Exercise your own judgment as to the time and manner, but do the work effectively.

"Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"Simon Cameron,
"*Secretary of War.*"

On the same day General McClellan was called into council with the President, the Secretaries, and General Scott, upon the subject; and it having been asserted to him by the highest functionaries in the land that Maryland was really about to be thrown into the tide of secession, his judgment, as a military man, as to what should be done, was necessarily prompt and clear. To permit even a possibility of the secession of Maryland in the rear of Washington, at the base of the whole army, and of all the operations then planning, was not for a moment to be thought of. The duty of ascertaining the reality of the danger rested not upon General McClellan, but upon his informants, the heads of the Government. The duty of preventing the danger asserted by them to be real, rested upon him, and it was done, promptly and vigorously done.

Circumstances have since come to light which make it very doubtful whether any such project as that denounced to General McClellan was really entertained at the time by the persons charged with being concerned in it. But the crisis at which General McClellan was called upon to act, forbade all hesitation on his part. He reinforced the order sent by Mr. Secretary Cameron to General Banks, with a letter from himself to that officer. The arrests were made, and the prisoners, mostly gentlemen of character, intelligence, and high standing, were properly turned over to the control of the Secretary of State. Under the orders of this functionary

and against the protest of the military officers, who upon the suggestion and at the request of the Federal authorities, had acted in the matter, these gentlemen were removed from their own State to Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, were treated with great indignity and indecency, and their guilt being assumed as unquestionable, were detained in a close and cruel confinement long after all danger from any possible evil influence of theirs in Maryland had passed away; no such opportunity being conceded to them of establishing their innocence as would have been granted to the meanest soldier accused of a violation of his military duty.

On the 1st of November, 1861, General McClellan was called to relieve General Scott of the general command of the armies of the Union.

This high distinction was conferred and this grave responsibility imposed upon General McClellan by the President, after three months of constant intercourse with him in the discharge of his duties as Commander of the Potomac army, and in consultation upon the affairs of the Union. It was a step which it would be doing the President great injustice to suppose lightly taken; and in taking it the President certainly assumed a substantial moral obligation to do all that might in him lie to make easier the task of the man upon whom he had deliberately imposed the onerous responsibility of the command of the armies of the Republic. History will one day pass her final verdict upon the character of the way in which that obligation was fulfilled by Mr. Lincoln. It will be enough for us to show what that way was.

The disastrous affair which had occurred at Ball's Bluff but a few days before President Lincoln conferred the supreme command of the forces upon General McClellan, ought to have warned the President of the danger of interference with the well-considered plans of a commander in the field.

In the beginning of the month of October, General McClellan had found reason to believe that the enemy were preparing to evacuate their positions at and about Manassas Plains. Watching the whole field of operations with an instructed and intelligent eye, he had not failed to perceive that the victory of July 21st, while it had given a certain spirit and prestige to the army of the Confederates actually in service, had indisposed the Southern people in general to making any particular efforts to increase their army, or to strengthen the hands of their government. They had been trapped by the successes of that day into a condition of careless self-confidence which must prove eminently advantageous to the cause of the Union if the renewal of active hostilities could be postponed until the Army of the Union should be strong enough to take the offensive at one and the same time against all the great points of Southern resistance. Little had been done towards adequately fortifying the Southern seaport New Orleans, the most important city of the South, was almost literally defenceless, and the whole Confederate army in Kentucky and Tennessee scarcely amounted to the strength of a single army corps. This being the general condition of affairs at the South, the Confederate Government perceived that it was absolutely necessary to the defence of their capital — Richmond — that the army under General Johnstone, at Manassas, should be kept prepared to fall back upon and cover that city, at the first intimation of a probable Federal movement for its capture by the way of the lower Rappahannock or the James and York Rivers. The value of the position at Manassas, as a base for offensive operations against Washington, had passed away during the inaction which was enforced upon General Beauregard immediately after his victory of July. The Southern army at Manassas had suffered so much from disease, and from defective organization, during the months of August and September, that it was in no condition, in the beginning of October, either to assume the offensive or even to join battle with a superior force advancing from Washington. In the very improbable contingency that General McClellan should suffer himself to be hurried by non-military influences into making the lamentable blunder of such an advance, General Johnstone had accordingly prepared himself to retreat at once toward his true base at Richmond.

Nothing of this was commonly understood at the North, where the continued presence of Johnstone at Manassas was perpetually denounced as an insult, a menace, and a peril to Washington and to the Union; and President Lincoln was incessantly besieged with entreaties, more or less imperious, to command a direct movement upon the enemy.

On the 19th of October, General McClellan clearly conceiving the true state of the case, ordered General McCall to cover a grand reconnoissance in force to be made the next day from Drainsville. This reconnoissance was successfully made; and on the next day, October 20th, General Stone, occupying Poolesville in Maryland, was ordered to make a feint of crossing the Potomac in order to

fl the enemy at Leesburg in Virginia, which Jneral McClellan believed them to be, as ly in fact were, abandoning. This feint was de. But in making it General Stone em- yed an officer whose direct personal relations h the President, and whose official rank as enator of the United States seem to have led him into adventuring further than it s expected or intended he should go; and events of the next day, Oct. 21st, con- ted the simple reconnoissance of Edward's rry into the disastrous battle of Ball's luff, a battle fought, certainly, without the owledge or the orders of the commanding neral, fought where there was no direct mili- y purpose to be gained even by a victory; l fought with so little skill and judgment t it resulted in the complete and humiliat- g defeat of our troops by a body of the emy largely inferior in point of numbers d of artillery.

All that could possibly have been won by successful issue of this unhappy movement ould have been a stimulation of the public petite for "brilliant and exciting intelli- nce," and a powerful reinforcement of the ready formidable Aulic Council of military izens by whom the Government was sur- unded and the commanding general beset. s failure confirmed the exulting confidence the Southern troops in their own invincibil- y, and cast another shade of gloom over the avery which the defeat of Bull Run had ready clouded.

Good might, however, have come out of is evil, had the President learned from it e absolute necessity of trusting the control the armies implicitly to their nominal com- ander, and of abstaining himself, and caus- g others to abstain, from ignorant and im- atient interference with operations which nperatively demanded time for their ripening, nd unity of authority for their successful xecution.

Immediately after taking command of the rmies of the Union, General McClellan ddressed letters of instruction to Generals Halleck, Buell, Sherman, and Butler, com- anding respectively the departments of Mis- ouri and Ohio, and the expeditions of the outh Atlantic and the Gulf. In these letters he whole field of operations before the army is urveyed with masterly judgment, and the pecial part to be taken in those operations by ach commander, sketched out for him with learness and with precision, and, as subse- uent events have proved, with an almost narvellous sagacity. The restoration of pub- ic confidence in Missouri by a thorough reform in the military administration of that State, and the chastisement of corruption, the conciliation of the well-disposed population of Kentucky by a "religious respect for the rights of all;" the prompt and decisive occupation of Knoxville and East Tennessee, cutting off all communication between Virginia and the Mississippi; the reduction of Fort Pulaski in the Savannah River, and the organization of a formidable attack upon Charleston. These were the principal measures which General McClellan proposed to himself as the constituent parts of his grand campaign for the reduction of the seceded States to their allegiance to the Union.

Had these measures been carried into effect simultaneously in the spring of 1862, under the untrammelled supervision of a single military mind, and with forces adequate as well in point of preparation as in point of numbers, to the work, it is difficult to resist the conviction that they must have resulted in the complete prostration of the organized force of the Confederate States. As we shall shortly see, such was the condition of the Confederate armies at the time when General McClellan was maturing his plans, that the hastily prepared and somewhat hurriedly executed movements which were made in the West, under the direct authority of President Lincoln, in February and March, sufficed to make an impression upon the front of Confederate resistance in that quarter, which, had it been accompanied by an equal impact upon the eastern and southern bulwarks of the then loosely-jointed Confederate system, could hardly have failed to determine a speedy issue of the war. Won as they were, these isolated and premature triumphs in the West simply aroused the Confederates to a full sense of their danger. The great scheme of the war was broken up by them, and the nation expiated, in more than a year of desperate and costly efforts to master the Mississippi and open a way into Eastern Tennessee, the impatience which refused to recognize the infinite advantages of the delay which perfects concentration, over the desultory and incoherent energy which spends itself in ill-combined and in spasmodic efforts.

The period during which General McClellan really held command of the armies of the Union, and was really in a position to enable him to plan and prepare a campaign proportionate to the area of the war, extended over but a little more than two months. He was called to fill the post vacated by Lieut.-General Scott in November, 1861. Incessantly occupied with the details of the organization

of the main army, which was to be directly commanded by himself, General McClellan was, at the same time, burdened with the duty of supervising all the military preparations of the Union, and of elaborating the vast plan of campaign already sketched.

It is not surprising that, while sparing neither body nor brain in this collossal task, the young Commander-in-Chief should have overtaxed even his vigorous constitution. Towards the middle of December he contracted a serious illness, which, for a short time, confined him to his head-quarters at Washington.

During this time the political pressure upon the President, for an advance of the armies, became daily more and more vehement. The Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, left the Cabinet, and was succeeded by Mr. Stanton, who, while he professed the warmest regard for the young General in command of the armies, gave his most strenuous efforts in support of the external clamor which was driving the President towards a practical nullification of his influence and his authority.

Before General McClellan had fully recovered his health, and without any consultation whatever had with him, the President finally, on the 27th of January, 1862, succumbed to these demoralizing forces, and assumed himself the command of the national forces.

On that day he issued, from the Executive Mansion, the following War Order: —

"*Ordered*, That the twenty-second day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

"That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

From the moment of the promulgation of this most extraordinary order, the General whom it so peremptorily and so insultingly superseded, ceased, of course, to be respon ble for the conduct of any military operatic not carried on directly under his own ey and specially committed to his own dire control.

It is necessary to remember here that t armies thus directed to be set in motion up a given day, thus publicly announced to fo and friends alike, were made up of ma thousands of men entirely unfamiliar wi war, and commanded, for the most part, l officers as inexperienced as themselves.

The few "veterans" of this host were no whose nominal service, under armies, had date of but from four to five months. As the condition of these great branches of t military service, on which the practicability c moving such a force must have been absolut ly dependent, had the troops been troops c the line inured to war, no one could possibl form an intelligent notion, excepting the co manding general, under whom they had bee organized, and who, as we have seen, was n so much as consulted upon the subject.

Viewed in the light of these consideration this singular Order would seem as unaccoun able in itself as it is certainly unique i the history of human warfare, were not a adequate, if not a satisfactory, explanation c its origin and intent furnished to us by on of the most intrepid defenders of Mr. Lincol and his administration.

In his "Life of President Lincoln," Mr Raymond, of New York, thus simply an clearly states the case: —

"As winter approached without any indi cations of an intended movement of our ar mies, the public impatience rose to the high mt point of discontent. The Administratio was everywhere held responsible for thes unaccountable delays, and was freely charge by its opponents, with a design to protrac the war for selfish political purposes of its own; *and at the fall elections the public dissatisfaction made itself manifest by adverse votes in every considerable State where elections were held.*"

From the moment when considerations of political and partizan expediency thus invaded the great question of the conduct of the war in the mind of the President, all harmonious concert of action between that functionary and General McClellan necessarily came to an end. With such considerations General McClellan, as an honest and single-minded soldier laboring solely for the defeat of the armed enemies of the Union, had and could have nothing whatever to do. The "public dissatisfaction," which "made itself manifest

adverse votes" in the fall elections of 61, had its origin in many other causes be- s the delays in the movement of our ies. The civil administration of the gov- nent had been conducted with an extraor- ry recklessness alike of the laws of the l and of the liberties of the citizens, while bare fact of the civil war itself necessarily k the public confidence in the statesman- of a party whose leading representative openly laughed the possibility of such a to scorn, and had predicted the complete oration of order throughout the nation within xty days" from the passage of the Ordi- ce of Secession by the State of South olina. To concentrate this "public dis- sfaction," if possible, upon the delays in movement of our armies; to brand those ys as "unaccountable;" and to fix the onsibility of them upon the commander he forces, was such a move in partizan tac- as seems to have tempted the Administra- into entire forgetfulness of the fatal conse- nces which it was to entail upon the public ice and the welfare of the state.

t would appear, too, that a singular con- nce in his own capacity as a military ler, was, at the same time, growing up in mind of the President. For, not content h assuming the general command, by clamation, of the armies of the Union, . Lincoln at once proceeded to assume the ct control of the campaign of the Army the Potomac in particular.

On the 31st of January, 1862, appeared President's Special War Order, No. 1, ched in the following terms: —

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 1862.

"*Ordered*, That all the disposable force of Army of the Potomac, after providing ly for the defence of Washington, be med into an expedition for the immediate ect of seizing and occupying a point upon railroad southwestward of what is known Manassas Junction; all details to be in the cretion of the Commander-in-Chief, and expedition to move before or on the twenty- ond day of February next.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Had the civil war been suddenly brought an end, by the submission of the South, be- a single movement had been made in the mpaigns of 1862, this "Special War Order, o. 1" would, doubtless, live in history as e most grotesque document which ever anated from a man elevated by his llow-men to a position of great trust and grave responsibility. The accredited biographer of Mr. Lincoln informs us that he distinguished himself in his early life by his bravery and skill in conducting the defence of a flat-boat on the Mississippi River against an attack made upon it by seven negroes. The remembrance of this exploit does not seem to have impelled the President to relieve our naval commanders of the responsibilities of their profession. And it is highly improbable that it would ever have occurred to the President had he found himself on board of the "Monitor," during her memorable conflict with the "Merrimac," to assume the command of that gallant little craft, and prescribe manœuvres of battle to Lieutenant Worden. Yet the brief land campaign against the Indians, in which we are assured that Mr. Lincoln once took a creditable part as a captain of militia, appears to have inspired him with the belief that he might reasonably and respectably undertake to handle one of the largest armies of modern times, engaged in one of the most formidable and difficult invasions upon record!

General McClellan has many times, in the course of his career, exhibited a power of self-command, and a forgetfulness of all merely personal considerations in behalf of his obligations to his country and to the troops under his command, which entitle him to a lofty place among those true heroes who have dared to feel that

"The path of duty is the way to glory."

But never, surely, were these qualities more keenly tested than they must have been by this "War Order," which at once shocked his common sense as a soldier, and outraged his self-respect as an officer high in command.

Before this "Order" was issued, General McClellan had explained to the President the plan of campaign which he intended to pursue in Virginia. Like the immortal Dutch Commissioners, who harassed the soul of Marlborough with their incessant interference in his campaigns, the President certainly had a right, in virtue of his position, to know what operations the general in command of his armies was about to undertake; but, like those high and mighty marplots, also, his Excellency abused this right into a warrant for assuming the control of those operations, objecting to them, and modifying all the conditions essential to their success. Had Mr. Lincoln consulted General Halleck on the subject of these pretensions of his, that officer, who has done his country the service of trans-

lating Jomini's great work on the "Art of War," might have enlightened him as to the limits of executive duty, with the following passage upon which the campaign of 1862, on the Peninsula, has furnished a commentary more striking than any which the elder history of war has bequeathed to us: —

"In my judgment," observes Baron Jomini, upon the part taken by the Executive Aulic Council, of Vienna, in directing the operations of the Austrian armies, "the only duty which such a council can safely undertake is that of advising as to the adoption of a general plan of operations. Of course I do not mean by this a plan which is to embrace the whole course of a campaign, tie down the generals to that course, and so inevitably lead to their being beaten; I mean a plan which shall determine the objects of the campaign, decide whether offensive or defensive operations shall be undertaken, and fix the amount of material means which may be relied upon, in the first instance, for the opening of the enterprise, and then, for the possible reserves in case of invasion. It can not be denied that all these things may be, and even should be discussed in a council of government made up of generals and of ministers: but here the action of such a council should stop; for if it pretends to say to a commander-in-chief not only that he shall march on Vienna or on Paris, but also in what way he is to manœuvre to reach those points, the unfortunate commander-in-chief will certainly be beaten, and the WHOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS REVERSES WILL REST UPON THOSE WHO, TWO HUNDRED MILES OFF FROM THE ENEMY, PRETEND TO DIRECT AN ARMY, WHICH IT IS DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO MANAGE WHEN ACTUALLY IN THE FIELD."

How completely the President, while leaving to General McClellan the nominal command of the Army of the Potomac undertook to direct that army, appears from the following note, sent by him to General McClellan, while the latter, animated by an honorable determination to remember only the respect due the exalted office of the Chief Magistrate, was preparing a paper in which his reasons for the movement he had resolved upon should be clearly set forth.

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, February, 3, 1862.

"MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN, —

"MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to mo directly to a point on the railroad southwe of Manassas.

"If you will give me satisfactory answe to the following questions, I shall glad yield my plan to yours.

"1st. Does not your plan involve a great larger expenditure of *time* and *money* th mine?

"2d. Wherein is a victory *more certa* by your plan than mine?

"3d. Wherein is a victory *more valual* by your plan than mine?

"4th. In fact would it not be *less* valuab in this; that it would break no great line the enemy's communications, while mi would?

"5th. In case of disaster, would not a r treat be more difficult by your plan th mine?"

"Yours truly,
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

It will be observed that there is no que tion, in this strange note, of the general o jects of the campaign about to be undertake of the nature, whether offensive or defensiv of the operation about to be begun; nor of t material means to be provided for the ex cution of these operations.

The President desires the Commander-i Chief to discuss with him the way in whi Richmond, the admitted objective point the campaign, is to be reached. He assum that he is himself at least as good a judge t that way as the Commander-in-Chief can b and proposes, in fact, though not in form that General McClellan shall undertake execute not his own plan of operations, bu a plan of operations conceived by the sup rior military ability of the Chief Magistra of the republic. The importance of this not to a first comprehension of all the subsequen events not of the Peninsula campaign alone but of the whole war, cannot well be exag gerated.

It was answered by General McClellan, s far as concerned the Peninsula campaign, i the paper which, as we have already said, h was drawing up when it was handed in t him. It has been answered, so far as th welfare of the republic, the honor of ou arms, and the prospects of the cause of th Union are concerned, by two long and wear and wasting years of Herculean efforts thwart ed and misdirected; by the unnecessary expen diture of hundreds of millions of dollars diverted from the pursuits of industry an subtracted from the national wealth; by th

rt-breaking sickness of a nation's hope
erred; by the irreparable sacrifice of thou-
ds upon thousands of lives; answered in
od and tears from the heights of Freder-
sburg, and the plains of Manassas, from
wildernesses of Chancellorsville, and the
amed unnumbered graves of Spottsylva-
.

The paper presented by General McClellan
he Secretary of War, on the very day of
receipt of this note, is so full and manly
tatement of the whole case as it then stood,
l throws so clear a light not only on the
ble military history of the war as well
sequently to its date as before that time,
t it cannot be too often reproduced or too
efully pondered.

"HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
"WASHINGTON, Feb. 3, 1862.

HON. E. M. STANTON, *Sec'y of War*.

"SIR: I ask your indulgence for the
owing paper, rendered necessary by cir-
nstances.

"I assumed command of the troops in the
inity of Washington on Saturday, July 27,
61, six days after the battle of Bull Run.
ound no army to command; a mere collec-
n of regiments cowering on the banks of
Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dis-
ited by the recent defeat. Nothing of any
sequence had been done to secure the
thern approaches to the capital by means
defensive works; nothing whatever had
en undertaken to defend the avenues to
city on the northern side of the Potomac.
e troops were not only undisciplined, un-
lled, and dispirited; they were not even
ced in military positions, — the city was
most in a condition to have been taken by
lash of a regiment of cavalry.

"Without one day's delay I undertook the
ficult task assigned to me; that task the
on. Secretary knows was given to me with-
t my solicitation or foreknowledge. How
I have accomplished it will best be shown
the past and the present. The capital is
ure against attack; the extensive fortifica-
ns erected by the labor of our troops ena-
a small garrison to hold it against a
merous army; the enemy have been held
check; the State of Maryland is securely
our possession; the detached counties of
irginia are again within the pale of our
ws, — and all apprehension of trouble in
elaware is at an end; the enemy are con-
ned to the positions they occupied before the
saster of the 21st of July; more than all
is, I have now under my command a well
illed and reliable army, to which the desti-
nies of the country may be confidently com-
mitted; this army is young and untried in
battle, — but it is animated by the highest
spirit, and is capable of great deeds. That
so much has been accomplished, and such an
army created in so short a time, from noth-
ing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the
highest glories of the Administration and the
nation. Many weeks, I may say many months
ago, this Army of the Potomac was fully in
condition to repel any attack; but there is a
vast difference between that and the efficiency
required to enable troops to attack success-
fully an army elated by victory and intrench-
ed in a position long since selected, studied,
and fortified. In the earliest papers I sub-
mitted to the President, I asked for an effec-
tive and movable force far exceeding the
aggregate now on the banks of the Potomac.
I have not the force I asked for. Even
when in a subordinate position, I always
looked beyond the operations of the Army of
Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind
with a barren victory, — but looked to com-
bined and decisive operations. When I was
placed in command of the armies of the
United States, I immediately turned my at-
tention to the whole field of operations,
regarding the Army of the Potomac as only
one, while the most important, of the masses
under my command. I confess that I did
not then appreciate the total absence of a
general plan, which had before existed, —
nor did I know that utter disorganization and
want of preparation pervaded the Western
armies. I took it for granted that they were
nearly, if not quite, in condition to move
toward the fulfilment of my plans; I ac-
knowledge that I made a great mistake.
I sent at once, with the approval of the Ex-
ecutive, officers I considered competent to
command in Kentucky and Missouri, — their
instructions looked to prompt movements, —
I soon found that the labor of creation and
organization had to be performed there;
transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, disci-
pline, all were wanting: these things required
time to procure them. The generals in com-
mand have done their work most creditably;
but we are still delayed. I had hoped that
a general advance could be made during the
good weather of December; I was mistaken.
My wish was to gain possession of the East-
ern Tennessee Railroad as a preliminary
movement, — then to follow it up immediately
by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as
nearly at the same time as possible. I have
ever regarded our true policy as being that of
fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking

for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles, — but I prefer to strike at the heart. Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the Army of the Potomac. 1st. That of Washington, its present position, involving a direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions; or a combination of the two plans. The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks; an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now on his extreme right and left. Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river and near his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre (we might destroy the former), we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway communication.

"The fords of Occoquan, below the mouth of Bull Run, are watched by the rebels; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in rear (concealed by the woods), and the arrangement of his troops is such that he can oppose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has just been received, to the effect that the enemy are intrenching a line of heights, extending from the vicinity of Sangster's (Union Mills) towards Evansport. Early in January Sprigg's Ford was occupied by Gen. Rhodes with 3,600 men and eight guns. There are strong reasons for believing that Davis's Ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate, or prove, that the enemy anticipates the movement in question, and is prepared to resist it. Assuming, for the present, that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our columns (for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least five or six) can reach the Accotink without danger; during the march thence to the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills, this danger must be met by occupying, in some force, either the two first-named places, or better, the point of junction of the roads leading to the village of Occoquan. This occupation must be sustained so long as continue to draw supplies by the roads fr this city, or until a battle is won.

"The crossing of the Occoquan should made at all the fords from Wolf's Run to t mouth, the points of crossing not being nec sarily confined to the fords themselves. Shou the enemy occupy this line in force we mu with what assistance the flotilla can affor endeavor to force the passage, near the mout thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whc line, or be taken in flank himself.

"Having gained the line of the Occoquan, would be necessary to throw a column, by t shortest route, to Dumfries, partly to for the enemy to abandon his batteries on t Potomac, partly to cover our left flank again an attack from the direction of Acquia, an lastly, to establish our communication wi the river by the best roads, and thus gi us new depots. The enemy would by th time have occupied the line of the Occoqu above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in t force, and perhaps extending his lines sor what further to the southwest.

"Our next step would be to prevent the er my from crossing the Occoquan between B Run and the Broad Run, to fall upon our rig flank while moving on Brentsville. Th might be effected by occupying Bacon Ra Church and the cross-roads near the mouth Bull Run, or still more effectually, by movin to the fords themselves, and preventing hi from debouching on our side.

"These operations would possibly be resi ed, and it would require some time to effe them. As nearly at the same time, as pc sible, we should gain the fords necessary our purposes above Broad Run. Having s cured our right flank, it would become nec sary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for w could not leave it between our right flank ar the main body. The final movement on th railroad must be determined by circumstanc existing at the time.

"This brief sketch brings out in bold r lief the great advantage possessed by th enemy in the strong central position he occ pies, with roads diverging in every directio and a strong line of defence, enabling him remain on the defensive, with a small for on one flank, while he concentrates everythin on the other for a decisive action.

"Should we place a portion of our force i front of Centreville, while the rest crosses th Occoquan, we commit the error of dividin our army by a very difficult obstacle, and b a distance too great to enable the two par to support each other, should either be a

ced by the masses of the enemy, while
other is held in check.

"I should, perhaps, have dwelt more de-
dly on the fact that the force left near
gster's must be allowed to remain some-
re on that side of the Occoquan until the
isive battle is over, so as to cover our re-
t, in the event of disaster: unless it should
decided to select and intrench a new base
ewhere near Dumfries, a proceeding in-
ving much time.

"After the passage of the Occoquan by
main army, this covering force could be
wn in to a more central and less exposed
ition, say Brimstone Hill, or nearer the
oquan.

"In this latitude the weather will, for a
siderable period, be very uncertain, and a
vement commenced in force on roads in
rably firm condition, will be liable, almost
ain to be much delayed by rains and
w. It will therefore be next to impossi-
to surprise the enemy, or take him at a
dvantage, by rapid manœuvres. Our
w progress will enable him to divine our
poses, and take his measures accordingly.
e probability is, from the best information
possess, that the enemy has improved the
ds leading to his line of defence, while we
l have to work as we advance.

"Bearing in mind what has been said, and
present unprecedented and impassable
dition of the roads, it will be evident that
precise period can be fixed upon for the
vement on this line. Nor can its duration
closely calculated; it seems certain that
ny weeks may elapse before it is possible
commence the march. Assuming the suc-
s of this operation, and the defeat of the
my as certain, the question at once arises
to the importance of the results gained. I
nk these results would be confined to the
ssession of the field of battle, the evacua-
n of the line of the Upper Potomac by the
emy, and the moral effect of the victory;
portant results, it is true, but not decisive
the war, nor securing the destruction of
e enemy's main army, for he could fall
ck upon other positions and fight us again
d again, should the condition of the troops
rmit. If he is in no condition to fight us
ain out of range of the intrenchments at
ichmond, we would find it a very difficult
d tedious matter to follow him up there, for
would destroy his railroad bridges, and
herwise impede our progress through a
gion where the roads are as bad as they
ell can be, and we would probably find our-
lves forced, at last, to change the whole
theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces, and perfect his measures, at the very point where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared.

"II. The second base of operations, available for the Army of the Potomac, is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which affords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east.

"The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year.

"The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington (which is *very* unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours; all Virginia would be in our power; and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a position selected by ourselves; disperse or pass beneath the Caudine Forks.

"Should we be beaten in battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our flank is covered by the water, our right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only oppose us in front, we bring our fleet in full play.

"After a successful battle, our position would be, — Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting Burnside with Buell both by Raleigh and Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee and Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and Memphis.

The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charleston; to advance our centre into South Carolina and Georgia; to

push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans.

"We should then be in a condition to reduce, at our leisure, all the Southern seaports; to occupy all the avenues of communication; to use the great outlet of the Mississippi; to reëstablish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead of that of the rebels; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I ever had in view; this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish.

"For many long months I have labored to prepare the Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme. From the day when I was placed in command of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condition, that they, too, could perform their allotted duties.

"Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of landing which promises the most brilliant results is Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught; it is neither occupied nor observed by the enemy; it is but one march from West Point, the key of that region; and thence but two marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced. Should we fail in that, we could, with the coöperation of the navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us; for his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank of the river.

"Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can use Mob Jack Bay; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula.

"To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a large amount of cheap water transportation must be collected, consisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a different character from those required for all previous expeditions. This can certainly be accomplished within thirty days from the time the order is given. I propose as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing-place for the first detachmen to transport by water four divisions infantry with their batteries, the regul infantry, a few wagons, one bridge train, a a few squadrons of cavalry, making t vicinity of Hooker's position the place embarkation for as many as possible; move the regular cavalry and reserve art lery, the remaining bridge trains and wago to a point somewhere near Cape Lookou then ferry them over the river by means North River ferry-boats, march them over the Rappahannock (covering the moveme by an infantry force near Heathsville), and cross the Rappahannock in a similar wa The expense and difficulty of the moveme will thus be very much diminished (a savi of transportation of about 10,000 horses and the result none the less certain.

"The concentration of the cavalry, &c in the lower counties of Maryland, can l effected without exciting suspicion, and t movement made without delay from th cause.

"This movement, if adopted, will not all expose the city of Washington to dange

"The total force to be thrown upon t new line would be, according to circumsta ces, from 110 to 140,000; I hope to use t latter number by bringing fresh troops in Washington, and still leave it quite safe. fully realize that, in all projects offered, tim will probably be the most valuable consider tion. It is my decided opinion, that in th point of view, the second plan should b adopted. It is possible, nay highly probabl that the weather and state of the roads ma be such as to delay the direct movement fro Washington, with its unsatisfactory result and great risks; far beyond the time require to complete the second plan. In the firs case we can fix no definite time for a advance. The roads have gone from bad t worse — nothing like their present condition has ever been known here before — they ar impassable at present, we are entirely at th mercy of the weather. It is by no mean certain that we can beat them at Manassas On the other line, I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoraliz the enemy by forcing him to abandon his pre pared position for one which we have chosen in which all is in our favor, and where suc cess must produce immense results.

"My judgment, as a general, is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of thi movement. So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would pre

the move from Fort Monroe as a base — certain, though less brilliant movement, that from Urbana — to an attack upon Manassas.

I know that his Excellency the President, you and I, all agree in our wishes, and these wishes are to bring the war to a close, as promptly as the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire confidence in us. I am sure of it. Let us then look only to the great result to be accomplished, and disregard everything else. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"G. B. McClellan,
"Major-General Commanding."

At the time when this letter was written the Western armies of the Union were already in motion and, supported by the gun-boats, were beginning that campaign which, resulting in the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, compelled the evacuation of Nashville by the Confederates, and led to the bloody but indecisive battles of Shiloh and Pittsburg Landing. This movement, naturally enough, excited the public mind to a still greater impatience with what the Administration press persistently represented as the "unaccountable delays" of the Army of the Potomac, and still further indisposed the President to give the commander of that army the cordial support which he had a right to expect from the National Executive, and which was absolutely necessary to the success of its own far more important movements.

Awakening the Southern government and people to a lively sense of the peril impending over them, this campaign at the West accelerated the preparations of General Johnston in Virginia, for the evacuation of Manassas and redoubled his efforts to provide for the defence of the Confederate capital against any attack from the line of the James or the York Rivers. Against the loss of important opportunities thus incurred in consequence of the abandonment of General McClellan's plan of a general and simultaneous advance, must be set, however, the fresh confidence which the Western victories infused into the army of the Union, dispirited by the defeat of Bull Run. The advantages won over the enemy at Port Royal and at Roanoke Island, though not otherwise of any particular importance, concurred in producing this wholesome effect; and, had the correspondence at the beginning of February, between General McClellan, the President, and the Secretary of War, brought about a frank concession to the General of the powers necessary to enable him to act with freedom and with force, great results might still have been secured.

This, however, was very far from being the case. Mr. Lincoln, indeed, gave way so far as to permit General McClellan to endeavor to proceed with the necessary arrangements for opening his campaign from the Lower Chesapeake, but it was not until the 27th of February that the Secretary of War authorized the Assistant-Secretary, Mr. Tucker, to procure the transports and steamers for moving the forces to their new field of operations. Notwithstanding the urgent representations of General McClellan and of Mr. Tucker, nothing had, before this date, been permitted to be done towards accomplishing this vital preliminary work; and it is worthy of notice by all those who have thoughtlessly and ignorantly lent themselves to the outcry which partizanship has raised over the alleged "slowness" of General McClellan's movements, that in *thirty-seven days* from the time when the Government at last put the General at liberty to set about preparing his transportation, he had moved, with the assistance of Mr. Tucker, his whole army of

121,500 men,	44 batteries,
14,592 animals,	74 ambulances,
1,150 wagons,	

together with pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, luggage, and the like required for a force of this magnitude, from Washington to Fortress Monroe.

This was done with the loss of but eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore at near Fortress Monroe in a gale, — the cargoes, however, being saved.

Well may Mr. Tucker claim for this extraordinary achievement that, "for economy and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record."

While General McClellan was superintending and carrying out this colossal movement he was not, however, suffered to be entirely his own master, nor was he delivered from the torment of the Presidential plan of campaign. His own conduct, during this trying time, is admirably depicted by an observer whose competency and whose candor no man of intelligence and of character will be likely to dispute. The Prince de Joinville, an educated and accomplished military man, whose sole interest in the events passing before his eyes, beyond that of a deep and cordial sympathy with the cause of the Union, is that of a student of the political and military history

of his times, thus describes the position and the bearing of General McClellan, during the months of February and March, 1862.

"As the day of action drew near, those who suspected the General's project, and were angry at not being informed of it; those whom his promotion had excited to envy; his political enemies (who is without them in America?), in short, all those beneath him or beside him who wished him ill, broke out into a chorus of accusations of slowness, inaction, incapacity. McClellan, with a patriotic courage which I have always admired, disdained these accusations, and made no reply. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations in laborious silence."

On the 8th of March, while these preparations, as we have seen, were going rapidly forward, and at a moment when the completest freedom and the profoundest secrecy in regard to his movements were essential to the General's success, he was suddenly sent for by the President to learn that the whole matter must once more be reconsidered and debated. He had already been interrupted in the progress of the arrangements, begun on the 27th of February, by the importunities of the President and the Secretary of War, that he would secure the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and clear the Potomac River of the rebel batteries. In respect to the former, General McClellan fully showed, what events have since a thousand times confirmed, that the true defence of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad lay in the occupation of the Shenandoah, an occupation which his army, upon the eve of a great expedition, was not then in a condition to effect, for which it was the duty of the President, now proclaimed by himself to be Commander-in-Chief, to provide, and which, in spite of repeated lessons, the President has never since intelligently attempted to carry out.

In respect to the rebel batteries on the Potomac, established as they all of them were independently of the rebel base at Manassas, it had been long settled by the report of General Barnard, that their establishment "could not be prevented by the army." It was by the navy alone that the river could be cleared of them, unless the whole Army of the Potomac was to be employed in the task by "forcing," to use the words of General Barnard, "a very strong line of defence of the enemy, and doing all that it would have to do if it were really opening a campaign against them."

The President, however, kept insisting upon this latter operation, and General McClellan, on the 8th of March, 1862, called his di ional commanders into council at head-qu ters, at the request of the President, for purpose of discussing with them a movem towards the Occoquan upon the enemy's ri batteries. At this council the grand ulte movement to the Lower Chesapeake was cessarily revealed. Upon the consequen of this revelation, thus directly forced u General McClellan by the conduct of "Commander-in-Chief," the President, Prince de Joinville simply, but with a terri significance, remarks: —

"McClellan was then forced to explain projects, and the next day they were kno to the enemy; informed, no doubt, by one those thousand female spies who keep up communications into the domestic circles the Federal enemy, Johnstone evacuated M nassas at once."

Watchful as Johnstone had all the win been of the young commander, the value whose silent and patient preparations he co prehended far better than the petulant a headstrong politicians by whom General M Clellan was surrounded, this timely not enabled him to reach Richmond, and to c centrate his attention and his forces upon t Peninsular defences of that capital a mon before the Federal commander was suffered assume the initiative of his campaign.

Memorable indeed, on many accounts, w this ominous eighth day of March, 1862.

On the 8th of March General McClell was compelled, as we have seen, to make l plan of campaign known far beyond what h ever been esteemed proper or prudent in t annals of war.

On the 8th of March another blow w struck at his control of the army with whi he was to operate, in the publication by t President, again without consultation wi himself, of two more "General War Orders.

The first of these divided his army in army corps, and assigned to these corps the several commanders, thus practically takin out of General McClellan's hands the orga ization of his troops. The second tied u anew his whole campaign in the followin almost inconceivable manner: —

"Executive Mansion, Washington,
"March 8, 1862.

"President's General War Order, No. 3

"*Ordered*, That no change of the base o operations of the Army of the Potomac shal be made without leaving in and about Wash ington such a force as, in the opinion of th

eral-in-Chief and the commanders of army ps, shall leave said city entirely secure.

That no more than two army corps (about thousand troops) of said Army of the Po-ac shall be moved *en route* for a new base operations until the navigation of the Po-ac, from Washington to the Chesapeake y, shall be freed from the enemy's batteries other obstructions, or until the President ll hereafter give express permission.

That any movement, as aforesaid, *en route* a new base of operations, which may be ered by the General-in-Chief, and which y be intended to move upon the Chesapeake y, shall begin to move upon the bay as ly as the 18th of March instant, and the neral-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so ves as early as that day.

" *Ordered*, That the army and navy co-rate in an immediate effort to capture the my's batteries upon the Potomac, between shington and the Chesapeake Bay.

" ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

. Thomas, *Adj't Gen.*"

By the promulgation of his General War der No. 1, the President, had assumed the nmand of all the armies of the Union. By promulgation of this " Order No. 3 " he sumed the command of the campaign of the otomac.

A single comment upon one single clause this " Order " will suffice to show the owledge of military affairs, and the respect the feelings towards General McClellan nself, which presided over its composition. e " General-in-Chief," as General Mc-ellan is derisively entitled, is made " re-onsible " for the readiness of his army " to ve upon the Bay as early as the 18th of arch."

Now it will be remembered that the army uld " move upon the Bay " only by the lp of steamers and transports; that the resident had never consented to any " move-ent upon the Bay " at all until the middle February, there being at that time no ansport service whatever available on the otomac; and that the Secretary of War had ever authorized the establishment of a trans-ort service until the 27th of February, or ss than ten days before the publication of his " Order " which thus called upon Gen-ral McClellan to create, *within twenty days*, he complete sea transportation service neces-ary for an army as large as that with which he Allies first invaded the Crimea !

On the 8th of March, again, the *Merrimac* making her appearance suddenly from the port of Norfolk, — in which, as had been known for months to the Federal Navy Department, she had been raised from the bottom, refitted and equipped for a new and terrible experiment in naval warfare, — assailed the Federal fleet lying in those waters, scattered and discomfited the ships, and, for the moment, rode supreme over the lower James.

The engagement which took place the next day between the *Merrimac* and the *Monitor*, though it recovered the prestige of the Federal navy, and secured the safety of Fortress Monroe, failed to establish the power of the Naval Department to control the James River. General McClellan was thus compelled to modify the plans of his campaign, upon the calculation that the York River alone must make his line of water communication with his base at Fortress Monroe.

On the 9th of March Johnstone began to evacuate Manassas and Centreville. During the night of that day General McClellan ordered a general movement of the army towards the enemy's abandoned positions, less, of course, with the hope of being able to inflict any serious loss upon him, than in order to prepare the troops for their entry upon the great campaign before them. The observations which this movement enabled the General to make of the strength of the enemy's position confirmed him in the double belief that an advance upon those positions, during the winter, would have been extremely dangerous to the untried army of the Union, and that they had been held so long only that Johnstone might ascertain distinctly from what quarter Richmond was likely to be menaced. General McClellan's own language on this subject has acquired a weight, from the subsequent course of events, which demands its reproduction here : —

" New levies that have never been in battle cannot be expected to advance without cover under the murderous fire from such defences, and carry them by assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently falter, and are repulsed with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions in front of Washington, with the new troops composing the Army of the Potomac during the winter of 1861–2, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same army, though inured to war in many battles hardly fought and bravely won, has thrice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid.

" My letter to the Secretary of War, dated February 3, 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement to the enemy to retire

from his position at Manassas, and free Washington from danger.

"When the enemy first learned of that plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsular campaign, as at no former period, northern Virginia was completely in our possession, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the orders for an evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harrison's Bar, and were again left free to advance northward, and menace the National Capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defence of Washington is a Peninsula attack on Richmond."

While this movement on Centreville and Manassas was going on, another complete and formal change in the organization of the army was made by the President, the order making it, like so many preceding orders, being published without consultation with General McClellan, and coming this time to his knowledge through one of his aids-de-camp, who, having seen it in the *National Intelligencer* of March 12, 1862, telegraphed a copy of it to the General at Fairfax Court House.

The Order ran as follows: —

"Executive Mansion,
"Washington, March 11, 1862.

"*President's War Order, No.* 3.

"Major-General McClellan, having personally taken the field, at the head of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining command of the Department of the Potomac.

"*Ordered, further*, That the departments, now under the respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Department of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command of said department.

"*Ordered, also*, That the country west of the Department of the Mississippi be a military department, to be called the Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded by Major-General Fremont.

"That all the commanders of the departments, after the receipt of this order by them, respectively report, severally and directly, to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of and each of them.

"Abraham Lincoln."

When it is remembered that the Presid had permitted General McClellan to "t the field" two days before this order issued, without the slightest intimation t any such change in the organization of army was contemplated, it would certai seem to be unnecessary to look elsewh than to the habitual state of mind of Chief Executive of the nation for an adequ explanation of the "unaccountable delay disappointments, and deceptions which h unhappily marked the course of the under Mr. Lincoln's administration of affai

General McClellan met this fresh bl with his usual fortitude and patience.

On the 10th of August, 1861, being appe ed to by Mr. Lincoln to "withdraw," a let addressed, at his own request, to Gene Scott, on the subject of the then immin peril of Washington, General McClellan h replied: —

"Washington, Aug. 10, 186

"The letter addressed by me under d of the 8th inst. to Lieutenant-General Sco commanding the United States Army, w designed to be a plain and respectful expr sion of my views of the measures demand for the safety of the Government in the imm nent peril that besets it at the present ho Every moment's reflection and every f transpiring, convinced me of the urgent nec sity of the measures there indicated, and felt it my duty to him and to the country communicate them frankly. It is therefo with great pain that I have learned from yo this morning, that my views do not me with the approbation of the Lieutenant-Ge eral, and that my letter is unfavorably regar ed by him. The command with which I a entrusted was not sought by me, and has onl been accepted from an earnest and humb desire to serve my country in the moment o the most extreme peril. With these views am willing to do and suffer whatever may b required for that service. Nothing could b farther from my wishes than to seek any com mand or urge any measures not required fo the exigency of the occasion, and, above al I would abstain from any conduct that coul give offence to General Scott or embarass th President or any department of the Govern ment.

"Influenced by these considerations, yield to your request, and withdraw the lette

erred to. The Government and my supe- officer being apprised of what I consider be necessary and proper for the defence of National Capital, I shall strive faithfully l zealously to employ the means that may placed in my power for that purpose, dis- ssing every personal feeling or considera- n, and praying only the blessing of Divine ovidence on my efforts."

In the same temper of single-minded devo- n to the duty which he had undertaken, neral McClellan now wrote to the Presi- nt, who was so recklessly and so wilfully ling with the gravest military interests of e nation, —

"I believe I said to you some weeks since, connection with some western matters, t no feeling of self-interest or ambition ould ever prevent me from devoting myself the service. I am glad to have the oppor- nity to prove it, and you will find that, nder frequent circumstances, I shall walk st as cheerfully as before, and that no con- leration of self will in any manner inter- re with the discharge of my public duties."

The way seemed now to be cleared at st for the grand movement of the Army the Potomac against Richmond by the ute upon which its commander had fixed.

The line of the Rappahannock and the anassas Gap Railway were left secure from l important menace by the enemy, and a ouncil of generals being held at Fairfax ourt House, March 13, 1862, it was greed that if the *Merrimac* could be neu- alized and the transportation arrangements peedily completed, the operations against ichmond, from Fortress Monroe, should be t once commenced. The proceedings of this ouncil were submitted to the President, by hom they were approved, upon condition hat Washington should be entirely secured, nd Manassas Junction occupied in suffi- ient force. General Banks was accordingly harged by General McClellan with the occu- ation of Manassas Junction, and the defences f Washington were put under the command f General Wadsworth.

At this time General "Stonewall Jack- on" was at Winchester, from which on the 12th of March, he retreated upon the advance f General Shields, and a brief campaign in he Valley of the Shenandoah followed, with uch results as, had that Valley continued to form a part of General McClellan's com- mand, and had the instructions given by him to General Banks been carried out, would have enabled the Union forces completely to clear the country of the enemy.

But the Valley of the Shenandoah was comprised by the President in a new Moun- tain Department, created by him at the re- quest of the political friends of General Fre- mont, and the lamentable events which speed- ily signalized that portion of the theatre of the war have no further connection with the grand campaign of General McClellan than the sinister influence which they exercised upon its fortunes, and for which the Presi- dent alone must be held finally responsible.

For the defence of Washington, General McClellan left a force in all amounting to 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery. His dispositions taken for the safety of the Capital being fully known to the Presi- dent and the Secretary of War, General McClellan was permitted by them to de- part on his way to the seat of operations with the fully implied understanding that these dispositions were satisfactory not to him- self alone, but to them. On the day after his departure, however, the President submitted these dispositions to two subordinate gen- erals, to be by them revised and passed upon, and upon their report proceeded to detach from the grand expeditionary army, and to detain at Washington no less than fifty thousand men, forming one full third of the force upon which General McClellan had been suffered to count not only in preparing his plan of operations, but in actually com- mencing his movement against the enemy. Had the President, in taking this step, been acting under direct instructions from the War Office at Richmond, he could not have more effectually forwarded the purposes of the ene- my. Restrained by the conventional pro- prieties of his position, General McClellan contents himself with describing it, in his offi- cial report, as a "fatal error." It was in truth "a fatal error;" but the circumstances attending a similar step which had been taken by the President a few days before, upon the eve of General McClellan's departure, will abundantly justify the use of sterner lan- guage from unofficial lips.

The division of General Blenker, 10,000 strong, had been attached to the Army of the Potomac during the whole time of the prepa- rations for the Peninsular campaign. "A few days before sailing for Fortress Monroe," says General McClellan, in his Report, "while still encamped near Alexandria, I met the President by appointment, on a steamer. He then informed me that he had been strongly pressed to take General Blenker's division from my command and give it to General Fremont. His Excellency was good enough

to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the division to remain with the Army of the Potomac. It was therefore with surprise that I received, on the 31st, the following note: —

"'EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"'WASHINGTON, March 31, 1862.

"'MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN, —

"'MY DEAR SIR: This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the case, I an confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment, that the Commander-in-Chief may order what he pleases.

"'Yours, very truly,

"'A. LINCOLN.'"

"To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and could ill afford to lose 10,000 troops which had been counted upon in forming my plan of campaign; but as there was no remedy, I would yield and do the best I could without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterwards, I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's division had been given to Fremont, from any 'pressure,' other than the requirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might leave, confident that no more troops beyond these 10,000 should, in any event, be taken from me, or in any way detached from my command.'"

What the "full pressure of the case" was to which the President thus confidently alludes, as his justification for an act at once insulting and unjust to the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, to that army itself, and to the whole country, whose dearest interests it imperilled; we may learn now from the best authority. In his "Life of President Lincoln," Mr. Raymond carelessly informs us that this thing was done "out of deference of the importunities of General Fremont and his friends, and from a belief that this officer could make a good use of a larger force than he then had at his command in the Mountain Department."

The bitterest opponent of Mr Lincoln and of his Administration may vainly ransack the vocabulary of contempt for phrases which shall intensify the terrible, though unconscious, sarcasm of this bland and indifferent paragraph. It will stand upon the record of o times forever in melancholy, but irrefragal proof that the leader of the finest army whi the Union had ever sent into battle, we forth upon the most important campaign the war for the Union at the mercy of "Commander-in-Chief" whose profound ign rance of the military art was only equall by his boundless confidence in his own geni for war, and whose inability to comprehend t relative importance of different operations the field was only less conspicuous than b subservience to political terrorism, and to t lowest considerations of personal expedienc in the Cabinet.

So vital is a distinct understanding of th fact to the just comprehension of all the su sequent events of the campaign of the Peni sula, that we may well pause at this point o our narrative long enough to fix the trut clearly in the reader's mind.

We have already seen that, while Gener McClellan has been commonly represented a having been in command of the armies the Union for the greater part of a year, h in truth, occupied that position for a litt more than two months. All the details o the practical organization of the vast forc contributed by the patriotism of the peopl to the policy of the President were, indeed confided to him. He was charged with thes serious, exhausting, and important, but obscur duties from the moment when he appeared a Washington upon the Macedonian cry of th paralyzed and panic-stricken Cabinet in July 1861, down to the time of his departure fo the Peninsula. But the formal authority t plan and direct the great campaigns of the army was committed to him on the first of November, 1861, and was withdrawn from him again before the middle of January, 1862, by the President, whose idea of the whole duty of the military head of the State is happily summed up in his own phrase, that "the Commander-in-Chief may direct whatever he pleases."

Upon resuming the absolute control of all the forces, the President proceeded to debate plans of campaign with the commanding general, suspending the necessary preparations for the most vital operations of the war until he had convinced himself by the verdict of a jury of twelve officers, that his own notions of the wise and practicable in war were not absolutely better and more profound than those of the young chieftain, of whom General Scott, even at a moment when the retiring veteran imagined that he had reasons to be

fended with his rising junior, had felt himself obliged to say that he possessed "very gh qualifications for military command."

When at last the President somewhat unaciously made up his mind not to insist on moving the army into the field by the assisted light of nature, he resolved that s own genius should still determine the rm in which that army should move; and volving this weighty matter in the recesses his own mind, he took such order upon it, on three successive occasions, completely odified all the conditions of the tremendous oblem which General McClellan was working out, at the most critical moments for the ccessful solution of that problem.

And this not by any means in exclusive obeence to such purely military inspirations as ay be supposed to have been vouchsafed to "Commander-in-Chief who could direct natever he pleased," but under the pressure strictly political considerations, utterly and tally foreign to the stern and serious busiss in hand.

How these considerations affected the nount of the forces dispensable by General cClellan for his campaign, Mr. Lincoln's endly biographer, Mr. Raymond, has alady shown us. From the same source we rive the following light upon the scarcely ss important conclusions which the President ddenly sprang upon the commander of the oops, in relation to the division of his army to army corps, and to the assignment of vaous general officers to the command of those rps.

Mr. Raymond favors us with the following tter, "never before," as he says, "made iblic," upon this subject: —

"FORTRESS MONROE, May 9, 1862.

"MY DEAR SIR: I have just assisted the ecretary of War in forming the part of a spatch to you, relating to army corps, hich dispatch, of course, will have reached u long before this will. I wish to say a w words to you privately on this subject. ordered the army corps organization not only the unanimous opinion of the twelve genals of division, but also on the unanimous inion of every *military man* I could get an inion from, and every modern military ok, yourself only excepted. Of course I d not, on my own judgment, pretend to unerstand the subject. I now think it indisensable for you to know how your struggle gainst it is received in quarters which we nnot entirely disregard. It is looked upon merely an effort to pamper one or two pets, and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them, that you consult and communicate with nobody but Fitz John Porter, and, perhaps, General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just; but, at all events, it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

"When you relieved General Hamilton of his command, the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally, that Senators and Representatives speak of me, in their places, as they please without question; and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them. But to return, are you strong enough, even with my help, to set your foot upon the neck of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you. Yours truly, A. LINCOLN."

Upon this letter it is only necessary to observe that General McClellan, as he shows us in his Report, had never opposed the organization of the army into army corps. He had merely insisted that it was necessary to test the merits of the divisional commanders under his orders before deciding upon their respective fitness to be trusted with the vitally important responsibilities of a corps command. Regarding the army under his orders as the hope of the nation in the field, and not as, in any sense, a machine for organizing political influence and power, General McClellan never permitted himself to reflect upon the view which "Senators and Representatives" might take of his action in regard to one or another office. He was absorbed in the duty of ascertaining and selecting the men to whom the lives of his soldiers and the honor of the country might be most safely entrusted.

Whether those whom he found reason to trust would be considered by their rivals as his "pets," or those whom he hesitated to advance would be regarded by their friends as his "victims," were questions which it would have forever and justly disgraced him, as a commander, to entertain.

The President looked upon the matter from quite another point of view, and being the "Commander-in-Chief, who could direct

whatever he pleased," he accordingly relieved himself of the "pressure" brought against him by "Senators and Representatives," and compelled the general commanding the army to accept such corps commanders as he thought fit to assign to the service.

It is with no invidious feeling towards any of the officers so assigned by Mr. Lincoln, that we call attention to the fact that of the four corps commanders, selected by the President, with the help of the "Senators and Representatives" afore-mentioned, every one has been removed from that high station since General McClellan was relieved of his command.

One of these generals, the brave and veteran Sumner, has been taken by death from the country he had so nobly served. He had previously, however, been removed by Mr. Lincoln from the command of his corps in the Army of the Potomac.

Another, General McDowell, has been sent by Mr. Lincoln to a post of comparative obscurity in the Far West. A third, General Heintzelman, has been assigned by Mr. Lincoln to the duties of a sort of grand police inspector in the States of Ohio and Indiana. The fourth, General Keyes, has been dismissed by Mr. Lincoln from the army of the Union.

Whether it would have been better for the fame of those commanders and for the general service of the Union that General McClellan should have been suffered to come to his own conclusions in respect to the rank which ought to be assigned to them after a practical experience in the field, is a question which the reader may be profitably left to ponder for himself.

General McClellan reached Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April. It had been understood that the troops at this point, 10,000 in number, under General Wool, were to compose a part of the Army of the Potomac. During the night of April 3d, a telegram from Washington announced that this understanding was revoked by the "Commander-in-Chief who could direct what he pleased"; and that General McClellan was deprived of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command. This order left the base of all General McClellan's operations under the command of another and independent general!

General McClellan, in his Report, tells us that "The council, composed of four corps commanders, organized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the Army of the Potomac upon Richmond.

For the prompt and successful executio of the projected operation, it was regarde by all as necessary that the whole of the fo corps should be employed, with at least th addition of ten thousand men drawn from th forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe that position and its dependencies being r garded as amply protected by the naval for in its neighborhood, and the advance of th main army up the Peninsula, so that it coul be safely left with a small garrison.

The President having thus been clearl informed, not merely by General McClella but by the four corps commanders whom h had himself selected from among the division generals for promotion, that, "for the promp and successful execution of the projecte operation, "it was *necessary* that the whole o the four corps commanded by these officer with at least ten thousand additional me from Fortress Monroe, should be employe how did it come to pass not only that one o these corps, and that the strongest of them was withdrawn bodily from General McCle lan's expedition, but that the general com manding it was nominated to the command of new and independent department, created e pressly for him? To withdraw nearly one third of the force "necessary" for the promp and successful execution of a great militar movement, was for the President to take upo himself the terrible responsibility of the fai ure of that movement. Ignorant as the Pre ident was of all military matters, and su rounded by counsellors no more enlightene than himself, some dim sense of this formi able truth, one would suppose, might hav dawned upon his mind. By what was th healing ray obscured?

"The order creating a new department fo Gen. Irwin McDowell," says the well inform ed New York *Times* of April 7, 1862, "is bu the culmination of a long cherished plan o the progressive Republicans." In othe words, the President of the United State deliberately assumed the dread responsibilit of ruining the most important campaign o the most important army of the nation, fo the sake of propitiating the most "progre sive" and impatient and annoying member of his own political party. This was so di tinctly understood at the time in Washingto that it was the subject of public as well a private conversation; and the following ex tract from the New York *Times* of April 1 1862, will show the pleasant and humorou light in which the trifling of the Commander

n-Chief who could "direct whatever they leased," and of "progressive Republicans," ho could control these Commanders-in-Chief ith the lives of our soldiers, the honor of heir generals, and the hopes of the nation as regarded by those who were at home beind the political scenes: "It looks now ery much as though the two Macs had been itted against each other, and it would be a ood joke, after all, if Banks's dashing movement down the valley should frighten the ebels out of Gordonsville, and drive them recipitately out of Virginia, thus cheating oth Macs out of a fight."

While the Administration and its friends at Vashington were taking these cheerful and ocose views of war, its responsibilities and s conditions, General McClellan, at Fortress Ionroe, was earnestly endeavoring to ascertain he truth in regard to the rebel forces before im, resolved to do his best with his army and or the country, in spite of official recklessess and executive injustice. He found this ask not much more easy than Lord Raglan ad found it before Sebastopol. His only roper dependence, of course, was upon the eports of General Wool, and General Wool, stonishing as it may appear, had no authentic r intelligent reports to give. He could prolect General McClellan's rear, but could hrow no safe light on the state of affairs in is front. On the 5th of April, for example, General Wool telegraphed to the Secretary f War: "The Army of the Potomac will not ind many rebel troops to contend with." On he 6th of April, he telegraphed: "General Magruder has thirty thousand men at Yorkown." Clearly, General McClellan was left to ind out all the conditions of the situation or himself. His engineer officers, headed by General Barnard, found the strength of the nemy's lines on the Warwick River and beore Yorktown so great, that it was "not leemed practicable to break them," and "too hazardous" to attempt the capture of Yorktown by assault.

The *Merrimac*, which the President had promised General McClellan should be neutralized by the navy, was still so far mistress of the James that the naval forces in Hampton Roads were entirely unable to assist the army in the reduction of the water-batteries of Yorktown and Gloucester.

In short, all the elements of the position in Virginia were so completely different from those upon which General McClellan had been officially led to count, that his whole plan of campaign had now to be re-cast in the face of the enemy.

The following letter from General Keyes, one of the four officers appointed by the President himself to the command of army corps, states the true condition of affairs at this time, so well, that we give it in full:—

"Head-quarters, 4th Corps.
"Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862.

"My dear Senator: The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that *four* army corps should be employed, and that the navy should cooperate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left by moving gun-boats up James River.

"To-day I have learned that the 1st Corps, which, by the President's order, was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d Corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations, and from the Army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy has not means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gun-boats up James River for fear of the Merrimac.

"The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by General McDowell and Brigadier-Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base.

"This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for.

"I command the James River column, and I left my camp, near Newport News, the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had not all arrived in camp the day I left, and, for the want of transportation, has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the advance; and in fact we marched so quickly and so rapidly that many of our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we are stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breastworks, erected nearly the whole distance, behind a stream or succession of ponds nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown and the other ending in the James River, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and, on the water side, it

and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either.

"The approaches on our side are generally through low, swampy, or thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to make, before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country.

"You will then ask why I advocated such a line for our operations? My reasons are few, but, I think, good.

With proper assistance from the navy, we could take Yorktown, and then, with gun-boats on both rivers, we could beat any force opposed to us on Warwick River, because the shot and shells from the gun-boats would nearly overlap across the Peninsula, so that, if the enemy should retreat, and retreat he must, he would have a long way to go without rail or steam transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be destroyed.

"Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Richmond.

"Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains command of James River, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can subsist it in the position it now occupies.

"You will see therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the navy would coöperate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite, now that the navy cannot coöperate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect!

"The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. Independently o the strength of the lines in front of us, an of the force of the enemy behind them, w cannot advance until we get command o either York River or James River. The eff cient coöperation of the navy is, therefore absolutely essential, and so I considered i when I voted to change our base from th Potomac to Fort Monroe.

"An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown and if several strong gun-boats could be sen up James River also, our success will be cer tain and complete, and the rebellion will soo be put down.

"On the other hand, we must butt agains the enemy's works with heavy artillery and great waste of time, life, and material.

"If we break through and advance, both ou flanks will be assailed from two great water courses in the hands of the enemy; our sup plies would give out, and the enemy, equal if not superior, in numbers, would, with th other advantages, beat and destroy this army

"The greatest master of the art of war ha said that 'if you would invade a countr successfully, you must have *one* line of opera tions and one army, under one general. But what is our condition? The State of Virginia is made to constitute the command in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz. Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside and McClellan, besides the scrap, over th Chesapeake, in the care of Dix.

"The great battle of the war is to come of here. If we win it, the rebellion will b crushed. If we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible than I care to foretell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means proposed, will certainly suc ceed. If any part of the means proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our success will be uncertain.

"It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st Corps to have a separate department, and, as this letter advocates his return to General McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to General McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, and I have from last July to the present day supported General McClellan and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good-will as though he had been my brother

r the friend to whom I owed most. I shall ontinue to do so to the last, and so long as e is my commander, and I am not desirous o displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the understanding hat he was to execute a definite plan of ampaign with certain prescribed means. The lan was good and the means sufficient; and, ithout modification, the enterprise was cer- ain of success. But, with the reduction of orce and means, the plan is entirely changed, nd is now a bad plan, with means insufficient or certain success.

"Do not look upon this communication as he offspring of despondency. I never de- pond; and when you see me working the ardest, you may be sure that fortune is rowning upon me. I am working, *now*, to ny utmost.

"Please show this letter to the President, nd I should like, also, that Mr. Stanton should now its contents. Do me the honor to write o me as soon as you can, and believe me, vith perfect respect,

"Your most obedient servant,

"E. D. Keyes,
"*Brig.-Gen. Com'g 4th Army Corps.*

Hon. Ira Harris,
"*U. S. Senate.*"

While General McClellan and his subordi- nates, in the field, were thus anxiously con- emplating the conditions and seeking the olutions of the problem before them, the Commander-in-Chief," in Washington, stood mazed at their hesitation. He saw what vas to be done at once, and suggested it, by elegraph, to General McClellan, in this light nd airy fashion: —

"Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 P. M.

Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, —

"Yours of 11 A. M. to-day received. Sec- retary of War informs me that the forwarding f transportation, ammunition, and Wood- bury's Brigade, under your orders, is ot and will not be interfered with. You ave now over one hundred thousand troops vith you, independent of General Wool's ommand. I think you had better break the nemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use time s advantageously as you can.

"A. Lincoln, *President.*"

This despatch, it will be observed, bears date April 6th. The "enemy's line," which the Commander-in-Chief who could "direct whatever he pleased," thus cavalierly recom- mended should be "broken at once," had only been discovered by our forces two days before, and is described by General Keyes, who led the advance, as "one of the strong- est ever opposed to an invading foe in any country." No trustworthy information being accessible to General McClellan as to the strength of the enemy behind this line, and General Johnston having had ample time, thanks to the premature revelation of General McClellan's plans, forced upon him by the "Commander-in-Chief," to throw his whole army, if it should have so pleased him, upon this point, General McClellan ventured to think that he might "use time" more "ad- vantageously" than in risking thousands of heroic lives upon the more than dubious as- sault of such a position.

The army and the country have since learned, in an agonizing experience of such "murderous assaults" at Fredericksburg and elsewhere, to appreciate the humane soldierly wisdom which declined to act upon Mr. Lin- coln's brilliant suggestion. It is the glory of General McClellan that, at a moment when a more vulgar mind might have sought popular *éclat*, and the favor of "Senators and Repre- sentatives," by hurling the army of the Union upon this bristling front of death, he chose that better part which all the *ex post facto* declamation in the world shall never take away from him; and the second siege of Yorktown crowns him, in the history of his country, with that title which was held especially honorable by the most warlike race of all time, — *Victor sine clade*, — the bloodless conqueror who had the moral courage to hold to what he felt to be wise and right while all the journals of "progressive Republicanism" rang with exul- tation over the sanguinary conflicts of Shiloh and Pittsburg Landing, and with insulting comparisons between the loud noise of battle at the West, and the silent but irresistible growth of "great designs" in the East.

These comparisons, too, be it remembered, were condensed and hurled at the young Gen- eral in despatches from the seat of govern- ment at Washington, as, for example, in the following characteristic letter from the Presi- dent: —

"And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to *you* that you strike a blow. *I* am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember, I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, in- stead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments, at either place

The country will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas repeated.

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act.

"Yours very truly,

"A. Lincoln."

Not less characteristic is the calm comment which General, McClellan, in his Report, makes upon this appeal to his selfish fears and hopes. "I could not forego the conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal consequences intimated in the President's despatch."

A speedier evacuation of Yorktown might have been forced upon the Confederates by a movement which General McClellan had planned of the corps of McDowell up the left bank of the York River, but the creation of the Department of the Rappahannock had made this movement impossible.

Finally, on the 4th of May, 1862, the overwhelming batteries of the Union army having just been completed, and ready to open, from all quarters, their irresistible fire upon the rebel positions, General Johnstone commanded the evacuation of Yorktown.

The news of this event was hailed with delight throughout the North, and in Congress a vote of thanks was moved to the General and to his army, by a member from the West belonging to the extreme section of the Republican party, Mr. Owen Lovejoy. Those who have since honored as a martyr this leader in their own faith now departed, are now not ashamed to deride the great and substantial victory which then moved him to this just and creditable action.

The evacuation of Yorktown was followed immediately by an advance of the victorious army as rapid as the horrible condition of the roads and the necessity of establishing a new base of supplies on the York River would permit. Having the advantage of the railway in his rear, and being much too strong in point of numbers to be easily pushed, in retreating through a friendly country, General Johnstone fell back fighting. General Sumner, in the front of General McClellan's pursuit, came with a small part of his corps upon the enemy strongly intrenched in front of Williamsburg. Such was the state of the roads, "narrow and full of frightful morasses from which it was difficult to extricate the cannon," says the Prince de Joinville, "although the weather had been fine and dry for several days," that no such thing as a general action was to be thought of in these virgin forests. The Confederate intrenchments were gallantly, but fruitlessly assailed by General Sumner's cavalry under General Stoneman. The infantry of Sumner came up too late in the evening to affect anything, and during the night one of those tropical rains began, which in the early spring so often convert whole square miles of country, in Eastern Virginia, into one immense lake. The next day was fought the battle of Williamsburg, begun, practically by accident, while the commander of the army was where his duty called him to be, in the rear, organizing and pushing forward the tremendous work of the general advance. The Union troops of General Hooker were first engaged, and although they fought with extraordinary gallantry, suffered terribly, and had begun to fall back when the battle was reëstablished by General Hancock, and by General McClellan, who, having been notified of what was going on, had made his way through incredible difficulties to the front, and appeared in person on the field at the decisive moment to secure the victory to the army of the Union. The Prince de Joinville thus paints, in simple but burning words, this critical and glorious scene:

"The Federal General Hancock, seizing the moment, cried to his soldiers, as he waved his cap, 'Now, gentlemen, the bayonet!' and charged with his brigade. The enemy could not withstand the shock, broke and fled, strewing the field with his dead. At this very moment General McClellan, who had been detained at Yorktown, appeared on the field. It was dusk, the night was coming on, the rain still falling in torrents. On three sides of the plateau on which the General was, the cannon and the musketry were rattling uninterruptedly. The success of Hancock had been decisive, and the reserves brought up by the General-in Chief, charging upon the field, settled the affair. Then it was that I saw General McClellan pressing in front of the Sixth Cavalry, give his hand to Major Williams, with a few words on his brilliant charge of the day before. The regiment did not hear what he said, but it knew what he meant, and from every heart went up one of those masculine, terrible shouts which are only to be heard on the field of battle. These shouts, taken up along the whole line, struck terror to the enemy. We saw them come upon the parapets and look out in silence and

notionless upon the scene. Then the firing ied away, and night fell on the combat, which, n America, is called the battle of Williamsurg."

The battle of Williamsburg was but an pisode in the march upon Richmond, and, n the circumstances of the case, could not ossibly have been any more than an epiode in that march. But it threw the elecric light of battle over that love of the rmy of the Potomac for its commander, hich had already developed itself, and hich has since inwrought itself so deeply nto the moral substance of that splendid rganization that, in spite of two years of ncessant obloquy, misrepresentation, and alumny poured out upon his head, the ame of General McClellan rings still like trumpet through its heart.

"It seems," observes one of the most rilliant of modern historical writers, that although by human contrivance a hole people may be shut out from the nowledge of momentous events, in which s armies are taking a part, there is yet a ubtile essence of truth which will perneate into the heart of a nation those kept n ignorance."

Through all the cloud, which partizan assion has raised about the name of Genral McClellan, through all the rolling and welling slanders of a partizan press, and he wordy mists of partizan reports on the onduct of the war, this truth has made its ray into the nation's heart, that the real istory of that arduous march through the wampy forests of the Peninsula, and of hat great siege which has made the rude ame of the Chickahominy immortal, is ritten in the love which the soldiers of IcClellan bear to their commander.

Criticism may assail this love; malignity nay denounce it; but impartial history has nly one verdict upon such affections. Their root is in reality — reality proved and ested by all that is sharpest and sternest n human experience. Their meaning is ncontrovertible. He who wins such affecions is worthy to have won them.

The progress of our sketch has brought us now to that portion of General McClellan's career which is best known to the public, which has been most discussed by friends and foes, and which has been most fully set forth by himself in his Report upon the Peninsular Campaign.

It is not necessary that we should here re-write, in detail, the history of the siege of Richmond. It has already, we trust, been made sufficiently clear that the course of policy pursued towards General McClellan and his army from the moment when, on the 8th of March, the President found himself constrained to waive the adoption of his own "plan," for the campaign against Richmond had made it impossible for General McClellan to look for success in his enterprise to anything like those bold and decisive movements by which, when untrammelled and at liberty to act, he had organized victory in Western Virginia. In the execution of such movements it is vitally essential that he who undertakes them should know precisely upon what amount of force he may count, and that he should be the absolute master of the dispositions of that force.

For General McClellan, in the face of his experience of the President's theory and practice of the "command-in-chief" of the armies, to have risked a single important manœuvre upon the belief that any one of the corps under his orders was so attached to his army that it might not at any moment be detached from him by telegram, for service in the Rocky Mountains of the West, or the sea islands of the South, would have been little less than a crime.

Immediately after the evacuation of Yorktown, the Confederates abandoned Norfolk, and blew up the *Merrimac*. The troops of General Huger, to the number of 18,000 men, were drawn in upon the main body at Richmond, before which city Johnstone prepared himself for a desperate stand on the formidable defensive line of the Chickahominy. The crew of the *Merrimac* were transferred to the naval batteries, which, suddenly thrown up at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, proved themselves, when assailed by the gun-boats and iron-clads of the Federal fleet, a not less formidable barrier to the passage of that river than the *Merrimac* in her time had been.

This repulse of the gun-boats, and this increase of the force assembled at Richmond, made it impossible for General McClellan, situated as he was, to venture upon the grand flank movement for transferring his base to the James, to which the destruction of the *Merrimac* would otherwise have invited him. Although his army had been reduced by the policy of the Administration far below the figure which had been deemed necessary to its safety by the President himself and his councillors, when the expedition was decided upon, it was

still however strong enough, with the aid of the gun-boats on the York and the Pamunkey, to threaten and advance upon Richmond, to drive the Confederates within the lines of their capital, and to compel them to a decisive battle whenever it should receive the reinforcements which it could scarcely be deemed the Government would hesitate to throw into its thinned but triumphant ranks.

"Who," exclaims the Prince de Joinville, with very natural amazement,—"who could foresee that the 80,000 men assembled before Washington, would do nothing and less than nothing to aid the army in overcoming the concentration of forces it was called upon to encounter?"

General McClellan urged the exigency of the position, in repeated telegrams, upon the President and the Secretary of War, as he advanced. Imperfect as all sources of information necessarily were in a country profoundly and passionately hostile to his army, he yet learned enough of the true state of things in Richmond to satisfy him that it was the intention of the Confederate government, reassured as they were, by the repulse of the gun-boats, as to the safety of their capital from an attack by the James, to concentrate all their available forces for defence on the line of the Chickahominy. The following telegram, of May 14, will show how his representations of these facts were received at Washington: —

"Camp at Cumberland, May 14, 1862.

"His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln,

"*President of the United States:*

"I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs.

"I beg leave to repeat their substance to your Excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information from every source accessible to me, establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my commanders whom I have been able to consult.

"Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position probably intrenched, a much larger force —perhaps double my numbers. It is possible that Richmond may be abandoned without a serious struggle; but the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond it may well be that it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia, south or west of there, and we should be in condition to press them without delay. The Confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States.

"I have found no fighting men in this Peninsula—all are in the ranks of the opposing foe.

"Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes of military occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly urge upon your Excellency that the opportunity has come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the Government. I ask for every man that the Government can send me. Any commander of the reinforcements, whom your Excellency may designate, will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject.

"I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them; but our triumph should be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their Government, and will fight well in its support; you may rely upon them. They have confidence in me as their General, and in you as their President. Strong reinforcements will, at least, save the lives of many of them. The

reater our force, the more perfect will be ur combinations, and the less our loss.

"For obvious reasons, I beg you to give mmediate consideration to this communi- ation, and to inform me fully at the ear- est moment of your final determination.

"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
"*Major-General Com'g.*"

To this telegram a reply finally came, ated May 18, and signed by Mr. Stanton, ho had now begun to rule the situation.

"WASHINGTON, May 18—2 P. M.

"GENERAL: Your despatch to the Presi- ent, asking reinforcements, has been re- eived and carefully considered.

"The President is not willing to uncover ie Capital entirely; and it is believed that ven if this were prudent, it would require ore time to effect a junction between your rmy and that of the Rappahannock by the ay of the Potomac and York Rivers, than y a land march. In order, therefore, to ncrease the strength *of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General McDowell has been ordered to march upon hat city by the shortest route.* He is or- ered, keeping himself always in position, o save the Capital from all possible attack, o to operate as to put his left wing in ommunication with your right wing; and ou are instructed to coöperate so as to es- ablish this communication as soon as pos- ible by extending your right wing to the orth of Richmond.

"It is believed that this communication an be safely established either north or outh of the Pamunkey River.

"*In any event, you will be able to prevent he main body of the enemy's forces from aving Richmond, and falling in over- helming force upon General McDowell.* He will move with between thirty-five and orty thousand men.

"A copy of the instruction to General McDowell are with this. The specific task ssigned to his command has been to pro- ide against any danger to the Capital of he nation.

"At your earnest call for reinforcements, e is sent forward to coöperate in the re- uction of Richmond, but charged, in at- empting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and you will give no order, ither before or after your junction, which an put him out of position to cover this ity. You and he will communicate with ach other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for suffi- cient coöperation. When Gen. McDowell is in position on your right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you will instruct your staff officers to be pre- pared to supply him by that route.

"*The President desires that General Mc- Dowell retain the command of the Depart- ment of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves forward.*

"By order of the President.

"EDWIN M. STANTON."

The sentences which we have italicized in this strange despatch are an apocalypse of the views which had prevailed in Wash- ington as to the Peninsular campaign. That movement against Richmond had now become entirely secondary in the minds of Mr. Lincoln and his advisers to the "de- fence of Washington." The commander of the Department of the Rappahannock was to vindicate the wisdom of the White House by moving against Richmond "by the shortest route," and Richmond was to be taken by his forces, those of General Mc- Clellan coöperating.

By advancing General McDowell on this route instead of sending him by water, the Administration, as a glance at the map will show, not only compelled General McClel- lan to abandon entirely all hope of taking advantage of the possible reopening of the James, but forced him to extend his right wing inordinately in order to meet and make his junction with McDowell march- ing from the north; drove him to the tedious and wasting work of bridging the Chickahominy, and finally exposed him, by the sudden withdrawal of McDowell's army, — which took place as soon as those peril- ous preparations for "coöperating" with it were fairly under way, — to the terrible blow which the Confederates eventually struck.

A telegram from Mr. Lincoln, on the 4th of May, put General McDowell under the orders of General McClellan, in the case of the junction of their forces, and announced that the Army of the Rappa- hannock would positively move on the next day but one.

While all this, however, was going on, the Confederates had not been idle. They had clearly ascertained that the relative importance of the operations on the Poto- mac and in the Shenandoah Valley, and of those before Richmond, was far from being understood at Washington, and they were

swift to take advantage of the discovery. General "Stonewall" Jackson appeared in the valley, and spread such consternation by his movements, that in the afternoon of the 24th of May the President telegraphed again to General McClellan, announcing that, in consequence of "Banks's critical position," he had been obliged to "suspend" McDowell's advance.

This change of purpose leaving General McClellan with a line immensely and dangerously extended, and entirely in the dark as to what he might ultimately expect in the way of support from McDowell, it became more than ever necessary for him to strengthen himself artificially, and to construct such a number of bridges over the Chickahominy as would enable him safely to hold both banks of that stream in order to guard his communications. Arduous at all times in the face of a powerful and active enemy, this work was made trebly arduous by the unprecedented state of the weather. Incessant rains, such as had not been known for twenty years, flooded the low and swampy banks of the Chickahominy and swelled that brook itself to a river. Still the General urged his men to their ungrateful toil, and still the men unmurmuringly responded to his calls. That the Army of the Potomac was to be left to itself to await, as best it might, the moment when the enemy should feel himself strong enough to assume the offensive, became daily more and more plain. Such was the panic spread by the dashing and eccentric demonstrations of Jackson, and such the profound obfuscation which he contrived to breed in the official mind at Washington, that he actually wrung from Mr. Lincoln, on the 25th of May, the following telegram: —

"WASHINGTON, May 25, 1862, — 2 P. M.

"MAJ.-GEN. MCCLELLAN: The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Gen. Banks before him; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas Gap Railroad from both north and south — in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and a concerted one, *such as could not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defence of Washington.* Let me hear from you instantly.

"A. LINCOLN,
"*President.*"

Possessed with an extraordinary infatuation as to the probability of the enemy's swooping down upon Washington by the way of Fredericksburg, the President, for some days, could not be made to comprehend that there was anything important in the world to be done excepting to cut the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. In vain did General McClellan urge some attention to the true principles of the defence of Washington, as laid down by him before leaving the Potomac. The whole concern of the Administration centred upon the city of the Rappahannock.

On the 26th General McDowell advanced beyond the Rappahannock, and the enemy in that quarter began to fall back toward Hanover Court House and Richmond. This rebel force, commanded by Generals Anderson and Branch, was considerable enough in numbers to threaten the right and rear of General McClellan's extended line, and he at once ordered General Fitz John Porter — justly described by the New York Times, as one of the "noblest, most painstaking, and trustworthy of our officers" — to attack and dislodge it.

General Porter performed this duty with signal success. The battle of Hanover Court House was fought by him on the 27th of May. The whole division of General Branch, about 10,000 strong, was utterly routed, and General Anderson, who was supporting him at Ashland, hastily retreated upon Richmond. The fugitives from these points carried the news of the disaster into the rebel capital, where it was universally supposed that the action indicated the junction of the army of McDowell with the army of McClellan. This belief threw the city into the greatest alarm and confusion. The roads leading to the South were crowded with escaping citizens, women and children; and had the junction of the two Union armies been really now effected and General McClellan been thus enabled to force a decisive battle for the possession of Richmond, it can scarcely be doubted that the place must have fallen into his hands. So well aware of this was General McClellan, that immediately after the victory he telegraphed to the Government — "There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can."

"It is the policy and duty of the Government to send me by water all the well drilled troops available. I am confiden

at Washington is in no danger. Engines d cars in large numbers have been sent to bring down Jackson's command.

"I may not be able to cut them off, but ll try; we have cut all but the F. & R. R. The real issue is in the battle about be fought in front of Richmond. All ir available troops should be collected ere, not raw regiments, but the well-illed troops. It cannot be ignored that desperate battle is before us; if any regi-ent of good troops remain unemployed it ill be an irreparable fault committed.

"G. B. McClellan, *Major-General.*
Hon. E. M. Stanton, *Sec'y of War.*"

On the next day, the 29th, having tained information that there was positively rebel force between Hanover Junction d Fredericksburg, he telegraphed this so to Washington. The President and ecretary of War, however, on the au-hority of certain contrabands, preferred to elieve that the rebels were not concen-rating on Richmond, but, on the con-rary, reinforcing the terrible Stonewall ackson, who might at any moment de-roy Gen. Banks, devour Gen. Fremont, nd annihilate Washington.

They accordingly threw away all the re-ults of the battle of Hanover Court House, y refusing to permit McDowell to join the Army of the Potomac.

Two years of waiting and fruitless efforts ave since atoned for the colossal blunder hen committed at Washington.

The golden opportunity offered to the ountry at the end of May, 1862, by Por-er and McClellan, has never since re-urned. The Confederates were not slow o avail themselves of the advantages held ut to them by the bewilderment and vac-llation of the Washington government. Gen. McClellan, as we have already seen, had been obliged to extend his line danger-ously, in order to meet the overland ad-vance of McDowell, and to attempt to hold both banks of the Chickahominy, in order to secure his own communications.

As soon as it was ascertained that Stone-wall Jackson had arrested the advance of McDowell, Gen. Johnstone at Richmond, at once determined to throw himself upon the weakest point of Gen. McClellan's position.

A rain-storm of unparalleled violence, on the night of May 30th, favored his de-sign. In a few hours the Chickahominy was converted into a roaring torrent. All the bridges of the Army of the Potomac, with a single exception, were rendered im practicable. The roads were destroyed. And on the 31st of May, the Confederates furiously assailed the left wing of Gen. McClellan's army at Fair Oaks. Gen. Casey's redoubts, in the advance of this wing, were stormed and carried; and after a desperate battle, in which the advantage rested with the Confederates, their victori-ous progress, threatening the absolute de-struction of the whole left wing, was arrest-ed with difficulty, just at nightfall, by the artillery of Gen. Sumner.

Night put an end to the conflict. Dur-ing the night an attempt was made to throw new bridges across the stream, and pass over the whole right wing of the Army of the Potomac. It was too late; the floods increasing prevented the execu-tion of the work. All that men could do General McClellan and his subordinates did. The General-in-Chief, rising from a sick-bed, spent the greater part of the night on horseback conferring with his generals and pushing on the operations. Snatching a slight repose towards day-break, he remounted his horse at the first sound of the guns, and appeared in the ad-vance of Sumner's corps when the battle began again in the morning; on the side of the Federal troops, with all the valor of des-peration; on the side of the Confederates in a fierce, confused disorderly fashion, attrib-utable to the fact, not then generally known to either army, that Gen. Johnstone, expos-ing himself with his usual gallantry, had fallen dangerously wounded. This circum-stance left the rebel army for a time with-out a recognized leader. Failing to over-come the determined resistance of the Fed-eral troops, the Confederates about noon on the 1st of June fell back in confusion on Richmond.

Thus ended the battle of Fair Oaks. Had it been possible for Gen. McClellan at this time to throw his right wing, with his artillery, across the Chickahominy, and advance upon Richmond during the two or three days of confusion which followed the failure of the Confederate attack and the fall of Gen. Johnstone, Richmond might have been seized and occupied.

Thanks to the confused and contradic-tory orders from Washington, by which his army had been forced to assume the posi-tion which it held before the battle, and to the tremendous rains of the 30th of May, this was simply impossible.

Gen. Lee succeeded immediately to the

command of Gen. Johnstone; the Army of the Potomac strengthened itself in its position; and on the 3d of June Mr. Lincoln kindly telegraphed to Gen. McClellan to keep a close eye "on the Chickahominy River!"

The first days of June passed on; continual rains surrounded the operations of the army with difficulties, which, as Mr. Stanton, on the 11th, telegraphed to Gen. McClellan, "No art or skill could possibly avoid, but only endure;" the reinforcements, so urgently needed, still failed to arrive.

So weak had now become the extended lines that, on the 13th of June, the rebel Gen Stuart, with 1500 cavalry and four guns, was able to make a clever circuit of the whole army.

Thoroughly appreciating the dangers of his position, and determined not to imitate the inaction which had paralyzed the army before Corinth, Gen. McClellan, after taking the precaution to order supplies to City Point on the James, in preparation for a movement which he was already meditating, to a new, safer, and stronger base, on that river, devoted himself to bringing on a general engagement before Richmond.

The Prince de Joinville thus describes some of the adventures which attended the preliminary reconnoissances now become necessary: —

"On one occasion," says the Prince, "the General had climbed, with several of his officers, to the top of a high tree, and there, every man on his branch, with spy-glass in hand, they had held a sort of council of war. This took place within a hundred paces of the hostile pickets, whom no attempt at observation could escape. We dreaded to hear the crack of the rifles of the famous Southern squirrel-shooters; but they were magnanimous, and the reconnoissance ended without a mishap. On another occasion, the staff of a Confederate commander appeared, simultaneously with our own, upon the banks of the Chickahominy. At once, the hostile gentlemen ordered up one of their bands, which played a popular air; but it was hardly ended before the musicians gave way to a battery, which, coming up at full gallop, opened a terrible fire, to which we soon responded. These examinations convinced us that the enemy was not idle, and that he had thrown up works, armed with heavy guns, precisely where we did not wish to see them."

During all this time General McClell was vainly attempting to convince t Government of the importance of co centrating all its efforts on the reductio of Richmond. He suggested that mov ment upon Atlanta which has since, aft two years, been adopted, as a means c compelling the enemy to divide the for which they were gathering up for t decisive struggle before their capit He reiterated his appeal for the coöper tion of McDowell, and his convictio that the movements of "Stonewall Jackson were designed to culminate i the sudden return of that commander t Richmond, when he should have su ceeded in preventing this coöperation.

Meanwhile, if the Army of the Pot mac, thinned by battle and disease, wa really to be left to itself, General McCle lan determined so to wield it that whe attacked, as he saw that he in that cas should be, by an overwhelming concen tration of the enemy, he might hold hi communications by the York River lon enough to enable him to change his bas successfully to the James. This once effected, he supposed, as he had a righ to suppose, that the Government a Washington, awakened at last to under stand the designs of the Confederate would finally abandon its strange, inco herent, and inconclusive military policy and throw the whole strength of th army upon this decisive point.

On the 25th of June, the bridge an intrenchments being at last completed, a advance of Heintzelman's corps brough on a smart action, preliminary to th general advance, which resulted advan tageously to the Federal troops. Bu in the evening of the same day McClel lan learned that Jackson, with 30,00 men, had reached Hanover Court House threatening his right and rear. Other rumors, some of them no doubt incorrect, were brought in to him, of the reinforcements pouring into Richmond; but the substantial truth that the Confederate Commander-in-chief had completely outwitted the Government at Washington, and was ready to pour his whole available force upon the devoted army before Richmond, was no longer to be questioned. On the next day, the 26th, the Confederates attacked the right wing of the army in force, and the retreat to the James began.

The forces which had been befooled

ıd beaten by Jackson, in the valley and ong the Potomac, were now consoli- ıted by the Administration into the Army of Virginia," a commander for hich army was sought in the person of eneral Pope, and the Army of the Po- ımac was left to Providence, to the skill its commander, and to its own heroic ravery.

The history of the seven days which llowed need not here be written. hrough every hour of that tremendous eek the army proved itself worthy of ıe firm reliance upon its conduct and s courage in which its General began ıe of the most dangerous and difficult ndertakings ever attempted in war.

"I was confident," says McClellan, in s Report, "in the valor and discipline my brave army, and knew that it ıuld be trusted equally to retreat or dvance, and to fight the series of battles ow inevitable, whether retreating from ctories or marching through defeats; short, I had no doubt whatever of its ility, even against superior numbers, to ght its way through to the James, and t a position whence a successful ad- ıce upon Richmond would be again ssible. Their superb conduct through e next seven days justified my faith."

How well the Army of the Potomac ight have borne itself through this ter- ble ordeal had it been commanded by "Congressional Committee on the Con- ıct of the War," or even by the adminis- ative officers who suffered Gen. Jackson paralyze for weeks with twenty thousand en the powerful armies of the Rappahan- ock, the Mountains, and Washington City, ight be an interesting subject of histori- l inquiry. By what qualities it was that ıe general who actually led them through week of battle and of victory, without ıe loss of a gun, unbroken in discipline, ıd unshaken in spirit, from positions hich the folly or the recklessness of their vn government had rendered untenable, ck to the most formidable base of opera- ons which has ever been held by an army the Union operating against Richmond, foreign witness, competent to the task, as very adequately set forth.

Mr. Motley, the accomplished Minister the United States in Austria, in October, 862, sent to Mr. Seward the following ex- act from the leading military journal of ıe Austrian Empire. "It is not to be ondered at, then, if the General-in-Chief of the Army of the Potomac was in haste to save the army intrusted to him from the dangers surrounding it, even from certain destruction; from a noose, in fact, which required only to be drawn a little closely together in order to suffocate the soul of the Union. The manner in which he acquitted himself of this most difficult of all military tasks redounds to his infinite honor, and places him at once in the ranks of those memorable commanders whose names history treasures for posterity; men who, if they have, perhaps, not had the art to chain victory to their banners, possessed, at any rate, the fortitude, the audacity, and the circumspection to rescue their armies from impending ruin. The American General has made a thorough study of war in the swamps of the Chickahominy, and has made himself a complete master in that most difficult of professions. He has manifested the unquestioned talent to save his army in a manner not sufficiently to be admired, out of the most desperate of situations. Moreau made himself immortal by his famous retreat from the Iller to the Rhine, in the year 1796. What is due to the American General-in-Chief, who conducted, with a morally and physically exhausted army through a swampy, pathless country, covered with ancient forests, and in face of an open enemy outnumbering him two to one, the most classical of all retreats recorded in military history, without a single disaster!"

The President of the United States seems to have conceived that this great achievement was adequately recognized in the following telegrams sent immediately after that magnificent victory of Malvern Hill, which dissipated all the hopes formed by the Confederates of the destruction of McClellan's army, and assured its quiet reorganization at its new base:—

"WASHINGTON, July 3, 1862—5 P. M.

"MAJ.-GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN,—

"Yours of 5.30 yesterday, is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, officers, and men have done the best you could. All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it."

"JULY 5, 1862—9 P. M.

. . . . . .

"A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches gave me. Be assured the heroism of yourself, officers, and men

is, and forever will be, appreciated. If you can hold your present position we can hive the enemy yet.

"A. Lincoln."

These despatches are the more significant that, coming as they did after a despatch sent by Gen. McClellan on the 28th of June, from Savage's Station, in which, standing amid the dead and dying of his heroic army, and "feeling in his heart," to use his own warm words, the loss of every brave man who had been needlessly sacrificed, he had plainly said to Mr. Stanton "you have done your best to sacrifice this army," the words of the President virtually indorsed this terrible indictment, and authorized the General, who made it to anticipate that the necessary means would be given him, to "hold his position and to hive the enemy."

But irresolute and vacillating as ever, the President speedily subsided into fresh acquiescence in the will of those who had determined to eliminate General McClellan and his army from the contest.

To the latter, after all that they had borne and done, no word of recognition or of gratitude came from the Government, and when their commander, after waiting many days, ventured to ask for them this simple act of justice, in the following touching words, no reply, whatever, was made to his request.

"Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the (7) seven days, and the recent retreat.

"No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing about me, merely give my men and officers credit for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They deserve it.

"G. B. McClellan,
"*Major-General.*

"Maj.-General Halleck,
"*Comd'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*"

During the whole month of July Gen. McClellan remained at Harrison's Bar, pleading for the reinforcements which were never to come; refused even the slightest light as to the future plans of the Government; and watching the po erful and vigilant enemy at Richmo with the full knowledge that they wa ed only the moment of the embarkati of his troops, should so mad a measu be adopted, to precipitate themselves force upon the "Army of Virginia," a overwhelming its boastful and incomp tent leader in the North.

Military literature has nothing m solemn, nothing which in the light of t misfortunes which, since it was writt have overtaken the country, can be garded as more wisely prophetic th the letter which, during this weary s son, General McClellan, on the 7th July, 1862, addressed to the President

All that he had affirmed in the h of victory among the mountains of W Virginia in respect to the true aims a policy of the war for the Union, Gene McClellan, in this letter, reaffirms with the weight of his subsequent, his sadd and his larger experience.

"Head-Quarters, Army of the Potoma Camp near Harrison Landing, Va., July 7. 1

"Mr. President, —

"You have been fully informed that rebel army is in our front, with the p pose of overwhelming us by attack our positions or reducing us by block our river-communications. I cannot regard our condition as critical, and earnestly desire, in view of possible c tingencies, to lay before your Excellen for your private consideration, my g eral views concerning the existing st of the rebellion, although they do strictly relate to the situation of t army, or strictly come within the sc of my official duties. These views amo to convictions, and are deeply impres upon my mind and heart. Our ca must never be abandoned; it is the ca of free institutions and self-governme The Constitution and the Union m be preserved, whatever may be the c in time, treasure, and blood. If secess is successful other dissolutions are clea to be seen in the future. Let neit military disaster, political faction, foreign war, shake your settled purp to enforce the equal operation of laws of the United States upon the p ple of every State.

"The time has come when the Gove ment must determine upon a civil a military policy covering the whole grou

of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

"This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of states, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for: pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes: all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

"This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

"A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

"Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

"The policy of the Government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

"In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

"I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you, and from love for my country.

"Very respectfully, your ob't servant,

"G. B. McClellan,

"*Major-General Comd'g.*"

The response to this letter was long in coming. But it came at last on the 3d of August, in this brief and imperative sentence from General Helleck, —

"It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek."

In the morning of the next day, Gen-

eral McClellan thus replied to this fatal order:—

"Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to Acquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause.

"I fear it will be a fatal blow.

"Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for so important a movement as this; and while they are in progress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my statements.

"This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of the gun-boats, I consider our communications as now secure. We are (25) twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle, until we have marched (15) fifteen to (18) eighteen miles, which brings us practically within (10) ten miles of Richmond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point (25) twenty-five miles; but with the aid of the gun-boats we can supply the army by water during its advance, certainly to within (12) twelve miles of Richmond.

"At Acquia Creek we would be (75) seventy-five miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

"From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about (70) seventy miles; for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land.

"The result of the movement would thus be a march of (145) one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only (25) twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and there appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, that this order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army it be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive.

"It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force, to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry, to those portions of the Army of the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here,—a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed,—it matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true defence of Washington; it is here, on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.

"Clear in my conviction of right, strong in the consciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated solely by love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before,—I entreat that this order may be rescinded.

"If my council does not prevail, I will with a sad heart, obey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty whatever skill I may possess.

"Whatever the result may be, and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country.

"G. B. McClellan,
"*Major-General Commanding.*

"Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck,
"*Major-General Comd'g U. S. A.*"

Vain entreaty! answered only by orders more peremptory and positive than the first, for the instant removal of the whole army. No adequate means of transportation having been provided by the Government for the execution of these orders, the movement went on more slowly than they wished.

This was regarded at Washington as a misfortune. In point of fact the delay probably saved General Pope from

still more crushing defeat than that hich he was soon to experience. For induced General Lee to doubt whether e removal from Harrison's Bar upon hich he was counting was after all real- to take place, and led him accordingly delay the movement of the mass of s troops from Richmond. On the 18th August General McClellan determined push forward two of his army corps, their return, as far as Yorktown by nd; and on the same day, there being longer any question as to the reality the raising of the siege of Richmond, e Confederate General Longstreet hur- d forward with his whole force to- ard the North.

General Porter, with the first of the ederal Corps which left Harrison's Bar, ving intercepted a letter at Williams- rg which led him to believe that the emy were massing themselves rapidly ainst Pope, pushed his men on without pause to Newport News, which he ached on the 18th of August, having arched his troops, with but one halt in ree days and one night, sixty miles, rough the tangled and swampy wilder- ss of the Peninsula. This was the me General Fitz John Porter who was stined to be afterwards persecuted out the army, with the honorable history which his name is indissolubly con- ected, on the charge of withholding his en from action in order to prevent eneral Pope from winning a victory!

After giving his last orders for the fence of the Peninsula, General Mc- llellan sailed for Aquia Creek, where he ported for orders, August 24th, 1862. hen he arrived there he found every- ing in the wildest confusion. To his quest for information as to the whereа- outs of the army, the General-in-Chief General Halleck) replied: "I do not now where General Pope is, or where ne enemy in force is." Two days af- rwards General McClellan, at the quest of the General-in-Chief, went to lexandria, where he was to take charge f the sending out of the troops, nobody eing able to tell him, however, where he troops were to be sent, or to whom. eneral Pope, indeed, scarcely seems o have known where he was himself. Ie had been fighting, or rather he had een fought, ever since the 10th of ugust, and it is a curious illustration f the way in which General McClellan's history has been written by his enemies, that Mr. Lincoln's biographer denounces him for not having begun to join Pope on the 10th of August, — the order moving General McClellan from the Peninsula having been issued exactly one week before that date, on the 3d of August!

The charge of delay brought against a general for failure to move ninety thousand men from the James River to Northern Virginia in the space of one week, is a brilliant novelty in the history of human accusations. The telegrams of General Halleck and the President to General McClellan, during the week which followed his arrival at Alexandria, tell a pitiful story of executive imbecility. Deprived of his command, charged with neglecting duties which he had no means of performing, and with failing to execute the most chaotic and contradictory orders, General McClellan was still called upon continually for light and counsel in the midst of the general darkness and hurley-burley.

On the 30th of August, for example, the War Department issued an order reducing General McClellan's command to his personal staff and about one hundred men. On the next day General Halleck telegraphed to him: "I beg of you to assist me in this crisis, with your ability and experience, I am entirely tired out." Without a murmur of dissatisfaction at the indecent treatment to which he had been subjected, General McClellan earnestly devoted himself to the task of bringing order and safety out of the chaos around him, — chaos so complete that it compelled him to telegraph to General Halleck, "There appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army." On the day before this decided despatch was sent, General Pope had contrived to loose fifteen thousand men. On the 1st of September General Halleck sent for General McClellan to come to Washington and take command of its defences. He went, and suggested the propriety of sending some one in authority to find out what had really happened to General Pope. The suggestion was adopted in the afternoon of the same day. The President requested an interview with General McClellan; came to General Halleck's house to see him; assured him that he had always been his friend, and begged the displaced com-

mander, as a personal favor, to use his influence with the Army of the Potomac to secure its coöperation with General Pope. General McClellan replied that the Army of the Potomac needed no such stimulus to its duty, but the President insisting, with tears in his eyes, General McClellan telegraphed to General Porter: —

"Major-General Porter, —

"I ask of you for my sake, and that of the country, and the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial coöperation to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our army are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful coöperation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.

"I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary.

"Geo. B. McClellan."

To this telegram General Porter replied: —

"Fairfax Court House,
10 A. M., Sept. 2, 1862.

"You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial coöperation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty.

"F. J. Porter,
"*Major-General Commanding.*"

The next day the President and General Halleck came to General McClellan's house with news from General Pope. They announced that everything was in the worst possible condition, the army retreating rapidly and in confusion upon Washington, and ruin impending over the country. The President implored General McClellan to take the whole matter into his own hands, assume command of the troops, and save the state.

Never, perhaps, in the history of the world, has a man of character and ability, dishonorably and unworthily de with by his official superiors, been so su denly and rapidly avenged by the cou of events as was General McClellan this moment.

A month had scarcely elapsed sin the constitution of the Army of Virgin under General Pope, had deprived h of his last hope of vindicating, by t capture of Richmond, the wisdom of plans of campaign against that city. that had been refused to him had be conceded to General Pope; and when was recalled from the Peninsula it w with the scarcely disguised intenti on the part of the Government to d miss him in disgrace from the servi So late as the 18th of August, the m tary authorities in Washington had ri culed the idea that Lee could possib venture upon an attempt to overwhe Pope, and to retaliate upon the No the invasion of Virginia.

A fortnight later the heads of t Government were kneeling to the G eral whom they had thus insulted a wronged, and praying him to relie them of a burden of command to wh their force was no longer equal.

That this was asked of him in no la and magnanimous spirit, is painfully e dent from the fact that no formal or reinstating him in the command of army was issued. He was merely pointed to the command of the "troo for the defence of the Capital."

But whatever the temper in whi the public servants of the Union set t Union's sore need before him, Gene McClellan saw that need and saw more. Making no conditions, no throwing himself on the justice a honor of the State, he accepted t dread responsibility of attempting rally a disorganized army and to be back with it an exulting and confide foe.

Getting at once into the saddle, Ge eral McClellan rode out to meet t retreating forces. He came upon Ge eral Pope in person at no great distan from the Capital, but could learn nothi from him as to the position either of t enemy or of our own men. It was n till long after nightfall that he succeed in gaining such a definite idea of the co dition of things as enabled him to beg to issue his orders. But the fact of

reappearance at the head of affairs was the signal of a sudden and astonishing change in the *morale* of the retreating troops. The soldiers of the Potomac army received him everywhere with enthusiastic cheers, the routed horde became a formidable host again, and before midnight of the 2d of September Washington was safe against any attack from the enemy.

The ulterior plans of Lee now began to develop themselves. His movements on the 3d of September indicated his intention to cross the Upper Potomac, thus threatening Maryland and Pennsylvania.

By the 7th General McClellan had restored the framework of the army sufficiently to enable him to take the field in pursuit of the adventurous invader It is curious to see that the same authorities who had so constantly pursued General McClellan with the charge of his excessive "slowness" to move during the spring and summer of 1864, now opened upon him eagerly for moving too fast and too far.

General Halleck, unwilling to give up his pet belief that Lee would never venture into Pennsylvania, followed General McClellan on his march with telegrams, urging such movements on his part as, if he had made them, would have resulted in the complete success of Lee's campaign of invasion. On the 12th of September the President sent him the following despatch: "Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the army is recrossing the Potomac. *Please do not let him get off without being hurt.*"

Three days before this despatch was sent, General Lee had issued his orders to his army for the capture of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the cutting off and seizure of Harper's Ferry, and the concentration of the main body in Maryland, at a point from which it would equally menace Baltimore and the heart of Pennsylvania. And at the very moment when the President was inditing this despatch, Stonewall Jackson was appearing in force before Harper's Ferry.

The disgraceful surrender of that place by Colonel Miles and Colonel Ford almost immediately followed, the post being given up to the Confederates at eight, A. M., on the 15th of September. General Franklin, moving by order of General McClellan to its relief, was then actually within three miles of the position of Maryland Heights, and within seven miles of Harper's Ferry, at a point in Pleasant Valley where his advance had rested the night before from the combat and victory of Crampton's Gap.

On the same day with the combat at Crampton's Gap, the battle of South Mountain was fought and won for the possession of Turner's Gap. In this battle, one of the best contested of the war, about 30,000 men were engaged on each side. Here fell General Reno, in whom says the commander, "the nation lost one of its best general officers."

The President acknowledged the tidings of this victory in the following characteristic manner: —

"War Department,
"Washington, Sept. 15, 1862 — 2.45 P. M.

"Your despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you. *Destroy the rebel army if possible.*

"A. Lincoln.

"To Maj.-Gen. McClellan."

The "rebel army," which the victors of South Mountain were thus requested to "destroy," was the same army, it will be remembered, which had destroyed Pope's "Army of Virginia," and thrown the Capital at Washington into a paroxysm of terror. The army invited to "destroy" it was an army which had become almost a mob but a fortnight before, and which had only been brought and held together in the advance upon a victorious enemy by the moral power which the name and the character of its commanding general exerted upon the men.

Two days afterward was fought the signal battle of Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, by which the whole Confederate plan of campaign was broken up; Maryland and Pennsylvania were delivered from the presence and the terror of the foe; and the triumphant and aggressive enemy, driven across the Potomac, was put once more upon the defensive. Never before had two such armies contended for victory on a single field in the new world. For fourteen hours nearly two hundred thousand men and five hundred pieces of artillery had shaken the solid earth, with their thunder of battle, among the Maryland hills.

The failure of General Burnside, on the left of the Federal line, to attack the enemy at the time when he was ordered so to do, and the subsequent delay of the same general in executing one of the vital movements of the day, prevented the Federal army from achieving the complete results of its victory. But the Army of the Potomac remained masters of the field of battle. Enough had been done for glory, enough for the safety of the State; and a thrill of triumph and of gratitude ran through the whole land.

On the next day the condition of the troops, as reported by their commanders, Meade, Sumner, Burnside, Hooker, and others, was not such as to make a renewal of the action desirable during this day, the 18th; reinforcements came up, though by no means in the numbers which had been expected, and General McClellan made his preparations for a fresh attack on the positions of Lee at daylight of the 19th.

But Lee had no disposition to risk another conflict at this point. After making a show, during the day, of moving over fresh troops from Virginia, Lee, under cover of the night, withdrew his army to the south side of the Potomac.

As the rebel lines were but a short distance from the river, this evacuation was effected without difficulty before daylight, and when the Federal advance reached the river, early in the morning of the 19th, it was discovered that their rear was then escaping under cover of eight batteries, placed in strong positions upon the elevated bluffs on the Virginia shore.

At dark on the same day a detachment from Fitz John Porter's corps crossed the Potomac, took the enemy's batteries, and drove back his supports a considerable distance.

After recrossing the river, General Lee, who knew how completely the army which defeated him at Antietam had been exhausted by its previous efforts and sufferings before Washington, concentrated his forces at Martinsburg and Winchester, and maintained a strong front to the foe.

On the 19th General McClellan telegraphed, "No fears need now be entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania." It is probable that those persons in power at Washington, whose obstinacy and incapacity alone had made it possible that "fears" ever should have been entertained for the "safety of Pennsylvania" found it impossible to forgive the man who had saved themselves and the nation from the fruits of their folly. But this as it may, the only acknowledgment vouchsafed to the deliverer of the North and to his heroic army, was the following telegram from General Halleck. It bears date Sept. 20, 1862, at a moment when the heart of the whole nation outside of the official councils at Washington was throbbing with gratitude to God and with admiration of the gallant chieftain and the gallant army to which, under God, the safety of the North was due.

"WASHINGTON, Sept. 20, 1862—2 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN,

"We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. You should keep me advised of both, so far as you know them.

"H. W. HALLECK,
"*General-in-Chief.*"

Patient as he was, General McClellan for his brave army's sake, could not tamely brook the tone of this peevish and insolent despatch at such a moment, and he replied at once in these sharp, but dignified words:

"I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch, I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault-finding, and that *you have not yet found leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or even to allude to them.*

"I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement.

"G. B. McCLELLAN,
"*Major-Gen. Comd'g.*"

Something of course must be pardoned to men who, being no more than mortal found themselves in the humiliating position into which the official superiors of General McClellan had now, by their real inferiority to that officer, been brought. The campaigns of Pope in Virginia, and McClellan in Maryland had demonstrated this inferiority, not merely to all other competent observers, but to these official superiors themselves. The President and General Halleck knew

at, but for General McClellan and the my which he alone had been able to hold gether, the beginning of September would ve seen them fugitives from Washington prisoners in Richmond; and it would asking too much, perhaps, of feeble hu- an nature to find fault with them for a rtain degree of restlessness and discomfort his presence.

But that they should have set themselves work, as soon as the safety of the North as assured, to find or make an occasion for priving its saviour of his command, was a ime against the state, the magnitude of hich is only to be measured by all that the tion has since been thereby called to bear loss, of suffering, and of shame.

Yet all the evidence in the case compels to believe that of this crime against the ate, the authorities at Washington will entually be found guilty at the bar of im- rtial history.

On the 22d of September the President sued his proclamation of emancipation, eclaring a general war against the social stem of the seceded States, to begin on e 1st of January, 1863.

This proclamation, of course, was utterly consistent with all those principles in edience to which alone General McClellan, his letter from Harrison's Landing, had xpressed his belief that the war could be onorably and successfully conducted. But eneral McClellan felt that this circum- ance only made it more imperative upon im to impress on the minds of his army e true nature of the relations between the vil and the military authorities.

"The principles upon which, and the bject for which armies, shall be employed suppressing rebellion," said General cClellan, in a General Order to his oops, October 7th, 1862, "must be etermined and declared by the civil au- orities; and the Chief Executive, who is harged with the administration of the ational affairs, is the proper and only urce through which the needs and orders f the Government can be made known to e armies of the nation. Discussions by fficers and soldiers concerning public meas- es determined upon and declared by the overnment, when once carried beyond mperate and respectful expressions of pinion, tend greatly to impair and destroy e discipline and efficiency of troops, by ubstituting the spirit of political faction r that firm, steady, and earnest support of e authority of the Government which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of the people at the polls."

"In carrying out all measures of public policy," added the General in conclusion, "this army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled their conduct towards the defenceless."

General McClellan's abstinence from interference in the civil policy of the Administration was not reciprocated by a similar abstinence on the part of the Administration from interference in his own military plans.

On the 1st of October the President visited General McClellan at his head-quarters, went through the camps, and went over the battle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam. It was upon this occasion that the President shocked the army and the nation by calling upon one of his suite to entertain him with certain comic songs while riding among the fresh graves of the soldiers who had fallen in the terrible battles of September.

The condition of the army was fully explained to the President, who recognized, or seemed to recognize, the absolute impossibility of moving now upon a new campaign of invasion in the face of an organized and powerful enemy, and who expressed his renewed and grateful confidence in its commander.

The army under General McClellan was indeed utterly worn down by the efforts which it had made. The main body was composed of the troops which General Pope had exhausted in his fatal campaign at the end of August. Hastily reorganized by General McClellan in the first week of September, the army had been marched through the mountains of Maryland to fight the fierce battles of South Mountain and Antietam. It needed everything that an army can need.

But the President, returning to Washington, caused his General-in-Chief to issue, on the 6th of October, an order directing General McClellan to "cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South."

The President, the Secretary of War, and General Halleck knew, when this order was issued, that it would not be obeyed, for they knew that it could not be obeyed. Whether they expected by issuing it to drive General McClellan into a resignation,

or were merely preparing a "record" to which they might afterwards appeal in proof of his "tardiness" and their own "energy" is, perhaps, a question. There can be no question, however, that the order itself was an outrage alike upon common sense and all military propriety. It was followed up, a week later, by another of those astonishing military letters of advice and instruction which President Lincoln seems never to have ceased writing until the success of General Grant in taking Vicksburg, a year afterwards, on a plan which his Excellency had not suggested, induced him to admit that a general in the field might sometimes understand what he was doing better than a politician in the White House.

Whether from neglect at Washington, or from an inadequate organization of the transportation service, the necessary supplies came forward to the army so slowly, in such small quantities, and in such poor condition, that the "horses," in one case, as General Meigs testifies, "remained fifty hours on the cars without food or water."

Before moving upon the enemy, General McClellan was extremely anxious so to guard the line of the Potomac as to put a stop to the possibility of those raids by the Shenandoah which have since inflicted, through three consecutive years, so much shame upon our army, and so much loss upon the people of the Pennsylvania and Maryland border. The importance of taking these precautions was increased in the mind of General McClellan by the fact that Bragg's rebel army was then at liberty to reinforce Lee, and so to enable him to do precisely what he has since done, not once nor twice, but regularly with the recurrence of the harvest season of the Shenandoah.

General McClellan urged this matter upon General Halleck at Washington. The only reply which the "General-in-chief" vouchsafed was the information that "no appropriation existed for permanent intrenchments," and a silly sneer to the effect that Bragg was four hundred miles away while Lee was but twenty.

On the 26th of October the army began to cross the Potomac, and marching on a line east of the Blue Ridge, the 7th of November its several corps were massed at and near Warrenton. "The army," says General McClellan, "was in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt whether during the whole period that I had the honor to command the Army of the Potomac it was ever in such excellent condition to fight a great battle." The Confederates under Longstreet, were directly in front at Culpepper, and the rest of Lee's army lay west of the Blue Ridge. The army and its General alike expected, with confidence and hope, the issue of a new and near impending passage-of-arms with their antagonists.

Delivered from the terror of Lee's presence in the North; reassured for the safety of Washington by the position of McClellan's army, and persuaded that victory must crown its next efforts, the Administration judged the moment come for striking down the General whom they hated, as men hate those whom they have injured.

Late on the night of November 7th, in a storm of wind and rain, General Buckingham reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He found the commander surrounded by his staff and by some of the generals of the army, and handed him a despatch of which he was the bearer.

Opening the despatch, and reading it without a change of countenance or of voice, General McClellan passed over to General Burnside a paper which it contained, saying, as he did so, "Well, Burnside, you are to command the army."

Of General Burnside, let it be said, that no man in the Army of the Potomac has ever more emphatically than himself denounced the fatal step by which he was called to take the place of a commander whose superiority he fully recognized; and whose well-earned hold upon the confidence of his whole army he knew could never be transferred to any other officer by the despatches of presidents or the order of "generals-in-chief." But of the officials who thrust upon the destined victim of Fredericksburg this fearful responsibility, and inflicted upon the hero of Antietam this unparalleled wrong, what can present condemnation say that shall not seem tame in the eyes of future contempt?

The order relieving General McClellan instructed him to repair to "Trenton in New Jersey."

A soldier to the last, he lost no time in obeying this injunction. On Monday, the 10th, he rode through the camps, and bade farewell to his tried and trusty men. Hatred itself has never ventured to question the evidence which the conduct of the army on that day bore to the merit and the char-

ter of its commander; and the "Fare-ll at Warrenton" will one day take its ace among the noblest subjects be-eathed by American history to American t, with the "Adieux of Fontainebleau" the fasti of France.

The words of General McClellan's Fare-ll Order are weighty with manly and astered emotion. No man can read them d fail to feel that in the heart from which ey sprang lies the true secret of that faith their commander which, in the soldiers Williamsburg and Fair Oaks, of Gaines' ill and Malvern, of South Mountain and ntietam, has lived through all their sub-quent experience of war, and defies alike e wasting influence of time and the ma-nity of remorseless and unwearied de-action: —

"Officers and Soldiers of the Army of e Potomac: — An order of the President volves upon Major-General Burnside the mmand of this army. In parting from u I cannot express the love and gratitude bear you. As an army you have grown under my care. In you I have never und doubt or coldness. The battles you ve fought under my command will oudly live in our nation's history. The ory you have achieved, our mutual perils d fatigues, the graves of our comrades llen in battle and disease, the broken rms of those whom wounds and sickness ve disabled, the strange associations hich can exist among men, unite us still y an indissoluble tie.

"We shall ever be comrades in support-g the Constitution of our country, and the tionality of its people.

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,
"*Major-Gen. U. S. Army.*"

Two years have passed since these brave and touching words were addressed by George Brinton McClellan to the Army of the Potomac. Reviled, calumniated, persecuted with an ever-increasing malignity during these two years; every act of his life sifted for a matter of accusation against him; every conspicuous officer of his old army who could be proved to be loyal to his merits, made the partaker of his disgrace, George Brinton McClellan has calmly waited in silence for the certain victorious vindication which time and the justice of the popular heart reserve for honor, forbearance, and fortitude in the long duel with power and calumny and corruption.

No word has he uttered, no line has he written during this long ordeal of patience, which fits not with the temper of all that he had said and written while wearing the triple stars and marshalling his great army for battle. From the dignified consistency of his civil record he speaks to-day to every American citizen as from the untarnished honor of his military career he speaks to every American soldier: "WE SHALL BE COMRADES IN SUPPORTING THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE NATIONALITY OF ITS PEOPLE."

With these words a deposed general, whom a faction in power sought in vain to disgrace, bade farewell to the grand army of the Union on the 7th of November, 1862. With these words a President elect, whom the nation has determined to honor, will greet the people of the Union regenerated and disenthralled, on the 7th of November, 1864!

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Whatever the determination of the Government may be, I will do the best I can with the Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 4½

WEST POINT ORATION,

BY

GEN. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

All nations have days sacred to the remembrance of joy and of grief. They have thanksgivings for success, fasting and prayers the hour of humiliation and defeat, triumphs and pæans to greet the living laurel-crowned victor. They have obsequies and eulogies for the warrior slain on the field of battle. Such is the duty we are to perform to-day. The poetry, the histories, the orations of antiquity, all resound with the clang of arms; they dwell rather upon rough deeds of war, than the gentle arts of peace. They have preserved to us the names of heroes, and the memory of their deeds, even to this distant day. Our own Old Testament teems with the narrations of the brave actions and heroic deaths of Jewish patriots, while the New Testament of our meek and suffering Saviour, often selects the soldier and his weapons to typify and illustrate religious heroism and duty. These stories of the actions of the dead have consequently survived, in the lapse of ages, the names of those whose fall was thus commemorated centuries ago. But, although we know not now the names of all the brave men who fought and fell upon the plain of Marathon, in the pass of Thermopylæ, and on the hills of Palestine, we have not lost the memory of their examples. As long as the warm blood courses the veins of man, as long as the human heart beats high and quick at the recital of brave deeds and patriotic sacrifices, so long will the lesson still incite generous men to emulate the heroism of the past.

Among the Greeks, it was the custom that the fathers of the most valiant of the slain should pronounce the eulogies of the dead. Sometimes it devolved upon their great statesmen and orators to perform this mournful duty. Would that a new Demosthenes, or a second Pericles, could arise and take my place to-day, for he would find a theme worthy of his most brilliant powers, of his most touching eloquence. I stand here now, not as an orator, but as the whilom commander, and in the place of the fathers of the most valiant dead. As their comrade, too, on many a hard-fought field against domestic and foreign foe, — in early youth and mature manhood, — moved by all the love that David felt when he poured forth his lamentation for the mighty father and son who fell on Mount Gilboa. God knows that David's love for Jonathan was no more deep than mine for the tried friends of many long and eventful years, whose names are to be recorded upon the structure that is to rise upon this spot. Would that his more than mortal eloquence could grace my lips and do justice to the theme!

We have met to-day, my comrades, to do honor to our own dead; brothers united to us by the closest and dearest ties, who have freely given their lives for their country in this war — so just and righteous, so long as its purpose is to crush rebellion, and to save our nation from the infinite evils of dismemberment. Such an occasion as this should call forth the deepest and noblest emotions of our nature — pride, sorrow, and prayer; pride that our country has possessed such sons; sorrow that she has lost them; prayer

that she may have others like them; that we and our successors may adorn her annals as they have done, and that when our parting hour arrives, whenever and however it may be, our souls may be prepared for the great change.

We have assembled to consecrate a cenotaph, which shall remind our children's children, in the distant future, of their fathers' struggles in the days of the great rebellion. This monument is to perpetuate the memory of a portion only of those who have fallen for the nation in this unhappy war — it is dedicated to the officers and soldiers of the regular army. Yet this is done in no class or exclusive spirit, and in the act we remember with reverence and love our comrades of the volunteers, who have so gloriously fought and fallen by our sides. Each State will, no doubt, commemorate in some fitting way the services of its sons, who abandoned the avocations of peace and shed their blood in the ranks of the volunteers. How richly they have earned a nation's love, a nation's gratitude, with what heroism they have confronted death, have wrested victory from a stubborn foe, and have illustrated defeat, it well becomes me to say, for it has been my lot to command them on many a sanguinary field. I know that I but echo the feeling of the regulars, when I award the high credit they deserve to their brave brethren of the volunteers.

But we of the regular army have no States to look to for the honors due our dead. We belong to the whole country, and can neither expect nor desire the general government to to make, a perhaps invidious distinction in our favor. We are few in number, a small band of comrades, united by peculiar and very binding ties; for with many of us our friendships were commenced in boyhood, when we rested here in the shadow of the granite hills which look down upon us where we stand; with others the ties of brotherhood were formed in more mature years, while fighting among the rugged mountains and fertile valleys of Mexico — within hearing of the eternal waves of the Pacific, or in the lonely grandeur of the great plains of the far West. With all, our love and confidence have been cemented by common dangers and sufferings, on the toilsome march, in the dreary bivouac, and amid the clash of arms, and in the presence of death on scores of battle-fields. West Point, with her large heart, adopts us all — graduates and those appointed from civil life, officers and privates. In her eyes we are all her children, jealous of her fame, and eager sustain her world-wide reputation. Gener and private soldiers, men who have cheerfu offered our all for our dear country, stand here before this shrine, ever hereaf sacred to our dead, equals and brothers the face of the common death which aws us all, perhaps on the same field and at same hour. Such are the ties which un us, the most endearing which exist amo men; such the relations which bind together, the closest of the sacred broth hood of arms.

It has therefore seemed, and it is fittin that we should erect upon this spot, so sacr to us all, an enduring monument to our d brothers who have preceded us on the p of peril and of honor, which it is the desti of many of us to tread.

What is this regular army to which belong?

Who are the men whose death merits su honors from the living?

What is the cause for which they ha laid down their lives?

Our regular or permanent army is nucleus which, in time of peace, preser the military traditions of the nation, as w as the organization, science, and instruct indispensable to modern armies. It m be regarded as coeval with the nation. derives its origin from the old continen and State lines of the Revolution, when with some interruptions and many chang it has attained its present condition. fact, we may with propriety go even yond the Revolution to seek the roots our genealogical tree in the old Fren wars, for the Cis-Atlantic campaigns of t seven years' war were not confined to "red men scalping each other by the gr lakes of North America," and it was them that our ancestors first participat as Americans in the large operations civilized armies. American regiments th fought on the banks of the St. Lawren and the Ohio, on the shores of Ontario a Lake George, on the islands of the Car bean and in South America. Louisbu Quebec, Duquesne, the Moro, and Po Bello attest the valor of the provinc troops, and in that school were educat such soldiers as Washington, Putnam, L Montgomery, and Gates. These and m like Green, Knox, Wayne, and Steub were the fathers of our permanent arm and under them our troops acquired th discipline and steadiness which enabled th to meet upon equal terms, and often

feat, the tried veterans of England. The udy of the history of the Revolution, and perusal of the despatches of Washing-n, will convince the most skeptical of the lue of the permanent army in achieving r independence and establishing the civil ifice which we are now fighting to pre-ve.

The war of 1812 found the army on a ting far from adequate to the emergency, t it was rapidly increased, and of the w generation of soldiers many proved ual to the requirements of the occasion. ndy's Lane, Chippewa, Queenstown, ttsburgh, New Orleans — all bear witness the gallantry of the regulars.

Then came an interval of more than thirty rs of external peace, marked by many nges in the organization and strength of the ular army, and broken at times by tedious l bloody Indian wars. Of these the most narkable were the Black Hawk war, in ich our troops met unflinchingly a foe as re-tless, and far more destructive than the lians — that terrible scourge, the cholera; l the tedious Florida war, where for so ny years the Seminoles eluded in their pes-ntial swamps our utmost efforts, and in ich were displayed such traits of heroism as t commemorated by yonder monument to de and his command, "when all fell, save ee, without an attempt to retreat." At t came the Mexican war, to replace Indian mbats and the monotony of the frontier ser-e, and for the first time in many years the ss of the regular army was concentrated, l took the principal part in the battles of t remarkable and romantic war. Palo to, Resaca, and Fort Brown, were the ievements of the regulars unaided, and as the battles of Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera uz, Cerro Gorda, and the final triumphs in valley, none can truly say that they could e been won without the regulars. When ce crowned our victories in the capital of Montezumas, the army was at once dis-sed over the long frontier, and engaged in rassing and dangerous wars with the In-ns of the plains. Thus thirteen long years re spent, until the present war broke out, l the mass of the army was drawn in, to be ployed against a domestic foe.

I cannot proceed to the events of the recent st and the present without adverting to the llant men who were so long of our number, t who have now gone to their last home, no small portion of the glory of which we ast was reflected from such men as Taylor, orth, Brady, Brooks, Totten, and Duncan.

There is a sad story of Venetian history that has moved many a heart, and often employed the poet's pen and the painter's pencil. It is of an old man whose long life was gloriously spent in the service of the state as a warrior and a statesman, and who, when his hair was white and his feeble limbs could scarce carry his bent form toward the grave, attained the highest honors that a Venetian citizen could reach. He was Doge of Venice. Convicted of treason against the state, he not only lost his life, but suffered beside a penalty which will endure as long as the name of Venice is remembered. The spot where his portrait should have hung in the great hall of the doge's palace was veiled with black, and there still remains the frame, with its black mass of canvas — and this vacant frame is the most conspicuous of the long line of effigies of illustrious doges!

Oh! that such a pall as that which replaces the portrait of Marino Faliero could conceal from history the names of those, once our comrades, who are now in arms against the flag under which we fought side by side in years gone by. But no veil can cover the anguish that fills our hearts when we look back upon the sad memory of the past, and recall the affection and respect we entertained toward men against whom it is now our duty to act in mortal combat. Would that the courage, ability, and steadfastness they display had been employed in the defence of the "Stars and Stripes," against a foreign foe, rather than in this gratuitous and unjustifiable rebellion, which could not have been so long maintained but for the energy of these, our former comrades.

But we have reason to rejoice that upon this day, so sacred and so eventful for us, one grand old mortal monument of the past still lifts high his head among us, and graces by his presence the consecration of this tomb of his children. We may well be proud that we have been commanded by the hero who purchased victory with his blood near the great waters of Niagara, who repeated and eclipsed the achievements of Cortez; who, although a consummate and confident commander, ever preferred, when duty and honor would permit, the olive branch of peace to the blood-stained laurels of war, and who stands, at the close of a long, glorious, and eventful life, a living column of granite against which have beaten in vain alike the blandishments and the storms of treason. His name will ever be one of our proudest boasts and most moving inspirations. In long-distant ages, when this incipient monument has become ven-

erable, moss-clad, and perhaps ruinous, when the names inscribed upon it shall seem to those who pause to read them, indistinct mementoes of an almost mythical past, the name of Winfield Scott will still be clear cut upon the memory of all, like the still fresh carving upon the monuments of long-forgotten Pharaohs.

But it is time to approach the present.

In the war which now shakes the land to its foundation, the regular army has borne a most honorable part. Too few in numbers to act by themselves, regular regiments have participated in every great battle in the east, and in most of those west of the Alleghanies. Their terrible losses and diminished numbers prove that they have been in the thickest of the fight, and the testimony of their comrades and commanders show with what undaunted heroism they have upheld their ancient renown. Their vigorous charges have often won the day, and in defeat they have more than once saved the army from destruction or terrible losses by the obstinacy with which they resisted overpowering numbers. They can refer with pride to the part they played upon the glorious fields of Mexico, and exult at the recollection of what they did at Manassas, Gaines's Mill, Malvern Hill, Antietam, Shiloh, Stone River, Gettysburgh, and the great battles just fought from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy. They can also point to the officers who have risen among them and achieved great deeds for their country in this war; — to the living warriors whose names are on the nation's tongue and heart, too numerous to be repeated here, yet not one of whom I would willingly omit.

But perhaps the proudest episode in the history of the regular army is that touching instance of fidelity on the part of the non-commissioned officers and privates, who, treacherously made prisoners in Texas, resisted every temptation to violate their oath and desert their flag. Offered commissions in the rebel service, money and land freely tendered them, they all scorned the inducements held out to them, submitted to every hardship, and when at last exchanged, avenged themselves on the field of battle for the unavailing insult offered their integrity. History affords no brighter example of honor than that of these brave men, tempted, as I blush to say they were, by some of their former officers, who, having themselves proved false to their flag, endeavored to seduce the men who had often followed them in combat, and who had naturally regarded them with respect and love.

Such is the regular army; such its history and antecedents; such its officers and men. It needs no herald to trumpet forth its praise it can proudly appeal to the numerous fiel from the tropics to the frozen banks of the S Lawrence, from the Atlantic to the Pacif fertilized by the blood and whitened by t bones of its members. But I will not pau to eulogize it. Let its deeds speak for i they are more eloquent than tongue of min

Why are we here to-day?

This is not the funeral of one brave warrio nor even of the harvest of death on a sing battle-field, but these are the obsequies of t best and bravest of the children of the lan who have fallen in actions almost numberles many of them among the most sanguinary a desperate of which history bears record. T men, whose names and deeds we now seek perpetuate, rendering them the highest hon in our power, have fallen wherever armed r bellion showed its front — in far distant Ne Mexico, in the broad valley of the Mississip on the bloody hunting-grounds of Kentuck in the mountains of Tennessee, amid t swamps of Carolina, on the fertile fields Maryland, and in the blood-stained thickets Virginia. They were of all grades — fro the general officer to the private; of all ag — from the gray-haired veteran of fifty yea service to the beardless youth; of all degre of cultivation — from the man of science the uneducated boy. It is not necessary, n is it possible, to repeat the mournful yet illu trious roll of dead heroes whom we have m to honor. Nor shall I attempt to name all those who most merit praise — simply a fe who will exemplify the classes to which th belong.

Among the last slain, but among the fir in honor and reputation, was that hero twenty battles — John Sedgwick — gentle a kind as a woman, brave as a brave man c be, honest, sincere, and able — he was a mod that all may strive to imitate, but whom fe can equal. In the terrible battles which ju preceded his death, he had occasion to displa the highest qualities of a commander and soldier; yet after escaping the stroke of deat when men fell around him by thousands, he last met his fate at a moment of comparativ quiet, by the ball of a single rifleman. H died as a soldier would choose to die — wit truth in his heart, and a sweet, tranquil smil upon his face. Alas! our great nation po sesses few sons like true John Sedgwick.

Like him fell, too, at the very head c their corps, the white-haired Mansfield, aft a long career of usefulness, illustrated by h skill and cool courage at Fort Brown, Mo terey, and Buena Vista — John F. Reynold

d Reno, both in the full vigor of manhood d intellect — men who had proved their ility and chivalry on many a field in Mex-, and in this civil war, gallant gentlemen whom their country had much to hope, had pleased God to spare their lives. Lyon ll in the prime of life, leading his little army ainst superior numbers, his brief career fording a brilliant example of patriotism d ability. The impetuous Kearney, and ch brave generals as Richardson, Williams, rrill, Stevens, Weed, Strong, Saunders, d Hayes, lost their lifes while in the midst a career of usefulness. Young Bayard, like the most renowned of his name, that knight above fear and above reproach," as cut off too early for his country, and that cellent staff-officer, Colonel Garesché fell nile gallantly doing his duty.

No regiments can spare such gallant, de-ted, and able commanders as Rossell, avis, Gove, Simmons, Bailey, Putnam, and ingsbury, — all of whom fell in the thickest the combat, — some of them veterans, and hers young in service, all good men and ell-beloved.

Our batteries have partially paid their rrible debt to fate in the loss of such com-anders as Greble, the first to fall in this ar, Benson, Hazzard, Smead, De Hart, azlitt, and those gallant boys, Kirby, oodruff, Dimmick, and Cushing; while e engineers lament the promising and gal-nt Wagner and Cross.

Beneath remote battle-fields rest the corpses the heroic McRea, Reed, Bascom, Stone, weet, and many other company officers.

Besides these were hosts of veteran ser-eants, corporals, and privates, who had ught under Scott in Mexico, or contended many combats with the savages of the far Vest and Florida, and, mingled with them, oung soldiers who, courageous, steady, and ue, met death unflinchingly, without the pe of personal glory. These men, in their ore humble sphere, served their country ith as much faith and honor as the most il-strious generals, and all of them with per-ct singleness of heart. Although their mes may not live in history, their actions, yalty, and courage, will. Their memories ill long be preserved in their regiments, r there were many of them who merited as roud a distinction as that accorded to the first grenadier of France," or to that other ussian soldier who gave his life for his omrades.

But there is another class of men who have one from us since this war commenced, whose fate it was not to die in battle, but who are none the less entitled to be mentioned here. There was Sumner, a brave, honest, chivalrous, veteran, of more than half a century's service, who had confronted death unflinchingly on scores of battle-fields, had shown his gray head serene and cheerful, where death most revelled, who more than once told me that he believed and hoped that his long career would end amid the din of battle — he died at home from the effects of the hardships of his campaigns.

That most excellent soldier, the elegant C. F. Smith, whom many of us remember to have seen so often on this plain, with his superb bearing, escaped the bullet to fall a victim to the disease which have deprived the army of so many of its best soldiers.

John Bufford, cool and intrepid; Mitchell, eminent in science; Plummer, Palmer, and many other officers and men, lost their lives by sickness contracted in the field.

But I cannot close this long list of glorious martyrs without paying a sacred debt of official duty and personal friendship. There was one dead soldier who possessed peculiar claims upon my love and gratitude. He was an ardent patriot, an unselfish man, a true soldier, the *beau ideal* of a staff officer — he was my aid-de-camp, Colonel Colburn.

There is a lesson to be drawn from the death and services of these glorious men which we should read for the present and future benefit of the nation. War in these modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to the most prejudiced that for the organization and command of armies, and the high combinations of strategy, perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is requisite. To count upon success when the plans or execution of campaigns are intrusted to men who have no knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom of a Story or a Kent from a skilful physician.

But what is the honorable and holy cause for which these men laid down their lives, and for which the nation still demands the sacrifice of the precious blood of so many of her children?

Soon after the close of the Revolutionary war, it was found that the confederacy, which had grown up during that memorable contest, was fast falling to pieces from its own weight. The central power was too weak; it could only recommend to the different States such measures as seemed best; and it possessed no real power to legislate, because it lacked the executive force to compel obedience to its laws. The national credit and self-respect

had disappeared, and it was feared by the friends of human liberty throughout the world that ours was but another, added to the long list of fruitless attempts at self-government. The nation was evidently upon the brink of ruin and dissolution, when, some eighty years ago, many of the wisest and most patriotic of the land met to seek a remedy for the great evils which threatened to destroy the work of the Revolution. Their sessions were long, and often stormy; for a time the most sanguine doubted the possibility of a successful termination to their labors. But from amidst the conflict of sectional interests, of party prejudices, and of personal selfishness, the spirit of wisdom and conciliation at length evoked the Constitution, under which we have lived so long.

It was not formed in a day, but was the result of patient labor, of lofty wisdom, and of the purest patriotism. It was at last adopted by the people of all the States, — although by some reluctantly, — not as being exactly what all desired, but as being the best possible under the circumstances. It was accepted as giving us a form of government under which the nation might live happily and prosper, so long as the people should continue to be influenced by the same sentiments which actuated those who formed it, and which would not be liable to destruction from internal causes, so long as the people preserved the recollection of the miseries and calamities which led to its adoption.

Under this beneficent Constitution the progress of the nation was unexampled in history. The rights and liberties of its citizens were secure at home and abroad; vast territories were rescued from the control of the savage and the wild beast, and added to the domain of civilization and the Union. The arts, the sciences, and commerce, grew apace; our flag floated upon every sea, and we took our place among the great nations of the earth.

But under the smooth surface of prosperity upon which we glided swiftly, with all sails set before the summer breeze, dangerous reefs were hidden which now and then caused ripples upon the surface, and made anxious the more cautious pilots. Elated by success, the ship swept on, the crew not heeding the warnings they received, forgetful of the dangers they escaped in the beginning of the voyage, and blind to the hideous maelstrom which gaped to receive and destroy them. The same elements of discordant sectional prejudices, interests, and institutions, which had rendered the formation of the Constitution so difficult, threatened more than once to destroy it. But for a long time the nation was so fortunate as to possess a series of political leaders who, to the highest abilities united the same spirit of conciliation which animated the founders of the Republic, and thus for many years the threatened evils were averted. Time and long-continued good fortune obliterated the recollection of the calamities and wretchedness of the years preceding the adoption of the Constitution. Men forgot that conciliation, common interest, and mutual charity had been the foundation and must be the support of our government — as is indeed the case with all governments and all the relations of life. At length men appeared with whom sectional and personal prejudices and interests outweighed all considerations for the general good. Extremists of one section furnished the occasion, eagerly seized as a pretext by equally extreme men in the other, for abandoning the pacific remedies and protection afforded by the Constitution, and seeking redress for possible future evils in war and the destruction of the Union.

Stripped of all sophistry and side issues, the direct cause of the war, as it presented itself to the honest and patriotic citizen of the North, was simply this: Certain States, or rather, a portion of the inhabitants of certain States, feared or professed to fear that injury would result to their rights and property from the elevation of a particular party to power. Although the Constitution and the actual condition of the government provided them with a peaceable and sure protection against the apprehended evil, they preferred to seek security in the destruction of the government, which could protect them, and in the use of force against the national troops holding a national fortress.

To efface the insult offered our flag, to save ourselves from the fate of the divided republics of Italy and South America; to preserve our government from destruction, to enforce its just power and laws; to maintain our very existence as a nation — these were the causes that impelled us to draw the sword.

Rebellion against a government like ours, which contains within itself the means of self-adjustment, and a pacific remedy for evils, should never be confounded with a revolution against despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs. Such a rebellion cannot be justified upon ethical grounds, and the only alternative for our choice are its suppression, or the destruction of our nationality. A

ch a time as this, and in such a struggle, litical partisanship should be merged in true and brave patriotism, which thinks ly of the good of the whole country.

It was in this cause and with these tives, that so many of our comrades gave ir lives, and to this we are all personally dged in all honor and fidelity. Shall ch devotion as that of our dead com- les, be of no avail? Shall it be said, in er ages, that we lacked the vigor to com- ete the work thus begun? that, after all se noble lives freely given, we hesitated, d failed to keep straight on until our land s saved? Forbid it, Heaven, and give firmer, truer hearts than that!

Oh, spirits of the valiant dead, souls of r slain heroes, lend us your own indom- ble will, and if it be permitted you to mmune with those still chained by the mmels of mortality, hover around us in e midst of danger and tribulation, cheer e firm, strengthen the weak, that none ay doubt the salvation of the republic, and e triumph of our grand old flag!

In the midst of the storms which toss our ip of state, there is one great beacon ght, to which we can ever turn with con- dence and hope. It cannot be that this eat nation has played its part in history; cannot be that our sun, which arose with ch bright promises for the future, has ready set forever. It must be the inten- on of the overruling Deity that this land, so long the asylum of the oppressed, the refuge of civil and religious liberty, shall again stand forth in bright relief, united, purified, and chastened by our trials, as an example and encouragement for those who desire the progress of the human race. It is not given to our weak intellects to understand the steps of Providence as they occur; we comprehend them only as we look down upon them in the far distant past.

So is it now.

We cannot unravel the seemingly tangled skein of the purposes of the Creator — they are too high and far-reaching for our limited minds. But all history and His own revealed Word teach us that His ways, although inscrutable, are ever righteous. Let us then honestly and manfully act our part, seek to understand and perform our whole duty, and trust unwaveringly in the beneficence of the God who led our ancestors across the sea, and sustained them afterward, amid dangers more appalling even than those encountered by His own chosen people in their great exodus. He did not bring us here in vain, nor has he supported us thus far for naught. If we do our duty and trust in Him, He will not desert us in our need.

Firm in our faith that God will save our country, we now dedicate this site to the memory of brave men, to loyalty, patriotism, and honor.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate for the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought. I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add what, I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blo But no peace can be permanent with Union.

As to the other subjects presented the resolutions of the Convention, I ne only say that I should seek, in the Cons tution of the United States and the la framed in accordance therewith, the r of my duty, and the limitations of exe tive power; endeavor to restore econo in public expenditure, reëstablish the s premacy of law, and, by the operation of more vigorous nationality, resume our co manding position among the nations of t earth.

The condition of our finances, the d preciation of the paper money, and t burdens thereby imposed on labor and ca ital, show the necessity of a return to sound financial system; while the righ of citizens, and the rights of States, a the binding authority of law over Pre dent, army, and people, are subjects of n less vital importance in war than in peac

Believing that the views here expres are those of the Convention and the peop you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibili to be borne should the people ratify yo choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I ca only seek fervently the guidance of t Ruler of the universe, and, relying o His all-powerful aid, do my best to r store union and peace to a suffering peopl and to establish and guard their liberti and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

HON. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, *and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will b received and considered by the Executiv Government of the United States,* and wil be met by liberal terms on other substan tial and collateral points, and the beare or bearers thereof shall have safe conduc both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S

PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

REVIEW OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR RELATIVE TO THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN,

BY

HIRAM KETCHUM,

OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,

COUNSELLOR AT LAW.

1864.

TO THE PUBLIC.

The following numbers were published in the Journal of Commerce through several successive months, ending in May, 1864, under the signature of the Author. They were designed to show that the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War had done great injustice to MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. By request these numbers are now collected and published in pamphlet form, and the Author asks for them an attentive perusal, and a candid and impartial judgment.

HIRAM KETCHUM.

May 16, 1864.

REVIEW OF McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN.

The Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives on the conduct of the war have made an elaborate report, a part of which is calculated, probably intended, to impair public confidence in the military capacity of General McClellan. A report from a committee derived from so high a source as the Legislative Department of the government will, as it ought, command public attention, and influence to some extent the mind of the country. The publication of that report preceded, by some days, and even weeks, the publication of the evidence upon which it professes to be founded. The report has been published in many newspapers, and is industriously circulated in a pamphlet form. The opponents of General McClellan ought to be satisfied with the influence to his discredit which this document was diffusing, especially as he has not interposed one word to counteract that influence, and check its progress. The general has observed his characteristic silence; yet his persecutors are not content with the amount of influence already enlisted against him, but are constant and persevering in their efforts to destroy him. The New York Times, published yesterday, Friday, has a long and bitter article, in which, strangely enough, it resorts to rebel testimony taken from the Richmond Whig, to depreciate the military character of Gen. McClellan. Would the Times be willing to admit testimony in favor of his high military character from the same source? Such testimony the Times well knows is at hand, but I will not use it.

Now I have read the testimony annexed to the report of the War Committee with some care, and in my opinion that testimony, in connection with well known facts of public notoriety, does not authorize the conclusions, unfavorable to Gen. McClellan, made public by the committee in their report. It is evident to my mind that there is a concerted, a party effort, aided by the government, to pervert the truth, and by such perversion to destroy General McClellan. This effort shall not succeed if my opposition, in concert with other, can defeat it. When I see a combination of the strong against the weak, an exercise of the vast power and influence of the government against an individual citizen who is innocent of any offence against that government, my sympathies in every such case are with the weaker party, and in the present case, whatever of power and influence I can exert, by the open use of my own name, and such reputation and character as I happen to possess in a city where I have lived for more than fifty years, shall be put forth without fear and without stint to accomplish a fair administration of justice in the case under consideration.

I intend, with permission, through the columns of the Journal of Commerce, to submit, with as much brevity as is consistent with clear elucidation, a fair and impartial examination of the material points connected with the operations of General Mc Clellan, brought out by the evidence before the War Committee. There are very few persons that have that evidence at command, for it is very voluminous. The newspapers could not be expected to publish the whole of it, but in making selections they might manage to be impartial. Especially those who condemn McClellan ought to publish his testimony, but this they refuse to do.

NO. II.

My first proposition, which I mean to prove to the entire satisfaction of every reasonable man, is this:

If General McClellan's plan had not been interfered with; his plan settled and concurred in by the government before he left Washington for

the peninsula, he would have captured Richmond certainly as early as the month of June 1862.

The evidence in support of this proposition, to which I invite the candid and careful attention of the reader, shall now be given.

The testimony of Prince de Joinville, under his own name, was not drawn forth by the committee, but it was given to Europe and the world, and must have been known to the committee. This was the testimony of a highly intelligent witness, who communicated the truth of what he knew himself, and none can question his truthfulness and impartiality. In quoting from the Prince's statement, I shall have to reproduce what has lately appeared in the editorial columns of the Journal of Commerce. When Gen. McClellan went to Yorktown, he had no thought of besieging that position. The siege of that place was rendered necessary by causes entirely unforeseen, and unexpected by the general. He had made ample provision for the turning of that position. Prince de Jonville says (page 41): "The enemy held the James with the Merrimac and his gunboats; the York was closed by the Yorktown and Gloucester Point batteries. Nevertheless, by a disembarkation on the Severn, beyond Gloucester, he might carry the latter position, and open the way of the Federal gunboats into the York River. A subsequent movement up the left bank, in the direction of West Point, would put us so far in the rear of the army charged with the defence of the lines of Yorktown that it would have been in a most perilous position. This accomplished, the Confederates must have abandoned Gloucester, and fallen back hastily upon Richmond. The execution of this *coup de main* had been left to a corps of the army commanded by Gen. McDowell. This corps was to be the last to embark at Washington, and it was calculated that it ought to reach Yorktown in a body on its transports at the moment when the rest of the army, moving by land, should appear before that post from Fortress Monroe." The Prince proceeds: "Instead of finding it, we received the inexplicable and as yet unexplained intelligence that this corps, 35,000 strong, had been sent to another destination. *The news was received in the army with stupefaction*, although the majority could not foresee the deplorable consequences of a step taken, it must be supposed, with no evil intention, but certainly with inconceivable recklessness. . . . . *This step, taken when it was, deranged a whole system of machinery fairly at work.*"

Here then, when the army was before Yorktown, and before the idea of a siege had entered any man's head, was a sore disappointment. One of the foundations upon which the hope, nay, almost certainty, of speedy success had been reared, was suddenly, unexpectedly removed by a power which the leader of the army could not control. Let us pause here for a single moment to consider what the present position and fame of this commander would be at this moment if his just expectations had not been cruelly disappointed; but what is of infinitely more consequence, what, at this time, would have been the position of our country but for this fatal step! But disappointments do not stop here. After the siege of Yorktown, and after the army had reached the front of Richmond, another opportunity was supplied by the vigilance and skill of the commanding general to retrieve the great error of the past and to capture Richmond. By the command of Gen. McClellan, Gen. Fitz John Porter, with a portion of our army, marched in a furious storm to Hanover Court House, twenty miles north of Richmond, routed the enemy, some 8,000 or 10,000 strong, killed 200, took 700 prisoners, and captured one piece of artillery. The victory was gained on the 26th day of May. The advance guard of McDowell, says Prince de Joinville, "was then at Bowling Green, fifteen miles from that of Porter. It needed only an effort of the will; the two armies were united, and the possession of Richmond

certain! Alas! this effort was not made. I cannot," says he, "recall these fatal moments without a real sinking of heart."

What loyal man in the country does not at this day join in the lament of the illustrious stranger? Here then another opportunity was lost to secure the great object of the peninsular campaign. It has long since been admitted that if this opportunity had been improved, Richmond must have been taken, and in that case McClellan would have been the idol of his country, for the rebellion against that country would have been crushed. Was it any fault of this general that the opportunity was not improved? Certainly not. Yet what man in the country has suffered so severely for the failure to seize an opportunity for certain success, which his sagacity as a military leader had created? Yet his sufferings bear no comparison to those of his beloved country, and I doubt not he grieves far less for himself, for the loss of immortal renown, than for that country. The Prince de Joinville adds:

"Not only did the two armies unite, but the order came from Washington, to burn the bridges which had been seized. This was the clearest way of saying to the army of the Potomac, and to its chiefs, that in no case could they count on the support of the armies of Upper Virginia." This statement of De Joinville is substantially confirmed by evidence given before the joint committee. General Franklin testifies at page 625 that the primary cause of the failure of the peninsula campaign was "*the detachment of McDowell's corps from the army of the Potomac, at the particular time it was detached. I think the detachment of that corps left General McClellan on the peninsula with all his plans disarranged.*" Franklin was not questioned further on this point, but the committee immediately changed the course of inquiry. The question which called forth the above answer was put by Mr. Odell, and seemed quite accidental. General HENRY J. HUNT, chief in command of the Artillery of the Potomac, was a witness before the committee. He yet remains in the army of the Potomac, and is, I am informed, much relied upon, not only as an officer of great skill in his line of duty, but confided in as an intelligent, truthful man, receiving the respect of his brother officers.

Gen. Hunt fully concurs in the statement above quoted from De Joinville. The general says, (page 571):

"As I understood it, McDowell's corps, which was the last to embark, was to move across to West Point, or near to that place, a portion of it touching at Gloucester, so as to throw itself between the enemy's works at Yorktown and Richmond. Of course the withholding of that corps prevented the plan, if that was the plan, from being executed as intended." He further says: "The next cause for the failure of that campaign was this: I think if a junction of all our forces had been made after the battle of Hanover Court House, *we should have made a sure thing of it.*"

Thus then it is made manifest by the testimony and statements above referred to, that if General McClellan's plans had been executed, Richmond would have fallen. I can find nothing in Part I. of the committee's Report, containing 754 pages of printed matter, to countervail this testimony. Now I confidently submit to every candid reader, was not General Mc Clellan entitled to the benefit of this fact in the report of the committee.? It might have been impracticable for the government to furnish the means promised, but even that should not have deprived him of the credit of having conceived and adopted those plans. It might be, that though his original plans were interfered with, and frustrated by those in authority over him, yet still the plans were creditable, as their execution was certain to lead to success.

In my future numbers I shall investigate, first, whether there were good and satifactory reasons for not allowing General McDowell's command to render the service which it was to perform; and second, whether, not-

withstanding the abstraction of that command, General McClellan ought to have taken Richmond. The object of this paper is to show that the general's plans were right.

It appears by the evidence, as shown in my last number, that Richmond would have been taken a year ago, if Gen. McClellan had received the aid promised by the government. If there is any fallacy in the argument which reaches this conclusion, let it be shown. I do not stop to notice the theory of Gen. Ethan Allen Hitchcock; to that I may hereafter return, only remarking that the theory is a discovery of the General himself; he would be entitled, upon application, to receive a patent for it, *as new*, but it might fail of the other qualification required in a patentable discovery, that is in being *useful*.

The aid promised and withheld was the co-operation of Gen. McDowell's command. That this co-operation was promised and not given, are facts uncontradicted. The justification alleged for keeping back this command is, that it was required for the protection of Washington. Let us see how far this justification is supported by the evidence.

At the time when, contrary to public expectation, Gen. McDowell did not march to the assistance of the army on the Peninsula, he was much censured; but it now appears, from his full and apparently candid testimony before the committee, that such censure was unjust. From that testimony we learn that McDowell's command was the last to be embarked for the Peninsula, that the corps first sent down should have nothing to do with his comand, which was to go beyond Yorktown, while the first should go and threaten Yorktown. But after Gen. McClellan had moved with the army to Fortress Monroe, and written to McDowell that his corps should be the last to move, the President became apprehensive that if his command should go down below, the enemy might take advantage of the defenceless condition of Washington, and while our forces were going against Richmond, they might come against Washington. The President therefore ordered that McDowell's force should remain for the defence of the capital; it did not move to Yorktown as promised. General McDowell testifies without reservation, that he personally used no influence, nor in any way sought to be detached from Gen. McClellan's command. He remained to act purely on the defensive, for the defence of the capital. He afterwards, upon inquiry of the Secretary of War, ascertained that it would be within the scope of his defensive instructions to go to Fredericksburg. At Fredericksburg he could act for the defence of the capital. This was a decision of the War Department; *let not this decision be forgotten.* In accordance with this decision, McDowell went down opposite Fredericksburg, and afterwards, by permission of the War Department, put a small force, merely for a defensive purpose, across the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg. After lying some time in that city, the Gen. received information that the President intended to give nim authority to move down upon Richmond whenever Gen. Shield's division should join him. This division did join him, and the two generals were upon the eve of moving towards Richmond when a telegram came announcing the raid of the rebel general Jackson up the Shenandoah Valley. Thus it is related in Mc-Dowell's testimony:

"The President, or Secretary of War in the name of the President, telegraphed to send a division up after Jackson. I did so, although I replied that *it was a crushing blow to us all.* The President ordered another brigade to move up there, and then another brigade, and then another regiment. And finally the President put the question to me in this way—if I did not think that, as the department commander, it was my duty to be here in Washington. I replied that I had not so thought, or I should certainly have been here; that I thought my presence was most required down below, but as there was a doubt upon

he matter I would come up. I had oped that I should not be diverted rom going to Richmond."

Gen. McDowell also informed the President, in answer to that telegram: "While I should be too late to effect ny good up there, I should lose the pportunity of doing any good down elow."

Just here let it be noted that Gen. McClellan testifies: "When I heard of the advance of Jackson upon Gen. Banks, I telegraphed to the President hat I believed the intention to be imply to prevent reinforcements be- ng sent to me. I had no idea it neant a serious threat upon Washing- on."

It is thus evident, without referring to other testimony, that General McDowell desired that his command should, in the first instance, go to Yorktown, and secondly that he should march from Fredericksburg to Richmond. As military men, McClellan and McDowell concurred in judgment as to the steps to be taken for the capture of Richmond. The alarm of the President for the safety of Washington prevented the taking of these steps. The next inquiry is,—was there any foundation for this alarm? This inquiry shall be pursued in my next.

The question now to be discussed is, Could McClellan have been sent to Richmond without endangering the safety of Washington? We have seen Generals McClellan and McDowell concur in the opinion that it could. The question was one to be decided by military men. I cannot find that this question was put by the committee to any witness, who from his military knowledge and experience was presumed capable of giving a reliable opinion—the opinion of an expert. The question should have been thus framed:—"Suppose the command of General McDowell was necessary to assure the taking of Richmond, could it have been sent either to Yorktown when McClellan went to that place, or afterwards to Hanover Court House to unite with Porter, without endangering the capital?" What must have been the answer to that question? In the first place, the strength of the enemy, and the force at his command, which under all the circumstances, he would probably bring against the capital, would have been considered. The command of McDowell, say 35,000 strong, it was proposed to send to Richmond. If it had been sent, the fact would have been well known to the enemy, and this would have compelled him to employ a larger force to defend Richmond. We know from reliable testimony that the enemy expected the junction of McDowell and Porter on the 26th of May, and McDowell's failure to come was ascribed by the enemy to a treasonable omission of duty on his part. The junction of those two commands would in the judgment of the enemy have resulted in the capture of Richmond. The testimony of the Prussian officer, then in the rebel service at Richmond, may be relied on for this statement. Assuming, then, that McDowell had moved down to Richmond, what force could the rebels have spared to assail Washington? Certainly not a large one, probably none at all. Then, secondly, what were the resources of the government for the defence of Washington, if McDowell's 35,000 troops had been sent to Richmond? I aver, without fear of contradiction, that if when McClellan went down to Fortress Monroe in March, 1862, or at any other time up to the first of June in that year, the President had seen fit to write the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, throwing out all the other loyal New England States, and New Jersey, that he had been obliged to send away so large a force to assist in the capture of Richmond, that fifty thousand men would be required in the fortifications at Washington to make a perfect defence of the capital, that number, most of them well disciplined, well drilled, and well appointed troops, would have been in the capital in less than ten days from the date of the call, ready for immediate service. I know that 10,000 of this number from the city

of New York alone would have responded to such a call in less than one week. There did come a call for troops from the War Department in the latter part of May. It was received by the 7th on the 26th day of that month, the day before the capture of Hanover Court House, in the evening of that day, Sunday, and on Tuesday morning this regiment, fully armed and equipped, fit for immediate service, was in Baltimore; the 22nd New York was there the next day, and several other regiments followed within a few days, when there came an order countermanding the call for troops, much to the disappointment and chagrin of other regiments in this city desirous and eager to march. It was not in this city only, but in Boston and elsewhere, that this disappointment was felt. I have spoken of troops not actually in the field, whose services could have been commanded by the government in an emergency for the defence of the capital. Let us now see what troops were, at the time when Gen. McClellan left Washington, actually in the service for this purpose. In his examination before the Committee on the conduct of the War, the following question was put to General McClellan:—"When you took the army to the Peninsula, how many troops were left for the defence of Washington; where were they stationed, and by whom were they commanded?" To which he gave the following answer:—"There has been published a letter which I wrote on board the steamer Commodore, on the first day of April last (1862), to the Adjutant General, giving the number of troops left and their stations. The numbers there given were furnished to me by my adjutant general, from the latest and most authentic returns in his possession. I recollect that the aggregate was something over 70,000, but I cannot give the details." This statement was also testified to by Gen. McC ellan before the McDowell Court of Inquiry. I am aware that General E. A. Hitchcock professed, in his testimony, before the committee, to be much "amazed and shocked at the testimony of Gen eral McClellan, because he included in this number of 70,000 not only the number in Washington, but also those troops employed to guard the approaches by the enemy to the capital, though stationed and acting at some distance from it. In the judgment of General Hitchcock, a force could not act for the defence of the capital unless posted in Washington, or on the opposite shore of Virginia, or somewhere in the immediate vicinity. Gen. McClellan took a different view of defensive forces; he included all those, wherever stationed, whose object was to intercept advances upon the capital, from which quarter soever those advances might be anticipated. If for instance, an advance on the city of New York was expected from an enemy in Canada, it might well be that a force posted at Albany, 160 miles distant, could act for the defence of this city. It was as I have shown, the decision of the War Department that General McDowell was acting within the scope of his orders to protect Washington, although his command was actually at Fredericksburg. The idea of General McClellan evidently was that all troops occupying and guarding the avenues leading to the capital, through which, or some of them, the enemy was expected to approach and assail the capital, in situations where they could be easily rallied to the capital itself, might, with propriety, be called troops for the defence of the capital. Who can dispute the soundness of this view? To show the actual location of those forces, I will transcribe the letter of the general, referred to in his answer above quoted. The letter is contained in the report of the committee.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, STEAMER COMMODORE, April 1, 62.
Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, Adj. Gen., U.S.A.

General:—I have to request that you will lay the following communication before the Hon. Secretary of War.

The approximate numbers and po-

sitions of the troops left near and in rear of the Potomac are about as follows:

Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient to give him 5,000 for the defence of Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men; other disposable troops now with Gen. Wadsworth being about 11,400 men.

The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it it designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas.

Gen. Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, including Col. Geary at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery.

I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to Manassas. Four thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guard above alluded to, will make up a force under the command of Gen. Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men.

It is my design to push Gen. Blenker's division from Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination.

The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus (including Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery; Banks' 5th corps, which embraces 41 guns, some 3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guard, about 2,000 men) amount to about 35,468 men.

It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say, 850 men, being with some 500 cavalry, 3,350 men on the Lower Potomac.

To recapitulate—

At Warrenton there is to be	-	7,780 men.
At Manassas, say	- - - - -	10 859 "
In the Valley of the Shenandoah		35.859 "
On the Lower Potomac	- - -	1,350 "
In all	- - -	55,456

There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under General Wadsworth, some 18,000 men, inclusive of the batteries under instruction.

The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at Washington subject to disposition where their services may be required.

I am, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,
GEO B. McCLELLAN,
Maj.-Gen. Commanding.

This topic shall be pursued in my next number.

I have shown, and the Committee on the conduct of the War had sufficient evidence before them to prove, that there was no cause for the alarm exhibited by the President, which kept him from sending McDowell's command to Yorktown, or to Hanover Court House. That this alarm was really felt by the President, I am bound to believe. The question now is, who awakened this feeling of apprehension? Who is responsible for it? I have no doubt that Generals James S. Wadsworth and E. A Hitchcock are the persons.

On the 21st day of April, 1862, Gen. Wadsworth made a report to the Secretary of War; the next day he testified before the committee and verified the accuracy of his report. This document states the number of men left under his command for the defence of Washington, to be 19,022 present for duty. This does not differ materially from Gen. McClellan's letter above copied; but the essential difference between these reports is this, one

states only the number of troops in a very limited command, while the other defines the number, in other far more extensive commands, all for the defence of Washington. The President was led to believe that Wadsworth's 19,022 troops was the aggregate force left for the defence of the capitol. He says in a communication to Gen, McClellan dated April 9, 1862, "Do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction, to this city, [Washington] to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade." Thus, it is proved that the President was fully possessed with the idea that there was no force for the defence of the capital but that reported to be under General Wadsworth. He supposed the whole line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to Washington to be entirely open, and that the enemy on that line would encounter no resistance except from Wadsworth's command. No wonder he felt some apprehension. It seems impossible that the President could ever have seen McClellan's letter dated April 1, then on file in the War Department. From that report he would have learned that at Manassas and Warrenton almost in front of Washington, and directly on the line to Richmond there were besides those under Wadsworth's, 18,639 troops, and twelve guns, or 36,639 men and 44 field guns directly applicable to the defence of Washington, without counting the 1,350 men on the lower Potomac, who could also have been drawn in if an attack was imminent. Besides all this there were 35,467 troops and 65 guns in the Shenandoah Valley ready to move to the defence of Washington if necessary. There were in fact all told 77,500 men and 103 field guns for the defence of Washington and its approaches, without counting the force under Gen. Dix at Baltimore, which amounted to ten regiments and two battalions of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and five batteries. These numbers are from official returns.

Gen. Wadsworth testifies before the War Committee that he had within his jurisdiction "*everything for the defence of Washington,*" and further testifies that the total amount of men present for duty under his command was 19,022. The general evidently left the impression upon the minds of the Committee that these troops were the sole reliance for the defence of the capital; the same impression must have been received by the President, and contributed to the delusion under which his mind labored. Wadsworth's report was brought to his attention, and, basing his suggestion upon this report, Hitchcock intimated to the Secretary of War that McClellan had left the capital defenceless; that he had violated his orders, and rendered himself responsible for all the consequences. Here was a mare's nest. Hitchcock says:—"When this state of things became known to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, he required General Thomas and myself to make a report upon the execution of the President's order, the letter of Gen. McClellan of the 1st April, the report of General Wadsworth of the 2d April, and one or two other papers requiring us *to give an opinion whether Gen. McClellan had complied, or not, with the requirements of the order of the President.*" Who made this state of things known to the Secretary of War? General Hitchcock himself, doubtless. A court of inquiry, in fact, though not in name, was thus instituted to report whether or not McClellan had obeyed orders. All that a court of inquiry has power to do, is to inquire and report to the power appointing it.

That court made a report to the War Department. Hitchcock testifies: "The report went of course to the President, and, on the next day, if I mistake not, the 3d of April, the President came to the war office and held quite a long conversation with the chiefs of the various bureaus of the War Department, the Secretary of War being present. At the conclusion of that consultation the President himself ordered that one of the Corps

of the Army of the Potomac which were then in front of Washington should be detained for the defence of the capital. The selection was left with the Secretary of War who designated the Corps commanded by McDowell. I will mention," says Hitchcock, "that Gen. McDowell himself was not present, and I believe knew nothing of the steps which led to his detention here until after the order was issued. As soon as General McClellan heard of this he complained of it. He wished the whole of McDowell's Corps sent to him."

Now I call upon every officer of the army, and upon every American eitizen to give his attention for a brief space of time to the scenes here described.

George B. McClellan, a young general with little experience in actual service, without any solicitation on his part, is called by his government to a post of the highest responsibility. He is placed in command of the largest army by far ever brought together in his native land, an army organized for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection the most formidable the world has ever beheld, an insurrection which threatened the overthrow of the government, and the extinction of popular liberty. At a distance from the capital; in the very face of the enemy, anxious beyond all expression for success; excited and agitated by the consciousness that the eyes of his country, and the whole civilized world are eagerly fastened upon him, scanning and criticising all he does, and all he leaves undone. This is one scene in the drama. Now turn to another. At the capital of his country this same young commander, in his absence is charged with having disobeyed the order of his superior in command, in neglecting to secure the safety of that capital against an invading foe; a grave offence. A court or commission of inquiry is instituted before which he has no notice to appear, of its very existence he is not apprised. Ignorant of any charge brought against him, with no counsel or friend to speak for, or defend him, he is tried before the court, a report condeming him is brought in. The President and all the officials of the War Department are assembled to hear and cogitate upon this report; the Commander-in-Chief approves of it and passes sentence upon the absent accused. The stiletto has been thrust into his back, and he is ignorant of the assault until he finds himself fainting from the loss of blood That sentence is that he shall be denied the co-operation of a corps which had been promised him, and which he deemed essential to success, because he had violated express directions in neglecting the safety of the capital.

Now let us see whether General McClellan was in truth guilty of the charge preferred against him. The charge was that he had violated an order "that Washington should be perfectly secure." But who shall say in what "security" consists? The President says: "My explicit directions that Washington should, *in the judgment of all the commanders of corps*, be left entirely secured, had been entirely neglected." The *commanders of corps* were therefore made sole judges of what was required for security. These commanders were Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, Mc Dowell and Sumner. They were absent, with the exception of McDowell, on the peninsula, with McClellan. We have seen what McDowell's opinion was. All these commanders of corps were examined before the War Committee, but none of them was asked whether he considered the forces actually left by Gen. McClellan, sufficient to ensure the safety of the capital. The testimony of neither of them was before Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, and there is little doubt that every one of them would have admitted the force, actually left there, to be sufficient to secure the safety of Washington. There was therefore no authority for the decision that in the judgment of commanders of corps Washington was left unsafe.

General Hitchcock testified that Gen. McClellan complained of that de-

cision made in the office of the Secretary of War on the 3d of April. Yes, he did complain: his letter to the President is in the following words:

NEAR YORKTOWN, April 5, 7 1-2. P.M

"The enemy are in large force along our front, and apparently intend making a determined resistance. A reconnoisance just made by Gen. Barnard shows that their line of works extends across the entire peninsula from Yorktown to Warwick river. Many of them are very formidable. Deserters say they are being reinforced daily from Richmond and from Norfolk. Under these circumstances I beg that you will reconsider the order detaching the first corps from my command. In my deliberate judgment the success of our cause will be imperiled by so greatly reducing my force when it is actually under the fire of the enemy, and active operations have commenced. Two or three of my divisions have been under fire of artillery most of the day. I am now of the opinion that I shall have to fight all the available force of the rebels not far from here. Do not force me to do so with diminished numbers; but whatever your decision may be, I will leave nothing undone to obtain success. G. B. MCCLELLAN,

Major General.

A LINCOLN, President.

This letter speaks for itself, it needs no comment.

The report and testimony of Gen. James S. Wadsworth might be subjected to severe animadversion. His statements are contradicted by reliable testimony. The report of Col. William B. Green to General Barry, Inspector of Artillery, has been extensively published. It shows conclusively the gross inaccuracy of General Wadsworth. Moreover, the opposition, if not bitter hostility of General Wadsworth to General McClellan is well known in military circles at Washington; it can be shown that Wadsworth did not wish Richmond to be taken by McClellan. But I shall not dwell upon this topic; my object in these communications is single, and I shall not be diverted from its pursuit.

Now I submit to all men whether these two points have not been established by the testimony contained in the report of the Committee on the conduct of the war.

1. If General McDowell's command had not been denied General McClellan, he would have taken Richmond a year ago.

2. There was no justifiable reason for withholding that command.

Beyond all controversy, the Committee were authorized by tha evidence, to report these conclusions, and in failing to do so, they have done General McClellan signal injustice. I arraign that committee, collectively and individually, at the bar of public opinion, and charge them with that injustice.

I shall next proceed to show that General McClellan did the best he could with the forces under his command.

YORKTOWN.

The next duty is to inquire whether, although deprived of the co-operation of McDowell's command, McClellan ought, under all the circumstances, to have taken Richmond with the force under his command. It has been asserted with great confidence that he ought; the Committee on the Conduct of the War unanimously censure, nay condemn him for not having taken the rebel capital, and captured the army which defended it. It is obvious that this condemnatory sentence cannot be met successfully by a general denial; the grounds upon which it rests must be carefully examined, step by step, first at Yorktown, then from Yorktown to Richmond, then before Richmond, &c. I shall pursue this inquiry in the light of such evidence as was furnished by the state of things existing at the times respectively when the movements of the army were made. It would be unfair to view these movements in the light of information supplied since General McClellan was ordered to leave the Peninsula, and not accessible before that time. I shall be pardoned, it being unavoidable, for giving some details of evidence which may seem dry and tedious to such of

y readers as are in a hurry and can
ly read short paragraphs. There
e some of my countrymen, even in
ese times of agitation and bustle,
ho are willing to be at pains to in-
estigate, and ascertain, if they can,
e truth on a subject like that under
nsideration. To such I must be con-
nt to address myself. The first po-
tion to be examined is *Yorktown.*

It is admitted that Gen. McClellan
ppeared before Yorktown with an
my consisting of 107,000 troops,
ell equipped, well drilled, well sup-
lied, and composed of men of physi-
l, intellectual, and moral power,
ich as have never been surpassed in
y military organization. This army
eserves the highest wrought eulogy
at has ever been passed upon it.
his eulogy has been recorded by the
ommanding General of the Army of
e Potomac, and history will trans-
it it to future generations.

Let it be remembered, for the fact
eems to have been kept studiously
ut of mind, that the army which this
oyal and ever to be honored host
ent to subdue were composed of
American citizens, most of them na-
ive born, numerically equal, probably
uperior to our own, well officered,
ell drilled, under strict discipline,
ighting behind entrenchments, on soil
laimed to be their own, and animated
vith a zeal which the resistance of an
nvading enemy alone can inspire.
Now although the loyal army sur-
assed the rebels in the material of
war, this was counterbalanced by the
ard lessons they had learned in the
school of privation and suffering;
hey were at home fighting on the
lefensive, in positions chosen by them-
selves, behind ramparts of their own
construction. Men versed in the art
of war have learned from the records
of former military conflicts, to com-
pute with mathematical accuracy the
advantages and disadvantages of ar-
mies in such circumstances, composed
of the same race of men, neither supe-
rior to the other in spirit or military
prowess. With such an enemy in
front discharging his fire, well might
McClellan implore the President, *do
not force me to fight with diminished
numbers.*

General McClellan in all his milita-
ry operations has acted under the in-
spiration and guidance of two gene-
ral principles.

1. The rebellion had assumed a
character so formidable as to place the
country in a state of civil war. Ar-
my was arrayed against army in the
field. The rules for the government
of belligerent parties which modern
civilization furnishes, were of binding
force. General McClellan had receiv-
ed the education of a soldier; he was
well-instructed in these rules. He
had before him the example of Gen.
Scott, who had always conducted war-
fare in conformity to these rules, nev-
er for an instant departing from their
injunctions, and this great General
had received the approbation of his
country for his course. On no consid-
eration, to gratify no man, or set of
men, would Gen. McClellan violate
these rules and deviate from the path
pursued by his illustrious predecessor
under whom he had learned the art
of war. Such a violation, such a de-
parture, would fix a stain upon his
character as a soldier, which no suc-
cess could efface; besides it would dis-
honor the flag of the Christian nation
which he served. To do this was im-
possible for George B. McClellan.

2. McClellan, while he meant to do
what he could to put down the rebel-
lion, to exert every nerve to accom-
plish this object, yet was anxious to
do it without any unnecessary loss of
life of the soldiers led by him; he
knew who these soldiers were, whence
they came, how they were connected
in their respective homes and neigh-
borhoods, and what value to set upon
their lives.

These were his principles; and, be-
sides these, as a matter of fact, he had
the conviction that the enemy was a
very formidable one; others could af-
ford to despise him, but he could not.
He could have wished it otherwise,
but his personal knowledge of the of-
ficers who led that enemy, and the
spirit and prowess of the troops led
by them, forced this conviction on his

understanding; he could not ignore it, but as a soldier he felt his obligation to act upon it.

All these composed the creed of Gen. McClellan; and if the tirades of abuse amounting almost to the ravings of lunatics, which have been spoken and written against him, from Senator Chandler's speech on the floor of the Senate, down to the late editorial article in the New York Times, shall be closely analyzed and examined, it will be seen that this creed is that which mainly stirs up the ire of his opponents.

McClellan marched from Fortress Monroe towards Yorktown on the 4th of April 1862, and soon reached the fortified position which was evacuated by the enemy in great precipitation on the 4th day of May, one month thereafter. The retreat of the enemy from a very strong and well fortified position was compelled by our army in one month.

The charge against the commanding general is that he spent too much time before Yorktown—that he should have taken it immediately on his arrival before it by assault, and not waited the operations of a siege.

What is the testimony upon this point? It shall be fairly given. The Prince de Joinville, an eye witness, says:—"We reached the Confederate lines which opened on us at once, with a sharp fire of artillery. We replied, but without making any impression on the well defined works which covered the hostile cannon. The creek had been reconnoitered and found impassable by infantry, both on account of the depth of water, and of its marshy borders, in which the troops would have been under a cross-fire of numbers of sharpshooters concealed in the woods and behind the embankments.

"Throughout the seven miles of Confederate lines he encountered the same attitude of alert defence. Every where cannon and camps. Of course the inference was that we were arrested by forces apparently formidable, and before a position not easily carried."

General McClellan before the committee testifies: "Question. Could not the line of works have been assaulted when you arrived before them in full force with a fair prospect of success?—Answer. I think not. I resorted to the operations of a siege after a more careful personal examination than a commanding general gives to such things; and I was fully satisfied that the course I adpoted was the best under the circumstances."

"Question.—You did not open your batteries as they were finished, one by one, but waited until all were ready, did you not?—Answer. We did, and expected to open fire from them all on Monday morning. A few shots were fired for a special purpose from battery No. 1 against vessels landing at the wharf."

"Question. Would it not have been better to have opened your batteries as they were completed, without waiting for the completion of all of them?—Answer. I think decidedly not; because they would probably have been overwhelmed by the concentrated fire of the enemy. The object was to wait until we had such an overwhelming force at our disposal as would crush everything before us."

General John. C. Barnard, chief of General McClellan's engineer corps, who next to the general commanding, is the highest authority, reported *at the time*:—"It was not deemed practicable considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country), to break the line across the isthmus, and too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place" (Yorktown) "by assault."—"The forcing of such a line with so little loss, in itself is an exploit less brilliant, perhaps, but more worthy of study than would have been a murderous assault, even if it had proved successful." These are extracts from the engineer's report now made public, I believe, for the first time, but that report was accessible to the committee.

General Erastus D. Keyes commanded a division in the Army of the

Peninsula. He was before Yorktown. His advance was stopped by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, fortified by breast works, erected, nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of ponds, nowhere fordable; one terminus behind Yorktown, and the other ending in the James River which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. He says:—"Yorktown is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side, it, and Gloucester, are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either. The approaches on our side are generally through low, swampy or thickly wooded grounds; over roads which we are obliged to repair or make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading foce in any country. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get command of either York or James River."

General Fitz John Porter who commanded the advanced corps and who also conducted the siege of Yorktown, reported: "Personal recognizances confirmed by the reports of engineer officers, and the troops, showed the Yorkstown defences to be strong, and well armed, and connected with those on the Warwick by field works for artillery and infantry; that the bridges were destroyed and the approaches to the dams which had backed up the water to overflow the banks were obstructed by abbatis and defended on the right bank by stone forts, which were well armed and manned and connected by infantry parapets."—"Offieers on picket reported the enemy apparently in great numbers and very active, while deserters stated that troops at Yorktown and vicinity, originally about 15,000, had been greatly increased by arrivals from Norfolk and Richmond, and were confident of successfully defending the place."

In opposition to this is the testimony, 1st, of Gen. Silas S. Casey. He says: "That part of the army that went to Yorktown, I think, should have stormed the works, as from the information I received afterwards there were but about 7,000 or 8,000 men on the arrival of the first corps on the peninsula." This is all this witness says about storming the works. If General Casey had commanded the army, he would not have acted on information received *afterwards.*

2. General Samuel P. Heintzleman. The following testimony transcribed from the report was read by the General; "Question. If there was only about 7,000 men in Yorktown, and you had so large an army, what military objection had you to isolating the place and attacking further up the Peninsula? Answer. By the time we got to Yorktown their army had been largely reinforced there, though nothing like as fast as ours. Question What was the estimated strength of our army there? Answer. I never heard. I was always of opinion that we could have forced their lines; and from information that I got at the Adams House, about two miles from Williamsburgh, the day before the battle there, I was satisfied we could have done so."

3. General Joseph Hooker testified: "From my examination of the works at Yorktown, and reaching away beyond the position that I occupied, I felt that their lines could be pierced without any considerable loss by the corps with which I was on duty—Heintzleman's corps. We could have gone right through, and gone to the rear of the enemy. They would run the moment we got to their rear, and we could have picked up the prisoners. Right there at Yorktown the enemy had expended a great deal of labor. But I would have marched right through the redoubts which was a part of the cordon they had, and got on the road between Yorktown and Richmond and thus compelled the enemy to fight me on my ground, and not have fought them on theirs." This

testimony is characteristic of this witness; and he would undoubtedly have marched *right through* the redoubts, always provided *the enemy had not prevented him.* He would, too, have compelled the enemy to fight him on his own ground, provided *he could have got possession of the ground, and kept it.*

So then it will be seen that the witnesses in favor of beseiging Yorktown are: 1. Prince de Joinville, 2. General McClellan, 3. Gen. Barnard, 4. Gen. Keyes, and 5. Gen. Porter. In favor of storming the works, Generals Heintzelman, Casey, and Hooker. This being a question to be decided by the opinions of military men. I take into consideration such opinions only, the opinions of what the law terms *experts;* other opinions are not competent evidence. It ought perhaps to be stated in this connection that General Barnard, although he gave the opinion above quoted from his report made at the time of the siege, yet afterwards changed his mind. The evidence of this change was furnished by a most extraordinary report made by him to General McClellan long after the siege of Yorktown; after it was well understood what testimony the committee sought in respect to General McClellan, and, strange to say, even after this general had been relieved of his command, and when it was supposed he was not in favor with the administration. It must have been painful to General Barnard to feel himself compelled to attempt the ruin of a brother officer at such a time. and under such circumstances; but let the veteran engineer console himself with the assurance I now give him, that General McClellan is not ruined in reputation; he is not dead. He may be annoyed, but he is not in disgrace, nor is he friendless,

BEFORE YORKTOWN.

I did suppose that what had been said in my last number would have been sufficient to show that General McClellan was deserving of commendation, rather than censure, for deciding to besiege the enemy's works at Yorktown in preference to carrying them by what, in the opinion of General Barnard, would have been a *murderous assault even if successful.* The country has since had some experience of such assaults at Fredericksburg. The sole consolation for our disasters in these conflicts is found in the fact that, although we lost many thousands in killed and wounded, yet perhaps the enemy suffered as severely as ourselves. But, on referring again to the report of the committee, I see that a strong point is attempted to be made against the general for what is termed his "delay before Yorktown." The following paragraph is taken from the pamphlet edition of the committee, published and sold in the office of the *New York Tribune.* The capitals and italics are also copied:

"DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN.

"All the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, variously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by General McClellan, who estimated it at from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, U. S. Senator from Virginia—then living within the rebel lines, near Williamsburg,—testifies that *the rebels did not determine to reinforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forces intended to stop before Yorktown, and intended to commence a regular siege o the place.* It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that *our forces when they first appeared before Yorktown could have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown and cutting off reinforcements, when the place must have fallen in a very short time.* Some of our generals expected and desired that that should be done. Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan the application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application."

I shall refute these statements in their order. It is not true that the rebels did not intend to reinforce Ma-

gruder until it was determined to commence a regular siege of Yorktown.

PROOF.

General McClellan did not contemplate the necessity of a siege when he first advanced (April 4th) upon Yorktown, after landing on the Peninsula; he then expected to be joined by McDowell's command. On the 4th of April he issued orders for the continued march of the army at an early hour the next morning. General Keyes', General Couch's, and General Smith's divisions were ordered to positions on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, which would enable them to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown, and to intercept reinforcements coming in. But General Keyes reported the impossibility of carrying those orders into effect, specifying, among other things, that "the enemy is in great force, and is *constantly receiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front of us is their new one of the strongest ever opposed to an invading force in any country.*" This report bore date April 7th. On the 5th and 6th of April he had previously reported that the enemy's works (Lee's Mills) in front of Smith, cannot be carried by assault. General Keyes was not before Yorktown, but in front of the enemy, on the Warwick. General McClellan himself testified: "We did not know, before we landed on the Peninsula, of the line of works along the Warwick. We knew that Yorktown was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, but we did not know of the line of the Warwick."

General Casey, who it will be remembered, acted under General Keyes, and did not join for several days after Keyes, says:

"From information I received afterwards," (that is after the evacuation of Yorktown), "there were but 7,000 or 8,000 men there on the arrival of the five corps" (not before Yorktown, but) "*on the Peninsula*" General Heintzelman says: "By the time *we got to Yorktown* their army (the enemy's) *had been largely reinforced.*" General McClellan, in answer to the inquiry, "What was the force of the enemy when Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula?" says: "I do not know positively; but my belief is that there was not at that time much more than Magruder's original command, which, I think, we had always estimated at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Movements of troops had been going on across the James River to the Peninsula *some days before my arrival.* I remember *that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been crossed over to Yorktown from the south bank of the James.* I therefore hurried my own movements, and started from Fort Monro sooner than I would have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think that large masses of reinforcements arrived at Yorktown *from one to two days before I reached its vicinity.* Johston himself arrived there the day before I did."

Thus much for the proof in opposition to the testimony quoted from Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden (United States Senator!) The senator says he practiced law for a number of years, from Willimsburg down to Hampton, including Yorktown. He is asked by the committee: "In your judgment what would have been the result had a vigorous attack been made upon Yorktown proper, or a flank attack made?" The law gives value to the *judgment* of none but *experts;* it does not allow such judgments or opinions to be given in evidence, except perhaps when the witness is clothed with the dignity of "a Senator," and I freely admit that the "judgment" of Senator Bowden is of as much value as the judgment of Senator Chandler, or Senator Sherman; Senators all! But let us hear the reply of the witness. He could not forget that though a senator, he had practiced law; he therefore says: "I have very little skill, if any, in military affairs, but my decided impression is," &c. This answer was a rebuke as severe as could have been given, for putting such a question to such a man. If there had been any

honest lawyer on that committee, with even the elementary knowledge of the law of evidence, he would have said to the witness: "You are excused from giving any further answer; if you are not a military man, your opinion is no evidence, and if you are a military man, your *impression* would not be evidence." But the witness was not interrogated, and he proceeds to tell, not what he knew but what he had heard from other Union men, better qualified to judge than himself; he concludes his narration of hearsay testimony in these words: "This I gathered from others, for I did not myself go to Yorktown after the Confederates took possession of it until they evacuated it." If any one of my readers desires to know what, in particular, Senator Bowden "gathered from others," I will refer him to the report of the committee, page 583. I beg leave to take leave of the Senator, with commendation for his modesty, and I will say for him that I regard his judgment in military matters as highly as I do any other lawyer of my acquaintance.

But the committee say:—"It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that (here come the italics) *our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works, &c.*"

I have just shown what the officers *at the time* thought, but I do not find in the report that any, but General Heintzelman, were as wise *after the time* as the committee represent. This General says, I was always of the opinion that we could have forced their lines, and from information I got at the Adams House, about two miles from Willimsburg, the day before the battle there, I was satisfied we could have done so. The veteran general does not tell the committee from whence he derived this information; perhaps it was Senator Bowden, for he lived up there. If the general did get his information from this source, he certainly shows proper respect for the "civil authority," a commendable trait in a military man.

The report at the conclusion of the paragraph quoted says:

"General Heintzelman forwarded to General McClellan the application of General Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application." This passage of the report is founded on the following testimony given by General Heintzelman: "We were willing to try to force the lines with a single brigade. General Hamilton made the application, and I forwarded it to the commanding general."

On the 16th April Brigadier General Hamilton reported that the line of rebel works for three quarters of a mile could have been carried by a single brigade, with very little loss, and "I further report that I believe I can carry these works and hold them without much loss." This is the application made by Gen. Hamilton Gen Hamilton, when he made this report, was under the impression that the artillery in our batteries Nos. 7 and 8 had driven the enemy from Winn's Mills works, which was erroneous. No answer or direction was given to Gen. Hamilton in reply to his suggestion, because it was well known, and it had been reported by the general conducting the siege, that it had been found impracticable to cross the Warwick anywhere in the vicinity of Winn's Mills, this river not being fordable and the bridges destroyed; also that "a close and thorough reconnoissance on the 25th made by that excellent officer of the army, Col. Jesse Gove, with his regiment, the Twenty-Second Massachusetts Volunteers, confirmed his former report of the 5th and 11th, that the Warwick was not fordable, the bank swampy, and the dams near its headwaters, on account of artificial obstructions, unapproachable in face of the enemy on the opposite banks."

Gen. Grover, part of Heintzelman's command, after carrying a small work, defending a dam east of the Warwick, near Winn's Mills, drew off his forces because the Warwick could not be crossed, the narrow dam at

that point being defended by several strong works well manned. Winn's Mills were near the headwaters of the Warwick. Gen. Barnard says in his report: "The first group of works (the enemy's) is at Winn's Mills, where there is a dam and a bridge. This bridge the enemy destroyed."

Thus I have examined and refuted sentence by sentence—the reader will see that this detail was necessary—the italicised libel of the committee which has been circulated by thousands and tens of thousands, by the aid of a metropolitan press, and the machinery of the United States government, and all for what? to destroy the reputation, as a soldier, of Geo. B. McClellan.

I have seen a copy of General Barnard's report, bearing date May 6, 1862, and of Gen. Barry's, bearing date May 5, 1862, and of General Fitz John Porter, bearing date May 8, 1862. These reports seem to me to give evidence of professional talent of a high order. The words in which *this* report of Gen. Barnard concludes have been quoted, and shall not be repeated. But the following additional quotations from the same report may be aptly given here. "If we could have broken the enemy's lines across the isthmus, we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, soon have fallen into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength of that line and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to the impracticable character of the country) to do so. If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by a single operation It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault." Perhaps General Hooker would not have deemed it "too hazardous;" but here let me say what I declare upon reliable authority, that this same general never saw the defences of the enemy behind the Warwick. General Barry, fully confiding in the artillery placed and pointed under his command, reported that our batteries, when opened, "would have compelled the enemy to surrender in 12 hours." But the committee did not call Barry and Porter to the witness' stand,—they selected their own witnesses; yet it must have been known to them that these generals knew a great deal about the siege of Yorktown. The enemy did not give General Barry an opportunity to try his well-placed guns, and demonstrate the power and efficiency of his batteries, but directly decided to evacuate before they were opened. What a tribute was this evacuation to the unsurpassed skill and generalship of McClellan! A force of equal, if not superior number retires, precipitately, from their own chosen and deliberately constructed fortifications, without firing a gun. Who for a moment imagined that Major General McClellan would, under similar circumstances, have retired from fortifications erected for the defence of any loyal city under his command? This young general would never have evacuated had he been behind such fortifications with an army numerically equal in his front. It cannot be denied that this siege and its result was an eminent military success. Why was not that great captain, Lieut. Gen. Winfield Scott, asked his professional opinion of the operations before Yorktown? The reply is easy—because the committee well knew he would not give an answer to suit their purpose. Yet while the siege of Yorktown, as a military enterprise, is regarded with admiration by distinguished soldiers at home and abroad; while it illustrates in a remarkable degree the proficiency of our country in the science and art of war, a committee of an American Congress make it a theme of censure, and strive by the most studied arts to defame and degrade their own illustrious countryman who suggested the plan and supervised the whole conduct of that siege. *Shame! shame!*

The joint committee must have intended to rebuke the action of the House of Representatives, which on the 9th May, 1862, passed the following resolution of thanks:—"Resolved,

That we receive with profound satisfaction intelligence of the recent victories achieved by the armies of the Potomac, associated from their localities with those of the Revolution, and that the sincere thanks of this House are hereby tendered to Major General George B. McClellan, for the display of those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of life.

I have done with Yorktown, unless the committee or some of its members see fit to reply to what is here recorded. I do not wish to be considered the defender of General McClellan. He needs no defence. The simple unvarnished narrative of what he has done, and what he has left undone, in the service of his country, and his reasons for his action and non-action, will form not only his defence but his eulogy. My office is to arraign before the American people and the world, the joint committee of Congress. It will afford me sincere gratification to be convinced that this committee does not deserve the marked reprobation of all intelligent and honorable men.

Since I sent my last number to the press I have been addressed by a merchant of high position and respectability, substantially as follows: "Well! I see you have turned military man, and are engaged in the discussion of military questions." My reply to such a question is—I am no military man, and am no judge of military matters; that is to say, my judgment is not the result of such theoretical and practical knowledge as entitles my opinions to be received as evidence to guide the judgment of others. I am not an expert. But I do profess to some knowledge of the rules of evidence, and also to some acquaintance with the Constitution of my country, and to the duties imposed upon public officers by that Constitution.

1. As to the rules of evidence. Every witness may testify to facts which have fallen under his own observation, or which he personally knows; but information derived from others is hearsay evidence, and is open to many objections. It is very unsafe to form conclusions from such testimony.

As I have before shown, opinions can only be received as evidence when they proceed from witnesses who have, from theory and practice, peculiar knowledge of the subject upon which they testify. These rules are the result of long experience in the practical business of mankind, especially in controversies brought before courts of justice, and they have been established with the view to aiding the human mind in the endeavor to arrive at truth through the medium of human testimony. Another rule is, that leading questions shall not be put to a witness; that is to say, a question shall not be asked which suggests to the witness the answer which is desired and expected. Considering that the joint committee was composed of members, a large majority of whom were known to be unfriendly to McClellan, and were intent upon his degradation, and considering too, that most of the witnesses were dependent for their positions, and especially for their promotion, upon the favor of the Administration, leading questions would not be likely to elicit the truth. Witness the single case of General Barnard, in illustration of this remark. Now I affirm, from a thorough and attentive perusal of the evidence contained in No. 1 of the committee's report, that all these rules have been grossly and repeatedly violated by the committee in taking testimony. To speeify: A great deal of improper and hearsay evidence has been received in answer to questions put by the committee. Numerous opinions have been drawn forth and recorded, from witnesses whose opinions were not evidence. The report abounds with leading questions which plainly suggest to the witnesses the answers desired, and the answers are, for the most part, given as desired.

2. As to the Constitution, and duties of official agents of the government:

The President, the chief of these

official organs, is by virtue of his office, commander in chief of the army, but that of itself, does not qualify him to take command of the army or to interfere in military operations. The idea, that because he is the constitutional conmander in chief of the army, he shall take command in fact, is absurd, according to the theory of our constitutional government. The country has been engaged in three wars with foreign nations since the Revolution. The short war with France, under John Adams, second President of the United States, the war with Great Britain, under Mr. Madison's Administration, and the war with Mexico, under Mr. Polk's Administration. Neither of these Presidents ever for a moment undertook to interfere directly with troops or regiments in the field. The idea of John Adams, or James Madison, eminent statesmen as they were, bestriding a horse and reviewing an army, would strike any American citizen of their day as ridiculous. A President may put in office, by consent of the Senate, the incumbents of the War Department; but when duly filled with officers, constitutionally chosen, this department must manage and control military operations in time of war. The like is true of every other department. Who expects the President to control the operations of the Treasury Department? Would Mr. Chase allow for a moment such interference or control? Certainly not. President Lincoln has practically violated this established theory of our government. He has interfered directly, in his own proper person, with military operations; he has personally directed generals in command what they ought to do, and what they ought to leave undone. What has been the result? Nothing but evil and disaster. I have shown, beyond the possibility of refutation, that but for the interference of the President, General McClellan would have taken Richmond a year ago. Unless this war is conducted by military men, upon military principles, it needs no prophet to tell us it can never succeed. It is a well known fact that the General-in-Chief at Washington does not control the military operations of the country, but he is constantly interfered with and controlled by the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, and this constitutional commander is constantly under an outside pressure, not directed by military science, which he has more than once acknowledged his utter inability to resist. Is it possible that our cause should prosper when these things exist? My remedy is:—Let George B. McClellan be made General-in-Chief and Acting Secretary of War, and then let him control the operations of the war, without interference, just as Mr. Chase now controls the operations of the Treasury Department without interference. Then success will follow, and confidence will be felt that military operations will be properly conducted.

This number is an episode suggested by the question casually put to me as above stated. I shall accompany the Army of the Potomac from Yorktown to Williamsburg in my next number.

FROM YORKTOWN TO WILLIAMSBURG.

Yorktown was evacuated on the 4th of May, 1862; suddenly, unexpectely, precipitately evacuated. What, then, was the duty of General Mc Clellan, and did he perform that duty? It is obvious that fresh, hot, and vigorous pursuit was one branch of that duty. By this means the enemy, or a part of his force, might be encountered and captured. Another and more important branch of his duty was, if posaible, to intercept the retreat of the enemy by throwing a force between him and Richmond. Let us see what the general actually did; his own testimony on this point is too clear and comprehensive to require elucidation or abridgment. Here it is: "As soon as I knew that the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. I ordered the cavalry under General Stoneman, with the horse-artillery in pursuit. I directed the divisions of Kearney and Hooker to move by the direct road from Yorktown to Wil

liamsburg, while the divisions of Smith, Couch, and Casey, were ordered by the road from Warwick Court House to Williamsburgh. Franklin's division, which was on the Transports, was ordered up to Yorktown, with the intention of moving it to the vicinity of West Point, in order to intercept the retreat of the enemy. The divisions of Richardson, Sedgwick, and Porter were moved to the immediate vicinity of Yorktown, ready either to support the troops who had advanced by land, or to go by water, as circumstances might render advisable. The general instructions given to the troops ordered in pursuit were to overtake the enemy and inflict as much damage as possible. This was on Sunday. That night I heard that the cavalry had come up with the enemy in the vicinity of Williamsburg, and that the infantry were within a half hour's march, rapidly approaching, and would undoubtedly carry the position. Gen. Sumner was in command of the troops ordered to the front. I remained at Yorktown on Sunday, and on Monday morning engaged in arranging for the forwarding of Franklin's division to West Point, and in consultation with the naval commander, as well as other duties incident to my position.

I heard nothing from the front on Monday morning that gave me any idea that there was anything serious involved. I heard nothing from General Sumner. The first intimation I had that there was anything at all serious was from Governor Sprague, who came to me at Yorktown and told me that things were not going on well in front. This was, I think, about noon; it may have been half an hour or an hour one way or the other. He told me that things were not going well, and that my presence in front was necessary. As soon as I heard that I took a boat, went down to camp where my horses were, and immediately left for the front, meeting on the way the Prince de Joinville, and an aid of General Sumner, who had been sent back to hurry me up. Up to this time I had had no information from General Sumner or any one in command, that there was anything at all serious in front. I arrived on the ground, I should think, about an hour or an hour and a half before dark. I acquainted myself, as rapidly as possible, with the state of affairs, and immediately ordered reinforcements to General Hancock, who was heavily engaged when I arrived, and I endeavored to communicate with General Heintzelman, who was on the left of our position. I was told that it was impossible to communicate directly with our left under General Heintzelman. I sent an officer, Capt. Alexander, with a company to endeavor to open communication with General Heintzelman, that I might learn the state of affairs there. He returned after dark with the information that it was impracticable to get through the marsh. I tnen went round some seven or eight miles, by way of the rear, to communicate.

During the night I heard from General Heintzelman that Hooker's division had been badly cut up, and could not be relied upon for very heavy work in the morning; that Kearney's division, although it had suffered severely, could be fully relied upon to hold its own; and that no advance could be made in that quarter without having reinforcements.

I felt satisfied, from what I knew of Hancock's position, that the battle was won; that he had occupied the decisive point, and gained possession of a portion of the enemy's line; and that they must make a night retreat or we would have greatly the advantage of them in the morning. So fully was I satisfied of that, that I countermanded orders that I had given in the afternoon, for the advance of Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions to the front and sent them back to Yorktown to go by water; feeling sure that the battle was won." Here is the whole story, uncontradicted by any reliable testimony. The committee make no open and direct attack upon General McClellan for failure of duty in pursuing the enemy to Williamsburg, but they make insinuations by which they

mean to leave an impression that he was remiss in duty. The most salient of these indirect attacks are italicised by the *Tribune* in his edition of the report. The passages thus made prominent are these: "*Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending of two divisions up the York River to West Point.*" * * "He" (Gov. Sprague) "testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed 'those in front could attend to that little matter.'" The report of the committee adds: "After some time General McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon."

The charges are, then: 1. *General McClellan remained behind*, &c. The committee mean to imply that he ought to have been in front, facing the danger. 2, Upon being informed of the collision at Williamsburg, he made light of it; and 3. He was slow, when informed there was trouble in front, in giving relief.

1. General McClellan, instead of going himself in pursuit of the retreating enemy, sent several of his corps commanders, men of high military reputation, and of experience, while he remained at Yorktown to dispatch a body of troops by water to intercept the retreat of the enemy, by getting between him and Richmond. Before the evacuation of Yorktown it was impracticable for our naval force to go up York River. At a narrow pass in this river, between Yorktown and Gloucester Point, there were very formidable fortifications and armaments on both sides—on the side of Yorktown and on the side of Gloucester Point; these were under the control of the enemy before the evacuation. If either of these positions was in our hands the obstacle in the way of our naval operations up York River would have been removed. The original purpose was that McDowell's force should take Gloucester Point, when Yorktown could not have failed to be evacuated, and a free passage to Richmond made for our army not only by land, up the Peninsula, but also up the York River. The execution of this purpose having been defeated, as we have seen, the next thing to be done was to gain the works on the Yorktown side, and the same result would have been brought about. After the evacuation York River was unobstructed, and now it became a very desirable object to embark a force at Yorktown, send it up York River to West Point, and thus intercept the retreat of the enemy to Richmond. For this purpose it became necessary to make suitable arrangements with the naval commander, and get the troops on board and under way. McClellan judged that the best interests of the service required him to remain, and personally supervise the accomplishment of this work, for there were difficulties in the way which required to be removed. Who can question the soundness of this decision? Yet this prevented the general from being at or near Williamsburg when an actual collision occurred. When he was sent for, and apprised of the danger, he went promptly. But because a collision did occur—and it would not have occurred if Gen. Stoneman had been more tardy in pursuit—and because there was danger which General McClellan was not present to share, the committee most unfairly, most unmanfully, think a proper opportunity is afforded, which they are prompt to improve, to insinuate that the general shrinks at the prospect of danger, and is deficient in personal courage. I say an "insinuation" is made; it would have been imprudent, probably unsafe, for the committee to make a direct charge of cowardice; they therefore find it convenient to deal in insinuations; "unsafe," not that Gen. McClellan would have noticed it, but there are probably many brave men in the army less discreet, exercising less self-control than the general, who might have resented it by chastising the authors of such a charge. Similar insinuations are made in other parts of the committee's report, intended to wound the sensibilities of a soldier, which shall be noticed hereafter.

The committee seem to think that the commander-in-chief of 100,000 men can best prove his fitness for his high position by rushing into danger, and exposing his own life; the Joint Committee of Congress need instruction on this point, and any corporal in the army could give them that instruction.

2 The general "made light of it." That expression is incorporated in the report, being extracted from the testimony of Governor Sprague, who testifies: "With one orderly I left the advance at 12 o'clock to go to Yorktown and communicate the condition of affairs to General McClellan, who was supposed to be at Yorktown, though no communication had been received from him since early the day before. I reached Yorktown in about one hour and a half, and found General McClellan with General Fitz John Porter and General Franklin. I communicated to him the condition of affairs at the front, and urged him to go up there at once. His reply was that he thought they could take care of *this little matter*, but he said he would immediately leave for the front." "I afterwards ascertained that General McClellan arrived at the front about five o'clock."

This testimony of Governor Sprague was thought worthy of being incorporated in the report, and of being made prominent in the *Tribune's* edition, and yet the committee could hardly have relied on the accuracy of the witness Sprague, for according to his testimony the general must have been with the army in five hours after he, Sprague, left Williamsburg, a distance of twelve miles, and traveled over a road almost impassable. Yet the committee say, "after some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown, &c." Yet it did so happen that after the general had arrived at Williamsburg, reinforcements were sent in the proper direction, order and confidence were restored. He saw at once that the enemy had been whipped, and immediately ordered several generals to return at once to Yorktown and embark with Franklin. This will do for Williamsburg.

FROM WILLIAMSBURG TO CHICKAHOMINY.

It has been shown in these papers that General McClellan would have taken Richmond a year ago, if he had been permitted to execute the purposes he had formed with the concurrence of the Administration. This is not denied by the opponents of Gen. McClellan; but they say, *first*, that there were good grounds for the withholding of McDowell's command, and, *secondly*, that, without the aid of this command, there were several opportunities for taking Richmond, which the general failed to improve. Among other opportunities neglected was that which occurred immediately after the battle at Williamsburg, when, it is said, our army could have entered Richmond.

The first of these grounds has been replied to. I now come to the second, which shall be examined in the light of the testimony and contemporaneous history, with as much candor, fairness and impartiality as I can exercise.

After describing the battle of Williamsburg, in which he bore a conspicuous part, General Hooker is asked by the committee this question: "Is it your judgment that you could have gone into Richmond then?" To which he answers: "I think we could have moved right on, and got into Richmond by the second day after that battle without another gun being fired." General Keys is asked: "Do you know why there was not an immediate and general pursuit of the enemy after the battle?" He replied: "I do not." Again: "In your judgment, as a military man, should or should not there have been an immediate pursuit?" Answer—"My opinion, as a military man, is that the most vigorous and immediate pursuit should have been made after the battle of Williamsburgh." Question—"In your judgment, if an immediate and vigorous pursuit had been made, what would have been the result?" Answer—"If an immediate and vigorous pursuit of the enemy had been made, I think we should have over-

taken portions of his troops, and have been able to capture such baggage as he took with him. I think also it would have hastened our arrival in the neighborhood of Richmond, and we should have been able to attack the enemy before he had made the preparations for defence and obtained the reinforcements which our delay gave him an opportunity of doing."

General McClellan testifies that it is about fifty miles from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy, that is to New Bridge. He is then asked: "It has been stated that some two weeks were occupied in the movement from Williamsburgh to the Chickahoiminy; will you explain the reason for that?" Answer—"I do not remember the exact time; I can only say that we were very much delayed after the affair at Williamsburg by the condition of the roads, and the diffiulty in bringing up supplies. We had a great deal of trouble of that kind before reaching the Chickahominy. I think the movemeht was made as rapidly as possible under the circumstances." Question—"After leaving Williamsburg you met with no serious resistance from the enemy until after crossing of Bottom's Bridge, did you?" Answer—"Merely cavalry affairs. There were some sharp cavalry affairs, but no resistance in large force."

The committee say in their report: "Several of the generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could be followed into Richmond—one of them says without firing a gun. Gen. McClellan says that the roads were so bad in consequence of the rains, that it was impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit."

All the testimony bearing upon the point under review, and the reference of the committee to the same, is here transcribed. General McClellan is at issue with Generals Hooker and Keyes, and the committee evidently favor the testimony against McClellan. I hope my readers will patiently follow me while I investigate the question—is the bias of the committee in the right direction?

It is true that the roads were bad in consequence of the rains, and that made it impracticable to pursue the enemy vigorously. On the night when the rebels evacuated Williamsburg, Prince de Joinville says "that the rain was falling in torrents," and, before that time, and ever since the leaving of Yorktown, there had been copious rains. On the night before the battle at Williamsburg, General Hooker says "that the roads had become so very muddy—raining very hard—the mud was knee-deep, and my men had become so fatigued that I halted right in the road, intending to renew the march at the dawn of day in the morning." But the condition of the roads was not the only cause why General McClellan could not proceed on the morning after the battle. He says he was prevented "by the condition of the roads, *and the difficulty in bringing up supplies.*" It will be remembered that the base of supplies for our army was Yorktown, and the base of supplies for the rebel army was Richmond.

We were marching from our base of supplies, and the enemy was marching to his base of supplies. Our army left Yorktown in great haste to pursue the retreating enemy; it took as small an amount of provisions and ammunition as conld be conveniently transported in a rapid march—the roads being in a wretched condition for travel. General Casey testifies: "On the morning of the 4th of May, when there was some evidence that the enemy was about evacuating their lines, I was ordered at a half hour's notice to go to the river and leave everything behind—tents, blankets, knapsacks and everything. When I got there the enemy had evacuated their works. I then intended to send back for the tents, blankets and knapsacks for my men. But I got a peremptory order from General Sumner to push on after the enemy, without waiting for anything. The consequence was that my division—a great many of them—were without blankets and knapsacks for severl weeks. It was raining terribly all the time,

and the consequence was that I lost a great many men from that exposure, as they were obliged to lie down in the mud, exposed to the rain, without any protection whatever." Gov. Sprague says: "We had started off to Yorktown so hurriedly that no preparations for rations had been made, and many of the regiments had nothing to eat." Gen. Heintzelman says: "Most of the troops were out of ammunition." Heintzelman, as I am informed, reported on the 5th of May that all his provisions would be exhausted that night, and that Hookers's and Kearney's commands were so much exhausted and injured by the contest as not to be reliable for service the next morning. Kearney's ammunition and provisions were mainly exhausted. These being the facts, who can fail to see that it was utterly impracticable to pursue the enemy immediately after the battle of Williamsburg. On the 4th of May about 45,000 troops started from Yorktown by land in great haste to pursue a retreating enemy, carrying with them such ammunition and supplies only as could be carried on a rapid march. Generals Franklin, Sedgwick and Porter went up the York River with their commands to West Point, at which place Franklin with his 11,000 troops arrived on the evening of the 6th and the morning of the 7th of May. After the retreat from Williamsburg, Johnson, the rebel commander, marched rapidly to West Point to prevent the landing of Franklin's command before Sedgwick and Porter should arrive with their commands. It must be obvious that in this condition of things Gen. McClellan could not march upon Richmond until he had established a base of supplies nearer to Richmond than Yorktown, and brought up his commissary stores asd ammunition for the supply of his army to such base of operations. These supplies had to be brought up the York River, and landed at Elton, on the side of the Pamunkey River opposite West Point. Elton was the first temporary depot for these supplies, and the next temporary depot was Cumberland, situated on the Pumunkey about fifteen miles from West Point, while the main base of supplies was finally fixed at White House on the Pamunkey River, where the railroad from West Point to Richmond crosses the Pumnnkey, and about thirty miles from Richmond. To make these necessary arrangements required all the time that was taken to prepare the Army of the Potomac to proceed on its march to the Chickahominy.

The testimony, therefore, of Generals Hooker and Keyes is very loose and unreliable. The Prince de Joinville, who has given to Europe and the world the most clear, accurate and soldierlike history of the campaign on the Peninsula that has yet appeared, after describing the capture of Williamsburg, proceeds:—"The mass of Federal troops was detained by the necessity of waiting for provisions from Yorktown, the arrival of which was retarded by the state of the roads. They came at last, and as the fine weather dried the roads up very fast, a two days' march brought us up with the corps which had disembarked and established a depot at the head of York River. The whole army was collected around this point, and then resumed its march to Richmond, along the Pumunkey, a navigable affluent of the York.

How evident therefore it is that the testimony of Hooker is utterly incredible, when he says, "I think we could have moved right on and got into Richmond the second day after the battle without another gun being fired." Fifty miles' march from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy in two days, the roads being in the worst condition imaginable for travel, the army being without food, short of ammunition, and a portion of it exhausted after severe fighting—who can believe such a witness? But this is the opinion of General Hooker—the professional opinion—and all distinguished men of his profession acquainted with the character of General McClellan will put as much confidence in this opinion as in that other

opinion which he has uttered under oath: "I do not hesitate to say that the failure of the Peninsula campaign is to be attributed to the want of generalship on the part of our commander." While that record remains, General Joseph Hooker will never have the confidence of the Army of the Potomac, for that army will never believe that he can be a safe and reliable leader "who bears false witness against his neighbor." This general, whom the Prince de Joinville styled "an admirable soldier," has, since he gave his testimony against General McClellan, been placed at the head of a larger army than that commanded by McClellan on the Peninsula—an army well clad, well supplied, and well appointed in every respect, and he has had the opportunity of meeting the enemy; how he improved that opportunity the country knows, the world knows, and especially do the officers and soldiers who fought under him know; they are capable of instituting a comparison between him and the general whom he has defamed, and I greatly err if that general will shrink from the comparison.

Gen. McClellan is not the only military chief who has been assailed in the testimony of Hooker, who says "that Gen. Sumner was in command (at Williamsburg) with a large force, certainly not less than 30,000 men. He could have advanced through the line of defences across the Peninsula at Williamsburg without losing ten men. The enemy could not fire for I had him in a vice. I wanted him to advance, and until three o'clock of that day I expected he would advance and march through the line held by the enemy, and go to picking up prisoners. During this time my own troops were engaged with not less than three or four times my number. Gen. Kearney, who was the last of all the army to leave Yorktown—except Porter's division, which was left to garrison Yorktown—was the first to come to my assistance. If General Sumner had advanced, the rebellion would have been buried there. He did not advance at all! Here, then, it would seem that that veteran General Sumner lost a glorious opportunity to finish the rebellion." But it happens that the old general was there before the committee also to testify. He says that none of his own corps were there. It was ten miles in the rear. He was in command there by virtue of his seniority in rank. He occupied the centre. Question by Mr. Odell—"What was the number of troops under your command at the centre?" Answer—"My impression now is that before General Peck arrived there was not to exceed a brigade and a half of infantry at that point, or about two-thirds of Smith's division. There was a large body of cavalry there, but I did not look upon them as available troops to hold that point against an attack from the woods." Question.—"About how many men were there in that brigade and a half?" Answer.—"I do not think there could have been to exceed 3,000 men; all the rest of the forces under my control were in the rear, coming up." It will be seen that the number of troops under Gen. Sumner's command differs from the statement of Gen. Hooker as three to thirty. General Sumner further testifies: "An application was made to me for reinforcements for Gen. Hooker; I think I complied with the application by sending my staff officers to the rear to hurry up the troops from the rear. I did not deem it safe to send any more troops from the centre, and the result showed that it was fortunate I had not done so. I allude to the attack made by the enemy in the afternoon at the centre." Thus much for Gen. Hooker, the present commander of the army of the Potomac.

But what shall be said of Gen. Keyes? He has a reputation in the army differing widely from that of Gen. Hooker; he is regarded as a reliable man—how could this general give the professional opinion that "the most vigorous and immediate pursuit should have been made after the battle of Williamsburg?" How could that distinguished general have answered the following ques-

tions if they had been put: Was it practicable for the army to have moved when their provisions were exhausted? When they were short of ammunition, to have moved at all before a base of supplies was established? From the facts above stated, all of which are of the most reliable character, it will be seen how Gen. Keyes must have answered these interrogatories if they had been put to him. It is melancholy to think that men who never lack courage on the field of battle should fail to speak their honest convictions when they have reason to suppose that the utterance of undisguised truth will give offence to those in power. We have seen a melancholy exemplification of this truth in the case of General Barnard, and we fear a similar illustration is exhibited in the case of General Keyes; he knew what kind of testimony the committee wanted. General Keyes gave this testimony, it will be recollected, when Gen. McClellan was no longer at the head of an army, but supposed to be in disgrace. He was examined on the 26th March, 1863. We think there is some foundation for the fear above expressed—not as to the physical courage of General Keyes, for he is no coward, but as to the higher quality of moral courage, in the following statement: On the 16th of April, 1862, General Keyes sent a report, from which we have before quoted, to the Assistant Adjutant General of the Army of the Potomac. We take the following extract from this report: "I was thus enabled in the first day to comprehend with tolerable clearness the position of the enemy from a short distance above Lee's Mills down to James River. He is in a strongly fortified position behind Warwick River, the fords in which have been destroyed by dams, and the approaches to which are through dense forests, swamps and marshes. *No part of his line, as far as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life.*" Other quotations have been given from General Keyes in former numbers.

This was the opinion of General Keyes, officially expressed, when he was with the army before the lines at Yorktown; but before the committee, after General McClellan was relieved of his command, he says, among other things, "My impression now is, that if the whole army had been pressed forward we could have found a point to break through But I give this simply as my impression." After stating that Yorktown was very strongly defended, and if we made an assault on it we should have met with severe loss, he says: "I will not say if we had pressed on immediately on arriving in front of their lines, we might not have found a point where we could have broken the line, and then have invested Yorktown on two sides, when the fall of it, of course, would have been hastened. It is my opinion that if we had pressed on rapidly when we first arrived, we might have found a point through which we could have broken."

Thus it will be seen that the general makes a distinction between Yorktown proper and the lines of the enemy on the Warwick, extending to James River. He was not before Yorktown with his command, but on the lines, and it is as to the practicability *of assaulting the lines* that he speaks in the report above referred to.

BEFORE RICHMOND.

These numbers are resumed after an interim of intense public anxiety, and, I may add, of great joy, in which the popular mind and feeling have been too much engrossed to give any attention to historical events. The Army of the Potomac, after sad experience at Fredericksburg, and a signal and most important victory at Gettysburg, is now where it was after the not less important victory at Antietam, when General McClellan was relieved of his command. Had the Administration not seen fit to remove General McClellan, the officers of the Army of the Potomac, with almost entire unanimity, always excepting Major General Joseph Hooker, would, it is believed, bear testimony that in their judgment our army would not have been defeated in Virginia on the

two occasions referred to, and, certainly, the rebel army of General Lee would not have ventured a second invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. That invasion has, however, been made, attended with immense destruction and loss of property, the most frightful alarm of peaceable citizens, and very serious loss of life. Shall there be no day of reckoning for these things? We shall see when the ballot boxes receive the votes of the American people. Until then let us be patient, and be especially careful that no previous irregularities change the character of the issue then to be decided.

When the enemy retreated from Williamsburg he returned to his capital and his base of supplies. Our army had not established a base of supplies between Yorktown and Richmond. It requires not a military man to say that a large army cannot carry on its proper operations, nay, tnat it cannot exist, without being in near and easy communication with its depot of daily food, ammunition, and other indispensable supplies. The capital of the enemy was fortified; before General McClellan pursued the enemy to his capital with a view to assault it, he must of course establish a base of supplies for his own army, and store it with the necessary articles of consumption. That base of supplies was established at the White House, on the Pamunkey River, a stream rising in a region of country north of Richmond, and discharging its waters in the Charles River at West Point. The Pamunkey River is navigable from the Charles to the White House, so that this base of supplies was accessible by water. The White House, too, was in direct communication with Richmond by a railroad running from West Point to that capital. So soon as this base of supplies was fixed and stored, General McClellan moved his army on Richmond. General McClellan was asked before the committee—Question. It has been stated that some two weeks were occupied in the movement from Williamsburg to the Chickahominy; will you explain the reason for that? Answer. I do not remember the exact time; I can only say we were very much delayed after the affair at Williamsburg by the condition of the roads and the difficulty in bringing up supplies. We had a great deal of trouble of that kind before reaching the Chickahominy. I think the movement was made as rapidly as possible under the circumstances.

This answer cannot fail to satisfy all reasonable persons. The enemy retreated to Richmond; he could have entered his fortified capital had he chose to do so, and certainly General McClellan could not divine whether he would enter or not. It was a reasonable supposition that he would. What defense the enemy could have made behind his fortifications at Richmond is not known to this day; we never assaulted those fortifications, and have no certain knowledge of their construction or their strength, But this we know—the city of Richmond is capable, from its position and surroundings, of being fortified so as to repel the assault of an invading army. For one whole year before, the enemy was apprised of our intention to capture Richmond, and during all that time he was laying out and constructing fortifications to resist an assault. He had officers skilled in the art of engineering aud the art of defence. These facts are certainly known. What we should have found Richmond if we had attempted an assault can only be conjectured; but the probability is that we should have been required to operate by siege, as was done at Yorktown and at Vicksburg, and in both instances successfully, one without loss, and the other at a great sacrifice of life. We say it is probable we should have besieged it, because it is certain the rebel force behind the fortifications exceeded in number our troops in front of them. This fact is capable of proof, and I call upon the opponents of General McClellan to consider it, to ponder it, and then confess their error in assailing his conduct and his character.

General Barnard testified before the

committee as follows: "No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men, and 3,000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals." What reply can you make to these facts, gentlemen? Can you join the President of the United States and others in censuring General McClellan for calling for reinforcements?

Had the Chickahominy and the margins of that river been in their usual condition, our army could have crossed that stream and followed the enemy as near to Richmond as it would have been safe to approach his fortifications. But the Chickahominy was not in its usual condition, nor was it in the condition it was when Gen. McClellan began to change his base of operations. Thus, this stream is described with professional accuracy in the testimony of General Barnard: "A word is proper here respecting the Chickahominy, which, at the season we struck it, was one of the most formidable obstacles that could be opposed to the advance of our army—an obstacle to which an ordinary *river*, though it be of considerable magnitude, is comparatively slight. The Chickahominy, considered as a military obstacle, consists of a stream of no great value, a swamp, and bottom lands. The stream flows through a belt of heavily timbered swamp, which averages three or four hundred yards wide. A few hundred yards below New Bridge is a short length of the stream not margined by swamp timber; but everywhere else between New and Bottom's Bridges the belt of swamp timber is continuous and wide. The tops of the trees rise just about to the level of the crests of the high lands bordering the bottom, thus perfectly screening from view the bottom lands and slopes of the high lands on the enemy's side. The disappearance, in the place indicated of swamp timber near New Bridge, and the dwindling away of the same at some points above the bridge to isolated trees, gave us some glimpse of the enemy's side near this point. Through this belt of swamp the stream flows sometimes in a single channel, more frequently divided into several; and when but a foot or two above its summer level, overspreads the whole swamp." * * * "It was currently reported at the time of our arrival that the stream was nowhere fordable." * * * "Although it was thus shown that the stream was no obstacle for infantry, the swamp and the bottom lands were *impracticable to cavalry and artillery.* It was necessary to provide bridges, and, except at the site of the New Bridge, to corduroy a certain length of road on each margin."

Now at this distance of time, when space has been given for cool reflection, it is hoped that General McClellan will be pardoned by his enemies for the condition in which he found the Chickahominy, and the swamps and submerged lands consequent upon that condition. It has been reproachfully charged by a member of the War Committee, on the floor of the Senate, long before the report of that committee was made, that we went to digging. "We found the worst swamp there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in the centre of it and went to digging." Who was it that made the swamp? How came it in the way of our army? Could a major general, in full command, have prevented it by a general order? "Who hath divided a water course for the overflowing of water, or a way for the lightning or the thunder? Hath the rain a father, or who hath begotten the drops of dew?" There was indeed a "swamp" and more than a swamp, as we have seen, a complete submersion of a most formidable character. This overflow was so sudden and unexpected that some persons conjectured that sluices had been cut above Richmond, and water let in from other sources to increase the volume of the stream. The rebels said it was an interposition of Divine Providence to save their capital. Certain it is that General McClellan had no power to prevent this overflow. Nor ought the general to be censured with

extreme severity by his radical fellow-citizens, because there went up from these surcharged swamps a miasm which poisoned the atmosphere and caused sickness in the camps. The general could not help it; all he could do was to remain at his post, faithful in the discharge of duty, and inhale the same poisoned atmosphere inhaled by those under his command. He was not censured by the privates in the ranks of his army, nor by the officers either, until some of them were called to swear before the War Committee. The army of the Potomac at that time was composed of men capable of judging of the qualifications and the merits of their commanders. That army did not censure their chief commander, but they loved him. The most affecting anecdote I ever heard was related to me by a member of the N. Y. 7th regiment. This regiment was stationed for three months in the summer of 1862 in Baltimore. It was a part of their duty to assist the wounded soldiers coming daily from the Army of the Potomac to land, and aid them to the hospitals, or in the further prosecution of their journey. These wounded and sick soldiers expressed an ardent attachment for General McClellan. One young man, very feeble, was assisted to land by the person who related to me the anecdote; he summoned up his remaining strength, raised his head, rested on his elbow, cheered for General McClellan, and died.

General Howard, an educated and accomplished soldier, a graduate of West Point, and afterwards a professor in that celebrated institution, made a speech to his fellow-citizens in Portland, Maine, from which the following is an extract:

"My friends, much has been said in regard to the general intrusted with the command there—much adulation and much abuse. I believe in my heart that General McClellan is worthy to be trusted. You can trust him, but you must submerge political parties, however, in the good of the country. You sent me forth to one of your institutions, without any special politics except love of country. This war is educating us up to that standard of patriotism. When we shall have shed a little more blood, we shall learn to live more in accordance with the spirit of our fathers. I know that I am no worshipper of men. I do not believe that General McClellan has passed through the campaign thus far without a mistake, but for one I trust him and urge you to. Trust him, not as a god, but as a general. He has shown at every movement great ability and caution; too much so, perhaps, for some who are inclined to doubt him; but whether so or not is to be tested by results. I hope we don't need the instruction of another Bull Run to teach us to be cautious. It is best to be. The old men say so, and when you find a young man combining ability with caution, you may trust him, for you have there the sprightliness of youth combined with the considerotian and reflection of age."

The general, at the time of making that speech, had lost an arm in one of the battles before Richmond. He has since done distinguished service in the field at Chancellorsville and at Gettysburg. He adds to his high military qualifications the character of a sincere and enlightened Christian. *He was not called to testify before the War Committee.*

[The previous matter was contained in eleven numbers, which through inadvertance, have been run together. Hereafter we shall give the numbers as in the original publications.]

NO. XII.

We have seen what was the condition of the Chickahominy on the arrival of our army at the stream and the formidable obstacles thereby interposed to our military operations. General McClellan cannot, of course, be responsible for this condition of things; he could not use his artillery or his cavalry, as we have seen by the testimony of General Barnard. It was impossible in that condition of the ground to make any aggressive demonstrations upon Richmond; before those were attempted, as he was compelled to wait until the waters

which had swelled the streams and saturated the bottom land on its borders, should subside, and the ground become dry and hard. In the mean time all he could do was to prepare to repel assaults on his own level before Richmond by the rebel forces operating on their own grounds. But it was certain that General McClellan needed reinforcements, and he had not yet despaired of being joined by McDowell's forces collected at Fredericksburg. "They covered nothing at this place," says the Prince de Joinville, and were so notoriously useless to the Federal cause, that in the Confederate journals they were spoken of as the "fifth wheel of the coach." The Prince proceeds: "It was known that McDowell desired ardently to give the lie to these railleries by bringing at the decisive moment, his assistance to the cause of the Union. Accordingly, McClellan had no sooner arrived before Richmond than he undertook to discover what he had to hope for from this quarter. No official advices either from Washington or from Fredericksburg had informed him of McDowell's presence at that point, but rumor and probability agreed so well in placing him there that the General-in-Chief resolved to make an attempt to establish a communication with him. On the night of the 26th (May 1862) "he sent forward General Porter's division, with a few squadrons of cavalry, in a furious storm to Hanover Court House, a village about twenty miles north of Richmond, where the railway to Fredericksburg crosses the Pamunkey. The troops of Porter moved rapidly, and about mid-day on the 27th came upon the hostile division of Branch at Hanover Court House. This they assailed with vigor, dispersed it, and took one of its guns. Assailed in their turn by Confederate troops who had suffered them to pass by the woods where they lay hidden, turned on their new enemies and scattered them also. This brilliant affair cost the Federals 400 men, and left General Porter in possession of a cannon, of 500 prisoners, and of two bridges, one on the Fredericksburg, and one on the Virginia Central Railroad. The advance guard of McDowell was then at Bowling Green, fifteen miles from that of Porter. It needed only an effort of will; the two armies were united, and the fall of Richmond certain! Alas! this effort was not made. I cannot recall those fatal moments without a real sinking of the heart. Seated in an orchard in the bivouac of Porter, amid the joyous excitement which followed a successful combat, I saw the Fifth Cavalry bring in whole companies of Confederate prisoners, with arms and baggage, their officers at their head.' May I be pardoned so far to digress as to say, which it has no doubt, greatly pained the foreign prince to hear, that his friend Porter, has been stripped of his bivouac, and turned out upon the world, with every mark of disgrace that his government could stamp upon him; but the prince and the world may rest assured that these marks shall be effaced from a character as radiant of military honors as any in his native land, by a grateful country, and the patriotic soldier shall yet be restored to the rank of which he has been unjustly deprived. This opinion and prediction I venture after a careful study of the official record of General Porter's trial.

This battle at Hanover Court House has been adverted to in those numbers, but cannot properly be omitted here in describing the progress of the campaign in chronological order, although liable to the charge of repetition. I shall notice the battles before Richmond in future numbers.

NO. XIII.

FAIR OAKS.

There can be no just judgment formed of the measures adopted and executed by General McClellan in the conduct of his campaigns, except by consideriug them first in their general plan, and then examining them in detail. The general outline of his operations, as dictated by himself alone, or as agreed upon in council with others, shall be fairly and fully stated; for the present, let every day's work

be csrutinized, and the questions put be fairly answered,—What could the general have done to-day which he did not do? What has he left undone to-day which he might have done?

In answering these questions it is not only right but indispensable that the unforeseen and natural obstacles interposed in the way of his operations should be duly regarded. For instance, who could have foreseen, what human power could have prevented the copious and unexpected showers of rain which poured down and swelled the Chickahominy, and submerged the margins of this stream—a wide area of bottom land—rendering the ground unfit for military movements? In addition to this natural occurrence, the general was met by a military array of the most formidable character. These were the forces to be conquered, and the eye of the fair critic must be kept constantly upon them, as well as upon the force subject to our own command.

It has been shown that the junction of McDowell had been prevented "at the moment," says the Prince de Joinville, "when the junction would have been decisive of the campaign." "Henceforth," adds the Prince, "the army of the Potomac could only rely upon itself. No time was to be lost before acting, for every day augmented the disproportion between the forces of the adversaries, and it was to be feared the Federals encamped amid the marshes of the Chickahominy would suffer severely from the great heats now setting in. We had been for some days face to face. The Federal advance was but five miles distant from Richmond. Skirmishes were of daily occurrence, and with the feelings on both sides, a general action was inevitable. Gen. McClellan waited for two things before making the attack. He waited for the roads, which the rain had swamped, to become solid and practicable for his artillery, and for the completion of the numerous bridges which he was throwing over the Chickahominy." The character of the localities, the impossibility of quitting the railway by which the army was supplied, and the necessity of keeping on his guard against any attempt of the enemy to turn his position, had forced the general to divide his troops into two wings, on the opposite banks of the river. It was consequently most important to be able to mass them rapidly, either on the right bank for an offensive movement against Richmond, or on the left bank against any attempt to turn the position. Here it will be seen that the side of the stream towards Richmond is called the *right bank*, while the opposite side is called the *left bank*. "The danger of turning the position was much to be feared, for the Confederates had retained possession of several bridges on the upper Chickahominy, which would permit them to occupy the excellent positions that are to be found on the left bank, just so soon as the Northern army should abandon these positions. To make this more plain, the Confederates could cross the stream in its upper part, and come down and get between our forces on the right, and our base of supplies, the White House, if we failed to guard the left bank with a sufficient force to intercept such a movement. In this way they would have shut us up upon the right bank blockaded, starved, and reduced to an extremely critical position. "The roads," says the same intelligent and impartial witness, "were long in drying, the bridges were long in building." "Never have we seen so rainy a season,' said the oldest inhabitant. "Never did we see bridges so difficult to build," said the engineers. The abominable river laughed at all their efforts; too narrow for a bridge of boats, too deep and too muddy for piers; here, a simple brook some ten yards wide flowing between two pieces of quicksand, in which the horses stuck up to their girths, and which offered no bearing; there, divided into a thousand tiny rivulets spread over a surface of three hundred yards, and traversing one of those woody morasses which are peculiar to tropical countries, changing its level and its bed from day to day, the river in its

capricious and uncertain sway annulled and undid to-day the labors of yesterday, carried on under a burning sun, and often under the fire of the enemy." These quotations are testimony of unbiased and highly intelligent eye witnesses of what they relate, far beyond the influence of hope or fear of the United States or Confederate Governments. I say "witnesses," for this statement is the result of the joint personal observation of the Prince de Joinville and his two nephews.

In this condition of things what was to be done? The enemy, as we have seen, did not find it necessary to retreat behind the intrenched and fortified works of his capital, but he showed himself on elevated and advantageous positions outside of those works. Thus posted we could not—it was entirely impracticable, in the state of things then existing, for Gen. McClellan to make an offensive demonstration. All he could do was to wait, and safety required that, while waiting, he should fortify his own position to enable him to resist attacks of the enemy. This he did, and the necessity of so fortifying was soon demonstrated, as we shall see.

The left wing of our army had crossed the river at Bottom Bridge, and the right wing remained on the other side to repel a flank movement of the enemy, as has been shown. The left wing proceeded on the railway leading from our base of supplies to Richmond, about half the distance from the river to the capital, to a station called Fair Oaks. A short distance south of the railway, and running in the same general direction, was the country road leading from Williamsburg to Richmond. On this road, south of Fair Oaks, and no great distance therefrom. is a place called Seven Pines. The left wing was formed of four divisions encamped on the Richmond side of the river, along the railway on either side. On the opposite side of the river lay the right wing of the army, consisting of five divisions and the resources. To pass from one end to the other would have made a journey of something like fifteen or twenty miles, but in so passing there was only one bridge to be crossed, and that was Bottom Bridge The distance in a direct line between the extremities of these two wings was short. It was to unite the two arms of our forces that three or four bridges across the river were commenced. One alone was fit for use on 31st May, 1862. To defend the encampments of the left wing, entrenchments and rifle pits were dug at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. General Heintzelman with his two divisions crossed the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge on the 25th May. This General says; "The next day I rode to the front and saw how the troops were posted. Engineers were sent over, and were directed to fortify a position about the Seven Pines. In making this forward movement there were frequent skirmishes that did not amount to much. We commenced two or three lines across the road and country there before we finally got located."

The commencement of a series of lines and fortifications furnishes the foundation for the charge brought by Senator Chandler, of Michigan, one of the War Committee, against General McClellan, in the utterance of which this Senator made the Senate Chamber ring on the 16th July, 1862. The charge was: "We found the worst swamp there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down in the centre of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands and tens of thousands of lives of the bravest troops that ever stood on the face of God's earth, digging in front of the intrenchments and before the whipped army of the rebels." The state of facts which preceded this digging, and rendered it necessary, has been truly and faithfully described in plain prose, and now that the poetic muse of the Michigan Senator has had time to rest after her daring flight, I would ask him—were you authorized to make an attack so gross, and so utterly groundless upon a soldier who was doing what he could in circumstances most trying, to put down the

rebellion against his government by all the means of civilized warfare? Was it manly to assail one who could not reply? Whose mouth was closed by the proprieties of his position, as well as by the rules established for the government of that position. Mr. Chandler, you ought to be ashamed of this rude, and, I may add, vulgar assault. All the harm I wish you is that you should be tried and punished at their discretion, by the soldiers from Michigan, so highly eulogized by all who have fought under Major General McClellan.

On the 31st of May, only six days after Gen. Heintzelman had crossed the river, the enemy commenced in large force the attack upon the left wing of our army at Seven Pines; on that day and the next, there was fought at Seven Pines and at Fair Oaks one of the most sanguinary battles of the war, in which our arms repelled a force of the enemy greatly superior in numbers, and were on the last day victorious over that enemy.

In the record contained in a work recently published, entitled "*War Pictures from the South*, by B. Estvan, Colonel of Cavalry in the Confederate Army," the state of things among the Confederates which led to this attack is thus described: "In the meanwhile disease spread among our (the Confederate) forces to a considerable extent; virulent, obstinate fevers, caused by the miasma of the neighboring swamps, prevailed to a great extent, and the ravages that ensued became so great as to cause much anxiety to General Johntson. The deaths, indeed, were so numerous that sufficient persons could not be procured at Richmond to undertake the task of burying the bodies, which lay exposed in the church-yards by hundreds, spreading pestilence around. The medical faculty anticipated fearful consequences from this state of things, and General Johnston contemplated gloomily the inroads disease was hourly making in his brave army, which almost seemed as if it were doomed to sink altogether into an inglorious grave. In this dire emergency he resolved at all costs to attack his intrenched opponents."

What credit ought to be given to this record others can form their own judgment, I have no opinion to give.

It is not my object to give a description of the battle of Fair Oaks; no charge has been made against General McClellan for the conduct of this battle; it was every way honorable to our arms and the result furnished good ground for rejoicing on our part. But it is charged against General Mc Clellan, that immediately after this battle he lost an opportunity which fairly offered to enter Richmond. The report says: "The officers engaged in that battle who have been examined testify that *the army could have pushed right into the city of Richmond with little resistance;* that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., that might impede their flight."

This I understand to mean that our soldiers composing the left wing of the army were bound to follow the rebels immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks into Richmond. So understood, the report of the committee is not supported by evidence, as I shall show. General Heintzleman says: "The next morning I learned that the enemy had retreated in great confusion, and on Sunday we gained nearly all the ground we had lost the day before. I sent General Hooker's half division forward, and sent an officer to General Richardson, who commanded one of General Sumner's divisions, and asked him to co operate with us, and find out what the enemy was doing. He saw General Sumner, but he said he could make no reconnoissance without orders from General McClellan. I sent my troops forward, and they got within about four miles of Richmond. They sent back word how far they had got, and I sent word to General McClellan. He ordered me to stop, and fall back on the old line. From information we got from the rebels I had no doubt we might have gone right into Richmond." This is the testimony of an officer engaged in the battle, and it hardly sus-

tains the declaration of the committee. General Sumner, also engaged in the battle, gives *no testimony* whatever to support the committee's report. General Joseph Hooker is asked by the committee: "Suppose that the next day after the repulse of the enemy at Fair Oaks, General McClellan had brought his whole army across the Chickahominy, and made a vigorous movement upon Richmond, in your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect of that movement?" To this question he replies: "That at no time during the whole of the campaign did I feel that we could not go to Richmond." The witness preferred to testify as to his "feeling," and not to give his judgment "as a military man," General Hooker is a wholesale swearer. But the general must be understood as giving it as his opinion that both wings of the army could have entered Richmond: for he is not inquired of as to "one wing.' General Keyes, who took a conspicuous part in the battle of Fair Oaks, and has testified in relation to it with great precision and deliberation says: "It would have been necessary, in my judgment, to have had a portion of the right wing of the army to enable us to follow the enemy into Richmond."

So, then, it is very clear that according to the testimony of the generals engaged in the battle who were examined as witnesses, that it was only by joining the right and left wings of the army that it would have been authorized to pursue the enemy into Richmond after the battle of Fair Oaks.

It will be recollected that there was but one bridge, Bottom Bridge, over which the right wing could have passed, and the wings of this line were so extended, that it would have taken all of two days to enable the right wing to pass over this bridge, and that such a movement if made, would have been attended with danger of having our whole army cut off from its base of supplies. It must be concluded, therefore, that it was impracticable, with the means at our command, to follow the enemy into Richmond after the battle of Fair Oaks. General McClellan's own testimony on this point is very conclusive: "Question. Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks could you not have advanced on Richmond" If not, why not?" To which the general answers: "I do not think it would have been possible at that time to have taken our artillery with us. The result of which, independent of all other considerations, would have been to have brought us in front of the enemy's works at Richmond, without artillery, where they had heavy guns. That and the condition of the bridges were the principal reasons for not advancing at that time."

Ought not the committee to have been satisfied with that answer, especially as they failed in embarassing the general by the next question they put, which was: "The enemy retired, *after taking with them their artillery*, after their defeat, did they not?" A very adroit question this; but the general was too used to strategy to be caught; he therefore defeats the object of the committee by telling the simple truth in the most artless manner: "Answer. They had very few guns in action. I am not sure they had any guns. It was on their part almost entirely an infantry affair." I have done with Fair Oaks.

No. XIV.

GROSS INJUSTICE OF THE COMMITTEE.

The *Tribune* edition of the committee report italicizes the following sentence: "*Gen. McClellan was with the main part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river.*"

Questions like the following were put to the witnesses examined by the committee.

Question—Where was Gen. McClellan during the fight at Williamsburg?

Answer—He remained at the camp near Yorktown.

Question—How far was that from the field of battle?

Question—Why was not the com-

manding general nearer at hand then?

Question—To General Sumner—Where was General McClellan during those battles? (Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.)

Question—Where was General McClellan during your second fight at Malvern?

The committee was appointed to inquire into "the conduct of the war." Questions like those quoted in respect to battles where success crowned our arms, and where, of course, the conduct of the war had been fully and satisfactorily shown, clearly manifest the intention of the committee to inquire into the conduct of General McClellan—to put him on trial. Senator Chandler's speech, already quoted, makes this intention still more palpable. Now, I know not but a committee might have been appointed by both Houses of Congress to inquire into the conduct of General McClellan or of any other officer in the army, and that such committee would not have been competent to pursue such an investigation. But it is clear that a committee thus constituted would, though not nominally, but really, have been in the nature of a judicial tribunal—a Court of Inquiry at least. Before a committee, or any tribunal of this character, the party whose conduct and character were subjects of investigation, ought to have a hearing, or, at least, to indicate the names of persons to be called as witnesses on his behalf. This seems to me a plain requirement, according to all fair and honorable proceedings. The report of such a committee against a general in the army would, in the eyes of many, of most persons, be regarded as a conviction, and popular condemnation would follow as an almost necessary consequence. Nothing more unjust can be well conceived than such a condemnation upon exparte testimony, without allowing the party most interested an opportunity of defending himself.

Now let us see what course was actually pursued by this committee. They called what persons they chose as witnesses, and they omitted to call such persons as they chose to exclude. The committee did not call Major General Fitz John Porter, who was as active and efficient before Yorktown and in the battles before Richmond as any general in the army. General Howard, as we have before shown, was not called; nor Generals Meagher and Sickles, very intelligent and highly educated gentlemen, all of whom had personal acquaintance with the doings of our army on the Peninsula. Why were they not called? They had all expressed publicly their high admiration of Gen. McClellan. General McClellan himself was examined. If the committee really desired to know why this leader of the army did not personally mingle in the fights of his troops, or either of them, why was not the general himself questioned? Can it be doubted that he would have given a reason satisfactory to all military men. Very lately I met an officer of the American army whom I first knew when he was a mere youth of great promise in the celebrated academy at Jamaica, Long Island, and who has been in the military service of his government nearly fifty years, and, as a thoroughly educated military officer, has no superior in the country, if he has in the world, and he volunteered the declaration to me that in every situation in which he had been placed, General McClellan had done as well as he could, and that was as well as any other man could have done. I would give more for that piece of testimony, coming as it did from a gentleman of stainless integrity, and undoubted moral as well as physical courage, than for as many reports as the "War Committee" could write.

SUMMARY REVIEW.

It has been shown that General McClellan did right in not attempting to carry Yorktown by assault before he had laid siege to it, and that after the siege operations were completed, the post was evacuated without waiting for an assault. It has been shown that when the enemy evacuated he was pursued with great promptness and rapidity until he reached his next

fortified position at Williamsburg, and that, after a short but severe conflict there, he was compelled to retreat in all haste to his capital. It has also been shown that as soon as General McClellan had taken sufficient time to establish a base of supplies at the White House, he followed his retreating foe to the Chickahominy and beyond it, that he attacked and captured Hanover Court House, but failed, by no fault of his own, to form a junction with McDowell's command at the latter place; that he fought the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, and repulsed the enemy in force vastly superior to his own on the second day of the fight, and that he was not prepared after these contests to enter Richmond for several reasons, and especially because he could not move his artillery against the fortifications of that capital.

Since the appearance of my article on "Yorktown" my attention has been directed to certain passages contained in a recent publication, entitled "The First Year of the War, by Edward A. Pollard," printed in Richmond. These passages are here transcribed.

'General Magruder, the hero of Bethel, and a commander who was capable of much greater achievements, was left to confront the growing forces on the Peninsula, which daily menaced him with an army of seventy-five hundred men, while the great bulk of the Confederate forces were still in motion in the neighborhood of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and he had no assurance of reinforcements. The force of the enemy was ten times his own; they had commenced a daily cannonading upon his lines; and a council of general officers was convened, to consult whether the little army of 7,500 should maintain its position in the face of tenfold odds, or retire before the enemy. The opinion of the council was unanimous for the latter alternative, with the exception of one officer, who declared that every man should die in the intrenchments before the little army should fall back. 'By G—, it shall be so,' was the sudden exclamation of General Magruder, in sympathy with the gallant suggestion. The resolution demonstrated a remarkable heroism and spirit. Our little forces were adroitly extended over a distance of several miles, reaching from Mulberry Island to Gloucester Point, a regiment being posted here and there, in every gap plainly open to observation, and on no other portions of the line, the men being posted at long intervals to give the appearance of numbers to the enemy. Had the weakness of General Magruder at this time been known to the enemy, he might have suffered the consequences of his devoted and self-sacrificing courage; but as it was, he held his lines on the Peninsula until they were reinforced by the most considerable portion of General Johnston's forces, and made the situation of a contest upon which the attention of the public was unanimously fixed, as the most decisive of the war."

From this historical record, it appears that Magruder's small force of 7,500 men, was spread out from Mulberry Island, in the James River, across the Peninsula to Yorktown, and beyond to Gloucester Point, on the York River, opposite Yorktown. The 7,500 troops must therefore have needed the garrison in Yorktown. This is hardly credible, but he was enabled to hold his lines until *they were reinforced by the most considerable portion of Gen. Johnston's forces.* It follows, then, that after this reinforcement, Magruder was able to cope with our forces. The question is then—*at what time* was this reinforcement brought up? Fortunately we are able to ascertain this *point of time* without the aid of Mr. Pollard's history. I am compelled to reproduce here some extracts from the testimony heretofore given. Gen. McClellan testifies: "Movements of troops had been going on *some days before my arrival.* I remember that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been *crossed over to Yorktown* from the south bank of the James. I therefore hurried my own movements, and

started from Fort Monroe sooner than I would have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think the large masses of reinforcements arrived in Yorktown from one to two days before I reached its vicinity. JOHNSTON HIMSELF ARRIVED THERE THE DAY BEFORE I DID. Gen. Heintzelman says: "*By the time we got to Yorktown their army* (the enemy's) *had been largely reinforced.*"

I am not quite sure that Mr. Pollard's statements were entitled to so extended a notice; but the radical enemies of General McClellan would not scruple to use even the enemy's testimony to injure the general upon whose destruction they are intent, therefore this battery I trust has been silenced.

No. XV.

BEFORE RICHMOND.

After the battle of Fair Oaks, fought on the 1st day of June, 1862, our army remained before Richmond until General McClellan decided to change his base of operations by retiring across the Peninsula to James River, where the supplies of the army could be furnished by our navy. This decision was made on the evening of June 26th. Of the intermediate time between the battle of Fair Oaks and the movement towards the new base, I propose to treat in this number.

The committee bring no distinct charges against the General for misconduct of any sort except that they intimate strongly that the right division of our army should have been crossed over the Chickahominy, and formed a junction with the left division, on the Richmond side of this stream. Indeed, the committee seem to have been convinced that, without a junction of these two divisions, an attack on Richmond would have been inexpedient. The reasons for retaining one divisiion on the left side of Chickahominy have been already given. It was to prevent a movement of the enemy whereby our army would have been cut off from its base of supplies, the White House. Just here it seems to me that a portion of the testimony of General Henry T. Hunt will greatly enlighten the mind of the reader. He is asked: "But at Fair Oaks the enemy had been routed and been driven from their position, had they not?" Answer—"No sir, they had driven us from our position, and we re-took it. The country there was low and swampy, and the few lines which we could have advanced were those which had been prepared by the enemy, in the same way as the lines of our own position had been prepared by us. We were enabled, by means of an inferior force to hold our own against their combined attack. Being upon our own ground, we finally repulsed them. Had we changed positions and attacked them upon their own ground, being restricted by the nature of the ground to certain lines of attack which they had prepared, I think the result would have been different; probably a reverse to us. During the whole of that campaign, I considered that a serious reverse to us there would, in all probability, lead to the destruction of the army as an organized force." One cannot but be forcibly struck with the similarity of our position at Fair Oaks and the more recent great battle at Gettysburg. Had our army attacked the enemy's lines here, instead of being attacked on our own ground, who can be free from the apprehension that the "result would have been different, most probably a reverse to us"

"Question—Is it, then, your opinion that we were not strong enough at any time before Richmond to have coped with their army there?" Answer—"I cannot say that; we might have been successful, or might not have been, if we attacked. But I should have thought it imprudent or improper to have attacked, where there was not a fair prospect or a certainty of making the attack a sure thing. In that, however, I am merely giving my own judgmeat about the matter. The point is this; with the information we had of the strength of the enemy's forces; knowing that he had been preparing the ground, and had that advantage, that he was on-

encumbered with sick, his hospital being behind him: with all the advantage of an interior position and lines; the two armies were so much on terms of equality, as I judged from all I could learn from those whom I thought were well informed, that an attack of that kind would have been in the highest degree doubtful; and as long as there was a force within accessible distance, and there was any hope that it might join us, and enable us to bring the combined force to bear, I would have considered it imprudent to have made an attack." Question—"I did did not mean that the enemy, after the battle of Fair Oaks, should have been followed up by the same force that had defeated them, but that our whole force should have been brought across the Chickahominy directly after that battle, and moved on to Richmond." Answer—"I have known intimately the rebel commander at that place—General Johnston—and *I think that would have been exactly what he wanted and desired.*"

General Keyes is asked—"Why the army remained so long as it did with one portion on the right and the other on the left bank of the Chickahominy?" To which he answered—"Without being able to answer definitely, as I should if I had command of the army, I can state that I always supposed that the enemy would be able to cross the Chickahominy above where we were, and come down in the rear, and cut off our communication with the White House, which was the depot and base of our supplies, unless we had left a very strong force on the left bank of the Chickahominy." Gen. Keyes also testifies that he can give no military reason for permitting the army to remain after the battle of Fair Oaks inactive for so long a time; but he very properly adds: "I consider that the fact that I am not able to give a reason is very inconclusive, as I was not in a position to know what reasons influenced the commanding general to keep the army in such a condition.'

General McClellan is asked—"Did not the want of communication between the right and left wings of our army prevent you reaping those advantages which you might have otherwise obtained from the defeat of the enemy at Fair Oaks?" Answer—"I think that if there had been reliable communication between the right wing and the centre and left wing, we could have gained greater advantages by the battle."

These quotations from the evidence, and they could be multiplied, show conclusively that the committee utterly failed to convict General McClellan of want of professional ability or skill in not uniting the two wings of the army before they were united.

The testimony discloses copies of telegrams between the President, the Secretary of War, and General McClellan during the time under review, a summary statement of which shall be given.

On the 7th June, McClellan to the Secretary of War, informing that the Chickahominy River had risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth of three or four feet. The men were working night and day up to their waists in water to complete the bridges. "The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery, and even cavalry, except directly in the narrow road, which renders any general movement, either of this or the rebel army, utterly out of the question at present until we have more favorable weather." June 13—The same to the same: "The enemy are massing their troops near our front, throwing up earthworks on all the approaches to Richmond, and giving every indication of fight." June 14—"I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit for artillery to move; would be glad to know whether troops can be sent here;" urges the necessity of placing the troops sent from McDowell's command under his control, saying, "If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them. In no other way can they be of any assistance to me. The indications are, from our balloon

reconnoissances, and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in force and determination to fight desperately." June 18—Gives notice to the Secretary that rebel troops have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson. June 18.—Same day.—The President telegraphs that Jackson has been reinforced by ten thousand from Richmond. The President adds—"If this is true it is as good as a reinforcement to you of an equal force." Same day McClellan rejoins—"If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to reinforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries." June 20—The President again telegraphs the General that a despatch had been received from Gen. Sigel corroborating the report that Jackson is being reinforced from Richmond—suggesting that it may not be true; if he knew it was not true more force could be sent to McClellan, but as the case stood this could not safely be done.

There follows a detailed statement from the Adjutant General's office, showing that on the 20th June, 1862, McClellan's army contained as follows—"aggregate present for duty, 115,102; on special duty, 12,225; absent, 29,511. Total aggregate of present and absent, 156.808.

June 25.—McClellan to the Secretary of War, desiring particular information as to the position and movements of Jackson.

June 25–McClellan telegraphs: "I incline to think that Jackson willl attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true, but the army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity for reinforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate; but if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders. It must rest where it belongs. I feel that there is no use in again asking for reinforcements."

June 26.—The President to General McClellan: "The despatch suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by two hundred thousand, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act upon the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously, I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, and shall omit, no opportunity to send you reinforcements whenever I possibly can.

"P.S.—General Pope thinks if you fall back, it would be much better towards the York River than towards the James. As Pope now has charge of the capital, please confer with him through the telegraph.

"A. Lincoln."

I shall defer comments upon these facts (and this extraordinary postscript, too), briefly but fairly stated, until my next number; we have arrived at a most important point in the progress of the campaign. In the meantime, will the reader please direct his attention to the following inquiries:

1. Could General McClellan possibly have done anything more or better before Richmond than he actually performed?

2. Had he been reinforced, could he have taken Richmond?

3. Ought he not to have been reinforced?

I shall endeavor to discuss these

questions with fairness and candor in my next.

No. XVI.

CHANGE OF BASE.

My notice of the progress of the Army of the Potomac has been brought down to June 26th. On the next day, June 27th, 1862, the battle of Gaine's Mill was fought. Fair Oakes, it will be remembered, is on the right bank of the Chickahominy, the side towards Richmond; Gaines's Mill is on the left bank of this stream. At Gaines's Mill our forces were led by Gen. Fitz John Porter. The number of our forces engaged in that battle is variously estimated by the witnesses who have testified. Some put their number below, others above 30,000. The general in immediate command on our side puts our number above 30,000, and so would have stated had he been examined as a witness, but, strange to say, he was not called. It was evidently the theory which the committee endeavored to make out, that Porter's command should have been united to the command on the opposite side of the river before the battle of Gaines's Mill. On the other hand, Gen. Porter entertains the opinion that had he been reinforced by several regiments from the right bank of the Chickahominy he could have succeeded in effectually repelling the greatly superior numbers that assailed him, and, as a consequence, our troops could have assaulted the fortifications before Richmond. Indeed he does not hesitate to say that had he been furnished with 500 axes at the time when he sent for them by General Barnard, he might have successfully defended his position. But through some misapprehension or negligence, the request, which should have been delivered by Gen. Barnard at headquarters, was not delivered, and the necessary aid was consequently withheld. But it should be remembered that the generals in command on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy were expecting an attack, and were therefore reluctant to part with any part of their respective commands. General McClellan is asked: "As soon as you had reasonable cause to believe that the enemy proposed to attack you in force, should not the two wings of your army have been united to repel the attack? And was this done? And if not, why not?" Answer—"The right wing was drawn to the immediate vicinity of the bridges as soon as was practicable under the circumstances, after we knew definitely of Jackson's approach. The intentions of the enemy were difficult to divine. He appeared in force on both banks of the Chickahominy, and made several sharp attacks on the right bank as well as the left. So that I do not think more troops could wisely have been sent to the support of Porter than were actually sent." Question—"Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as an attack was to be made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mills?" Answer—"I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were." This course of inquiry was closely pressed upon the general through a number of other questions, but he persists in testifying—"We had great difficulty in ascertaining the intentions of the enemy. I do not see that, under the circumstances at the time, we could have done differently from what we did do."

After the conclusion of this battle, which was as bravely and obstinately fought as any battle during the war, it was finally decided by Gen. McClellan to change his base of operations to the James River, and our whole force, on the night of this battle, was withdrawn to the right bank of the Chickahominy; the last troops left about daybreak of the succeeding day. The trains commenced moving to James River that night, June 28, 1862. On the 27th June, 12M., McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War: "My change of position on other side is just in time. Heavy attack now being made by Jackson and two other divisions. Expect attack also on this

side." Same day, 3 P.M., Gen. McClellan's chief of staff telegraphs the Secretary of War: "We have been fighting all day against greatly superior numbers." "Our men fight like veterans, and will do all that men can do." At 20 minutes past midnight, morning of June 28th, McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War: "I know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right bank) we repulsed several very strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all that men could do—all that soldiers could accomplish; but they were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it will prove the most desparate battle of the war. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those battalions who fought most bravely and suffered most are still in the best order; my regulars were superb, and I count upon what are left to turn another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers.

"Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personal of the army. If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need blush for the Army of the Potomac.

"I have lost this battle because my force was too small; I again repeat I am not responsible for this; and I say it with the earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortune; but to do this the government must view the matter with the same earnestness that I do; you must send me very large reinforcements, and send them at once. I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahominy, and think I can withdraw all our material. Please understand that in this battle we lost nothing but men, and those the best we have. In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. I merely reiterated a truth which to-day has been too plainly proved. I should have gained this battle with ten thousand fresh men. If at this instant I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I would gain a victory to-morrow; I know that a few thousand men more would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly—I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that. The government has not sustained the army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost."

Let this letter be read with care. It exhibits an earnestness which, if it had been properly met by the War Department, would have ensured the capture of Richmond; but it failed, as all previous appeals since the battle of Williamsburg had failed, to excite that vigor and activity on the part of the government which, beyond all peradventure, could have furnished, as before shown, the required reinforcements. Had there been the same earnestness manifested that has since been exhibited to take Vicksburg, or Charleston, or to repel the late invasion of Lee's army of the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, General McClellan would have fulfilled his promise to take Richmond, and won the approbation and applause of his country and the world, and, more than that, would ere this time have suppressed the great insurrection. Why has the Army of the West been more successful than the Army of the Potomac? That army has not conquered superior numbers behind their own fortifications, which General McClellan was expected to do, and which he has been censured for not doing. General Grant has not been thwarted and overruled in his plans, and in their execution, as McClellan was.

An hour before the letter above copied was sent by telegraph, General McClellan conferred with Gen. Heint

zelman. This officer testifies: "About 10 o'clock, P.M., June 27, I got a telegram that Gen. McClellan wished to see me immediately, about a mile and a half off. He had, in the meantime, established his headquarters on my side of the Chickahominy. I went over there, and found them all packed up, ready to move. The general stated the situation of affairs, and what he proposed to do. One thing was to move across to the James River. The other plan was to collect all the troops from my side of the Chickahominy and have a battle the next day, and throw everything upon the result of that battle. I asked him what would be the result if we lost. He said that if we were defeated the army would be lost, but that he was inclined to risk everything on that battle. I told him it was of vital importance to the country, I thought, to save that army; that we would be ruined if that army was lost; and I thought it would be better for us not to fight that battle, but to fall back from there to James River; that we could reach there with a loss of perhaps a few pieces of siege artillery and some wagons, and then we could receive reinforcements. He said that was his opinion; still he felt inclined to risk everything on a battle. The next day we commenced to retreat." Col. Alexander, of the engineer corps, on the 28th June, received instructions from Gen. McClellan to conduct a reconnoissance to James River for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any enemy on the road, and for ordering up supplies to the army, for he intended to march there. Thus it is evident that the commanding general did not rely exclusively on his own judgment in deciding on the important step he proposed to take, and that preliminary measures were carefully taken for the removal of the army.

The President sent a telegraphic reply to Gen. McClellan's letter: "June 28, 1862. Save your army at all events. Will send reinforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements; I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reinforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. *It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the government is to blame.*"

The last sentence in the President's telegram I have italicised, and shall comment upon it in my next number.

No. XVII.

"IT IS THE NATURE OF THE CASE, AND NEITHER YOU NOR THE GOVERNMENT IS TO BLAME."

This is the declaration communicated by the President of the United States to General McClellan on the 28th day of June, 1862, immediately after the battle of Gaine's Mill. The commander-in-chief acquits his subordinate general of all blame. With this the general might, so far as he was personally concerned, have been satisfied. But he did not concur in opinion with his superior officer; he thought that "the nature of the case" might have been entirely altered by supplying him with reinforcements, and that it was clearly within the power of the government to supply the reinforcements called for. The conclusion arrived at by the President prolonged the rebellion. The conclusion of General McClellan favored the immediate suppression of the rebellion. How came the President to arrive at his conclusion? He was led to believe that if he sent the reinforcements asked for, he would leave Washington unprotected. So he consoles himself and tries to console the general by saying: "If you have had a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the

price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington." That the President was wrong in his conclusion has been fully shown in these numbers. There was not a day after the army reached the Peninsula when General McClellan could not have been reinforced by more than 20,000 troops in addition to those already sent him without at all weakening the defences of Washington. The general could safely leave his whole military reputation to the decision of a competent military tribunal on this point. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether there was any better way to defend Washington than by sending troops directly to Richmond to assault it.

The President is not a military man, and was not a competent person to decide what force was required for the protection of Washington, nor how this force should be divided, nor where its divisions should be placed to effect this object. This is said with no intention of underestimating his abilities as a statesman. It is manifest that he did not rely on his own unassisted judgment in this particular; then the question arises, who misled him? who gave him bad advice?

It will be remembered that General McClellan began to call for reinforcements immediately after Yorktown was evacuated. On the 28th day of May he says: "It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all the well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger." Who in the whole army better understood what defences were required for the protection of Washington? Who could give a more reliable professional opinion on this point than General McClellan? General McDowell saw and urged the necessity of sending reinforcements. It has been stated recently in the newspapers that General Wadsworth was in favor of sending reinforcements.

The testimony of General Ethan Allen Hitchcock shows conclusively, I think, that he first gave the President the alarm in respect to the defences of Washington, and that too in the absence of Gen. McClellan. He may be regarded as the military authority upon whose advice the President acted in keeping back the reinforcements. General Hitchcock was not a general having any command, but was a cabinet adviser of the President in military matters. It may well be asked, ought the President to have any such irresponsible adviser? The Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief are at the head of the military department of the government, subject to the general supervision and control of the President himself, but not a particle more subject to such supervision and control than any other department of the government. The President is just as much entitled to select a private adviser in matters of finances, overlooking and ignoring the Secretary of the Treasury, as he has to select a secret adviser in military matters. There is no authority furnished by the testimony for saying that any of the commanders in the field dissented from the view above expressed by Gen. McClellan in reference to the defences of Washington, or concurred in the opinion upon which the President acted.

It thus appears that but for General Hitchcock, McDowell's corps would have been sent to the Peninsula—that reinforcements would have been sent sufficient to have effectually repulsed the enemy at Gaines' Mill, and had he been there so repulsed, there would have been no necessity for changing the base of operations, but the wing of the army on the right bank of the Chickahominy would have been able to enter Richmond.

It is easy for fancy to conjecture what effects would have followed had this result been reached at that time, more than a year ago. What an amount of treasure would have been saved to the country; what a number of valuable lives would have been preserved; what apprehensions, and fears, and alarms, and fearful forebodings we should all have been spared! Can any man say that General McClellan is to blame for not reaching this result? What more could he have done

than he did? Yet, strange to say, this joint committee have made him the subject of their censure. The country will judge between them and him

No. XVIII.

The autumnal elections, even down to the Municipal election of the City of New York, are over. These numbers will now be resumed. I have felt an invincible reluctance to write or say anything in connection with the name of General McClellan with a view of influencing the elections of 1863, and my communications have therefore been for a time suspended.

The last conflict of the Army of the Potomac which has been noticed is the battle of Gaines' Mill. Since that battle was the subject of comment, Major General Fitz John Porter has published under his own signature important testimony in relation to it. No man is more capable of furnishing reliable testimony relative to this battle than General Fitz John Porter, since he was the principal actor in it on the side of our government. There can be no room for doubt, in a candid view of all the testimony, that if at that time General McClellan had been reinforced with the troops which he implored his government to send him, he could have taken Richmond.

Let us pause to contemplate the state of things on the Peninsula at the moment when General McClellan was forced to change his position in front of the rebel capital. I speak not now of the interference by the War Department with his original plan of operations, approved and sanctioned by that department, by withholding McDowell's force while our army lay before Yorktown, nor of preventing the junction of McDowell's and Fitz John Porter's commands at Hanover Court House; but if, after these omissions or blunders, twenty or even ten thousand fresh troops had been placed under McClellan's command, this general could have entered Richmond, in the face of superior numbers fighting behind their own intrenchments. Improbable as this may have seemed at the time, yet McClellan knew what his brave followers were capable of performing; and that he did not overestimate their power is proved by what they actually accomplished before the arrival of our army at Harrison's Landing. Although the enemy had the advantage of a defensive position behind their own intrenchments, yet even ten thousand fresh troops at Gaines' Mill, or at Malvern Hill, could have ensured the conquest of Richmond.

The excuse for not sending reinforcements is that all the troops in Virginia, not before Richmond, were required for the defence of Washington. It has already been shown that such an excuse is not a valid one. If there were not sufficient troops before Washington, or near it, for its protection, the whole country knows that one call from the President could have collected in one week from the loyal cities and States more than twenty-five thousand true and valiant men ready and eager to defend the capital of the country. Zeal for the cause of loyalty was at its highest pitch of fervor at the time when General McClellan commanded the Army of the Potomac.

Reinforcements were not sent, and Richmond was not taken. The omission to send these reinforcements was so clearly wrong that the conviction has forced itself upon many minds that the President, influenced by the advice of unwise or unpatriotic counselors, did not wish to take the rebel capital at that time by the instrumentality of General McClellan. But suppose this judgment to be an uncharitable one; suppose there was only an error of judgment on the part of the War Department, why should the blame for a failure of the Peninsular campaign be cast upon Gen McClellan? Why should he be held up to the country as the cause of this failure? Why should he be hunted, as he has been hunted, like a deer upon the mountains? He has been called a traitor—no soldier—a coward! What justification, what apology can be given for such persecution? Amidst all this manifestation of hatred and ma-

gnity, the subject of it has remained lent; when reviled he has not reviled gain, but with care, industry, and patience he has written a history of his campaigns, fortified by official documents and correspondence, in a report made to the War Department. This report it is said he has asked permission to make public, so that the people, his fellow-citizens, may have all the evidence before them, to enable them to form a judgment upon his military career. But that permission is denied him, yet he remains silent; the articles of war will not permit him to speak; he acknowledges his obligation to obey those articles. The day cannot be far distant when justice shall be done this accomplished soldier and true patriot. All his declarations have been inspired by the loftiest patriotism. In a conversation with him, not public, he informed me that no peace with the rebels should be thought of until their military organizations were put down, nor until Northern men conld be permitted to travel, visit or settle in the South, and have all their constitutional rights respected. This conversation was prior to the State election in Connecticut in April last, and in reference to that election.

Many months since Gen. McClellan was deprived of the command of the Army of the Potomac, that army which he loved, and which loved him. Little but disaster has befallen that army since he left it; thousands and tens of thousands of the brave men composing it, when he left the army, now fill honored graves. I feel confident that the impartial judgment of the country, when the full time arrives for the expression of that judgment, will be that these disastrous results would never have been beheld if George B. McClellan had been continued in command. Let this fact be pondered by all those who have been bereaved of relatives and friends in the disastrous battles which have been fought since the father of the Army of the Potomac was torn from his children. But these bereaved fathers, and mothers, and sons, and wives, and daughters are not the only persons who have cause of complaint and lamentation. All the soldiers of the Northern and Eastern and Middle States which composed the Army of the Potomac, and their friends and fellow-citizens at home, have just cause of complaint. They have been placed in a false position; they have been injured; the section of country in which they dwell has been made to suffer by a comparison with the inhabitants of another section; their reputation for valor and prowess has been breathed upon; their honor has been tarnished. If McClellan had taken Richmond; if McClellan had been left in command of the Army of the Potomac, no inference unfavorable to the valor and skill and manhood of Northern and Eastern troops would have suggested itself to any mind. Then the President of the United States would have had no occasion to write to a meeting of his fellow-citizens in the city of New York:

"You purpose also to celebrate our Western victories. Freed from apprehension of wounding the just sensibilities of brave soldiers fighting elsewhere, it would be exceedingly agreeable to me to join in a suitable acknowledgment to those of the great West, with whom I was born and have passed my life."

He had reason to be proud of his birth-place, "THE GREAT WEST," and but for his own interference he could have been spared the fear of wounding "the sensibilities of brave soldiers elsewhere."

No. XIX.

CHANGE OF BASE.

In my previous numbers I have not commented on the progress of our army after the battle of Gaines' Mill, when General McClellan decided to change the base of operations of that army. Since the appearance of Gen. McClellan's report there is no longer a necessity of continuing a narrative of the march of the army or its conflicts; they are all contained in that report, which I hope will be consulted by every citizen of the country. The campaign of the Peninsula is an

item so important in the conduct of the civil war in which the country is engaged, that without a full and accurate knowledge of it no citizen can pass an intelligent and just judgment upon the character of the present Administration. In view of the fact that this Administration seeks a continuance of its rule by the sufferages of the people, the report of Gen. McClellan should be carefully studied. It is a document so clear in its statements, bearing on its face the impress of truth, and verified by official correspondence and reports, that it may be relied upon as an authentic history. I wish it were possible that every voter in the country could be made acquained with the contents of this report—that it could be read by every citizen, or read to him, if from any cause he cannot give it a personal perusal.

That the Army of the Potomac did make a successful change of its base, and by an effectual resistance did repel all attacks made by the rebel army to prevent this change, and beat back with terrible slaughter the assailants; that the movements of our army on its march were by night, and the battles were through seven continuous days, are facts not disputed. The report shows that these movements and sanguinary conflicts, terminating in the arrival at the position sought to be reached, were not unpremeditated, accidental or fortuitous, but were planned and ordered and supervised by the general commanding the vast host comprising the army of the Potomac, George B. McClellan. Never before on the American soil was such a fete performed; there is no passage in the military history of our country so luminous as that which records the doings of our army during those seven days. It is doubtful whether any act or series of acts has shed such lustre on our arms in the view of scientific and experienced military men in Europe as the movements of our army in retiring from the Chickahominy to the James, in the face of a foe superior in numbers and led by able commanders. No one military exploit in the progress of this civil war has done more to admonish foreign powers that it would be dangerous to interfere with the operations of the lawful government of the country to suppress the rebellion, and therefore to prevent such interference.

Even Pollard, the Confederate historian of the war, is compelled to admit with reluctance, that "the skill and spirit with which McClellan had managed to retreat was indeed remarkable, and afforded no mean proofs of his generalship. At every stage of his retreat, says this author, he had confronted our forces with a strong rear guard, and had encountered us with organized lines of battle and regular dispositions of infantry, cavalry and artillery. His heavy rifled cannon had been used against us constantly on his retreat. A portion of his forces had now effected communications with the rivers at points below City Point. The plan of cutting off his communication with the river which was to have been executed by a movement of Holmes' division between him and the river, was frustrated by the severe fire of the gun boats, and since that the situation of the enemy appeared to be that of division or dispersion of his forces, one portion resting on the river, and the other to some extent involved by our lines."

"It had been stated to the public of Richmond, with great precision of detail, that on the evening of Saturday the 28th of June, we had brought the enemy to bay on the south side of the Chickahominy, and that it only remained to finish him in a single battle. Such in fact appeared to have been the situation. The next morning, however, it was perceived that our supposed resources of generalship had given us too much confidence that the enemy had managed to extricate himself from the critical position, and, having massed his forces, had succeeded under cover of the night in opening a way to the James River."

"Upon this untoward event, the operations of the army on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy were

to follow a fugitive army through a country where he had admirable opportunities of concealment, and through the swamps and forests of which he had retreated with the most remarkable judgment, dexterity and spirit of fortitude."

Thus much for the testimony of our enemy. The commander and historian of the Army of the Potomac was fully authorized to say:—"The seven days are classical in American history; those days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible series of conflicts with the ever memorable victory of Malvern, where they drove back beaten and shattered the entire Eastern army of the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place for rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James."

Hear the testimony from Europe. Mr. Motley, our Minister at the Court of Vienna, thus writes to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, in October, 1862. The letter will be found in the diplomatic correspondence communicated to Congress by the Secretary of State, pages 569 and 570. Extract: "In this connection I deem worthy of your notice a brief extract from a remarkable series of papers in the principal military journal of this empire, in which the course of our campaigns is criticised, sometimes severely, but never ungenerously; always with talent, and with thorough knowledge of the subject, topographically and strategically, and with a firm disposition to do justice. You will be interested to read the comments of so able a writer upon the withdrawal of our armies from the James River.

"It is not to be wondered at, then, if the general-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac was in haste to save the army intrusted to him from the dangers surrounding it, even from certain destruction; from a noose, in fact, which required only to be draw a little closely together in order to suffocate the soul of the Union. The manner in which he acquitted himself of this most difficult of all military tasks redounds to his infinite honor, and places him at once in the ranks of those memorable commanders whose name history treasures for posterity; men who, if they have perhaps, not had the art to chain victory to their banners, possessed, at any rate, the fortitude, the audacity, and the circumspection to rescue their armies from impending ruin * * * The American general has made a thorough study of war in the swamps of the Chickahominy, and has made himself a complete master in that most difficult of professions. * * * He has manifested the unquestioned talent to save his army, in a manner not sufficiently to be admired, out of the most desperate of situations. Moreau made himself immortal by his famous retreat from the Iller to the Rhine in the year 1796. What is due to the American general-in-chief who conducted, with a morally and physically exhausted army, through a swampy pathless country, covered with ancient forests, and in face of an enemy outnumbering him two to one the most classical of all retreats recorded in military history, without a single disaster?"

No doubt this criticism, from a high military source, in an empire thoroughly instructed in the art of war, must have been highly gratifying to our distinguished ambassador himself, the author of histories which are classics in our language. Similar emotions must have swelled the hearts of all our loyal countrymen in Europe at the time. With far different feelings, however, were the commendations of our American general regarded by the Committee on the Conduct of the War; they could easily sacrifice their country's renown to gratify their personal dislike for General McClellan.

It is a fact familiar to the student of history that the military renown of armies and the nations they served, has been often as much heightened by skilful and well-ordered retreats from situations of peril as by successful assaults. The famous retreat of the ten

thousand Greeks under their leader Xenophon, needs only to be mentioned in this connection. The hardly less famous retreat of Moreau in 1796 has been adverted to by Mr. Motley. In the war between this country and Great Britain in 1812-15, our navy performed exploits highly distinguished, and greatly elevated our national character.

In the early months of that war, when we had experienced little but disasters on the land, it was truly said "Our little navy has dragged up by the locks the drowning honor of our country." But of all the feats of that navy in this memorable war, there was not one that reflected greater honor upon the naval arm of the service than the masterly escape of Captain Isaac Hull when in command of the frigate Constitution from a squadron of British vessels, consisting of a razee of sixty-four guns and four frigates, after a close pursuit of three days and nights. This display of American seamanship was viewed with admiration and astonishment by the greatest naval power in the world.

I purpose to conclude this series of articles in two more numbers; one, on the order of the General-in-Chief (Halleck), to General McClellan, to remove the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, and the protest of the latter general against this order. The other number on the letter of General McClellan to the President, dated July 7, 1862, concluding in these words, remarkable for their solemnity: "I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country."

When these numbers arecompleted they will, in compliance with numerous and urgent requests from distinguished persons in many parts of the loyal States, be collected and published in pamphlet form for general circulation. To some extent the distribution of these pamphlets must be gratuitous. Persons wishing to contribute to the expense of such distribution, will please communicate with the *Journal of Commerce*, which has consented to receive such contributions.

No. XX.

ORDER TO LEAVE THE PENINSULA.

On the 3d of August, 1862, General Halleck ordered General McClellan to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula. On the next day, while making preparation for this important movement, General McClellan sends a remonstrance to the general-in-chief, entreating him, in the strongest terms afforded by our language, to rescind this order. In this remonstrance, couched in language most respectful, he argues the point with great earnestness and power and concludes in these words: "If my counsel does not prevail, I will, with a sad heart, obey your order to the utmost of my power, directing to the movements, which I clearly foresee will be of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. Whatever the result may be—and may God grant that I am mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my country."

This entreaty was unavailing—the order was not rescinded.

Now the country well knows what has been the sad experience of the Army of the Potomac since, in obedience to this fatal order, it marched from the Peninsula. In every great battle, on the soil of Virginia, this army has been defeated with immense loss in killed and wounded. At Bull Run under Pope; at Fredericksburg under Burnside; at Chancellorsville under Hooker, thousands and tens of thousands of our bravest and most loyal troops have been slain or disabled. Families without number have been bereaved of husbands and fathers, of sons and brothers and kindred, or have been compelled to see them crippled or maimed. These are sad results—were they inevitable? Might they not have been avoided by following the counsel of General McClellan?

The counsel was to reinforce the army where he was, and from that point, with the reinforced army, march on Richmond. Hear what he says: "This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a debouche on both banks of the James River, so that we are free to act in any direction; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communication as now secure.

"We are twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) or miles of Richmond.

"At Aquia Creek we would be seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, with land transportation all the way.

"From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I deem it impracticable to withdraw this army and its material except by land.

"The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundrend and forty-five miles (145) miles to reach a point now only 25 miles distant and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water transportation.

"Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of the North, and the strong probability that it would induce foreign powers to recognize our enemies; and these appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the strongest terms afforded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly reinforced to enable it to assume the offensive.

"It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. I point to Burnside's force; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington or Harper's Ferry; to those portions of the army in the West not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of the rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation.

"All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available man brought here; a decided victory here and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we may meet with elsewhere; here is the true defence of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James that the fate of the Union should be decided."

True, this army has retrieved its tarnished reputation at South Mountain and Antietam under McClellan, and at Gettysburg under Meade. But let it be remembered that in these conflicts it was defending the soil of loyal States, not invading the region of rebellion. This army was repelling and driving back the rebel hosts who had the audacity to invade the territory of the loyal States. We only prevented by these victories, and barely prevented, the States which had been true to the lawful government of the country from being overrun, and their cities, including the national capital itself, from being assaulted and sacked. Were these results caused solely by the order to abandon the Peninsula? Not entirely. It should be remembered that McClellan was not only ordered to march from Harrison's Landing to Aquia Creek, but was deprived of his command of that army when it joined the Army of Virginia. If he had been directed when he left the Peninsula to unite the Army of the Potomac, with the Army of Virginia under Pope, and take command of the two armies united, the disaster of Bull Run would not, it is believed, have occurred. This is a question which the military men in those armies are most competent to decide; but I have no doubt their decision would conform to the opinion above given. One thing is very certain, that the officers and privates of these armies knew and had confidence in McClellan; they did not know, and to a large extent had no confidence in Pope.

This fact is proved by the evidence of General Burnside, given before a court martial. Why was this command withheld from General McClellan? He outranked General Pope. For the same reason, I fear, that the original plans of McClellan, when he went to the Peninsula, were interfered with and defeated; for the same reason that McDowell was kept back from joining Porter at Hanover Court House; for the same reason that reinforcements, repeatedly called for, were not sent to the Peninsula. There was no desire on the part of irresponsible military advisers of the President, inferior in rank to McClellan, that this general should capture Richmond, and gain the credit and influence that such a victory was sure to give him. Hence the mind of the President was kept, by generals at Washington, in a state of constant apprehension, not to say alarm, as to the safety of the capital. One call from the War Department requiring volunteers for the defence of Washington, issued at any time during the months of April or May 1862, would have filled all the garrisons in and about the capital with some of the best and well drilled volunteers in the States of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Jersey, within ten days after making the call. It is a notorious fact that such volunteers in large numbers were not only willing but desirous—eager for such a service. This, from what I saw here in New York, I affirm without fear of contradiction.

It will be observed that my comments refer solely to the consequences of occurrences on the Peninsula. What General McClellan could have done in command of the united armies before the battle of Bull Run was demonstrated by what he actually did with these armies after they were demoralized by defeat. When even the President of the United States said that the troops defeated under Pope would not fight, those troops were collected, organized, and led on to victory under the general they loved. It is not my purpose to speak of what might have been done by General McClellan if he had not been separated from his command, after the battle of Antietam.

But it may be enquired—"Why remind the country of these things now? It is not patriotic to allude to the errors or mistakes of the past, while the rebels are yet unconquered, and even confident of success; the country even now has need of United sentiment and action to put down the great rebellion." Admitted; yet it is nevertheless useful to examine and criticise the past, in order to prevent the recurrence of errors in the future. Let us all hope that now a more wise and efficient policy will be pursued.

There are few citizens of the loyal States who do not concur in the sentiments long since uttered and published by General McClellan in these words: "*I am in favor of the prosecution of the war with all the means at the command of the loyal States until the military power of the rebellion is destroyed.*" When the *military* power is destroyed there may be a wide difference of opinion as to the policy to be inaugurated and pursued as to the States in rebellion. One party it is feared will advocate a vindictive policy inspired by hatred and revenge. The other party, which is is hoped and believed will be the prevailing one will temper mercy with justice—will endeavor by all the means practicable one more to unite the whole people of these United States in cordial support of the Constitution made by their fathers. Let us not now, in anticipation of the coming conflict of opinion to be settled, it is hoped, at the ballot box, be seperated upon the question of present duty. That duty is plain.

In order to overcome military power, military power must be resorted to. This power can only be wielded with any hope of success by those trained to its exercise. The profession of arms must be learned by study and drill and experience. The qualifications of a great military commander are most graphically sketched and eloquently described by Edmund Burke:

"The fortitude required of him is ery different from the unthinking acrity of the common soldier or ommon sailor in the face of danger nd death. It is not a passion, it is ot an impulse, it is not a sentiment, is a cool, steady, deliberate prinple, always present, always equable, aving no connection with anger, mpering honor with prudence, inted, invigorated, and sustained by a enerous love of fame; informed, oderated, and directed by an enrged knowledge of its own great ublic ends; flowing in one blended ream from the opposite sources of ie heart, and the head, carrying in self its own commission, and provng its title to every other command y the first and most difficult comand, that of the bosom in which it esides. It is a fortitude which unites ith the courage of the field the more xalted and refined courage of the ouncil; which knows as well how to etreat as to advance; which can conuer as well by delay as by the raidity of the march or the impenosity of an attack; which can be ith Fabius, the black cloud that owers on the tops of the mountains, r, with Scipio, the thunderboalt of ar; which, undismayed by false hame, can patiently endure the everest trial that a gallant spirit can ndergo, in the taunts and provocaions of the enemy, the suspicions, the old respect, and 'mouth honor' of hose from whom it should meet a heerful obedience, which, undisturbed y false humanity, can calmly assume hat most awful moral responsibility of leciding when victory may be too deary purchased by the loss of a single life, nd when the safety and honor of their country may demand the certain sacrifice of thousands."

When a military leader is found mbodying the characteristics here described, he must not be interfered with, much less controlled; he must be let alone to work out his own plans by subordinate officers and agencies of his own selection. President Lincoln is a professional man; he is a lawyer, and has, no doubt, in the course of his professional practice, been entrusted by his clients with very important cases, involving large amounts of property, great public interests, as well as the liberty and life of the citizen. In every such case I can readily imagine that, after making himself thoroughly acquainted with the facts and the law applicable to the same, he has insisted upon his professional right to manage the controversy in his own way, without the interference even of his client. Such interference is I know, never permitted by any lawyer of reputation; no such counsellor will be responsible for the result of a cause unless committed to his sole control. These principles are equally applicable to the profession of arms. Let us hope that in General Grant the country has found a military commander worthy of the high trust committed to him. This general has by the nomination of the President, and the concurrence of Congress, been placed at the head of the armies of the country. In making this selection the whole constitutional duty of the President in this regard has been performed. If General Grant fails, no censure will attach to the President, unless he has attempted to interferfere with the discharge of the general's professional duty. The President may certainly congratulate himself that he is relieved from all the care and anxiety of managing the armies in the field. The President never made a greater mistake than to assume, because he was commander-in-chief under the Constitution, that, therefore, he was required to direct the military operations of the armies. He has, however, more than once made just this mistake. Should it be repeated, no weight of odium is too heavy to cast upon the President, for he too is none other than the agent of the people not the government, but the chief executive officer selected by the people to administer a government whose powers are prescribed and defined by a written Constitution. There are not a few intelligent citizens who prediet that General Grant is called

to Washington to be made instrumental in advancing party objects, as well as to control the armies. Such, it is not to be believed is the purpose of the general himself, but he may nevertheless be made subservient to party purposes. If General Grant is determined to destroy the military power of the rebellion, and perseveres in that determination, and is not interfered with by the President or War Department, he will, beyond all doubt, succeed. If however, he allows himself to become a tool of party, his success in putting down the rebellion cannot be relied on, and he will, personally, be disgraced and ruined in reputation.

No. XXI.

THE NEW YORK TIMES.

I had proposed to finish this series of communications in this number, but an editorial article in the New York Times of the 15th March, numbered six of a series published in that paper, reviewing the report of General McClellan, requires a notice, and I am therefore prevented from executing my original purpose.

The "New York Times" supports the Administration. To this there can be no objection if that support is rendered fairly and ingenuously. There are two modes of misrepresentation and giving false coloring to facts; one by allegations that are not true, and the other by suppressing the truth what in legal technicality is called *suggestio falsi* and *suppressio veri*. Both of these maxims have been violated by the Times in the article referred to, and another maxim adopted which has not found a place in any approved code of morality: "All is fair in politics."

The first great wrong done to Gen. McClellan, after it was decided that he should move on Richmond by the way of the Peninsula, was the withholding of Gen. McDowell's corps, which had been promised him, as has been previously shown in these numbers. Had not that corps been kept back, and the good faith of the Administration thereby violated, the result of the Peninsular campaign would have been widely different from what it was. Had the fact been disclosed to General McClellan, before he embarked for Fortress Monroe, that he was not to have the aid of McDowell's command, he doubtless would never have embarked—would have regarded the enterprise of taking Richmond as impracticable. But this fact was not communicated to the General till he arrived at Yorktown, when it was too late to recede. All the plan of his campaign, deeply to his regret and I may add grief, was thereby deranged. These facts are well known to the Times, and the only way in which the Administration can relieve itself of public censure is by showing that it had been previously deceived by Gen. McClellan. This has been attempted before by Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a brigadier general of volunteers, who held staff relations with his Excellency the President and the Secretary of War. I have heretofore commented at large on this attempt made by Hitchcock; it is now renewed by the Times, with what success we shall see.

The charge against General McClellan is, that when he embarked with his army at Alexandria for the Peninsula he violated the President's order "to leave Washington entirely secure." That order was issued by the President, and bears date March 13th, 1862, and is in these words:

To Maj.-Gen. GEO. B. McCLELLAN:

"The President, having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objections to the same, but gives the following directions as to its execution:

"1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"2d. Leave Washington entirely secure.

"3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or at all events move such remainder of the

my at once in pursuit of the enemy
some route.

"EDWIN M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

This order is not given in the Times
ticle, an omission which could not
ve been made by a fair and candid
viewer, sincerely desirous of estab-
hing the truth, especially when he
oted in full a previous order bear-
g date the 8th of March. By every
proved rule of construction the or-
r of the 8th of March was supersed-
d by the order of the 13th of March.
y this order the plan of operations
hich had been agreed upon by the
mmanders of army corps *was not ob-
cted to*, neither was it expressly ap-
roved, but the direction to General
cClellan personally in the order of
e 13th of March was: "LEAVE
ASHINGTON ENTIRELY SECURE; this
as mandatory to the commanding
eneral. What should constitute se-
rity is left to his judgment, and he
not concluded by the judgment of
is corps commanders before ex-
ressed, or thereafter to be expressed;
ut the plain import of the order is:
I look to you, the general-in-chief, to
ave Washington entirely secure."

The preparations of General Mc-
lellan, he informs us, were at once
egun in accordance with directions
the order of March 13th. He shows
y official documents what he did. A
air judgment deduced from these
ocuments must decide whether he
xecuted the order with sound judg-
ent and in good faith. These docu-
ents are not given, nor are their
ontents stated in the Times' article,
ut they are adverted to as "a shuf-
ling attempt which General McClel-
an makes to explain this matter."

The first of these documents is an
rder dated March 16th, 1862, and
ssued to Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, con-
aining specific directions what that
eneral should do, and stating the
eneral object of the order to be "to
over the line of the Potomac and
Washington."

The second is directed to Brigadier
General Wadsworth, bearing the same
late, March 16th, 1862. There are
various other orders and official communications bearing on the safety of Washington in the report of General McClellan, but they may all be summed up in the following paragraph in the same report:

Without including Gen. Blencker's division, there were left 67,428 men and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I deemed more than adequate to insure Washington against any force the enemy could bring against it. The general gives at large the reasons for this opinion. Among these reasons is the following, which I think no one but "The New York Times" would regard as "a shuffling attempt to explain away this matter." (The charge of having left Washington unprotected.)

"It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement of the army to the Peninsula would have the effect to draw off the rebel army from Manassas to the defence of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. This opinion was confirmed the moment the movement commenced, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our intentions; for, with the exception of Jackson's force of some 15,000, which his intructions show to have been intended to operate in such a way as to prevent McDowell's crops from being sent to reinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude made its appearance in front of Washington during the progress of our operations on the Peninsula; nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's Landing was Washington again threatened."

So anxious was the general to satisfy the President and Secretary of War, that he was about to leave Washington in a state of perfect security, so as to relieve their minds from all anxiety or apprehension on this point, that he was at pains to see General Hitchcock, the only military man who held staff relations with these high officials. Here what the General says in his report:

"It is proper to remark, that just

previous to my departure for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief of staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff relations with his Excellency the President and Secretary of War, to submit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washington, and the positions in which I designed posting them. Gen. Hitchcock after glancing his eye over the list, observed that he was not the judge of what was required for defending the capital, that Gen, McClellan's position was such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and he presumed that if the force designated was in his judgment sufficient, nothing more would be required. He was then told by the chief-of-staff that I would be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced officer. To this he replied, that as I had had the entire control of the defences for a long time, I was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give any expressions of opinion at that time."

General Hitchcock at that time—before the General embarked—took the right view of the matter—that Gen. McClellan was a better judge of the requirements for the safety of the capital than himself, and that his judgment must control. Who has been found from that day to this, to impeach the correctness of General McClellan's decision? The capital was not put in danger while the army remained on the Peninsula, nor was the retention of McDowell's command necessary for its protection. This is the testimony of actual experience, one of the best witnesses. Before the war committee General McClellan was asked: "Was it not almost certain beforehand that the withdrawal of your army to a position where it did not cover Washington would cause the enemy at least to make a threat or feint of an attack upon Washington which would lead to a panic, and perhaps to a recall of your army, or a portion of it? Answer—I think not; I do not think that anything occurred, prior to the battle of Cedar Mountain, which should have justified a panic in Washington. The only advance of the enemy that I remember at all was that of Jackson upon Gen. Banks. When I heard of that I telegraphed to the President that I believed the intention simply to be to prevent reinforcements being sent to to me. I had no idea that it meant a serious threat upon Washington."

I have carefully read the testimony of Generals McDowell, Sumner, and Heintzelman, before the War Committee, and cannot find that either of them was examined in reference to the sufficiency of the force left by General McClellan for the defence of Washington. They were witnesses, next to General McClellan, most competent to give an opinion upon the point. No opinion was sought from either of them. General McDowell was desirous of uniting his command with that of General McClellan, and earnestly protested against the alleged necessity of retaining it in the vicinity of Washington. Yet it was retained, and accomplished no useful purpose, while, if it had embarked in the first instance, and gone down to Fortress Monroe with the other corps, or if it had united with the command of Gen. Fitz John Porter at Hanover Court House the capture of Richmond would have been made certain. Who can fail to see that the distribution of the troops for the defence of the capital, whether in the immediate vicinity of the capital, or at a greater or less distance from it, in the avenues through which the enemy must of necessity approach Washington, were questions for military science and experience to decide. General McClellan, as the commander of the army, did decide these questions, and made these distributions in the exercise of his best judgment. There is no testimony whatever but that of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, and, perhaps, I may add, Wadsworth, tending to show that his decision was erroneous. The evidence of these witnesses has been heretofore in these numbers examined, but I may be pardoned, just in this connection, for again adverting to the topic. Gen. McClellan in his re-

port says: "On the 21st day of April, the day following my departure for Fort Munroe, Generals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of War to examine and report whether the President's instructions to me of March 8th and 13th had been complied with. On the same day their report was submitted, and their decision was that the requirement of the President, that this city (Washington) shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." I have shown, I think, conclusively, that the order of March 8th was superseded by the subsequent order of March 13th. It was very proper to enquire whether, under this order, the safety of Washington had been provided for. That question could only be decided by ascertaining what troops and armament had been left for such defence. No such investigation was made, but the attention of these two generals was directed to an enquiry whether or not the force agreed upon by the corps commanders had been left, and distributed in the manner suggested by them in their report.

A proper investigation would have shown that a much larger force than was suggested by either of the corps commanders was actually left for the defence of the capitol, although the force was, under the direction of the general-in-chief, distributed in a different manner than that contemplated by the corps commanders.

Generals Hitchcock and Thomas assume that the report of the corp commanders prescribed a rule of duty to Gen McClellan. I deny it, and have shown that the only duty required of him by the President was defined in the last order given—*leave Washington perfectly secure.* If he did provide, that which, in his own judgment, was perfect security, he obeyed the order. I have heretofore shown the gross injustice of putting Major Gen. McClellan, in his absence, on trial before generals of inferior rank, and bringing in a report against him without giving him a hearing, or any notice of an enquiry the result of which might be, and actually was, injurious to his reputation. This enquiry and report was made while the general himself, at the head of the largest army ever before assembled in these United States, was absent in the actual and perilous service of his country

General McClellan further states, in reference to the time when the report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas was made, as follows: "At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any approach to Washington was Jackson's force, in front of Banks's, in the Shenandoah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Railroad leading from this valley to Washington, and it will be admitted, I presume, that Banks, occupying the Shenandoah Valley, was in the best position to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and above. The number of troops left by me for the defences of Washington, as given in my letter to the Adjutant General, were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and these, of course, I constitute the most trustworthy and authentic source from which such information can be obtained.'

In consequence of this report of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, made to the War Department, the President's apprehension for the safety of Washington was excited, in consequence of which he wrote a letter to General McClellan, on the 9th of April, in which he inquires of this General—"And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be prevented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops?"

Here the President plainly implies that no troops could be placed anywhere to resist an attack upon Washington except immediately in front of the Capitol. Could any conclusion be more erroneous, not to say absurd?

In reference to another part of the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, General McClellan says in his report: "In regard to the steamer 'Merrimac,' I have also stated, that so far as our operations on York River were concerned, the power of this

vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that conclusion.

"Previous to our departure from the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe, to consult with Flag Officer Goldsborough upon this subject. The result of that consultation is contained in the following extract from the evidence of Admiral Goldsborough before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, viz., 'I told Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about the Merrimac going up York River, that she could never get there, for I had ample means to prevent that.' Capt. J. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the Committee as follows: 'Gen. McClellan expected the Navy to neutralize the Merrimac, and I promised it should be done.'"

There is further given the testimony of Gen. Keyes to the same effect, which will be found in the Report of Gen. McClellan.

Thus much for this infamous proceeding at Washington, instituted and consummated by Generals Hitchcock and Thomas and the Secretary of War, immediately on Gen. McClellan's leaving Washington, on a mission no less important than the conquest of the rebel capital. This proceeding, which resulted in the withholding of Gen. McDowell's corps from the Peninsula, prevented that conquest. But for this trial and conviction of Gen. McClellan in his absence, and without notice, the rebel capital would have been in the possession of the lawful government of this country more than eighteen month ago, and MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN would, by general acclamation, have been hailed as the savior of his country. That he has not been is no fault of his own.

NO. XXII.

NEW YORK TIMES.

In my last number I attempted to answer Article No. 6, in "the New York Times" review of General McClellan's report — with what success the careful and candid reader must decide. No. 7, in the same journal, shall now be noticed, and then, I have no more to do with "the New York Times."

No. 7 censures General McClellan for not having *assaulted* the enemy's lines at Yorktown instead of *laying siege* to his line of works. In the remarks of "the Times" our own general is treated with marked contempt. A comparison between him and the Duke of Marlborough is instituted greatly to the disadvantage of our countryman. Such a comparison was uncalled for. General McClellan, before he was summoned from the pursuits of civil life, and it may be added the profitable pursuits of civil life, to enter the service of the country, and assist in putting down the rebellion, had been educated in the military academy at West Point, and seen some actual service in the Mexican war, but he had never risen in the regular army above the grade of captain. He had retired from even this military position, and he sought not to enter military life a second time, but he was called from his retirement to that service, and, prompted by love of country, and gratitude to a government which had given him a military education, he promply obeyed that call. From the day he re-entered the army to the day when he was relieved of his command by order of the President, he addressed himself diligently to the duties of his calling in the position assigned him No man can deny him this meed of praise; he was industrious, watchful, and persevering by day and by night; he did the best he could with all fidelity to his government. I am unauthorized, upon authority which cannot be gainsaid, to declare that the President of the United States, after the battle of Antietam, expressed the highest confidence in this general's military capacity and generalship, believing him superior to any and every other general in the service, with no fault but being in his opinion *too cautious*.

Now this recent captain made no

claim to the abilities and experience of the greatest general that England, through a course of centuries, has produced—the illustrious Duke of Marlborough. When General McClellan went to the Peninsula he commanded, indeed, the largest army ever before assembled in his native country—he did not usurp that command; he did not intrigue for, or even solicit this command; but it was conferred upon him, inexperienced as he was. He accepted it, and did the best he could. Impartial, judicious military men, have said that he did as well and accomplished as much as any other general, ancient or modern, could have done, or accomplished, in his position, under all the circumstances which actually existed. This is all that can be said about it. It is ungenerous to taunt him because he did not, in the first act of his first great campaign, rise to an equality with the renowned Duke of Marlborough. The Committee on the Conduct of the War took a large amount of testimony on this disputed point of assault or siege. I have heretofore examined in the numbers referred to this testimony, given on both sides, with as much candor and impartiality as I was able, and shown that the testimony in favor of siege greatly preponderated. The witnesses examined were of the committee's own selection, and they were selected with no partiality for General McClellan, yet the result of this testimony, and of the public authentic documents accessible to the committee, was entirely favorable to the siege. Many other officers could have been examined, and it would have been entirely practicable to examine, on this point, Lieut.-Gen. Scott himself. What their judgment would have been it is impossible to say, but there can be no doubt that an overwhelming majority of the rank and file of the whole army would have ratified the decision of the commanding general. Certain it is, that on the 6th of May, two days after the evacuation by the enemy, the Congress of the United States voted thanks to Gen. McClellan *for those high military qualities which secure important results with but little sacrifice of life.* One would think that controversy on this point should cease. Not so thinks the "New York Times." This journal makes no reference to the testimony taken before the War Committee; it takes no notice of the reports of our own generals; it ignores the opinion of the Army of the Potomac, the most enlightened body of citizen soldiers ever combined; it does not even mention the resolution of Congress; it enters into no discussion whatever upon the question, but pronounces, *ex cathedra*, a sentence of condemnation of General McClellan for having laid siege to Yorktown. The article in the "Times," now reviewed, opens thus: "There is now, we suppose, not the shadow of a doubt, that had the Army of the Potomac been simply allowed to *walk* on up to Richmond, it would have been able to walk over all the force which Gen. Magruder had to oppose it. We now *know* how contemptible that force was." The italics are not mine.

Suppose this assertion to be true: General McClellan, in April, 1862, could not act upon what we *now* know, and of which he was then ignorant. All he could do was to use the best means then in his power, and collect the most reliable information attainable *at that time*, as to the number and condition of the enemy, and act upon that information. He might have been misinformed; he might have failed to obtain accurate information; instances might be cited where great generals have been deceived without any fault or remissness of their own. But how do we *now* know what our army could have accomplished, more than it did accomplish before Yorktown two years ago? The "New York Times" answers this question in the following sentence: "General Magruger's official report of the operations on the Peninsula shows that his whole army consisted of eleven thousand men; of these six thousand were useless to him, being placed in garrison at Gloucester Point, Mulberry Island, &c.; so that it will be seen," adds he, "that the balance of the line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was

defended by about *five thousand men.*" "Says" who? General Magruder. And who is General Magruder? He is the witness—the CHIEF witness produced by the accuser and reviler of General McClellan, and the public are entitled to know the position and character of this witness by whose testimony it is sought to condemn our own general. General Magruder is a rebel officer; he was well and extensively known when he served under the United States Government. The officers of our regular army are not ignorant that his characteristics were, first, a great amount of pomposity and desire of show in his personal bearing; second, a habit of appropriating to General Magruder a lion's share of all the credit and renown which attached to every military enterprise in which he happened to be engaged; third, he was habitually in a state of artificial excitement, sometimes called intoxication, but more commonly, drunkenness; and, lastly, he is universally known as a *traitor* to his lawful government, which educated him to the profession of arms. Behold the witness put upon the stand by the "New York Times," to blacken the character of General McClellan! What says this general as to the force of the enemy when he arrived at Yorktown? He testifies before the War Committee that when Gen. Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula there was not at *that time* much more than Gen. Magruder's command, which had been always estimated from 15,000 to 20,000. It will be remembered that Gen. Heintzelman landed on the Peninsula, not at Yorktown, but at Fortress Monroe, thirty miles from Yorktown. The general proceeds in his testimony: "Movements of troops had been going on across the James River to the Peninsula for some days before my arrival. I remember that immediately upon my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that quite a large number of troops had been crossed over to Yorktown from the south bank of the James. I therefore hurried my own movements, and started from Fort Monroe sooner than I should have done. From the best information that I have been able to get, I think that the large masses of the reinforcements arrived in Yorktown from one to two days before I reached its vicinity. Johnston himself arrived there the day before I did." Gen. Heintzelman, whose division was the first to arrive before Yorktown, testifies that a few days after he landed at Fortress Monroe (March 23) he got information that Gen. Magruder had a small force only, not exceeding 10,000 men, on the Peninsula, but he further testifies: "By the time we got to Yorktown (April 5) their army had been largely reinforced *there.* Gen. McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe April 2, *ten days after Heintzelman.*

On *this information* Gen. McClellan acted—he could not act upon any other, and better evidence than Gen. Magruder's report will be required to show that this information was incorrect.

The future historian of this great rebellion will gather from all sources of information all the facts, carefully collate them, and record the results; but, at this time, it cannot be admitted that judgment upon the performances and character of our generals should be pronounced upon testimony derived from rebel official reports. Indeed the very circulation of these reports has been prohibited by a military order in some, if not all, the departments of our military service. Those who take the trouble to examine will find conflicting statements of facts in the reports of our commanding generals, and the reports of commanding rebel generals, and in no one particular is there so strong a motive to vary from strict accuracy of statement as in giving the numbers engaged. Through all time the habit of commanding generals has been to understate their own numerical force, and exaggerate the force of their enemies, when giving accounts of battles which have been fought, or conflicts terminated. It cannot be supposed that such a man as Gen. Magruder would be an honorable exception to this custom. Even Gen. Lee, the commander of the purest character in the

rebel service, in giving an account of the battle of Gettysburg, would not be believed by loyal men in preference to Gen. Meade, our own commander. Much less ought the testimony of Gen. Magruder to out-weigh that of Gen. McClellan.

I shall conclude these numbers in my next.

No. XXIII.—Part I.

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.

On the 7th July, 1862, the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were near Harrison's Landing, Virginia, the seven days' fight was ended, the rebels were in front with the purpose of overwhelming our army by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blocking our communications on the James River. The position of our army was one of peril. Up to this date General McClellan had communicated with the President of the United States, and the Secretary of War on military subjects only. On this day he sent a letter to the President, laying before him, for his private consideration, his general views concerning the then existing state of the rebellion. These views, the general says, "amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed on my mind and heart."

It has been objected that the general had no right to send such a letter, although a private one, to his superior in command, the chief executive of the country. There is no evidence that the President himself ever made this objection, but some of his zealous friends have done so. These friends betray ignorance of the character and spirit of our republican institutions. The President is not a monarch or ruler of any sort by hereditary right; he is an agent of the people, chosen by them to execute specified duties under the constitution. Every citizen in the land is one of his constituents, and has a personal interest in the government of the country which the President is chosen to administer for a limited period. It is the people's government, to be administered for their benefit. There is not one of these people who has not the right respectfully to submit his views to the President, upon any subject of public interest. This no man will deny, and if George B. McClellan had been, on the 7th of July, 1862, a private citizen, an unofficial person, his right to communicate his views to the President, or any other officer of the government, would be unquestioned. But because George B. McClellan was an officer of the government, subordinate to the President, it is alleged that he has forfeited the right which would clearly have been his as a private citizen. If the general had submitted his views to the President in a spirit of insubordination, that is, in the manifestation of a spirit that denied the authority of his superior, the objection would have been valid; but when the communication is perfectly respectful, and made evidently with a desire to promote the general welfare, and dictated by strong convictions of duty, who can rightly censure it? The captain of a ship is supreme in his command; his authority cannot be questioned; but if, in a time of great peril, the mate of the same ship should respectfully suggest to him a course to be steered, and what sails ought to be taken in, and what other sails ought to be set, in order to save the ship and cargo, who can say that such a subordinate officer ought to be censured? Especially if the suggestion was made privately, and not in the presence of the crew; and more especially if the mate happened to be one of the owners of the ship and cargo? I shall not attempt further to argue or illustrate this point: Gen. McClellan had a perfect right to send to the President just such a letter as he did send, if, in his judgment, after mature reflection, it contained what he deemed useful and timely advice. Had he failed to send it, he would have fallen short of his duty as an American citizen and a military commander

Let us next see what advice he gave the President. Gen. McClellan says: "*Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institu-*

tions and self government." This declaration is too plain to require explanation or illustration.

The general also says: "*The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost, in time, treasure and blood.*"

Time was when this declaration would have received not only the assent, but the hearty commendation of every loyal American citizen. Then we all loved the Constitution—we were proud of it: but the time is when many American citizens, professing loyalty more loudly than their neighbors, can see no beauty in this Constitution, and are willing to discard it, or mar it, so as to leave it no longer the frame of government which it was designed to be by the illustrious men who made it, and the people, our predecessors, who adopted it. Gen. McClellan is not one of these new lights; he regards the Union as indispensable to the preservation of popular liberty, and the Constitution as the only clear and well defined, thoroughly understood bond of that Union to which the people have given their assent. The manner in which free institutions shall exist, and by which they have existed, is here a matter of agreement. The government which exists and can only exist by the consent of the governed, is embodied in the Constitution, and the only mode by which this government can be altered or varied is prescribed in the Constitution itself. If this Constitution is stripped of its sanctions, it is impossible to predict what substitute will receive the consent of the governed, or how that consent will be obtained. Without a constition which has been adopted by the people, we have no government, and are in a state of anarchy; out of which it is not given human foresight to scan what form of government will arise.

The general further says: "*Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake our settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.*"

This is simply declaring that the whole people of the United States, loyal and disloyal, must be governed, protected, or punished *by law*, sovereign law. All are entitled to the protection which the law provides—all who violate the law must be punished according to law. These propositions are simple expressions of elementary truths. To the mind of all enlightened in the principles which govern and preserve society, they are elementary truths; an attempt to prove them would only cloud them with obscurity. Yet a doctrine has gained currency, even among some respectable people, that rebels are entitled to no protection, or advantage from the laws which they have violated, and the Constitution which they have cast off. How can these rebels be punished? Who shall prescribe that punishment? By what rule shall it be meted out? The answer to each of these questions is the same, and is very simple. The offence to be punished consists in the violation of the will and decrees of the community; this will and these decrees find their only expression and embodiment *in law.* No power on earth but the community whose law has been violated has a right to punish that violation, and that community can only utter its voice in form *of law*—therefore punishment must be prescribed by law. In a Christian community it will not be denied that all men have violated the law of GOD, and except these violaters of the law have thrown away their weapons of rebellion, they are all rebels against the government of God. Yet what child born of Christian parents does not know that these rebels will be judged by the law which they have violated, and trampled under their feet? "Did not Moses give you the law and yet none of you keepeth the law?" "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him and know what he doeth?"

Nothing can be more clear than that General McClellan's policy, recommended in the strongest manner to the President, was to put down the military resistance to the government

by force of arms. But that policy looked beyond the suppression of the militry combinations of rebels, to a re-establishment of the authority of government over all the people within the territorial limits of the United States. When the victory of arms is made complete then the operation of moral causes must be relied upon to unite the people of the whole country. The sword must not be the sole reliance to accomplish a reunion, but the olive branch must be held out.

Let us now refer to the moral instrumentalities the employment of which the geneeral recommends. They are:

"This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded: and it should be conducted on the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespasses sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrest should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded or received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, excepting for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permamently to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

"This principle might be extended upon the grounds of military necessity and security to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumissions in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

"A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty."

Here we have a delineation of the the policy which alone can restore peace to the country. It may not be practicable at this time to pursue literally this line of policy, but the spirit which dictated it is that which must guide the action of the government if we would have p ace. There is nothing new in the policy here recommended, for it is substantially the same as that announced by the President in his inaugural address, and which was embodied in the Crittenden resolutions adopted by both houses of Congress. This was the policy of the beginning of the contest, and which called forth volunteers unprecedented in numbers, inspired by a patriotic zeal of the most intense fervor. To gather an army then it was not necessary to offer bounties to soldiers the most tempting ever presented to swell the ranks of an army, which has gone far to exhaust the resources of the country. Had that policy not been changed, but persevered in, faithfully, the contest would have been ended long ere this. But it was changed, and the new policy adopted of the universal

abolition of slavery by the Federal Government. Hence the war has been prolonged, and will be prolonged until the government returns to the point whence it departed, under the pressure brought to bear upon the President by the outside influence of a few noisy, zealous, persistent radical men, who were not, and are not, the true friends of the Constitution made by our fathers, and which, at this moment, is the fundamental law of the land.

No. XXIII.—Part II.
AMALGAMATION.

That Constitution recognized a distinction between the white race and the descendants of the African race in this country, and did not admit the latter to equal privileges with the former. The effort now is to abolish that distinction, and place the two races upon the same footing, politically. This effort, if successful, must, as a necessary consequence, lead to the blending of the two races, as races have been blended, dwarfed and demoralized, in Mexico and more Southern latitudes. To this complexion the American people are not willing to come, but they revolt at it. Yet the purpose to reach this result is now openly avowed, and defended by the same persons whose influence led the President to change the policy originally avowed by him for the suppression of the rebellion.

A work has lately appeared entitled "Miscegenation; the Theory of the Blending of the Races as applied to the American Whiteman and Negro," in which such blending is warmly recommended. In the appendix to the work, extracts from the testimony of Wendell Phillips, and the testimony of Theodore Tilton are given, showing the same earnestness and zeal in support of this theory as they have heretofore shown in the anti-slavery cause, and maintaining that such blending is the necessary sequence to abolition. If the Republican party should succeed at the next election, the abolition section of that party will confidently assert that the American people have decided in favor of the political equality and amalgamation of the white and negro races, and the other section will not deny it. It will then be insisted that the descendants of Africa shall, equally with the whites, be eligible to seats in the jury box, and on the bench of the judiciary, and in the legislatures of the several States, and in the Congress of the United States. Next will follow amalgamation of blood. It remains to be seen whether the free white race of the country is prepared for this change.

Although the President has changed, Gen. McClellan has not changed; he stands, to-day, committed to the policy which he proclaimed in his address to the Union men of Western Virginia, on the 26th of March, 1861, months before he was called to Washington to command the Army of the Potomac. In that address he says: "I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio river. They come as your friends and brothers—as enemies only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your homes, your families and your property shall be under our protection. All your rights shall be religiously respected, notwithstanding all that has been said by traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized by interference with your slaves. Understand one thing clearly; not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt on their part."

Such was the policy he proclaimed to the world before he was called by the President, with the hearty approval of the nation, to be general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Western Virginia afterwards proclaimed her fidelity to the Union. But the utterance of these sentiments was remembered by the radical abolitionists of the country, who early conspired, and perseveringly labored to destroy the man who avowed them, until their influence exiled him from command, and their bitter hatred still pursues him, for no other reason but his firm adherence to the principles which guided him in re-entering, when called upon, the military service of

his country. Abraham Lincoln has suffered himself to be pushed and turned aside from every purpose which he avowed upon entering on the duties of President of the United States. A recent document has appeared under his own hand, being a letter bearing date the 4th April ultimo, addressed to A. G. Hodges, Esq., Frankfort, Kentucky, in which he acknowledges, vindicates, and attempts to justify this change. In this document he admits that he took an oath to preserve the Constitution, yet, in effect, affirms that it was impossible to keep this oath without losing the nation. He maintains "that measures otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. RIGHT OR WRONG," he declares, "I ASSUMED THIS GROUND, AND NOW AVOW IT." This is a bold avowal to be made by the chief magistrate of a republic, as much obligated to obey the law as the humblest citizen in the country. This right or wrong doctrine is certainly a very dangerous one to teach the people of the country. What was it that RIGHT OR WRONG the President resolved to do, and actually accomplished? Nothing, on the first breaking out of the rebellion, when possibly summary measures by the power which alone, in the absence of Congress, controlled the government, might, by general consent, have been justified. But this right or wrong action was taken after Congress assembled, and time had been afforded to provide, by legislation, for the wants of the country in the exigency which then existed. "After the months of March and May, 1862," he says, "he was, in his judgment, driven to the alternative of either surrendering the Union, and with it the Constitution, or laying strong hand upon the colored element." The meaning of this is, that he was compelled, as the executive power of the government, to abrogate the relation of master and slave, or the Union and the Constitution must perish. Admitting for the present that if there had been sufficient grounds in the actual state of facts existing at the time to drive the President to this alternative, he would have been justified in the decision he made, the important question arises, What were these causes? Who would have compelled the destruction of the Union and the Constitution if the President had not laid a strong hand upon the colored element? It is very certain the rebels had not the power to accomplish this result. The declaration, by whomsoever made, that the rebels possessed this power, would not be believed. There had been no evidence given whatever that the numerical force of the free white loyal citizens of the country was not sufficient to put down the rebellion. But there had been melancholy evidence that the Administration had not the wisdom to direct that force, or, having the wisdom, it did not wish to terminate the rebellion, until an ulterior object—the abolition of slavery—had been accomplished. Some of the best men in the country believe that this was the policy which guided the conduct of the Administration, and there are not a few Republicans who, believing, justify it.

I am not willing to believe, for I have not sufficient evidence of the fact, that the President himself has not at all times been willing and desirous of bringing the war to a close by subduing the enemy; but I have what I deem sufficient evidence that prominent members of his own party, near to his person, had no desire that Gen. McClellan should take Richmond, but, on the contrary, labored to prevent such conquest, and that these persons so operated by their influence on the President as to make him an instrument in carrying out their designs. This I charge.

The rebels had it not in their power to destroy the Union if the negroes had not been emancipated, or if they had not been enrolled in the army. It is a gross libel upon the white population in the loyal States to affirm that they were not sufficiently numerous, patriotic and brave, to conquer the military force of the rebels without the aid of the negroes. What was it,

then, that compelled the President, "right or wrong," to lay a strong hand upon the colored element? Was this measure rendered necessary by the threatened interference of one or more foreign powers in our domestic affairs? If it were, and our government was awed by that threat, our condition is mortifying in the extreme, and the people are entitled to know what nation or nations have thus humbled us. If the rebels themselves could not do it, nor the interference of foreign nations, there is only one other power which could exercise an influence to destroy the nation if the President had declined to avail himself of the negro element to preserve it. That power was the President's own party. The leading influence of that party might have demanded that the President, right or wrong, should use the power of the Executive to destroy slavery, and threatened, if he did not do so, they would abandon the government. The enemies who would have destroyed the government in the contingency supposed, must have been the abolitionists. It is well known that these abolitionists were no friends of the Constitution; that they had been trying, for a number of years, to weaken the regard and reverence of the people for that Constitution. If this was the power—and I suspect it was—that compelled the President, in order to preserve the Union, to lay a strong hand upon the colored element, the people of the country ought to know it. They ought to know who the real traitors in the loyal States are. Pray, Mr. Lincoln, enlighten the public on this point; favor that same public with another letter under your own signature.

The President asserts, with much confidence, that he has made no loss, but a great gain, by laying his hand on the colored element. It shows, he says, a gain of quite a hundred and thirty thousand soldiers, seamen and laborers. In stating the account of loss and gain resulting from measures adopted and carried out by the President, in respect to what he calls the colored element, many items ought to be inserted which his Excellency has not probably thought of. 1st. He has made the negro a soldier. Now there is no fact more clearly demonstrated, and thoroughly known, than that, in this country, the negro is regarded by the white man as his inferior; he considers himself degraded by an association with the negro. There is another fact, well established, that the fellowship in arms is one of a peculiarly honorable and endearing character. By the measure adopted the negro is made the fellow soldier of the white man. It ought to be considered how this forced fellowship will operate upon the morale of the American white soldier; will it not impair his self respect? Must he not feel degraded by the company he is compelled to keep? If these results are inevitable, will the white soldier fight as well, will he accomplish as much, in such company? There is but one anwer to this question—*he will not.*

Again. The negro is not as courageous as the white man; he does not possess the same mental resources; he is more easily frightened, and, when frightened, he will run; he will flee from the face of an enemy; his fear may easily become contagious in the ranks of an army, and thus a panic may be excited. It is therefore by no means certain that an addition of 130,000 negroes to an army of white men is so many clear gain. On the contrary, this addition may be, in fact, a loss.

2d. The President by his proclamation has dissolved or attempted to dissolve the legal relation of master and slave in States in rebellion, not within our military lines. The objeet of this proclamation was to deprive the master of the service of his slave, and excite him to hostility against his master. There are thousands of true and loyal men who deny the right of the President to do this act, and in contests between the negro and American white men, once their fellow citizens, although in rebellion, their sympathy, their natural sympathy—for it is a sympathy of race and caste—is with the white man. There is no disputing

these facts, and their influence operates to divide the loyal men of the country, and thereby to weaken the power of our government; while the same facts unite, nerve, exasperate, and make desperate the enemy. These facts, in the account credited with 130,000 negro soldiers, are to be placed per contra, on the other side.

The truth is the President's mode of dealing with the colored "element," has been unfortunate in the extreme. So far from being indispensable to the preservation of the legitimate government of the country, it has been most influential in strengthening and inspiring hopes of perpetuity to the illegitimate Confederate government. The traitorous leaders of that government could not have suggested measures better calculated to unite the people upon whom it relied for support. These leaders justified the rebellion which they inaugurated by confident and earnest declarations that the Federal government intended to destroy their property in slaves; the Union loving men in the South, relying upon our solemn protestations that such was not our purpose, are pointed to these measures of the President as a fulfillment of these predictions.

On the other hand the sympathizers with secession among ourselves, for there are such, point to the same measures to show that the abolitionists, never friends of the Constitution, have gained the point for which they have been striving through a long course of years—the abolition of slavery, right or wrong. The secessionist and abolitionists have thus succeeded in breaking down or sensibly impairing the organic law, the Constitution of the country. How infinitely better it would have been, in dealing with the colored element, to follow the advice of General McClellan. "Military power should (he says) not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized."

"This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and probably even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time."

It remains to be seen whether the people of this country will set their seal of approbation upon a policy which, instead of seeking, as its ultimate object, the suppression of the rebellion, aims to abolish, throughout the country, the institution of slavery, without the consent of the States in which that institution exists, and to elevate the African race to a political equality with the white race.

President Lincoln's views on these points have been clearly avowed, and his determination to enforce them, right or wrong, has been carried into practical operation.

General McClellan's views have also been clearly made known; he has declared them to amount to convictions deeply impressed upon his mind and heart, and, as we have seen, they are "*That the Constitution and Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood.*" He would "*also enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.*" He has expressed his belief "that the Constitution gives power sufficient even for the present exigency.' The thought of violating the Constitution, in letter or spirit, by an usurpation of power, has never been permitted to enter his mind.

Thus have I concluded this series of numbers—their purpose has been declared, and I respectfully, yet confidently, submit that it has been shown to be a fair deduction from the evidence before the country:—

1st. That General McClellan, if he had been sustained by the government, according to promise, would have taken Richmond.

2d. That there was no sound or valid reason for withholding the force promised for his support, and

3d. That he did the best he could, or that any other general could under the circumstances, with the forces placed under his command; and

Lastly, That General McClellan has been deeply injured by the Administration.

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WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 6.

SPEECH OF GOVERNOR PARKER,

AT FREEHOLD, N. J., AUG. 20, 1864.

SUBJECT:

Our National Troubles—Their Causes and the Remedy.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: I am here to-night in esponse to an invitation to address my friends nd neighbors on national affairs. The times emand that I should speak plainly. This is ot the day for honeyed words or set phrases. Ve are in the midst of stirring events. In the ext three months is hidden a history more nportant to us, as a people, than all that has one before. Man's capacity for self-govern-ent is on trial. The approaching election ill probably decide whether this government ill share the fate of other republics that ave perished from the earth before reaching e meridian of their greatness, or whether the nited States of America will continue to be a ower among the nations. It therefore becomes very citizen to counsel freely with his fellows, fearlessly discuss great principles, and exam-e without restraint the qualifications and aims of candidates for popular favor, al-ough some of those candidates already oc-upy high positions. At the ballot-box, Amer-an citizens, whether voters or candidates, are qual. Under our form of government the ler is but the servant of the people, and hen he comes to render an account of his ewardship, and asks to be continued, his acts ust be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. To sure a fair election, the people must have free peech throughout the canvass, and this should e distinctly understood at the threshold. (Ap-lause.)

I will inquire, *first*, what is the present ondition of our country? *Secondly*, what rought the country to its present unhappy ondition? And *thirdly*, by what means can be restored to its former condition of peace, nion, and prosperity?

I. THE PRESENT CONDITION OF THE COUNTRY.

The condition of the country is truly deplor-ble. A civil war has been raging for over ree years. It has desolated many districts, nd changed the busy hum of peaceful indus-try, to the quiet of solitude. Its track has been marked by burning towns. It has brought mourning to almost every household. It has filled our cemeteries with new-made graves, and our hospitals with the sick and maimed. It has taken from the industrial pursuits of civil life nearly one-half of our arms-bearing population. It has involved us in a debt equal to one-fourth of the value of all the assessed real and personal estate in the country. It has fastened a mortgage on every farm. It has taxed heavily all that the people eat or wear, whether luxuries or the necessaries of life. It has reduced to comparative poverty many who supposed they had a competency. It has brought hunger unsatisfied to the table of many a poor and honest laborer. It will bequeath to our children a legacy of taxation greater than ever before cursed a nation. The child is not yet born who will live to see the payment of the debt, or the end of the taxation produced by this war. And yet we are only in the midst of this terrible strife, with but little hope of its speedy termination, if our national government be continued in the hands of those who now administer it. They who grow rich on the war at the expense of the people, may attempt to prove that it has brought prosperity to the country, and that nobody is hurt; but I submit, fellow-citizens, whether I have overdrawn the picture. The evils and horrors necessarily attending a civil war cannot be adequately described. In fact, they cannot even be enumerated. It is the greatest calamity that can befall a nation.

But there are other evils not necessarily produced by a state of war, but for which the present war has been made a pretext, and which are inflicted on the people through the power that has been entrusted to the federal administration for the purpose of prosecuting the war. (Applause.) These evils are not so apparent as those of which I have before spoken, for they do not so much affect the senses, and yet they have had much to do with producing the present sad condition of the country.

I refer, fellow-citizens, to the encroachments of the federal administration on the rights of the States, and the despotic power which has been exercised to overthrow the liberty of the citizen. The system of government framed by our fathers (the best ever devised by the wisdom of man) has been perverted, and is made the instrument of wrong and oppression. It can scarcely be recognized as the government of former years. The Constitution is regarded as a mere rope of sand. Its solemn provisions are now made to yield to what is called "military necessity," which means the arbitrary will of a single individual, fallible as ourselves. (Applause.) A modern invention, termed the "war power," is made to override the explicit mandates of the organic law. Free press, free speech, trial by jury, and *habeas corpus*, the corner-stones of our system of government, have been undermined and swept away. An effort has been made to construct a powerful consolidated government, overshadowing the sovereignty of the States, and vesting despotic power in the Executive. The legislative and judicial branches of the government have been absorbed by the Executive. Laws are made by proclamation without the concurrence of Congress, and are executed without the action of the judiciary. The title to property in large districts is sought to be destroyed by a single stroke of the pen. States are organized, their very constitutions, laws, and institutions prescribed, and the qualifications of voters and officers fixed by the edict of one man. So far has the Executive gone in these assumptions of power, that, since his nomination for reëlection, leading men of his own party have been compelled in a formal manifesto to denounce him in the strongest terms as a usurper. (Loud Applause.) No inmate of Fort Lafayette has been more violent in his denunciations of the exercise of arbitrary power than are the able chairmen of the Senate and House Committees on the Rebellious States. And yet these very men, leaders in the respective houses of Congress, in common with the majority of the dominant party, have upheld the Executive in repeated encroachments on the rights of the people more arbitrary, and, if possible, more dangerous in their character, than those of which they complain. Citizens have been violently dragged from their houses without warrant, without the semblance of a trial, merely at the whim of some secretary, the ringing of his little bell; and for long, weary months have been confined in the damp cell of a prison, and at length discharged without so much as being informed of the nature of the accusation, or even of the ground of suspicion against them. And this has been done in communities far removed from the seat of war, in States where no armed rebel had ever set his foot, where the courts were open, and where the laws were faithfully and impartially administered by pure and learned judges. (Applause.) And this has occurred in the nineteenth century, under what is called a Republican government. in a land where there is a written Constitution, and among a people sprung from an ancestry who for centuries contended against kingly power, and at last secured in *magna charta* the liberty of the people. (Cheers.) And through three long years of such practices, we hear no word of protest or complaint from the distinguished chairmen of the Committees on the Rebellious States who seem at a late day to have awakened to discover, what every conservative man saw long ago, that the Executive had usurped the powers of the other branches of the government. Now that their eyes are open, it is hoped that they will look into other abuses and usurpations.

The question of interference with elections would open a vast field of inquiry for the gentleman who is separated from Kentucky only by the Ohio River, and to the gentleman who resides in Maryland. Let them inquire whether, through orders from the Administration, the exercise of the elective franchise by legal voters has not in those States been prevented by military force? Whether, by such means, a working majority was not secured in the present House of Representatives? Whether military commanders, under the direction and authority of the President, did not fix by proclamation the qualifications of voters in direct opposition to the protest of the State authorities and contrary to State legislation, in which alone such power resides? Whether legal voters were not kept from the polls by the bayonet, on the assumption that they were disloyal? Whether any proceedings were instituted to inquire into their alleged disloyalty, or whether sergeants of squads of armed men stationed around the polls were not made the sole judges, and their musket the challengers? And also, whether, when the election was over, the suspected persons were not suffered to go at large, the suspicion of their disloyalty being confined to the day of election, only long enough, however, to prevent their voting? I have, fellow-citizens, given a brief and very faint description of the present sad condition of the country. I have not spoken of the general despondency that has settled like a pall over the great body of the people; of the indisposition to enter the army, and the difficulty with which its depleted ranks are filled; of the prevailing disappointment at the result of military operations, after the blood and wealth of the nation have been poured out like water, and of the gloomy anticipations of disaster under the auspices of those who direct public affairs. Nor have I spoken of the national humiliation, in being forced to submit to the direct violation of a doctrine which through common consent has been incorporated in our political system, and in having a ruler chosen and inaugurated over a conquered American republic, by the despotic power of a European emperor, without so much as a protest from our Government. Such being our unhappy state, the next inquiry presents itself what is the cause?

WHAT BROUGHT THE COUNTRY TO ITS PRESENT CONDITION.

The war is the chief cause, or, rather, it is e instrument through which we have suffered. ome of the evils I have mentioned are the in- parable accompaniments and natural conse- uences of civil war, while for the infliction of her evils the war has been made a pretext. n order, therefore, to discover who are respon- ble for the present lamentable state of affairs, e must inquire how the war originated. The ar was produced by political ambition. (Ap- lause.) Ambitious and wicked men used the avery question to attain power. Agitators, hose chief aim was to unsettle and destroy, ith the hope that amid the confusion that ould ensue, their aspirations for place might e gratified, seized hold of a strictly moral uestion, and dragged it into the political arena nmindful of the good faith with which the tates entered into the federal compact, and re- rdless of the consequences which it was evi- nt would flow from their action. They und the religious sentiment of the North hos- le to slavery, and they cunningly inculcated e modern doctrine that slavery is a sin, and at the people of the North are responsible r its continuance, and they insisted that this oral evil must be eradicated, by the sword, if ecessary. There never was a greater mis- ke; for slavery, whether it be a sin or not, es not at our doors. It is a State institution, xisting before the general government was reated, the right to regulate which was never elded by the States, and the people of the orth are no more responsible for slavery in the outhern States than in Asia, and had no more ght to interfere with the institution in the one lace than in the other, except by moral sua- on, and then strictly under the local law. he result has been such as was expected by very student of history who knows that moral eforms can never be effected by force, although he attempt has always inaugurated bloody and elentless war. The Abolitionists and Seces- onists are responsible for the war. (Loud ap- lause.) The Secessionists were the most uilty in the eye of the law, for they committed he overt act, raised the standard of revolt, and esisted with violence the authority of the Gov- rnment. The Southern leaders, in the midst f intense excitement, contrary to the desire of majority of their constituency, withdrew their tates from the Union, took possession of our ortresses, and defied the national authority. lthough there had been much provocation, lthough there was reason to apprehend an at- empt to interfere with their domestic institu- ions, yet, had they remained in Congress, the ectional party that had succeeded in the elec- ion could not have carried a single measure de- tructive of their rights or detrimental to their nterests. It was, therefore, a great crime for hese men thus deliberately to sever the Union, o attempt the destruction of this great nation, nd the everthrow of a government established after years of suffering, by our and their fa- thers, and which was the beacon light to the friends of free institutions throughout the world. I say this was a crime, and they are now gathering some of its bitter fruits. But their guilt should not withdraw our attention from others, guiltless, it may be, in the eye of the law, but who are morally equally culpable. These we have in the North. They fill ex- alted positions in our government, and with these we have to do in the approaching elec- tion. (Applause.) They are the men who, for twenty-five years, have been laboring to produce a sectional collision; who avowed that the States could not exist half slave and half free; who counselled resistance to acts of Con- gress; who passed State laws in direct oppo- sition to the provisions of the federal Constitu- tion, securing the rights of property and pro- viding for the rendition of slaves; the men who were willing to let the Union slide; who were not content with the old order of things, but prayed for an anti-slavery constitution, an anti-slavery Bible, and an anti-slavery god; the men who sang pæans to the memory of a misguided enthusiast, who, with a band of fanatical followers, armed with weapons of death, invaded the soil of a sovereign State for the purpose of inciting servile insurrection; who, in defiance of the authority of the general government, took forcible possession of its prop- erty, and who, as a criminal, forfeited his life to the offended law. These men wanted war, and were filled with joy when the South seceded. (Applause.) After doing all in their power to fan the flame of hate, when war seemed inevi- table, the Abolitionists did nothing to allay or extinguish it. The majority of the people, without respect to party, wanted peace, and de- sired compromise, but the Republican leaders would not consent to fair terms, and refused to submit the momentous issue to the people. They were afraid that the Peace Convention would propose a plan of pacification, and circu- lated petitions against compromise. Many Re- publicans were sincere in their efforts to avert war when they realized the impending danger, but they were a minority of the party. Others preferred peace, but having succeeded in elect- ing a President with the powerful aid of the Abolitionists, they did not wish to break with that interest. They found themselves bound hand and foot. The leaders at Washington, who furnished brains and energy to the party, were Abolitionists. The President always inclining in the same direction, gradually yielded to their dictation until he became entirely under their control. After the many evidences that have been given of the truth of these asser- tions, all who remain in connection with the Ad- ministration party must be considered as agree- ing in sentiment with the leaders, and must be held responsible for their acts. The passage of the Crittenden Resolutions by Congress would have prevented war. The plan proposed in those resolutions would have been an equitable settlement of the controversy. It recommended

amendments to the Constitution, prohibiting slavery in all territories north of a certain line, and permitted it south of that line. Congress was prohibited from interfering with slavery in the States. It was declared that the slaveholding States were entitled to the faithful observance of the fugitive slave laws, passed in conformity with the Constitution, and recommended the States to repeal the personal liberty bills which obstructed the execution of the acts of Congress. It also provided that the laws for the suppression of the African slave-trade, and especially those prohibiting the importation of slaves into the United States, should be made effective. The great mass of the people were favorable to that compromise, and had it been submitted to them would have adopted it by an overwhelming majority; and yet the resolutions were defeated by the unanimous vote of the Republican senators, and in the House of Representatives a motion to submit these propositions to the people was voted down. It is not necessary to dwell much longer on this branch of the subject. There is cumulative evidence that the Republican politicians prevented fair terms of settlement. (Applause.)

On the 3d day of January, 1861, Stephen A. Douglas made a speech in the United States Senate, in which he said: "If you of the Republican side are not willing to accept the proposition of the Senator from Kentucky, pray tell us what you are willing to do? I address the inquiry to the Republicans alone, for the reason that in the Committee of Thirteen every member from the South, including those from the cotton States, expressed his readiness to accept the proposition as a final settlement of the controversy, if tendered and sustained by the Republican members. *Hence the sole responsibility of our disagreement, and the only difficulty in the way of an amicable adjustment is with the Republican party.*" Senators on both sides of the chamber heard that speech, and no one denied the truth of the statement. Senator Douglas also alleged in a letter published but a short time before his death, "that while some of the Republicans were Union men in good faith, many of the leaders desired a dissolution of the Union, and urged war as a means of accomplishing it." Should any farther proof be required, it may be found in a letter of Senator Chandler, of Michigan, a representative man of those who influence the present Administration. During the session of the Peace Congress he wrote to the governor of his State: "No Republican State should have sent delegates, but they are here and cannot get away. Ohio, Indiana, and Rhode Island are caving in, and there is some danger of Illinois, and now they beg us for God's sake to come to their rescue, *and save the Republican party from rupture.* I hope you will send stiff-backed men or none. The whole thing was gotten up against my judgment, and will end in thin smoke. Still, I hope *as a matter of courtesy to some of our erring brethren*, that you will send the delegates. *Some of the manufacturing States think that a fight would be awful. In my estimation, without a little blood-letting this Union will not be worth a rush.*" Enough has been said to convince the most skeptical that the abolition element of the Republican party — which, unfortunately for the country, proved the stronger element — wanted war. It was hoped that the withdrawal of the Southern States, and the feeling of bitterness which the war would engender at the North would seat that party firmly in power; but the chief object to be attained was the abolition of slavery, which it was feared could not be accomplished in any other way. And all "whom it may concern" have recently been notified that it is to be continued for the same purpose. The abandonment of slavery is made a *sine qua non* to the establishment of peace, and for this object we are expected to submit to further taxation, to endure further conscription, and mourn over other hecatombs of slain. The men who counsel such a policy have, with the aid of Southern leaders, been instrumental in bringing on our country this most cruel of all wars. Such men would prefer separation to a Union with slaveholders. But the country would not now be in so deplorable a condition, even under the calamities incident to war, if hostilities had been conducted on different principles. (Applause.) We have had an army such as the world had never seen, composed of skilful officers, and of men as brave as ever shouldered a musket or marched up to the cannon's mouth, equipped with all that science and wealth could produce, and yet, with almost treble the population of the enemy, and infinitely greater resources, we find ourselves held at bay in front of the two most important positions of the adversary; confronted at the Confederate capital by a force not inferior to our own, while strong bodies invade Northern soil, and lay waste the country, and threaten the National Capital; and after furnishing nearly two millions of men, and expending but little less than four thousand millions of dollars (if we estimate the state and municipal, as well as the national expenditures), we find ourselves, in the fourth year of the war with the Government apparently paralyzed, the people desponding, our citizens unwilling to enter the army, and obliged, with the aid of enormous bounties, to reinforce our depleted ranks, chiefly by enlisting men who have just landed on our shores, or by running down a few miserable negroes whom the fortunes of war have brought within our lines. (Long-continued applause.) And why is this? Are the people less brave or less patriotic than at the commencement of the war, when their martial ardor could scarcely be restrained? ("No, no.") Why is it that we are called on to behold that most pitiable of all spectacles, a powerful nation, like a bound Samson, engaged in the greatest war of ancient or modern times, with a people who seem to have lost heart in the struggle, and who are devising every possible expedient to avoid personal military service? The answer is, that the war has been perverted from a war for the Union to a politi-

al war; a war for emancipation and the de-
ruction of State rights. The policy of the
dministration in the conduct of the war, both
ilitary and civil, has well nigh crushed the
pirit of the nation, and produced a want of
onfidence in its ability to prosecute the war to
successful termination. In a military point
f view, the great error has been that civilians
t Washington have undertaken to conduct
perations in the field, and, with the aid of
aps and charts, to work out a campaign on
eir "plan," instead of entrusting the business
o the general in command. Beside this, a
ommittee of Congress have been visiting the
rmy, interfering with its discipline, and inquir-
ng into the political predilections of its officers;
nd have forced from the service some of the
ravest and most accomplished generals, who
ad risked their lives on many battle-fields, be-
ause they did not quite come up to their stand-
rd of loyalty, although professedly on other
rounds. (Applause.)

GENERAL M'CLELLAN.

The most notable instance of malignant per-
ecution that has occurred during the war may
e found in the case of General McClellan.
Here was a young soldier called to the command
f the armies without any solicitation on his
art. He was a man of comprehensive mind,
nd took in at a glance the magnitude of the
ar. (Applause.) He had to organize an army
ble to undertake a great campaign against
he enemy's capital. He found nothing but a
isorganized mass, and everything was to be
onstructed from the foundation. As every
ood general should do, he submitted his plan
o the Government, in which he proposed to
ccomplish a given result with a certain force,
which the Government promised to furnish.
Goaded on by the cry of fanatics impatient
o witness the fall of Richmond, the President
was induced to issue his famous war orders,
dividing the Army of the Potomac, and pushing
forward McClellan's army into the enemy's
country before it was in fit condition. Notwith-
standing this, had the Government fulfilled its
part of the contract, McClellan would have
taken Richmond. (Applause.) The division
of Blenker was taken from him, ten thousand
men were virtually subtracted from his force by
the revoking of an order which had added
Fortress Monroe to his department; and when
under fire at Yorktown, he was informed of the
withdrawal of McDowell's corps of 35,000 men.
Thus one-third of his promised army was taken
from him before the advance commenced. The
navy did not take Yorktown, nor was the Mer-
rimac, in the James River, neutralized as was
expected. All this overthrew the original plan
of the campaign. With a force entirely inad-
equate to the undertaking, he was compelled
to advance. His repeated calls for reinforce-
ments were in many instances treated with
neglect, and sometimes with contempt, not by
the President, for it is right to say that at that
time he was, I believe, the friend of McClellan.
He advanced to within five miles of Richmond,
where he was induced to stretch out his right
wing to meet promised reinforcements that
never came; and while in this necessarily ex-
posed position he was attacked with fury by
large bodies of the enemy, sweeping down like
an avalanche, and compelled to seek a new
position to save his army. Then followed those
seven days in front of Richmond, which have
become historical, in which the glorious old
Army of the Potomac vindicated its discipline
and courage, and the genius of its favorite gen-
eral. Although attacked by a superior force
flushed with prospective victory, there was no
rout, but the slow, deliberate, sullen movement
of an army, confident in its own power, and
relying implicitly on the skill and resources of
its commander. Recalled from the peninsula
against his urgent protest, his command taken
from him, confined in Alexandria without so
much as a squadron, he was compelled, for
hours, to listen to the distant sound of the con-
flict. A routed army came flying to Washing-
ton. Panic seized the authorities, for all, indeed,
seemed to be lost. Then occurred one of those
scenes that happen but once in a generation.
The capital lay at the mercy of a powerful and
victorious enemy; the army to defend it was
scattered, disorganized, dispirited, totally incap-
able in its then condition of a successful de-
fence. The general who had been rebuked,
and, as far as possible, disgraced, was sought
and with tearful eyes entreated to save the
capital and the nation. (Cheers.) It was
such a tribute as no man ever before received.
Did McClellan refuse? Did he respond by
reminding the authorities of their former treat-
ment of him? Oh, no! Small minds would
have done this, but not so McClellan. (Re-
newed applause.) His noble spirit rose superior
to all that was around him. He thought only
of his country. He was equal to the occa-
sion. He spoke the magic word. It was the
voice of McClellan, and the men flew to arms.
Order again reigned, and when the command
was given, "*Comrades of the Army of the Po-
tomac, advance!*" a magnificent host, with Mc-
Clellan at its head, marched out of Washing-
ton, with the light of coming victory beaming
on every face. (Cheers.) The victories of
South Mountain and Antietam were won, and
the capital saved; and yet, after all this, upon
the baldest pretexts that could be invented,
McClellan was removed from command while
in the face of the enemy, exiled to New Jer-
sey (laughter), and since his retirement has
been subjected to every species of malignant
persecution and petty annoyance that could
be devised. (Applause.) But, fellow-citizens,
this "Jersey exile," George B. McClellan, will
live in the hearts of his countrymen, and
his memory be cherished by mankind so long
as the country to whose welfare he has de-
voted his life shall have a history. (Loud ap-
plause.)

THE CIVIL POLICY.

Not only the military but the civil policy of the Administration has weakened and divided the North, while at the same time it has strengthened and cemented the South. The cultivation, by acts of conciliation, of the Union feeling which existed for some time after the commencement of the war, would ere this have produced discord in the ranks of the enemy, driven the secession leaders from power, or inaugurated a counter revolution which would have compelled a peace without such an immense sacrifice of human life. (Applause.) The secession leaders told their people that the object of the war was to abolish slavery, to confiscate their lands, to settle their plantations with negroes and make them subject to their own servants. This was not believed by the mass of the people; but the civil policy of the Administration soon dispelled their doubt, and gave to the rebel cause a strength which it could not otherwise have acquired. Emancipation, confiscation, and subjugation became the watchwords. The door to reconciliation was closed. The acts of Congress, and the proclamations of the President in reference to the status of the rebellious States, have made terms of peace impossible so long as they are insisted on. There cannot be a Union unless the States are equals, and they cannot be equal if a single State is deprived of the control of its domestic institutions. Each sovereignty must have the same powers. A union of States negatives the idea of superiors and inferiors. Every adhering State is interested in this principle, and should insist that the returning States should have the right of legislation over their internal affairs that are subjects of the local law. If the general government may compel Virginia to abolish slavery, why may it not compel New Jersey to reëstablish slavery? It is evident to an impartial mind that the abolition policy forbids reunion. If carried into execution it will change our system of government. If the Southern territory should be overrun and the people subjugated, there might be some kind of a government of conquerors and vassals, but not a Union. The emancipation proclamation sounded the death knell of the Union, and the recent letter of the President is but its sequence. It built up a high wall between us and peace. It was the first step in the fatal path which has led the President to his present position. The editors who affect to be surprised at the letter "To whom it may concern," who regret its publication and attempt to explain away its contents, should have known, if they had the sagacity that political editors generally have, that the President's course would necessarily bring him to declare that the abandonment of slavery must be a condition to negotiations for peace. (Applause.) It is the natural result of his policy of the last two years, and I cannot understand how any one should be surprised at it. Have not his adherents taught the same doctrine? Have not the party organs that regard the letter as written without reflection, and not intended to convey the meaning its terms imply, been almost daily regaling the reading public with some such expressions as these: "No union with slaveholders,"— Slavery is the cause of the war, and there must be no peace until slavery is rooted out?" ("Yes.") Did they ever condemn or dissent from the declaration of Vice-President Hamlin, that "the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was, is mere claptrap and nonsense;" or of Thaddeus Stevens, that "the Union never shall be restored by my consent under the Constitution as it is;" or of Mr. Julian, that "we must not only cut up slavery, root and branch, but we must see to it that these teeming regions shall be studded over with small farms and tilled by freemen;" or of Senator Wilson, that "the John Brown Harper's Ferry outbreak was the legitimate consequence of the teachings of the Republican party;" or of a prominent Republican and successful politician of Ohio, that "slavery must be put down, rooted out, if every wife has to be made a widow, and every child be made fatherless?"

Having answered at greater length than I intended, the first two inquiries, I come now, fellow-citizens, to consider the third and most important question: — What is the remedy?

III. HOW CAN THE COUNTRY BE RESTORED TO ITS FORMER CONDITION.

It will, of course, take years to attain to the prosperity that blessed our land before the war. It will require time to heal the wounds that have been inflicted. A century may elapse before the incubus of debt will be removed; but I have faith that all this can be accomplished. I believe that this nation, so vast in its proportions, and so wonderful in its progress, was raised up by Providence to carry the blessings of civilization and Christianity throughout the globe. I have faith that the government will yet be saved. But can it be done by continuing the present Administration? Are not four years long enough to try the abolition experiment? Have you not spent enough money and sacrificed enough men, and come near enough to the precipice of utter ruin, to cure the country of fanaticism? Are you not tired of the carnage of battle-fields, of the sufferings of hospitals, of the lamentation of mourners, of the staring sign-boards of the embalmer, or of the long processions that convey the heroic dead to their last resting-place? Are you not weary of continual encroachments on the liberties of the people? You say you are weary of these things. Then how are you to have a change? Not by force; not by violent resistance to acts of Congress which you honestly believe are unconstitutional; not by refusing to bring vexed constitutional questions before the courts where they belong, in the expectation that your State authorities will rebel and resist the laws by force of arms, and thus bring war to your own doors; but by the free

nd undisturbed exercise of the elective fran-hise. The ballot-box, my friends, is the sov-reign remedy for the ills which afflict the body olitic. The election day, for which so many atriotic hearts have yearned as the time when hey could lawfully change the administration, s rapidly approaching. The people are anx-ously waiting for the day, and they demand on hat day a free and fair ballot, not only in New ersey and Massachusetts, but in Kentucky nd Maryland. The people will not be satis-ied with the counting of bogus electo-al votes, a project so palpably wrong that even Vade and Davis protest against it, and warn he President that if he persists in its execu-ion he will inaugurate another civil war. And ow should you exercise the right of suffrage n order to produce a change? Of course you hould vote against the reëlection of Mr. Lin-oln. There is no prospect of a change for the etter as long as he continues to occupy the residential chair; for although he has said that e was brought to the adoption of his present olicy by force of circumstances, drifting, as it ere, like a ship without a rudder, yet he has ince declared that policy unchangeable; that he withdrawal of the emancipation proclama-ion would be an astounding breach of faith, nd that the abandonment of slavery must be a condition of peace. You see, therefore, that here is no hope for the country if he be con-inued in power.

THE CHICAGO CONVENTION.

But there is still hope for the country. On the 29th day of this month a convention to nominate a candidate for the Presidency of the United States will meet at Chicago. It will be the most important assemblage that ever convened on this continent. Upon its decision will hang the fate of the nation. The eyes of all men are turned in that direction, and many prayers will ascend even from the lips of those who heretofore have acted with other parties, that God would guide its counsels to a right result. (Applause.) I have no doubt that the delegates to that convention, being impressed with the immense responsibility of their position, will conduct their deliberations in a spirit of harmony and conciliation that will silence faction and insure success. They will represent a constituency that to-day constitute a majority of the legal voters of the loyal States, the conservative masses, — the Democracy, whose faith is founded on the Constitution, the friends of law and order, and the real lovers and defenders of the Union. We know not whom they will nominate, but if they act with reasonable discretion, the man whom they nominate will be elected. (Cheers.) Individuals may have their preferences, but they have delegated others to represent them in the convention, and I cannot conceive how wise and patriotic men can nominate a candidate or make a platform we will not prefer to a continuation of the present condition of things. (Applause.)

But I am asked, How will the election of the Democratic candidate benefit the country? What do the National Democracy propose to do when they obtain power? I cannot tell what they will do first, but I think they ought to commence by undoing almost everything that has been done at Washington during the last three years. They ought to unmuzzle the press, take the lock off the mouths of men, and restore in its pristine purity that great writ of right — the *habeas corpus*. They ought to open the doors of military prisons, crowded with citizens incarcerated without the formality of trial, and set the prisoners free. They should repeal all acts of Congress that infringe on the proper jurisdiction of the State courts; they should make short work of the Indemnity Act, and give every man who has been aggrieved the opportunity to test the legality of his imprisonment, in a court of justice. They should repeal the Conscription Act, and if troops are needed for the United States service, they should be raised by the States through their own agents. (Applause.) They ought to repeal the Confiscation Act, and wipe out all proclamations of emancipation and reconstruction, and all test-oaths to support executive decrees past, present, and to come, and the only oath they should require is the support of the Constitution and the laws. Having gone back to where we stood before the war began, and having put the government once more in the right, the way would be open for terms of peace. The Democracy would not be strenuous on merely formal points; in what manner terms should be proposed, and by whom; whether informal meetings of citizens who are cognizant of the views of those in power should prepare the way for negotiation; whether commissioners should be appointed by the general government, or whether there should be an armistice and convention of States. They should not stand on technicality or etiquette in the midst of suffering and death, if an honorable and lasting peace be within their grasp. I am in favor of whichever of these modes will bring peace and Union the soonest. (Applause.) The difficulty now is that the parties cannot be brought together in consequence of impossible terms being insisted upon in advance. The success of the Democracy would bring the belligerents face to face; an honest effort would be made to agree upon fair terms, and that would be a step in the right direction, even if the effort should prove unsuccessful.

I am asked, on what terms would the Democracy negotiate with a view to peace? I am not authorized to speak for the party. I suppose the Chicago Convention will do that. But I think I know something of the sentiments of the people, and particularly of the Democracy, and I am satisfied they would repudiate the Niagara letter of the President. (Loud applause.) They would not insist on the abolition of slavery as a condition. If the Southern people chose, in their several States, to abolish slavery, they would be well satisfied

provided the negroes were kept at home; but if they were not willing to dispense with that institution, for which the present generation is not responsible, but which was entailed on them partly by the action of the people of the North, the Democracy would be content to permit them to manage it in their own way, and get rid of it when they desired; believing, however, that it would be better for both races that there should not be immediate emancipation. The sufferings of what are called the freedmen, for the last two years, have exceeded all the miseries endured by the colored race in this country before that time. (Applause.) But there is one thing the Democracy would insist upon, and that is, the union of the States. (Applause.) They are the real Union men of the country. They were Unionists when the men who now profess to monopolize the loyalty of the country derided them as Union-savers. (Applause.) They rallied around the flag when it was called "a flaunting lie." There is no danger of their favoring a dissolution of the Union; but if the speeches and sayings of ultra leading Abolitionists mean anything; if they believe that slavery is a sin, and that we should not hold communion with slaveholders, there is danger that, failing to subjugate the South, and free the slaves, they would consent to a separation before the Democracy obtain power. The Democracy would recognize the sovereignty of States within their proper sphere, under the Constitution of the United States, but they would insist upon the recognition of, and obedience to, the Federal Government in all matters pertaining rightfully to its jurisdiction.

But will the rebellious States agree to terms of peace on the basis of the Union? Recent events indicate that they will. It is certain that if we make no attempt to negotiate, we will never know what can be accomplished. There has been a change in the tone of Southern sentiment. Influential men recently expressed a willingness to talk over our difficulties, without prescribing independence of the confederacy as an ultimatum. I believe the Southern people are tired of the war. We can judge of their feelings by our own. They have suffered more than we can possibly imagine, and I believe that if the general government is placed in the hands of an administration that will be willing to concede and guarantee the rights of the States under the Constitution, they will gladly make peace; and if the secession leaders interpose and place themselves in the way of a peace on fair terms they will be hurled from power by their own people.

CONCLUSION.

Fellow-Citizens: I have now answered all the questions proposed as the theme for discussion on this occasion. I have depicted the troubles of the country, the causes that produced them, and the remedy to be applied. The cause is left with the people for their verdict. I know what that verdict will be in this town, in this county, and this State. Like a rock in mid-ocean, New Jersey has stood throughout the storm, immovable, breasting and beating back the waves of fanaticism that have surged around her. She is the beacon-light of the Democracy, and the hope of the country. (Cheers.) The people everywhere will come to her standard. She has long stood alone, anxious and trembling for the Union; but now, thank God, her constancy is about to be rewarded. She has stood by the Constitution at all times and under all circumstances. She has obeyed the laws, whether they were acceptable to her or not. She has always conformed to the decisions of the judiciary. She has never violated a compact. She has never deserted the Government when legally called on, although she did not approve the mode of its administration. She is the exemplar of consistency, patriotism, and honor. I am proud of this gallant little State of New Jersey, and would not, to-night, exchange my position as her chief magistrate for the crown of the most powerful kingdom of the old world. (Applause.)

Mr. President, and Members of the Democratic Association: I am glad to see you here, to-night, in such large numbers. It is by means of such associations that correct principles are to be disseminated and thorough organization secured. Although we have the right with us in the coming contest, yet, to secure victory, there must be constant and vigorous labor. We have an adversary, possessed of immense patronage, who will not let go the grasp on power without a desperate struggle. But we will succeed. (Cheers.) No power on earth can stand in the way of the people when aroused. Let us, then, continue to stand by the mottoes of our ancient faith: "The Constitution our guide,"—"Obedience to law, and the faithful observance of all compacts,"—"The Union must and shall be preserved." (Cheers.)

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HON. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS,

ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY.

On the recurrence of a day which arks one of the great stages in the ogress of the world toward free constitutional government, it cannot be inpropriate to consider the nature of e liberties which are supposed to be e birthright of a free people. At a riod when those liberties are affected the prevalence of doctrines which reaten to undermine their foundations d to prostrate their magnificent struce in the dust, it is our imperative ty to do what we can to strengthen ose foundations, and to eradicate the uses of their disintegration. I shall sume, therefore, that the discussion hich I am now to offer to this audience one fitting to the occasion, and deanded by the character of the times.

In entering upon such a discussion I do not wish to conceal from you my nviction that constitutional liberty is ow in great peril in this country, or my lief that, unless great exertions are ade to save it, it will be irretrievably st. You may or may not share with e this conviction or this fear. But en if you do not, it is none the less oper that I should apprise you, in adance, of what lies at the bottom of my wn thoughts on this subject, in order at you may judge what importance, any, ought to attach to the opinions I ay express.

In all such discussions it is necessary at terms should be defined. You will aturally ask, therefore, what I underand by "constitutional liberty;" and s it is principally in reference to the potical and social rights of individuals that propose now to consider that liberty, answer that I understand it to imply e existence of some fundamental law, securing to the citizen certain personal rights, which government can, in no circumstances, and for no purpose, violate or take away, when there is no accusation of crime; and which, when there is an accusation of crime, can be touched by the power of government only in a certain mode and form. This I take to be the essence of constitutional liberty. The practice of securing it by fundamental laws, more solemn in their character and supported by firmer sanctions than the ordinary legislation, began with our English ancestors many centuries ago. They were not the first inventors of citizenship as a condition of social existence involving certain inviolable personal rights. That condition was well known to the Greeks, to the Romans, to the Jews, and to other nations of antiquity. But the circumstances in which the people of England found themselves, after the Norman conquest, made it necessary for them to devise certain peculiar means of protection against the power of the sovereign to oppress or injure his individual free-born subject. They did this by means of special compacts with their princes, founded on and declaring the ancient rights of the free citizen, and binding the sovereign and his successors forever to abstain from infringing them. In this way they secured the rights of person and property against arbitrary seizure, protected the home against unlawful invasion, and provided for the trial of offences by the institution known as the jury. The great charters, which effected this security and formed the basis of English constitutional liberty, were all made long before the discovery of the art of printing, that is, before the fifteenth century. After

that discovery, in the progress of time, and through much tribulation, the freedom of the press also became an universally received and unalterable condition of English social and political existence, — a fundamental principle, which recognizes and is founded on the fact that, without freedom of discussion, there can be no other freedom. This result, in relation to the press, had been reached before the American Revolution. It was a result in regard to which there never could have been heretofore, and never can be hereafter, any step backward without destroying the entire framework of constitutional liberty; because the nature of modern society and the functions of the press are such that its freedom or its subjection to arbitrary control necessarily marks the distinction between free and arbitrary governments. This is essentially true everywhere; for while, on the one hand, according to our ideas, freedom of the press means the right of printing unrestrained by any power of government, other than the power, after publication, to punish judicially for violations of law, the absence of that freedom, in other systems, implies the arbitrary power, before publication, to say what shall be printed, or to prevent printing at all.

One other institution of civil liberty was added to the catalogue before the occurrence of our Revolution, namely, the writ of *habeas corpus*, — a process by which every person imprisoned can compel a judicial inquiry into the cause of his imprisonment, and under which he is entitled to his liberty, if the inquiry shows that the cause or mode of his imprisonment was unlawful.

It is impossible to allude to these things before a cultivated American audience, without being conscious of a strange kind of incongruity between the audience and the subject. That we, American citizens, living in this latter half of the nineteenth century, and under the Constitution of the United States, should have a practical interest in considering the means of preserving our civil liberties, and be, or feel ourselves, under the necessity of discussing first principles, is certainly a most extraordinary condition of American society. But I think you will agree with me, before I conclude, that such necessity, humiliating as it is, actually exists.

To prove it, let me in the first pl draw your attention to what took pl when the Constitution of the Unit States was established. The immunit of person and property from arbitr seizure by executive authority, and t freedom of the press, with all the le machinery by which they are protect were, of course, brought hither by c ancestors as part of the common la and after the Revolution they beca incorporated in all our State consti tions, as conditions of social existen without which there can be, accordi to the feelings of our fathers, no life t is not civil death, no happiness that not the happiness of slaves. Wh therefore, a Constitution for a natio government was presented to the peo of the several States for their adopti and it was seen that it proposed establish a government with direct a sovereign powers, without placing t government under the restrictions respect to the rights of person and pr erty which the people and their anc tors for so many generations had be accustomed to regard as indispensable liberty, it is not surprising that a c termination was formed by wise and gacious men to supply what they rega ed as a serious defect in the new tional system. That determination w unquestionably shared in and sustain by the masses of the people. It w quickened mainly by the observati of one positive feature and of seve negative features of the proposed Co stitution. It was observed that the Co stitution contained no special protecti for the liberty of the press; no distin and express reservation of the rights th would remain in the people and in t several States, after granting to the ce tral power the rights enumerated in t instrument; and none of the usual mea by which reserved and inalienable righ of person and property are secured governments of the American constit tional type. It was further observed th the Constitution contained a clause whi would confer on the new national go ernment an implied power to suspen the writ of *habeas corpus* under certai circumstances; and hence it was su posed that a government which could d this, and which, at the same time, w placed under no positive restriction i respect to the modes of arresting, in

psoning, and trying persons charged
h offences, would have the liberties of
e citizen completely in its grasp, not-
hstanding all the provisions of the
mmon law of the States and of the
ate Constitutions. There was great
ce in this reasoning, and great founda-
n for the jealousy displayed; not a
ndation resting upon any evil design
any person concerned in the framing
the new government, but a founda-
n existing in the nature and relations
the system proposed.

For it was correctly reasoned that as
e people of each State were to grant
a central government certain powers
a sovereign nature, with supreme au-
rity of legislation reaching to the
rson of the citizen, and as the same
thority was also to have the power to
spend the writ of *habeas corpus* on
rtain occasions, it would be a just in-
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erve their common-law personal rights,
the political rights of their States, if
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had been allowed to be drawn, would
ve justified the position that for great
tional purposes the people meant to
eate a national government of a totally
ferent character from the character of
ir State governments, and that they
re willing, for national objects, to live
der an arbitrary and despotic power,
ile for domestic purposes, they were
live under a limited constitutional re-
blic. In order to preclude forever all
ound for such an inference, the people,
a great majority, resolved that certain
endments of a restraining character
ould be added to the Constitution. It
es not in the least detract, in my judg-
ent, from the force that should be given
what then took place, that the federal
nstitution was ratified in five States
thout the proposal of amendments. I
ve studied the history of these occur-
nces with care, and have examined, in
nnection with them, the contempora-
ous popular feelings and purposes;
d I am entirely satisfied that even at
e close of the year 1787, when the
nstitution had been ratified by five
ates without proposing amendments,
vast majority of the people of the
hole country, including majorities in
ose five States, were convinced that
e rights of persons and property
ust be secured by proper provisions,
and were determined to have it done.
When, in the beginning of 1788, the people of Massachusetts acted upon the Constitution, and it was found that it could not be carried without plainly insisting that its ratification should be followed by amendments protecting the common and fundamental rights of the citizen and the rights of the States, — an example that was quickly followed by all the remaining States, — there was an undoubted and overwhelming majority of the nation who meant to prevent, by every possible means, any future style of construction or administration which would make the government, under any circumstances, one of arbitrary or unrestrained powers.

This, as you know, was done by adding to the Constitution after its adoption, and, so as to make them a part of the instrument, those provisions which declare what the government of the United States shall not do in its relations to the rights of the citizen, the rights of the States, and the freedom of the press.

Now I will not depart from the rule which I always impose on myself on such occasions as this, by speaking of political parties and political persons. No partizan denunciations, no attacks upon motives, no mutterings of vengeance, will now do the slightest good. I shall speak only of the tendencies of opinions, practices, and acts of legislation. I desire you, therefore, to direct your attention to the prevalence of a certain tone of thinking and acting upon the relations between government and citizen, which is anything but American, and which will be fatal to liberty unless it is soon terminated, if it has not already destroyed our capacity to appreciate and defend liberty as we ought. You will readily understand to what I refer, when I remind you how common it has been among us, for now quite a long period, to hear the rights of government spoken of as paramount to the rights of individuals; how great have been the wrongs which we have excused under the plea of "necessity," and how completely the sacredness of those constitutional guarantees which protect the liberties of the citizen has faded out from the minds of great numbers of men. The proposition that the government has rights paramount to the rights of the citizen, as a legal or as

an ethical proposition, is just as untrue as it would be to assert that the rights of the citizen are paramount to those of the government. As the government derives all its rights and all its powers from the Constitution, which places it under positive restrictions in respect to the modes of exerting its authority over individuals, and as the Constitution, in all its parts and for all its purposes, is the supreme law of the land, it is impossible that the rights of persons should be justly subordinated to anything else. Of course, when I speak of the rights of persons, I do not include a right to commit crimes, or to endanger the public safety, or to obstruct public operations; but I do include the right, even when there is an accusation or suspicion of wrongdoing, to be dealt with in those modes to which the government is restricted by the fundamental law — a right without which there can be no security for innocence, and no certain method of preventing or punishing guilt.

But there has sprung up in our days, and amid the circumstances which surround us, a habit of thinking on these subjects, which is one of the sure indications of that weakness which always precedes a relapse into despotism. It is the habit of depreciating the safe and ordinary modes of procedure, as if they were unsuited to emergencies, and lacked the vigor which we erroneously suppose to be attendant upon arbitrary measures; and to such an extent have we carried this habit, that in communities where there was no immediate public danger of any kind, where the ordinary machinery of justice was in full activity, the most enormous disregard has been manifested of the plainest constitutional principles. Well, it needs no prophet to foretell that a people who allow their own liberty to be thus dealt with, cannot preserve it. They will lose it not so much because a tyrant, or a class of tyrants, has arisen to steal it away, as because they have themselves been untrue to it, by giving their sanction to maxims of government utterly unsuited to the nature of their institutions. Liberty is not a fashion, it is a principle. It is not an outward show, it is an inward virtue. It is to a people what chastity is to a woman. To consent to live without it for a period, with intent to resume it in better or in other times, is to consent to the ruin of the moral nature. Repentance and the power of the Holy Ghost made a Mary Magdalen fit for the society of heaven. A special interposition of Providence, and the purification of great suffering, may restore constitutional liberty to a people who have once surrendered it. But nothing else can. When once the plea of urgent necessity, with its insidious influence, has satisfied the conscience, and great constitutional guarantees, founded in the experience of ages, have been put aside, the power of that plea over the moral sense has been established, and its next occasion will be its next triumph.

I cannot but marvel that my countrymen should not universally see how impossible it will be to preserve constitutional liberty in this country, if those parts of our political system which secure the rights of States and of citizens are made to give way to the unchecked force of national and physical power wielded by a central arm of authority. For one, I have never desired to see that arm crippled, in the slightest degree, of its legitimate power, and there is no citizen of this republic who could more deeply deplore its severance into two or more confederacies. But I hold it to be the first and highest duty of those who are charged with the conduct of our national affairs, to *prevent* the destruction of liberty that must follow the exercise of power which the Constitution not only does not sanction, but which it absolutely prohibits. I have never seen a single instance of the exercise of arbitrary power, in which the object to be attained, if rightful, could not have been better reached by the legitimate methods of the Constitution. I have never heard or read a presentation of the argument of "necessity" which did not leave all that is most dear and valuable in our system exposed to present overthrow and final ruin. I have never seen an occasion when the government could not have gained infinitely greater strength by conciliating the feelings, and winning the coöperation of men who love their country because it is free, than it could obtain from those who are careless of the principles that underlie its institutions.

That my solicitude is not ill-founded will, I think, be apparent to any candid mind, when I describe what now exists in the legislation of the United States.

A little reflection will show you that when liberty has been secured by certain fundamental laws which limit the powers of government, if the legislative and executive departments of that government will not religiously respect those laws, they can be kept in operation only by the judicial department, which affords to the injured citizen the means of redress against the immediate agents in the wrongful act. Human wisdom never has devised, and in all probability never will be able to devise, any other practical method of holding the administrators of government to the provisions of written constitutions of liberty. Destroy or impair this method, create impediments in the way of judicial action, or strike out of existence this practical means of enforcing constitutional guarantees, and those guarantees become mere waste paper. Of what avail is it that a constitution provides that no man shall be deprived of his liberty without legal process, if those who seize me, or order me to be seized, in an arbitrary arrest, are protected by legislation against the exercise of my right of judicial redress? It is this right of judicial redress, this power to make the wrongdoer accountable, that makes the really valuable distinction between our systems of liberty and the acknowledged despotisms of the world. Destroy it, and a republican government can be as despotic and irresponsible a power as any autocracy on earth.

There is now a law on the statute book of the United States which not only undertakes to deprive the judicial tribunals of the States of all cognizance, civil and criminal, over proceedings instituted against persons who have done any act injurious to a citizen, by order of the President of the United States, but which also makes the order of the President, or of any one acting under his authority, a full and perfect defence, in all courts, in any civil or any criminal proceeding in which the act is drawn in question. If this law is to be sustained by public opinion and by the judicial tribunals, it will be found that it has annihilated the liberties of the citizen as effectually as any device that was ever resorted to in any age or in any country. If, while it removed all responsibility of subordinates, it had proportionately heaped responsibility upon the President, something of the dignity and regard for principle which characterizes free constitutional governments would have been saved, although the propriety of such legislation could not even then have been defended. But with such a law in operation as this, it would be manifestly unjust to impeach the President for a high crime against liberty, or for a misdemeanor against personal rights, whatever he might order to be done to a citizen; because it is the obvious intention of the legislative department that "during the present rebellion" the President shall have and exercise an absolutely discretionary power over the persons of all citizens. For this reason also I think it plain that if the law can be regarded as constitutionally valid, so as to furnish a defence to the subordinate officer who does the act which the President orders, it must be held to furnish the President himself with an equally good defence: because it was the obvious design of the law to make an executive order paramount to every provision of the Constitution that secures and protects the liberties of the citizen "during the present rebellion."

I ask you, my countrymen, what possible justification can there be for such legislation as this? The Constitution of your country declares that you shall not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without judicial process; that you shall *not* be tried for offences by courts-martial; that you *shall* be tried by a jury of your neighborhood; and while it assumes that there may be a state of war, and that for the security and efficiency of military operations, there may be times and places in which military law must temporarily prevail, there can be no pretence that it justifies legislation which puts the rights of citizens everywhere throughout the land absolutely under executive control by declaring that no person shall be amenable anywhere, civilly or criminally, for any act done under an executive order. Why should our legislators have thus outraged the feelings and principles of those to whom constitutional liberty is at least as dear as all else that life affords? I read with grief and shame that an American Congress, laying aside all the cherished principles and traditions of a free people, and abolishing their last safeguards, have placed the liberties of their countrymen absolutely in the power of one man.

I know that some apologist will say that if this legislation is not in accordance with the Constitution, the final judicial arbiter of all such questions will so declare. Let us not have too much reliance on a judiciary that may be obliged to feel itself unsupported by public opinion. I have as much confidence in the judges of the land as any lover of liberty and right ought to have. But I have not passed thirty years of my life in observing the administration of justice, or been concerned in the study of its movements upon constitutional questions, without having learned how necessary it is to keep its atmosphere pure and clear by the purifying and invigorating influences of an enlightened and virtuous public sentiment.

And now, having endeavored to point out with precision what seem to me to be the sources of our great error, I will not be so unjust as not to admit that a civil war in a constitutional republic presents a difficult problem to the action of those who are charged with the conduct of public affairs. But what I insist upon is, that we have needlessly and weakly debased the standard of public conduct; for we have not required that the difficulties of the problem should be met by a corresponding statesmanship, which might have solved and removed them by appliances in strict accordance with constitutional principles. We have resorted to the subterfuges of a latitudinarian construction, instead of adhering to the undoubted letter and spirit of the fundamental law; and hence we are in a state of confusion. Look, for example, at the injury that has been done in this country, within the last three years, to the freedom of the press and the rights of personal liberty by the doctrine that men may be made accountable for what are called "treasonable sentiments." Newspapers have been suppressed, and men have been incarcerated or banished for the expression of political opinions, in disregard of the fact that we live under a Constitution which strictly defines the offence of treason, and which, unquestionably, excludes from the category all merely moral aid and comfort of a public enemy. However reprehensible it may be to write or speak as if one wished success to the enemies of one's country, it is nothing but a relapse into the worst ages of constructive treasons, to pretend that mere writing or speaking on subjects that are political can be made cognizable by the public authority and visited with the penalties attached to that crime. Long before the Constitution of the United States was made, such constructive treasons were exploded by our ancestors; and when that instrument was made they were carefully excluded from our political existence. They are, indubitably, incapable of being reconciled with the freedom of speech and of the press; for no human intellect can draw the line anywhere save where the Constitution places it, namely, at the limit of physical aid and comfort of an enemy, and yet leave untrammelled that right of free discussion without which such institutions as ours cannot exist. Let me be explicitly understood.

What I complain of is, not that men have been restrained or punished for doing or publishing what has enabled others to frustrate military operations, but that for discussions or utterances clearly within every legal and moral right of the citizen, and in no degree injurious to military operations, the liberty of the press has been violated, and men have been thrown into prison. This, *you know*, has been done flagrantly and repeatedly, and so pernicious has been the effect of our passionate violence, that private malice has again and again asked and induced the public authorities to act where the cause and the theatre were alike contemptibly trivial. Such are the inevitable consequences of a departure from the sacred principles of a free constitution. The practice, too, of dealing by military power with men who have been unfaithful in public trusts, but who are in no sense amenable to military law, is another proof of the disregard of constitutional principle, which has now become chronic, and bids fair to be perpetual.

I have thus laid before you, in an imperfect manner, a few of the reasons which, to my mind, afford grounds for serious concern about the duration of our system of constitutional liberty. I know and appreciate all the existing obstacles to the production of any considerable effect of these suggestions upon the minds of others. It has been my fortune heretofore to encounter the ridicule that attended those who were de-

ded as "Union-savers." It is my for-
ne now to be classed with those whose
nxiety for the safety of our free institu-
ons, if admitted to be sincere, is re-
arded as superfluous, or, being flip-
antly treated as a pretence, is pro-
ounced, in the fashionable cant of the
mes, as "disloyalty." These things
o not move me. But I confess I
m moved when I contemplate the ex-
ent to which educated minds have
ielded to the idea that our free institu-
ons must give way to the establishment
f some other system, and that, all things
onsidered, the change through which
e are believed to be passing is not to
e regretted. There is a great deal
ore of this feeling abroad than appears
pon the surface. Along with it, side
y side with it, and sometimes in direct
lliance with it, there is operating a fatal
anker that eats out the life of public
irtue — a coarse, rank greed for wealth
nd luxury and power, that sets them
bove all systems of liberty, and trifles
vith public principles and interests as if
hey were things to be hawked about
pon the stock exchange. And last,
ot least in mischievous effect, is the
pathy that looks on all violations of a
reat Constitution, one of the consum-
nate masterpieces of the human intellect,
ne of the last citadels of human hopes,
s we should see the mimic fortification
vhich a school-boy has erected in the
nows of winter, melt under the blaze of
vernal sun.

What is the remedy? What shall
ave us from the fate that has overtaken
ther republics? I know of nothing that
an save us but to intrust the adminis-
ration of our affairs, through the ballot-
ox, to men who can govern without vio-
ating the Constitution.

If we have not lost the power of re-
turning to the paths of the Constitution,
we may yet escape these perils. But we
cannot escape them if we continue to
deride and decry the limitations which
the Constitution has imposed upon the
national powers. We may convert this
Union into a consolidated democracy,
whose uncontrollable force shall override
all State authority and all local and indi-
vidual rights; and we shall do it, if we
do it at all, at the cost of constitutional
liberty as the price of the conversion.
You will see, I am convinced, that this
must be the result, if you will reflect
upon the fact that the people of the
United States, in their collective and na-
tional capacity, if unrestrained by those
limitations which have their origin in the
separate sovereignties of the States, must
be he absolute masters of all social and
political conditions within their limits.
In such a result we must lose even the
common law, for as a nation we have no
common law. That body of law — the
source of the rights of property and per-
son, the nursery of freedom, the origin
of suffrage — exists only by reason of
the distinct sovereignties of the States.
If ever the national powers shall com-
pletely overcome those sovereignties, the
common law will disappear.

No more awful spectacle can be con-
templated than that of a great, powerful,
and energetic nation, who have no rule
of action but the rule of a written Con-
stitution, and who have lost their fidelity
to its requirements. We have been so
situated through three whole years of
civil war, that it has been in the power
of extreme and violent men to denounce
a pure and high regard for the limita-
tions of our fundamental law as treason
to the Union. The moral cowardice
which has made us shrink from defend-
ing the unquestionable rights of the
States, from fear of being charged with
complicity in rebellion, has deprived the
nation, in its utmost need, of the coun-
sels and thoughts of many of its best
citizens, and has made many a man in
public station yield his assent to meas-
ures which his reason and conscience
disapproved. We must correct this evil,
or we shall have no means left to us
by which we can rescue our country from
the jaws of ruin. Patience, moderation,
obedience to law while it remains law,
and fidelity to the Constitution forever,
are the virtues on which our salvation
depends.

But this solemn theme, reaching into
the impenetrable future, extends beyond
all the limits of public speech appropri-
ate to such an occasion as this. We
have a priceless inheritance to defend,
and I will not say that, under present
circumstances, the existing military strug-
gle can be discontinued. But it must
be conducted by a power that will re-
spect the fundamental civil conditions
of our national existence, or its exertions
will be utterly fruitless of any good.
We all know that there *is* a sword,

which was drawn, at the first, in defence of the Constitution, and which can never be used for its subversion. Let him who wears that sword — whether he is reserved by the Government for one or another emergency, whether he is to be called by the people to one or another public position — receive the confidence which his character and your own welfare alike demand at your hands. Guard his reputation as you would guard one of your dearest possessions. It is no light thing that, at so early an age, such capacities and such a character as McClellan's should have become developed among us to the full stature of a soldier and a statesman, and should have become so known throughout the land for the purity and elevation that have marked him from his first appearance in this stormy, this perilous period of our national history. I am no solicitor, in his behalf, for men's suffrages, to place him anywhere; and I know well how gravel how truly, how conscientiously, as on should look upon a trust for the publi good, he looks upon all that abundar measure of admiration and approbatio which flows to him from the hearts o his countrymen. I know that you can not call him to assume any responsibi ity concerning which a noble sense o duty will not be the sole ground o his determination, and the sole sprin of all his acts; and I also know, if I an capable of knowing anything that con cerns the welfare of my country, that t him, or to men like him, the America people must look hereafter, if they woul preserve that system of constitutiona government without which all powe and all dominion will be like —

Dead sea-fruits,
Which tempt the eye,
But turns to ashes on the lips.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, Nov.* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with the Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of military operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 8.

SPEECH OF HON. EDGAR COWAN,

OF PENNSYLVANIA,

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 27, 1864,

ON MR. TRUMBULL'S AMENDMENT REPEALING THE JOINT RESOLUTION OF JULY 17, 1862, QUALIFYING THE CONFISCATION ACT AND LIMITING FORFEITURES UNDER IT TO THE LIFE OF THE OFFENDER.

MR. COWAN said,—

MR. PRESIDENT: I should not have said a word during this discussion except for the fact that among all those who have engaged in it not one of them has taken the pains to state the question clearly and distinctly out of which it arises. The Constitution provides that "No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture (of estate), except during the life of the person attainted. The true question is, whether by any law we can make here, the estates of traitors can be forfeited absolutely and for the fee. Because to repeal the joint resolution of 17th July, 1862, would give the act it qualifies that operation; if it did not the repeal would be useless and inoperative.

Now I suppose that no lawyer in this country, before the present war, could have ever hesitated a moment as to the true construction of the clause in question or of the reason which underlaid it. The language is plain and free from a legal ambiguity; it is the same which has been embodied in English statutes for the last two hundred years, and has been the subject of judicial construction without a doubt as to its meaning. No one until recently ever dreamed but that it was intended to restrain the forfeitures in judgments of treason to the lifetime of the traitors, and that after their deaths their lands would descend to their heirs-at-law as in other cases. The reason for this too was simple and obvious, that the punishment of a traitor, as far as possible, might be made to fall upon his own head and not upon the heads of his wife and children, who are presumed to be innocent until they are found guilty. Experience, long and painful, too, had shown that this humane view was far more wise and politic for the state than the older and more barbarous rule which forfeited forever the estates of those who rebelled against it. Under this latter the heirs, feeling that they had been involved in the punishment of an ancestor without having shared in his guilt, of course always were disaffected toward a government they thought capable of such injustice toward them, and under the smart of it never failed to revolt themselves when a fit opportunity presented. Under the new policy, however, they were reconciled to the state because they were allowed the presumption of innocence in inheriting the estates of their ancestors, and were made loyal to it by the clemency it showed in not treating their misfortunes as crimes.

Recently, however, in the indignation naturally excited in the minds of our people by the wickedness of the rebellion, many have desired to strip all those engaged in it of their entire property, as a terror to those who might in the future contemplate of-

fences of the same kind. Filled with this notion, attempts are made to carry it out here by enactments which would relieve the court of all restraint in declaring forfeitures of the property of persons engaged in the rebellion, so that they might condemn a tract of land absolutely as prize of war the same as the ship of an enemy at sea is condemned when it is captured. This would be the effect if the joint resolution be repealed by the amendment of the Senator from Illinois.

Now, I am ready to aver and prove that this cannot be done without a clear violation of our authority delegated to us by the Constitution here, and by the Constitution alone. We are here to make laws for the people according to the powers expressly given to us in that instrument, and we have no more right to transcend those powers by making laws not warranted by it, or by making laws forbidden by it, than any tyrant has to justify his usurpations; no more, indeed, than the rebels have for disregarding and disobeying it. Let no man, therefore, solace himself with the reflection that he is actuated by good motives while he is violating it, or, in the popular phrase, that the government is to be saved even at the expense of the Constitution. He must save it according to the Constitution and by the exercise of the powers it confers, because if there is a government left after the Constitution is gone, that government would be a despotism and not the government he is entrusted to save. All this is, I think, so plain that all who are not wilfully blind must see it. If we for the purpose (as we think) of saving the Government could violate the Constitution to do so, then the President might, for the same purpose, do so too. Now suppose he were to decide that the great danger to it was the coming presidential election, and that for the purpose of saving it from that danger he would prevent an election altogether, and hold over himself till it was safe to go back to the Constitution and again entrust the people with the right to choose a Chief Magistrate: will any man say that would be saving the Government? Would it not the rather be saying that it was impossible to save the Government, and that it was necessary to substitute in its stead a despotism?

It is in this aspect all true men must view it; and there is no man true to the Government or who has faith in its continued existence who would for one moment doubt its capacity to save itself according to the laws of its own creation. Indeed I have no doubt if it is ever lost it will be by violating its fundamental law, the Constitution, and if that is obeyed it can be saved and will endure. The honorable Senator from Illinois admits that all the power possessed by our Government is derived to it under and by virtue of the Constitution, and I consider this admission important as coming from him: for there are some of his school who seem to think that in time of war we get some new accession of power from some other source outside that instrument, which they call war powers, and upon these they are disposed to draw without stint whenever constitutional objections are made to their schemes. But it so happens that we hold and enjoy even our war powers under the Constitution, which provides as well for the chastisement of belligerent enemies as it does for the punishment of the citizens who offend against its criminal code. And if we were at war to-day with a foreign power, we would be as much bound as the Constitution in all respects while carrying on that war, as we are bound by it while proceeding against one of our citizens for murder or any other offence. In the first case we are governed by the laws of war as we find them in the laws of nations, and in the latter by the municipal laws enacted by Congress according to the Constitution. The framers of that instrument found the "laws of nations" all ready made to their hand, and they provided that they should be the law of the new people they were then starting out on its national career.

ney adopted them as the law of the nited States. But they adopted no unicipal code ready made, but they ovided a Congress and gave it au- ority to make one according to cer- in fixed rules and with certain defi- te limitations; so that we see they opted one code and provided for aking another. The first regulates r intercourse with foreign nations in ace and war, the second regulates e relations and authority of the overnment with our own citizens as ch.

Here, however, comes the difficulty; difficulty which has confused so many scussions and left so many minds herwise clear in much and perplexing certainty; it is this: under which these codes are our relations with oels regulated? Are we to treat em as foreigners at war with us, or citizens offending against our crim- al code? I answer, unhesitatingly, at so long as actual war exists we e bound to treat them precisely as ough they were a foreign nation; may do to them and their property, blic and private, exactly what we ght do to the public and private operty of Mexico and Mexicans if were at war with them, and nothing ore. After the war is over and the med rebellion is put down, we have right to do to them whatever we ve a right by law to do to citizens o offend against our laws. And s, too, is the necessity of the case; s what we are doing now, or what ought to be doing, because, actual r existing, we are governed by the vs of nations and not by our mu- ipal laws. By the latter we might r, convict, and execute for the crime treason some of the prisoners we te; but it is well known we do not; leed we durst not for our sakes as ll as for the sake of the law. If we d so they would retaliate and exe- te our prisoners; and the war hav- g thus broken out of the pale of in- national law would become one of rder and extermination, instead of ing civilized and lawful war. If we had once subdued the organized and armed rebellion, so that they could not retaliate, then we might enforce against them our municipal law, or law enacted by Congress; until that event happens we cannot.

The act of 17th July, 1862, being clearly a municipal law in most of its features, it must be subject to the restriction imposed by the Constitution; and if we undertake to punish the rebel as a citizen, then we must accord to him all that a citizen charged with a crime has a right to claim under the Constitution; that is, he must be charged by a grand jury, must be tried by a petit jury, &c., and though his life may be forfeited absolutely, yet his lands cannot.

The joint resolution asserts this principle and makes it part of the act, makes the act itself constitutional; but if we repeal it, then it is not constitutional and the courts could not execute it.

But we are told that this law is not exactly a municipal law; that it is not to operate on the rebel as a citizen but as an enemy and a belligerent; that as we have the right to shoot him on the field of battle, we have also a right to confiscate his estates, &c., with a great deal more to the same purpose, but all of which means, I suppose, if it be put in legal phrase, "that by the laws of war the private property, real and personal, of belligerent enemies is lawful prize of war." If this is true, then we have the right of course; but if it is the law already, why reënact it here? It is unquestionably the law of war that private property of enemies captured at sea is fair prize of war; but being the law, no one has ever thought of giving it any additional force by putting it into an act of Congress.

Now I propose to show that from the very nature and necessity of the matter Congress cannot enact laws of war; to attempt it would be an absurdity. Under ordinary circumstances it would be enough to say to reasonable men that one nation or one

belligerent could not make laws of war, because the laws of war must bind both belligerents; and it is manifestly absurd to suppose that if one belligerent were to lay down the law to govern the struggle the other would be bound to obey it. It could only be the law when both agreed to be bound by it; if they did not then it would be mere idle proclamation, or, as lawyers say, *brutum fulmen*.

Again, even if a foreign nation or nations were to join with the United States in establishing new rules or laws to be added to the international code, Congress would have nothing whatever to do with the matter.

This can be illustrated in a very simple manner. I have said that the Constitution adopted the international code ready made, by conferring power upon Congress to affix a proper punishment for its violation in certain cases, such as piracy, &c., to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water; (that is, what disposition shall be made of prizes of war, and not what shall be prize of war as has been argued). Here the power of Congress ends and the power of the President and Senate begins. The President appoints and the Senate confirms embassadors to foreign courts; they also make treaties; and lastly, the courts decide all cases arising under the laws of nations, especially prize cases.

Now, it is well known that the great Powers of Europe, in congress assembled in Paris, in 1856, proposed certain ameliorations in the laws of nations regulating war, as follows: first, to abolish privateering; second, enemy cargoes (except contraband of war) to be covered by neutral flags; third, neutral goods (except contraband of war) not seizable under enemy flags.

The United States were invited to agree to those changes, and the Federal Government was willing to do so, provided another change was made, namely, "that private property of enemies should not be prize of war at sea any more than on land."

Now, allow me to ask, suppose our Government had agreed, by what agency under our Constitution could that result have been brought about? Surely no one will say it would be Congress; but every one must know that the President, through his ministers abroad, would have entered into treaty with the Powers proposing that we would have been called on to ratify it in this Senate; and that, so far from the House of Representatives having anything to do with it, we would have been bound not to let them know anything about it until our action had been taken.

Here we see beyond dispute that to the President and the Senate is intrusted the power of proposing and agreeing to alterations and amendments to the laws of nations.

Now, I wish to say further in this connection, that in pursuance of the doctrine I have advanced we have established courts to decide cases arising under the laws of nations, and that in deciding those cases an act of Congress would have no binding force whatever, because if it contravened the well-settled principles of public law, the court would be bound to disregard it.

MR. TRUMBULL. There never was such a case in the world.

MR. COWAN. There never was a clearer proposition, nor one which could be more easily maintained before an intelligent court. I never heard it denied or doubted except on the floor of the Senate, and that at a time when I was satisfied Senators had not examined it.

MR. TRUMBULL. I should like to ask the Senator from Pennsylvania if he ever read the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall on that very point, in which he said that the law of nations was subject to the control of the sovereignty; that a nation might make itself odious to other nations by refusing to follow it; but that the power of Congress to confiscate property was clear and unquestioned.

MR. COWAN. I know precisely the opinion to which the Senator refers —

rown s case — and I know, too, that
e case as actually decided gives no
untenance whatever to the doctrine
r which he contends, no matter what
e judge may have said, by the way,
hile he was ruling it. Besides, there
a doctrine of Chief Justice Marshall,
a subsequent case, which is directly
the teeth of his doctrine in Brown's,
the Senator understands the latter.
he fact is, however, that there is no
fficulty in reconciling them.

Let me put a case. Suppose we had
ceded to the treaty of Paris, and we
d gotten afterwards into a war with
reat Britain. Then suppose Congress
d enacted a law declaring enemy
ods might be taken as prize of war,
ough covered by a neutral flag.
hen, further, suppose one of our cruis-
s had captured British goods on board
a French vessel, and had brought them
to a prize court for condemnation;
ould it not have been sufficient to
revent such a result to show that we
ad bound ourselves by treaty not to
ake prize of goods under such cir-
umstances? And if the act of Con-
ress had been relied on by the captors,
ould not the court have pointed to
he Constitution to show that such
ases were to be decided by what the
ourt believed and decided to be the
aw of nations, and not what Congress
night have enacted in the premises?
And might not the court further say,
'We sit here to preserve the peace of
nations, to compel the observance of
reaties and the administration of pub-
ic laws between independent sover-
eignties; and we cannot, even at the
idding of one or both of the other de-
partments of our Government, decide
the law as they would have it or make
it; but we must decide it as it is."

Again, it is a remarkable fact that just at the time Mr. Seward was endeavoring to induce the sovereignties of Europe to exempt the private property of belligerent enemies at sea from being made prize of war, just at the same time the honorable Senator from Illinois and others were endeavoring by a congressional enactment to make the private property of enemies on land (which had been exempt long before by international law) lawful prize of war! I doubt whether the friends of any government ever before showed such a want of consistency as in this instance, when they were struggling to bring about such different results.

Mr. Trumbull. The Senator from Pennsylvania, I suppose, does not mean to misrepresent me. I never attempted on this floor to maintain a proposition to change the laws of nations. By the laws of nations, from the beginning of time, the persons and property of the enemy were at the control of the conqueror.

Mr. Howard. By the laws of war.

Mr. Trumbull. By the laws of nations in reference to war, of course.

Mr. Howard. The laws of war as recognized by nations.

Mr. Trumbull. That is international law.

Mr. Cowan. I do not know whether the honorable Senator is aware of it or not, but I assert here that he is trying to make a law to seize the real estate of belligerents as such, to condemn and confiscate it as prize of war, and to do all that I call adding a new provision to the laws of nations and of war. If you take an enemy's private ship at sea it may be condemned as prize by the laws of nations, but if you take an enemy's private plantation, it cannot be forfeited as prize under those laws. They are defective in that respect; indeed they say expressly it cannot be done, and that the title is the same after the conquest as before. This is the difficulty the honorable Senator is trying to remove, and in doing so, if he succeeds, he must repeal (or violate) the laws of nations, and enact a new and different rule here. He says himself that he claims the right to do this on the same grounds precisely that he has a right to shoot a rebel on the field of battle; that is, that it is a war right. Now war rights are regulated by the laws of war, which, as he has well said, are the "laws of nations in reference to

war." The truth is, he is trying to do that which is forbidden by the laws of war and by the Constitution also, if it were attempted as municipal law. Nothing can be clearer than this, and he may just as well submit to these limitations first as last. Let him read the latter, if he wants to know what he may rightly inflict upon rebels as citizens for violating their allegiance, and let him read the laws of war for what he may do to them as public enemies. At present I am for confining myself to these latter strictly. I think we are bound to make war according to the rules they furnish us, and I would as soon think of transcending them, or violating them, as I would think of trampling a statute under foot. The crime is the same in both cases, for both are laws of the land.

The true question is, can we make prize of war of the real and personal estates of those who have been engaged in this rebellion, and can we forfeit their real estates absolutely? We have seen that we cannot do this by due process of municipal law; can we do it by virtue of the laws of war as settled by civilized and Christian nations? I answer, that we cannot; that there is to-day no conflict of authority whatever on the question; there is no book that treats of it, or a chapter devoted to it, which does not lay down the rule that we cannot, — all for the best reason in the world, namely that we can make war far more successfully by not being able to exercise any such power.

Now, as the authorities for this position have been so often quoted *in extenso* to the Senate, I shall content myself with referring to Wheaton's International Law, 596, 597; Vattel, book 3, chapter 9, section 13; Klüber, part 2, title 2, section 2, chapter 1, sections 250–253; Halleck, 789.

The Normans violated this law when they made the conquest of England, and, by confiscating the lands of the Saxons, kept the realm in a state of chronic rebellion for generations; and Saxon outlaws, in revenge for this spoliation, infested the forests and highways, setting the laws at defiance. England herself violated it again, when she made the conquest of Ireland, and that country continues in a condition little better than revolt even at this day, almost every estate being surrounded even yet by the descendants of its former owners, and only awaiting a successful rebellion to assert their claims. Other countries have furnished similar examples for thousands of years, showing how dangerous and impolitic it is to confiscate the titles of the nobility only, without going the length of this bill, which would strike at the homesteads of the great masses of people. In the first case, a single great landed proprietor in each county might be driven from his estates; while in the last, thousands would be rendered outlaws and desperate by depriving them of their homes. Surely at this day no one can expect anything but endless feud as the result of such a measure.

The honorable Senator from Illinois has said, and the honorable Senator from Michigan has backed him, that in all time, from the beginning, the persons and property of the conquered have been at the control of the conqueror. I beg leave, Mr. President, to dissent. To assert such a proposition, is to deny the existence of international law, because if the will of the conqueror is the law, then that is equivalent to saying there is no law at all; it is going back to barbaric times when there was no public law, when the cry was *væ victis*, and the victor did what he chose.

I assert, however, that the victor cannot lawfully now do what he pleases with either the persons or property of his victims. Can he kill his prisoners? Can he sell them into slavery? Surely not. And no more can he lawfully take from them the title to their lands, or touch in any way their private property, except as matter of necessity; and all this for the benefit of the conqueror even more than for the conquered, because every

ıe conversant with war and the his-ry of war, knows that the more rictly it can be confined to a struggle etween State and State, and between ıe armed combatants of such States, ıe more easily will the object of it be tained, — that object in all wars be-g "peace." While, on the other ınd, if it be carried on so as to in-olve the population of the State in-ıded, to exasperate and imbitter them outrages either upon their persons property, then peace is impossible. ere, too, we may learn why private ersonal property at sea still continues able to seizure in war, because to ke it does not exasperate and imbit-r the contest as plunder on land ways does. Besides, the former is ound in ships which may be taken by ıe captor and carried into port, and ommitted to the care of an officer till ıe proper court determines the law-ılness of the prize, all of which is npossible, or nearly so, in the case of oods and chattels on land. These ıtter indeed have never been called rize of war, but "booty" or "plun-er," names which of themselves indi-ate that they were spoils which could ot very well find their way into the ublic treasury, and were, besides, not f much avail in enriching the soldiers, ho were always more debauched and ıjured than benefited by them.

But what, Mr. President, has been he consequence of this theory of con-iscation to us, — this doctrine that ar has no law but the will of the ictor? Have we derived benefit from t, or injury?

Now, sir, I believe that one of our ost disastrous blunders in the man-gement of the war, was in attempting o organize and legalize this immense ystem of plunder against the people f the rebellious States, under pretence hat the avails of that plunder would o into the Treasury, and pay the xpenses of the war. Nothing could ave been more unwise and impolitic, nd nothing could have resulted worse, even to the Treasury itself.

The first result was, to alienate our friends in those States, by making their property a something to be taken rather than protected, because every one knows that officers and agents would not discriminate much in favor of that loyalty which obeys the Government for the time being, and which lives in constant dread of the usurper if it disobeys him, and in constant fear of the legitimate government unless it openly resists him. They would just as likely plunder such a one as they would one of the real traitors, and such we have found to be the fact. Scarcely a man comes to us from those States, who does not report himself the victim of a double oppression; first he is plundered by the rebels because he yields to them a sullen and reluctant obedience; then, when the Union army should come to his rescue, it usually comes only to plunder him still more for having obeyed them at all. In this way we have lost most of the support we might have had there, which was invaluable to us in restoring the Union.

Again, the effect upon our armies and their officers has been most mischievous. They have been tempted away from their proper errand of liberating the people from the usurpers, and of winning them back to their allegiance by giving them that protection which is reciprocal to it, and they have gone after cotton and plunder. Have we not seen, day after day, as the result of this, that, and the other expedition, that a great quantity of cotton had been brought in? Indeed, the enemy seems to be almost lost sight of in the presence of this potent commodity, unless he chooses to interrupt the trade in it by inflicting a defeat upon us.

Our officers in the mean while have been confederating with "army sharks," and sharing with them in the accursed spoil till all that was noble and manly in their natures is gone in the mad race for plunder. And the common soldier was also taught to stain his hands and harden his heart in this unholy license, till, his honor gone, defeat was no more a disgrace.

Mr. President, nothing can be so painfully humiliating as to refer to the condition of things which is acknowledged to prevail in many places in the occupation of our armies. War is terrible at best, when all the humane and softening influences are brought to bear for its amelioration, but when law is disregarded, restraints are broken down, and the lessons of centuries forgotten, it becomes a scourge without anything to redeem it from execration; and in return for all this what have we gained? I assert that not a dollar has really come into the Treasury from it, if the accounts are fairly stated.

Another and worse result has been that we have been by this measure hindered, and perhaps prevented from attaining the object for which we struggle, the restoration of the Union, and, by imitating the barbarous policy of the rebels, we have been aiding them in their wicked enterprise.

It is easy to see that their policy and ours ought to have been entirely different; our mission was to restore a Union, theirs to destroy it; ours to reclaim and conciliate angry and excited populations, theirs to widen the breaches and aggravate differences; so that if in any case we imitated their barbarities we were really playing into their hands. It is one thing to put down a rebellion, and another and quite different thing to excite and maintain one. To achieve the former requires the humane genius of a Hoche, whereas to insure success in the latter nothing is better than to oppose it with the diabolical cruelty of an Alva.

Let the rebels themselves answer how this idea of wholesale confiscation has helped their cause. It did for them what they could not do for themselves; it made them united and desperate against us. Thousands and thousands of their people, who had been constrained to bow the knee to the Baal of disunion, now enthusiastically minister at its altars, because of our folly in threatening to confiscate their property. Indeed, I cannot conceive of anything more hurtful to our cause than to say to the people of the South, "If we succeed in suppressing the rebellion we will confiscate the estates of all those who have been engaged in it."

Mr. Wade. Give them a premium for rebellion.

Mr. Cowan. The honorable Senator from Ohio thinks that to refuse to confiscate would be a "premium for rebellion." So thought the world in barbarous ages; but the honorable Senator is a lawyer, and it has been in the line of his reading, so that he must know that the very reason why the old and barbarous rule was abolished was because it operated as a premium to rebellion; while the new rule, forbidding forfeitures and confiscations, has proved a bounty to loyalty and fidelity, — a guarantee of future reconciliation and peace.

Now, I know it is pretended that this law is only to apply to the case of actual traitors, but it is not so; it includes in its terms thousands and tens of thousands of persons who could not possibly be convicted in any court of the crime of treason, because it assumes a fallacy, and that is in this, that all are traitors who hold office under the Confederate States, and all those who refuse to lay down their arms after sixty days' notice by the proclamation of the President. This is not true in fact or in law.

Now, what is the law? In making this inquiry we need not go further than to Blackstone's Commentaries (volume four, page 77), where a very brief compend may be found of the common law as it has always prevailed in England; and it may be remarked here that the Statute of 11 Henry VII., chapter one, was only declaratory of the common law, which excuses the obedience paid to a king or government *de facto*: —

"When, therefore, a usurper is in possession, the subject is excused and justified in obeying and giving him assistance; otherwise, under a usurpation, no man could be safe, if the

wful prince had a right to hang him r obedience to the powers in being, the usurper would certainly do for sobedience. Nay, further, as the ass of the people are imperfect dges of title, of which in all cases ssession is *prima facie* evidence, the w compels no man to yield obedience that prince, whose right is by want possession rendered uncertain and sputable, till Providence shall think to interpose in his favor and decide e ambiguous claim; and, therefore, ll he is entitled to such allegiance by ssession, no treason can be commit-d against him."

Here, then, is not only the common w, but the common sense of the case. could not be otherwise to merit the ame of law, and it only remains to quire as to the fact.

Let us go back a little, and see. At e commencement of the rebellion ore than one half the people of the onfederate States were opposed to the cession movement, and, wherever ey had an opportunity to express eir will, a majority in almost every tate voted against it. I think it can-ot be disputed that there was a ma-ority for the Union in every State ex-ept perhaps in South Carolina. How hen, it may be asked, was the will of hat majority set aside and contro-ened? I answer, by the fraud and orce of the secessionists, who had so anaged that before this time they ere in possession of all the depart-ents of the government in all the lave States except Delaware; Mary-and, where they had only the legisla-ature; Kentucky and Missouri, where hey had the governors but not the egislatures; and in all except those amed, having the machinery of the tate governments in their hands, they ere able, by means of that machinery, o put the Federal Government out of ossession of their several States, and t the same time to put it out of the ower of that Government for the time o give that protection to the people which they had a right to expect from t, and which was the consideration of their allegiance due to it. What position did that leave them in? What were they to do? They had no means of resisting their State governments, because those governments had not only the insignia of power over them, but they had the means of enforcing it. What did they do? Just what everybody in all times heretofore has done in like circumstances; they obeyed the governments in fact existing over them, and they looked for relief to the Government of the United States, the only power to which they could look, and which was bound by the Constitution which created it to repel invasions and put down rebellion in the several States. What did that Government do? Did it go immediately to their rescue, and punish the usurpers? Not at all, sir. The then President, Mr. Buchanan, was of opinion that he had no right to interfere between them and their State governments, and he and his Congress did nothing whatever to assert their supremacy or to deliver the people who had been overborne, but remained inactive till the expiration of his term, 4th March, 1861, a period of three months.

Now, what were these loyal men to think of this? Does any candid man think it was treason if some of them during that time had reconciled themselves to secession, had accepted office under a rebel State, nay, or had even assisted in organizing the confederacy? How were they to know whether the new administration of Mr. Lincoln would come down and help them or not, especially as it took several weeks itself after it got in before it was able to decide the question? And yet, sir, these are the men who are to be considered as felons under this act, and to have their estates forfeited absolutely because they did not without organization, without leaders, without arms, indeed without even authority, fight against their State governments, and stand up for their connection with the Federal Government, when that government had allowed itself to be ignominiously expelled without striking a

blow for them; nay, when it had gone off giving them notice they were to expect no relief from it. Would it have been very strange if, when that government came back with its offers of protection, these loyal men had said, "It is too late; you left us when we most needed you, and now when we have made our peace and formed new relations, we will not return to you?" Surely, they might have said this to Mr. Buchanan with great force and propriety.

Well, Mr. Lincoln's administration having resolved to discharge its constitutional obligations by putting down the rebellion, had it any right to expect these people to return to their allegiance till it was in a condition to protect them? Was it not first bound to make that return perfectly safe before it could hope for any assistance from them? They were then in the toils of the confederacy, and to ask them to refuse obedience to it before we were in a condition to keep them from being hanged for that refusal, would be asking rather more that human nature is able to grant. When, then, were we able to protect them? was it after Bull Run, after the repulse before Richmond, after Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, or indeed after any of the terrible and sanguinary battles in which we have strugged to regain our supremacy? Have we not in some instances induced them to come to us after a temporary success, and then left them again to the tender mercies of the rebels?

I think, Mr. President, that our course in regard to these people has been of a character entirely the reverse of that which would have been successful in suppressing the rebellion. We were filled with incorrect ideas of the work we were engaged in, or of the only methods by which we could perform the gigantic task we had undertaken. We started out with exaggerated notions of our own strength, and we disdained to think that our success depended upon the loyal men of the South; we thought we did not need them, and treated them accordingly. Think of such a proposition as that contained in this law, that if they do not lay down their arms in sixty days they will be punished by loss of their estates! How, pray, are they to lay down their arms? Surely we know enough to know that this is mere mockery, and that the rebel president might as well expect a soldier in our armies to lay down his arms upon a promise of his protection.

Mr. President, I have sometimes doubted whether we could be serious when we expect any good results to come from such measures as this, which not only exposes us to ridicule, but does harm to our cause. What was wanting in this crisis of our history, with new criminal legislation, when the code was complete before? We had a statute punishing treason with death, a just and proper punishment, one well according with the magnitude of the crime as well as with the majesty of the law which inflicted it. For all those who conspired the dismemberment of the Republic, who used the means and perverted the State governments to bring it, this is the fitting punishment, because it is the highest, and falls upon the guilty alone, where it ought. I would have had no additional laws; in war they are not needed. I would have contemplated no reforms within the area of the rebellion; they cannot be made at such a time. What we wanted was men and money; these granted, the true function of Congress was over until peace was restored and all parties again represented. But, above all things, I would not have played into the hands of the enemy; I would not have done that which the rebels most desired to have done, because I have no doubt that this and all kindred schemes have been the very ones which they most wanted us to adopt. I do not know that Jefferson Davis ever prays; but if he does, I have no doubt he would pray——

Mr. Wade. Pray for just such an advocate.

Mr. Cowan. Pray for just such a atesman as the honorable Senator om Ohio, the most effective ally he ver had or could have.

He would have prayed for measures n our part which were obnoxious to l people of the South, loyal and dis-yal, union and disunion. He would ave prayed that we should outrage all eir common prejudices and cherished eliefs; that we should do these things y giving ourselves over to the guid-nce of men whom it was part of their eligion to hate; to hate personally and y name, with an intensity rarely wit-essed in the world before. He would ave prayed for confiscation, general nd indiscriminate; threatening as well e victims of the usurpation as the surpers themselves; as well those we ere bound to rescue as those we were ound to punish. Fervently he would ave prayed for our emancipation laws nd proclamations as means to fire the outhern heart more potent than all hers; they would rally the angry pop-lation to his standard of revolt as if ch had personal quarrel. He would en have a united South; while as e result of the same measures a dis-acted and divided North.

That is the way, I think, he would ave prayed and would pray now. Is ny man so stupid as not to know that e great desire on the part of every bel is to embark in revolt with him e whole people of the disaffected dis-icts? Is not and has not that been nsidered enough to insure success to m? And where does history show e failure of any united people, num-ering five or six millions, when they ngaged in revolution? Nowhere; ere is no such case.

What did we do to bring this unity out in the South? We forgot our rst resolve in July, 1861, to restore e Union alone, and we went further, nd gave out that we would also abol-h slavery. Now that was just exactly e point upon which all Southern men ere most tender, and at which they ere most prone to be alarmed and ffended. That was, of all things, the one best calculated to make them of one mind against us; there was no other measure, indeed, which could have lost to the Union cause so many of them. It is not a question either as to whether they were right or wrong,—that was matter for their consideration, not ours,— for if we were so desirous of a union with them we ought not to have expected them to give up their most cherished institutions in order to effect it. Unions are made by people taking one another as they are, and I think it has never yet occurred to any man who was anxious to form a partnership with another that he should first attempt to force that other either to change his religion or his politics. Is not the answer obvious; would not the other say to him, "If you do not like my principles why do you wish to be partner with me? Have I not as good a right to ask you to change yours as a condition precedent?"

So it was with the Southern people; they were all in favor of slavery, but one half of them were still for union with us as before, because they did not believe we were Abolitionists. The other half were in open rebellion because they did believe it. Now, can any one conceive of greater folly on our part than that we should destroy the faith of our friends and verify that of our enemies? Could not anybody have foretold we would have lost one half by that, and then we would have no one left to form a union with? We drove that half over to the rebels and thereby increased their strength a thousand-fold.

Is not all this history now? The great fact is staring us full in the face to-day; we are contending with a united people desperately in earnest to resist us. Our most powerful armies, most skilfully led, have heretofore failed to conquer them, and I think will fail as long as we pursue this fatal policy.

Now, Mr. President, I appeal to Senators whether it is not time to pause, and inquire whether that policy which has certainly united the Southern peo-

ple in their cause, and which quite as certainly has divided the Northern people in their support of ours, ought not to be abandoned at once. Why persist in it longer? Can we do nothing to retrieve our fortune by retracing our steps? Can we not divide the rebels and unite the loyal men of the loyal States by going back to the single idea of war for the Union; or is it now too late? Have we lost irrecoverably our hold on the affections of our countrymen who were for the Union in 1861 — even in 1862? Is there no way by which we could satisfy them that we yet mean Union, and not conquest and subjugation? And what a difference in the meaning of those two phrases! The first offers the hand of a brother, the second threatens the yoke of a master. Or are we obliged now to exchange the hopes we had of Southern Union men for that other and miserable hope in the negro? Is he all that is left of loyalty in the South, and the only ally we can rely upon to aid us in restoring the Union? Ye gods! what have we come to at last? Either to yield to an unholy rebellion, to dismember an empire, or to go into national companionship with the negro. Is this the alternative to which our madness has brought us?

Mr. President, these things are enough to drive a sane man mad. After all our pretension, all our boasting, how absurd will we appear in the eyes of all other nations if we fail in this struggle! Especially as almost all the measures about which we have occupied ourselves for the last three years have been based upon our success already assumed as a fixed fact. We provided for confiscating the estates of rebels before we got possession; we emancipated slaves before we got them from their masters, and we provided for the disposition of conquests we have not made; we have disposed of the skin of the bear and the bear itself is yet uncaught. All this we have put upon the record; the statute-book will bear witness against us in all coming time; and we cannot escape the consequences if we fail.

Mr. President, our government was intended to be one of law, preëminently of law. There was to be nothing in the administration of it left to the arbitrary will of an individual or individuals. This was its merit, or intended so, *par excellence*. I am for preserving its character in that respect strictly. Let no man, from the President down to the most petty officer, dare do anything, whether to friend or enemy, except as warranted by law. Let us make war according to law, and let us have peace according to law. If we fight a belligerent enemy, let us do it according to the law of nations. If we punish or restrain a refractory citizen, let us do it by the law of the land, by "due process of law." Had we had faith in our Constitution and laws and our people, we had not been in our present condition. Had we made war, and war alone, the loyal people North and South to a man would have been with us. The voice of faction, if not entirely hushed, would have been harmless. The capital of the demagogue would have been worthless, and the nation would have been irresistible. Had we treated the negro as the Constitution treats him, as a person, as another man; had we made no distinction or difference between him and other citizens, we had not aroused against him that tribal antipathy which will be far more likely to destroy him than a false philanthropy will be likely to elevate him in the scale of being. If he was friendly to us, the same use could have been made of him that we have made; we could have enlisted him in our armies now as we have been enlisting him in our navy for long years. We could have received him as a volunteer, if he was able-bodied, without looking to his complexion, and we could have drafted him without inquiring into the relations which existed between him and his master, any more than we inquire into the relations of the white man of

wenty years of age with his parent or is guardian. State laws adjusted all hose questions, but to the United States it made no difference whether ie owed service to individuals or not, ie owed his first duty to the Republic s military service if it was required. All this was lawful, and no loyal man ver did or would have complained of t, kindly done in the proper spirit.

I have only to say in conclusion, sir, hat I hope that the joint resolution will not be repealed, and that this and all kindred projects will fail in the future, for the simple reason that they strengthen the rebels by uniting their people with them, and they weaken the Union cause by dividing its friends and distracting them with unnecessary issues. Let us unite upon the single idea of suppressing the armed opposition to the Government. Let the energies of the nation be devoted solely to that purpose, and success may yet come, if success is possible.

THE HARRISON BAR LETTER.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862.

To the President: — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d instant.

I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose they so much require.

After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ult. in a daily series of engagements, wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both sides.

The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous; that of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday evening the 1st, our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point, our line of defence there being too extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 4 A. M. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued during the entire day, and until the forenoon of yesterday.

The road became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was very great, but the army preserved its *morale*, and would have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to make.

We now occupy a line of heights about two miles from the James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is about three miles long. These heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gun-boats can render valuable support on both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front, we must hold our ground as best we may, and at whatever cost.

Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming numbers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiery exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impregnable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and if so our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we are not beaten in any conflict. The enemy were unable, by their utmost efforts, to drive us from any field. Never did such a change of base, involving a retrograde movement, and under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have lost no guns except 25 on the field of bat-

tle, 21 of which were lost by the giving way of McCall's division under the onset of superior numbers.

Our communications by the James River are not secure. There are points where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and command the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every effort to preserve at least the *personnel* of the army, and the events of the last few days leave no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such reinforcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are shipping our wounded and sick, and landing supplies. The Navy Department should coöperate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the kindest and most efficient manner.

When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we have preserved our trains, our guns, our material, and above all, our honor.

G. B. McC., *Maj-Gen.*

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate at the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought.

I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add what, I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face of my gal-

comrades of the army and navy, who e survived so many bloody battles, and them that their labors and the sacrifice o many of our slain and wounded breth- had been in vain; that we had aban- ed that Union for which we have so n periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether the army and navy or at home, would, I would, hail with unbounded joy the manent restoration of peace, on the basis he Union under the Constitution, with- the effusion of another drop of blood. no peace can be permanent without ion.

As to the other subjects presented in resolutions of the Convention, I need y say that I should seek, in the Consti- on of the United States and the laws ned in accordance therewith, the rule my duty, and the limitations of execu- power; endeavor to restore economy public expenditure, reëstablish the su- macy of law, and, by the operation of a e vigorous nationality, resume our com- nding position among the nations of the th.

The condition of our finances, the de- ci- on of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system; while the rights of citizens, and the rights of States, and the binding authority of law over President, army, and people, are subjects of not less vital importance in war than in peace.

Believing that the views here expressed are those of the Convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibility to be borne should the people ratify your choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I can only seek fervently the guidance of the Ruler of the universe, and, relying on His all-powerful aid, do my best to restore union and peace to a suffering people and to establish and guard their liberties and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

THE MEANEST MAN IN CREATION.

We ask the attention of readers to the owing extract from Judge Abbot's late ech at Boston: —

Let me ask for a moment who these men who denounce those who appeal to the ter part of man's nature? For twenty rs past they have endeavored to destroy Union; year in and year out they have nounced the glorious Constitution — the of our safety, as "a covenant with death l an agreement with hell;" who have uted at and denounced the Union as it s and the Constitution as it is, and these the men who denounce you and me. ey don't want the Union. They are the n who have talked about war, war that o last always, but who never have and ver will risk a hair of their own misera- heads. When they talk of war they an to risk the lives of your children and ne, while they remain at home. They belong to the class you have heard of before, who are willing to sacrifice all their wife's relations, and even consent to sacrifice their first cousins in the war, but not a mother's son of them will even get within the sound of a bullet.

They are the men who get your children and mine under false pretences — not for the Constitution, but for the negro. When they have got of us all they can get, — thank God they can get no more of mine, — their patriotism expends itself in buying negroes, and in sending to Germany for recruits to fight in a war they don't care anything about. Do you — I mean to be plain — do you want to know who is the meanest, most despicable creature, animal — I'll not call him man — who crawls? I'll tell you.

Voices — Wilson! Sumner!

Abbott — Gentlemen, don't call names.

I'll describe a class. It is the man who constantly appeals to the worst passions of our nature; who is constantly urging us to battle, and who has not courage, ability, or capacity to risk a hair of his own head. You think of that, and when you have found such a man, you have found one of the most miserable wretches who crawls. That is one class. There is another. They who are constantly denouncing us if we say a word for peace and Union. If you a these men to turn their pockets inside o you will find them stuffed with "gree backs," the spoils of your industry a mine. They want war because it mea power and spoils. Of course these pate patriots don't want to end the war. The are the men who find fault with us becau we want to restore the Union.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding th laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national go ernment, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that i sue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general go ernment over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government b religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, Nov.* 7, 186

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existin between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mer suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, Jan uary* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions. are so dear to me that I hav willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*. 1861.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with th Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Le ter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization o States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to Pres ident Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected subject to the necessity of military operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor re ceived. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our presen armies. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, Augus* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional sol diers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanen restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *Gen eral McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a tru and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClel lan's West Point Oration.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 9.

SPEECH OF HON. ROBERT C. WINTHROP,

AT THE

Great Ratification Meeting in Union Square, New York,

SEPTEMBER 17, 1864.

I THANK you, fellow-citizens, for this friendly and flattering reception. I thank your honored President for the kind words in which he has presented me to you. I feel glad in being here under the lead of one who, as the gentleman who called the meeting to order well said, has added new honor to a name that was already associated with so much true and tried patriotism, with so much of spotless integrity, and with so much of financial and commercial wisdom. You know me, men of New York—if I may presume to imagine that you know me at all—as a member of the old Whig party of the Union, as long as that party had any organization or existence. (Cheers.) And I cannot help recalling the fact, on this occasion, that among my earliest political efforts, nearly thirty years ago, was a speech in this city against the Democratic candidates of that day. (Applause.) I fear that my faculty of making a speech, or certainly an open-air speech, is somewhat impaired by the lapse of years; but such as I can make is heartily at the service of the Democratic candidates of to-day. I could not find it in my heart to refuse the request of your Committee of Arrangements, seconded as it was by an old and valued friend, whom I knew so long ago as the tried and trusted friend of Daniel Webster, that I would at least be present as a witness of this great demonstration. Nor, being here, can I refuse to respond to the call which has been made on me by your honored President, and to bear my humble testimony to the cause in which you are engaged. It was promised me that I should see the greatest meeting ever held in America; and no one can doubt, I think, that the promise is fulfilled. It is, indeed, a glorious sight, this vast assemblage of American citizens, unseduced by patronage, unawed by power, in the great commercial metropolis of the Union,—itself one of the noblest products of that Union,—all rallying beneath a common banner, all animated by a common resolve; that banner, the Stars and Stripes—that resolve, to do all that in us lies for the rescue of our country from the dangers by which it is encompassed. (Cheers.) You are assembled in Union Square, and I am glad to know that you all intend to

stand square on the platform of the Union. (Laughter and applause.) You are assembled on the anniversary of the day on which the Constitution of the United States received the attesting signatures of its framers; and I rejoice to be assured that you are all resolved to uphold the authority and vindicate the supremacy of that Constitution. (Applause.) Yes, my friends, in yonder city of Philadelphia, which we are glad to remember, in this connection, was also the birthplace of George B. McClellan, (Cheers,) on the 17th day of September, 1787, that sacred instrument was perfected, which has secured union and peace to our land for more than seventy years past, and which, if this day's ratification shall be successfully carried out, may still, I fondly hope and believe, secure union and peace to our land for seven times, or even for seventy times seventy years to come. (Applause.) You are assembled, too, on the anniversary of the day, when the noble candidate, whose nomination you are about to ratify, completed his great work of rescuing the capital of his country from the Confederate hosts by the glorious victory of Antietam. You have not forgotten those memorable days of September, '62, when the fate of our Republic seemed just trembling in the scales, when almost all men's hearts were failing them for fear, and when the gallant McClellan, forgetting the unmerited indignities to which he had just been subjected, — forgetting everything but his country's dangers and his own determination to stand or fall with its flag, — and responding without a murmur, or a moment's delay, to the personal appeal of the President, gathered up the scattered fragments of his brave but broken army, reorganized their shattered battalions as by the waving of a magician's wand, drove back the invaders across the Potomac, and once more secured the safety of Washington and of the Government. (Loud cheers.) I would not disparage the successes which have been achieved on other days and under other commanders. We all remember, with grateful admiration, the splendid victories which have been won, on the land and on the sea, by Meade and Grant and Sherman, by Porter and Kearsarge Winslow and the heroic Farragut, and by so many others of our generals and admirals. All honor to the heroes of Vicksburg and Chattanooga, of Gettysburg and Atlanta, of Mobile Bay, and of the blessed waters, whatever they are called, which at last ingulfed the Alabama; and all gratitude to the soldiers and sailors, by whose brave hearts and stout arms those victories were achieved! But none of them have eclipsed, or even dimmed, the brilliant record of the Army of the Potomac and its leader during those eventful days which ended at South Mountain and Antietam. For that gallant leader it is glory enough that it may be said of him, as the result of that brief but almost miraculous campaign, that, born in the birthplace of the Constitution, he was privileged, by an auspicious and beautiful coincidence, to commemorate its seventy-fifth birthday, by saving the capital of his country. But who of us is not ready to accept the omen, that it is still reserved for him who saved the Capital on that day, to save the country itself at this? (Loud applause.)

And now, fellow-citizens, you have not forgotten that this was the last military service which General McCllellan was permitted to perform in the defence of the Union. You have not forgotten that only a few weeks afterward he was summarily deprived of his command and sent into that retirement from which no patriotic offers of his own, and no persistent solicitations of his friends, have prevailed on the Administration to recall him. But the day is at length at hand when the people of the United States have the Constitutional opportunity and the Constitutional right to revise and reverse the decrees of the Administration; and most heartily do I hope that this one of their decrees, if no other, will be revised and will be reversed. Most

eartily do I hope, that disregarding all onsideration of parties and platforms, nd with the single and simple view of estoring Union and Peace to our dis-acted land, the people of the loyal tates will resolve, by their votes in lovember next, to take up upon their wn shoulders this leader whom the ulers have rejected, and to bear him iumphantly into that same White louse from which the rejection has manated. That, as I understand it, the proposition before this meeting; nd for one, certainly, I gladly avail yself of the earliest opportunity which as been presented to me to express ny approval of it. Young men of lew York, and of the nation, will you ot take it in special charge, and see o it that this is done? The candidate hom we support is eminently a young nen's candidate, — the youngest in ears, I believe, that was ever nomina-ed for the Presidency; but who as won laurels in the field, and hown a discretion and a wisdom in ivil affairs, which would have done onor to the oldest. It ought to be he pride of Young America not only o see that he has fair play and a gen-rous support, but to secure him an pportunity of showing what young nen can do, and are destined to do, in he high places of the land, as well as n the field of battle. (Loud ap-lause.)

And yet let me not seem for a mo-nent, fellow-citizens, to put the great ssues of the approaching election on ny personal grounds. The question efore us is not about candidates, but bout our country; not about the elative claims or merits of Abraham incoln and George B. McClellan, but bout the nation's welfare and the ation's life. (Three cheers for Mc-Clellan.) In whose hands will that recious life be safest? That is the uestion; and I do not forget that it s a question of opinion, on which very man has a right to form, and very man has a right to follow, his wn opinion. I do not forget, either, ow many honest and excellent men, in my own and in other parts of the land, with whom I have heretofore delighted to take counsel in private and in public affairs, have come to different conclusions from my own. But I have not been able to resist the conviction, my friends, that the best interests of the country, and the best hopes of restoring the Union of the country, emphatically and urgently demand a change of administration at the approaching Presidential election. (Cheers.) I cannot resist the conviction, — or certainly the deep and earnest apprehension, — that, if the policy adopted and pursued by President Lincoln and his supporters during the last two years is to be persisted in for four years to come, we shall find ourselves plunged irretrievably into the fearful and fathomless abyss of disunion. I can enter into no detailed discussion of that policy on this occasion, nor can it wisely be discussed on any occasion, in the hearing of our Southern enemies. I can only say, that in my humble judgment it has been a policy calculated to divide and weaken the counsels of the North, and to unite and concentrate the energies of the South; and, beyond all question, it has accomplished that result, if no other. Why, my friends, the all-important end of reëstablishing the Union has been almost shut out of sight, so mixed up and complicated has it been with schemes of philanthropy on the one side, and with schemes of confiscation, subjugation, and extermination on the other. Instead of the one great Constitutional idea of *restoration*, we have been treated to all manner of projects and theories of *reconstruction*. There would almost seem to have been a willingness, in some quarters, to vie with our enemies themselves in discarding and destroying the old Constitution of our fathers. At one time we have had solemn propositions for annihilating whole States, whole systems of States, and blotting out their stars from the national banner. At another we have heard open declarations from the high places of the

land, that we never again were to be permitted to have "the Constitution as it is and the Union as it was." Good Heavens, what else are we fighting for? What other Union are we striving to establish? What other Constitution are we struggling to vindicate? What other Constitution are our rulers and legislators solemnly sworn to support? We might expect such declarations from Rebels in arms against the Government; but who can listen to them from loyal lips, without recalling the warning words of a great English statesman and orator, when he bade us "look with horror on those children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged parent to pieces, and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that by their poisonous weeds and wild incantations they may regenerate the paternal Constitution and renovate their father's life"! Heaven save us from any such regeneration and renovation as that. (Great applause.)

Fellow-citizens, we all know that it was the success of the Republican party, with its sectional organization and its alleged sectional objects, which furnished the original occasion, four years ago, for that atrocious and ungodly assault upon our Government, which inaugurated this gigantic civil war. ("That's so!" Applause.) We all know that the secession leaders of the South, who had so long been meditating the movement in vain, exulted in the election of Abraham Lincoln at that day, — as I fully believe they will exult again, if he is re-chosen in November, — because it supplied the very fuel which was needed for kindling this awful conflagration. That assault upon the Government can never be characterized in terms of too severe condemnation; and, if railing at the rebellion or its authors would do any good this evening, — if it would be anything better than baying at yonder moon, — I would join with you in denouncing it until the vocabulary of condemnation was exhausted. But we all know that the whole North rose nobly up, as one man, without distinction of party, to repel that assault; and that they have sustained the Government, — Democrats, Republicans, and Conservatives alike, — with all their hearts and hands, pouring out their blood and money like water, from that day to this. And the loyal States will continue to sustain the "powers that be" in all their constitutional action, until the end of their term, whatever may be the result of the pending election — not all of them, by any means, as approving the policy of the Administration, but all of them as recognizing its rightful possession of the authority of the Government. But no considerations of loyalty or of patriotism call upon them to go further. ("No," and cheers.) No considerations of loyalty call upon us to prolong the supremacy of a party whose art and part it has so eminently been to extinguish almost every spark of Union sentiment in the Southern breast, and to implant there in its stead a desperate and defiant determination never to be reconciled, never to submit or yield, never again to come under rulers, whom, reasonably, or unreasonably, they have learned so thoroughly to hate. No considerations of patriotism call upon us to renew the official term of an Administration, whose peculiar policy, by inspiring this spirit of desperation and hatred, has rendered the victories of our armies a hundred-fold harder to achieve, and has robbed them of so many of their legitimate results after they have been achieved. For never, my friends, do victories cost so much, and come to so little, as when they are wrung from a foe who has been goaded and maddened to despair. This sort of goading and maddening process may answer well enough for increasing the sport at a bull-fight, but it has certainly involved us in at least one Bull Run. ("Good," laughter and cheers.) And I fear the day is still distant when it will secure us

at sort of victory which we can asonably hope to see followed by nion and Peace.

Nothing could be further from my rpose, in these remarks, than to st the slightest imputation upon the triotism of President Lincoln, or ybody else. No one can doubt that wishes to write his name on the ll of history as the restorer of the nerican Union. It is a title which ight satisfy the most exalted ambi-on. He may well be excused for s eagerness to remain in office until has accomplished the work. He ay almost be pardoned for wielding e enormous patronage and power nich belongs to the Executive in a ar like this, for securing his own mination and his own election, if he ally believes that he can accomplish

And those who are of opinion that is just about to succeed — whether ithin sixty days or ninety days — fore Christmas or after — are right give him their support. We would l support him if we were of their inion, for we want the country ved, no matter who is to have the ory. But President Lincoln is evi-ently looking forward to another tle in the history of the future. He sires to be enrolled as the great Lib-rator of the African race — a glori-us title, also, if it could be legiti-ately obtained. But I greatly fear at in aiming at the second, he has st the first. No man, I think, can elp perceiving, that he is so embar-assed and entangled by his proclama-ons and commitments and pledges regard to slavery, as to be almost capacitated for bringing this terrible truggle to an early and successful rmination. He has contrived to eave a Gordian knot, which he him-lf is unable to untie, and which the ravest and sharpest swords seem thus ar powerless to cut asunder. No one an have forgotten, certainly, that re-ent and most extraordinary manifesto "To Whom it may Concern," in which n reply to the very first sugges-ions of peace, he felt obliged to insert a condition which discomfited his best friends, and rendered all such efforts hopeless.

Fellow-citizens, we need a change of counsels. ("That's true." Applause.) We need a change of counsellors. We need a return to the policy on which the loyal States first rallied so unanimously to the suppression of the rebellion. We must go back to the principles embodied in the resolution adopted by the Congress of the United States, not far from the 4th day of July, 1861, and worthy to have been adopted on that hallowed anniversary itself, — adopted in the Senate on the motion of Andrew Johnson, and adopted in the House of Representatives on the motion of the lamented Crittenden. That terrible repulse at Bull's Run had then just taught us wisdom. Would to heaven that we had not so soon forgotten that lesson! If we had never departed from that resolution—if "ease had never recanted vows made in pain" —I firmly believe that Union and Peace would have been our blessed portion at this moment. You all remember that resolution. It embodied the simple policy of a vigorous prosecution of the war for no purpose of subjugation or aggression, in no spirit of revenge or hatred, with no disposition to destroy or impair the constitutional rights of any State or any section, but for the sole end of vindicating the Constitution and reëstablishing the Union. (Cheers.) That was the policy which would have divided the South, and which ought to have satisfied and united the North. Let me rather say that it was, and is still, the policy, which steadily pursued, under the lead of men against whom the whole Southern heart and mind and soul have not become hopelessly embittered and poisoned — under the lead of men, too, who are not ashamed to avow that readiness for reconciliation which is the highest ornament of the Christian character, and without which we cannot rely on the blessing of God—this, I say, is the policy which thus pursued will again, if anything earthly ever will, unite both

North and South in the bonds of Constitutional fellowship, and exhibit our country and its flag once more in the face of all the world, with "a star for every State, and a State for every star." And what a glorious day that will be, my countrymen, for us and for all mankind! If to yearn for it, and pant for it, and pray for it, be a subject for reproach, as exhibiting too great a willingness for peace, I am the guiltiest man alive. (Cheers.) And how can we hasten that day more effectively than by supporting the candidate who is the very impersonation of the policy I have described? Our noble candidate has enforced and illustrated it a thousand-fold better than any one else can do, in his memorable despatch from Harrison's Landing, in his brilliant oration at West Point, and still more recently in his admirable letter accepting the nomination we are assembled to ratify. (Three cheers for General McClellan.) These are the true platforms for the hour; and not for the hour only, but for all time. ("That's so.") We need no other, and some of us, certainly, can recognize no other. ("They're good enough.") I rejoice to see so many of their noble sentiments and golden sentences emblazoned on the countless banners and illuminations around me. Let us cherish them in all our memories and write them on all our hearts.

Yes, my friends, if anybody is disposed to cavil with you about your platform, tell him that Gen. McClellan has made his own platform, and that it is broad enough and comprehensive enough for every patriot in the land to stand upon. Tell him that you should as soon think of holding Gen. McClellan responsible for not taking Richmond, when he was so rashly interfered with, and so cruelly stripped of his troops on the right hand and on the left, as you should think of holding him responsible for any equivocal, or any unequivocal, words of Chicago Conventions or of any other conventions, which malicious partisans may attempt to pervert to his injury. Tell him that you should as soon think of the brave Army of th Potomac having been frightened fro following their gallant leader to th field by the Quaker guns on the roa side, as of his supporters for the Pres dency being scared from their positio by any paper pellets of the brain, wis or otherwise, which ever came fro the midnight sessions of a Resolutio Committee in the hurly-burly of National Convention. (Cheers.)

General McClellan, I repeat, ha made his own platform, which ough to be satisfactory to everybody. Hi letter of acceptance, especially, ough to be hailed with delight and with gra itude even by those who are too fa committed in other directions to giv him their support. (Applause.) It i worth an army with banners to th cause of the Union. It has the clario ring to rally a nation to the rescue. I speaks, too, in trumpet-tones to ou deluded brethren in rebellion, warnin them that there is to be no cessation o hostilities upon any other basis tha that of Union, but proclaiming to them that the door of reconciliation an peace is open on their resuming thei allegiance to the Constitution and law of the United States. And, certainly my friends, that letter of acceptanc has turned the flank of his revilers a handsomely as the gallant Sherman has turned the flank of Hood at Atlanta. (Laughter and applause.) It has taken away every pretext for those indecent and unjust insinuations against the patriotism and loyalty of all the opponents of the Administration, which have fallen from so many ruthless partisan pens, and from so many reckless partisan tongues. It has destroyed every pretence for the imputation, that there is a party at the North, ready for a precipitate and ignominious abandonment of the great struggle in which we are engaged, and willing to entertain propositions incompatible with the restoration of the Constitution and the Union. The Union — "the Union at all hazards" — is as distinctly the whole import of George B. McClellan's letter of the 8th of September, as "the Union

any event" was of that Farewell ldress of George Washington, whose omulgation is so nearly associated th the day on which we are as- mbled. "The Union, — it must be eserved" — is as clearly the maxim McClellan in 1864 as it was of An- ew Jackson in 1832. A Democratic esident saved the Union then, and I lieve a Democratic President can ve the Union now. Let us rally, en, to the support of that great prin- ple of unconditional Unionism, which common to Washington, Jackson, and cClellan. Let us go for the flag, the hole flag, and nothing but the flag. Cheers.) Let us vindicate the rights free opinion, of free speech, of a free ess, and of free and unawed elec- ons (loud cheering), even in a time civil war, and show to all the world at we are, and still mean to be, a free people. (Voice — "We mean to be.") Let us bring no railing accusations against the patriotism of others, and let us treat all which are brought against our own patriotism with the contempt and scorn which they deserve. Let us furnish all the men and all the money which are required for the aid of our gallant defenders in the field, and bear the welfare of our soldiers and sailors ever uppermost in our hearts. And as we throw out our McClellan banners to the breeze, let the word still and ever be, alike to friend and foe: "The Union is the one condition of peace. We ask no more. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards."

Mr. Winthrop closed amid loud applause, followed by "three cheers for the speaker."

HENRY CLAY.

XTRACT FROM A SPEECH OF THE HON. HENRY CLAY, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE SUBJECT OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY 7, 1839.

"Sir, — I am not in the habit of peaking lightly of the possibility of dis- olving this happy Union. The Senate nows that I have deprecated allusions, n ordinary occasions, to that direful vent. The country will testify, that, if here be anything in the history of my ublic career worthy of recollection, it is he truth and sincerity of my ardent de- otion to its lasting preservation. But ve should be false in our allegiance to it f we did not discriminate between the maginary and the real dangers by which t may be assisted. Abolition should no onger be regarded as an imaginary dan- ger. The Abolitionists, let me suppose, ucceed in their present aims of uniting he inhabitants of the Free States as one nan, against the inhabitants of the Slave States. Union on the one side will be- get union on the other.. And this process of reciprocal consolidation will be at- ended with all the violent prejudices, mbittered passions, and implacable ani- mosities which ever degraded or deformed human nature. A virtual dissolution of the Union will have already taken place, whilst the form of its existence remains. The most valuable element of union, mutual kindness, the feelings of sympathy, the fraternal bonds, which now happily unite us, will have been extinguished forever. One section will stand in menacing and hostile array against the other. The collision of opinion will be quickly followed by the clash of arms. I will not attempt to describe scenes which now lie happily concealed from our view. Abolitionists themselves would shrink back in dismay and horror at the contemplation of desolated fields, conflagrated cities, murdered inhabitants, and the overthrow of the fairest fabric of human government that ever rose to animate the hopes of civilized man. Nor should these Abolitionists flatter themselves, that, if they can succeed in their object of uniting

the Free States, they will enter the contest with a numerical superiority that must insure victory. All history and experience proves the hazard and uncertainty of war; and we are admonished by Holy Writ, "that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong." But if they were to conquer, whom would they conquer? A foreign foe? one that had invaded our shores, insulted our flag, and laid our country waste? No, sir; no, sir. It would be a contest without laurels, without glory, — a self, a suicidal conquest, — a conquest of brothers over brothers, — achieved by one over another portion of the descendants of common ancestors, who, nobly pledging their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, had fought and bled, side by side, in many a hard battle on land and ocean, severed our country from the British crown, and established our national independence.

The inhabitants of the Slave States are sometime accused by their Northern brethren with displaying too much rashness and sensibility to the operations and proceedings of Abolitionists. But, before they can be rightly judged, there should be a reversal of conditions. Let me suppose that the people of the Slave States were to form societies, subsidize presses, make large pecuniary contributions, send forth numerous missionaries throughout all their own borders, and enter into machinations to burn the beautiful capitals, destroy the productive manufactories, and sink into the ocean the gallant ships of the Northern States. Would these incendiary proceedings be regarded as neighborly, and friendly, and consistent with the fraternal sentiments which should ever be cherished by one portion of the Union towards another? Would they excite no emotion, occasion no manifestations of dissatisfaction, nor lead to any acts of retaliatory violence? But the supposed case falls far short of the actual one, in a most essential circumstance. In no contingency could these capitals, manufactories, and ships rise in rebellion and massacre inhabitants of the Northern States.

"I am, Mr. President, no friend of slavery. The Searcher of all hearts knows that every pulsation of mine beats high and strong in the cause of civil liberty. Whenever it is safe and practicable I desire to see every portion of the human family in the enjoyment of it. But I prefer the liberty of my own country to that of any other people; and the liberty of my own race to that of any other race. The liberty of the descendants of Africa in the United States is incompatible with the safety and liberty of the European descendants. Their slavery forms an exception — an exception resulting from a stern and inexorable necessity — to the general liberty in the United States. We did not originate, nor are we responsible for, this necessity. Their liberty, if it were possible, could only be established by violating the incontestable powers of the States, and subverting the Union. And beneath the ruins of the Union would be buried, sooner or later, the liberty of both races."

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August 30, 1862.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 10.

ADDRESS OF

HON. GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS

AT PHILADELPHIA, SEPT. 30, 1864.

ENTLEMEN OF PHILADELPHIA: —

Some of you have done me the great onor to invite me to deliver an address here on the present state of the ountry, and the issues involved in the pproaching presidential election. The omination of General McClellan to he presidency by the Democratic par-y, affords to me an ample reason for omplying with your invitation. For nany long and weary months it has een my constant hope that the Amer-can people would come at length to ppreciate and sympathize with his haracter, and would perceive how his ublic principles are identified with he welfare of the country and the afety of its institutions. There is a easonable prospect that such a condi-ion of the public mind respecting this listinguished man will be reached; eached in spite of malignant detrac-ion, in spite of official oppression and ersecution, without the slightest sac-ifice of his personal dignity, without shadow of change on his part, and hrough the simple power of a true nd upright character to vindicate it-elf. My estimate of him is not, so far as I can perceive, the mere result of personal regard, or of narrow habits of observation. Having known and lived with persons of marked character all my life, I do not see any sufficient reason for mistrusting my own judgment in this particular instance, and I do not imagine that anybody can suggest any good reason why I should not publicly express it.

It is now eighteen years, or more, since I first met General McClellan, for a single evening, in a domestic circle in New England, where he had come to attend the marriage of one of his kindred. He was then a young lieutenant in the army, recently graduated from West Point; alert, full of intelligence, and impressing all whom he met by a remarkable combination of spirit and modesty. But from that time I had not particularly observed him, until my attention was suddenly arrested by a very striking opinion and prediction concerning him, uttered by a veteran officer of the army, of high rank and great experience, who has been long retired, but who had followed the career of McClellan, as he

has the careers of all the men who have been educated at West Point for the last forty years, with the closest observation. This gentleman, whose authority in all military affairs stands very high, was asked by a friend, in the summer of 1861, at the time when it began to be rumored that General Scott, from his increasing bodily infirmity, might be obliged to retire, who there was that would be fit to take General Scott's place? He answered immediately, "General McClellan, who is now fighting his way through Western Virginia. If *he* is put at the head of the army, the government and the country will be safe."

From that period until General McClellan was removed from all active service, for no assignable or creditable reason, I followed his course with the strongest interest, and when he came to the city of New York to reside, in the early part of the winter of 1862–3, I sought to renew our acquaintance, and have since been honored by his friendship. The opinions, therefore, which I have formed concerning him, are not founded solely upon observation of his public acts or writings; although there is but little need to put forward the judgments of private intercouse. General McClellan's qualities as a man and a statesman stand before the world upon tests which all intelligent persons can apply. His accomplishments as a soldier are by no means the limit of his powers. A broad, capacious, and cultivated intellect, well instructed in the principles and history of our institutions; a great faculty for calm and wise thinking; a solid judgment; a power of self-control that has been tried by greater and worse provocations than even Washington was subjected to, and that has proved as strong as Washington's; a sagacity in perceiving the characters of men, which will insure him, I confidently predict, from unworthy influences, strong religious principle, entire purity of life, and fervent patriotism — these are some of the characteristics of a man who, still under the age of forty, has a wider personal popularity than any other living American. How strange it would be now, that a great party has named such a man for the highest office in the land, and has assumed his public principles as its policy, if he were not to be the choice of a majority of the people! How strange it *is*, that such a man should be the subject of gross misrepresentation and misconception! One hears, occasionally, from persons otherwise intelligent, an amount of prejudice concerning General McClellan, and a degree of credulity equal to the reception of the most monstrous fabrications, that are so astonishing that one is tempted to ask how such persons can have acquired such impressions or what their modes of forming their opinions can be. But the influence of party over the mind is too old a thing to need elucidation, and the arts by which the unscrupulous make use of that influence have not been invented for this particular era. It will be a good proof of our intelligence and virtue, as a people, if we shall now break that influence and defeat those arts.

Notwithstanding my great personal regard for General McClellan, I certainly would not vote for him, or urge others to do so, if I believed that there was the slightest danger of his proving, in the office of President, to be anything but the firm and independent man that I conceive him to be. In my opinion, there is no ground whatever for any apprehension on this point. I do not indeed think that his independence is of that quality that will lead him to disregard the counsels of the wise and the good; but I firmly believe that it is of a quality that will prevent the counsels of those who are not wise and good from ever approaching him. If any man labors to bring about Gen. McClellan's election in the expectation that he can thereby accomplish any selfish personal scheme, or any public plan or project that is not as comprehensive as the Union, and as beneficent as the Constitution itself, in my judgment he will make a great mis-

e. If any man shall refrain from ing for him in the belief that his ministration will be influenced by y person or persons in whom the ple of this country ought not to fide, such a man will also, I believe, atly err.

I know how difficult it has been de for the American people to ieve in public virtue. Private or rsonal virtue we can believe in. t our politics have been so degra- d by tricks of deception, our politi- ns have so often compelled the peo- to distrust them, — that when a n, placed suddenly in a conspicu- s and responsible position as a can- date for our suffrages, is called upon declare his principles, one of our st impulses is to regard what he ys, as a snare for our votes. This a miserable habit, but it is not with- t its causes. All I can do to coun- act it in this instance is, to tell u frankly what I think about Gen- al McClellan's letter accepting the mination, and about the man who ote it.

Be good enough, then, to remember e thing, that General McClellan, ile he has the perceptions, qualities, d knowledge of a statesman, is not politician. He has never been ac- stomed to practice the arts by hich elections are carried, and I do t believe that he ever wrote a line his life for mere political effect, or e that did not express his honest nvictions. His letter accepting the mination was written to give to the eople of this country his ideas of the inciples on which a national admin- tration ought, in this crisis, to be nstituted; and to state the princi- s on which it must be constituted y *him*, if he is to be the next Presi- ent. That he will be likely, under ny "pressure," to pursue any other ourse, or that he will ever be found to ave said one thing and to do another, have no shadow of apprehension.

Of course it was impossible for him o do anything more than to lay down he general principles that must guide him, if he is placed in the high office to which he has been named. But if you will take that letter and examine it carefully and without prejudice, you will find that it states the only policy by which there can be any hope for a reunion of the whole people of this country under one flag and one government, — the flag and the government of the United States. It is very easy for this man or that to find a particular fault, or to pick a particular flaw in it; but if any man will take his pen in his hand and sit down to state a course of policy that can give peace to this country, and at the same time reëstablish its government over the whole of its territory, he will find that if he varies essentially what is contained in that letter, he will have introduced or omitted something, the introduction or omission of which an enlightened and sound judgment must pronounce to be, in all human probability, absolutely fatal to any prospect of success. So at least, it has appeared to me. Knowing as I did, that when the nomination came, the answer to it would emanate directly from the mind of a man who had calmly surveyed the whole field of our national troubles, who has now been for some time removed from the immediate turmoil of public affairs, who has kept himself aloof from political entanglements, who has neither asked or desired political preferment, and who has at the same time watched from day to day and with a careful eye the military and the political aspects of this great civil war, I was prepared for a wise and well considered response. I was not disappointed. To me, under all the circumstances of the nomination, considering the various and conflicting views which our opponents attributed to the several parts of the great party which nominated him, — the firmness, the candor, and the precision of his answer stand as the surest guarantees of his own future course, and of that of the party whose leader he has become. If the American people cannot so re-

gard it, I know not where, or how we are to find the qualities that shall "give the world assurance of a MAN."

It is a remarkable evidence of General McClellan's intellectual powers, that he not only perceived, at the very first, the magnitude and character of the military struggle that was about to take place between the two great sections of this country, but that he comprehended the civil relations of the federal government to the people of the revolted States more accurately, and with a wider grasp, than most of our statesmen. That his views were so correct and so extensive, must be regarded, when we consider his age, as quite extraordinary. At the beginning of the war he was just five and thirty. Where else was there a man of that age in the United States whose opinions, respecting the character and relations of this great civil dissension, which had sundered an empire, would bear to be tested by the true theory of the institutions of the country? Between the opinion that there could be *no* coercion of the people of a revolted or seceded State, and the opinion that the federal government could throw off all the restraints of the Constitution and proceed to subjugation, there was certainly a middle ground of reason and of law. That ground General McClellan occupied from the first. Before the two houses of Congress had declared that ground in the resolution which the Republican Administration and its party afterwards so signally and fatally deserted, he applied it in all his military conduct in Western Virginia; and after he arrived in Washington, in August, 1861, and proceeded to form the Army of the Potomac, and to lay out a great campaign, the very first paper which he submitted to his official superiors, and all his orders and instructions to his subordinates, show what his conception was of the only lawful and constitutional theory on which the war could be waged by the government of the United States.

His view appears to have been this. The government of the United Stat is a government of direct and sovereig powers, granted to it by solemn cessi of the people of each State. It h therefore a right to put down all mi tary or other forcible resistance to t exercise of its constitutional powers any State. But it can have no right acquire by force powers which have ne er been conferred upon it by the Cons tution, and which cannot be exercis under the Constitution; and it ca therefore never treat a State, or t people of a State, as if they had forfei ed their right of self-government those matters to which the Constit tion of the United States does not e tend. Taking this just and accura view, he appears to have entertain the hope that after the Southern armi had been defeated, the people of t seceded States would find it most e pedient to abandon their plan of a se arate government and resume the constitutional obligations. But in o der to aid this tendency, if such a te dency could be developed in the Soutl he saw very clearly that a humane, ci ilized, and just policy toward the pe ple of those States was absolutely e sential to success; and having bee educated in the high principles wit which modern civilization surroun the exercise of war by Christian nation and recognizing the fact that this co test had taken the proportions of great war, he strove, in all that he di and all that he inculcated, to impre such a policy upon all its operation Nay more, he strove to impress tha policy upon the action of the gover ment. It is all embodied, as yo know very well, in the celebrated lett which he addressed to President Li coln from Harrison's Bar.

When Mr. Lincoln received that le ter he had in General McClellan an er tirely disinterested and patriotic advis er. When the President made up hi mind not to pursue such a policy a General McClellan recommended, bu on the contrary to pursue a directly op posite course, forced upon him by wha he himself described as the "pressure

a faction of his own party, he not
ly surrendered to the judgment of
s contemporaries and of history the
sdom of his act, but by his subse-
ent conduct toward General McClel-
n he surrendered to the judgment
mankind his own character for mag-
nimity and justice. Whatever might
his opinion, or the opinion of others,
specting General McClellan's views
the conduct of the war, *he knew* that
eneral McClellan had served him as
e head of the government, and had
rved the country with perfect fidelity
d honor, and that both President and
ople owed to that general a large
bt of gratitude. Yet he has permit-
l General McClellan to be pursued
his partizans with an almost unpar-
eled malignity, when he might at
y time have stopped the current of
traction. The power which a Presi-
nt of the United States can exercise
er his party organs, and that portion
his followers who are most prone to
ack the character of others by un-
rupulous defamation, is as great as
e power of any monarch over his
urtiers; and when that power is not
ed to restrain and rebuke such defa-
ation in the case of a man eminent-
conspicuous and important to the
untry, it is a just and proper infer-
ce that the power has not been exer-
ed because he who holds it is willing
at the injury should be done. Be
e verdict of posterity, therefore, what
may, respecting the wisdom of Mr.
ncoln's rejection of General McClel-
n's policy, and his removal from com-
and, it will be held hereafter as it
ust now be held by all unprejudiced
inds that, as an impartial ruler and
as a just man, Mr. Lincoln owed it
the country, to himself, and to the
neral who had so faithfully and truly
rved both, to protect that general's
putation from attacks which he knew
be malicious, and from imputations
ich he knew to be unfounded. This
ty he has entirely failed to perform.
et it was a duty plainly incumbent
on him, both as a man and as the ex-
utive head of this nation.

But I did not come here to discuss the personal relations of the two men who are now the representatives of two opposite parties, and on the election of one or the other of whom the weal or the woe of our country is, as I believe, to depend. I wish to state the issues, and to state them fairly, in an appeal to your reason and intelligence; and I wish if possible to clear those issues of all irrelevant matter. In this effort, my first duty is, to state the Democratic policy, as represented by the candidacy in which General McClellan stands before the country, according to my conception of his position. Of course, I look for that position where the country looks for it, in General McClellan's letter accepting the nomination.

I beg you not to think that it was merely out of regard to his own consistency that General McClellan made the answer which he did make to the Chicago nomination. Consistency is a very important thing to a man who has a great reputation at stake, and whose usefulness depends upon the preservation of the public respect for his steadiness of character and purpose. But there are duties incumbent upon a patriot which are at least as great as the duty of personal consistency, and one of those duties in addition to the duty of being consistent, General McClellan has performed most nobly on this occasion, and to my entire satisfaction as I hope it will prove to yours also.

All will agree, who are not ready to court vast public dangers, that the preservation of the Constitution of the United States is, or should be, the object of all our efforts. To me it appears very clearly that for both sections of the Union, for the South as well as for the North, the Constitution affords the only means by which we of the North can restore the Union, or by which they of the South can reënter it.

It cannot be doubted that the Constitution is in the greatest possible peril. On the one hand, it has been so wrenched out of its appropriate working and its true meanings by those who have for four years been charged with its adminis-

tration, that great numbers of men have been made to feel that instead of being the best it is the worst government on earth. On the other hand, there are those who, despairing of the attainment of peace under the forms of the Constitution, which they have seen perverted as they believe, into the means of prolonging the war, and promoting disunion have turned their thoughts to other methods, and have forecast in various modes of reconstruction, some new arrangement of our national existence, that would imply a new national government. Sectional ideas and interests, other than those which mark the distinctions between North and South, begin to intrude themselves among these discontents. Men in the West speculate upon its relations with the East and with the centre. Men in the central States look upon both sides of them, and are reflecting on the relative strength and importance of the ties which go eastward and westward. All are uneasy and anxious about the particular relation of their own or of some other section to the causes and differences which produced, or which still keep open, this great schism that has separated the South from the rest of the Union. Meanwhile, the burden of taxation is settling down upon the whole people with a terrible weight, and men begin to realize the magnitude of a public debt which they fear is already beyond the just resources of the country to pay, for which they can see no limitation ahead, and which is expressed in a fluctuating currency — the most demoralizing of all the financial conditions into which a nation can be thrown.

Every reflecting person will admit, then, that here is a state of things which imposes upon any man who has a part to play in public affairs a very stringent duty — the duty of defending and preserving that CONSTITUTION, which not only forms the existing bond that now holds us together as a people, but which affords the only possible means by which we can reach any improvements in our system without revolution and its attendant risks of anarchy, as it is, in my judgment, the only means by which we can win back to the national fold the members who have gone astray from it.

These considerations, then, will be allowed by all reasonable men, as furnishing a sufficient ground for insisting that the just authority of the federal government shall be preserved, and that whatever modifications are hereafter to be made in our national system they must be made according to the forms and method which the Constitution prescribes. I hold this to be a principle absolutely essential to the safety of our American institutions. I have lived through one scene of revolution enacted, to be sure, on a small scale, and in a community in which I was interested only as a near neighbor, in which it was attempted to make a new government by substitution, without resorting to the sanction and consent of the existing government to the proposal of change; and I never wish to see a repetition of that process. I allude, of course, to the case of Rhode Island and its civil war. I have, indeed, read elaborate discussions, in which a process of making a new Union outside of the methods of amendment, provided for by the Constitution, have been worked out on paper; but I have never seen one which was not marked by a fatal *hiatus* — that did not leave open a door through which anarchy would be almost certain to enter; or one that did not necessarily admit itself to be a revolution.

There is, therefore, in my opinion, a very important principle, as well as sound policy, involved in the position taken by General McClellan. That position is that the Southern States shall return to the Union; and that if they do so we will receive them and guarantee to them all the rights which the Constitution has ever secured to them. Is there anything unreasonable in this requirement, anything which will be likely to cause the people of the South to reject it when it shall be proposed to them by a great popular vote of the

North which shall remove the present administration from office? Let us see.

The people of the South must see, as well as we do, that when a popular government like that of the United States has been in operation for nearly eighty years, resting upon certain principles which have made a powerful nation out of a feeble confederacy, while it has a perfectly well-defined method of meeting all requirements of change, cannot be set aside with safety, for the purpose of making another system by mere substitution. They, as well as we, require for national safety a principle that is able to make a vigorous nationality strong enough to cope with any external enemy that the world can present to us; but we cannot preserve the power and attitude of a great nation, if we are to set aside that principle, and go into the formation of a new confederacy by agreement of the two sectional parts of that nation. The hazards are too great, and the people of both sections ought to see that it is neither necessary nor wise to incur those hazards. The Constitution we can amend, in its orderly and regular method, if it requires amendment, but we cannot set aside the principle of union which makes us a nation, and which is as essential to their welfare and safety as it is to ours.

These truths I expect to see the people of the South recognize, if we can furnish them with the evidence that we require nothing more of them than their return to the Union. The Democratic party, speaking through General McClellan, has done all that it can do, at present, to give this assurance. If the people of the North will sanction this policy by their votes, and the people of the South really desire peace and reunion, this long and bloody civil war can be brought to an honorable and successful termination. It is plain, however, that one of the first things to be done hereafter will be to ascertain if the people of the South desire to return to the Union, and to promote as well as we can, without compromising the authority of the Federal Government, any existing wishes of that kind.

The great misfortune of the case and what creates the chief difficulty, arises from the character and conduct of Mr. Lincoln's administration. It is an administration which does not appear to have had any course of action that could be dignified with the name of a policy. It has lived from hand to mouth on a series of expedients. No one connected with it has been able to hold out to the South a steady, consistent system based on a correct constitutional theory of the war, and leading to a simple and definite constitutional end. This is the reason why multitudes of men in the North have not been able to support Mr. Lincoln's prosecution of the war, and why there has been no Union party in the South. Measures lying wholly outside of the Constitution, or at least lying wholly within very debatable ground, have been resorted to *in terrorem* for the purpose of being used as auxiliary to the exercise of military force — such as the sweeping edicts of confiscation and emancipation, and the plans of the President for making constructive States within the domains of the States now claiming to be seceded from the Union. The consequence of all this has been to convince the people of the South that the triumph of the military power of the United States involves the loss of all their property, and the destruction of that principle of our system which makes every State the uncontrolled regulator of its domestic institutions. So much for the past. A new drama now opens.

Mr. Lincoln is a candidate for rëelection; and we have under his own hand, since he became a candidate for rëelection, a direct, authentic, and perfectly plain declaration of the conditions on which he will consent to receive the people of the South back into the Union. It is in these words:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON July 18, 1864.

To whom it may concern: —

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, *and the abandonment of slavery, and*

which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I have no right to impute to Mr. Lincoln purposes which he has not expressed, or reservations which he has not made. I have seen a great many ingenious explanations written by his political friends, to show how the President did *not* say that he would *not* receive and act upon other propositions which he did *not* mention. But I think if I were to read that paper to a jury of twelve intelligent men, who knew the subject to which it relates, and were to ask them to infer from it that Mr. Lincoln did not mean to make the abandonment of slavery *one* of *three conditions* on which he is willing to have a restoration of the Union, I should provoke a very significant smile. As plainly as the English language can speak, he couples together "the restoration of peace," "the integrity of the whole Union," *and* "the abandonment of slavery," as the three things which must be presented to him in one proposition, by the power that now controls the Southern armies. A proposition, he says, embracing these three things, will be met by the executive government of the United States — *how?* By liberal terms on those three points? Not at all; they will be met by liberal terms on "*other* substantial and *collateral* points." The language is carefully framed to exclude the idea that there can be any more liberality about the point of slavery than about the restoration of peace and the integrity of the Union. The one is as much a fixed purpose with Mr. Lincoln as the two others. He knows that both sections of the country have so understood him, and to this day he has never uttered a word to correct that impression. We are bound to believe that he does not wish to correct it.

Here then is a position which "goes a whole bar's length" beyond the reservation to the supreme court of the question what *has become* of slavery in the progress of the war. Speaking in a paper addressed to every man on earth who can read English and has any concern in knowing his views, and dealing at the same time with the restoration of peace and the preservation of the integrity of the Union, Mr. Lincoln makes a positive requirement of the abandonment of slavery as an essential feature of any proposition on which he will treat. He did not mean to "palter in a double sense." He meant to be understood. He has been understood. The issue is made up between him and the Democratic party, on this point. If he changes that issue he comes over to us, so far as this matter is concerned. For, my friends, let it be observed that the Democratic party, speaking through General McClellan, its candidate, while it demands the restoration of peace and the integrity of the Union, has not made the condition of the abandonment of slavery essential either to peace or Union. There can be no mistake about General McClellan's position any more than about Mr. Lincoln's. We ask, says General McClellan, nothing but the Union. We, says Mr. Lincoln demand with the Union the abolition of slavery. You of the South, says the one, can come into the Union as you were before you left. You can come into the Union, says the other, but you must abandon slavery before your proposition to return can be considered.

Now let us inquire calmly, which of these courses of action is likely to give peace to this country; present and lasting peace. For the attainment of Mr. Lincoln's object, it is but rational to suppose that absolute and complete subjugation of the white race is essential. It is not within the limits of probability, that the people of the Southern States will *consent* to abolish slavery at our dictation, until the white race there is so reduced that its consent will be practically unimportant, and will therefore cease to be necessary. The consequence will be that you will have on your hands, for government, a country

as large as Europe, in which the whites will be unwilling, if they are able, and unable if they are willing, to coöperate in carrying on civil government. You must govern the country by the sword until you can introduce a new white population, and even then you must constantly interfere to settle the question as to which race is to be the predominant one. The result must be substantially a state of war for generations, or a reduction of vast portions of our country to a condition resembling that of other countries in which African slavery has been improvidently and summarily abolished. That we could make such a country pay the cost of governing it, no rational being can suppose; and that we ourselves can pay the taxes requisite, is just as far from being a rational conjecture.

Mr. Lincoln, I think, before he committed himself to such a course, should have considered where he was carrying the public credit of the United States. The financial scheme on which his administration has been managed has made the property of every man in this country, even that of the depositors in our savings banks, dependent for its value upon the safety and redemption of the public debt. If this war is to be conducted for the object propounded by Mr. Lincoln, that debt is absolutely illimitable, and must consequently become worthless, without any distinct act or acts of repudiation. If, on the other hand, we can have by a change of administration, a definite and constitutional end before us — if peace and reunion on the basis of the Constitution can be secured — the Democratic administration can address itself to the financial measures necessary to protect the public credit, by husbanding its resources, and by a vigorous application of economy to the public expenditures. That it will do so is morally certain, for no political party can, under any conceivable circumstances, assume the awful responsibility of ruining a nation and all its people by a voluntary repudiation.

If there is one thing of which the Democratic party has a right to boast, it is its management of the national credit. That credit has never been injured in Democratic hands, and for myself I do not believe that it ever will be, while the continued existence of the Union shall enable us to have any public credit all. But you can destroy the national credit by the same kind of process by which you can destroy the Union, and that is, by embarking in projects for which the Constitution affords you no warrant, and which open expenditures, compared to which all the present cost of this wasteful and extravagant war are as the drop which you can suspend from your finger to the illimitable ocean.

In every possible light in which it can be viewed, I deprecate this requirement which Mr. Lincoln has made a joint condition with the restoration of peace. It strikes at the principle which lies at the basis of the whole Union, and which denies to the federal power, as the representative of even a majority of the people of the United States, the right to dictate local laws and institutions. There are other communities besides those which hold slaves, that are jealous of their rights of local self-government. And, therefore, thankful as I should be if slavery could be abolished by the consent of those whose affair it is, and who can alone deal with the negro wisely and beneficially for him and themselves, I am unwilling to purchase its abolition by putting at hazard that important principle of local self-government. I do not wish to see what remains of the Union subjected to any further strains. I frankly confess my fears of the effect of such consolidation, and just as frankly I avow my belief that its effect on the stability of the Union will be most pernicious. We are a people more singularly situated than any other people have ever been, who have reached a commanding height of national greatness with republican forms of government. By a most happy thought, our fathers devised a means of constituting a nation out of separate

republics, by uniting their inhabitants for certain purposes of government, leaving them for all other purposes independent of each other. What front against the outer world this principle of Union has enabled us to present, I need not remind you. But have you ever reflected upon what it is that preserves constitutional liberty, in our internal condition; what it is that stands as a barrier against the mere physical force of this nation, and protects the rights of minorities and sections from being crushed beneath the same power that can make itself so formidable to the external world? Beyond all question, it is the States, with their separate political rights, their local institutions, their admitted control over their own domestic affairs. Break down these barriers, and one of two consequences must inevitably ensue; we shall either resolve ourselves into a completely consolidated nation, which must of necessity take the form and wield the powers of a despotism, or we shall take refuge against that destruction of our civil liberties, in the formation of sectional confederacies.

Now, whether this result is, or is not to come about, depends in my opinion, upon the clearness with which the people of the United States shall see, and the firmness with which they shall act upon, the requirements of the problem of the restoration of the Union between the North and the South. If, disregarding the principles of the Constitution, and exercising the powers of military conquerors, we demand as conditions of peace things inconsistent with the acknowledged basis of the Union, we shall, if we succeed in exorting those conditions, overthrow the principle that makes Republican institutions possible in so great a country; and then, to avert the final loss of such institutions, we shall in turn destroy the principle that gives us nationality, and disappear from our position among the leading powers of the world. The intrigues that have been and will be set on foot, by foreign influences, to hasten this catastrophe, you can appreciate as well as I can describe them. If, on the other hand, we are wise enough to perceive and follow the safer path, we have a most powerful lever with which to work, in that principle of human nature which the creator of all has implanted in all, and which opens or shuts the reason of mankind according as pride is wounded or is saved. I know how much the sectional passions have been aroused. I know that the people of the North must rise to a great height of magnanimity. But after all, when our own interest dictates the very thing that magnanimity demands, does it require a very great moral effort to reach that temper of mind, which will enable us to see how we can relieve the pride of an adversary and convert him into a friend. This is often the only needful stroke in human affairs, and it is a process of wonderful simplicity and efficacy even in the most imbittered controversies.

There can be no question, as it seems to me, that this administration of Mr. Lincoln stands to-day as a barrier against the reunion of the South and the North. Believing this to be true, I have, as a citizen of the United States, a duty to perform in endeavoring to effect a change. I am bound not to yield to Mr. Lincoln's personal demand for rëelection, when I am convinced that he has made his removal from office necessary. That he himhimself has made this so, is but too apparent from the exaction which he has coupled with the restoration of peace.

Here, then, is exactly where we of the Democratic party stand. We propose no compromise whatever of the authority of the federal government. Our candidate has made this absolutely plain. But we do not admit that Mr. Lincoln has any claim to be for four years longer identified in person with the authority of the government, when we believe that we could have peace if that authority were lodged in the hands of a man who will not make

the condition of peace which Mr. Lincoln exacts. We wish to be rid of that condition which we believe enlists the pride of the South against the authority of the government, and by relieving that pride to save that authority.

This is the simple truth of our position, reduced to an exact issue. But the monstrous claim has been put forward, that Mr. Lincoln, constitutionally elected in 1860, was entitled to rule over the whole United States; and that, as the secession of the Southern States has prevented his so ruling for the first term, it will in some way derogate from the just authority of the government if Mr. Lincoln is not elected for the second term. I wish to have a word or two to say on this claim, to my Republican friends, — to my old *Whig* friends, — whose votes assisted to put into office the author of the rescript "to whom it may concern." I ask you to analyze this strange doctrine, — what there is of it, — and to put it home to your consciences and your intelligence. You and I once belonged to the same political organization, the noble old Whig party of the Union. *You* thought that the Republican party could be put into power without endangering the political institutions of this country. *I* thought otherwise; and so we separated. But wherever we went, we could not unlearn the teachings of the great masters of our political faith. In that school in which we were trained in long years of political success or political adversity, if we learned anything which it became us as American citizens to know, we learned that the elective franchise is to be used, not for the benefit of presidents or secretaries, but for the welfare of our country; and that, when an incumbent of office represents a policy injurious to the country, *he* is to be sacrificed, and the *office* is to be saved, that it may answer the ends of its creation. So plain is this principle of political ethics that it astonishes me to hear any man who ever bore the name of "Whig" advance a fictitious identity between the incumbent and the office, when the question is on the policy which that incumbent pursues.

Why the very name which we wore so long and with so much glory, and which goes back to an era of the grandest memory, puts to shame this slavish doctrine. The English Whigs of 1688 broke the succession to the British throne, because the continuance of the incumbent was incompatible with the public welfare, and made him and his posterity wanderers on the face of the earth until their whole line was extinct. And are we, the American Whigs of the nineteenth century, to act upon a doctrine that would have kept the Stuarts on the throne, because, forsooth, the law gave them a right to expect to reign indefinitely? The Whig doctrine was that the law gave them a right to reign so long as they were fit to reign. I do not mean to admit that our American franchise is to be exercised on any lower principle, especially when its sole effect on the incumbent will be to retire him to private life, to live like the rest of us under the protection of the Constitution and the laws.

Consider, for one moment, where this doctrine, which has been advanced for Mr. Lincoln, inevitably leads you. You yield to this pretension of a personal claim to reëlection, because there has been a rebellion against the authority which, for the time, resided in his person, and you drop your ballot into the box in his favor, when that ballot, deposited for any other man, just as effectually asserts and protects the authority of the office. You thus debar yourself by a fiction from all opposition to any official acts or measures of Mr. Lincoln's administration, and your vote counts in the grand total of sanction which the result, if it is in his favor, will afford to his entire course. You thus forego all your opinions, whatever they may be, on the financial scheme which has given us an inconvertible paper-currency, and unsettled all the legal and moral basis of all pecuniary relations; on the violent

assumptions of an executive authority to seize and imprison citizens without process of law, and in places where no military operations exist; on the suppression of the freedom of speech and of the press; on the interference of military power with the rights of the ballot; on whatever act or principle, or policy, of this administration ought to be passed in review by American citizens, through the only lawful and peaceable means by which such wrongs can be corrected. You will never have another opportunity to express your opinions upon these measures than the one that is now before you; for if Mr. Lincoln is reëlected, the sanction of the American people will have been deliberately placed upon his official acts, and the Constitution will have received at the hands of the people their authoritative support for all the constructions and interpretations which he and his followers and his ministers have undertaken to affix to it. These consequences will manifestly follow, if you adopt and act upon the claim for reëlection that is put forward for Mr. Lincoln on the ground of his personal identification with the authority of the office.

All other claims that can be advanced for him are, I admit, questions of public policy, and are therefore fit to be considered. They resolve themselves into the single question of his capacity to restore the Union. On this question, it seems to me there can be but one judgment passed by intelligent men. He and his supporters put themselves upon this issue, namely: They regard no union as of any value, which is to embrace any slave-holding States. They must therefore either force the Southern States, by war, to extinguish slavery, or, failing in that, they must make a country which will exclude all slave-holding communities. A distinguished Massachusetts senator (Mr. Sumner) has recently expressed the attitude of Mr. Lincoln very forcibly, in these words:

> The President was clearly right when, in a recent letter, he declared that he should accept no terms of peace which did not begin with the abandonment of slavery. ("Good," and cheers.) The Union cannot live with slavery. Nothing can be clearer than this. If slavery dies the Union lives; if slavery lives the Union dies.

Mr. Greeley, too, is equally explicit; for, standing at the head of the Lincoln electoral ticket in the State of New York, he declares

> There is but one obstacle to the American Union to-day, and that is slavery; there is but one peril to the American Union, and that is slavery. We have resolved to put down slavery and restore the Union. (Cheers.) *On that platform we stand.*

Thus the conditions of mortality for the Union appear to be fixed. Still let us hope that before the final doom is pronounced, the people of this country may have a voice to utter. But it must be uttered now or never. When Mr. Lincoln has been reëlected, the *fiat* will have gone forth. He will never be able to retrace his steps; he will never disenthral himself from the control of those who have pushed him on to the point where he must make the success or failure of his arms turn upon his power to force the abolition of slavery. The motto of his next administration has been composed. "If slavery dies, the Union lives; if slavery lives, the Union dies." And as all is to be cast upon this single die, — as all our hopes of rebuilding the Union of our fathers are to depend upon this one issue, and as that issue involves a preordained consequence and a declared purpose, it is written so that he who runs may read, that the independence of the Southern Confederacy is to be yielded, if we cannot by arms extort the abandonment of slavery. What hope or expectation the supporters of Mr. Lincoln can have of the holding together of the West and East after such a result has been reached, I am unable to conceive. For myself, so long as there remains any Constitution of the United States to cling to — that instrument to which I have many times sworn fealty — I shall remember and keep my vows. I am a citizen of the United States, bound to the Constitution of my coun-

try while it lives. But I cannot shut my eyes to the manifest future. I believe that the Constitution will *not* live under the experiment of a Northern United States; and with that Constitution goes all hope of Republican self-government for this country.

There are undoubtedly among those who have hitherto acted with the Republican party, many who are now disposed to pause and reflect. I implore them to consider whither we are tending. In former years, my voice with the voices of others, was raised against your organization, your policy, and your candidates, and fell unheeded. Let all that pass away. I ask no credit to myself or to others for any predictions we may have uttered. I shall ask none hereafter in any event. I only beseech you *now*, now, in the accepted present, in the day of salvation, ere the present has become the future, and we are all alike involved in what that future is to bring — to give to your country your calmest thoughts and your utmost wisdom. Give heed to the counsels of one who has perilled life and reputation on the field of battle in defence of your Union, and who now tells you how it may still be saved, in thoughts and accents that must have struck a resounding chord in your hearts. He has never asked for your suffrages; he wants no place, or power, or dignity. His character seems to have formed itself into one of great strength and moral beauty, by the operation of events upon a pure and patriotic nature. The love of country, impressed upon him when you, oh! city of Philadelphia, gave him in his boyhood to the institution which received him for the Union and trained him to revere its flag — the love of country has been his ruling principle, next to the fear of God. But mark how that love of country has been tempered and enlarged by the great transactions in which he has borne his part. No narrow view of the exigencies of the times has cramped his intellect, no personal wrongs have soured him, no injustice has driven him from his own equipoise, no temptation has led him into the devious ways of the demagogue, no sophistries of his own or of others' coinage have distorted his perceptions of the true principles of our government. He stands to-day in the vigor of life, in military skill, in solidity of character, in varied accomplishments, in wise and sound intellectual habits, and in firmness of principle, the foremost man of his generation in this country; and whatever may be the result of this pending and momentous canvass, his importance to the future welfare of our America will be more and more acknowledged, as such virtues and such capacities become more and more essential to the safety and defence of social order under republican institutions and laws.

As you have done me the honor to ask for my opinions on the issues involved in the approaching election, I close with a recapitulation of what I have said. I believe

First. That this war must be brought speedily to a close, or this country and its inhabitants will be financially ruined. It is impossible *now*, to do more than pay the interest on the accrued debt, if any provision whatever is to be made for a sinking fund to meet the principal.

Second. That the Lincoln policy of war for the extinction of slavery is a policy for an illimitable debt, because it is a policy for a perpetual standing army of vast proportions; and if adopted, that it must render our public obligations and securities worthless, entail pecuniary ruin alike upon government and people, and overthrow the Constitution.

Third. That the McClellan policy of receiving the Southern States back to their places in the Union as they were before they left it, is the only policy that affords the slightest prospect of peace and reunion, with the Constitution preserved, our nationality saved, and the public credit rescued from destruction.

HENRY CLAY.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH OF THE HON. HENRY CLAY, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE SUBJECT OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY 7, 1839.

"Sir, — I am not in the habit of speaking lightly of the possibility of dissolving this happy Union. The Senate knows that I have deprecated allusions, on ordinary occasions, to that direful event. The country will testify, that, if there be anything in the history of my public career worthy of recollection, it is the truth and sincerity of my ardent devotion to its lasting preservation. But we should be false in our allegiance to it if we did not discriminate between the imaginary and the real dangers by which it may be assisted. Abolition should no longer be regarded as an imaginary danger. The Abolitionists, let me suppose, succeed in their present aims of uniting the inhabitants of the Free States as one man, against the inhabitants of the Slave States. Union on the one side will beget union on the other. And this process of reciprocal consolidation will be attended with all the violent prejudices, imbittered passions, and implacable animosities which ever degraded or deformed human nature. A virtual dissolution of the Union will have already taken place, whilst the form of its existence remains. The most valuable element of union, mutual kindness, the feelings of sympathy, the fraternal bonds, which now happily unite us, will have been extinguished forever. One section will stand in menacing and hostile array against the other. The collision of opinion will be quickly followed by the clash of arms. I will not attempt to describe scenes which now lie happily concealed from our view. Abolitionists themselves would shrink back in dismay and horror at the contemplation of desolated fields, conflagrated cities, murdered inhabitants, and the overthrow of the fairest fabric of human government that ever rose to animate the hopes of civilized man. Nor should these Abolitionists flatter themselves, that, if they can succeed in their object of uniting the Free States, they will enter the contest with a numerical superiority that must insure victory. All history and experience proves the hazard and uncertainty of war; and we are admonished by Holy Writ, "that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong." But if they were to conquer, whom would they conquer? A foreign foe? one that had invaded our shores, insulted our flag, and laid our country waste? No, sir; no, sir. It would be a contest without laurels, without glory, — a self, a suicidal conquest, — a conquest of brothers over brothers, — achieved by one over another portion of the descendants of common ancestors, who, nobly pledging their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, had fought and bled, side by side, in many a hard battle on land and ocean, severed our country from the British crown, and established our national independence.

The inhabitants of the Slave States are sometimes accused by their Northern brethren with displaying too much rashness and sensibility to the operations and proceedings of Abolitionists. But, before they can be rightly judged, there should be a reversal of conditions. Let me suppose that the people of the Slave States were to form societies, subsidize presses, make large pecuniary contributions, send forth numerous missionaries throughout all their own borders, and enter into machinations to burn the beautiful capitals, destroy the productive manufactories, and sink into the ocean the gallant ships of the Northern States. Would these incendiary proceedings be regarded as neighborly, and friendly, and consistent with the fraternal sentiments which should ever be cherished by one portion of the Union towards another? Would they excite no emotion, occasion no manifestations of dissatisfaction, nor lead to any acts of retaliatory violence? But the supposed case falls far short of the actual one, in a most essential circumstance. In no contingency could these capitals, manufactories, and ships rise in rebellion and massacre inhabitants of the Northern States.

"I am, Mr. President, no friend of slavery. The Searcher of all hearts

knows that every pulsation of mine beats high and strong in the cause of civil liberty. Whenever it is safe and practicable I desire to see every portion of the human family in the enjoyment of it. But I prefer the liberty of my own country to that of any other people; and the liberty of my own race to that of any other race. The liberty of the descendants of Africa in the United States is incompatible with the safety and liberty of the European descendants. Their slavery forms an exception — an exception resulting from a stern and inexorable necessity — to the general liberty in the United States. We did not originate, nor are we responsible for, this necessity. Their liberty, if it were possible, could only be established by violating the incontestable powers of the States, and subverting the Union. And beneath the ruins of the Union would be buried, sooner or later, the liberty of both races."

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate at the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought.

I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add what, I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded breth-

ren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union.

As to the other subjects presented in the resolutions of the Convention, I need only say that I should seek, in the Constitution of the United States and the laws framed in accordance therewith, the rule of my duty, and the limitations of executive power; endeavor to restore economy in public expenditure, reëstablish the supremacy of law, and, by the operation of a more vigorous nationality, resume our commanding position among the nations of the earth.

The condition of our finances, the depreciation of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system; while the rights of citizens, and the rights of States, and the binding authority of law over President, army, and people, are subjects of not less vital importance in war than in peace.

Believing that the views here expressed are those of the Convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibility to be borne should the people ratify your choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I can only seek fervently the guidance of the Ruler of the universe, and, relying on His all-powerful aid, do my best to restore union and peace to a suffering people, and to establish and guard their liberties and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, *and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States,* and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August 30, 1862.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 11.

MISCEGENATION

INDORSED BY THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

Henry Clay, in September, 1848, when he asked his biographer, Rev. Walter Colton, to write a pamphlet exposing the objects of abolition fanaticism, charged him to show that

> The ultras go for abolition and amalgamation, and their object is to unite in marriage the laboring white man and the black woman, and to reduce the white laboring man to the despised and degraded condition of the black man.

We propose to show that this object has been declared by the Abolition party now in power, and shall prove it, not by mere argument, but by the record of that party in speeches and documents, and through its newspapers. In the course of our extracts, we shall have occasion to give the testimony of Abraham Lincoln, Gov. Andrew, of Massachusetts, Charles Sumner, Henry Wilson, Henry Ward Beecher, Gen. N. P. Banks, Montgomery Blair (Lincoln's Postmaster General), John W. Forney, Hon. Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, Horace Greeley, of the *Tribune*, Harriet Beecher Stowe (author of Uncle Tom's Cabin), Wendell Phillips, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Theodore Tilton, Lucretia Mott, Parker Pillsbury, Sarah M. Grimke, Angelina G. Weld, the Massachusetts Legislature, William Lloyd Garrison, Albert Brisbane, Dr. J. McCune Smith, William Wells Brown, C. C. Burleigh, Seth B. Cole, Lieut. Col. Hoyt, of Kansas, the N. Y. Tribune, N. Y. Times, N. Y. Evening Post, N. Y. Independent, N. Y. Principia, Anti-Slavery Standard, Anglo-African, Bangor Whig, Oswego Times, Leavenworth Conservative, the New York Loyal League, the New York Central Lincoln Club, and other Republican authorities.

Lincoln and the Republican party proclaim, to-day, that the war shall not end until slavery is abolished. So far the country thoroughly understands them. But the question further arises: What is to be the condition of the negro when he has attained his freedom? We fear that the people do not fully realize the answer that Lincoln and the leaders of his party have already made to this question. The occasion of the discussion which elicited many of the expressions of opinion to be quoted, was the publication, in the early part of 1864, of a very curious pamphlet, entitled "Miscegenation." Some conservative Republicans have denied that the ideas which inspired this pamphlet have any wide-spread advocacy in the Republican party. We shall see.

The New York *Tribune*, several months before this pamphlet was published, contained an editorial article of a column, arguing in favor of the equality of the negro with the white, and asserting that diversity is the condition precedent of races on this continent, and their *assimilation* the problem. After the appearance of the pamphlet, it published an editorial concerning it wholly favorable, from which the following is an extract: —

From the *Tribune*, March 16th, 1864.

There is, no doubt, a great prejudice against the black race in the United States; but it is impossible to say *that this is not the result of a cruel and systematic degradation*, and it will continue to be impossible to say this with the least logical accuracy until all traces of the bondage in which the blacks have for nearly two centuries been held have disappeared. Such prejudice is by no means a novelty, nor has it been at all confined to blacks. All Christians in the middle age supposed that Jews exhaled a bad odor from their bodies, and *the marriage of a Jew and Christian at that period would have been far more likely to provoke a mob in any civilized city than the marriage of a white man and a black woman would be now.* There is the simple fact. It is impossible to get around it, or under it, or over it, with the whole copperhead power of wriggle. Now, *the white hatred of the black in this country is precisely of this character.* Delicate people say that it is natural. We answer that it is impossible to prove that it is natural. Of course it is easy to classify its different sources. A man of great refinement may dislike to associate with an ignorant negro as he would with any ignorant man of whatever tribe. A man proud of his purse may scorn a poor negro as he would a poor white man. A man systematically acquiescent in the wrongs and cruelties of society, may shun a negro as he would any unpopular white. A man who has himself been under-estimated may be jealous of any attempt to do justice to others. But we must insist that all this settles nothing except our human inhumanity, — except that in spite of our religious professions, *we do not dwell together as brethren — except that we do not, in spite of our Bibles, believe that God has made all men of one blood.*

It is hard to decide how long this prejudice may continue to influence society; and it will probably continue to be felt long after all traces of it have disappeared from the statute books of all the States. But this thing is certainly clear, that under the Constitution in its most liberal interpretation, and admitting our cherished American doctrine of equal natural rights, *if a white man pleases to marry a black woman, the mere fact that she is black gives no one a right to interfere to prevent or set aside such a marriage.*

If a man can so far conquer his repugnance to a black woman as to make her the mother of his children, we ask, in the name of the divine law and of decency, why he should not marry her?

Horace Greeley, in whose paper this appeared, is to-day the principal elector on the Republican ticket for Abraham Lincoln for the State of New York. For most Republicans, the authority of the *Tribune* is sufficient to decide any question, but we will not stop here.

Next, perhaps, in influence and circulation in the Republican party, is the professedly religious *Independent*, edited by Henry Ward Beecher. The leading editorial article of two columns in the issue of February 25, 1864, was upon the subject of miscegenation, and contained the following language : —

Leaving out of view our native born American of English descent, there are enough of other stocks on this soil to make three other nations, — namely, the Irish, the Germans, and the negroes. Even the negroes number one million more than the whole population of the United States at the adoption of the Constitution. But these three stocks have not come hither to establish themselves as distinct peoples : *but each to join itself to each* till all together shall be built up into the monumental nation of the earth !

Read this again, Irishmen and Germans ! The article continues : —

We believe the whole human race are one family — born, every individual, with a common prerogative to do the best he can for his own welfare; that in political societies all men, of whatever various race or color, should stand on an absolute equality before the law; *that whites and blacks should intermarry if they wish*, and should not unless they wish; that the negro is not to be *allowed* to remain in this country, but is to remain without being allowed, — asking nobody's permission but his own; that we shall have no permanent settlement of the negro question *till our haughtier white blood, looking at the face of the negro, shall forget that he is black, and remember only that he is a citizen.*

The article concludes : —

Whether or not the universal complexion of the human family at the millennium "will not be white or black, but brown or colored," we certainly believe that the African-tinted members of our community will in the future gradually *bleach out their blackness.* The facts of to-day prove this beyond denial. Already three-fourths of the colored people of the United States have white blood in their veins. The two bloods have been gradually intermingling ever since there were whites and blacks among our population. *This intermingling will continue.* Under slavery it has been forced and frequent; under freedom it will be voluntary and unfrequent. But by and by counting the years not by Presidential campaigns but by centuries, *the negro of the South, growing paler with every generation, will, at last, completely hide his face under the snow.*

And the Washington correspondent of the *Anti-Slavery Standard* says that " this article in the *Independent* expresses the views of MOST OF THE INTELLIGENT REPUBLICANS IN CONGRESS upon the subject. Nobody here advocates amalgamation, though doubtless there are very many who believe that, in time, *the two races will amalgamate.*"

The *Independent* of Feb. 4, 1864, contains an extended article on the hero of negroism — Toussaint L'Ouverture — lavish in commendation, warm in eulogium, full of the spirit that pervades the pamphlet, " Miscegenation." At the close occurs this significant

int of what radicalism has in store for "white-kinned but black-hearted citizens": —

They must cease to call unclean those whom God has cleansed; they must acknowledge genius, whatever be the color of the skin that enwraps it; and *they must prepare themselves to welcome to the eadership of our armies and our Senate*, as Southern ubstitutes for Jeff. Davis and his drunken Comus-rew, that have so long bewitched and despoiled is, *black Toussaints, who, by their superior talents nd principles, shall receive the grateful homage of an ppreciative and admiring nation.*

The New York Evening *Post*, which advo-ates Lincoln's reëlection, and the publisher f which, Mr. Henderson, was removed from ffice for corruption and fraud, speaks of it as wrong and pusillanimous policy to exclude he negro from our country, and says: —

We are a more heterogeneous and mixed peo-le than any that ever before appeared upon the arth; more than our ancestors even of Great ritain, and to this mixture we owe much of our eculiar energy, and nearly all our peculiar liberal-y and genial kindness of heart. Nowhere in the orld are there so few invetcrate prejudices of ace, nowhere so few pernicious distinctions of lass, nowhere so many large, just, comprehensive nd beneficent social arrangements, as in the nited States, because nowhere else has there een such a collision, and final commingling of aces. * * Can we doubt that if we are true to he grand opportunities of our position in refer-nce to these poor debased Africans, as well as n respect to the hordes of uncouth foreigners onred upon our shores, we shall not only elevate hem to a higher condition, but produce in our-elves a manliness and sincerity of character, that ill lift the whole nation as far above other nations n moral dignity as it already is in physical ower?

The Twentieth U. S. Colored Regiment, on heir passage through New York city, were resented with a flag and an address by — o quote from the address — "the mothers, ives, and sisters of the members of the New ork Union League Club," which closed as ollows: —

When you look at this flag, and rush to battle r stand at guard beneath its sublime motto, "God nd Liberty," *remember that it is also an emblem of ve and honor from the daughters of this great me-ropolis* to their brave champions in the field, and hat they will anxiously watch your career, glory-ng in your heroism, ministering to you when ounded and ill, and honoring your martyrdom ith benedictions and with tears.

It required only the dittle word "obey," dded to "love and honor," to make this al-nost a marriage contract. But the Loyal eague never presented such an address to hite soldiers. A Republican orator in Jack-sonville, Ill., said, a few months ago, that when the war was over the "brave Othellos of the South would come North and claim their fair Desdemonas."

Charles Sumner, after all the brave deeds and noble sacrifices of our white soldiers, can only see the negro in this war. These are his words: —

Wherever I turn in this war I find the African. If you ask for strategy, *I know nothing better* than that of the slave Robert Small, who brought the rebel steamer Planter, with its armament, out of Charleston, and surrendered it to our Commodore as a prize of war. If you ask for successful courage, *I know nothing better* than that of the African Tillman, who rose upon a rebel prize crew, and overcoming them, carried the ship into New York.

Sumner, in one day, in the last Senate, offered a series of seven resolutions on the slavery and negro questions; presented memorials praying that the right of suffrage may be extended to persons of African descent; introduced a bill to repeal the Fugitive Slave Act, and another to enable negroes to testify in Federal courts. A negro was put in nomination for the office of chaplain at the organization of the last Massachusetts Legislature, and was barely defeated, and Mr. Sumner wrote to some of his friends, expressing his "mortification that the friends of human progress in the Legislature of the Old Bay State had not been more united, and elected a colored chaplain."

If this is "human progress," the world may well pray to remain stationary.

Henry Wilson, in the last Senate, said that "*the black soldier was equal to the white soldier in everything, and superior to him in endurance.*"

Miscegenation was a part of the original purpose of the Abolitionists.

Gen. Banks, when in the House of Representatives, said, "In regard to whether the white or black race was superior, he proposed to wait until time should develop whether the white race should absorb the black, or the black the white." General Banks is now creating rotten burroughs in Louisiana to elect Mr. Lincoln, and he recently issued an order compelling white and black children to mingle together at public schools.

Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, said, in a speech in Boston, in 1860, "Slavery will die out, because the day shall surely be when there will be one whole family of man upon a sanctified earth as there will be in heaven. *But I do not intend to wait for the providence of God to work it out.*"

Hon. Mr. Kelley, of Pennsylvania, in his reply to Mr. Cox's speech on miscegenation, quoted a passage from a work on Central America, in which it was stated that "the great work of practical amalgamation had been going on quietly for generations; that color was considered a mere matter of taste, and that some of the most respectable inhabitants had black wives and mongrel children," and Mr. Kelley added that the incident *purified our minister of some prejudices*, and continued: "Our fellow-citizens of African descent, freed by the rebellion, will not be long in Americanizing this, to them, congenial region, *in which complexional differences do not affect the social or political position of a man*, if we have the sense and humanity to give them a fair chance for culture and enterprise.

Forney, commenting on this in the Philadelphia *Press*, says: "These are practical, and therefore valuable, truths. *They open the way for statesmen to new thoughts and to new preparations for the eternal adjustment of the tremendous issues growing out of the war.*"

Thus all the administration leaders and organs who have spoken of this subject at all, have favored the "sublime mingling of the races." The "new thoughts" and "eternal adjustment," spoken of by Forney, are, of course, miscegenation.

"If anybody wants to marry a negro honestly," says the Bangor *Whig* (Republican, of course), "*let him do it.*"

"The only possible basis of national peace and prosperity," says the Oswego *Times*, an administration organ, "is the recognition *of the equal manhood and citizenship of every race on American soil*, without regard to color, nationality, or previous social condition."

"The slave of yesterday," says the Leavenworth *Conservative*, "the soldier of to-day, must be, will be, the citizen of to-morrow."

The front rank of the Abolitionists, who have always brought the others of the party up to their standard, are over head and ears in miscegenation.

As early as 1863 Wendell Phillips said, —

Remember this, the youngest of you: that on the 4th day of July, 1863, you heard a man say, that in the light of all history, in virtue of every page he ever read, he was an amalgamationist to the utmost extent. I have no hope for the future, as this country has no past, and Europe has no past, but in that sublime mingling of races, which is God's own method of civilizing and elevating the world. God, by the events of his providence, is crushing out the hatred of race which has crippled this country until to-day.

Theodore Tilton followed more boldly, devoting a whole address to the defence of miscegenation, on one occasion, and saying, —

The history of the world's civilization is written in one word, — which many are afraid to speak, and many more afraid to hear, — and that is amalgamation.

Parker Pillsbury, on receiving advance sheets of the pamphlet, wrote, in rapture, to the author: —

CONCORD, N. H., January 10, 1864.

Author of Miscegenation — Care American News Company, 121 Nassau Street, New York: —

Though all unknown to me, I thank you a thousand times for one hasty reading of the sheets you have so kindly and so complimentarily sent.

My testimony can do you little good; indeed, publicly known, might do you more harm than good. But your work has cheered and gladdened a winter morning, which I certainly began in cloud and shadow.

You are on the right track — pursue it; and the good God speed you.

I have long been so confident of the correctness of your philosophy *that I would gladly see our law of divorce so modified as that new marriages among the American races might even now take place* where unfruitful or unhappy unions or (disunions) are recognized.

It may not be time to say this aloud; but it will yet be said, and I think not too soon.

All the mysteries of the wondrous apocalypse now unfolding in our country, are not even dreamed of yet; and I hail your work as a true prophecy.

Pardon my haste, for I am doubly loaded with work; but I am,

Most truly yours to aid,

PARKER PILLSBURY.

Pillsbury is so enthusiastic, that he desires divorces granted so that white men may discard their white wives, and marry negroes instead!

Angelina G. Wild and Sarah M. Grimke write to the author, —

We are wholly one with you in opinion as to the result and the desirableness of the result which is inevitably before our country.

Lucretia Mott writes to the author, —

It was an early and bold step in the Massachussits Anti-Slavery Society to petition for the repeal of the law making intermarriages of the races a crime and penal offence. By their persistency this repeal was effected.

Albert Brisbane writes to the author, —

My opinion is that the different races now existing on the earth are but the roots, the rude elements of a future and perfect race.

Dr. J. McCune Smith writes to the author, —

I am willing to put my signature to your doctrines.

William Wells Brown, another negro, and particularly liked by the Republican party, says, —

This rebellion will extinguish slavery in our land, and the negro is henceforth and forever to be a part of the nation. His blood is to mingle with that of his former oppressor, and the two races blended in one will make a more peaceful, hardy, powerful, and intellectual race than America has ever seen before.

The call for the Anti-Slavery Convention, last year, — of which Garrison, who now supports Lincoln earnestly, and the motto of whose life has been, "The Constitution is a league with death and covenant with hell," — ends as follows : —

Let the approaching anniversary, therefore, be well attended by the tried men and women, whose purpose it is still to continue the great moral struggle until before the Constitution and laws all are made free, and *complexional distinctions are unknown*.

In behalf of the Executive Committee,
WM. LLOYD GARRISON, *President.*
WENDELL PHILLIPS, } *Secretaries.*
CHARLES C. BURLEIGH, }

The *Anti-Slavery Standard* published a long and complimentary notice of "Miscegenation," saying, —

The future must decide how far black and white are disposed to seek each other in marriage. The probability is that there will be a progressive intermingling, and that the nation will be benefited by it. We are sure that many will agree with us in finding the pamphlet interesting and instructive, and in thanking the unknown author for it.

The New York *Principia* (Rep.) says of the argument in the pamphlet, —

It needed not one tithe of it to prove that God has made of one blood all nations of men, endowed them with equal rights, and that they are entitled to all the civil and political prerogatives and privileges of other citizens.

The pamphlet, "Miscegenation," is eloquence, poetry, and romance, compared to some of these expressions of men who have led and still lead the Republican party. The pamphlet lays down the precise platform upon which the Republicans must stand if they carry out their theories. It is to the party to-day what Helper's book was a few years ago. The Republicans, when we quoted from that book, stoutly denied that it represented their views. To-day it is behind the age, and "miscegenation" takes its place, flaunting its banners of "progress" — progress toward anarchy and towards a war of races, as well as a war of states. The subject is disagreeable to talk of; but abolition and civil war were disagreeable to talk of five years ago; yet, if the nation had been better warned of the dangers that lay in its path, a different spirit might have actuated the people, and compromise might have preserved to us peace and prosperity.

Some idea of this pamphlet may be obtained from its table of contents, which is as follows : —

1. Physiological Equality of the White and Colored Races; 2. Superiority of Mixed Races; 3. The Blending of Divers Bloods essential to American Progress; 4. The March of the Dark Races Northward; 5. The Mystery of the Pyramids — The Sphynx Question Answered; 6. All Religions derived from the Dark Races; 7. The Type Man a Miscegen; 8. Love of the Blonde for the Black; 9. Present and Future Relations of the Irish and the Negro; 10. The Mistake of all Religions and Systems of Education; 11. How the Anglo-American may become Strong and Comely; 12. The Miscegenetic Ideal of Beauty in Women; 13. Secret of Southern Success; 14. Heart Histories of the White Daughters of the South; 15. All our Victorious Battlefields baptized by the Blood of the Negro; 16. Progress of Public Opinion and National Policy towards Miscegenation; 17. The Bloods of all Nations find their Level: 18. The Future — No White, no Black; 19. Miscegenation in the Presidential Contest; 10. An Omen.

To those who desire to obtain the pamphlet for reference or argument, as showing the logical conclusions of Republican teachings, it may not be out of place to mention that it will be sent to any part of the country by addressing E. P. Patten, 35 Park Row, New York city, and enclosing the price: one copy, thirty cents; five copies, one dollar. We invite especial attention to chapters 9, 16, 18, and 19.

Harriet Beecher Stowe, the author of "Uncle Tom's Cabin," introduces into a later novel, written by her, as the principal characters, a mulatto man and woman, to show the benefit of a mixture of bloods.

Ralph Waldo Emerson, who detracts from his fame by writing abolition articles, thinks the negro is better than the white man. He writes of the negro, —

He has avenues to God,
Hid from men of Northern brain,
Far beholding, without cloud,
What these with slowest steps attain.

That is to say the negro has the avenues straight to the throne of God, while the white man labors to attain it with slow and weary steps.

Henry Ward Beecher said, in reference to colonization, in one of his sermons: —

What! Drive out the colored people from among us? I would sooner that these two hands undertake to uproot and cast out every shrub, bush, and tree that grows between this and the Rocky Mountains.

The answer to the question "What will you do with the negroes when they are freed?" has always been, "They must be placed on an equality with the white, side by side with the white laboring population, with no prejudice of race working against them, and no right denied them."

In the *N. Y. World* of Sept. 23, will be seen the description of a scene at the Rooms of the Central Lincoln Club, in New York city, of which Charles S. Spencer is President. After a Lincoln mass meeting, addressed by the United States District Attorney, and other Lincoln orators, who dwelt largely on the wrongs of the black race, their superiority, and their natural and physical capacity for the highest enjoyment, the floor was cleared for a negro ball: —

In came the colored belles into the Twenty-third Street Republican headquarters, arrayed in all that gorgeous and highly colored, not to say highly scented, splendor for which the dark daughters of the Æthiop race are æsthetically distinguished. One might pick out all colors among the hundred and fifty belles who soon tripped in on the light fantastic toe over the floor of the Republican grand council chamber. Some of them sat on the platform, or picked their bouquets to bits on the rostrum, sacred but half an hour before to Lincoln eloquence and the theory of miscegenation; while others, seized by eager partners, whirled round in the dizzy waltz, displaying all that extravagant voluptuousness and wriggling of figure for which the dancing African female is so remarkable. Some of the bells were octoroons, to suit we suppose, the love-sick glances of Republicans as yet only in the vestibule of the great miscegenation church. Others were of the quadroon type; others yet mulattoes, of great vivacity and variety of tint; while not a few were of the pure Congo or Bozoo character, black as the ace of spades, and ready for any work from shaking a carpet to talking philosophy and humanitarianism with the most perfect possessor of the Lincoln creed.

On the floor during the progress of the ball were many of the accredited leaders of the Black Republican party, thus testifying their faith by their works, in the hall and headquarters of their political gathering. There were Republican office-holders, and prominent men of various degrees, and at least ONE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTOR ON THE REPUBLICAN TICKET.

The *Tribune*, of two or three months previous, gave a description of a meeting at New Orleans, of negroes, largely interspersed with white men and women from the North, and addressed by white Abolitionists, in which the writer devoted much of his space to the portrayal of the beauty of the mulatto ladies present. In a speech before a Loyal League Club in Brooklyn, reported in the *Brooklyn Eagle*, June 30, Hon. Seth B. Cole accounted for the good fighting qualities of the Southern people by the fact of their association with the negroes.

The New York *Tribune* of Feb. 24, 1864, in referring to a remark in Congress, of Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, that it was the interest of the country that black men should be employed in the war to save the blood of white men, responded, that "it is equally for the interest of the country that *white men should be employed, because it will save the blood of black men,*" and on another occasion the *Tribune* said that Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, need have no personal fears of the social and political equality of the blacks, for no statute could ever raise him to their level.

After all the teachings we have quoted, it is no wonder the negro began to consider himself a better man than the white man. The *Anglo-African*, the negro organ in New York, has a sharp attack upon Elizur Wright, because he presumes to say that the negro has not as much virility as the whites. It says, —

No, friend Wright, you need not disturb yourself about the black man of these United States; he has a good standing color, and an abundance of endurance; just brush some of those knotty cobwebs from your brain and look at him: *tall, brawny, and well-limbed, sound-brained as God made him, a man and a brother. You sharp-nosed, hatchet-faced, lank-haired people,* aided by science and the "hub," have vainly tried to crush the manhood out of him, and failed; do give him up; you cannot *lie* him out of his manhood. *He is a better man and a better citizen than you or your race "ever dare be," under any circumstances, in all climates;* if not, why do you cut down his equal chances? Why shut your eyes to facts? Bluff Ben. Butler, the other other day, started on a forced march of some two or three days. He had two white and two black regiments of infantry. He was in a climate, moreover, "favorable to the whites." How was it when they arrived *there?* One-half the white soldiers had straggled, exhausted, on the road — *every black soldier* answered to his name at roll-call. Pshaw! Don't "fool" any longer. If you want this rebellion wiped out *take three hundred thousand of our blacks; give us Ben. Butler or let us go alone, and in sixty days the South will be wiped out.*

Here is what Lieut. Col. Hoyt, a Western radical, wants the negroes to do: —

I hate the South to-day, not only as my enemy, not only as the enemy of my Government, but as the enemy of all mankind. I hate her piratical institutions, which rob men of their manhood and women of their virtue. I hate her history, and I hate her traditions, for upon all I behold the unwashed stains of that unavenged blood extorted by the lash of the slave-whip. *I have believed, I still fondly believe, that the sun of another Saint Domingo may rise upon her, and a million of Toussaint Louvertures, clad in the habiliments of war, and with vengeance written on their faces, with one desperate and triumphant stroke, dash in pieces the accursed South.* Are Kansans proud to own John Brown, of Ossawatomie? I, for one, say, in the whole history of this State there is nothing reflecting such lustre as the citizenship of the gray-haired martyr of Harper's Ferry.

Hon. Montgomery Blair, Mr. Lincoln's Postmaster General, in his speech at Rockville, Md., during the cabinet imbroglio, thus unequivocally charged his associates in the cabinet and in the party, with the attempt to bring about practical miscegenation: —

The Abolition party, while pronouncing philippics against slavery, seek to make a caste of another color by amalgamating the black element with the free-white labor of our land, and so to expand, far beyond the present confines of slavery, the evil which makes it obnoxious to Republican statesmen; and now, when the strength of the traitors who attempted to embody a power out of the interests of slavery, to overthrow the government is seen to fail, they would make the manumission of the slaves the means of infusing their blood into our whole system, by blending with it '*amalgamation, equality,* and fraternity.' The cultivators of the soil must then become a hybrid race, and our government a hybrid government, ending, as all such unnatural combinations have ever done, in degraded, if not abortive, generations, and making serfdom for the inferior caste, — the unmixed blood of the conquered race inevitably asserting a despotism over it. To facilitate this purpose, a concerted appeal is now made to the people of the free States through the press, to open the way to this daring innovation, beginning in the Southern States, unhappily now brought under the ban of the Calhounite conspirators. With this view, it is proposed to declare the State governments vacated in that section when they are restored to the Union, and all the loyal men of the South, whom the treason of Presidents Pierce and Buchanan, in complicity with Southern traitors, has subjugated, are to come under absolute submission to the representatives of the Northern States in Congress without the vestige of a State right, a State law, or constitution to protect them; nay, not even the franchise of a vote to send a solitary representative to the legislative body to which their destiny is to be committed.

The New York *Times* (Rep.), of March 26, says of this miscegenation: —

It may readily be imagined that it is with great reluctance that we speak out our minds in this matter. But we have no hesitation in saying that if we had at the outset conceived it possible that hostility to slavery would ever have led to wholesale intermarriage with negroes, or of all marriageable Republicans and their sisters, that party should never have received any countenance or support from this journal. We owe it to ourselves and posterity to say that the odious matrimonial arrangements, into which so many of those whose opinions on certain great questions of public policy we have hitherto shared, have taken us wholly by surprise.

Mr. Lincoln is as much an aider and abettor of the Abolitionists in this new policy of miscegenation as he has been in their policy of emancipation. He will go wherever they push him. Hear Frederick Douglas's account of his visit to the White House: —

I have been down there, said he, to see the President, and, as you were not there, perhaps you may like to know how the President of the United States received a black man at the White House. I will tell you how he received me, — just as you have seen one gentleman receive another (great applause), with a hand and a voice well balanced between a kind cordiality and a respectful reserve. I tell you I felt big there. (Laughter.) Let me tell you how I got to him; because everybody can't get to him. He has to be a little guarded in admitting spectators. The manner of getting to him gave me an idea that the cause was rolling on. The stairway was crowded with applicants. Some of them looked eager; and I have no doubt some of them had a purpose in being there, and wanted to see the President for the good of the country! They were white, and as I was the only dark spot among them, I expected to have to wait at least half a day; I had heard of men waiting a week; but in two minutes after I sent in my card the messenger came out, and respectfully invited "Mr. Douglas" in. I could hear in the multitude outside, as they saw me pressing and elbowing my way through, the remark, "Yes, damn it, I knew they would let the nigger through," in a kind of despairing voice, — a peace Democrat, I suppose.

In an address to a bogus association calling itself the Working Men's Democratic Republican Association, from New York, Mr. Lincoln took especial pains to place working negroes and white men on an equality. Said he, in his turgid and awkward way, —

None are so deeply interested to resist the present rebellion as the working people. Let them beware of prejudices, working disunion and hostility among themselves. The most notable feature of the disturbance in your city, last summer, was the hanging of some working people by other working people. It should never be so. The strongest bond of human sympathy outside of the family relation should be the one uniting all working people, of all nations, tongues, and kindreds.

"Some working people by other working people," means negroes by white men, and the President suggests that the white man should love the negro better than any one

except a relative, and where such a love existed, of course he might possibly, in time, become a relative.

We have room for no more extracts, but these are sufficient.

The attempt to raise the colored race to a social equality with the white must result in a conflict of races and the annihilation of the negro. It is one of those wild and impracticable theories of the "agitators," never to be realized in this or any other generation, but that lead to strife and anarchy if permitted to obtain in governments or in communities. The negro is to be made a sacrifice to the bigotry and political hatreds and ambitions of the Abolition party. The work has already begun. The African is dying by thousands in the track of our armies. The cry for help for homeless and starving men, women, and children has reached us, and true philanthropy, while deploring the abortive and reckless fanaticism, calling itself philanthropy, which has caused this suffering, has sent material aid. Let it be remembered that it was prophesied years ago that if the Abolitionists obtained influence and power, a civil war would result; let the prophecy be recorded here, that, if the American people indorse the unnatural theories now advanced by these same men, they invite a war of the races, which, if begun, can only end by the extirpation of the negro from the continent. Miscegenation is but another pet object of the Lincoln party, of the same stamp with emancipation, confiscation, and subjugation. If the nation is willing to be led to slaughter in a vain and disastrous attempt to accomplish these objects, let it continue Lincoln in power; if it is willing only to go to the battle-field for the sake of restoring Union and peace, let it remove him.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

Mottoes for the Campaign, selected from General McClellan's Writings.

The true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, Nov.* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I can with the Army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of military operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report*

DOCUMENT No. 18.

REPUBLICAN OPINIONS

ABOUT

LINCOLN.

THE matter here submitted to the judgment of honest freemen is like evidence drawn by cross-examination from opposing witnesses If they are under a bias, it is a bias which adds strength to their testimony. When Democrats declare their want of confidence in Mr. Lincoln's character and capacity, his supporters dispense themselves from weighing his charges, by raising a cry of "Copperheadism!"—a cry which would seem to be regarded as a sort of knock-down argument that leaves no more to be said. But when Republican statesmen, Republican organs, and Republican associations avow their belief that Mr. Lincoln is weak, is vacillating, is incapable, is selfish, is lawless, is tyrannical, is politically dishonest, we have a body of testimony against which the senseless cry of "Copperheadism" will not avail. When the ablest men of Mr. Lincoln's own party declare him incapable, the fair presumption is, that he *is* incapable; when they declare him a vulgar, crafty office-seeker, of weak character and tyrannical instincts, who has demonstrated his utter unfitness for his great station, the charges, at any rate, cannot be got rid of by the glib-tongued slander so much in vogue, that such accusations are inspired by secret sympathy with the rebels.

The matter here presented is somewhat bulky; but it is only a small part of the Republican testimony which might have been collected. It is the aim of this selection to present expressions which have a *representative* character—in which the writer does not merely express his own views, but is the organ of many other minds. When multitudes thus speak by deputy, the attention of the reader is saved and economized, and he is enabled without weariness to get the distilled utterance of Republican thought respecting the personal claims and character of Mr. Lincoln.

The force of this pamphlet lies in the documents; we encumber them with no other commentary than brief explanatory remarks to describe the occasions which called them forth.

The first of these documents in importance, though not first in order of time, is a pamphlet on "The Next Presidential Election," which was the forerunner of the "Pomeroy Circular." This pamphlet was prepared and privately circulated in January last, by the same committee of influential Republicans that issued the Pomeroy circular. The organization, of which that committee was the organ, is thus described by Mr. Pomeroy, in a speech made by him in the Senate of the United States, on the 10th of March:

"Some curiosity has been manifested, here and elsewhere, as to the authority and genuineness of a circular issued by me, as Chairman of the National Executive Committee. Such curiosity is very laudable, and I take an early opportunity to say that I did issue that circular, and that it embraces the views of the National Committee upon the subject presented. The Committee was instituted in the usual manner, at a public meeting convened in this city, in the month of January last. That meeting comprised members of Congress and citizens from nearly every loyal State in the Union. The Committee, is composed of members of Congress and other citizens of the United States; all of them, so far as I am advised, of the most unquestioned loyalty, and devoted to the Union and to freedom, as the best means for restoring and preserving the Union. The object of the Committee is to unite the sentiment of the country in the support of men and measures suited to the times. It issued a letter, called by some a circular, which it has distributed, as also the speeches of members of Congress, on the engrossing topics of the day."

The purpose of the organization here described was to head off a crafty attempt of the contracting and office-holding interests, to forestall the action of the Republican Convention, and force Mr. Lincoln on the party against its better judgment. This project was conceived with foresight, and executed with great dexterity. Its instruments were the Republican State Legislatures, elected in the fall of 1863. During that year, and with a view to this very object, the party war-cry given to the Republicans was—"*Lincoln and Loyalty—Opposition to the Administration is Treason to the Country.*" It was foreseen that Republican Legislatures, elected on this issue, would be as pliant as wax to official manipulation from Washington. None but the contractors and office-holders, who concocted the scheme, were long-sighted enough to detect its bearing, till the trap was ready to be sprung. But, in the Assembly of the State Legislatures, in January, 1864, it was seen that they all began to act with the concert of a set of puppets, in nominating Mr. Lincoln for re-election. All the leading men of the party, who were not either office-holders or contractors, then first came to understand the game by which the party had been outwitted and overreached. The organization, described in the foregoing extract from Senator Pomeroy's speech, was quickly and clandestinely formed, and its first important act was the preparation of the following circular, which was secretly sent to influential Republicans throughout the country, leaving out, of course, the contractors and Mr. Lincoln's office-holders. The following is a correct copy of that first circular, re-printed from the original pamphlet, with no other difference than a freer use of italics:—

The effort now making to forestall the action of the Republican National Convention, by procuring the formal nomination of Mr. Lincoln in State Legislatures and other public bodies, is deeply to be deplored.

The more so, *because this movement originates with the recipients of Executive favor and patronage, some of whom hold high stations in the administration of Mr. Lincoln, whose object is to perpetuate their own power and means of pecuniary advancement, without any regard whatever to the welfare of the country.* While these nominations are made to appear as though they emanated from the spontaneous will of the people, the *animus* in reality is *to defeat their will altogether, by producing such a public clamor in behalf of Mr. Lincoln, as to prevent the assembling of the National Convention at all; or, if it should assemble, to force his nomination upon the country, irrespective of the popular will.*

In time of civil war, with all its attendant calamities, *the attempt to advance the personal interest and ambition of any one man, or number of men, without regard to the public good, deserves, and should receive, universal condemnation.*

To the proper discussion of Mr. Lincoln's claim, to be made a candidate for the next Presidential term, there can be no reasonable objection; but it is the *people*, and not Mr. Lincoln and his dependents, who should decide upon his claim.

While the great body of the American people have *everything* at stake upon the right administration of the government, they have really no personal interest in its patronage. Therefore, they are the only disinterested party to select the Presidential candidate without interference from Executive influences.

But now it is too early to commit the people to the fortunes of any Presidential aspirant. The issues of war are ever uncertain; and though we have every reason to hope our gallant armies may have destroyed the rebel power before the meeting of the Convention, they may not. At all events, the people will be much better prepared to decide this question three or four months hence, than they can possibly be to-day.

Already has this premature action alienated many of the friends of freedom, *who believe that, even with a fair nomination in a full convention, Mr. Lincoln cannot be re-elected to the Presidency.*

There are many solid reasons in the very philosophy of representative government, against the election of a President for a second term.

The unbounded popularity of General Washington, during his administration, convinced the American people that, had he been less than Washington, he might, by the patronage of office, have subverted the liberties of the country, by procuring his own election periodically for life.

The want of a constitutional limitation, to the number of terms to which a President might be eligible, was then felt to be a serious defect.

Washington participated in this sentiment, and peremptorily refused to allow himself to be elected for a third term; and his decision furnished a precedent which had all the force of a constitutional restriction.

During the domination of the Republican party, from Jefferson to Monroe, the practice of the President nominating himself for the second term, and then his successor, through the machinery of a caucus, which virtually transferred the power of election from the

people to the Administration, was becoming a precedent which threatened the subversion of republican liberty.

General Jackson, in order to maintain the independence of the elective franchise, became the candidate of the people, in opposition to this caucus system, and, though defeated at first, was, in 1828, triumphantly elected, against the powerful patronage of the government. From that day no President until Mr. Lincoln, ever attempted to revive that odious system of having himself nominated without consulting the people in a National Convention.

General Jackson was made a candidate by the people for a second term against his will, and elected with unparalleled unanimity. Yet, such was the unbounded enthusiasm he inspired, that Jackson saw, as did every reflecting man, that the danger to liberty, which occurred under Washington's administration, was repeating itself.

And so utterly opposed was that stern patriot to the use of patronage for the purpose of procuring a re-election to the Presidency, that he laid down the *one term principle* as a fundamental doctrine in our democratic system, and it became a part of the political creed of the people, so strong, that no President from that day has been re-elected, and probably never will be by a fair expression of the popular will.

If Mr. Lincoln, in defiance of the teachings of Jackson, in violation of the great principle which underlies our democratic institutions, and in the face of the solemn warnings of history, can now so wield his patronage as to secure his election for a second term, who so blind as not to see that four years hence he will have less difficulty in securing his election for a third term! For, with an army of more than half a million of citizen soldiers under his command, and an annual patronage of a thousand millions of money, he can, if he has one-half the brain attributed to him by his friends, have himself elected from term to term during his natural life.

If the "military necessity" supplies a reason now for his nomination, and the extraordinary patronage occasioned by the war, furnishes the means of his election, as a matter of course, his interest is then to prolong the war as a means of perpetuating his power.

No man with the patriotism of a Washington or a Jackson, would seek to place himself in a position where his interest and his personal ambition would be coincident with the continuance of the rebellion and the perpetuity of the war.

But, aside from the consideration of the second term principle, there is still another and more forcible objection to the nomination of Mr. Lincoln.

The people have lost all confidence in his ability to suppress the rebellion and restore the Union. It is impossible to put out of view the fact, that there is a general feeling of disappointment in the loyal North, that after such a wasting of its precious blood, and such a vast expenditure of treasure, the rebellion continuous unsubdued; and all the promises of the Administration, time and again, for its speedy overthrow have been falsified.

The truth is, that there is no man who does not wear the livery of office, or is not in the pay of the General Government, who does not feel mortified and humbled, that our nation, with its twenty millions of loyal people in the North, with four millions of auxiliaries in the South, to say nothing of a large host of Union men there, has not succeeded yet in overthrowing the insolent slave oligarchy, which does not number five millions all told!

How is it, that Jefferson Davis, with his slender resources, without a navy, without manufactories, is still defiant at Richmond, and has twice sent his rebel hordes across the Potomac, putting in jeopardy even the personal liberty of Mr. Lincoln himself?

It is impossible to prevent the American people from making humiliating comparisons between the rebel chief and the President of the United States. They will understand why this condition of things exists; at the end of the third year of Mr. Lincoln's term. The fault is not in the want of intelligence and bravery, on the part of our soldiers, or the skill of our officers. For both soldiers and officers have proven, on many a battle field, that, in endurance and valor, and all the elements which constitute the great soldier, they are the equals, if not the superiors, of the rebels.

It will not do to throw the blame upon the country, for it has furnished all the men and all the money the President has asked.

It will not do to charge it upon the rebel sympathizers at the North, for they have had no means of interfering with the orders of the President. The responsibility rests *alone* upon him. He has been weak and vacillating throughout, seemingly incapable of settling upon any definite line of policy in regard to the rebellion.

Two theories in regard to it, have, and now divide, the American people. One is, that the Southern States are still States of the American Union; that their several constitutions and laws, though silent in the presence of the rebel power, will, upon the suppression of the rebellion, revive, and the people return to their former rights.

The other theory is, that they are no longer States in the American Union, in the sense of the Constitution, but the rebellion having acquired the strength and consistency of a belligerent power, the *status* of the entire

population has been changed from citizens to aliens, and they do not return to their rights upon the suppression of the rebellion, but only to such as the supreme legislative power may give them.

Had Mr. Lincoln adopted either one of these theories and adhered to it vigorously, he might long since have ended the rebellion.

Had he chosen the first, he could, before this, have brought back the States, with their institutions and laws, slaves and all.

Had he adopted the other, and sustained Fremont and Hunter, the friends of freedom *know* that the rebel armies might long ago have been overthrown and the whole rebel territory in possession of the United Slates, with the manacles of every slave stricken off, from the Susquehannah to the Rio Grande.

This vacillation and indecision of the President, has been the real cause why our well-appointed armies have not succeeded in the destruction of the rebellion.

He has constantly been going between these two theories, taking no positive ground for either, but holding on to the skirts of both.

Whether, from the feebleness of his will, which has been unequal to the alternate pressure of the respective leaders of these theories, or whether from the want of intellectual grasp, he has really been unable to comprehend their philosophy, or from the want of political principle and indifference to truth, he has, with that species of cunning which characterizes a certain class of lawyers, sought to ride both theories for the purpose of securing his re-lection.

The cant about "Honest Old Abe" was at first amusing, it then became ridiculous, but now it is absolutely criminal.

Honesty signifies nothing unless there is capacity to wield the power. In the language of Wendell Phillips: Who cares for the honesty of the President unless he be capable? it is not *honesty* but *capacity* that is wanted.

When the nation again places in the hands of a Commander-in-Chief the lives of all its able-bodied men, and all its material wealth, it will want a better guarantee than the antecedents of our jocular President can furnish, that the power will be wielded ably, efficiently surely, for the perpetuity of the Union.

Should Mr. Lincoln be forced upon the country in defiance of the better judgment of the Republican party, and the Democratic party be judicious in planting a candidate for the prosecution of the war, upon the first theory above indicated, (which is their theory.) MR. LINCOLN WILL BE MOST UNQUESTIONABLY DEFEATED, UNLESS HE SHOULD BE TEMPTED, IN AN EVIL HOUR, TO USE THE MILITARY POWER IN HIS HANDS, BY SUPPRESSING THE FREEDOM OF ELECTIONS IN THE LOYAL STATES. A victory won by the sword would be no victory, but a lamentable defeat to the friends of liberty.

A convention of patriots, if wise, will never nominate for the Presidency a military leader in actual command of an army, much less the Commander-in-chief, who now has more than half a million of soldiers under his command, and if necessary to success, might have a million before the next Presidential election.

The temptation to a military candidate to use the sword to secure his own election is too great, the warnings of history too impressive, for the American people ever voluntarily to consent to so hazardous an experiment.

Never before in our history has such a combination of high qualities been required as will be needed in the administration of the government for the next four years.

The war has created a debt, the magnitude of which is astounding to consider. The interest alone will oppress the people for scores of years to come; at the same time the means of discharging the debt will, by the necessary operations of the war, have been fearfully weakened. So many hundreds of thousands of men have been called from their industrial pursuits, never to return to them; so much of the material wealth of the country has been destroyed; so many fields for the production of its great staples laid waste; indeed its whole labor system has been perverted or disorganized!

To recover the nation from this state of utter exhaustion, and restore it to its wonted prosperity, will demand an order of intelligence which is bestowed upon but few men in any country at the same time, and the mightiest intellect in our land might well tremble in assuming such responsibility. We want, in our coming President, an advanced thinker; a statesman profoundly versed in political and economic science, one who fully comprehends the spirit of the age in which we live.

Appended to this circular, and forming part of the same pamphlet, was the subjoined article, from a well-known weekly newspaper, edited by a confidential associate in Republican circles. This article derives its importance from the company in which it is found, and its endorsement by the Republican association before described. This seems the proper place to insert it, as it is a tail-piece to the preceding circular:—

THE Arabs have a proverb that curses, like young chickens, always come home to roost. The above noble lines, which were quoted from the primer by Mr. Seward, in the apparent interest of Mr. Lincoln, verify the adage. Their warning having gone the rounds against all outside aspirants, returns to its starting

point, and settling upon certain recent signs in the State Legislatures, suggests that somebody is trying to steal at least the *nomination* and to *cheat* the usual conventions of the people.

These movements are evidently under the special direction of Thurlow Weed and Seward, but whether intended to be suddenly aggragated into an imposing re-investment of Mr. Lincoln with the toga without the formality of a new election, or whether it is a mere calling of the roll of those who have been bought for any exigency, it is rather difficult at this point to tell. There is one thing certain, however, and that certainty is, that the President himself is thoroughly cognizant of the whole movement, and is plunged to his arm-pits in the succulent patronage which he is doling out in its support.

Judged by this fact, he appears before us in an entirely new light, and, instead of the simple rustic who has innocently amused the country, even in its darkest hours, we find him the full partner of the crafty politician of whom he had all along appeared to be the dupe.

At the time of his election by the radicals, Mr. Lincoln, who is inherently an honest man, did not probably meditate a desertion of their principles; but finding a war unexpectedly upon his hands, he was erroneously persuaded to modify his views to suit the accident, and by certain sacrifices to endeavor to soothe and conciliate the South. Unfortunately his chief adviser was neither a man of foresight nor of courage. It was *his* belief that the rebellion would be put down in ninety days, and shrinking at the thought of the returning barons, he advised the President to find timely shelter in a conservative course, which, in addition to conciliating their ruffled mood, would quietly store up a large political "good will" towards his re-election. Mr. Lincoln foolishly yielded to this worse than weak idea, and from that moment became the unseen cornerstone of the new "conservative" party.

The first of the public acts with which Mr. Lincoln signalized his new converson was the remarkable dispatch in which he authorized Mr. Seward to announce broadcast to the world that "he did not expect to reduce the insurgent States to obedience by force of arms." The next was the circular by which he assured Europe as well as the Confederacy that our war should be so conducted "as not to alter the *status* of a single human being." These utterances, made as early as April, 1861, were doubtless honestly intended to appease the rebels, but we have seen that they only resulted in indorsing their power before foreign nations, and at the same time in depriving our cause of the solitary hold which it had upon European sentiment. These extraordinary acts have constantly puzzled the keenest of inquirers. By many it was often thought that they were purely the personal acts of Mr. Seward, and that the President, in whose name they were fulminated, being an easy-going man, was more fond of a juicy story than dry papers, really never saw them. But, aided by our new look into Mr. Lincoln's policy, we are able to translate the apparent contradictions, and to understand them as consistent, if not with his public attitude, at least with the unpromulgated temporizing Seward programme. We can now understand, moreover, the long tampering with the treason of the border States; the motive of the checks administered to the progress of emancipation in Maryland and in Missouri; of the amazing dictation to Congress how to vote on the Confiscation Act, lest he reprove them with his veto; of his removal of the District Attorney of St. Louis, for participating too actively in the radical election; of his lending the patronage of the government to Seward for the election of Horatio Seymour; and, perhaps, most significant of all, because most constant and continuous, of his retaining Weed around him, in face of his open apostacy from the emancipation and republican doctrines, and informal embrace of the "conservative" faith! If these things have no significance, perhaps the fact that Weed is now engineering the Lincoln expression in the Legislatures has!

It may be said that the great edicts of amnesty and emancipation are contradictions to our theory, and that Mr. Lincoln either did these things despite of Seward & Co., or that he is not a full partner to their plans. But the truth is, these acts, like Seward's tardy courage on the subject of the rebel rams, were the results purely of an irresistible pressure of the people, and we may add that the President undoubtedly found rising courage for his task in the fact that the rebel cause was fast sinking under our arms. In degree as the patriotic temper of the country reduced the hopes of the rebellion the President was released from his alarms, and to the same degree became the sincere auxiliary of its wishes. We have the utmost faith in his intentions, but knowing his defects, shall hardly expect to see him converted to the Conness doctrine of striking a rebel wherever you can reach him any earlier than Fernando Wood. Fernando, watching the decline of the Confederacy, has already voted in recognition of the negro regiments. When the planter aristocracy are fugitive, and the released white masses of the South rank as the intensest enemies of slavery, we shall expect to see Abraham and the sage of Bloomingdale weeping on each other's necks in all the beatitude of an excelling abolitionism.

Between this and that, however, there may be much danger in Mr. Lincoln's unfortunate

idiosyncracies; and while we have full respect for his intentions, we fear to entrust him (at least while he is bound in with Weed and Seward) with the stupendously important settlement of this war. He is hardly the man to handle this country, while its heart is over generous with reconstituted peace, so that due guarantees may be exacted from its enemies. We may reasonably apprehend any mistake in the future, from what has gone before; and as for general statesmanship, we take his full measure in the fact, that he once actually advised the extradition of four millions of laborers from our eager and entreating soil, while in the next breath, he proposed a bill to encourage foreign emigration. Compared with this gigantic crime against the yearning hemisphere, the retention of these hapless beings in slavery would have been a passable offence!

Manifestly, therefore, this excellent man, though honest as the sun, and perhaps the best story-teller in the world, is not the statesman to pluck this groveling country from the mire, and set its face, with august resolution, against our enemies across the ocean. He is not the man to grapple with a tithe of our responsibilities, foreign or domestic; and no mere political Peter Funks, whom charitable constituencies have sent to the State Legislatures with "permits to trade," can dictate such a candidate upon this rising hour.

We have seen nothing more shameless and insolent, than this legislative nomination, in the whole history of American politics, and the wonder is, that men of so much experience as Weed and Seward have undertaken it. It is an adaptation of the corrupt practices of the "ring" to a larger job than was ever before undertaken in this country. When Rome was in her lowest period of degradation, it was the custom of the Prætorian Guards to sell the Empire to the highest bidder. While our slave oligarchy was in swing, we once predicted that a candidate might yet pay his way to the Presidential chair through the avenues of the convention; but, really, we never expected to see the bribery of the conventions simplified and anticipated, by doling the first chances out, to the more limited consciences of legislative "rings." Indeed, what we least of all expected was, to see these speculators, who have now "got along with" five States, extending their unctuous palms over Uncle Abraham's head, in mock consecration of a political Messiah, who, with his tongue in his cheek all the while, is chiefly anxious to get through the ceremony, that he may delight them with some smutty story.

To fill out the last page of the pamphlet, the committee printed the following squib, conveying, by an apt parable, the idea that, while the superficial current was running in favor of Mr. Lincoln, there was a deep *undercurrent* in the Republican party, setting strongly against him. The squib, like Mr. Wilkes' article, derives its significance from the respectability of its influential endorsers:

Old Abe and Philosophy of Currents.—During a conversation which took place last week, between our worthy President and a distinguished western Senator, the recent legislative nominations for the next Presidency were incidentally referred to. "Yes," said Mr. Lincoln, nursing his leg with evident gratification—yes, the current seems to be setting all one way!" "It does, really, seem to be setting all one way," was the answer of the Senator; "but, Mr. Lincoln, as you have told me several good stories since I have been here, permit me, if you please, to tell *you* one." "'It has always been observed, that the Atlantic Ocean, at the Straights of Gibraltar, constantly pours into the Mediterranean, with tremendous volume. The Bosphorus empties into it, at its other end, and rivers are seen contributing to its waters all along its coast. It was, for many years, the constant puzzle of geographers, why the Mediterranean, under all these accessions, never got full and overran its banks. After a while, however, a curious fellow took the notion of dropping a plummet in the centre of the Straights, when, lo! he discovered that, though the tremendous body of water on the surface was rushing inward from the ocean, a still more powerful body was passing outward, in a counter current, at some twenty feet below!'"

"Oh, ah!" said Old Abe, seriously, evidently nonplussed, for the first time in his life; "that *does not* remind me of any story I ever heard before!"

The Republican Committee, by whom the preceding secret circular was issued, having concluded that Secretary Chase was the strongest man they could present against Mr. Lincoln, put forth, in February, another circular, announcing Mr. Chase as a candidate, and repeating, more briefly, their inculpations of Mr. Lincoln, and the corrupt influences at work to secure his nomination. The following is a copy of this second circular:—

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *Feb.* 1864.

SIR, — The movements recently made throughout the country, to secure the re-nomination of President Lincoln, render necessary some counter-action on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union who differ from the policy of his Administration.

So long as no efforts were made to forestall the political action of the people, it was both wise and patriotic for all true friends of the government to devote their influence to the supression of the rebellion; but when it becomes evident that party machinery and official influence are being used to secure the perpetuation of the present Administration, those who conscientiously believe that the interests of the country and of freedom demand a change in favor of vigor, and purity, and nationality, have no choice but to appeal at once to the people before it shall be too late to secure a fair discussion of principles.

Those in behalf of whom this communication is made have thoughtfully surveyed the political field, and have arrived at the following conclusions :—

1. *That even were the re-election of Mr. Lincoln desirable, it is practically impossible against the union of influence which will oppose him.*

2. That, should he be re-elected, his manifest tendency towards compromises and temporary expedients of policy will become stronger during a second term than it has been in the first, and the cause of human liberty and the dignity and honor of the nation suffer proportionately; while the war may continue to languish during his whole administration, till the public debt shall become a burden too great to be borne.

3. That the patronage of the government, through the necessities of the war, has been so rapidly increased, and to such an enormous extent, and so loosely placed, as to render application of the "one-term principle" absolutely essential to the certain safety of our republican institutions.

4. That we find united in Hon. Salmon P. Chase more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years than are combined in any other available candidate; his record, clear and unimpeachable, showing him to be a statesman of rare ability and an administrator of the very highest order, while his private character furnishes the surest obtainable guarantee of economy and purity in the management of public affairs.

5. That the discussion of the Presidential question, already commenced by the friends of Mr. Lincoln, has developed a popularity and strength in Mr. Chase unexpected even to his warmest admirers; and while we are aware that this strength is at present unorganized, and in no condition to manifest its real magnitude, we are satisfied that it only needs systematic and faithful efforts to develope it to an extent sufficient to overcome all opposing obstacles. For these reasons the friends of Mr. Chase have determined on measures which shall present his claims fairly and at once to the country. A central organization has been effected, which already has its connections in all the States, and the object of which is to enable his friends everywhere most effectually to promote his elevation to the Presidency. We wish the hearty co-operation of those in favor of the speedy restoration of the Union upon the basis of universal freedom, and who desire an administration of the government during the first period of its new life, which shall, to the fullest extent, develope the capacity of free institutions, enlarge the resources of the country, diminish the burdens of taxation, elevate the standard of public and private morality, vindicate the honor of the Republic before the world, and, in all things, make an American nationality the fairest example for imitation which human progress has ever achieved.

If those objects meet your approval, you can render efficient aid by exerting yourself to at once organize your section of the country, and by corresponding with the Chirman of the National Executive Committee, for the purpose either of receiving or imparting information.

Very respectfully,

S. C. POMEROY,
Chairman National Executive Committee.

WHILE the respectable and influential Republican Associations which issued the preceding documents, were aiming to counteract the office holders, who had got the start of them, portions of the Republican press indicated their opinion of Mr. Lincoln's incapacity, and their hostility to his nomination. The most important of these were the New-York "Tribune," the New-York "Evening Post," the "Independent," and "Brownson's Quarterly Review." Our space does not permit quotations from all these; but, as a vigorous specimen of manly and truthful criticism, we copy the following extracts from an article in the one last named. Doctor Brownson has been, for the last thirty years, known as one of the ablest and most eminent writers in this country. Two years ago, he was the Republican candidate for Congress in the New Jersey District in which he resides. His charges against Mr. Lincoln are supported, as the reader will see, by great force of reasoning.

[*From Brownson's Review for April*, 1864.]

We wish to speak of Mr. Lincoln in terms befitting ourselves and his high position, but we must say that he has proved himself totally deficient in administrative talent. *No branch of the government has been well and efficiently administered under him.* Much routine work, done by old experienced clerks, may have been done regularly enough; some of the Secretaries have been able men, and have managed their respective departments as well as they could be managed under such a chief; but the Administration in the sense that it must receive its impulse, its spirit and tone from the President himself, has been loose, fluctuating, unsystematic, weak, and inefficient, in all save expenditure of men and money. *It has lacked promptness, energy, economy. Its extravagance has been appalling, its expenditures enormous, and little to show for them. Its yearly expenses, when all accounts are audited, will be found to be double those of Great Britain in her gigantic wars with the Emperor Napoleon, when she subsidized nearly all Europe, while our resources are far less than hers were at the time.* During four years it will have run up a national debt above that of Great Britain, and equal to one-third of the assessed values of the whole Union, according to the census of 1860. *And no small portion of this enormous sum has been literally wasted. Vast sums have been expended on expeditions that have come to naught, and on the construction of Monitors, not worth their weight in old iron. Contracts have been made on terms needlessly disadvantageous to the government, and, in most of them, if heavy, the government has been swindled, by collusions between contractors and its own employés.* The Administration has not known how to inspire its own agents with a sense of duty, or to hold them to a rigid accountability. It has not known how to husband its resources, or to manage its finances with economy, with advantage to the public service. *The people gave generously, Congress voted liberally ample supplies of men and money, but nothing has come of it, but an army of suddenly enriched contractors, speculators, and swindlers, who are using all their influence to prolong the war.* The Administration seems never to have regarded economy as necessary. The war, it was sure, would be a short war; the rebellion was always on its last legs, and was sure to be soon put down; and what mattered to so great and rich a nation a few hundred million a year, more or less? Peace would soon return, commerce revive, and the resources of the people reunited would soon extinguish a national debt of any magnitude. *Suppose thousands of contractors, speculators, and swindlers do fatten on the spoils of the Treasury; are they not sure to be loyal supporters of the Administration and the war?*

Mr. Lincoln's military operations have shown an equal want of administrative capacity. The responsibility is not to be shifted from him to the generals commanding in the field, or to the General-in-Chief, with his headquarters at the seat of government. Generals commanding armies are subordinate to the civil power, and though the ablest, having the best dispositions in the world, they can accomplish little under a weak, indecisive, and vacillating civil administration, that has no intelligible purpose, that changes its purpose every other day, or does not insist on its purpose being carried out.

Mr. Lincoln has never told the army what he wanted or expected of it, for he has never known himself. He wanted to put down the rebellion, indeed, but by force of arms! by political manipulation! or by both combined! At first the troops were called out only to defend Washington, and the war was to be purely defensive. Then there came a cry "On to Richmond." Then an expedition was sent out to gain a few ports on the Southern coast, and then to get a foothold in some rebel State, for political and commercial rather than for military purposes. New Orleans was taken, in order to please the shipping interest, and the Mississippi River was left closed for the benefit of the railroad interest. *One day attention is momentarily given to military interests, and the next every thing yields to the desire of manufacturing, by the aid of Federal bayonets, sham States in Rebeldom, and securing a few Congressional or electoral votes for the Administration. What can the military do, liable every moment to be disconcerted by some new trick or crotchet of the Administration?* The astonishment is that they have done so much, not that they have not done more.

Then *we have never had only about three-fifths of the men present whose names are on the muster rolls, and whom the government is paying.* In August, 1862, the President himself told us, that the number of men on the grand roll receiving pay from the government was six hundred thousand, and yet the number present in the several armies was only about three hundred and sixty thousand. Where were the rest? In hospitals? Some of them were, but the greater part were well and hearty, the President said, at home, tending bar, at work on railroads, or on farms, and a considerable number of them, he might have said, had never been enlisted. But for these absent men, stragglers, deserters, or never enlisted, the three hundred thousand additional volunteers called for in July of that year would not have been needed. The administration of the army is all of a piece with this, and probably the government has, all along, being paying for at least one-fourth more men than it has or ever

has had in its service. *Who dare say that this could happen under a President of even ordinary administrative capacity?*

The policy of the Administration in its conduct of the war has been not only expensive, inefficient, but capricious, often unintelligible, to be explained only as one or another influence in the Cabinet, or outside, predominated.

Mr. Lincoln sent a fleet, with a land force under General T. W. Sherman, and took possession of Hilton Head, after one of the most splendid naval victories over land fortifications on record. Sherman, aided by the fleet, could easily, at that time, have taken possession of both Charleston and Savannah, but he had positive orders not to set a foot on the main land. Why? We know not, unless Charleston and Savannah were not strongly enough fortified and garrisoned to render their capture sufficiently difficult and costly—unless it would have too seriously damaged the rebellion, and been too great a humiliation to the rebels. Perhaps it would have irritated them. It has been the misfortune of Mr. Lincoln, from the capture of the arsenal and armory at Harper's Ferry, and the Navy Yard at Gosport, down to the present, to be never ready at the time, to be always behindhand, or in the wrong place, and obliged to re-take, at great expense and terrible loss of life, what a little forethought, promptness and energy might have enabled him to keep, or never to have lost. But for the courage and boldness of General Morris, when he first took command of Fort McHenry, the rebels in Baltimore might easily have taken that fort, the key to the whole position, and carried away Washington and Maryland in the secession movement, and so secured the Confederacy a prompt recognition as the United States by Foreign Powers, for the fort, if attacked only with pikes and scaling ladders by the rebel force then in Baltimore, could have made no defence, and must have surrendered, so destitute had it been left. The President is never ready to strike a home blow, and his measures are generally wrong measures, or right measures at a wrong time, or in a wrong place.

Mr. Lincoln evidently knows nothing of the philosophy of history, or of the higher elements of human nature. He imagines that men act only from low and interested motives, and does not suspect, because he does not feel, the presence of a heroic element, the element, Carlyle would call it, of hero-worship, that makes men admire and cling to, and uphold a bold, daring policy, energetically proclaimed, firmly adhered to, and consistently acted on, though in the face and eyes of their interest. *His soul seems made of leather, and incapable of any grand or noble emotion.* Compared with the mass of men, he is a line of flat prose in a beautiful and spirited lyric. He lowers, he never elevates you. You leave his presence with your enthusiasm damped, your better feelings crushed, and your hopes cast to the winds. You ask not, can this man carry the nation through its terrible struggles? but, can the nation carry this man through them, and not perish in the attempt? He never adopts a clean policy. *When he hits upon a policy, substantially good in itself, he contrives to be-little it, besmear it, or, in some other way, to render it mean, contemptible and useless.* Even wisdom from him seems but folly. It is not his fault, but his misfortune. He is a good sort of man, with much natural shrewdness and respectable native abilities; but he is misplaced in the Presidential Chair. He lives and moves in an order of thought, in a world many degrees below that in which a great man lives and moves. We blame him not because he is mole-eyed and not eagle-eyed, and that he has no suspicion of that higher region of thought and action in which lie the great interests and questions he is called upon to deal with, as President of the United States. He has done as much as was in his power to make himself, and should be respected for what he has made himself, and the fault that he is not fit for his position is the fault of us who put him there. His only fault is, the misfortune of being unconscious of hisown unfitness for his place.

GEN. FREMONT'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

In the latter part of May, a large Convention of Republicans, consisting of delegates from all the loyal States, was held at Cleveland, Ohio, and nominated General Fremont for the Presidency. General Fremont was the popular Republican candidate in the Presidential canvass of 1856. He is one of the most gifted and trusted leaders of the anti-slavery party. In his letter, accepting the Cleveland nomination, he expressed, with manly frankness, his opinion of Mr. Lincoln's character, and the ruinous tendency of his measures. We insert the letter in full:

Gentlemen,—In answer to the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you, on the part of the representatives of the people assembled at Cleveland, on the 31st of May, I desire to express my thanks for the confidence which led them to offer me the honorable and difficult position of their candidate in the approaching Presidential contest.

Very honorable, because, in offering it to me, you act in the name of a great number of citizens who seek, above all things, the good of their country, and who have no sort of selfish interest in view. Very difficult, because in accepting the candidacy you propose to me, I am exposed to the reproach of creating a schism in the party with which I have been identified.

Had Mr. Lincoln remained faithful to the principles he was elected to defend, no schism could have been created, and no contest could have been possible. This is not an ordinary election. *It is a contest for the right even to have candidates, and not merely, as usual, for the choice among them.* Now, for the first time since '76, the question of *constitutional liberty has been brought directly before the people for their serious consideration and vote.* The ordinary rights secured, under the Constitution and *the laws of the country, have been violated, and extraordinary powers have been usurped by the Executive.* It is directly before the people now to say whether or not the principles established by the Revolution are worth maintaining.

If, as we have been taught to believe, those guarantees for liberty which made the distinctive value and glory of our country, are in truth inviolably sacred, then here must be a protest against the arbitrary violation which had not even the excuse of necessity. The schism is made by those who force the choice between a shameful silence or a protest against wrong. In such considerations originated the Cleveland Convention. It was among its objects to arouse the attention of the people to such facts, and to bring them to realize that while we are saturating Southern soil with the best blood of the country in the name of liberty, we have really parted with it at home.

To-day, we have in the country *the abuses of a military dictation, without its unity of action* and vigor of execution. *An Administration marked at home by disregard of constitutional rights, by its violations of personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, as a crowning shame, by its abandonment of the right of asylum, a right especially dear to all free nations abroad. Its course has been characterized by a feebleness and want of principle* which has misled European powers, and driven them to a belief that only commercial interests and personal aims are concerned, and that no great principles are involved in the issue. The admirable conduct of the people, their readiness to make every sacrifice demanded of them, their forbearance and silence under the suspension of everything that could be suspended, their many acts of heroism and sacrifices were all rendered fruitless by the incapacity, or, to speak more exactly, by the personal ends for which the war was managed. This *incapacity and selfishness* naturally produced such results as led the European powers, and logically enough, to the conviction that the North, with its greatly superior population, its immense resources, and its credit, will never be able to recover the South. Sympathies which should have been with us from the outset of the war were turned against us, and in this way *the Administration has done the country a double wrong abroad.* It created hostility, or at best indifference, among those who would have been its friends if the real interests of the people could have been better known, while, at the same time, it neglected no occasion for making the most humiliating concessions.

Against this disastrous condition of affairs the Cleveland Convention was a protest.

The principles which form the basis of its platform have my unqualified and cordial approbation; but I cannot so heartily concur in all the measures which you propose. I do not believe that confiscation extended to the property of all rebels is practicable, and if it were so, I do not think it a measure of sound policy. It is, in fact, a question belonging to the people themselves to decide, and is a proper occasion for the exercise of their original and sovereign authority. As a war measure, in the beginning of a revolt which might be quelled by prompt severity, I understand the policy of confiscation, but not as a final measure of reconstruction after the suppression of an insurrection.

In the adjustments which are to follow peace no considerations of vengeance can consistently be admitted.

The object of the war is to make permanently secure the peace and happiness of the whole country, and there was but a single element in the way of its attainment. This element of slavery may be considered practically destroyed in the country, and it needs only your proposed amendment of the Constitution to make its extinction complete.

With this extinction of slavery the party divisions created by it have also disappeared. And if in the history of the country there has ever been a time when the American people, without regard to one or another of the political divisions, were called upon to give solemnly their voice in a matter which involved the safety of the United States, it is assuredly the present time.

If the Convention at Baltimore will nominate any man whose past life justifies a well-grounded confidence in his fidelity to our cordial principles, there is no reason why there should be any division among the really patriotic men of the country. To any such I shall be most happy to give a cordial and active support.

My own decided preference is to aid in this way, and not to be myself a candidate. *But*

if Mr. Lincoln should be re nominated, as I believe it would be fatal to the country to endorse a policy and renew a power which has cost us the lives of thousands of men, and needlessly put the country on the road to bankruptcy, there will remain no alternative but to organize against him every element of conscientious opposition, with the view to prevent the misfortune of his re-election.

In this contingency, I accept the nomination at Cleveland, and, as a preliminary step, I have resigned my commission in the army.

This was a sacrifice it gave me pain to make. But I had for a long time fruitlessly endeavored to obtain service. I make this sacrifice now only to regain liberty of speech and to leave nothing in the way of discharging to my utmost ability the task you have set for me.

With my earnest and sincere thanks for your expressions of confidence and regard, and for the many honorable terms in which you acquaint me with the actions of the committee, I am, gentlemen, very respectfully and truly yours,

J. C. FREMONT.

New-York, June 4, 1864.

To Messrs. Worthington G. Snethen, of Maryland; Edward Gilbert, of New York; Caspar Butz, of Illinois; Chas. E. Moss, of Missouri; N. P. Sawyer, of Pennsylvania, a committee, &c.

SENATORS BEN. WADE AND HENRY WINTER DAVIS ON MR. LINCOLN.

TO THE SUPPORTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

In his Annual Message, in December last, Mr. Lincoln proclaimed a plan for re-organizing the rebel States. As a qualification for voting, he required the citizens to swear allegiance to the Emancipation Proclamation, and declared that when one-tenth of the voters should take this oath, they might proceed to organize a State government, which should be binding over the other nine-tenths. His obvious purpose was to create a political machinery for re-electing himself, by conferring upon a small clique of his tools the power of casting the whole electoral vote of several of the rebel States. Even the Republican party in Congress could not be brought to favor so bare-faced a swiddle. They passed a bill for re-organizing the States in rebellion, which, although objectionable in many respects, had the merit of setting aside the corrupt scheme of Mr. Lincoln. This bill the President vetoed by proclamation. This was so gross an outrage, both in substance and in form, that two distinguished Republicans, Mr. Wade, the Chairman of Committee, to which the subject belonged, in the Senate, and Mr. Davis, Chairman of the corresponding Committee of the House, published the very able address to the Republican party which we here copy, and commend to the earnest attention of the country:

We have read without surprise, but not without indignation, the proclamation of the President, of the 8th of July, 1864.

The supporters of the Administration are responsible to the country for its conduct; *and it is their right and duty to check the encroachments of the Executive on the authority of Congress, and to require it to confine itself to its proper sphere.*

It is impossible to pass in silence this proclamation without neglecting that duty; and, having taken as much responsibility as any others in supporting the Administration, we are not disposed to fail in the other duty of asserting the rights of Congress.

The President did not sign the bill "to guarantee to certain States whose governments have been usurped, a republican form of government,"—passed by the supporters of his administration in both Houses of Congress after mature deliberation.

The bill did not, therefore, become *a law;* and it is, therefore, nothing.

The proclamation is neither an approval nor a veto of the bill; it is, therefore, a document unknown to the laws, and Constitution of the United States.

So far, it contains an apology for not signing of the bill, as *it is, political manifesto against the friends of the government.* So far as it proposes to execute the bill which is not a law, *it is a grave executive usurpation.*

It is fitting that the facts necessary to enable the friends of the administration to appreciate the apology, and the usurpation be spread before them.

The proclamation says:

"And, whereas, the said bill was presented to the President of the United States for his approval less than one hour before the *sine die* adjournment of said session, and was not signed by him"—

If that be accurate, still this bill was presented with other bills which were signed.

Within that hour, the time for the *sine die* adjournment was three times postponed by the votes of both Houses; and the least intimation of a desire for more time by the President to consider this bill would have secured a further postponement.

Yet the committee sent to ascertain if the President had any further communication for the House of Representatives reported that he had none; and the friends of the bill, who had anxiously waited on him to ascertain its fate, had already been informed that the President had resolved not to sign it. The time of presentation, therefore, had nothing to do with his failure to approve it.

The bill had been discussed and considered for more than a month in the House of Representatives, which it passed on the 4th of May; it was reported to the Senate on the 27th of May, without material amendment, and passed the Senate absolutely as it came from the House on the 2d of July. Ignorance of its contents is out of the question.

Indeed, at his request, a draft of a bill substantially the same in all material points, and identical in the points objected to by the proclamation, had been laid before him for his consideration in the winter of 1862-1863.

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose the provisions of the bill took the President by surprise.

On the contrary, we have reason to believe them to have been so well known that this method of preventing the bill from becoming a law without the constitutional responsibility of a veto, had been resolved on long before the bill passed the Senate.

We are informed by a gentleman entitled to entire confidence, that, before the 22d of June, in New Orleans, it was stated by a member of General Banks's staff, in the presence of other gentlemen in official position, that Senator Doolittle had written a letter to the Department that the House Reconstruction bill would be staved off in the Senate to a period too late in the session to require the President to veto it in order to defeat it, and that Mr. Lincoln would retain the bill, if necessary, and thereby defeat it.

The experience of Senator Wade, in his various efforts to get the bill considered in the Senate, was quite in accordance with that plan; and the fate of the bill was accurately predicted by letters received from New Orleans, before it had passed the Senate.

Had the proclamation stopped there, it would have been only one other defeat of the will of the people, by an executive perversion of the Constitution.

But it goes further. The President says:

"And, whereas, the said bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before the people for their consideration"—

By what authority of the Constitution? In what forms? The result to be declared by whom? With what effect when ascertained?

Is it to be a law by the approval of the people, without the approval of Congress, at the will of the President?

Will the President, on his opinion of the popular approval, execute it as law?

Or is this merely a device to avoid the serious responsibility of defeating a law on which so many loyal hearts reposed for security?

But the reasons now assigned for not approving the bill are full of ominous significance.

The President proceeds:

"Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare, and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last, when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration) unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration"—

That is to say, the President is resolved that the people shall not *by law* take *any* securities from the rebel States against a renewal of the rebellion, before restoring their power to govern us.

His wisdom and prudence are to be our sufficient guarantees.

He further says:

"And while I am also unprepared to declare that the free State Constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for naught, thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have set up the same as to further effort"—

That is to say, the President persists in recognizing those shadows of governments in Arkansas and Louisiana, which Congress formally declared should not be recognized—whose Representatives and Senators were repelled by formal votes of both Houses of Congress—which it was declared formally should have no electoral vote for President and Vice-President.

They are the mere creatures of his will. They cannot live a day without his support. They are mere oligarchies, imposed on the people by military orders under the forms of election, at which generals, provost-marshals, soldiers and camp-followers were the chief actors, assisted by a handful of resident citizens, and urged on to premature action by private letters from the President.

In neither Louisiana nor Arkansas, before Banks's defeat, did the United States control half the territory or half the population. In Louisiana, General Banks's proclamation can

didly declared :—" *The fundamental law of the State is martial law.*"

On that foundation of freedom he erected what the President calls " the free Constitution and government of Louisiana."

But of this State, whose fundamental law was martial law, only sixteen parishes out of forty-eight parishes, were held by the United States, and in the five of the sixteen we held only our camps.

The eleven parishes we substantially held had two hundred and thirty-three thousand one hundred and eighty-five inhabitants ; the residue of the State not held by us, five hundred and seventy-five thousand six hundred and seventeen.

At the farce called an election, the officers of General Banks returned that eleven thousand three hundred and forty-six ballots were cast ; but whether any, or by whom, the people of the United States have no legal assurance ; but it is probable that four thousand were cast by soldiers or employees of the United States military or municipal, but none according to any law, State or national, and seven thousand ballots represent the State of Louisiana.

Such is the free Constitution and government of Louisiana ; and like it is that of Arkansas. *Nothing but the failure of a military expedition deprived us of a like one in the swamps of Florida ; and before the Presidential election, like ones may be organized in every rebel State where the United States have a camp.*

The President, by preventing this bill from becoming a law, holds the electoral votes of the rebel States at the dictation of his personal ambition.

If those votes turn the balance in his favor, is it to be supposed that his competitor, defeated by such means, will acquiesce ?

If the rebel majority assert their supremacy in those States. and send votes which elect an enemy of the government, will we not repel his claims ?

And is not that civil war for the Presidency inaugurated by the votes of rebel States ?

Seriously impressed with these dangers, Congress, "*the proper constitutional authority,*" formally declared that there are no State governments in the rebel States, and provided for their erection at a proper time ; and both the Senate and the House of Representatives rejected the Senators and Representatives chosen under the authority of what the President calls the free Constitution and government of Arkansas.

The President's proclamation "*holds for naught*" this judgment, and discards the authority of the Supreme Court, and strides headlong towards the anarchy his proclamation of the 8th of December inaugurated.

If electors for President be allowed to be chosen in either of those States, a sinister light will be cast on the motives which induced the President "to hold for naught" the will of Congress rather than his government in Louisiana and Arkansas.

That judgment of Congress which the President defies was the exercise of an authority exclusively vested in Congress by the Constitution, to determine what is the established government in a State, and in its own nature, and by the highest judicial authority, binding on all other departments of the government.

The Supreme Court has formally declared that, under the 4th section of the IVth article of the Constitution, requiring the United States to guarantee to every State a republican form of government, "*it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State ;*" and "*when Senators and Representatives of a State are admitted into* the councils of the Union, the *authority* of the *government under which they are appointed,* as well as its republican character, *is recognized by the proper constitutional authority, and its decision is binding in every other department of the government* and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue ; and, as no Senators or Representatives were elected under the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to decide is placed *there.*"

Even the President's proclamation of the 8th of December, formally declares that "whether members sent to Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats constitutionally, rests exclusively with the respective Houses, and not to any extent with the Executive."

And that is not the less true because wholly inconsistent with the President's assumption in that proclamation of a right to institute and recognize State governments in the rebel States, nor because the President is unable to perceive that his recognition is a nullity if it be not conclusive on Congress.

Under the Constitution, the right to Senators and Representatives is inseparable from a State government. If there be a State government, the right is absolute. If there be no State Government there can be no Senators or Representatives chosen. The two Houses of Congress are expressly declared to be the sole judges of their own members.

When, therefore, Senators and Representatives are admitted, the State government, under whose authority they were chosen, is conclusively established ; when they are rejected, its existence is as conclusively rejected and denied ; and to this judgment the President is bound to submit.

The President proceeds to express his un-

willingness "to declare a constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in States" as another reason for not signing the bill.

But the bill nowhere proposes to abolish slavery in States.

The bill did provide that all *slaves* in the rebel States should be *manumitted*.

But as the President had already signed three bills, manumitting several classes of slaves in States, it is not conceived possible that he entertained any scruples touching *that* provision of the bill respecting which he is silent.

He had already himself assumed a right, by proclamation, to free much the larger number of slaves in the rebel States, under the authority given him by Congress to use military power to suppress the rebellion; and it is quite inconceivable that the President should think Congress could vest in him a discretion it could not exercise itself.

It is the more unintelligible from the fact that, except in respect to a small part of Virginia and Louisiana, the bill covered only what the proclamation covered—added a Congressional title and judicial remedies by law to the disputed title under the proclamation, and perfected the work the President professed to be so anxious to accomplish.

Slavery as an institution, can be abolished only by a change of the Constitution of the United States or of the law of the State; and this is the principle of the bill.

It required the new Constitution of the State to provide for that prohibition; and the President, in the face of his own proclamation, does not venture to object to insisting on *that* condition. Nor will the country tolerate its abandonment—yet he defeated the only provision imposing it!!

But when he describes himself, in spite of this great blow at emancipation, as "sincerely hoping and expecting that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout the nation may be adopted," we curiously inquire on what his expectation rests, after the vote of the House of Representatives at the recent session, and in the face of the political complexion of more than enough of the States to prevent the possibility of its adoption within any reasonable time; and why he did not indulge his sincere hopes with so large an installment of the blessing as his approval of the bill would have secured.

After this assignment of his reasons for preventing the bill from becoming a law, the President proceeds to declare his purpose *to execute it as a law by his plenary dictatorial power*. He says:

"Nevertheless, I am fully satisfied with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to adopt it; and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the United States; in which cases military governors will be appointed, with directions to proceed according to the bill."

A more studied outrage on legislative authority of the people has never been perpetrated.

Congress passed a bill; the President refused to approve it, *and then by proclamation puts as much of it in force as he sees fit, and proposes to execute those parts by officers unknown to the laws of the United States, and not subject to the confirmation of the Senate!*

The bill directed the appointment of provisional governors by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The President, *after defeating the law, proposes to appoint, without law, and without the advice and consent of the Senate, military governors for the rebel States!*

He has already exercised this dictatorial usurpation in Louisiana, and *he defeated the bill, to prevent its limitation.*

Henceforth we must regard the following precedent as the presidential law of the rebel States:—

"EXECUTIVE MANSION,
"WASHINGTON, *March* 15, 1864.

"*His Excellency Michael Hahn, Governor of Louisiana:*

"Until further orders, you are hereby invested with the powers hitherto exercised by the military Governor of Louisiana.

"Yours, ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

This Michael Hahn is no officer of the United States. The President, without law, without the advice and consent of the Senate, by a private note, not even countersigned by the Secretary of State, makes him dictator of Louisiana!

The bill provided for the civil administration of the laws of the State—till it should be in a fit temper to govern itself—repealing all laws recognizing slavery, and making all men equal before the law.

These beneficent provisions the President has annulled. People will die, and marry, and transfer property, and buy and sell; and to these acts of civil life courts and officers of the law are necessary. Congress legislated for these necessary things, and the President deprives them of the protection of the law!

The President's purpose to instruct his military governors "to proceed according to the bill"—a makeshift to calm the disappointment its defeat has occasioned—is not merely a grave usurpation, but a transparent delusion. He cannot "proceed according to the bill," after preventing it from becoming a law.

Whatever is done will be at his will and

pleasure, by persons responsible to no law, and more interested to secure the interests and execute the will of the President than of the people; and the will of Congress is to be "*held for naught*," "unless the loyal people of the rebel States choose to adopt it."

If they should graciously prefer the stringent bill to the easy proclamation, still the registration will be made under no legal sanction; it will give no assurance that a majority of the people of the States have taken the oath; if administered, it will be without legal authority, and void; no indictment will lie for false swearing at the election, or for admitting bad or rejecting good votes; it will be the farce of Louisiana and Arkansas acted over again under the forms of this bill, but not by authority of *law*.

But when we come to the guarantees of future peace which Congress meant to enact, the forms as well as the substance of the bill must yield to the President's will, that *none* should be *imposed*.

It was the solemn resolve of Congress to protect the loyal men of the nation against three great dangers, (1) the return to power of the guilty leaders of the rebellion, (2) the continuance of slavery, and (3) the burden of the rebel debt.

Congress *required* assent to those provisions by the Convention of the State; and if refused, it was to be dissolved. The President "holds for naught" that resolve of Congress, because he is unwilling "to be inflexibly committed to any one plan of restoration," and the people of the United States are not to be allowed to protect themselves unless their enemies agree to it.

The order to proceed according to the bill is, therefore, merely at the will of the rebel States; and they have the option to reject it, accept the proclamation of the 8th of December, and demand the President's recognition!

Mark the contrast! The bill requires a majority, the proclamation is satisfied with one-tenth; the bill requires one oath, the proclamation another; the bill ascertains voters by registering, the proclamation by guess; the bill exacts adherence to existing territorial limits, the proclamation admits of others; the bill governs the rebel States *by law*, equalizing all before it, the proclamation commits them to the lawless discretion of military governors and provost-marshals; the bill forbids electors for President, the proclamation and defeat of the bill threaten us with civil war for the admission or exclusion of such votes; the bill exacted exclusion of dangerous enemies from power and the relief of the nation from the rebel debt, and the prohibition of slavery for ever, so that the suppression of the rebellion will double our resources to bear or pay the national debt, free the masses from the old domination of the rebel leaders, and eradicate the cause of the war; the proclamation secures neither of these guarantees.

It is silent respecting the rebel debt, and the political exclusion of rebel leaders; leaving *slavery* exactly where it was by law at the outbreak of the rebellion, and adds no guarantee even of the freedom of the slaves he undertook to manumit. It is summed up in an illegal oath, without a sanction, and therefore void. The oath is to support all proclamations of the President, during the rebellion, having reference to slaves.

Any government is to be accepted at the hands of one-tenth of the people not contravening *that oath. Now, that oath neither secures the abolition of slavery nor adds any security to the freedom of the slaves the President declared free.*

It does not secure the abolition of slavery; for the proclamation of freedom merely professed to free certain slaves while it recognized the institution.

Every Constitution of the rebel States, at the outbreak of the rebellion, may be adopted without the change of a letter; for none of them contravene that proclamation; none of them establish slavery.

It adds no security to the freedom of the slaves. For their title is the proclamation of freedom.

If it be unconstitutional, an oath to support it is void. Whether constitutional or not, the oath is without authority of law, and therefore void.

If it be valid and observed, it exacts no enactment by the State, either in law or Constitution, to add a State guarantee to the proclamation title; and the right of a slave to freedom is an open question before the State Courts on the relative authority of the State law and the proclamation.

If the oath binds the one-tenth who take it, it is not exacted of the other nine-tenths who succeed to the control of the State government; so that it is annulled instantly by the act of recognition.

What the State Courts would say of the proclamation, who can doubt?

But the master would not go into Court—he would seize his slave.

What the Supreme Court would say, who can tell?

When and how is the question to get there?

No *habeas corpus* lies for him in the United States Court; and the President defeated with his bill its extension of that writ to this case.

Such are the fruits of this rash and fatal act of the President—*a blow at the friends of his administration, at the rights of humanity, and at the principles of Republican Government. The President has greatly presumed on the forbearance which the supporters of his administration have so long practised, in view of the arduous conflict in which we are engaged,*

and the reckless ferocity of our political opponents.

But he *must understand that our support is of a cause and not of a man; that the authority of Congress is paramount, and must be respected; that the whole body of the Union men of Congress will not submit to be impeached by him of rash and unconstitutional legislation, and if he wishes our support he must confine himself to his executive duties—to obey and execute, not make the laws—to suppress by arms armed rebellion, and leave political re-organization to Congress.*

If the supporters of the Government fail to insist on this, they become responsible for the usurpations which they fail to rebuke, and are justly liable to the indignation of the people, whose rights and security, committed to their keeping, they sacrifice.

Let them consider the remedy for these usurpations, and, having found it, fearlessly execute it.

B. F. Wade, *Chairman Senate Committee.*
H. Winter Davis,
Chairman Committee House of Representatives on the Rebellious States.

OUR PROFOUNDEST PERIL.

[*From the Tribune, September* 3, 1863.]

* * * * * *

But even dismemberment, through the triumph of the Confederate traitors, is not our chief peril. That involves our country's degradation to an insignificant rank among the nations; but a free people may accept and happily adorn such rank, as the history of Switzerland attests. It would be a great misfortune to be thus struck down; but it would not be absolute ruin. That can only overtake us through a loss of the spirit of liberty. Rome, with Hannibal thundering at her gates, was in imminentt peril. With Nero domineering over her cringing Senate and corrupted populace, though her external grandeur was unequalled, her armies everywhere triumphant, she was utterly undone.

In times of public peril like the present, it seems necessary to wink at official acts of arbitrary power, which would not be endured a moment in a state of peace. We do not surrender our liberties, but we hold them in abeyance while the nation's fate trembles in the balance. *We are living under a regime, not of law, but of force.* "*In law the war is silent,*" is the gist of a very old maxim. *Any of us may be snatched up at a moment's notice, immured in prison indefinitely, without other warrant than some functionary's order, and whoever is must make the best of his fate,* knowing that it is casual and transitory. In our poor judgment, *nine-tenths of the arbitrary arrests thus far, had better not been made,* and we would not deprive the government of the power to make them in a crisis like the present. Let it be distinctly understood, however, that each arrest will be made the subject of rigid and dispassionate inquiry after peace, and that, while no one should suffer for his innocent mistakes, in honestly endeavoring to serve and save the country, it will go very hard with any one who is proved to have gratified his own malice, or his love of exercising despotic power, without the warrant of a public necessity.

What we mainly apprehend, however, is not that individuals shall suffer—they always do and must suffer in a convulsion like this—but that *the salutary popular instinct, which guards with jealousy every infringement of constitutional safeguard for liberty, may be debauched and broken down.* We fear there are too many patriots this day who, if their hearts were laid open, would be willing to reward, with an imperial crown, the military genius who would speedily and utterly crush out the rebellion. In view of this tendency, it is in one sense fortunate that our struggle has as yet developed no Cromwell, Napoleon, nor even an Andrew Jackson. Corrupted as public sentiment has become, by forty years truckling to the slave power, too many might be willing to evince their gratitude to the saviour of our nationality, by making him a present of our liberty. * * * What we are concerned with is not the monstrous perversion of a current history of a great European nation, but *the lurking disease in our own system, which is betrayed by the patient reception and ready toleration of such impudent apologies for usurpation by conspiracy and wholesale murder.* Be sure that the people, who are prepared to listen with complacency to column after column of such excuses for the overthrow, by military force, of a sister Republic, and the establishment, on its ruins of an ultra Asiatic despotism, are *not too secure in the enjoyment of their own liberties.*

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York,
and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 19.

CAMPAIGN SONGS.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 1.

The Cry is, "Mac, my Darling."

AIR—"*Oh, my Nora Creina, dear.*"

Mac, my darling, proud I am
To hear that you've been nominated;
Last we met at Antietam,
Where you the rebel might abated.
In the seven days' fight I stood
Beside you on the hills and meadows,
And while our brave boys poured their blood,
We knew your heart was throbbing with us!
Oh, my captain, dear and true, [you
The coward tongues that would ignore
Are base as false—thank Heaven they are few!
Your soldiers trust you and adore you.

Abe may crack his jolly jokes
O'er bloody fields of stricken battle,
While yet the ebbing life-tide smokes
From men that die like butchered cattle;
He, ere yet the guns grow cold,
To pimps and pets may crack his stories;
Your name is of the grander mould,
And linked with all our brightest glories!
Oh, my general, dear and true,
The lying tongues that would defame you,
Are base as false—thank Heaven they are few!
For as our chosen chief we claim you.

They say—these dogs of churlish heart,
Who never heard a bullet whistle—
You'd let the Union drift apart
Like down-flakes from a shaking thistle;
They say, oh captain—but the words
Stick in our throats—we can't adjust 'em'
But lift to Heaven our dinted swords,
And answer only this: "We trust him!"
Yes, oh friend of rights and laws,
Despite the sneers of fool or craven,
Where hearts beat highest for the cause,
You have your home, your shrine and haven!

With patient toil and pitying breast
You sought your soldiers' blood to treasure,
Nor ever tried the cruel test,
How much we could endure to measure.
They feared you, for they saw our love;
To win success they would not let you;
But while the white stars shine above,
The boys you led will ne'er forget you!
Yes, oh captain! loved and true,
Desert you—we would perish rather;
Thank Heaven the hearts are not a few
That call you brother, friend and father!

FIRST DIVISION, SECOND ARMY CORPS,
IN FIELD, September 5.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 2.

The Veteran's Story.

"Crack! crack! went the rifles, and sharper each crack:
We heard a quick gallop—up rode little Mac.
'Twas 'Forward, my lads!' We went in with a dash;
There was cheer upon cheer, then a volleying crash,
A rush, a blind tumult, a shattering peal,
A thundered 'Charge bayonets!' the clash of cold steel,
A sharp, sudden pang, and, still clutching my gun,
As I fainted, I heard a 'Hurrah, boys! they run!'"

So the old veteran spoke, and, forgetting how much
His lame leg would pain him, he flourished his crutch;
The twinge stopped him short, and across his scarred face
There wrinkled a something, half smile, half grimace.

"Had you seen," he went on, "our young general when
He heard rolling round him the shouts of his men.
He shut up his field-glass, and let the reins fall,
And wiped his hot brow, and looked round on us all.

I shall never f rget the proud glance of his eye,
His smile of calm triumph his bearing so high,
But it all faded out as he saw where I lay;
('Twas a bayonet-thrust made me this cripple they say),
And he spoke, his voice choking," (the vet-'ran's did too),
"'My brave lad, I wish I could bear it for you.'
Do you wonder," he cried, and looked down at his limb,
"If I'd twenty to give I would give them for him?"

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 3.

McClellan the Brave.

AIR—"*Columbia the Gem of the Ocean.*"

What means this exciting commotion?
What means all this rallying of men?
And those shouts like the roar of old ocean—
Hark! we hear them again and again.
'Tis an army of freemen uprising,
Our birthrights from tyrants to save;
An army with banners and torches,
And our leader, McClellan the brave.

CHORUS.

Our leader McClellan the brave,
Our leader McClellan the brave:
An army with banners and torches,
And our leader McClellan the brave.

II.

Shout our war-cry wherever your voices
Can proclaim to the world where we stand,
And tell that a nation rejoices
That her day of redemption's at hand.
Let the friends of the UNION now muster,
The life of that UNION to save;
Not a star shall fade out of the cluster
If We're led by McClellan the brave.

CHORUS.

If we're led by McClellan the brave,
If we're led by McClellan the brave,
Not a star shall fade out of the cluster
If we're led by McClellan the brave.

III.

We have suffered in silence and sorrow,
Till our patience is quite worn away;
And we pray for the light of to-morrow,—
The dawn of our victory's day.
From the East and the West we are coming,
Forever our banner shall wave,
Defiance we bid to our foemen,
As we march with McClellan the brave.

CHORUS.

As we march with McClellan the brave,
As we march with McClellan the brave,
Defiance we bid to our foemen
As we march with McClellan the brave.

IV.

Rise up in your might, oh, ye patriots!
Fling the banner of faith to the air;
And wherever the fray shall be fiercest,
And success the most doubtful—*be there!*
Be firm in the right and unflinching,
Determined your country to save;
Make the world ring with shouts for the Union,
And hurrah for McClellan the brave

CHORUS.

Hurrah for McClellan the brave,
Hurrah for McClellan the brave,
Make the world rtng with shouts for the Union,
And hurrah for McClellan the brave.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 4.

Voice of the Army.

AIR—"*Scots wha hae wi' Wallace bled.*"

NO WORD AGAINST LINCOLN, BUT ALL ITS SOUL FOR "LITTLE MAC."

Comrades of the tented field,
Who the flag would never yield,
Making of your hearts a shield
Where the pennon flew;—
Men who have, with steady breath,
Rushed on lines of blazing death,
Thus a wounded brother saith:—
"To yourselves be true!"

Faithful to the Nation's Chief,
Work he bliss or work he grief,
Till the hour of just relief
When our votes we fling;
If he err, not ours to heed;
If he err, 'tis ours to bleed;
This the soldier's simple creed,
And to this we cling!

But, at length the hour is here
When, with soldier-conscience clear,
We in judgment may appear
On his hateful thrall.
Past respect for his high place
Bids us only veil the face,
Shrinking back from the disgrace,
Sad and silent all!

Turn, oh comrades of the tent,
Of the flag with bullets rent,
Of the field with blood besprent,
Turn to brighter skies!
See, with soldier brow and hand,
Sympathizing, calm, and grand,
Chosen Chief of all the Land,
Our own McClellan rise!

Let no ribald king or clown
Lie away our Chief's renown.
Strike the coward scoffers down,
Teach them what they are!
Bats and owlets dread the dawn,
Cowards, plunderers — all the spawn
Far from our dread work withdrawn —
Strive his way to bar.

Vain their efforts, brother tried,
Sharer of our woe and pride,
"Little Mac," our friend and guide,
Our watchword and our star!
Hail him, drums, with glad alarms,
Hail him with your fiery charms
All the din of battling arms:
YE HIS MUSIC ARE!

CHESNUT HILL, United States General Hospital,
Philadelphia, September 17, 1864.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 5.

The Hour and the Man.

AIR — "*The Bonnets of Bonny Dundee.*"

I.

When the blackness of war overshadowed the land,
The youthful McCLELLAN was called to command.
As he belted his sabre, and sprang on his steed,
'Twas Scott, the brave veteran, who bade him God-speed.

CHORUS.

Come fill up the cup, and come fill up the can,
And cheer! for the hour has come, and the man;
Our gallant young hero we've placed on the track,
And we'll seat in the White House our brave little Mac.

II.

Says Mac to his soldiers — "Strike down the armed foe,
"But to wounded and prisoners all gentleness show;
When the battle is over let violence cease, —
Remember we fight but for UNION and PEACE."

CHORUS.

III.

There were foemen before him and foes in his rear, —
In front of him Richmond; but Washington near, —
For Lee and Old Abe were in rivalry then, —
Lee killing, old Abraham stealing his men.

CHORUS.

IV.

How the army was saved — by what miracles wrought,
Ask the soldiers who under McClellan have fought;
How they felt when he lost his command, and again
When he galloped once more at the head of his men.

CHORUS.

V.

South Mountain, Antietam, encircled his name
With a halo as bright as the dawn's ruddy flame;
'Twas then — when his praises rang over the land,
Old Abra'm removed the young chief from command.

CHORUS.

VI.

The people have patiently bided their time,
To brand with their verdict the infamous crime;
In the joker's own coinage the debt we'll pay back —
Walk out Mr. Lincoln — walk in little Mac.

CHORUS.

Come fill up the cup, and come fill up the can,

And cheer! for the hour has come, and the man;
Our gallant young hero we've placed on the track,
And we'll seat in the White House our brave little Mac.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 6.

Soon We'll Have the Union Back.

AIR—"*The Hunter of Kentucky.*"

Good people all both great and small,
I sing a tale of pity;
My hand I fling across the string,
And waken up the ditty;
A ruined land that once was grand,
Is not a joking matter—
Though Abe we know, the more our woe,
The more his jokes he'll chatter!
Oh, McClellan,
Georgie B. McClellan,
Shall we have the Union back?
Tell us "Mac"—McClellan!

All evil sure we could endure,
Thrice all the ills we suffer,
Could we but glance on any chance
Our Union to recover.
There gleams one way, a flash of day,
But one bright bow of promise,
Good Lord, alack! just give us "Mac,"
And take Abe Lincoln from us!
Oh, McClellan,
Georgie B. McClellan.
The one to bring the Union back
Is only "Mac"—McClellan.

Then not a rag of our old Flag
Should ever part asunder!
"Fair terms of peace if you will cease—
If not, we'll give you thunder!"
A million swords to back our words
Beneath McClellan gleaming,
And soon, ye know, Jeff D. and Co.
For France they would be steaming!
Oh, McClellan,
Georgie B. McClellan,
Soon we'll have our prisoners back
Under "Mac"—McClellan.

The people all, both great and small,
Except the sons of Shoddy,
Are on the track for "Little Mac"—
They're with him soul and body;
For well they know the nation's woe
Can never be abated
Till in command of all the land
Our Chief we have instated!
Oh, McClellan,
Georgie B. McClellan,
The Union will come leaping back
Under "Mac"—McClellan.

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 7.

God Save our Noble Land.

AIR—"*America.*"

God save our noble land,
From Treason's two-edged brand
Drawn to devour!
From fierce Rebellion's rage,
Matchless on History's page;
God save our heritage
By his high power.

From equal woe of lust,
That treads into the dust
Our league of State;
That, ruling, breaks the law,
And, fighting, blackens war;
God save us from its maw
Insatiate!

O, God! we're wroth to feel
The rasp of Faction's heel
On Freedom's neck!
Nor shudder less to know
How those we trusted so,
To thwart, with right, the foe,
Our fond hopes wreck!

Save, then, our fathers' God!
The land our fathers' trod
With trust in thee.
Thou gavest them a chief,
Oh! send us, too, relief;
And let the reign be brief,
Of Tyranny.

Our fathers' George was Thine;
In him Thy light did shine
On Freedom's flag.
Their sons two Georges trust,
Oh! make them strong and just,
And let them to the dust
All factions drag!

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 8.

War Democratic View of McClellan's Nomination.

"He will immediately take steps to bring about a cessation of hostilities." — *Chicago Platform.*

CORPORAL CASEY SOLUS. AIR — "*Ould Ireland, you're my Darling.*"

May I niver taste bite nor sup to-night
But I joy to hear the story,
For the Rebels 'll catch in McClellan their match,
An' we'll soon have "payce" wid glory!
Such "steps" he will take as 'll make 'em awake
To a sinse of their situation,
An' wid thrayson dead on a bloody bed
Of the war we shall have a "cessation!"

CHORUS OF SOLDIERS. AIR: "*Yankee Doodle.*"

That's the kind of talk for us,
That's the peace we covet; —
Treason dead on a bloody bed,
And our starry flag above it!

CORPORAL CASEY AS BEFORE:

Little Mac's the man wid a wholesome plan
For an airly "payce" attainin', —
Wid threble might to purshue the fight
Decisive triumphs gainin'!
We do hate and abhor every form 'o war,
We but fight for con-ciliation,
An' wid thrayson dead on a bloody bed
Of the war we shall have a "cessation!"

CHORUS OF SOLDIERS AS BEFORE:

That's the kind of talk for us,
That's the peace we covet, —
Treason dead on a bloody bed,
And the stars and stripes above it!

CORPORAL CASEY AS BEFORE:

Och! The hour is nigh to see them fly
In wild confusion scatthered,
From their broken lines, an' their murdherin' mins,
An' their earthwork torn an' tatthered!
Wid a fiery brand in wan stout hand,
And an olive branch in the other, —
They will all come back undher "Little Mac,"
An' we'll have an end o' the bother!

CHORUS OF SOLDIERS AS BEFORE:

That comes home to the southern heart,
That's the way to strike it, —
"The brand in hand if you still withstand,
The olive branch if you like it!"

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 9.

We subjoin what we believe to be the first campaign song ever written in behalf of the Democratic nominee for President. It was composed early in the August of 1861, immediately after the first Bull Run, and when General McClellan was first called to save our endangered national capital from capture. It is valuable as giving what was then the army feeling, and feeling of the country; and its allusion to McClellan's early and very important victories in West Virginia will be read with interest. The song, we may add, is not original in our columns, having achieved wide popularity in army circles more than three years ago: —

"There's no such Word as Fail, Boys."

BY ONE OF THE RANK AND FILE.

AIR — "*The Low-backed Car.*"

McDowell's day is over —
A true and gallant man,
With a heart as big as a bullock's heart,
But wanting a head to plan;
Now brighter hours are dawning,
And brighter hopes me hail;
For with young McClellan to lead our lines,
There's no such word as fail!
There's no such word as fail, boys;
There's no such word as fail!
For with young McClellan to lead our lines,
There's no such word as fail!

No fault against McDowell,
No blame have we to urge,
He wasn't a red-tape martinet,
That soldiers pest and scourge!
Warm-hearted was McDowell,
His courage proof of mail, —
But he did belong to that luckless class
Who do know how to fail:
Who do know how to fail, boys,
As witness all our men;
But with young McClellan to lead our lines,
We'll try the game again!

Virginia's western counties
Resound McClellan's name,
Philippi, Grafton, Romney are
The first-fruits of his fame;
And soon the lurid halo
Of the rebel flag shall pale,
For McClellan belongs to the chosen class
Who don't know how to fail!
Who don't know how to fail boys,
Who won't know how to fail,
Who couldn't be taught at whatever price,
The will or the way to fail.

So burnish up your weapons, boys,
And keep your powder dry,
Bull Run will have done us a deal of good
When next the same we try;
One fair, square chance but give us, boys,
And you'll see the rebels quail;
For our leader is now of the chosen class,
Who don't know how to fail!
Who don't know how to fail, boys,
Who won't know how to fail,
And who cannot be taught at whatever price,
The will or the way to fail!

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 10.

The New Yankee Doodle.

Brothers East, and brothers West,
Blent in true communion,
Loving peace, but loving best —
And evermore — the UNION!
Little Mac and trusty Pen —
Names we join so handy —
They shall be our banner men,
Yankee doodle dandy!

We have got a work to do,
For this Yankee nation;
And we mean to put it through
Spite of all creation!
Little Mac, &c.

We by wit, and toil, and skill,
Must save our starry banner;
And, by George and Pen! we will,
In the neatest manner.
Little Mac, &c.

Columbia bids us free her flag
From a double treason,
Flaunting South, a bastard rag,
North, a mask of reason.
Little Mac, &c.

Far and wide, War's horrid brand
Sways its red dominion;
We must sheathe it, and our hand
Loose the Dove's white pinion
Little Mac, &c.

We must bring our brothers back
Erring but repenting,
Opening to them Honor's track,
And from Hate relenting.
Little Mac, &c.

In our hands averted swords,
No less keen for sheathing,
And upon our lips kind words,
Peace and Union breathing.
Little Mac, &c.

We have had enough of wool,
Quite too much of shoddy;
We must break up Lincoln's school
With — "Exit Everybody!"
Little Mac, &c.

Little Mac will take the chair,
And prove the better teacher;
Doing justice everywhere —
As bids the Sacred Preacher.
Little Mac, &c.

Swords to ploughshares shall be turned,
And bullets into ballots;
And, evermore, the counsel spurned,
Both North and South — of Zealots!
Little Mac, &c.

O brothers, let us falter not
Nor of a doubt be tellin';
All other watchwords be forgot —
In "Union and McClellan!"
Little Mac, &c.

Our foes in Lincoln green are clad,
But we in Truth's blue armor;
They with the lust of Power are mad,
But Right's our only charmer.
Little Mac, &c.

Yet a month, and little mere,
All their hordes shall perish;
While we cheer, from shore to shore,
The Georges both we cherish.
Little Mac and trusty Pen,
Names we join so handy;
They shall be our banner men —
Yankee doodle dandy!

The "World's" Campaign Songs, No. 11.

Union and Peace.

Air — "*America.*"

My Country! from thy woes,
From all thy gathering foes,
There comes release!
Yon banner wide is flung;
Behold its folds among,
Words breathed by every tongue —
Union and Peace.

The Jester jests in state,
The Zealot gluts his hate,
And spoils the land.
They hear the orphan's cry,
The parent's saddening sigh,
The widow's wail float by,
Yet mocking stand.

What care they that distress, —
That woe and want oppress
A people free?
Free thought they seek to kill;
Prisons with victims fill;
With haughty, lawless will,
Crush Liberty.

Their reckoning day draws nigh:
Aye! Hear the people cry
Trickster away!
Corruption, weakness, guile,
Misrule and malice vile —
A nation's bane long while,
Give place to-day.

Aye! thunder forth the shout!
Aye! fling the banner out
Which tyrants shun,
Our Constitution free;
McClellan, Liberty,
And let the chorus be,
THE UNION WON.

Then bear our banner high;
The Union saved — we cry
Let warring cease!
Our Rally-cry shall be, —
Speech, press, and ballot free;
McClellan, Liberty,
Union, and Peace.

For the Journal of Commerce.

McClellan and Union.

In the day of our peril, the day of our need,
When our banner droops low o'er the blood-reddened plain,
See! the hero McClellan steps forward to lead
Our nation disheartened to glory again.
The UNION his watchword; the Union of old,
To our patriot fathers more precious than gold,
Our own sacred birthright, by counsel or sword,
The Union—it must and it shall be restored!

Too long have fanatics, more zealous than brave,
The fires of dissension and anarchy fanned,
And traitors, loud heralded *loyal*, but gave
Fresh food to the flames that were wasting the land,
They mocked at the blood that so nobly was shed,
And the warnings forgot of our patriot dead;
And when in defiance the Southron uprose,
For *conquest* they eagerly rushed on their foes.

Yes, false was the war-note they sounded, when first
"To arms for the Union," was heard thro' the land,
Already for conquest and vengeance athirst,
Their reign o'er the ruins of Union was planned.
Their pretence to sever the African's chain,
For this they would fling to the winds, as in vain,
The rights that our forefathers perished to save,
And see Anarchy triumph o'er Liberty's grave.

From the fields of the slain, from the desolate land,
With the dark cloud of tyranny hovering nigh,
A leader, a hero, the people demand,
Who will dare for his country to do or to die.
One with wisdom to plan, and with strength to abide
By the counsels which genius and courage have tried,
Who will lead back our country to glory and power —
God bless our McClellan — the man for the hour!

McClellan the patriot, whose record shines pure,
Unstained and unchanged from the first to the last;
Serene in his triumph, or calm to endure
The arrows which envy and calumny cast.
McClellan the warrior! whose deeds and whose fame,
No song and no trumpet have need to proclaim —
Ah! thousands of brave men, in battle's hot breath,
'Neath the glance of his eye would cheer on to the death.

McClellan and Union! let this be our cry,
And the reign of the despot and traitor shall cease;
A nation shall lift up our standard on high,
And rejoice in the dawning of triumph and peace.
McClellan and Union! In God is our trust —
This temple of Liberty cannot be dust:
Our own sacred birthright — by counsel or sword —
The UNION it must and it WILL be restored!

Our Captive Soldiers.

A UNION SOLDIER TO SECRETARY STANTON.

Twenty-five acres of homestead, —
Meadow, orchard, and spring, —
And amid the laden fruit trees
The voices of song-birds ring.
Where the rippling stream glides lightly
By the fields of rustling corn,
And the winter hearth shines ruddy
When the summer days are gone.

I left that dear old homestead,
In the North, to join the fight;
To brighten our country's honor,
Or die to set her right.
To fight 'mid the smoke and rattle
Where the deadly bullets hiss,
To find a death in battle,
But not such a death as this.

Twenty-five acres of mire,
Cut by a filthy trench;
Stumps, and swamps, and brier;
Vermin, offal, and stench.
Through that black ditch is crawling
The drainings of a sink
Rippled with living corruption,
And this we have to drink!

Thirty thousand wretches
People this region infernal; —
Fathers, brothers, husbands,
In misery seeming eternal!

Twenty-five acres o f white men!
(Oh, happier those who fell!)
Whenever new-comers enter,
They whisper, "Is this hell?"

Naked, with nothing to shelte
Against the hot sun's ray;
Hungering, wasting, starving;
Dying a hundred a day.

Horrors no tongue can utter;
Horrors of which could boast
No Black Hole of Calcutta,
No pen on the African coast.

Oh! you who have brought us to it,
And left us in our despair,
(No hope of exchange or succor,)
As you sit in your cushioned chair,
Think what will be *your* portion
In future, — not one of bliss!
To-morrow *I'll* cross the "dead line,"
And make an end to this.

THE STOCKADE PRISON,
ANDERSONVILLE, Ga.

"Traitors, Clear the Track."

BY WALTER ANONYM.

AIR — "*Scots wha hae.*"

[From The Boston Post.]

Democrats! whom Jackson led,
Whigs! with Webster at your head,
Forward, with elastic tread:
'Tis a common cause.
Come, united heart and hand,
To redeem our cherished land,
By the Noble "Union" stand,
And our sacred Laws.

By the cursed "free-soil" fraud,
By those specious lies abroad,
Shout we now, with one accord,
Union! — "Little Mac!"
O'er each valley, lake, and dell,
Where a patriot's soul doth dwell,
Shall the thrilling chorus swell:
"Traitors, clear the track!"

See! the eagle from his crag
Leaps, to greet the Union flag;
Who would falter now, or lag
At his Country's call?
Up! the time is flying fast!
List, McClellan's bugle blast!
Up! restore the glorious past!
Forward, one and all!

By our youthful heroes' graves
Strewn where'er the "Old Flag" waves,
Ne'er shall Abolition knaves
Rule our land again.
Purge the land of every trace
Of the sordid, hireling race:
Every mark and line efface
Of the loathsome stain.

We shall need no "sobriquet"
To excite our ranks to-day;
Peace and glory lead the way,
No more spur we back.
On our glorious banner, see!
Union! Laws! *true Liberty!*
Thirty millions of the free!
"Traitors, clear the track!"

Not the Chieftain from the wars,
Red with blood, and rough with scars,
Not the ghastly son of Mars
Do we honor now;
But the patriot, brave and bold,
Unsubdued and uncontrolled,
With the "Old Flag's" tattered fold
Wreathed around his brow.

Dally not! the hour draws near,
'Tis the time for *faith*, not fear:
Steadily the "Old Ship" steer
Through the stormy rack.
O'er each valley, lake, and dell,
Where a patriot's soul doth dwell,
Let the thrilling chorus swell:
"Traitors, clear the track!"

Rally round McClellan.

A PARODY BY BOZ.

AIR — "*Battle Cry of Freedom.*"

Yes, we'll rally round McClellan, boys, rally once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.
And we'll rally from the hillside, we'll gather from the plain,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

CHORUS.

The Union forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah!

Down with Abe Lincoln, up with the star;
While we rally round McClellan, boys, rally
once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

We are springing to the call of our brothers
dear and brave,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.
And we'll aid them with our votes our country
now to save,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

CHORUS.

The Union forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah!
Down with Abe Lincoln, up with the star;
While we rally round McClellan, boys, rally
once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

We will welcome to our numbers all loyal
men and true,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.
Who will never with their hands in their bro-
thers' blood imbrue,
Shouting the battle cry of Union.

CHORUS.

The Union forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah!
Down with Abe Lincoln, up with the star;
While we rally round McClellan, boys, rally
once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

So we're springing to the call from the East
and from the West,
Shouting the battle cry of Union.
For McClellan is the man we have loved the
best,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

CHORUS.

The Union forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah!
Down with Abe Lincoln, up with the star;
While we rally round McClellan, boys; rally
once again,
Shouting the battle-cry of Union.

McClellan, the Pride of the Nation.

DEDICATED TO THE KEYSTONE CLUB, PHILADELPHIA.

AIR — "*The Red, White, and Blue.*"

McClellan, the pride of the Nation!
Our hearts and our voices unite
To hail our country's salvation,
And rejoice in the triumph of right.

The people already have spoken,
Proclaimed him the man of their choice,
The rod of the despot is broken,
And every true heart must rejoice.
Then, hurrah for the man of our choice;
Three cheers for the chief of our choice,
The people already have spoken,
McClellan's the man of our choice.

The gloom which so long has hung o'er us,
Will vanish and soon disappear;
And a radiant future before us,
The heart of the nation will cheer,
As of old, ere foul treason assailed it,
The banner of Union shall wave, —
The hope of the millions who hailed it, —
The flag of the free and the brave.
Hurrah for the free and the brave,
The flag of the free and the brave,
The hope of the millions who hailed it,
The flag of the free and the brave.

With McClellan the Chief of the Nation,
The Union of old he'll restore,
And give us an administration
Of Justice and Honor once more.
The Arch of the Union unbroken, —
Its Keystone as firm as of old;
Yes, the people already have spoken,
The triumph of right is foretold.
Then hurrah for the man of our choice!
Three cheers for the Chief of our choice,
The people already have spoken,
McClellan's the man of our choice.

McClellan Campaign Song.

Hark! hear ye the bugle that rouses the people
To save this great nation from ruin and shame?
Whose loud notes are ringing o'er hill and o'er valley,
Proclaiming our faith in McClellan's proud name.
Then up with our banner! Our gallant young leader
Is our best and our bravest — His deeds are our fame.

No jokes from his lips when the whole land is sodden
With the blood that has burst from the hearts of our braves;
When the face of our country, 'neath the hot breath of battles
Where our heroes have struggled, is blistered to graves.

Then up with our banner! Emblazoned upon it,
"We'll give to the country the man that she craves."

He will carry the flag he has led on to battle, —
Not a star would he tear from its broad field of blue;
The flag that 'mid sorrows, privations, and troubles,
O'er the heads of our Fathers triumphantly flew.
Then up with our banner! Our hero and statesman
Can conquer all storms that fanatics can brew.

We don't label him "honest," experience teaches
That trumpeting trademarks but cover deceit;
No rebuke from his lips of his senseless detractors;
His glorious record all falsehood can meet.
Then up with our banner for General McClellan!
Our hopes and our honors we throw at his feet.

He tells us no stories to suit the occasion,
When gravest of destinies balance the scale;
He acts like a man and he talks like a statesman,
Though we never yet heard of his "splitting a rail."
Then up with our banner for George B. McClellan!
With him as our leader, say, how can we fail?

History of the Rise and Fall of the Irrepressible Conflict.

AIR — "*Villikens and his Dinah.*"

There was an old joker in Springfield did dwell,
He wandered all over his stories to tell;
He joked irrepressibly by night and by day,
Till his smutty jokes drove decent people away.

(*Spoken* — Chorus for the smutty joker and the Ohio clergymen.)

Ri tu ral, ri tu ral, ri tu ral li da,
Ri tu ral, ri tu ral, ri tu ral li da,
Ri tu ral, ri tu ral, ri tu ral li da,
Ri tu ral, ri tu ral, ri tu ral li da.

Lonely he sat in his rickety chair,
His pockets was empty, his table was bare,
Says he, "I have joked all my fortune away,
I will starve if I don't find some joke that will pay."

(*Spoken* — Chorus for the joker looking for something to turn up.)

Ri tu ral, &c.

He put on his hat, to the street he did go;
Through the highways and byways he went to and fro;
He hunted and squinted through high and through low,
Till all at last he espied a good jolly negro.

(*Spoken* — A good strong chorus for the almighty negro.)

Ri tu ral, &c.

This darky was jolly as jolly could be—
A rollicking, frollicking, darky was he;
His ears and his mouth were a musical riddle,
His leg like a drumstick, his foot like a fiddle.

(*Spoken* — chorus for the jolly nigger.)

Ri tu ral, &c.

He looked him all over from his head to his foot;
Says the joker, "I think this fellow will suit;
I have it — I have it — I see how I may
With Sambo get up a good joke that will pay."

(*Spoken* — Chorus for the inventor of the irrepressible conflict.)

Ri tu ral, &c.

So he called together the people so dear,
They mustered and rallied from far and from near;
They crowded around him one fine summer day,
To listen and learn what the joker would say.

(*Spoken* — Chorus for the first Black Republican mass-meeting.

Ri tu ral, &c.

He talked of the wrongs of the negro so loud,
Till he touched the poor tender hearts of the crowd;
He talked till he made the fools all believe,
And the joker and Sambo both laughed in their sleeve.

(*Spoken* — Chorus for the joker and Sambo, the Siamese twins.)

Ri tu ral, &c.

They sighed and they sobbed as they crowded around,
They cried till their tears ran down to the ground;
Their poor tender hearts were exceedingly sore,
They wondered they never had seen it before.
(*Spoken* — Solemcholy chorus for the weeping Wide-Awakes.)
Ri tu ral, &c.

When the joker had found what a hit he had made,
He started with Sambo a full stock in trade;
And the madmen and fools shouted loud as he went,
"The joker we'll have for our next President."
(*Spoken* — Chorus for torch-light processions.)
Ri tu ral, &c.

'Mid the smoke and the fumes of the Wide-Awake torch, —
Like the ravings of madmen in drunken debauch, —
'Mid the groans for the nigger, and the devil to pay,
They elected the joker one unlucky day.
(*Spoken* — Chorus for the rail-splitter drifted into the apex of great events, — *Lincoln to the Canadian Peace Committee.*
Ri tu ral, &c.

To the sequel we look with sad'ning eye,
While the plaints of the widow ascend to the sky,
While the tears of the orphan and blood of the slain
Point the finger of Banquo to the joker again.
(*Spoken* — We'll omit the chorus: there there is no joke in this.)

Now debt and taxation pile high up the while,
Like pyramids reared on the banks of the Nile;
While the toils of our fathers all vanish in smoke,
We begin then to see the point of the joke.
(*Spoken* — A very long chorus for shoddy and greenbacks.)
Ri tu ral, &c.

And now, my dear hearers, I'll finish my song:
There's an end to the joke, and we'll have it ere long;
When "MAC" and his legions, the people have spoke,
They'll send him to Springfield to finish the joke.
(*Spoken* — The Chorus will be sixteen good hearty cheers for GEN. MCCLELLAN.)
Hurrah! hurrah! hurrah! hurrah!
(Repeat four times.)

A Song for the Boys.

TUNE — "*Yankee Doodle.*"

Come on, my jolly boys, and sing
Of Mac and of Antietam;
The Union we shall soon restore,
The rebels — we shall beat them.

With "Little Mac" we'll make them crack,
And put them in confusion,
If they refuse to heed the laws
And mind the Constitution.

With "Little Mac" upon the track
And Pendleton beside him,
We'll beat old Abe, the basswood babe,
With Fremont, too, astride him.

Old Uncle Abe is a used up babe,
With all his jokes and toddy;
The Copperheads have seen the threads
That were not in the shoddy.

Come on my jolly boys and sing
Of "Little Mac," the victor,
We'll show old Abe he can't be king,
Nor Fremont be dictator.

The Habeas Corpus we'll restore,
And all the Constitution;
The rebels South and traitors North
Shall meet with retribution.

Hurrah! my brave old army boys,
Make haste to save the nation;
Our Mac will lead without the need
Of a comet proclamation.

Our "Little Mac" is just the man
To restore the nation's glories;
He never will on battle-field
Indulge in smutty stories.

The "loyal" leagues who go for war
For the sake of speculation,
May take the shovel or the hoe,
Or perish by starvation.

"Little Mac" upon the Track.

AIR—"*Tippecanoe and Tyler too.*"

Oh have you heard the glorious tidings
Coming from the West?
The people are rising to a man,
And have put "Little Mac" upon the track
To drive out the radical clan,
And "Old Abe" along with the rest—
For they will drive out the radical clan.

When he took the chair "Abe" promised fair,
Honest to be, and true:
But he managed so badly the ship of state
That we put "Little Mac" upon the track,
And will work for him early and late;
For we must have a pilot new—
And we'll work for Mac early and late.

They told us the war would end at least
In sixty days;
But our burdens increase and will never cease
Till, with "Little Mac" upon the track,
We have one who can conquer a peace,
And our flag in triumph upraise—
For "Little Mac" can conquer a peace.

The thieves will try to make us think
Lincoln is the man;
They steal our treasure without stint or measure;
But with "Little Mac" upon the track
There will be an end to their pleasure,
Let them plunder then if they can—
For he will put an end to their pleasure.

A needless war our souls abhor,
But the UNION we'll maintain,
No luck we shall get with the present set;
But with "Little Mac" upon the track
There will be a change, you may bet;
For our rulers are foolish and vain—
And there will be a change, you may bet.

They say five hundred thousand more
The war will close;
They must go at the call like leaves to fall;
But with "Little Mac" upon the track
There will be no more drafting at all;
For he knows how to manage our foes—
And there will be no more drafting at all.

Our gallant soldiers know very well
Who holds them dear—
When in battle tried, who fought by their side;
And now "Little Mac" is upon the track,
With loud huzzas they will cheer;
For "Mac" is the soldier's pride—
And with loud huzzas they will cheer.

Then let us be up and doing our work,
The time is at hand;
Our banner is flying, and we must be trying
For "Little Mac" to keep a clear track,
For our foes will be cheating and lying;
But on truth we will take our stand—
For there will be cheating and lying.

May God grant peace and liberty,
Union forever and aye,
And gladden our sight with a future bright,
With an open track for good "Little Mac;"
For he will do the thing that is right
When "Old Abe" is out of the way—
For he will do the thing that is right.

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 21.

SPEECH OF GOVERNOR SEYMOUR

AT PHILADELPHIA.

The Governor appeared on the stage at eight o'clock, attended by the Committee of the Keystone Club. The hall was instinct with life and enthusiasm in an instant. The entire audience arose, and three stirring cheers greeted the speaker. The enthusiasm could not be quieted. Cheer followed cheer, shout echoed shout. At length Mr. Vaux conquered a temporary peace, and introduced Governor Seymour.

Mr. Seymour arose amidst the wildest and most uncontrollable enthusiasm. He said, —

GOVERNOR SEYMOUR'S ADDRESS.

Fellow-Citizens: I am suffering great pain from illness, and therefore must crave your indulgence while I attempt to speak to you with regard to the great issues which, at this time, agitate the minds of the American people. I stand before you, to-night, impressed with the magnitude of these issues. I stand before you an earnest man. I may hold mistaken views, but God knows I utter no word which is not prompted by the deep convictions of my judgment. (Cheers.) I do not stand here to-night in the spirit of intolerance, or to excite your passions or your prejudices against that portion of our fellow-citizens who do not agree with us in political sentiment. If I am honored by the presence of one of those who differ with us in regard to our duty at this time, I ask of him that, for the moment, he will lay aside his prejudices and listen to me while I shall attempt to show him, with entire respect, why I believe that it is not in the power of this administration to save the Union, and that to place that administration in power for four years more, would be dangerous to the liberties of the Union. (Loud cheering.) I do not claim superior wisdom. I do not claim for the Democratic party unerring judgment. I do not ask our Republican friends to yield to us in any degree, but simply to listen to the wisdom of our fathers. I ask them to return to the paths they trod when our country was great and prosperous. (Applause.) I look upon public affairs from a peculiar stand-point; one which gives me opportunities of seeing the waste of this terrible war in which we are engaged. The State of New York, since the commencement of this war, has sent about three hundred and fifty thousand men to the field. We have contributed in our due proportion — as the State of Pennsylvania and other States in this confederacy have contributed their just quota to sustain the armies of the government in the contest in which it is engaged. You know that under the peculiar organizations of the State governments, the governors of the respective States have many opportunities of knowing of the progress of the war better than the administration at Washington. It has been my duty to commission the officers of the State of New York. It has been my duty to give commissions to the young men of that State who have gone forth in the bloom and beauty and pride of their manhood, alas, many of them never to return to their peaceful homes, and the embraces of their families. (Applause.) I have seen much of the waste of this terrible war, in sweeping our young men into early graves, or imposing upon our country unwonted taxation that, in various forms, has been imposed upon the country, to enable it to carry on the war to a successful issue. Standing then amid new-made graves — the graves of hundreds and thousands of our strong and vigorous young men — the hope of our country — we should be recreant to our duty, false to liberty, and untrue to the memory of our fathers, if we did not call this administration to judgment, and demand of them an account of the blood and treasure that they have called for, and which has been so freely poured forth at their command. (Applause.)

Under the Constitution of the United States, it is not only our right but our duty to sit in judgment upon the policy of that administration. We are to do this, not in any spirit of passion or prejudice, but as it becomes men entrusted with the great liberties conferred upon us by the Constitution of the land. (Repeated cheers.)

This war has now been carried on for three years. This government has had placed at its disposal about two million five hundred thousand men. There has been no demand made upon the country for money that has not been responded to by all classes of citizens. I appeal to you, my Republican friends, if this is not true. While we have differed from you on questions of policy—while we have thought that this administration was not conducting the war on right principles—I appeal to you in this hour of our country's danger to know whether we, as well as you, have not made a free response to the demands which our government has made upon us? (Applause.) I do not propose to go into any history of the war. I accept the fact that we are at war. I accept the fact that the country is now brought to the extreme verge of peril, and the questions to-night are not the questions of the past. We are not to ask ourselves what brought the war about. The question is how the country, can preserve its existence and perpetuate its liberties? Draw the curtain over the past, and let us in the spirit of true manhood, without reference to past differces, determine what we shall do to save the country. (Tremendous cheering.) We have given to this administration, as I have said, more than two millions of men. You know how promptly their demands have been met. You know that from time to time they have promised us decisive results, and you know how these expectations nave been disappointed (Cheers.) When this war was commenced the government relied npon two forces to produce submission to its authority. One was the force of the armies, and the second was the force of the policy of the government. Why have we continued the war for these four years without causing the South to submit to our arms? Is it because our people have not given to the government all the support it demanded? Has it been because our sons and brothers who have gone forth to the contest have been untrue and recreant in the hour of conflict? I repel the charge, if any man be found base enough to make it. (Great Applause.) I admit that the war has been waged with varying fortune. I admit that we have sustained disaster as well as gained victories, but I contend that never in the history of the world have a people responded to the call of a government as our people have responded to the call of this administration, and never has such heroism been displayed as has been displayed by our armies in the field. (Applause.) The administration has been gratified in every wish; and war is not at an end, nor is peace restored. Has the army failed in its duty? Go to the swamps of Virginia, go to the sea-coast of South Carolina, go to the tropical fields of Louisiana, and you will find everywhere the graves of the American soldier. The soil of Virginia is become to us a sacred soil in a new and a terrible significance. (Cheers.)

At the beginning of the war, the administration said that, if we would give them seventy-five thousand men, they would put down resistance. You gave them seventy-five thousand men, and the resistance was not put down. I do not find fault with the administration for not accomplishing this with an inferior force, but I do insist that, when they assumed charge of the government of the country, they were bound to have known more of the resources of the South; they were bound to have known more of the character of our countrymen. (Great applause.) Do you remember that, three or four years ago, it was unsafe for any man to stand up in this community and attempt to show the resources and strength of the South? These things were overlooked in the spirit of arrogance, and we were told that all this resistance could be crushed out with a little force, and if any one did not believe it he was disloyal to his country, and held treasonable views. (Laughter and applause.) Now, I say that our armies, after they were filled to their proper proportions, did accomplish all that was required of them. They said, close up the Mississippi River, seal up the ports of the South, and the rebellion will die of itself (Laughter), the South is not self-sustaining. The Mississippi River was closed. The ports of the South were sealed, and the rebellion did not die. Then larger armies were needed, and the whole world was astonished at the call for six hundred thousand men. The cry was changed. They now said; open the Mississippi River, give us control of the great highway of the West, and it will bring peace and the submission of the South. Vicksburg was taken (Applause), and the Mississippi was open for the transport of our armies and the munitions of war. Not only was Vicksburg captured, but the army of Pemberton was destroyed. West of the Mississippi River there was not an organized force of any respectable strength opposing the Union troops. Lee's army was defeated at Gettysburg. Following these victories the country gave the government six or seven hundred thousand men to add to the armies in the field; and more, the people, thinking that they could trust this administration, gave them also political power, so that they stood nine months ago not only a government at the head of the greatest armies ever known in history, but a government that, as the elections in the free States showed, was sustained by the people through the whole Union.

I believe that all, notwithstanding political views and political prejudices, will admit that our armies have done their work. We, in common with our Republican friends, have honored the names of Grant and Farragut, Sherman, Sheridan, and all the heroes of the war. We deny that their efforts have been unsuccessful; and the blame of continued war is not with our armies. The blame rests elsewhere. It is the administration which has failed to bring this war to a close. (Repeated and prolonged cheering.) I aver that the failure is only due to the policy of the ad-

ministration. (Applause.) I aver that our armies have not only overcome the forces of armed resistance, but have done it while at every step they have been hindered by the action of the Government at Washington. The lives of the people of the North have been cut off, and the progress of our armies at the South, obstructed by measures of the administration, which have been most fatal to us in the prosecution of the war. (Loud applause.) I do not merely deal in argumentative speculations. I call your attention to what our armies have done. The army, more than two years ago, gave us possession of Louisiana and the great commercial port of New Orleans. For two years the administration has had its own way there. What has been the result of those two years of government? They have not tranquillized one foot of land. Every man knows that the civil, political, and business condition of that State is worse to-day than it was when the armies of our country handed it over to the control of the administration at Washington. (Loud applause.)

In order to determine how far the administration at Washington has availed itself of our victories, I call you to the condition of our country at the outset of this war and then to its condition to-day. Our armies, at an enormous expenditure of life and of treasure to you and to the people of every northern State, have battled courageously southward. But what has the administration done behind them? We have it from their own lips; it is set forth in their own edicts and their own orders, — the orders which have been issued by the generals in the field with the sanction of the administration, — that rebellious discontent has travelled northward as our armies have fought their way to the South. The State of Missouri remained in this Union of its own will; there was love enough there for the Union to put down resistance to the authority of the General Government at the very outset. How is it to-day, after three years' of rule of the administration at Washington? You are compelled to make contributions in men and in money, to hold in the Union, by force, a State which originally was with us of its own will.

Look at the condition of Kentucky, one of the most glorious States in the Union, which in former times gave us statesmen whose names we love to remember — the names of Clay and of Crittenden, and associated with the memory of Jackson. When armed resistance to the authority of the Government first began, the people of Kentucky resolved to stand by us. They severed the ties of consanguinity; they broke away from the dearest associations of relationship; and you remember with what joy we hailed such men as Wickliffe, Guthrie, and Crittenden, who stood by the flag and Constitution of our land. But since the Government at Washington has taken the control of that State in hand all has changed. The presence of armies there is now required, and those men who were with us at the outset now come here to tell you of the injury and insult to which they have been subjected. My friends, it would bring tears into the eyes of the strongest men in this audience if they could listen to the recitals of men like Wickliffe, Guthrie, and others, when they tell of the insults and wrongs heaped, not upon men alone, but upon women, refined women. I ask, in God's name, in this land of ours, are men so lost to all sense of manhood, that they would tear the gentle sister and the loving wife from their homes, because they still cherish a love for one who may be fighting under the flag of the South? Now, I care not how severely war may be waged against men, but I do protest in the name of all civilization; I do protest by the love we bear to our families; I do protest in the name of the most sacred relationships that, to punish a woman for an exhibition of true womanhood, for clinging with love and tenderness even to the erring, is a mean tyranny unparalleled in history. (Great applause.) I met those men, a few days since, at Chicago. Their forms, their countenances, all about them bore the air of true nobility; and when they stated in the convention the wrongs and outrages to which they had been subjected by an ungrateful administration, — an administration which clung to them like frightened children in the early hours of peril, — it drew tears into every eye; and we felt there could be no hope from an administration that could sink so far below the level of manhood as to heap such insult upon the people of Kentucky. What has the administration done for the Union in its management of that great State?

But go a little farther eastward, to the State of Maryland. It is, perhaps, doubtful what course that State would have taken, if left free to act for itself. But, I ask you, if, for the past three years, the control of the Government, in shaping its policy and its domestic relationships, has been of a character that tended to bring that State back to its allegiance? (Cries of "No, no.") You know it to be true, that men of that State, who clung with patriotic devotion to the flag of their country, are to-day writhing under the injustice of this Government, and cursing it from their very hearts, because they have been thus trampled upon? ("That's so," and applause.) Within three days, a general, who holds military control in that State, ordered the only paper there which had put up the name of George B. McClellan (tremendous and continued cheering) for the presidency, to be suppressed. The people of Maryland were undertaking the discharge of a great and solemn duty when they entered into this presidential canvass. It is their right to criticise the action of this administration. What reason was given (and I invite your particular attention to it) — what reason was given for this action? If the paper had violated the laws, why not bring the proprietors into court? why not make some charge against them? But the

order states that the commanding officer fears there will be popular violence. We are actually told that within forty miles of the very capital itself, under the shadow of the vast armies we have given to it, the administration cannot guarantee protection to citizens in the exercise of their chartered rights. When your delegates met at Chicago, for the purpose of placing a presidential ticket in nomination, an order was issued by another general (and it has not been disavowed), that the people of Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana — States that placed Mr. Lincoln in the presidential chair; that gave him overwhelming majorities — should not be permitted to purchase powder, shot, ammunition, or arms of any description. And thus you are told by another order that, as I said, while our armies are battling southward, rebellious discontent is travelling northward, until it has reached the lakes, and in three great States of this Union, this administration has lost confidence in the people — aye, and the people have lost confidence in it. (Great applause.) I will not follow this subject further, but I implore each man, within the sound of my voice, to lay the map of our country before him; then to take the edicts of generals and the legislation of Congress, and see how far, by the showing of the administration and its friends, discontent has spread itself since the commencement of this war. Is it not then a gross wrong to the people of this country, and to the armies of the country, for them to point you to the battle-field, and tell you that there is but one way to restore the integrity of this Government, and that by force, and force alone. They tell you this to divert your attention from the fact that they have not only signally failed to coöperate with the army and to avail themselves of victories, but have undone the work of the soldier, and made it impossible for themselves to restore the Union whether we have victories or not. (Applause.)

I will assume that in the next thirty days the army of Lee is destroyed; that of Hood annihilated, and every form of organized opposition is driven out of the field; and then our Republican friends, who have looked forward hopefully to victories that were to bring us peace and union, will see for the first time the full measure of the impolicy of the acts of the administration. For the first time they will see the dangerous position into which our country has drifted, amid the smoke and carnage of battle. These victories will only establish military governments at the South, to be upheld at the expense of northern lives and treasure. They will bring no real peace if they only introduce a system of wild theories which will waste as war wastes; theories which will bring us to bankruptcy and ruin. The administration cannot give us union or peace after victories. (Applause.) Men of Pennsylvania, I remember that in former years our country, under the policy of conservative men, increased from a people of three millions to a nation of thirty millions; that within the lifetime of one man it advanced from a feeble colonial existence into the full measure of one of the mightiest powers upon the face of the earth. I saw the husbandman cheerfully laboring, sure of the fruits of his toil. The light taxation that fell upon him was nothing; he could count his gain almost clear as he pondered how he would give some new comfort to his family, some new advantage of education or of social condition to his children. I saw cheerful labor in your workshops — the machinery, instinct with life, that seemed to perform the duties almost of animated men. I saw your streams leap forth in the morning from your hills, and glide away at evening into their rest, after turning the mechanism that gave wealth to your State. To-day, the weary laborer turns up the sod with the consciousness that the larger part of his product must go to pay the cost of the blood-shed and carnage; and he labors on with still less courage when he feels that, perhaps, the son that he has looked to as the companion of his labors hereafter, is to be torn from him for the purposes of war. When I enter your home I find that the mothers, the sisters, and the wives go less cheerfully around to their daily duties; and when there is sadness by the fireside there is sadness and gloom throughout all the land. (Great applause.) How can we return again to our former condition — free and prosperous, the admiration and the envy of the world? Men may tell you that victories will do it. Victories alone will not bring back these things. If we had had a wise, just, magnanimous administration, we have already won victories enough to have given us peace, prosperity, and national happiness. (Cheers.) It is only because the public mind has been occupied with the great drama of war; it is only because you have been watching with fearful anxiety your sons and brothers in the field that you have not seen the full measure of the evils which the policy of this administration has brought upon the country. If six months ago we had achieved complete military success, and the smoke of the battle were now wafted away, there would not be found to-day one man in the land to stand up and say that it was wise or well to replace this administration in power. (Loud applause.)

Let us then assume that we have gained victory and inquire if with victories this administration can restore peace to the land. (Applause.) In the first place, you have seen how it has been in those States that have been brought back to the Union: in the border States that never went out of the Union, and in those States which gave to the administration not only military and pecuniary support, but even political support. We have found that, precisely as we have given the administration political power, in the same ratio they have trod down our political rights. ("Good! good!" Applause.) When the administration went beyond the effort to restore the Union and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and said, "We will drive the Southern people to desperation; we will unite them as one man in opposition to our armies; we will shed the blood of our people, and pile upon them onerous taxes in order that we may carry out a vindictive and

revengeful policy of confiscation," they did not stop at this. There was no unconstitutional act passed in regard to the South, that was not accompanied by an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the people of the North. (Cheers.) When they said to the South, "You shall not have the Union as it was,"—when they said, as the attorney-general of my own State said in this city, a few days ago, "We do not want the Union as it was, but the Union as it ought to be," they also suspended the *habeas corpus* in the North. When they projected confiscation for the South, the courts, laws, and judiciary of the North were trampled under foot; your personal rights were not secure; and, for the first time, our homes were liable to be invaded by the subordinates of the Government. In Great Britain the humblest hut in the kingdom, although it may be open to the winds and rains of heaven, is to the occupant a castle impregnable even to the monarch; while in our country the meanest and most unworthy underling of power is licensed to break within the sacred precincts of our homes. But, look further. As I said, armed opposition is driven from the field in Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and parts of Louisiana; and yet this portion of our country, already conquered, requires more troops to hold it under military rule than are demanded for our armies to fight the embattled forces of the Confederacy. If you will make the computation for yourselves, from the proportion of troops required to hold these States, you will find that more men will be needed to keep the South in subjection to the arbitrary projects of the administration than are required to drive the armies of rebellion from the field. The peace you are promised is no peace, but is a condition which will perpetuate and make enduring all the worst features of this war. They have passed an act of confiscation. They say to the people of the South, "When we have conquered you, we will take from you your homes and your property, and drive you out without shelter in the world." This cannot be called a war measure, because the property of a people cannot be confiscated until you can lay your hands on it. (Laughter.) It is not a measure to help our armies, for the threat of confiscation renders the resistance to them more determined and desperate.

But it may be said, when we achieve victories, then we intend to be lenient; but if you intend to be lenient after victory, why did you pass these laws to hinder victory. (Applause.) But they have done more. They have said we will mould their institutions; we will place them under a military government. Mr. Sumner would reduce the Southern States to the condition of colonies; but Mr. Lincoln says they shall be admitted back as States when one-tenth of the population shall ask it, and this one-tenth shall govern, control, and represent the State. But if only one-tenth of the people are willing to come back, who is to hold the other nine-tenths in subjugation? (Great laughter and cheering.) At whose expense is it to be done? My friends of Pennsylvania, if you want to govern Georgia—if you want to enable one-tenth of its people to exercise this extraordinary power over the other nine-tenths—you must pay for the privilege you must give up your sons to the work. You must give them up to die of lingering diseases, sickening and sad, far away from their homes, without even the poor privilege which they now have, of knowing that they die upon the battle-field for the flag of their country. Every intelligent officer of our army will tell you that the waste of life is not so great during the most active service as in periods of inaction, when the men are herding together in the camps, when the mind becomes stagnant, and the system becomes peculiarly susceptible to disease; then it is that the work of death goes swiftly on. Are you willing, men of Pennsylvania, to give up your sons to the slow, lingering death of Southern camps—in God's name for what? To inaugurate this monstrous government of one-tenth, in violation of all the principles of American liberty; to allow the administration this precedent, dangerous to yourselves, that it is right to maintain a military subjection at this enormous cost of blood and treasure. If this policy prevails, you are to have a series of drafts upon your population; you are to have increased burdens of taxation thrown upon your labor; you are to have a perpetuation of that maxim which men are not ashamed to put forth,—that monstrous libel upon our institutions,—that in times of war there are no rights which the head of your Government is bound to respect. Read your Declaration of Independence; read your Constitution. When were those great principles of public liberty and private security established? Where was it that you had worked out for you the guarantees that were afterward engraved in the Constitution, that your rights of conscience should not be interfered with; that you should have freedom of speech; that no man should lay his hand upon your person unless he did so by the sacred authority of the law; that your home, though it might be the humblest in the land, yet all blessed as the shrine of domestic love and affection, should be to you a tower of strength, secure and inviolable? How were these great guarantees obtained? They were won by your fathers upon the battle-field. (Loud cheers.) War does not extinguish liberty. We fought our war of the Revolution to win, preserve, and perpetuate liberty. (Loud cheers.) War does not suspend the rights of men; and he who dares to say that Abraham Lincoln, at the head of his enormous armies, may rightfully do what George Washington would not do in the darkest hour of the Revolution, does not know what constitutional liberty is. (Tremendous applause.) The Union cannot be restored under this policy. It is not possible to hold that vast extent of country with its peculiarity of climate and condition in military subjection.

It is claimed by our Republican friends that these are war measures, but that when the victories are gained, the Government will be magnanimous. I hope this may be true; but what has been the teachings of the past? Is it not true, my Republican hearers, that after the news of some signal victory, won at the common cost of all the citizens of the Northern States, you display towards those who differ from you an arrogance that you did not the day before? Has the policy of the Government been made magnanimous, rational, and patriotic by victory? I point you to the legislation of last winter, after the wonderful successes of our armies. If you had visited Washington you would have found thirty thousand men lying in your hospitals. Day after day the dead were borne forth to be deposited in their graves, and your hearts would have sickened at the sight of pain and of death. Then if you had left the hospital with its rude and humble appointments, after having seen the devotion of these suffering men, whose eyes, perchance, amidst their deepest agony or in their dying hours would light up at the sight of their country's flag, after having been impressed with their virtue, their courage, and their patriotism; if you had passed

to the Capitol and walked through its gilded halls, adorned with all that art and riches could place there, with every emblem that told of our former greatness and liberty, and listened to the representatives of the people assembled there, you would have heard, with astonished ears, that in this hour of victory they were pouring forth the language of bitterness, vindictiveness, and strife. Has this Government been made magnanimous, just, or generous by victories? ("No, no!" Cheers.) I appeal to you again, my Republican friend, if it is not true that in your daily walks of life you have manifested the same courtesy and consideration toward those who disagreed with you in matters of judgment in the hour of victory, that you did when, in the darkest hour of the republic, you cried, "Let us lay aside all differences of opinion, and rally once more around the flag of our country." (Loud cheering.) Read over the acts of vindictive legislation passed in the last three years, — acts of confiscation, acts of punishment, acts of expatriation, acts sanctioning the violation of your most sacred rights and liberties, — and say whether the history of the past gives you a right to hope for wisdom and magnanimity in the future? These acts must be repealed before the country can be united and tranquillized. The administration must say to the people of the South: "Come back again and enjoy with us constitutional liberty; for if it is denied to you, in the end it will be denied to us. Let us forget the immediate past, and go back to the story of the Revolution. Our flag would not be complete, — the glorious category of the States of this Union would be imperfect — if we were to strike out the homes of Marion or Sumter, the grave of Jackson, and the birthplace of so many men associated with our history." If they tell you they will repeal these acts, they tell you they intend to do what they should have done a year ago. But they cannot and will not repeal these laws.

I would not say one unkind word of the President of these United States, — I would speak of him respectfully as the head of the Government; but neither Mr. Lincoln or his cabinet have now control over national affairs. I believe most sincerely that if it was in the power of Abraham Lincoln and the members of his cabinet to undo the past, they would cheerfully wipe it out. I believe if they were able to resume again their private stations, and felt themselves safe from an injured, outraged, and deceived community, if they felt that the laws they had violated would not be used against them, they would with joy leave the places of power, and give the Government into other hands. Why was Mr. Lincoln nominated at Baltimore, against the judgment of three-fourths of his own party; against the judgment of almost all the Republican members of the Senate? They were opposed to the nomination of any man who had identified himself with illegal arrests, and with violations of constitutional law. I ask you this question, my Republican friends, and I ask it with all respect and sincerity. God knows my heart, — that in this sad moment I cherish no resentments; I wish for nothing but the good of my country, and the salvation of its liberties. (Tremendous outbursts of applause. The chairman proposed three cheers for Governor Seymour, and the audience rose *en masse* and gave them, with waving of hats and handkerchiefs, and with the wildest enthusiasm.) In their private conversations they freely acknowledged that they preferred some other man than Mr. Lincoln. It was natural, of course, that those who held place under him should desire his nomination. But the great operating cause that produced his nomination was this, that there were men in the army and others surrounding him who did not dare to let him go into private life; who did not dare to be brought back under the jurisdiction of the laws of the land, the judgment of their peers. (Cheers.) The nomination was made because men who had enriched themselves by unworthy means from the treasury of the country feared to be brought to that account to which they will be brought when our Government is restored and our Union reinstated. (Cheers.) Mr. Lincoln and his administration will not repeal the law that denies you any remedy against wrongs done by them to our person or property, because they know that to do this is to bring themselves to judgment. They will not pursue a course that will give us a restored Union, because a restored Union reinstates the authority of law, and there would be an investigation of the frauds and failures that, in an unusual degree, have marked the conduct of affairs during the last three and a half years.

I do not mean to say that the administration is to be condemned because, under circumstances so unusual as those which have existed during this war, bad men have taken advantage of the confusion in affairs to do acts of wrong, but I do complain that when these wrongs are done the Government deliberately passes laws that protect the doer and thus makes wrong-doing its own act. Moreover, in an election like this, when the Government is spending such an enormous amount of money, and the liability to speculation is so great, the administration that will say to contractors, as has been openly said in circulars, "You have had a good contract, out of which you have made money, and we expect you to use a part of that money to assist to replace us in power," renders itself a partner in fraud and corruption. The contractor will say to this Government, "You shall not make a peace that shall put an end to all my profits. You called upon me to give my money, in violation of the laws of the land, to put you in power; you called upon me to do that which every great man has said is subversive of constitutional liberty and good order; and now, when you have gained your share of the triumph, you shall not turn around and cheat me of my share of the spoils." (Laughter and applause.) Has the administration, under these circumstances, the power to stop this plunder, and this drain upon the people of the country? They cannot do it; they have placed themselves in the power of men who can bring them before a grand jury and punish them as criminals for their acts. They cannot retrace their steps. It is impossible for them to restore the Union and bring back the South to her former fraternal relationship without saying that all they have done for the last three years has been wrong. Suppose there is a victory, and you call upon Mr. Lincoln to give us again peace, prosperity, and national happiness, — to do the work of pacification, by assuring the people of the South that if they return they shall have again at least the security of their homes. Mr. Lincoln lifts his manacled hand and says, "I cannot; there is the confiscation law, which I must obey." We beg him that at least he will allow them to live under their own State governments, so that we may be relieved of the taxation necessary to maintain a military government. Again, Mr. Lincoln lifts a manacled hand, and says, "I cannot; there is my proclamation; I stand before the country shackled by proclamations and shackled

by acts of Congress; I can do nothing to pacify the South." He is powerless unless he can induce Congress to undo all that it has done; he cannot disregard the wishes of those who have become his masters — for one man makes another his master when he enters into an arrangement with him that will not bear the inspection of the world, or the investigation of the laws of the land. (Loud cheering.) The Democratic party can restore the Union, and I believe it will. (Great applause.) If that is true, then I appeal to my Republican friends if they are not bound to give the Government into our hands.

Will any man say that we engage in this contest for political triumph? What is a political triumph? I stand before you to-night, a candidate in my own State for an honorable office. (Cheers.) What matters it if politics alone were to be considered, whether I am elected or beaten? A few brief years and I shall pass away and slumber in the grave. (Voice: "God bless you.") In a little time, we, with all our passions, our hopes, and our fears, shall be no more. No; the issues in this contest are the destiny of our country, the liberty of our land, the preservation of the Constitution, and the union of the States. We do not battle for constitutional law and for personal rights for ourselves alone. A change of parties may, perhaps, make you, my Republican friends, the objects of wrong under the precedents that you yourselves have established; but we battle for your rights as well as for ours. There is no man living who values the good opinion of others more than I do; but when the Democratic party comes into power, if any man in this land sees fit, in the most public place, to stand up and denounce me as all that is bad and base, I pledge myself here, I will battle for his right to do so, at the cost of my life. (Tremendous and continued cheering.) I wish that all could feel as I do on matters of religion — that they should love the gospel of peace and good-will, that they would speak kindly even of the erring, and that Christian love and charity should abound in all the relations of life; but, if there be those who would convert the temples of God into arenas for fierce, vindictive, partisan demonstration, I will stand in front of their porch and defend to the utmost their right to do so. We battle not for a party, but for all. In ordinary political elections the interests of the party may be a sufficient object, but now there is too much at stake. I therefore aver that when our Republican friends say to you and to me, "You sympathize with the South; you have kindly feelings for the South,"— they only say, "You can make peace with the South better than we." When they charge that we had ancient affiliations and cordial relations with the South, and that we desire the political help of the South, they only give another reason why we should be permitted to avail ourselves of these peculiar advantages to bring back our Union. (Laughter and cheers.) Is it not monstrous that the charge is brought in the self-same breath,—first that we desire a separation of the Union, and next that all our interests and sympathies are in favor of the restoration of the Union? They, on the other hand, have a political motive against restoring the Union. If this is true, they ought to give up the work to us. They ought to say to us, "You have supported us for four long years; you have given us three millions of men and three thousand millions of treasure; you have burdened your States with taxation, and loaded down your municipalities: your homes have been deprived of many comforts; more than all, you have given up your loved ones to die, and sad vacancies are left by the fireside. We have tried our policy for four years; we have failed to restore peace and to bring back the Union, and now, in common fairness, you should be allowed to try the effect of your policy."

We are not parties to their vindictive legislation. Let me tell you of this Confiscation Act. Before you can confiscate property you have got to get it. After wasting men and arms you will find that those who fight for their homes are the men who fight on and fight ever. (Applause.) And when you have got the property it will be in a desolated country, and its value will be destroyed. But in attempting to confiscate the property of the Southern people, the administration have in fact confiscated yours by the increase of taxation which their policy threw upon you. It is dangerous for a government to have more power than it can exercise wisely and well. Our fathers wished to avoid this danger; they did not fear for the rights of the States, for these cannot be trampled out of existence. The armed heel of military power may tread upon them for a day, but in the end they will rise again in their might and integrity. But our fathers said, "If we give this central government power which it cannot exercise judiciously, it will become odious to the people." They were called upon to form a government for a vast extent of country. They said, "If we have a king, he cannot know the peculiar wants of the people in the middle of Pennsylvania or in the middle of New York. He lacks the intimate knowledge of these localities necessary to one who is to legislate upon their affairs."

With an aristocracy the same difficulty would arise. They hit upon the common-sense idea which you all act upon in your daily life. There is no man in the community who is efficient at all trades and professions. There are lawyers, doctors, and clergymen. If you desire a lawyer you go to a person especially learned in that profession. You say he may not be a very honest man, but he understands law thoroughly. (Laughter.) Your family is sick; you do not go again to the lawyer but to the doctor. He may know nothing of law but he is an excellent physician. One man, or one set of men, cannot govern this country. There must be men of skill in all departments, in all localities, to do their separate work. The people of Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania, or of Oneida County, in New York, from which I come, may not be the best people in the world, but they know a great deal better than anybody else what schools they want, and who they prefer for justice of the peace and for constable. The people of Virginia and Pennsylvania have different interests. The people of Pennsylvania cannot legislate for Virginia, but Virginia can legislate better for herself than any one can for her. And so our fathers said, "We will only allow the Federal Government to do that which it cannot do amiss; to do that which it can do better than any one else. It shall represent our national power and dignity; it shall maintain our foreign affairs and treaties." That is the principle upon which our government is founded; that each section shall legislate on those subjects that particularly concerns it. Now, the administration calls upon you, men of Pennsylvania, to legislate for the people of Georgia, at your own cost of blood and money. We cannot trample upon the rights of the people of another State without trampling upon our own as well.

The attempt to gain power by a large jurisdiction and centralization, will result always in weakness.

A year ago a person came to me to ask my opinion about the draft. I said it was contrary to the genius of our institutions; that it was the habit of the people to come together in school districts, and make their voluntary contributions, and then in towns, and next in counties; and these little contributions at last swelled up the vast quotas of the States, and made the mightiest army that the world had seen, until the Government itself said, we can take no more, and rejected these offerings. I told them if they passed the conscription act it would prove to be a confiscation act against the North. The act was passed. It produced resistance, and the country shrank away from it by coming forward and giving large bounties. It fell heavily upon the homes of the poor. It proved the most expensive and burdensome method that could have been adopted of obtaining troops. And so, my friends of the Loyal League, a hand was laid upon your property in the form of bounties; and while you talk of confiscating the property of the people of the South and prolonged the war for that purpose, and united the opposition in the South, you crush out the life of the North. A selfish, narrow, and vindictive legislation reaches your own homes, for you have departed from the wisdom of our fathers and the principles of the Constitution. We must go back to these. We must teach every man in the land that his person is sacred, and he will love the laws that protect him. We must teach the poorest citizen that his home is sacred against any power of the State, and he will love the government that throws its shelter around his loved ones. We must teach him that the law and Constitution protect the right of conscience. What has brought here the millions of men who, of later years, have crossed the ocean? They have come here to enjoy not only the privileges which Almighty God has given to us, in our vast, extended, fertile plains, in our wide scope of territory, but they knew our Government gave freedom of conscience, freedom of home, and freedom of manhood. If we speak of dangers in the future, we do not allude to the conflict of party, — there is no danger that one party will array itself against another; but when you have destroyed the finances of the country; when you have vitiated its currency; when you have deranged profitable business so that the merchant dares not go on, and the manufacturer thinks it unsafe for him to continue his operations because of the uncertainty of the future; when the comforts of life become so costly as to be beyond the reach of men in ordinary circumstances, then you will discover that there is danger not of a conflict of parties, but that men of all parties, suffering and injured, Republican more than Democrat, because more deceived, will turn upon this administration, and endanger the security and peace of the society in which we live. Is it safe, my Republican friends, for you to go on prolonging this war for the sake of vindictive legislation? The war between France and England and Russia was settled when France and England had gained far less advantage than we have gained in this contest.

The men who were drafted this year under the five hundred thousand call have but one year to serve; the three-years' men who were taken into the army in 1862 will go out of the service next year, — their terms begin to expire in the spring; in nine months the army will need the largest additions that have been made to it at any one time. As the administration shrank from calling for more three-years' men just before an election, the places to be vacated by the one-year men must be provided to be filled in nine months; and thus it is reasonable to believe that the largest draft that has yet been made will be ordered at the beginning of the year 1865. I do not speak unadvisedly, for the administration has intimated to me that they expect another draft. The State of New York had furnished an excess of three-years' men, and I asked that, in making up the quota of New York, one three-years' man should be counted as equal to three one-year's men. They said they could not do that, as they needed men immediately; but they provided that a three-years' man should count as one man on this draft, as one man on the next draft, and as one man again on the third draft, and thus the matter would be equalized. So it appears from this that we are to have at least two drafts more. (Voice — "That's refreshing!") Every man knows that we must have this further draft. After war is ended, under the policy of this administration, we shall be compelled to maintain large armies to hold the people of the South in subjection, to carry out the emancipation proclamation and the confiscation act.

I appeal to you to investigate these questions, and ascertain what policy and what party are the most likely to restore union and peace; and when you have decided what the right is, let no man deter you from doing it, whatever may be the consequences. I am full of hope this night. I believe that we are to triumph, and that once again the flag of our Union shall float over all this broad land. (Loud cheering.) The day will come when again, in the counsels of our party, as we call the roll of States, the Gulf of Mexico will send up a response to the voice that shall come from the borders of our great lakes. Georgia shall echo back to Maine, the Atlantic to the Pacific; and hereafter we shall go on governing our country by the voice and will of the free people of the States, rendered wiser by the trials and sufferings through which they have passed. May the God of our fathers — he who gave them wisdom to frame our Constitution and establish our Union, — grant us the wisdom to retrace the steps which we have trod; to renew that union; restore the supremacy of that Constitution; and begin once again our career of national greatness and national glory. (Long and continued cheering.)

No. 22.

PAPERS FROM THE SOCIETY

FOR THE

DIFFUSION OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE.

S. F. B. MORSE, Pres. C. MASON, Cor. Sec., 13 Park Row

Freedom of the Press wantonly violated,

LETTER OF MR. MARBLE TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN,

Reappearance of the Journal of Commerce,

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS ON THIS OUTRAGE.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, ABRAHAM, LINCOLN,

President of the United States.

SIR: That the King can do no wrong is the theory of a monarchy. It is the theory of a constitutional republic that its chief magistrate may do wrong. In the former the ministry are responsible for the King's acts. In the latter the President is responsible for the acts of his ministers. Our Constitution admits that the President may err in providing for a judgment upon his doings, by the people, in regular elections. In providing for his impeachment, it admits that he may be guilty of crimes.

In a government of laws, and not of men, the most obscure citizen may, without indecorum, address himself to the Chief Magistrate, when to the Constitution whence you derive your temporary power and he the guaranty of his perpetual rights, he has constantly paid his unquestioning loyalty, and when to the laws, which your duty is to care for a faithful execution of, he has rendered entire obedience.

If the matter of his address be that in his person, property and rights, the Constitution has been disregarded and the laws disobeyed; if its appeal to the principles of justice be no more earnest than the solicitude of its regard for truth, and if the manner of his address be no less temperate than firm, he does not need courtly phrases to propitiate an attentive hearing from a magistrate who loves his country, her institutions, and her laws.

In THE WORLD of last Wednesday morning was published a proclamation, purporting to be signed by your excellency and countersigned by the Secretary of State, appointing a day of fasting and prayer, and calling into military service by volunteering and draft four hundred thousand citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. That proclamation was a forgery, written by a person who, ever since your departure from Springfield for Washington in 1861, has enjoyed private as well as public opportunities for learning to counterfeit the peculiarities of your speech and style, and whose service for years as a city editor of the New-York *Times*, and upon the New-York *Tribune*, acquainted him with the entire newspaper machinery of the city,

and enabled him to insert his clever forgery into the regular channels by which we receive news, at a time when competent inspection of its genuineness was impossible and suspicion of its authenticity was improbable. The manifold paper, resembling in all respects that upon which we nightly receive from our agents news, and from the government itself orders, announcements, and proclamations, was left with a night clerk about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, after the departure of every responsible editor, and was at once passed by the night editor into the hands of the printers, put in type, and published. No newspaper in the country but would have been deceived as we were!

Our misfortune was complete. At an early hour, however, before the business of the city had fairly begun, it was discovered that we had been imposed upon, and were being made to appear the instruments of a deception of the public. There was no delay in vindicating our character. Our whole machinery for spreading news was set in motion instantly to announce that we had been deceived by a forgery—that your excellency had issued no proclamation. The sale of papers over our counters was stopped. Our bundles to the Scotia, bound for Europe that day, were stopped. The owners' and purser's files were stopped. News-room bundles and files were stopped, and the agent of the line was informed that the proclamation was a forgery. Our printers and pressmen were brought from their homes and beds to put in type and publish the news of our misfortune. Our bulletin-boards were placarded with the offer of reward for the discovery of the forger; and to the agent of the Associated Press I sent a telegram reciting all the facts, for him to transmit at once to nearly every daily paper in the North, from Maine to California. Thus, before the Scotia sailed, before your Secretary of State had officially branded the forgery, the wings which we had given to Truth had enabled her to outstrip everywhere the Falsehood we had unwittingly set on foot, and in many places the Truth arrived before the forger had come to tell his tale.

For any injury done to ourselves, to the government, or to the public, this publicity was ample antidote. It indeed made injury impossible.

But the insult to your excellency was the greater in proportion to the eminence your station. Early in the afternoon of Wednesday, therefore, I went with Mr. Wm. C. Prime, the chief editor of the *Journal of Commerce*, which had been deceived precisely as we were, to the headquarters of the Department of the East, and we laid before the commanding general every clue in our possession which could lead to the discovery of the guilty persons. All the facts above recited were telegraphed at once to you, through the Secretary of War, by General Dix. I assert our utter blamelessness. I assert, moreover, that I have never known a mind so prejudiced, in which acquaintance with these facts would not enforce the conviction of our utter blamelessness.

Here was the absence of an intent to do wrong; here was an antidote for an injury unwittingly assisted, more complete and effectual than the injury itself; here was alacrity in search of the wrong-doer, and assistance rendered to your subordinate to discover the author of the insult done to you.

With these facts set fully before you by the General commanding this department, you reiterated an order for my arrest and imprisonment in Fort Lafayette; for the seizure and occupation of The World office by a military guard, and the suppression of its publications. The *Journal of Commerce*, its editors and publishers, were included in the same order.

I believe, though I cannot state of my own knowledge, that to the commanding general's assertion of our entire blamelessness it was owing that the order for our arrest and incarceration was rescinded. But the order for the suppression of The World was not rescinded. By your command General Dix sent a strong military force to its publication office and editorial rooms, who ejected their occupants, and for two days and three nights held possession there, injuring and abstracting some of their contents, and permitting no one to cross the threshold.

Not until Saturday morning did this occupation cease. Not until to-day has The World been free to speak. But to those who have ears to hear, its absence has been more eloquent than its columns could ever be.

To characterize these proceedings as unprecedented, would be to forget the past history of your administration; and to characterize them as shocking to every mind, would be to disregard that principle of human nature from which it arises that men submitting once and again to lawless encroachments of power, with every intermission of a vigilance which should be continual, lose something of the old, free, keen sense of

their true nature and real danger. CHARLES was doubtless advised to, and applauded for, the crimes by which he lost his crown and life. Nor can you do any so outrageous, oppressive, and unjust a thing that it will not be applauded by those whose prosperity and power you have created and may destroy.

To characterize these proceedings as arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional, would seem, if such weighty words have not been emptied of all significance, to befit better an hour at which you have not arrived, and a place where not public opinion but the authority of law speaks, after impeachment, trial, conviction, and judgment.

But, sir, the suppression of two daily journals in this metropolis—one the organ of its great commercial public, the other a recognized exponent of the Democratic principles which are shared by half or nearly half your fellow-citizens—did shock the public mind, did amaze every honest and patriotic citizen, did fill with indignation and alarm every pure and loyal breast. There were no indignation meetings, there were no riots, there was no official protest. But do not imagine, sir, that the Governor of this state has forgotten to do his duty; do not imagine that the people of this city or state, or country have ceased to love their liberties, or do not know how to protect their rights. It would be fatal to a tyrant to commit that error here and now. A free people can at need devise means to teach their chief magistrate the same lesson

To you, sir, who have by heart the Constitution which you swore to "preserve, protect, and defend," it may be an impertinence to cite those natural and chartered rights therein enumerated, among which are these That the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures, and that no warrant even shall issue, except upon probable cause supported by oath, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; yet these are the most priceless possessions of freemen, and these you took away from me.

Even a captured and guilty criminal who knew that his crime would be proved, and that the law would assuredly visit upon him condign punishment, might with propriety plead these rights and demand of the chief magistrate to throw over him these shields. Assaulted by the bayonets of a military commander, he might protest and assert his inalienable right to the orderly processes, the proofs, and the punishment of the law. But has the Saxon tongue any terms left for him to use, who, being the victim of crime, has been made also the victim of lawless power?

It is the theory of the law that, after the commission of any crime, all proceedings taken before trial shall be merely preventive; but the proceedings taken against THE WORLD were of the nature of a summary execution of judgment. Would trial by law have been denied, would the law itself have been set aside for the bayonet, would a process as summary as a drum-head court-martial have been resorted to by you, in a peaceful city, far from the boundaries of military occupation, had the presses which consistently applaud your course been, as we were, the victims of this forger? Had the *Tribune* and *Times* published the forgery (and the *Tribune* candidly admits that it might have published it and was prevented only by mere chance) would you, sir, have suppressed the *Tribune* and *Times* as you suppressed THE WORLD and *Journal of Commerce?* You know you would not. If not, why not?

Is there a different law for your opponents and for your supporters?

Can you, whose eyes discern equality under every complexion, be blinded by the hue of partisanship?

THE WORLD had sustained the government in its struggle to preserve our imperiled nationality. It had helped inspire the martial spirit of the people, and encourage them to the sacrifices they have so nobly made. It had advocated those measures of financial policy which could best preserve the tone and vigor of the government in the contest. It had deserved well of the Republic, and of those who love it.

But it also exposed and denounced the corruptions attendant upon your administration. It had opposed a delusive and enervating system of paper money. It had vindicated the fame of a patriot general, whom you had removed from command on the eve of victory. It had deprecated your re-election. Did you not find in these facts the provocations to your wrong and your persistence in wrong? Had you not made up your mind against us before the underling, your partisan, had concocted his plot? When you answer these interrogatories, I will produce the proof of threats made against us by those nearest you, and assuming to exert your prerogative, before this trick of forgery furnished you with the specious pretense of an accusation.

Can it be possible, sir, that for a moment you supposed that journals like ours could afford to be guilty of this forgery? Let the unanimous voice of your own press answer. Such a trick would hardly have succeeded in Sangamon county, Illinois. For a party which is about to go before the people, and ask them to commit to its hands the administration of affairs, which has been more generous and forbearing to your errors than you have been just to its guides, permit me to say, that it was less possible to be true of any one of them than it was of any man, high or low, who suspected them.

And so the end has proved. The confessed and guilty forgers were your own zealous partisans. JOSEPH HOWARD, Jr., who has confessed his crime, was a Republican politician and Loyal Leaguer, of Brooklyn. Consider, sir, at whose feet he was taught his political education, and in whose cause he spent his political breath Mr. HOWARD has been from his very childhood an intimate friend of the Republican clergyman, HENRY WARD BEECHER, and a member of his church. He has listened year in and year out to the droppings of the Plymouth sanctuary. The stump speeches which there follow prayer and precede the benediction he for years reported in the journal which is your devoted organ in this city. For years he was the city editor of that journal, the New-York *Times;* for a long time he was the Washington correspondent of the chief abolition newspaper of the country, the New-York *Tribune;* he has been a frequent contributor to the columns of the *Independent*; he journeyed with you from Springfield to Washington; he represents himself a favored visitor at the White House since your residence there.

By a curious felicity the stylus with which his amanuensis copied on tissue paper the proclamation and signed your name was abstracted from the editorial rooms of the *Tribune.* The party principles upon which you were pledged to administer the government have been the daily meat and drink of this forger. The stock-brokers who were his confederates will be found to be of the same kidney. They have all denounced as faithfully as you the party by whose defeat you rose to power. They have been the noisy champions of an exclusive loyalty; they have preached in club-houses and at street corners those politics which stigmatize constitutional opposition to the administration as disloyalty to the government. They all advocated a paper-money legal tender; they have all countenanced the paper inflation; they have all been heedless of the misery to poor men which such inflations breed; they have all rejoiced at the speculation thus fostered, and by speculation they had hoped to thrive.

For twenty-four hours something was pardoned to your presumed natural trepidation, since our blamelessness having been alleged to you by those here whom it was your duty to believe, it seemed only prudent to await your recovery.

For the next twenty-four hours, from moment to moment, it was expected that you would hasten to confess and repair your mistake. But the mistake thus prolonged grew to the proportions of a crime; and till the discovery of the forger stripped its mask off and disclosed the inspiring cause of the act, it grew monstrous hourly in men's eyes.

We were patient, that the immeasurable infamy of the act might swell to its full proportions, and stand complete.

By the recall of your arbitrary order, you have not made reparation for the wrong you have done. The injury and the insult yet remain. The violation of the Constitution stands recorded, and unless adequately atoned, becomes a fatal precedent. For the purpose of gratifying an ignoble partisan resentment you have struck down the rights of the press, you have violated personal liberty, subjected property to unjust seizure, ostentatiously placed force above law, setting a dangerous example to those who love force more than they respect law; and thus, and by attempting to crush the organs of free discussion, have striven to make free elections impossible, and break down all the safeguards of representative government.

It is you that in this transaction stand accused before the people. It is you who are conspicuously guilty. It is upon you that history, when recording these events, will affix the crime of a disregard of your duty, oblivion of your oath, and a pitiable subserviency to party prejudice and to personal ambition, when the country demanded in the presidential office elevated character, devotion to duty, and entire self-abnegation.

But you are not to be left to the judgment of history alone. Thank GOD, by the provisions of our Constitution, not yet wholly abrogated, the people are soon to pass upon your claims to re-election, and the right of impeachment yet remains to their representatives. The people and their representatives have the right to speak, when the pen is struck from the hands of a freeman by the bayonet;

when the Bastile, once broken down on the other side of the Atlantic by the reverberation of our Revolution, is reconstructed here.

In stormy times like these, amid dangers with which an unsuppressed rebellion environs us, his would have been a rash hand which had hastily set in motion for another purpose than the suppression of rebellion, the machinery of justice; who had invoked against the disloyalty of rulers the retribution and redresses of the law. The danger of such a conflict of authority is so far passed, that not even a president could now plead national safety as an excuse for refusing to do justice or submit to judgment.

Yet no citizen who regards his duties should ever hesitate, at the last, to oppose lawless deeds with legal remedies. The law may break down. It will then disclose to a watchful people the point of greatest danger. Courts may fail; judges may be intimidated by threats or bribed by the allurements of power, and those who have sworn to execute the laws may shrink from the fulfillment of their oaths. A craven Congress may sit silent, and idly watch the perishing liberties of the people whom they represent, but this cannot deter him, who, in defending his rights, is determined to do his whole duty, and to whom it is still competent to commit the final issue to that Power, omnipotent and inscrutable, which presides in events and sways the destinies of nations and the hearts of men.

MANTON MARBLE.

NEW-YORK, May 23, 1864.

Historical Notes.

[From the Journal of Commerce.]

We request our readers to peruse carefully an article published on the outside of this paper, which was prepared as an editorial for our edition on Thursday morning last, and which some of our contemporaries have already kindly published.

During the day on Wednesday the editors of this paper had been diligently engaged in aiding General Dix in tracing the authorship of the forged proclamation, having, in conjunction with THE WORLD, offered a reward of $100 for his detection, and in company with Mr. Barnes, of THE WORLD, having placed in the hands of the general such facts as have subsequently enabled the authorities to arrest the guilty party. In the evening, at about 9 o'clock, our office was occupied by a military force, and soldiers were dispatched to various parts of the city and Brooklyn, with brief and peremptory orders to arrest the editors and convey them to Fort Lafayette, by steamer, which was waiting to receive them at the Battery.

These orders came from the President, and no discretion was allowed to General Dix. We have the best reason to know that the general himself was earnestly opposed to the proceeding, and exerted himself strenuously to induce a suspension of the arbitrary act. The highest praise is due to General Dix for the course he pursued in the matter, and we feel under the strictest obligations to the correspondence between him and the War Department, of which we shall avail ourselves hereafter, to exhibit, in the clearest and most unquestionable manner, the entire innocence of the editors of this journal of the crime with which they were charged. We pause also to say that the officers of his staff, and the officers who were placed in charge of our office (Captain Hinsdale and Lieutenant Wales) were exceedingly courteous and gentlemanly in the performance of a most unpleasant duty, and we gladly bear testimony to their honorable conduct.

Two of the editors of the *Journal* were arrested. One of them, Mr. Hallock, was in the office at the time of the arrest. Mr. Prime was absent for a few moments before and was approached, as he entered the office, by a person who, finding one of General Dix's staff, who was stationed at the door executing, entered himself and was by him conveyed to headquarters. He was there received with great courtesy by General Dix, who informed him that the order for his arrest had been suspended, but that the order to take the newspapers received in force, and he could not be permitted to enter the office. Mr. Stone, having been at the residence in Brooklyn that the office was occupied by the military, at once proceeded to New-York to join his associates and ascertain the nature of the difficulty, and learning of their arrest he spent the night in endeavoring to find the clerk having charge of the *Journal* of Commerce, and to obtain a search warrant, which was issued by him at about one o'clock. Meantime the facts had leaked out, and a large crowd of sympathizing friends had collected around Mr. Stone's house, and followed Mrs. Stone that they were seeking to convey him to Fort Lafayette, and so she was left through the night in the deepest anxiety as to his fate. Mr. Hallock was very kindly allowed to arrange some office matters of importance, and to write a note to his family, who were of course thrown into the greatest distress by his arrest. He was then conveyed in a carriage to the battery, where the commanding officer found him, and he was released. The editor-in-chief was also much concerned and anxiety quickly silenced at the close of the Associated Press dispatches for the night.

From 9 o'clock on Wednesday night till 11 o'clock on Saturday morning no office was permitted to enter or depart, and the people of America had an excellent opportunity of seeing this free State in American estimation.

During this time we made no representation or appearance of any kind to the United States authorities. We continued ourselves with an occasional inquiry at the squares whether any new orders were received, receiving a negative reply until Saturday, when an order was given requiring the editors to appear at the office of the *Journal of Commerce* "to be sworn."

We have in our previous articles recited the history of the escape of the *Journal of Commerce* and the arrest of its editors.

Let us pause for a moment to the origin of the fraud which was perpetrated on us.

The forgery was a rare one, and has made his celebrity. Our article for Thursday morning pointed to the man.

Mr. Joseph Howard, the guilty individual, was educated in the newspaper business on the *New York Times*, and is familiarly known as "Howard of the Times." He was a fine young newspaper man, familiar with all the facts necessary to accomplish his purpose. He was a favorite contributor to the *Independent*, president of the First Republican Association in Brooklyn, long a member of the Rev. Mr. Beecher's church, member of the Republican Committee of Kings county, and employed many times in remote question on the *Eagle*. He is well known in political circles, the intimate friends of the most eminent of the Republicans, and it was a singular circumstance, which we have thought it our duty to lay before the authorities, that on Tuesday, the day prior to one of our reporters was he had been drinking champagne at the private room with one of the most prominent Republican politicians in the city, who is known to be a heavy stock operator. We do not subscribe the current calumnies. It is a reprehensible commentating of facts, and we shun all such ends.

The investigations of the stock operations, connected with the forgery and subsequent developments, the political reasons, are now over.

We entertain no feeling of animosity toward the young man. He has done us a great, in some respects an irreparable injury. We endeavored last by both word and deed. Mr. Beecher and other prominent gentlemen of the Republican party have written on General Dix, each accord expressions in his favor, stating that he was misled or prematurely moved, or something of the kind, so that he be not hanged. And that was quite right. We should be glad, and that was quite right. We should be glad, and that was quite right. We should be glad, and

raused to us and our contemporary, should all be credited to the account of the guilty young man, it might be made to appear that the punishmeot was already nearly adequate. But we have nothing to do with the punishment of the guilty, leaving him to his political friends who have influence at Washington. Our present concern relates only to the treatment of the innocent.

We were caught, as were others—not the New-York WORLD alone, but other papers, who by pure accident, and nothing else, were enabled to discover the fraud in time to suppress immense editions already printed, destroy stereotype pages containing the forgery, and save their reputations. We suffered.

They would not have been punished as we were, had they published it. No one dreams that if the radical newspapers had been caught, the administration would have pursued the course they took. It was one of the accidents of the morning, that while only a few hundred copies of the *Herald* were sent out containing it, two conservative papers issued it in a large part of their editions. Then arose the storm of political hatred and partisan animosity, and the men at Washington went mad.

To the disgrace of American history, an order was instantly issued for our suspension and incarceration in Fort Lafayette. The fullest particulars of the fraud, as full as the public have to-day, excepting only the name of the forger, were laid before the administration by telegraph. To the disgrace of Republican institutions, the order was reiterated in the face of those facts. The telegraph wires groaned with dispatches from loyal leaguers, friends of "Howard of the *Times*," members of Republican committees and anti-slavery churches, begging the President to suppress the copperhead newspapers in New-York. For three days this disgraceful state of things continued, and the sun shone all the while on the land that was cursed with such inhabitants.

The press of New-York city, excepting only the *Times*, was frank and outspoken in condemning the whole proceeding. Especially should it be noticed that the *Tribune*, the *Post*, the *Sun*, and the *Commercial Advertiser*, were true to old and noble principles. We regret that the *Post* subsequently lent its columns to a correspondent whose pen overflowed with folly, falsehoods and malignity.

What had we done to be thus delivered over to ruin?

We call to witness the respectable newspaper press from Atlantic to Pacific, when we say it was impossible by any degree of caution, to prevent such an occurrence. There is not a newspaper editor in America who, had he been in our office, would not applaud the course pursued by our foreman, and free him from all blame. Nor can any living man by any degree of care or ingenuity make himself or his business safe against fraud. Show us the man that dare boast of such immunity.

Mark this. We have within three years done more than fifty thousand dollars' worth of gratuitous advertising for this same administration, who have sent us orders innumerable to hunt up officers, to announce drafts, to proclaim this or that, every order coming to us in almost *fac simile* of this forged dispatch, and with no verification whatever. There is scarcely a night in the year that the War Department does not not send us, on manifold paper, now in this and now in that handwriting, at 1, 2, 3, or 4 o'clock, some such proclamation or order. If we should refuse to publish one of these we should be denounced as copperheads. If we demanded verification or pay we should be hooted at as traitors. Nay, more, we were ourselves arrested, and our paper was suppressed, on a supposed order from Washington, written out by a telegraphic operator, which General Dix took on trust, because he had seen others that resembled it which were true!

We have no defense of ourselves to make. We had done no wrong. We were victims of fraud, and the President, in a moment of evil judgment, resolved to punish our misfortune, and hurled on us the mandate of a strong power, destroying our property, and inflicting not alone a vast pecuniary damage, but a greater personal wrong and injury. We have asked no pardon from him. The clenched hand of man that strikes with passionate blow on the rock is bruised, and cannot for long time recover the self-inflicted injury. The arm of authority when it wields the sword of anger against the spotless steel of innocence wastes the vigor of its sinews and turns the edge of the weapon. The voice of denunciation hundered ever so loudly against the pure dies feebly on the wind, and its tones become forever powerless. It is not we that have been harmed so much as he who has so fiercely struck at us. We are grieved for him. He has withdrawn his grasp and we are again free. And now for the private wrong done us, we find it in our hearts to forgive him. It was, perhaps, an error of petulance or a mistake of poor judgment. Let it pass for awhile, till he and we can think it over in calmer times.

The public wrong which involves such mighty interests—the Constitution, the sacred authority of law, the liberty of the press, the freedom of the citizen from unjust search and seizure of his person or property, the freedom from arrest, except on warrants duly authorized, the right to be confronted by accusers, to trial by jury—this great wrong we have no power to pardon. Two thousand years ago the Romans enacted the law of Publius Portius Lacca, which authorized an appeal to the Roman people. In the time of Paul that had been sadly changed to the appeal to Cæsar, for Cæsar had grasped the power of the people. We possess the law in its original purity, and by that appeal must this whole act be judged.

We thank our friends for their hearty support. We thank many, very many gentlemen of the Republican party for their outspoken expressions of opinion. We leave to their own shame the contemptible catalogue of men who "stopped" their papers, excepting out of that list and honoring those who on Saturday came boldly to us and said, "We stopped because we thought you were wrong, we renew because we know you were wronged."

But what, Americans, what is to be said for our country and her prospects under the guidance of those who can be so erring, so foolish, so weak? Does it shake our faith in the future? Does it open to us any new view of doubt or despair? In no wise. Patience, patience! On the last day that we issued our paper we spoke in earnest tones, beseeching our countrymen to be patient and faithful. Faithful to the old cause, the old Union, the old Constitution. These men that lead us in the mad course of radicalism are but the men of a day. They cannot save our country. They will vanish from our sight ere long. Their deeds will follow them into oblivion or shame; and then, by the peaceful recurrence of our national election, we shall be placed in the position to save the grand old fabric of free institutions.

From the distant battle-fields the thunder of cannon reaches our ears to-night, and we know that our brothers and sons are struggling, not for a new country, but for the old faith that was given by our fathers. Let us be patient and labor, doing our duty here, in whatever of pain and persecution, under all the obloquy and reproach that the men who desire to overthrow our time-honored system may heap on us. Let no personal wrongs or private griefs shake our faith or lessen our zeal for the truth we uphold, for the principles by which our nation is to be saved if saved at all. The majesty of the law must be revered in our hearts even if violated in our persons, and it will yet be triumphant.

It was a sad and somewhat solemn view, for an American, that rush of the busy world along the street, by the guarded doorway of a suppressed newspaper. It was not for this, some thought, it was not for this our brave boys were dying on the field. Men recently arrived from foreign lands were unable to explain to themselves the strange sight. Some citizens went along chuckling complacently over the accomplished suppression of a free press; but these were few, very few in New-York; and the vast throng, in the main, passed by wish saddened countenances.

The dim sight of old men was dimmer with the mist of tears when this sorrowful exhibition of bayonets was made in our great commercial street. The exceeding beauty of our national character was marred; the splendor of our historic freedom was tarnished; the glory of our American boast was gone. A man of more than eighty years, born in New-Yotk, whose long and peaceful life had blessed himself and benefited his country, as he passed along the street uttered his sorrowful wish that God had let him die before his old eyes looked on such a scene. Young men, strong and earnest, were not moved to tears, but resolved that henceforth they would recall the old traditions, restore if they might the old laws, and be content, when the land was again as of old—united and free—to say their *nunc dimittis*. Not till then! Oh, not till then! God grant that we may live and work, till this story is remembered as a hideous dream, and from ocean to ocean the breeze that sweeps down from our mountains shall again be the breath of freedom.

The Recent Proceedings Against the Press.

[From the Albany Atlas and Argus, May 23.]

In common with tens of thousands of our fellow-citizens, we have restrained the expression of our indignation at the recent arbitrary course of the government in regard to the Democratic press of New-York city. We saw in it one of those errors into which the administration, on every occasion, blunders, from its mere want of intelligence and capacity. It was an injury and an outrage; but men do not always resent the injuries they receive from foolish and incapable men. We, like others, bore as patiently as we could with this exhibition of headstrong folly, because we regarded it as the result of passion and ignorance. It has no longer this excuse. The suppression of the two papers has been persisted in after the falsehood of the pretense of the original seizure has been fully exposed. We believe that the occasion was seized upon, and the outrage has been persisted in, for the purpose of intimidating the press. The simultaneous seizure of Governor Medary of the Ohio *Crisis*, upon some false accusation, and in violation of law, confirms this suspicion. These and other acts of the men at Washington go to show that they have grown reckless and desperate with fear, and that they no longer look to public opinion to sustain them, but to force. We do not mean to make these acts of violence the occasion of invective against our rulers at Washington, or of rhetorical appeals in favor of the liberty of the press or the rights of person and property. The day for that has gone by. It behooves citizens of the state to consult, in a time like this, in regard to what action shall be taken—not what words shall be uttered—to protect their rights.

We see that the Democrats of the New-York delegation in Congress have met for such consultation! They are honorable men, and men of courage, and know their duties and how to fulfill them. But if they will permit us to give advice, we would urge them to abandon their seats in Congress and return home to their constituents. When such acts of violence occur and are persisted in, constituting an invasion of the state and the overthrow of city laws, by military power, the part which a representative of the state plays in the federal Congress ceases to be honorable or useful. There is nothing in the position of a member of Congress at this time upon which the people look with much favor. The struggle of Democratic members to restore to the chambers their representative character, and to make the legislative body the organ of the people, under the Constitution, has been in vain. Equally fruitless has been the effort to expose the corruption or to correct abuses, or to restrain or punish usurpations. The struggle may be pursued till it ceases to be heroic, and may become disgraceful. Let the Democratic members leave their seats in a body and come home! Mr. Brooks and his colleagues of the New York delegation, Mr. Cox and the delegates from Ohio, can find among their constituents, a wider and nobler field of usefulness than they now fill. Their silence—their absence, will speak full as eloquently and impressively as any words they can utter.

What remains to be done, in the execution of the laws to repress such injuries, will be done by the civil power of the state, and by the executive as its head. Our system of laws do not provide preventive measures for outrages like these. But it suffices to enforce responsibility upon the authors. Since these words were written, we learn that the order of suppression has been revoked, the military have given up possession of the inhabited journals, and the unhappy and innocent telegraph operators have been released from Fort Lafayette. The universal expression of indignation from the press and the public has told even on the callous apprehension of the President and his cabinet.

The insult and the wrong remain. The wanton infamy on person and property is unatoned. The outrage, if allowed to pass by with impunity, becomes a precedent for future wrongs. It is intended by Messrs. Lincoln, Seward and Co., as an entering wedge of usurpation, and if they find the public mood will bear it, they will repeat the blow.

We let our words stand! We retract none of them. We believe that the advice we have given to our members of Congress will be urged upon them by the Democrats and the Democratic journals of all the states. Let them consider it wisely; and let the people, too, reflect upon what they may be called to do, should such outrages be repeated.

Suppression of Newspapers—Review of The Course of the Administration.

[From the Evening Post, Republican.]

there be any right which the founders of our government sought to guard from violation with a special care, it is the right freely to discuss political questions and public measures by means of the press. Accordingly, the Constitution of the United States provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, and in another article declares that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." The freedom of the press is asserted in the same article of our Constitution as the freedom of religious belief, and guarded from infringement by the same explicit terms. *It is therefore with pain that we see the offices of any of our journals entered by the agents of the government, and their publication stopped, at the command of the Executive.* We do not mean to say that there is no case in which the military power might not interfere to prevent the publication of a newspaper manifestly instigating treason and rebellion in a part of the country for the possession of which the rebel government is contending with ours, and in which the suppression of the delinquent journal becomes a sort of military necessity. *But the necessity ought to be clear, and the power of interference ought to be confined to the cases we have mentioned; in all other instances the punishment of sedition should be left to the ordinary remedies provided by law. The publishers of the offending journals may be arraigned, tried, convinced and sentenced;* and in cases where it is pretty certain that they are accomplices of those who are at war with our country, more severe personal measures may be justified. *But to march a platoon of armed men into the office of a journal and stop its publication, in a part of the country which has not been placed, and which there is no necessity of placing, under martial law, is a proceeding which has a strange aspect when we compare it with the constitutional provisions by which the rights of the press are so sedulously guarded from violation.* We cannot, therefore, but join in the hope expressed by some of the morning papers that the order for the suppression of these journals will be immediately rescinded: and this not so much for the reason that the publishers might have been entirely unaware that the pretended proclamation was a forgery, as for the higher and stronger reason that the order is an extreme measure, suited only to a state of things which does not exist in this community, and for which the plea of necessity cannot be urged. As much severity as you please against those who are guilty of the forgery or who favored it—the public feeling will approve it, but that severity should be combined with a manifest desire to infringe none of those rights of the citizen which a free government ought to cherish with a scrupulous regard.

[From the Tribune, May 21.]

There was a rumor last evening that the order closing the offices of *The Journal of Commerce* and THE WORLD had been rescinded. We trust it is true, and that those journals are to be no longer subjected to so serious an interference with their business. A government can commit no graver mistake than the infliction of punishment for an act where no guilt of intention can be imputed to the parties concerned, and where they were simply the dupes of some designing knave.

[From the same.]

The real facts which led to the publication of this monstrous forgery were not, we presume, known yesterday in Washington, or the suspension of the two journals would not, we suppose, have been ordered. The order, no doubt, will be revoked to-day. We hope it will, for certainly no journal should be punished for a mistake which might have very innocently been committed by the most loyal paper in the land.

[From the New-York Commercial (Rep.)]

It is evident that the journals in question erred innocently, and that they had no intention to mislead, or to be parties to the fraud committed. The *Tribune* half admits it would not have questioned the document had it been left at that office, and it was this omission to favor the *Tribune* that put some other papers on their guard, and so obviated the fatal necessity which led Secretary Stanton to commit the grievous error by which he has again shown his contempt for the freedom of the newspaper press. It is so short a time since Mr. Seward was led to put faith in a forged document, and to make it the basis of diplomatic action, that the Washington authorities should be lenient to those who sin in the same way. The forged rebel navy report has done us immensely more harm than this bogus proclamation possibly could do. Yet the "gentleman in New-York" who

avented it, and palmed it off as a *jeu d'esprit*, has not been troubled, and the Secretary of State, who was particularly "originating" by it, has known no sign of an ignition against his author. A more recent fraud is the correspondence between Lyons and Jeff. Davis, or rather the clerk of the latter on which was made the subject of an elaborate editorial in the *Post*. The sagacity even of the hybrid official may sometimes retard, and he should demand no more of others than he is willing to assume for himself. It is to be hoped that by this time the facts in regard to the publication of this proclamation are known in Washington, and that wisdom enough will be manifested there to revoke the order against these two journals. *It is fully time that arbitrary and unjustifiable procedure be brought to an end.* The sentiment found expression when the attempt was made to throttle freedom of debate on the floor of Congress, has not less its force when presses are suspended for acts entirely without design or thought of criminality.

[From the New Nation, Radical.]

Some time since, a Mr. Clapp, of Westchester county, was arrested and sent to Fort Lafayette by General Dix upon the suspicion of his being implicated in the frauds committed in connection with volunteer enlistments. As the matter involved military interests, public opinion remained silent, notwithstanding that Mr. Clapp was a citizen and not a military man, and consequently amenable only to civil courts as long as martial law had not been proclaimed. A day or two ago Colonel Arguelles, a Spanish subject, was deemed guilty of having trafficked in slaves in Cuba, and he was not only arrested, but summarily ordered off, though no extradition treaty between this country and Spain exists. An individual requested him to accompany him to attend to some night-cap business; at the door they found a carriage waiting, in which Colonel Arguelles was driven away without being allowed time to execute a letter to his family or friends.

Mr. Seward merely put into practice his doctrine with regard to the respect due to individual liberty, which is comfortable to that of Louis Napoleon. As it was for a crime against liberty that Colonel Arguelles last night was, the affair passed over quietly. On Thursday two newspapers were suppressed, and by whom, whether in selling stock or not, placed in the stead of the editorial pens. This is a more serious matter, and we are astonished that an immediate protest was not at once registered, and an appeal made to secure observance of the inoperable right of property and of the respect due the law. Are we in a state of siege? Have our courts and civil law been abolished and replaced by martial law and courts-martial? Our courts and judges may perhaps be replaced by a board of aides de camp. Is this just? is it legal? is it politic? Has any general whatever the right to cause detriment to property which may belong to a thousand individuals all of them entirely innocent and in fact far removed even without the knowledge of their representative, the chief editor, and to trample upon the fundamental law of all society and the right of property.

An act has been committed which the law holds as a crime or an offense; it is for the law and its judges to take cognizance of it, and not the administration through its generals. We have had a willing slavesaling, and the circulation of false news summarily disposed of, and to-day we have been warned by friends that it will not be allowed us in future to discuss the military worth of General Grant, as the administration have placed him above the laws and above criticism. To-morrow we may be arrested for discussing Lincoln and his re election, and at last Mr. Seward's bell will be supreme and sole law in the country.

(From the Hartford Daily Coursnt (Republican) May 19.]

The manner in which the forgery, purporting to be a proclamation from President Lincoln, was contrived and executed, indicates thorough acquaintance with the arrangements of the Associated Press and with the regulations of newspaper offices. It was written on manifold sheets, such as are always used in sending dispatches to the press, and regularly paged. It was carried to the different offices at a late hour after the editors had left, and just before the papers went to press. Important dispatches often come at such times, and the mode and extent of their publication is left to the judgment of the foreman. Of course, there was no time for investigation. It was necessary to decide at once. Under such circumstances the appearance of the forgery in a number of papers is not to be wondered at. For some reason a copy was not sent to the *Tribune*. This fact being learned accidentally in one case, and by inquiry in another, prevented two other papers from publishing the document.

[From the Springfield Republican, May 20.]

The New-York WORLD and *Journal of Commerce* establishments were taken possession of by order of General Dix on Wednesday and the papers were not issued on Thursday morning. Both papers were victims of the proclamation hoax, and the proprietors of the *Journal of Commerce* believed in its genuineness and refused to withdraw it for several hours after its character had been made known by dispatches from Washington. Both papers subsequently issued bulletins making known the facts, and it is evident that in neither case was there any complicity with the fraud. The proprietors of the two papers made formal protest against the stoppage of their business, and there is no doubt that the government will remove the embargo and allow them to go on.

Sold at 13 Park Row, New York, and at all Democratic Newspaper Offices, at $1 per 1,000 pages.

Campaign Document, No. 23.

From the New York World.

GREAT SPEECH

OF

HON. ROBERT C. WINTHROP,

At New London, Conn., October 18.

THE PRINCIPLES AND INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AGAINST THE UNION.

The Election of McClellan the only hope for Union and Peace.

NEW LONDON, Conn., Oct. 18.

Hon. Robert C. Winthrop addressed the citizens of New London, on Tuesday evening, at Lawrence Hall. The meeting could not have been larger without an extension of the walls of the building. The front seats and galleries were occupied by many ladies, and the audience was composed of the eminently solid and respectable people of the community.

Mr. Waller, the President of the McClellan Club, called the meeting to order, and nominated for chairman, Hon. Abiel Converse.

Mr. Winthrop now came upon the platform and was received with the greatest enthusiasm. He was introduced by the chairman, as follows:

Fellow-citizens: We are to-night honored with the presence of a distinguished gentleman, who fondly turns to New London as the birthplace of his father and the home of a long line of illustrious ancestors; a gentleman whose elegant culture and enlightened statesmanship have made him a national—nay, a world-wide reputation; a gentleman who in the better days of the republic was a leading spirit in the national Whig party, but who to-night stands with us shoulder to shoulder in the ranks of the only Constitutional Union party of the country—the party which proposes to place in the Presidential chair George B. McClellan. (Loud cheers.) Fellow-citizens, allow me to present to you the Honorable Robert C. Winthrop.

After the cheering with which he was greeted had subsided, Mr. Winthrop spoke as follows:

MR. WINTHROP'S SPEECH.

Fellow Citizens: I am deeply sensible to the kindness and the compliment of this reception. I thank you for this inspiring welcome to your city. I have come at your request to address you on the great subject which is uppermost in all our minds and in all our hearts. I am here for no purpose of declamation or display. I am here to appeal to no prejudices or passions. No arts of rhetoric can meet the exigences of this hour. If I were ever capable of them, I abandon and discard them all to-night. I am here only from a deep sense of the duty which rests upon each one of us to contribute what we can by word or by deed, for a suffering, bleeding country. Compelled by engagements or by my health, to refuse a hundred other invitations, I could not resist the appeal which was made to me from New London. (Applause.) And if any word of mine may be thought worthy of being listened to or regarded, in Connecticut or elsewhere, there is no place from which it may more fitly go forth than from this old and honored home of my fathers. (Applause.) It is a time, I am aware, my friends, when the best and wisest, and most patriotic men may differ, and do differ, widely from each other. I would cast no reproaches upon my opponents. I do not forget the reproaches which have been cast upon myself in some quarters; but I have no heart for bandying personalities at a period like this. I pass by all such matters as unworthy of a moment's consideration. Or rather, let me say, they pass by me like the idle wind. The air, indeed, is full of them. Arbitrary and arrogant assumptions of superior patriotism and loyalty—coarse and malicious representations and imputations—opprobrious and insulting names and epithets, often applied by men who might well be conscious that nobody deserves them so much as themselves—the air is full of them. They come swarming up from stump and rostrum, and press and platform.

We meet them at every turn. Let us not retort them. Let us not resent them. Let no one by any means be tempted or provoked by them into acts of vengeance or violence. Let us simply overwhelm them with contempt, and pass on, unawed and unintimidated, to the declaration of our own honest opinions, and to the assertion and exercise of our rights as freemen. (Applause.) Let us imitate the example of our own noble candidate, whose quiet endurance of injustice and calumny h s been one of the most beautiful illustrations of his character, and has won for him a respect which will outlive the ephemeral notoriety of his revilers. Our country calls at this moment for the best thoughts, the bravest counsels, the freest utterances, the most unhesitating devotion of every one of her sons. Let us compare our opinions with each other honestly, independently, fearlessly; and let no man shrink from following his own conscientious convictions, wherever they may lead him. It may be a misfortune, fellow-citizens, that a new election of our national rulers should have come upon us precisely at this moment. We would all gladly keep our eyes steadily fixed upon our country's flag, as it waves and wavers upon yonder battle fields. We would wil ingly follow its gallant supporters, in the conflicts in which they are engaged, with undivided and uninterrupted sympathies. But it is not in our power to postpone the time appointed for our great political struggle. The Constitution of the United States has fixed that time unalterably, and nothing remains for us but to discharge our duties as intelligent and responsible citizens. A great, a tremendous responsibility, certainly, is upon us. When the votes of the people of the United States—your votes, Men of New London, and mine among them shall have once decided the question — by what party and upon what principles and policy the national government shall be administered for the next four years—they will have determined, under God, the destinies of our country for unborn generations. No one in his senses can doubt that the results of the administration of the next four years will be decisive of the fate of this republic. Within that period the Union is to be saved or lost. Within that period the Constitution is to be vindicated or overthrown. Within that period the old flag of our fathers is to be re-advanced in triumph over all the States of which it has ever been, or ever borne, the emblem; or, rent in twain and shorn of half its lustre, it is to droop over a divided land. If the stake of the impending contest, my friends, were anything less than this, if anything less or anything other than the rescue of the Union and the salvation of the republic, were to be the result of this election, we might well hesitate about entering into a political struggle and arraying ourselves against an existing administration in a time of civil war. But with such an issue of national life, or national death, before us, there ought to be, there can be, no hesitation on the part of any patriotic citizen. Every one of us, young and old, is called upon by considerations from which there can be no appeal, by obligations from which there can be no escape, to form a careful, dispassionate, conscientious opinion as to his own individual duty, and then to perform that duty without flinching or faltering. We may be pardoned for an honest mistake. We may be excused for an error of judgment. But we can never be excused, before men or before God, or standing neutral and doing nothing. There is no exemption from this warfare. Not only should it be written on every man's forehead what he thinks of the republic; but no man should give sleep to his eyes or slumber to his eyelids without asking himself: What can I do for my country? How can I exercise that most precious of all privileges, that greatest of all rights, the elective franchise, in a way to rescue her from the dangers by which she is encompassed? (Applause.)

GRATITUDE FOR VICTORIES.

And now, my friends, the first emotion which belongs to these occasions of assembling ourselves together, and the one to which we are all and always most eager to give expression, is that of joy and gladness and gratitude for the signal successes which have been recently vouchsafed to our arms. (Cheers.) Most signal they certainly have been. It cannot be denied that, since the nomination of Gen. McClellan was promulgated at Chicago (loud cheers), the military aspect of our affairs has been greatly improved. The gallant Sherman at Atlanta (cheers), and the daring and dashing Sheridan, in the Shenandoah valley (cheers), have achieved victories of vital importance to the cause of the Union; and most heartily would we unite with our fellow-citizens of all parties in paying a well-earned tribute of respect and admiration to the commanders, and to the soldiers, who have been instrumental in accomplishing these glorious results. (Applause). We are told, indeed, that all these victories are impairing the prospects of our own political success, and diminishing the chances of General McClellan's election to the Presidency. (Laughter.) But we rejoice in them all, notwithstanding, and thank God for them with undivided hearts. ("Yes, yes.") The more of them the better, whatever may be their influence on the election before us. We are content to be so defeated—if that be their legitimate, or even their illegitimate, result—we are more than content. I venture to say, that our noble candidate would rejoice as heartily as President Lincoln himself at every success of our arms, even should the consequences be to leave him without a single electoral vote. He had rather see his country saved, and the Union restored, and the Constitution rescued, than to secure the highest honor for himself which it is in the power of man to bestow. Let us congratulate him, and let us congratulate each other—for we have a right so to do—that his nomination has roused the administration to new efforts. Let us rejoice that the army has been spurred on to redeem the failures of the civil policy of the administration. (Cheers.) The supporters of General McClellan may well be satisfied—even should they accomplish nothing more—with having given an impulse to the prosecution of the war, which not only affords the best promise of military success in the future, but which has already given so glorious an earnest of the fulfillment of that promise.

But why, why, my friends, should success on the battle field diminish the chances of General McClellan's election? What possible reason is there for such a result? Nobody imagines, I presume, that the hero of Antietam would be a less prudent or a less skillful superintendent of our military affairs than Abraham Lincoln or Secretary Stanton. Nobody dreams that he would be likely to interfere disadvantageously with the conduct of the war. The President, certainly, could not have thought so, when he so obviously connived a few weeks ago at offering him a high command, if he would only decline to be a candidate for the Presidency. (Laughter and applause.) The Republican party will hardly be ready to accuse the President of being willing to buy off a dangerous competitor at the expense of putting a doubtful general into the field.

VICTORIES ALONE CANNOT RESTORE PEACE.

No, it is the civil policy of the government which General McClellan is relied upon to change. It is the civil policy of the administration which imperatively demands to be changed. We believe that this civil policy of the administration has prevented all our military successes in the past, and will, if continued, prevent all our military successes in the future from effecting the great end for which we are contending — the only end for which we could constitutionally take up arms. We believe that this civil policy—if anything the administration has recently done can fairly be called civil (laughter)—has been calculated to extin-

uish every spark of Union sentiment in the South-
n States; that it has been calculated to drive those
tates finally out of the Union, instead of being
dapted to draw them back to their old allegiance.
"That's so." Cheers.) We believe that this civil
olicy has tended to breathe a spirit of defiance and
esperation into the breasts of every southern man
nd woman and child, that it has rendered the work
f our own brave soldiers a thousand fold harder to
e achieved, and has thus far given them only a bar-
n and fruitless victory, whenever they have suc-
eeded. Who is there wild enough to imagine that mere
ilitary triumphs can accomplish that great con-
ummation of Union and peace, which is the
evout wish and prayer of every patriotic heart?
Applause.) Why, my friends, we may go on con-
uering and to conquer month after month, and year
fter year; we may overcome armies, we may take
ossession of cities, we may strip and devastate
hole territories and regions of country, we may
ake a solitude and call it peace; but the restoration
f the old Union of our fathers, with all the States in
eir constitutional relations to the General Govern-
ent, and all the stars upon the folds of our coun-
y's flag will require something more than any mere
rce of arms can effect. (Applause.) Nobody saw
is more clearly, or admitted it more frankly than
resident Lincoln himself, when he declared so
nphatically in his inaugural address: "Suppose
ou go to war, you cannot fight always; and when,
ter much loss on both sides and no gain on either,
ou cease fighting, the identical questions as to terms
intercourse are again upon you." The great ad-
ntage of victories, my friends, is in opening
e way for a wise, conciliatory, healing policy
come in and settle the questions at issue;
d it is thus at the very moment when those
ctories are achieved, that we most need men
the head of the Government who can turn the
iumphs of our armies to the only account
r which they are worth a straw. It is this—this
plication of a wise, conciliatory, healing policy—
hich must follow close upon the track of military
iumph in order to render it fruitful,—it is this for
hich the present administration, as we think, is
holly incapacitated, and for which we believe a new
lministration is the great and paramount necessity
the hour. It is in this view that victories,
stead of impairing the prospects of General Mc-
ellan's election, ought to plead trumpet-tongued in
s behalf. The question prompted by every victory
ou'd be, "Where, where are the men who can turn
this conflict and carnage to account, and render a
petition of it needless? Where are the men who
n save us from the reproach of having shed all this
ecious blood in vain, and can originate and pursue
policy which shall make that blood effective for the
aling of the nation? Where are the men, where is
e man, who can extricate his country from impend-
g ruin, by first extricating himself from all mere
ctional and partisan pledges and entanglements
id by planting himself on the simple platform of
e Constitution?" (Loud cheers.) These are the
estions which each succeeding victory should call
on us to put to ourselves, and these are the ques-
ons which, in my judgment, can only be satisfacto-
y answered by the resolution to change the admin-
ration. If any man would vote for General Mc-
ellan in case our military successes had not occur-
d, a hundred fold more should vote for him now.
heers.) Without those successes it would have
attered little who was President. We could have
complished nothing. But with them a way is
ened for a new President to restore Union and
ace to our land. Shall we not have a new Presi-
nt to take advantage of that opening? ("Yes,
s.")

A CHANGE OF CIVIL POLICY DEMANDED.

But let us look at the issue before us a little more
osely, and more deliberately. You will not expect
e, my friends, to go back to the origin of the great struggle in which we are involved. I can tell you nothing about the history of the past which is not abundantly familiar to you. You all know that a wanton and unjustifiable rebellion against our national government was inaugurated in South Carolina nearly four years ago; that it soon expanded to the proportions of the most gigantic civil war the world has ever witnessed, and that it is raging madly and wildly still. You all know the story of its rise and progress. You all know how much treasure and how much blood it has already cost. And you all know what has been accomplished. You have followed our brave soldiers and sailors in all their toils and perils, in all their reverses and in all their triumphs, on the land and on the sea, from that first most impressive scene at Fort Sumter, when the stars and stripes were lifted by the gallant Anderson on the breath of solemn prayer, down to the latest achievements of Sherman, and Farragut, and Sheridan, at Atlanta, and in Mobile Bay, and in the Valley of the Shenandoah. (Cheers.) You have watched, too, the course of our civil rulers at Washington. Their shifting and drifting policy—as it has been strangely developed in resolutions and proclamations, and manifestoes, "To whom it may concern," is familiar to you all. You know what they have promised, and you know what they have performed in the past; and you know what they propose for the future. And now it is for you, and for each one of you to say, whether you are satisfied to recommit the final destinies of this republic to the same hands; whether you are satisfied that the men now in power are in the way of bringing this fearful struggle to a safe and successful termination; whether, in a word, you are ready to take your share of the responsibility of continuing their domination through that presidential term of all others, which is to decide whether there shall ever again be a President over the whole United States of America? (Applause.) For myself, as I have said elsewhere, I have reflected deliberately and deeply on this question, and I have in vain attempted to resist the conclusion, that the best interests of our country, and the best hopes of restoring the Union of our country, demand a change of our national rulers. I have not been able to resist the conclusion, that almost any other party would be more able than the Republican party, and almost any other President would be more likely than Abraham Lincoln, to accomplish that great consummation which every Christian patriot ought to have, and must have, at heart—the earliest practicable restoration of Union, and peace, and constitutional liberty to our afflicted land. I have not been able to resist the conviction that there would be a better chance under any other administration than the present for speedily effecting a termination of the rebellion, upon that basis of "the Union as it was, and the Constitution as it is," which is the only legitimate aim of loyal men. (Cheers.)

CONCERNING THE SWAPPING OF HORSES.

And let me say, in the first place, my friends, that I should have come to this conclusion, as I think, without any regard to the peculiar policy which the Administration has adopted during the last two years. I should have come to this conclusion upon the same plain, common sense views which President Lincoln himself seems to have expressed upon a somewhat similar state of facts. Some of you may remember, perhaps, to have seen an account of an interview which certain very earnest anti-slavery gentlemen, of Massachusetts, held with the President not a great while ago, on the subject of substituting Gen. Fremont for my old and valued friend Edward Stanley, now of California, as the Provisional Governor of North Carolina. The account is given in a letter written by the Rev. Mr. Conway, dated London, July 20, 1864, and published in the Boston *Commonwealth*. In that letter President Lincoln is represented as saying, in his most characteristic style, "Gentlemen, it is generally the case that a man who begins a work is not the best man to carry it on to a suc-

cessful termination. (Laughter.) I believe it was so (he proceeded to say) in the case of Moses. Wasn't it? He got the children of Israel out of Egypt, but the Lord selected somebody else to bring them to their journey's end. A poineer (continued President Lincoln) has hard work to do, and generally gets so battered and spattered that people prefer another, even though they may accept the principle. (Continued laughter.) Now, the letter of Mr. Conway gives us the application of these remarks in a manner that could hardly be mended. It quietly suggests that "Mr. Lincoln is averse to seeing the application of whatever truth there is in his theory to the one to whom it particularly applies—*himself*;" and Mr. Conway most pertinently adds: "Under him the war was begun; he had to deal with the disaffected; is it not possible that he has become so *battered and spattered* as to make it well for him to give up the leadership to some Joshua?" (Loud laughter and cheering.) It would seem, my friends, that nothing was said at this interview about "the danger of swapping horses in crossing a stream." (Laughter.) On the contrary, the President emphatically appealed to that memorable precedent in Holy Writ when the children of Israel, being themselves about to cross a stream, were compelled to follow a new leader, in order to get safely over. "I believe it was so (said he) in the case of Moses, wasn't it?" We all know it was so. We all know that the children of Israel could never have crossed the Jordan and entered into the promised land, had they refused to accept Joshua as their leader. And some of us are not a little afraid that the same fatality which attended the ancient Moses, is about to find a fresh illustration in the case of our modern Abraham. (Laughter and cheers.)

THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION A STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE WAY OF THE RESTORATION OF THE UNION.

Why, my friends, no one of us can have forgotten how much there was of mere personal prejudice and personal antipathy at the outset of that outrageous assault upon the national government by the Southern States. No one of us can fail to remember how deeply political and party antagonism entered into the origin of this rebellion. It has been said a thousand times, and everybody admits it to be true, that the first treasonable and fatal step could never have been taken but for the election of Abraham Lincoln as President. It has been said a thousand times, and no man denies it, that the Southern secession leaders —long as they may have contemplated their conspiracy against the Union, and earnestly as they may have desired to accomplish a separation of the States —could never have mustered followers enough to embolden them to attempt it, but for the success of the Republican party. We all know that the secession leaders aided and abetted the election of President Lincoln for that very purpose. (Applause.) He was their favorite candidate then, as I think he is their favorite candidate now. It was the triumph of that great sectional organization—the Republican party—which was originally relied upon for firing the heart of the Southern people. We cannot forget that the war cry of the South, at the time of their orignal revolt, was not so much—"We will not submit to the Constitution." "We will not abide by the Union," as "we will not have these men to rule over us." "We will not come under the dominion of the Black Republicans." Fellow-citizens, I need not say that this conduct on the part of the Southern States was utterly unwarrantable and worthy of all condemnation. The Republican party, to which I shall myself apply no opprobrious epithets, had prevailed fairly at the polls. The Southern States had enjoyed their full proportionate share in the national vote, and they were bound in honor as well as in law, to abide by the result. Nothing but the most direct and palpable violation of their rights would have furnished any shadow of justification for the course which they pursued. Abraham Lincoln was duly elected President of the United States for four yea
I rejoice that he was elected for no more than fo
(Laughter). And though some of us at the Nort
as well as so many at the South, were earnestly o
posed to him and to his party, and though not a fe
of us predicted the very results which have ensued,
was the bounden duty and sacred obligation
us all alike to acquiesce in the result, and to suppo
him as long as he supported the Constitution. A
I thank Heaven that the loyal States have support
him so unanimously. I thank Heaven that the who
people of the Northern States have sustained t
government so ardently, and fought the battles
the Union so bravely under whatever leaders th
have found in rightful authority over the
(Cheers.) No government on earth in any a
has ever been sustained with a nobler disregard
all party prejudices and all personal opinions th
our own government for the last four years. M
and money have been supplied without measure a
without a murmur. Few and far between ha
been the voices of dissent or the notes of discor
Where men could not approve the policy of t
administration, they have generally been conte
to be silent, or at most to enter a passing prote
in respectful terms. The exceptional cases,
which so much attention has been pointed,
the needless and unjustifiable severity with whi
they have been treated, have only served
illustrate more strikingly the general acquie
cence of the people. And as it has been in t
past, so it still is. We are all of us, I need not as
ready and eager to sustain the administration in ca
rying on the government, and vindicating its co
stitutional authority, to the end of their term. W
are ready to raise the men, we are ready to contribu
the means, for a vigorous prosecution of the wa
We will help them even to another draft, if anoth
draft be necessary. We will pay our taxes and e
coura e their loans. We will rejoice in all their vi
tories by sea and by land. They are no part
triumphs. They are our victories as well as their
Sherman has taken Atlanta, and Sheridan has almo
cleared the Shenandoah. We all hope and trust an
pray that Grant and Meade may soon take Richmon
(loud cheers), and that the brave work of our so
diers and sailors may go on unimpeded till nothin
remains to be effected by force of arms. The
shall have the best wishes of all our hearts, an
the best help of all our hands to this en
But all this, my friends, is a different part
speech from supporting the claims of the Admini
tration to a new term of the Presidency and a ne
lease of the White House. ("That's so," and laugh
ter.) And now that after four years of civil wa
waged at such an expenditure of life and treasure
the history of the world never before witnessed—no
that a new election of rulers has come regularl
round, is it not fit, is it not wise, is it not loyal an
patriotic, for those who do not and cannot approv
the policy of the Administration, and who have n
faith in their capacity to accomplish the restoratio
of the Union, to call upon them to withdraw fro
the high places of the land, and to make way for me
against whom the Southern heart is not so hopeless
inflamed and embittered? Is it not the solemn du
of the people of the United States to ask themselve
the question, whether, as things now stand, an
in view of all the prospects before us, it is quit
expedient, or quite just, to continue in place
President and a party, whose original election, justl
or unjustly, was the immediate occasion of so de
plorable a rebellion? Have not the people a right t
ask—is it not their duty to ask—whether a simpl
change of administration might not do something
might not do much towards removing a stumbling
block in the way of the restoration of the Union
toward destroying the unanimity and mitigating th
ferocity of our southern foes; toward conciliatin
the feelings of our southern friends if there are an
still left; and thus toward opening the way for a
easier progress of our arms and an earlier triumph o

great cause for which we are contending? (Ap-
ise.)

AT A PATRIOT IN LINCOLN'S PLACE WOULD HAVE SAID SIX MONTHS AGO?

ellow citizens, I am not here to indulge in any
onal imputations upon President Lincoln
ugh I have never been one of his partisan sup-
ters, I have never been one of his revilers. And
ne say, in passing, that he has received harder
vs from some of his own household—from Sena-
Wade and Representative Winter Davis and Gen-
Fremont, and from others who have been less
ve and less open, but not less violent in their de-
ciations of him, than he has from any of his
onents. But I cannot help remarking, that in
humble judgment, he would have adopted a
rse worthy of all commendation if, instead of
ing about swapping horses in crossing a stream,
ould have been induced to say, six months ago,
ne people of the United States, something of this
:

Fellow Citizens, you elected me fairly your Presi-
, and the President of the whole Union, four
rs ago. I have done my best to vindicate my
to the trust you conferred upon me, and I shall
inue to do so to the end of my term. You of
loyal States have nobly supported me. You have
n me all the men and all the money I have asked
You have borne and forborne with me in many
nges of policy, and in all the assertions of arbi-
y power to which I have thought it necessary to
rt. I shall go on to the best of my ability to the
of my allotted term. But I am ready then to re-
to the ranks. No pride of place, no love of pat-
age or power, shall induce me to stand in your
for a moment in your great struggle to restore
Union of our fathers. I do not forget how much
personal prejudice and party jealousy were ar-
ed against me at the outset. I do not for-
how deeply political and sectional antago-
ms entered into the causes of this
ellion. I am not insensible that the policy
ch I have recently felt constrained to adopt has
reased and aggravated those prejudices and those
agonisms. Select a new candidate. Choose a
President, against whom, and against whose
nds, there will be less of preconceived hostility
hate; and may God give him wisdom and cour-
to save the country and restore the Union." Ah,
friends, what a glorious example of patriotic
-denial and magnanimity this would have been !
o would not have envied President Lincoln the
portunity of exhibiting it? I am by no means
e it would not have re-elected him President in
e of himself. But it would certainly have gone
very far, towards securing unanimity in favor of
ne worthy successor; and it was the way, and the
y way to prevent that division of the Northern
timent which is in some quarters so earnestly de-
red as unfavorable to the success of our arms.
pplause.)

W MR. LINCOLN ABIDES BY HIS "NO-SWAP" POLICY.

But President Lincoln has thought fit to adopt the
y reverse of this magnanimous and self-denying
icy. He has quite forgotten that *one term* princi-
to which he and I were committed as mem-
s of the old Whig party. We see
n clinging eagerly and desperately to pat-
age and place. We see him demanding to be
nominated—demanding to be re-elected and claim-
it almost as a test of patriotism and loyalty that
should all with one accord support him for four
rs more. We hear his Secretary of State compar-
a vote against Abraham Lincoln to giving aid and
nfort to the rebels, and even indulging in what is
ll called a portentous threat, that if the people
ll dare to choose a new President, the government
l be abdicated, and left to fall to pieces of itself, be-
een the election and the inauguration. An absurd assumption, that a support of the government must necessarily involve a support of the policy of an existing administration,—this absurd and preposterous assumption, which has been put forward so arrogantly during the last year or two, is now pushed on to the monstrous length of maintaining that, patriotism demands the re-election of an existing President in time of war, even though a majority of the people may have no confidence in the capacity of the incumbent, either for conducting the war or for negotiating a peace. (Cheers.) No changing Presidents in the hour of danger or struggle is the cry. No swapping horses in crossing a stream. Everything else may be changed or swapped. You may change commanders-in-chief in the very face of the enemy; you may remove a gallant leader, as you did General McClellan, (tremendous cheering,) when he had just achieved one glorious victory, and was on his way to the almost certain achievment of another, (continued cheering;) you may swap Secretaries of War, as you did Cameron for Stanton (laughter;) you may swap Secretaries of the Treasury, as you did Chase for Fessenden; you may swap Postmaster-Generals, as you have just done, Blair for Dennison, (continued laughter;) you may change your candidates for the Vice-Presidency, "handy-dandy," and leave Mr. Hannibal Hamlin to shoulder his musket in a Bangor militia company, (laughter.) Thus far you may go, but no further. You must not touch me. (Laughter.) You must not change Presidents. Patriotism requires that Abraham Lincoln should be exempt from all such casualties. And so we are all to be drummed into voting for him under a threat of the pains and penalties of treason. Indeed, my friends, this extraordinary doctrine is getting to be a little contagious about these times; and from some recent manifestations in my own part of the country at least—however it may be here or elsewhere — I should suppose it was fast becoming a cherished dogma among officeholders of all grades, both national and State, that the only true patriotism consisted in keeping them all snugly in place, and that a failure to vote for any or all of them was little better than disloyalty to the government! It is certainly very accommodating in our Presidents and governors, and senators, and representatives, thus to save the people the trouble of an election. (Laughter.) If the war only lasts four years more, we shall, perhaps, be spared the trouble of elections altogether. ("That's true.") My friends, if the people are wise, they will give some of their public servants a lesson on this subject before it is too late, and teach them that the freedom of elections is too precious a privilege to be abandoned at the dictation of those who have already enjoyed a greater length of service, as some of us think, than is altogether consistent with the public welfare and the public safety. The progress of this terrible war is leaving its mark on not a few of our most cherished privileges as freemen. An overshadowing doctrine of necessity has obliterated not a few of the old constitutional limitations and landmarks of authority. An armed prerogative has gradually lifted itself to an appaling height throughout the land. But, thank heaven, it is still in the power of the people to assert their right to a fair and free election of their rulers. (Loud cheers.) And if they shall do so successfully—whatever may be the result—no nobler spectacle will have been witnessed in this land since it first asserted its title to be called a land of liberty. (Cheers.) Let it be seen that the American people can go through a Presidential election freely and fairly, even during the raging storm of civil war, and our institutions will have had a glorious triumph, whatever party, or whatever candidate may suffer a defeat. But, on the other hand, let the approaching election be overawed, or overruled by force or by fraud, and our institutions will have sustained a disastrous defeat, whatever may be the result to parties or to candidates. (Applause.)

THE UNION INIMICAL TO THE INTERESTS OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY.

And here, fellow-citizens, let me say, that in this eager and desperate determination of the President and his party to prolong their official supremacy at all hazards, and even by the most unblushing exercise of all the patronage and power, and influence of the government, in their own behalf, I find renewed reason for fearing that they cannot safely be trusted for an early restoration of "the Union as it was, under the Constitution as it is." No one can help seeing that it is by no means for their interest, as a party, to accomplish that result. No one can help seeing that such a restoration, under present circumstances, would give the finishing stroke to that political supremacy which they so eagerly seek to perpetuate. They themselves, certainly, are not blind, nor indifferent to the fact that when the South shall return to its allegiance, their own party domination is at an end. Why, we all know how it was, even when the Republican party achieved its first and only great success by the election of President Lincoln. We all remember that even then their sceptre would have proved a powerless and barren sceptre, if there had been no secession and no rebellion. We all remember that if the Senators and Representatives of the Southern States had not withdrawn so rashly and wantonly from their seats, the Republican party would soon have been in a helpless minority in one, if not in both branches of Congress. They could not have carried a measure, they could not have confirmed a nomination without the co-operation or consent of their opponents. And does anybody imagine that if the South were to lay down their arms to-morrow, and come back again into the old family fold, they would send any Senators or Representatives to Washington, whoever they might be, to sustain the measures or the men of the Republican party? No, my friends, that party itself sees plainly that no such thing is within the prospect of belief. That party sees that the restoration of union and peace under the old Constitution of our fathers is thus the end and upshot of their own dynasty. How, then, can we help fearing that they will willingly, if not systematically, postpone a result which is so sure to cut them off from any further enjoyment of power—of that power to which they are clinging with so phrenzied and frantic a grasp? The truth is, that the Republican party have so thriven and fattened on this rebellion, and it has brought them such an overflowing harvest of power-patronage, offices, contracts and spoils, and they have become so enamored of the vast and overshadowing influence which belongs to an existing administration at such an hour, that they are in danger of forgetting that their country is bleeding and dying on their hands. ("That's so." Applause.) And this suggests to me, my friends, an idea to which I cannot refrain from giving a brief expression. You have not forgotten, I am sure, that most memorable period which immediately preceded the inauguration of President Lincoln, when the minds and hearts of so many good men throughout the country were earnestly intent on devising some mode of arresting and averting that terrible struggle in which we were so soon afterward involved. You all remember that Peace Convention, as it was called, which assembled at Washington in February, 1861. You all remember the high and sanguine hopes which greeted its assembly; and you have not forgotten—no patriot can ever forget—how sadly those hopes were disappointed. For one, I have never for a moment doubted that if the incoming President and his friends in Congress had given countenance and encouragement to that convention, and to the measures it proposed, the secession would have ended with South Carolina and the Gulf States, and we should have had Union and peace before six months had expired. The rebebellion would have been nipped in the bud. It would have been crushed in the egg, and the wounds it had occasioned would have healed up, as the surgeons say, *by first intention*. I could furnish the opinions of some of the best men in our country, living and dead, to the effect. And why, why was that convention so repelled and repudiated by the ultra wing of the Republican party? Why did they stand idly by mocking at every effort to prevent and avert this great and terrible struggle, and rejoicing at what they called the glorious future before them? How can any one doubt that it was because the secession of the South, and the withdrawal of the Southern representation, would secure that party predominance which was essential to the carrying out of their cherished policy, as well as to the distribution of the spoils of victory. I was at Washington myself, during a portion of that period, in company with friends whom I esteem and honor to day, as I esteemed and honored then, though I find myself differing from more than one of them. We went on as the bearers of a petition of fifteen thousand citizens of Boston for the adoption of measures of conciliation and peace. It is not for me to say, even if I knew, what views were brought back by others of that little embassy; but I cannot forget the painful impression which was left upon my own mind, that there were men there, and in high places, too, who, instead of lifting a finger to arrest the dreadful catastrophe which was so obviously impending, were gloating and glorying over the departure of the successive southern delegations as furnishing a clearer field for the more successful prosecution of their own fanatical views, and for the more undisputed establishment of their own party supremacy. And can it be imagined that such men will be ready or willing to co-operate in bringing back the Southern States to their old allegiance to the Union? In bringing them back too, be it remembered, not merely with their old quota of representation, but with a much larger delegation in the House of Representatives than they have ever before enjoyed? For, my friends, if the President's proclamation is to have the full interpretation and sweeping efficacy which some of his friends claim for it, the representation of the Southern States,—after the next apportionment, certainly—is to be not merely on the old three-fifth principle, but on the whole black race, man for man, as well as on the whole white race. It will hardly lie in the mouth of the Republican party, most assuredly, to rufuse to the South a full representation on its whole black population. If the proclamation accomplished anything, it abolished the three-fifth principle of the Constitution—not, indeed, the way in which John Quincy Adams once tried to abolish it many years ago, by striking out all representation of those to whom it related; but by giving a full, complete five-fifths representation on the whole black population of the Southern States. I repeat, then, fellow-citizens, that it is too much the interest of the Republican party, as a party, to defer and postpone the return of the Southern States to the Union, for that party to be safely trusted with the work of restoration. (Applause.) Or, indeed, does any one imagine that those States are to be brought back without any representation? Is any one proposing to bring them back only as so many desolated and subjugated provinces, to be held for generations in a state of subjection and vassalage by enormous standing armies, and at an immeasurable cost of treasure and blood? Are we deliberately bent on having an American Hungary, or an American Poland, or an American Venice, on our continent? Do we desire to see even an American Ireland? Are all our efforts for the abolition of black slavery to end in establishing a quasi-condition of white slavery? (Cheers.) Is that what we are fighting for, under the old Liberty Flag of our fathers? ("No, no.") No, no, my friends, we must have the Old Constitutional Union again, if we have anything—with all the States and with all the rights reserved to the States or to the people, as well as with all the powers secured to the general government. (Applause.) We are not fighting for a mere territorial

Union. We are not fighting for a mere geographical area. We want, indeed, all the valleys and all the mountains and all the rivers, and all the lakes, which were ever included within the rightful limits of our once happy and prosperous land. But we want the men and women and children—white, certainly, not less than black—who have dwelt within those limits. And we want them in the old political organizations, which the Constitution has recognized, under their own State Governments, and with all the rights which belong to those governments. We want the Constitution of Washington, and Franklin, and Hamilton, and Madison, and Jay, without addition and without diminution. We want the glorious Union which that Constitution has secured to us in the past, and which, by the blessing of God overruling the madness of men, we trust, it is still destined to secure to us for the future. And Heaven forbid, that the temporary interests of any party should be suffered to interfere with the earliest practicable accomplishment of this great restoration! Heaven forbid, that this fratricidal war should be prolonged for a day or an hour, or an instant, in order to perpetuate or continue any mere party ascendancy! Heaven forbid, that so horrible a struggle should be suffered to degenerate into a great game of *Rouge et Noir*—blood and negroes—with nothing better than the spoils of office for its stake! (Cheers.) It is sometimes suggested, my friends, that the Democratic party have been too good friends with the South to be trusted in arranging this difficulty. Why, that is the very reason why they should be trusted. I have often had reason to find fault with the Southern proclivities of some of the Northern Democrats; but if those proclivities can now be turned to the account of saving the Union, they may well be forgiven for more than all the mischief they have ever done in the past. And now, bear with me once more, fellow-citizens, while I urge upon you, finally, that the principles or the policy of the Republican party, as well as their interest as a party, seem to me utterly incompatible with any early restoration of Union and peace. I refer, I need hardly say, to their policy or principles in regard to domestic slavery, as developed in the speeches of some of their leading members, and in the acts and express declarations of the President himself. We all know that the Administration have solemnly adopted the policy of complete emancipation as a necessary result of the rebellion and the war. We all know that after having rallied the country for two years on the plain, direct, constitutional issue of enforcing the laws, and restoring the Union, the President suddenly changed his hand, and, in the teeth of all his own declarations and arguments, put forth a solemn proclamation of universal emancipation. We all know that, at this moment, no man in the rebel States is allowed to return to his allegiance and resume his place as a loyal citizen, without swearing to support this proclamation, as well as to support the Constitution of the United States. And we all remember that recently, on the first authentic or unauthentic overtures of peace and submission, the President issued a formal manifesto—"To Whom it May Concern"—making an abandonment of slavery a condition precedent for even the reception of any such proposals.

THE POLICY OF "NO UNION WITH SLAVEHOLDERS."

Meantime Mr. Secretary Seward, for whom I have nothing but the kindest feelings, and who I honestly believe regrets such extravagances as much as any of us, has expressly admitted in his recent and most extraordinary speech at Auburn, in New York, that there are those of the Republican party, "who want guarantees for swift, and universal, and complete emancipation, or they do not want the nation saved." Ah, my friends, is there not too much reason for apprehending that this class of men is more numerous than even Mr. Seward imagines, and that in the next four years they will have acquired—even if they have not already acquired—a prevailing and paramount influence over the Administration? (Applause.) Mark the words: "Men who want guarantees for swift, and universal, and complete emancipation, or they do not want the nation saved." And this, I suppose, is what these men would call unconditional Unionism! (Laughter.) But it is what you and I, fellow-citizens, should call conditional dis-unionism, and it can hardly fail to be so stigmatized wherever it is openly encountered. Why, what have we heard of late from gentlemen holding the highest official positions under the Republican regime in my own Commonwealth of Massachusetts? What have been the most recent utterances of the most distinguished Republicans in Faneuil Hall? I will not name names, for I have no taste for personality, but I will give the precise language. From one we have the declaration that "the appeal from sire to son should go on forever and forever until the last acre of southern land, baptised by Massachusetts' blood, should be rescued from the infidels to liberty." This, certainly, would seem very like preaching an eternal crusade against southern slavery, without regard either to Union, peace, or the Constitution. From another equally distinguished Republican, we have even more distinct declaration, that "the Baltimore Convention and Abraham Lincoln *ask something more than the Union* as the condition of peace;" and that "he has announced in his letter 'to all whom it may concern,' that all terms of peace must begin with the abandonment of slavery." While from the same eminent source we are assured, that a vote for Abraham Lincoln is to usher in the glorious day, when the eloquence of Wendell Phillips may be enjoyed at Richmond and Charleston, as it is now enjoyed at New York and Boston." (Laughter.) I may be told, indeed, that all this is only the rant and rhapsody of fanatical rhetoricians; but I cannot so regard it. What said the resolutions adopted at this same meeting? One of them concluded by the unequivocal announcement, that "the war must go on until the pride of the (southern) leaders is humbled, their power broken, and the civil and social structure of the South reorganized on the basis of free labor, free speech, and equal rights for all before the law."

HOW LONG MUST WAR CONTINUE TO ACCOMPLISH COMPLETE EMANCIPATION?

Well, now, my friends, there can be no misunderstanding the import of this language. It is clear, explicit, unequivocal. It does not pretend that the war is to be prosecuted for the restoration of the Union, but for something more than the restoration of the Union; and it expressly defines that something more to be "the total abandonment of slavery," and "reorganization of the social structure of the South on the basis of free labor, free speech, and equal rights for all before the law." These are the ends for which the war is to be prosecuted; and it is not to be permitted to cease until these ends are accomplished. From these declarations we may form, I think, a pretty distinct idea of the prospect before us if the Republican party remains in power, and make some approximate estimate of the chances of an early peace. Why, in what millenial period are all these results to be accomplished? By what process are they to be brought about? How is this total abandonment of slavery to be enforced? Are we to wait till each individual master has filed his separate bill of release? Are we to go on fighting till each individual State has adopted amendments to those constitutions which now prohibit any such proceeding? Or shall we recognize the power of the confederate government, and wait for that to initiate and enforce this reorganization of the social structure of the South? Within what period, I say, this side of the Greek kalends, can all this be accomplished? (Cheers.) Fellow-citizens, there is not a man in the loyal States who would not rejoice with all his heart and

soul, if African slavery could be safely and legitimately brought to an end on this whole continent. The Republican party have no monopoly of the philanthropy or of the patriotism of the land, though some of them would seem to claim it. But, for one, I have never had a particle of faith that a sudden, sweeping, forcible emancipation could result in anything but mischief and misery for the black race, as well as the white. The proclamation, however, has been issued long ago, and its efficacy and its authority are to be the subjects of future experience and future adjudication. To those I willingly leave it. It was undoubtedly one of the greatest stretches of the doctrine of necessity—it was unqu stionably one of the most startling exercises of the one man power, which the history of human government, free or despotic, ever witnessed. I have no disposition to question its wisdom or its authority, as a measure adopted for securing greater success to our arms, and an earlier termination of the war—though I cannot help entertaining grave doubts on both points. But the idea that it is now to be made the pretext for prolonging that war, after the original and only legitimate end for which it was undertaken shall have been accomplished; the idea that we are to go on fighting and fighting for "something more" than the Union; the idea that the war is not to be permitted to cease until the whole social structure of the South has been reorganized, is one abhorrent to every instinct of my soul, to every dictate of my judgment, to every principle which I cherish as a statesman or as a Christian. It is a policy, too, in my opinion, utterly unconstitutional; and as much in the spirit of rebellion as almost anything which has been attempted by the Southern States. Why, does any one doubt for an instant, that if the Southern States were to lay down their arms to-morrow, and throw themselves unreservedly on their rights under the Constitution, that it would be the bounden duty of the government to receive their submission, and recognize their rights, subject only to such pains and penalties as might be legally enforced upon individuals duly convicted of treason? I have often hoped that this question might be brought to a practical test. I have often hoped, and still hope, that some one State, like the old State of North Carolina, or the great State of Georgia, might be induced to try the experiment of simply coming back under the old flag, without asking any questions, or seeking to exact in advance any conditions whatever. (Cheers.) What President, what administration, what party shall dare to stand in the way, and tell either of those States that we have ceased to fight for the Union—that we are fighting for *something more* than the Union, and that she must stay out until she has reorganized her whole social structure? What President, what administration, what party, shall dare to repel and repulse such a returning sister, and tell her that she cannot be readmitted to the old family household until she has prepared herself for relishing the eloquence of Wendell Phillips, justly celebrated as that eloquence may be? Why, my friends, the proclamation of the President, as an instrument for achieving success and securing submission is one thing, but a demand for the total abandonment of slavery, and the reorganization of the whole social structure of the South, as conditions precedent for receiving and accepting submission whenever it shall be tendered, and after it has been secured, is a wholly different thing. The one may, perhaps, be justified on a constructive plea of necessity. But there can be no plea of necessity after the submission is accomplished. If the States in rebellion, one or all, were simply to lay down their arms to-morrow, and throw themselves unconditionally on the old Constitution, and range themselves once more under the old flag, what else could we do, what else should we do, but receive them with open arms to the old Union of our fathers? Pains and penalties might be enforced on individual offenders. The law and the officers of the law would have all that matter to look after. But pains and penalties would soon be almost forgotten in the joy which would pervade the country. The return of the prodigal son would be nothing to it. We should get a nearer and clearer impression than almost ever before of that exquisite idea of the good Book—that there is more joy over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just men that need no repentance.

WHAT SHERMAN THINKS ABOUT IT.

Whatever the administration or the President might say, the great majority of the people of the United States, as I believe, would adopt the tone of that noble letter of the hero of Atlanta, when he said to the mayor of that captured city: "We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your land, or anything you have; but we do want, and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States." (Cheers.) "I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to early and perfect success. But, my dear sir, when that peace does come you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter. (Tremendous cheering.) Yes, not only would the gallant Sherman "watch with them to shield their homes and families against danger from every quarter," but that whole noble army, which has done such glorious service in the West, would watch with him, and we should witness such a fraternization, and such a jubilee, as would send a thrill of joy to the heart of every real friend of Union and peace and constitutional liberty in our land. (Cheers.) We should not stop to ask whether we had obtained anything more than Union and peace. We should leave the judicial tribunals to ascertain that. We should remit that question to the constables and the court-houses. We should feel that in vindicating the authority of the Constitution and laws, and in restoring the Union of our fathers, we had prepared the way for a glorious future for our country, and had accomplished the great end for which so many noble young men had shed their blood and laid down their lives. And so we should all thank God and be joyful. (Cheers.) Undoubtedly, my friends, it is the hope of us all, that, in some way or other, sooner or later, out of this abhorrent rebellion will have come the ultimate extinction of domestic slavery. Many of us believe that, if the war were to cease to-morrow, and the Southern States were to come back without any condition or terms whatever, slavery would be found to have received a wound from which it could never recover. Mr. Seward himself, in that same extraordinary speech from which I have already quoted, has expressly told us that, practically, slavery is no longer in question. "I told you here, (he says,) a year ago, that, practically, slavery was no longer in question—that it was perishing under the operation of the war." "That assertion," he adds, "has been confirmed. Jefferson Davis tells you in effect the same thing." And Jefferson Davis does indeed tell us very much the same thing, if the report is to be credited of his conversation with certain quasi-peace commissioners who went to Richmond under a pass furnished by General Grant at the request of President Lincoln. Jefferson Davis is stated in that report to have admitted that two millions of slaves—one-half of the whole number in the Southern States—had been practically freed already.

THE UNION THE ONE CONDITION OF PEACE.

But whatever may be our opinions on this point, it will be enough for us all—enough, certainly, for General McClellan and his supporters, if we shall have succeeded in restoring the Union; and I believe the people of the loyal States will agree with him and agree with us, that the war ought not to be prosecuted another day, another hour, another instant, for

any purpose under the sun, except the simple restoration of the Union. "The Union—the Union—the one condition of peace. We ask no more." (Cheers.) That is the platform of our candidate, and that is our platform. We are not for propagating philanthropy at the point of the bayonet. We are not for wading through seas of blood in order to reorganize the whole social structure of the South. Christianity forbids us; for it tells us not to do evil even that good may come. The Constitution forbids us; for, the moment the rebellion is suppressed, the war becomes unconstitutional, whatever may be its pretext. The condition of our country, which has already sent forth more than two millions of soldiers into the field, and which is already groaning beneath a debt of three or four thousand millions of dollars; the condition of our beloved country forbids us from sending another soldier, or spending another dollar, after the Union is saved. Fellow-citizens, a solemn oath to support "the Constitution of the United States as it is," is still upon all our rulers, and a solemn obligation to do so still rests upon the whole people. No rebellion elsewhere can justify rebellion on our part. We must pursue constitutional ends, and we must pursue them by constitutional means. Then we shall succeed, and then our success will be substantial and permanent. Oh, what a triumph it would be if the Constitution of our fathers should come out, after all, unscathed from this fiery trial; if it should be seen to have prevailed, by its own innate original force and vigor, over all the machinations and assaults of its enemies! How proudly, then might we hold it up before all mankind, in all time to come, as we have in all time past, as indeed the masterpiece of political and civil wisdom! How confidently could we then challenge all the world to show, us a system of government of equal stability and endurance. (Cheers.) It has already stood the strain of prosperity and of adversity. Foreign wars and domestic dissentions have hitherto assailed it in vain. The rains have descended, and the winds have blown, and the floods have come and beaten upon it, but it has not been shaken. The great final test is now upon it; rebellion, revolution, civil war, in their most formidable and appalling shape. Oh, if we can but carry it through this last trial unharmed! we never again need fear for its security. Let us then hold it up—Constitution, the whole Constitution, and nothing but the Constitution—as at once the end and the instrument of all our efforts. Let us demand a faithful adherence to all its forms and to all its principles. Let us watch jealously for the observance and fulfillment of all its provisions. And let us resolve that if it does fail and fall at last, it shall be by the madness of its enemies, and not by the supineness or willing surrender of its friends. (Applause.)

MR. LINCOLN MAKING FUN OF HIMSELF—A REMINISCENCE.

Fellow-citizens, with such issues before us, I need say but little about candidates. You know already, I am sure, all that you care to know about President Lincoln. Yet, perhaps, I can recall a little passage in his public life which may at least amuse you. His only term of Congressional service was during the period when I had the honor to preside over the House of which he was a member. He helped me to the Speaker's chair by his own vote, and I really wish I could find it in my conscience to return the compliment at this moment. (Laughter.) But I cannot forget a certain speech which he made, in the month of July, 1848, in reference to the nomination for the Presidency of a distinguished Democrat who still lives (I rejoice to remember), to enjoy the esteem and respect of all who knew him.

"By the way, Mr. Speaker, (said he,) did you know that I am a military hero? Yes sir, (continued he,) in the days of the Black Hawk war, I fought, bled, and came away. Speaking of General Cass's career, reminds me of my own. I was not at Stillman's defeat, but I was about as near it as Cass was to Hull's surrender; and like him, I saw the place soon afterward. It is quite certain that I did not break my sword, for I had none to break; but I bent a musket pretty badly on one occasoin. If Cass broke his sword, the idea is, he broke it in desperation; I bent the musket by accident. If General Cass went in advance of me in picking whortleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. (Laughter.) If he saw any live fighting Indians it was more than I did, but I had a good many bloody struggles with the mosquitos; and, although I never fainted from loss of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry. Mr. Speaker, if I should ever conclude to doff whatever our Democratic friends may suppose there is of black cockade federalism about me, *and thereupon they shall take me up as their candidate for the Presidency, I protest they shall not make fun of me, as they have of General Cass, by attempting to write me into a military hero.*" (Great laughter.)

Ah, my friends, what a blessed thing for the country it would have been if President Lincoln had only "recked his own rede;" if, after he became President, he had not made fun of himself by attempting to play the part of a military hero? Why, it is hardly too much to say that if he had never undertaken to direct and control the course of our armies, if he had not so rashly interfered with the movements of at least one of our generals, Richmond might have been taken, and the war triumphantly terminated, long before this time. You all know the General to whom I refer, and the circumstances of that interference. (Cheers.)

GENERAL M'CLELLAN'S CAREER AND MERITS.

Indeed the whole career of our noble candidate, is fresh in the minds and hearts of the whole American people. You have followed the story, I doubt not, as admirably narrated by my accomplished and excellent friend, Mr. Hillard. You have traced him through that memorable campaign in Mexico, and have not forgotten his gallantry at Contreras, where like Washington at Braddock's defeat, he had two horses shot under him, but came off substantially unharmed. (Cheers.) You have accompanied him on his visit to the scene of the Crimean war, and have not forgotten his masterly report on the armies of Europe. (Applause.) You have followed him in that glorious little pioneer campaign in Western Virginia, at the outbreak of the rebellion, and have not forgotten the brilliant victories by which that campaign was crowned. (Applause.) You have seen him assume the command of the whole forces of the Union, and have not forgotten with what devotion, and with what consumate skill, he organized the grand Army of the Potomac. (Applause.) You have followed him through that terrible Peninsular campaign. (Cheers.) You have accompanied him through these fearful seven days of agony and glory. (Cheers.) You have seen how cruelly he was thwarted and stripped of his troops on the right hand and on the left, and you have not forgotten how bravely he bore up under all the grievous disappointments to which he was subjected. You have seen him assuming command again at the solicitation of the President, at an hour of the greatest peril to our capital and our county—reorganizing as by magic the brave but broken battalions of the Army of the Potomac, and achieving the glorious victory of Antietam on the very birthday of the Constitution. (Immense cheering.) And you have not failed to read his admirable dispatch from Harrison's Landing, his brilliant oration at West Point, and his noble letter accepting the nomination for the presidency. (Cheers.) No words of mine, no words of anybody could add anything to such a record. No words of his enemies can take away one jot or tittle from that record. I have no disposition to exaggerate his services or his merits, much less to disparage those of others. We all know that other commanders have done nobly, and have achieved victories which have entitled them to the honor and

gratitude of the whole country. It has been their fortune, however, to be let alone. Many of them, too, are still in the field, privileged still to lead the armies and fight the battles of their country, instead of being unjustly deprived of their command and inexorably doomed to inaction. There will be an opportunity for doing full justice to their deserts hereafter. But what can be more fit, than for the people of the United States now to take up this young and gallant leader whom the rulers have so wantonly rejected, and to place him where his experience and abilities may be turned to account for the rescue of his country? In the full vigor of manhood, without a stain or a shade upon his character, a man of virtuous life and Christian principle, brave, prudent, patriotic, a stranger to all mere party politics a perfect stranger to anything like political management or political intrigue, one who has known how to command a great army and has never forgotten how to command himself, with no pledges on his lips or in his heart, except to the enforcement of the laws, the vindication of the Constitution, and the restoration of the Union;—what is there wanting in him to attract the confidence and support of all loyal men, and to secure the respect and admiration even of his enemies? (Loud and continued cheering.) Let me not forget, however, to remind you, my friends, that he has in his veins, in common with so many of you, and in common, as I am glad to remember, with myself, too, a little good old Connecticut blood, coming down from an ancestor who settled here a century ago. I am sure you will not think any the worse of him for that. (Cheers.)

A BIT OF TESTIMONY FROM THE SOUTH.

I fear, my friends, that I have already detained you too long. My own strength, certainly, will hardly hold out longer, even if your indulgence and your patience be not already exhausted. But I must not take my leave of you without giving you a little piece of testimony of the highest interest and importance. Among the refugees from Atlanta, immediately after its capture, there came within our lines not many days ago a person of the most estimable and excellent character, who had enjoyed the best opportunities of understanding the southern heart. And what said he, do you think, on being interrogated as to the prospects of the future? I can give you his remarks from the most authentic source. They were communicated to me by a good friend of the Union in one of the border states. "If Mr. Lincoln is re-elected," said he, "the people of the South will fight for thirty years, for they feel that they can do nothing better, but if McClellan is elected, such an overwhelming Union party will be formed in the South, that peace will be the almost immediate result." ("That's so." Loud cheers.) "I speak," said he, "the sentiments of the people, not the officials. The leaders of the rebellion are anxious for the re-election of Mr. Lincoln, as giving most hope of the ultimate success of the rebel cause. But the people," he added, "respect McClellan, and believe in his honesty, capacity, and patriotism; and, being heartily tired of the war, they will be willing to trust him." (Cheers.) Such is the latest and most authentic testimony from the very heart of the Southern Confederacy. It was communicated to me from a source entitled to the highest confidence, and it concurs, I need hardly say, with every opinion which I have been able to form for myself. I do firmly and honestly believe that, if by the aid of this good old State of Connecticut, George Brinton McClellan shall be proclaimed President of the United States of America on the 4th day of March next, as I hope and trust he may be (cheers), another year will not have expired without witnessing the final termination of the rebellion; and that the succeeding 4th of July will find us celebrating such a jubilee as has not been seen since that day was first hailed as the birthday of American independence. (Continued cheering.) I do not forget the danger of indulging in these ninety-days, or even twelve-months prophecies. ("That's so, too," and laughter.) I do not forget how many memorable warnings we have had of their fallacy. I can only say, that in that hope, in that trust, in that firm and unswerving confidence, I shall give my vote to the candidate of the Democratic party; and whether that vote shall prove to have been cast with the many or with the few, with majorities or with minorities, I shall feel that I have followed the dictates of my own best judgment, of my own conscientious convictions of duty, and of my own unalterable attachment and devotion to the Constitution and the Union of my country. (Loud cheering.)

DO NOT DESPAIR OF THE REPUBLIC.

I will not undertake to calculate the chances of success. The results of the late elections seem to decide nothing, except that the great battle is still to be fought, and that a victory is still within our reach. But whatever may be the results of the election, let us resolve never to despair of the republic. We are on the eve of one of the most memorable anniversaries in our history as a nation. Eighty-three years ago to morrow, on the 19th of October, 1781, the soil of Virginia was the scene of a far different spectacle from that which it unhappily witnesses at this hour. The soldiers of the North and of the South, instead of confronting each other in deadly strife, were then standing triumphantly side by side, under the glorious lead of Washington, to receive the final surrender of the forces which had been so long arrayed against our national independence. Would to Heaven that the precious memories of that event might be once more revived in every American heart! Would to Heaven that even now the associations of that day might overpower and disarm the unnatural hostility of our adversaries, and that the soldiers of the North and South might be seen like the soldiers in the old Roman story, rushing into each other's embrace under the old flag of our fathers! But even if such a result is to be longer, and still longer, and still longer postponed, let us never despair that such a day of final surrender will come; a day when rebellion will be everywhere suppressed and extinguished; a day when a policy of Christian statesmanship, breathing something better than threatenings and slaughter, and based upon a juster idea than that the whole southern people are barbarians and outlaws, shall accomplish its legitimate work of restoring Union and peace to our afflicted land—a day when, by the blessing of God, that glorious vision of Daniel Webster may again be verified for us and for our children, from Lake Superior to the Gulf of Mexico, and from ocean to ocean: "One country, one Constitution, one destiny." (Enthusiastic cheers.) And when that day shall come, I can desire for myself no other distinction than to be thought not unworthy of some humble share in that inscription which was engraved on the old tomb of my ancestors two centuries and a half ago—before New London, before even Boston, had a name or a local habitation on the American continent — "*Beati Sunt Pacifici*,"—blessed are the peace-makers. I can desire no other distinction for myself, than to be remembered among those who, in the words of our noble candidate, "would hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood." (Loud and continued applause.)

The chairman said: My friends, I know you are anxious to testify your approbation of the eloquent and statesmanlike speech to which you have just listened, I therefore call upon you as the best method of doing so to give three cheers for the speaker.

They were given enthusiastically. After three hearty cheers for McClellan, the meeting adjourned.

GENERAL McCLELLAN'S LETTER OF ACCEPTANCE.

ORANGE, NEW JERSEY,
September 8, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me of my nomination by the Democratic National Convention, recently assembled at Chicago, as their candidate at the next election for President of the United States.

It is unnecessary for me to say to you that this nomination comes to me unsought.

I am happy to know that when the nomination was made the record of my public life was kept in view.

The effect of long and varied service in the army during war and peace, has been to strengthen and make indelible in my mind and heart the love and reverence for the Union, Constitution, laws, and flag of our country, impressed upon me in early youth.

These feelings have thus far guided the course of my life, and must continue to do so to its end.

The existence of more than one government over the region which once owned our flag is incompatible with the peace, the power, and the happiness of the people.

The preservation of our Union was the sole avowed object for which the war was commenced. It should have been conducted for that object only, and in accordance with those principles which I took occasion to declare when in active service.

Thus conducted, the work of reconciliation would have been easy, and we might have reaped the benefits of our many victories on land and sea.

The Union was originally formed by the exercise of a spirit of conciliation and compromise. To restore and preserve it, the same spirit must prevail in our councils, and in the hearts of the people.

The reëstablishment of the Union in all its integrity is, and must continue to be, the indispensable condition in any settlement. So soon as it is clear, or even probable, that our present adversaries are ready for peace, upon the basis of the Union, we should exhaust all the resources of statesmanship practised by civilized nations, and taught by the traditions of the American people, consistent with the honor and interests of the country, to secure such peace, reëstablish the Union, and guarantee for the future the constitutional rights of every State. The Union is the one condition of peace — we ask no more.

Let me add, what I doubt not was, although unexpressed, the sentiment of the Convention, as it is of the people they represent, that when any one State is willing to return to the Union, it should be received at once, with a full guarantee of all its constitutional rights.

If a frank, earnest, and persistent effort to obtain those objects should fail, the responsibility for ulterior consequences will fall upon those who remain in arms against the Union. But the Union must be preserved at all hazards.

I could not look in the face of my gallant comrades of the army and navy, who have survived so many bloody battles, and tell them that their labors and the sacrifice of so many of our slain and wounded brethren had been in vain; that we had abandoned that Union for which we have so often periled our lives.

A vast majority of our people, whether in the army and navy or at home, would, as I would, hail with unbounded joy the permanent restoration of peace, on the basis of the Union under the Constitution, without the effusion of another drop of blood. But no peace can be permanent without Union.

As to the other subjects presented in the resolutions of the Convention, I need only say that I should seek, in the Constitution of the United States and the laws framed in accordance therewith, the rule of my duty, and the limitations of executive power; endeavor to restore economy in public expenditure, reëstablish the supremacy of law, and, by the operation of a more vigorous nationality, resume our commanding position among the nations of the earth.

The condition of our finances, the depreciation of the paper money, and the burdens thereby imposed on labor and capital, show the necessity of a return to a sound financial system; while the rights

of citizens, and the rights of States, and the binding authority of law over President, army, and people, are subjects of not less vital importance in war than in peace.

Believing that the views here expressed are those of the Convention and the people you represent, I accept the nomination.

I realize the weight of the responsibility to be borne should the people ratify your choice.

Conscious of my own weakness, I can only seek fervently the guidance of the Ruler of the universe, and, relying on His all-powerful aid, do my best to restore union and peace to a suffering people, and to establish and guard their liberties and rights,

I am, gentlemen,
very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

Hon. HORATIO SEYMOUR,
and others, Committee.

General McClellan's Views of the War and the Country.

The Harrison's Bar Letter.

HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862.

MR. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blockading our river communications. I cannot but regard our condition as critical; and I earnestly desire in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly come within scope of my official duties. These views amount to convictions; and are deeply impressed upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure or blood. If secession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political faction, or foreign war, shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon the people of every State.

The time has come when the Government must determine upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and military policy, and of directing the whole course of national affairs in regard to the rebellion must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power sufficient even for the present terrible exigency.

This rebellion has assumed the character of war; as such it should be regarded; and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property, taken for military use, should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order, and the protection of political rights. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for suppressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive it. The right of the Government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labor, should be asserted; and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be recognized.

This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State; thus working manumission in such State; and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question of time.

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men; would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty.

Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

The policy of the Government must be supported by concentration of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support will soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army: one who posesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity; and as I hope for forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love of my country.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
G. B. McCLELLAN,
Major-General Commanding.

HENRY CLAY.

EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH OF THE HON. HENRY CLAY, IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE SUBJECT OF ABOLITION PETITIONS, FEBRUARY 7, 1839.

"Sir, — I am not in the habit of speaking lightly of the possibility of dissolving this happy Union. The Senate knows that I have deprecated allusions, on ordinary occasions, to that direful event. The country will testify, that, if there be anything in the history of my public career worthy of recollection, it is the truth and sincerity of my ardent devotion to its lasting preservation. But we should be false in our allegiance to it if we did not discriminate between the imaginary and the real dangers by which it may be assisted. Abolition should no longer be regarded as an imaginary danger. The Abolitionists, let me suppose, succeed in their present aims of uniting the inhabitants of the Free States as one man, against the inhabitants of the Slave States. Union on the one side will beget union on the other. And this process of reciprocal consolidation will be attended with all the violent prejudices, imbittered passions, and implacable animosities which ever degraded or deformed human nature. A virtual dissolution of the Union will have already taken place, whilst the form of its existence remains. The most valuable element of union, mutual kindness, the feelings of sympathy, the fraternal bonds, which now happily unite us, will have been extinguished forever. One section will stand in menacing and hostile array against the other. The collision of opinion will be quickly followed by the clash of arms. I will not attempt to describe scenes which now lie happily concealed from our view. Abolitionists themselves would shrink back in dismay and horror at the contemplation of desolated fields, conflagrated cities, murdered inhabitants, and the overthrow of the fairest fabric of human government that ever rose to animate the hopes of civilized man. Nor should these Abolitionists flatter themselves, that, if they can succeed in their object of uniting the Free States, they will enter the contest with a numerical superiority that must insure victory. All history and experience proves the hazard and uncertainty of war; and we are admonished by Holy Writ, "that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong." But if they were to conquer, whom would they conquer? A foreign foe? one that had invaded our shores, insulted our flag, and laid our country waste? No, sir; no, sir. It would be a contest without laurels, without glory, — a self, a suicidal conquest, — a conquest of brothers over brothers, — achieved by one over another portion of the descendants of common ancestors, who, nobly pledging their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, had fought and bled, side by side, in many a hard battle on land and ocean, severed our country from the British crown, and established our national independence.

The inhabitants of the Slave States are sometimes accused by their Northern brethren with displaying too much rashness and sensibility to the operations and proceedings of Abolitionists. But, before they can be rightly judged, there should be a reversal of conditions. Let me suppose that the people of the Slave States were to form societies, subsidize presses, make large pecuniary contributions, send forth numerous missionaries throughout all their own borders, and enter into machinations to burn the beautiful capitals, destroy the productive manufactories, and sink into the ocean the gallant ships of the Northern States. Would these incendiary proceedings be regarded as neighborly, and friendly, and consistent with the fraternal sentiments which should ever be cherished by one portion of the Union towards another? Would they excite no emotion, occasion no manifestations of dissatisfaction, nor lead to any acts of retaliatory violence? But the supposed case falls far short of the actual one, in a most essential circumstance. In no contingency could these capitals, manufactories, and ships rise in rebellion and massacre inhabitants of the Northern States.

"I am, Mr. President, no friend of slavery. The Searcher of all hearts

knows that every pulsation of mine beats high and strong in the cause of civil liberty. Whenever it is safe and practicable I desire to see every portion of the human family in the enjoyment of it. But I prefer the liberty of my own country to that of any other people; and the liberty of my own race to that of any other race. The liberty of the descendants of Africa in the United States is incompatible with the safety and liberty of the European descendants. Their slavery forms an exception — an exception resulting from a stern and inexorable necessity — to the general liberty in the United States. We did not originate, nor are we responsible for, this necessity. Their liberty, if it were possible, could only be established by violating the incontestable powers of the States, and subverting the Union. And beneath the ruins of the Union would be buried, sooner or later, the liberty of both races."

THE MEANEST MAN IN CREATION.

We ask the attention of readers to the following extract from Judge Abbott's late speech at Boston: —

Let me ask for a moment who these men are who denounce those who appeal to the better part of man's nature? For twenty years past they have endeavored to destroy the Union; year in and year out they have denounced the glorious Constitution — the ark of our safety, as "a covenant with death and an agreement with hell;" who have scouted at and denounced the Union as it was and the Constitution as it is, and these are the men who denounce you and me. They don't want the Union. They are the men who have talked about war, war that is to last always, but who never have and never will risk a hair of their own miserable heads. When they talk of war they mean to risk the lives of your children and mine, while they remain at home. They belong to the class you have heard of before, who are willing to sacrifice all their wives' relations, and even consent to sacrifice their first cousins in the war, but not a mother's son of them will even get within the sound of a bullet.

They are the men who get your children and mine under false pretences — not for the Constitution, but for the negro. When they have got of us all they can get, — thank God they can get no more of mine, — their patriotism expends itself in buying negroes, and in sending to Germany for recruits to fight in a war they don't care anything about. Do you — I mean to be plain — do you want to know who is the meanest, most despicable creature, animal — I'll not call him man — who crawls? I'll tell you.

Voices — Wilson! Sumner!

Abbott — Gentlemen, don't call names. I'll describe a class. It is the man who constantly appeals to the worst passions of our nature; who is constantly urging us to battle, and who has not courage, ability, or capacity to risk a hair of his own head. You think of that, and when you have found such a man, you have found one of the most miserable wretches who crawls. That is one class. There is another. They who are constantly denouncing us if we say a word for peace and Union. If you ask these men to turn their pockets inside out, you will find them stuffed with "greenbacks," the spoils of your industry and mine. They want war because it means power and spoils. Of course these patent patriots don't want to end the war. These are the men who find fault with us because we want to restore the Union.

WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS.

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIGN, SELECTED FROM GENERAL McCLELLAN'S WRITINGS.

Our cause must never be abandoned; it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. — *Harrison's Landing Letter.*

We are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. — *Instructions to General Halleck, November* 11, 1861.

You will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 7, 1861.

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrrests on mere suspicion. — *Instructions to General Buell, November* 12, 1861.

Say as little as possible about politics or the negro. — *Instructions to General Burnside, January* 7, 1862.

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing my duty to my country. — *Letter to Secretary Cameron, October*, 1861.

The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, or blood. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a moment. — *Letter to President Lincoln, July* 7, 1862.

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. — *Letter to the President, July* 7, 1862.

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed forces and political organizations. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — *Despatch to General Halleck, August* 30, 1862.

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to professional soldiers. — *General McClellan's Report.*

By pursuing the political course I have always advised, it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. — *General McClellan's Report.*

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. — *General McClellan's Report.*

At such a time as this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks only of the good of the whole country. — *General McClellan's West Point Oration.*

A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. — *Harrison's Bar Letter.*

MARK THE CONTRAST.

DEMOCRATIC PRICES.		ABOLITION PRICES.	
Groceries.			
Teas	45a50c per lb.	Teas	$1 00a$2 50
Sugars	8 9c "	Sugars	20 30
Coffees	14 16c "	Coffees	65
Nutmegs	50 55c "	Nutmegs	$2 00
Pepper	8 9c "	Pepper	65
Allspice	6 8c "	Allspice	50
Cinnamon	20 22c "	Cinnamon	$1 00
Dry Goods — Domestic.			
Brown Sheetings	8½c per yd.	Brown Sheetings	65c per yd.
Prints, Calicoes, etc.	5½c "	Prints, Calicoes, etc.	40c "
Bleached Muslins	5½c "	Bleached Muslins	75c "
Canton Flannels	10c "	Canton Flannels	90c "
Foreign.			
Delaines	15½c per yd.	Delaines	75c per yd.
Dress Goods	25c "	Dress Goods	80c "
Velvets	$2 50c "	Velvets	$12 00c "
Raw Cotton, Etc.			
Cotton Laps	18c per lb.	Cotton Laps	$1 75 per lb.
Wadding	40c "	Wadding	2 20 "
Carpet Chain	20c "	Carpet Chain	1 10 "
Lamp Wick	20c "	Lamp Wick	1 50 "
Metals, Etc.			
Lead	6c per lb.	Lead	32c per lb.
Antimony	13c "	Antimony	75c "
Block Tin	31c "	Block Tin	90c "

Coal,

Of which the poor man's fire consumes as much as that which blazes in the rich man's fire — in former days could be had for *four or five dollars;* it now costs *fourteen and fifteen dollars.*

Cloths.

Satinets	45a50c per yd	$1 76 per yd.

Broadcloths, Cassimeres, etc., have increased from 106 to 150 per cent.

DRUGS have increased in price on an average of 200 per cent.

TOBACCO — Manufactured Cavendish Tobacco has risen from 35 cents to $1 25 per pound.

CIGARS have advanced from $20 to $60 and $200 per thousand.

FOREIGN STATIONERY, since the scarcity of specie, has risen 50 per cent.

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